Relevant bibliographies by topics / Information contracts

Academic literature on the topic 'Information contracts'

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Published: 14 March 2023

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Journal articles on the topic "Information contracts"

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Brunjes, Benjamin M. "Reducing risk and leveraging markets: The impact of financial structure on federal contractor performance." Journal of Strategic Contracting and Negotiation 4, no. 1-2 (March 2018): 6–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2055563619858613.

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This paper analyzes how financial controls, as established through the payment structure, are used and whether they influence federal contractor performance. These payment structures include variants on three primary types of contract: firm fixed-price, cost-reimbursement, and time-and-materials. Each of these payment structures creates different performance incentives for contractors, provides government contract managers with varying levels of information on contractor activities, and alters the dispersion of risk between the partners. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) prefers fixed-price contracts whenever possible, as they theoretically place the risk on the contractor, who is required to finish the work for the allocated price. Based on an analysis of nearly 25,000 federal definitive contracts that concluded between 2005 and 2014, findings indicate federal contracting officials tend to use payment structures in expected ways: to limit exposure to risk, leverage market forces, and reduce transaction costs when possible. Findings also show that there are important performance differences between contracts that use different financial structures, even when accounting for information asymmetries, asset specificity, and the complexity of the contracted work. Cost-reimbursement contracts are highly correlated with early contract termination.
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Carmichael, David G., and John P. Karantonis. "Construction contracts with conversion capability: a way forward." Journal of Financial Management of Property and Construction 20, no. 2 (August 3, 2015): 132–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jfmpc-10-2014-0022.

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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to explore the role and viability of changing contract terms as a project progresses and to offer an original analysis in this respect. Commonly, projects start out with broadly defined information, and this gets refined as the project progresses. This suggests that a prudent approach would be to tailor the contract between the project owner and the project contractor to the project stage, with conversions along the way. Information asymmetry between owner and contractor also suggests the need to tailor a contract to a project ' s situation. Design/methodology/approach – An original method of analysis of the conversion of contract terms within projects is given, along with discussion on the risk transfer between owner and contractor, the common law issues associated with implementing such conversions, any compensation that the owner might need to pay, the timing of the conversion and associated practical implementation issues. The paper, for definiteness, concentrates on construction contracts with conversion between payment types, but the paper’s approach applies to all contracts and all terms within contracts. Findings – The paper provides a readily usable method for analysing the value of having a convertible contract, couched within acceptable common law practice. Practical implications – The paper offers a novel method and framework usable by practitioners for establishing the value of convertibility within a contract. Having convertibility within a contract can be shown to offer benefits to both contracting parties. Originality/value – The idea of having flexible contracts is not new, but, hitherto, a rational method of analysing their value has been missing. This paper gives an original analysis of contracts with conversion capabilities. Current literature does not deal directly with the matter addressed in the paper.
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Tauqeer, Amar, Anelia Kurteva, Tek Raj Chhetri, Albin Ahmeti, and Anna Fensel. "Automated GDPR Contract Compliance Verification Using Knowledge Graphs." Information 13, no. 10 (September 24, 2022): 447. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/info13100447.

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In the past few years, the main research efforts regarding General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)-compliant data sharing have been focused primarily on informed consent (one of the six GDPR lawful bases for data processing). In cases such as Business-to-Business (B2B) and Business-to-Consumer (B2C) data sharing, when consent might not be enough, many small and medium enterprises (SMEs) still depend on contracts—a GDPR basis that is often overlooked due to its complexity. The contract’s lifecycle comprises many stages (e.g., drafting, negotiation, and signing) that must be executed in compliance with GDPR. Despite the active research efforts on digital contracts, contract-based GDPR compliance and challenges such as contract interoperability have not been sufficiently elaborated on yet. Since knowledge graphs and ontologies provide interoperability and support knowledge discovery, we propose and develop a knowledge graph-based tool for GDPR contract compliance verification (CCV). It binds GDPR’s legal basis to data sharing contracts. In addition, we conducted a performance evaluation in terms of execution time and test cases to validate CCV’s correctness in determining the overhead and applicability of the proposed tool in smart city and insurance application scenarios. The evaluation results and the correctness of the CCV tool demonstrate the tool’s practicability for deployment in the real world with minimum overhead.
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Sigalov, Katharina, Xuling Ye, Markus König, Philipp Hagedorn, Florian Blum, Benedikt Severin, Michael Hettmer, Philipp Hückinghaus, Jens Wölkerling, and Dominik Groß. "Automated Payment and Contract Management in the Construction Industry by Integrating Building Information Modeling and Blockchain-Based Smart Contracts." Applied Sciences 11, no. 16 (August 20, 2021): 7653. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/app11167653.

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Construction projects usually involve signing various contracts with specific billing procedures. In practice, dealing with complex contract structures causes significant problems, especially with regard to timely payment and guaranteed cash flow. Furthermore, a lack of transparency leads to a loss of trust. As a result, late or non-payment is a common problem in the construction industry. This paper presents the concept of implementing smart contracts for automated, transparent, and traceable payment processing for construction projects. Automated billing is achieved by combining Building Information Modeling (BIM) approaches with blockchain-based smart contracts. Thereby, parts of traditional construction contracts are transferred to a smart contract. The smart contract is set up using digital BIM-based tender documents and contains all of the relevant data for financial transactions. Once the contracted construction work has been accepted by the client, payments can be made automatically via authorized financial institutions. This paper describes the framework, referred to as BIMcontracts, the container-based data exchange, and the digital contract management workflow. It discusses the industry-specific requirements for blockchain and data storage and explains which technical and software architectural decisions were made. A case study is used to demonstrate the current implementation of the concept.
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Xiong, Wei, and Yangcheng Hu. "Delegate contract signing mechanism based on smart contract." PLOS ONE 17, no. 8 (August 19, 2022): e0273424. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0273424.

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In this paper, a delegate contract signing solution is proposed to eliminate the potential risk of contract fraud caused by information and interest asymmetry. By utilizing the functional properties of the Ethereum blockchain and smart contracts, a delegate contract signing mechanism is established. By running the mechanism, the delegate contract signing information is received and processed, and the information is broadcast to the blockchain network nodes. By designing the algorithms of "requesting contract signing", "successful contract signing" and "contract fraud dispute resolution", the delegate contract signing is realized. By proposing algorithms and their calling processes, the smart contracts are completed. Finally, the smart contracts based on the solution are tested and verified. The source code of the smart contracts has been published on GitHub.
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Filatova, Nataliia. "Smart contracts from the contract law perspective: outlining new regulative strategies." International Journal of Law and Information Technology 28, no. 3 (2020): 217–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ijlit/eaaa015.

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Abstract Smart contracts nowadays start being widely used in various areas of economic and social life. In most cases smart contracts are somehow related to legal contracts: the former may constitute part of a legal contract, an entire contract, or be used to automate a contract performance. Meanwhile, a question whether modern contract law is applicable to smart contracts is rather debatable, since smart contracts initially were designed to rely only on technical rules embedded in blockchain and considered as self-sufficient instruments capable of addressing various issues which may emerge in practice. However, practice has shown that technical regulation does not often cope with the problems one may face when using smart contracts, which confirms the need for legal regulation. Although smart contracts have many technical peculiarities, they do not make application of contract law provisions totally impossible. Thus, what the modern contract law needs is a set of special rules applicable to the practice of smart contracting.
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Corbett, Charles J., Deming Zhou, and Christopher S. Tang. "Designing Supply Contracts: Contract Type and Information Asymmetry." Management Science 50, no. 4 (April 2004): 550–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1030.0173.

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Tang, Chunhua, Huiyuan Zhang, and Jiamuyan Xie. "Optimal Contract Design in Contract Farming under Asymmetric Effort Information." Sustainability 14, no. 22 (November 13, 2022): 15000. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su142215000.

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This paper studies the contract design, optimal financing, and pricing decision of the leading agricultural enterprise when the level of effort of the farmer is private information. We use buyer direct finance and add agricultural income insurance to transfer risks to overcome the farmer’s loan difficulty and contract default caused by information asymmetry. We design four kinds of contracts, including the uninsured and symmetric information contract (SN contract), the uninsured and asymmetric information contract (AN contract), the insured and symmetric information contract (SY contract), and the insured and asymmetric information contract (AY contract). Through comparative analysis of the different types of contracts, several results are obtained. First, when there is no insurance, supervision of the leading enterprise can improve the farmer’s level of effort; but supervision costs are incurred, and incentive contracts can avoid the farmer’s moral hazard. Second, agricultural income insurance improves the farmer’s level of effort when information is asymmetric, which transfers risks and saves costs for all the game participants. Third, the leading enterprise prefers an asymmetric information contract and the farmer prefers AN contract when the probability of loan repayment is high.
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Wu, Yong, Giri Kumar Tayi, Genzhong Feng, and Richard Y. K. Fung. "Managing Information Security Outsourcing in a Dynamic Cooperation Environment." Journal of the Association for Information Systems 22, no. 3 (2021): 827–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.17705/1jais.00681.

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To efficiently manage information security, firms typically outsource part of their security functions to a managed security service provider (MSSP) under a variety of contractual arrangements. Based on this practice, we study a business setting in which the management of security outsourcing depends on the security efforts of both the MSSP and its clients, taking into account that their allocation of efforts can change during the contract horizon. Since their efforts are private to each other, a double moral hazard (DMH) problem can arise with the use of bilateral refund contracts, which have been widely adopted in the MSSP industry. Moreover, both the high probability of undirected attacks and system interdependency can exacerbate the DMH problem. We propose two new types of contracts to solve this problem. One is a monitoring contract, in which a cyberinsurance firm monitors the security efforts of the MSSP and its clients. The other is a liability contract, in which both parties take full liability for breaches through rewarding clients who are well protected and penalizing clients who end up being breached by hackers. Our findings show that monitoring contracts can only solve the DMH problem when variable monitoring costs are negligible. Liability contracts can also solve the DMH problem and are worth implementing when an MSSP encounters (1) a high probability of undirected attack, (2) high system interdependency, (3) a long contract horizon, or (4) when both parties have nearly equal responsibility over the course of the contract horizon. We also compare the proposed contracts in two additional settings: when the MSSP has a spillover effect and when the MSSP serves three or more clients.
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Benamraoui, Abdelhafid, and Yousef Alwardat. "Asymmetric Information and Islamic Financial Contracts." International Journal of Economics and Finance 11, no. 1 (December 15, 2018): 96. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/ijef.v11n1p96.

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This research paper aims to examine the relevance of asymmetric information to the two main financial contracts used by Islamic banks or conventional banks with Islamic windows, mudaraba and musharaka. We use theoretical proofs to explain how asymmetric information affects mudaraba and musharaka contract in terms of bank cost and yield and how to account for the adverse selection and moral hazard costs when calculating bank net profit or loss. We also provide suggestions supported by key modern theories including signalling, comparative advantage and incentives to resolve asymmetric information problems in the Islamic financial contracts. The research paper shows that asymmetric information is relevant to both mudaraba and musharaka contracts and directly affects Islamic banks and conventional banks with Islamic windows cost and yield. The paper also reveals that signalling and incentives are effective tools to deal with asymmetric information in Islamic financial contracts. Finally, the paper shows that Islamic finance providers need to opt for more secure financing, particularly with small borrowers.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Information contracts"

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Zeng, Shuo. "Topics of Principal-Agent Contracts: Contract Analysis and Pooling Principals." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/577498.

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Consider companies who rely on revenue generating equipment that fails from time to time. Assume that a company owns one unit of equipment, whose maintenance and repair services are outsourced to a qualified service provider. We assume that the company (the principal) outsources the maintenance and repair services using performance based contracts. Such contractual relationships fall into economics' principal-agent framework. The owners of the revenue generating units are referred to as principals, and the service provider as the agent. We address the following questions: What are the optimal contracting strategies for a principal and an agent? Can the agent benefit from pooling the service demands from multiple principals? This dissertation contains two main bodies of work contained in chapters 2-7 and chapters 8-13 respectively. In the first part of this dissertation (chapters 2-7) we examine the contractual options between a single principal and a single agent. The contractual options of a principal and an agent are modeled as a Markov process with an undetermined time horizon. For a risk neutral principal we identify the conditions under which a principal contracts with a risk-neutral, risk-averse, or risk-seeking agent and derive the principal's optimal offer and the agent's service capacity response. In essence, we provide an extensive formulating analysis of principal-agent contracts given any exogenous parameter values. That is, we derive mathematical formulas for the optimal contract offers and the agent's optimal service capacity. It turns out that a small number of formulas cover a large spectrum of principal-agent conditions. In the second part of this dissertation (chapters 8-13), in a counter distinction to the vast literature in economics on principal-agent contractual interplay and its predominant concern with the principal, here we focus on the agent. In the case of performance based service contracts it is known that the principal extracts all the economic surplus and the agent breaks even. But this is not the case for an agent of good standing contracting with multiple principals. We show that an agent who contracts a collection of principals with interdependent failure characteristics does better than break-even - such an agent realizes a profit rate that is convexly increasing in the number of principals. The corresponding cooperative game assessing each principal's contribution to the agent's profit is convex and its easily computable Louderback's value seems always to be in its core. In chapter 14 we present the outline of a future study that compares several different options of contract structure faced by the principal and the agent, because the optimal contracting strategies for the principal and the agent may not necessarily be the same under different contract structures. We discuss briefly the agent's and the principal's behavior under different forms of performance based contract, which serves as a starting point for future extensions of this dissertation. To summarize, this dissertation provides practical mathematical results and important managerial insights into the principal-agent contract in equipment repair services industry.
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Reiche, Sonje. "Contract renegotiation under asymmetric information : on the foundations of incomplete contracts." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2001. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/1634/.

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The dissertation explores the effect of limited contractual commitment on the form of contracts and studies its welfare implications. The main focus is on foundations of incomplete contracts. The thesis studies to what extent incompleteness of contracts can be linked to contract renegotiation. Particular emphasis is put onto explaining the absence of a contract from a relationship. Chapter 1 reviews the literature on contract renegotiation and incomplete contracting. Chapter 2 is based on a version of the hold-up problem. It shows that contracts that are vulnerable to renegotiation cannot provide better investment incentives than no contract. The main driving force is that investment, although beneficial from a total surplus point of view, has an ambivalent effect on the investing party's payoff. It increases the benefit of an efficient action and decreases the benefit of an inefficient action. An example is investment into human capital, such as additional job training. It increases personal satisfaction in a challenging job but may also increase the frustration from a job that consists only of repetitive tasks. If an exact job description is not feasible ex-ante and if the non-investing party has all the bargaining power ex-post, contracts cannot compensate for the cost of investment. Chapter 3 formalizes the intuition that contracting involves a cost because a contract constitutes a less flexible status quo for ex-post bargaining than no contract. For this, asymmetric information is introduced. With asymmetric information contracting is potentially costly because an inefficient outcome is not necessarily undone by an ex-post bargain. For example, during the renegotiation of the contract between General Motors and Fisher Body, the latter adopted a cost intensive production technology in order to convince its partner to renege on the former agreement. In the model of this chapter, parties weigh the benefit of a contract against lost flexibility. If these effects are similar, no contract is written. The possibility that a contract might be strictly dominated by no contract is explored in chapters 4 and 5. Such a strict dominance result is interesting because it is a more forceful advocate for the incomplete contract assumption. Chapter 4 contains a version of the durable good monopoly model with no discounting but costly contracting. These could be writing or legal costs. Early contracting is less costly than late contracting which highlights the idea that bargaining at a deadline is more costly. But also, early contracting suffers from the ratchet effect because it releases information. The main result says that the costs of the ratchet effect outweigh the cost savings, even if initial contracting costs are of order of magnitude smaller than late contracting costs. The seller strictly prefers to offer no contract. In chapter 5, a sequential screening model endogenizes the fixed contracting cost. The buyer is privately informed about one part of the good's value but ignores the second part, which is revealed later. Early contracting is beneficial because it suffers less from asymmetric information than does late contracting. Nevertheless, if uncertainty with respect to the first variable is greater than uncertainty with respect to the second variable, the seller cannot take advantage of this fact and he strictly prefers to wait. Moreover, if this is not the case, contracts are partially incomplete because they are not conditioned on the second variable. Finally, the thesis reports the new effect that all contracts are renegotiated in equilibrium. This is in contrast to the renegotiation proofness principle, which states that in models of contracting with renegotiation one can restrict attention to renegotiation proof contracts.
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Levin, Jonathan David 1972. "Relational contracts, incentives and information." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1999. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/9520.

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Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, c1999.
Includes bibliographical references.
Chapter 1: I study the design and functioning of self-enforcing incentive contracts under imperfect observability, using a model of repeated agency that allows for both common and private performance monitoring. When performance measures are mutually observed, optimal relational agreements always keep the parties on the Pareto frontier. When performance measures are privately observed, self-enforcing agreements involve the possibility of separation on the equilibrium path, but optimal contracts still take a basic "termination" form. Using these results, one can view optimal long-term contracts as the solution to a static optimization problem. I use this static program to describe the shape of optimal contracts and the nature of second-best inefficiencies. Under standard conditions, optimal moral hazard contracts are "one-step" - a fixed discretionary transfer is made to the agent any time performance is above some cut-off. Hidden information contracts are also characterized and it is shown that optimal contracts call for effort distortion by all types. Chapter 2: This chapter considers self-enforcing relational contracts between a firm and many agents. Even when contracting opportunities are technologically independent, firms will benefit from reaching multilateral contracts that link their transactional arrangements. Optimal multilateral contracts equalize the shadow cost of incentive constraints on each relationship, something bilateral contracts will generally fail to do. I derive some novel implications for asset ownership and ex ante investment, and consider ways in which firms might be able to use existing relationships as "leverage" in reaching new agreements. I also investigate conditions under which firms might want to refrain from multilateral contracting and conduct relationships separately - this may be the case if firm is concerned about a breakdown in one relationship acting as a catalyst that brings down others. The results are applied to discuss two-tier workforce arrangements, supplier associations and the prevalence of diversified business groups in developing countries. Chapter 3: A seminal theorem due to Blackwell (1951) shows that every Bayesian decision-maker prefers an informative signal Y to another signal X if and only if Y is statistically sufficient for X. Sufficiency is an unduly strong requirement in most economic!'problems because it does not incorporate any structure the model might impose. This chapter develops a general theory of information that allows a characterization of the information preferences of decision-makers based on how their marginal returns to acting vary with the underlying (unknown) state of the world. The analysis focuses on "monotone decision problems," in which all decision-makers in the relevant class choose higher actions when higher values of the signal are realized. This restriction allows a characterization of information preferences in terms of stochastic dominance orders over distributions of posterior beliefs. Conditions are also given under which one decision-maker has a higher marginal value of information than another decision-maker, and thus will acquire more information. The results are applied to oligopoly models, labor markets with adverse selection, hiring problems, and a coordination game. (This chapter is co-authored with Susan Athey.) Chapter 4: This chapter revisits Akerlof's classic adverse selection market and asks the following question: do greater information asymmetries reduce the gains from trade? Perhaps surprisingly, the answer is no. Greater asymmetries worsen the "buyer's curse," thus lowering the demand curve, but may shift the supply curve as well. Whether trade increases or decreases depends on where the information impacts the market. A characterization is given for the case of partition information and then for the general case using a definition of information formulated in the previous chapter.
by Jonathan David Levin.
Ph.D.
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Cuthbert, Rachel Catherine. "The information requirements for complex engineering service contracts." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2013. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.648305.

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Khalil, Fahad Ahmed. "Essays on information gathering in principal-agent contracts." Diss., Virginia Tech, 1991. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/37236.

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This dissertation is a collection of essays on principal-agent contracts under asymmetry of information. The papers investigate how the possibility of acquiring information influences contracts. The first essay analyzes the contract between a principal and an agent, when the principal can conduct an audit of the agent's cost of production. The principal can choose an audit policy after output is produced - but he cannot commit to an audit policy at the beginning. The probability of audit is a best reply to the agent's probability of misreporting given the contract. The interaction between the contract, the audit strategy and the reporting strategy is analyzed. The main result obtained is that, when the cost of production is high the optimal contract requires the agent to produce an amount greater than the output under full information. The principal audits randomly and truthful cost announcements cannot be induced with certainty. It is also shown that the principal audits with a higher probability when he cannot commit as compared to when he can. The second essay considers an effort monitoring problem. It analyzes the contract the principal will offer an agent when the monitoring strategy cannot be committed to. Given the contract, the monitoring strategy is a best reply to the agent's effort strategy. The interaction between the contract, the monitoring strategy and the effort strategy is analyzed. The source of the principal's gain from monitoring is explained. It is shown that the wage payments to the agent may be decreasing in the outcome of the agent's effort. The third essay endogenizes the amount of information the agent will rely on when deciding whether or not to accept the contract. By incurring an observation cost, the agent can observe the state of nature after the contract is offered. If he does so he will be able to turn it down whenever his payoff is negative. It is shown that the principal will always find it in his best interest to offer a contract such that the agent has no incentive to use his ability to observe the state of nature. Furthermore. an increase in the cost of observation is very valuable to the principal. The paper also looks at the case in which the principal is allowed to put several agents in competition for the contract. It is shown that, though the principal has monopoly power and can force the single agent to his reservation utility, having several agents compete for the contract increases the principal's payoff.
Ph. D.
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Isabar, Diyala, and Hansson Björn Aurell. "Preventing Interference in Smart Contracts." Thesis, KTH, Skolan för elektroteknik och datavetenskap (EECS), 2019. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-255159.

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Smart contracts are a new form of contracts that handle transactions of economical value between users on a network, without the need for a middle man. This is possible as the integrity of the transactions are ensured using Blockchain technology. However, safe transactions are not always a guarantee as secure smart contracts can be difficult to write. Security vulnerabilities in smart contracts can be exploited and result in great financial losses for contract users. In this report we examine how interference can be counteracted in transactions involving smart contracts. This is to ensure that assets of economical value do not run the risk of disappearing and that the flow of information between smart contracts remains truthful. The term "interference" is coined precisely in relation to smart contracts. Moreover, two different solutions for two interference problems are examined, which mainly involve locking the access to certain functions for specific contracts so that no modification of the state of one contract can take place until a transaction is finished. The methods for counteracting interference in the transactions work, but the solutions are adapted to the specific pr blems and do not serve as a "general" solution to the problem of interference.
Smarta kontrakt är en ny form av kontrakt som används för att utfärda ekonomiska transaktioner utan någon mellanman eftersom att transaktionernas integritet säkerställs med hjälp av Blockchain-teknologi. Detta säkerställer dock inte alltid säkra transaktioner eftersom det kan vara svårt att skriva säkra smarta kontrakt. Säkerhetsproblem i smarta kontrakt kan utnyttjas och orsaka stora ekonomiska förluster för kontraktanvändarna. I denna rapport undersöker vi hur störningar kan motverkas i transaktioner som involverar sådana smarta kontrakt. Detta för säkerställa att tillgångar av ekonomiskt värde inte riskerar att försvinna och att informationsflödet mellan smarta kontrakt förblir sanningsenligt. Termen störningdefinieras precist i förhållande till smarta kontrakt. Därefter undersöks två olika lösningar till de olika störningsproblemen, som huvudsakligen involverar att låsa tillgången till vissa funktioner för vissa kontrakt så att ingen modifikation av tillstånd kan ske tills dess att transaktionerna avslutats. Metoderna för att motverka störningar i transaktionerna fungerar men dessa lösningar är anpassade till de specifika prob emen och fungerade inte som en allmän lösning på störningsproblematiken.
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Banerjee, Anindya. "Information and contracts : a study of principal-agent relationships." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1987. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:62b32d23-b43f-4a1a-a4e0-8185e3104ecd.

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This thesis is concentrated broadly in the field of mathematical industrial economics and more specifically upon what is known in the literature as principal-agent relationships. It focuses on investigating the nature of optimal contracts between, say, owners of the firm and the manager appointed by them to run the affairs of the firm or yet again between the owners and the workers employed in the firm. Chapter 1 introduces by first establishing the background of the analysis and then summarising the results of the thesis. The background consists mainly of implicit contract models, both of the symmetric and asymmetric information kind, and models of moral-hazard. The results of the thesis are contained in four chapters following the introduction. Chapters 2 and 3 are concerned primarily with the use made of principal agent models in the asymmetric-information implicit contract literature. This literature attempts to explain involuntary unemployment by showing that the inefficiency generated by the asymmetry in information between the principal (firm) and the workers (agent) manifests itself in employment lower than the efficient level. We show instead that results are altered in quite striking ways depending not only on the eventual asymmetry of information but also the asymmetry prevailing, say, when the agent takes his action, but before production occurs. Chapter 4 makes the case in favour of using the first-order approach in solving principal-agent models by proposing a weakening of the sufficient conditions which make this approach valid. Such weakening extends the range of cases - given by particular configurations of utility and density functions - for which the analytical convenience of the first-order approach may be utilised. Chapter 5 uses moral-hazard models and the first-order approach to answer the specific question "Should owner-managed firms with limited liability be taxed a higher rate than similar firms with unlimited liability?". The answer is "Yes, but only under certain conditions". Chapter 6 summarises and draws together the various strands of the arguments presented in the thesis.
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Litterscheid, Sina [Verfasser]. "Essays on Contracts, Mechanisms and Information Revelation / Sina Litterscheid." Bonn : Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Bonn, 2014. http://d-nb.info/1077266731/34.

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Ozcan, Fatma Rana. "Category-Based Analysis of Smart Contracts." University of Cincinnati / OhioLINK, 2019. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ucin1563872670303612.

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Bergquist, Jonatan. "Blockchain Technology and Smart Contracts: Privacy-preserving Tools." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Avdelningen för datalogi, 2017. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-323826.

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The purpose of this Master's thesis is to explore blockchain technology and smart contracts as a way of building privacy-sensitive applications. The main focus is on a medication plan containing prescriptions, built on a blockchain system of smart contracts. This is an example use case, but the results can be transferred to other ones where sensitive data is being shared and a proof of validity or authentication is needed. First the problem is presented, why medication plans are in need of digitalisation and why blockchain technology is a fitting technology for implementing such an application. Then blockchain technology is explained, since it is a very new and relatively unfamiliar IT construct. Thereafter, a design is proposed for solving the problem. A system of smart contracts was built to prove how such an application can be built, and suggested guidelines for how a blockchain system should be designed to fulfil the requirements that were defined. Finally, a discussion is held regarding the applicability of different blockchain designs to the problem of privacy-handling applications.
Syftet med detta examensarbete är att utforska blockkedje teknologi och s.k. smarta kontrakt för att bygga applikationer där känslig information hanteras. Huvudsakligen ligger fokus på att utveckla en struktur baserad på blockkedje teknologi och smarta kontrakt för en medikationsplan. Detta är ett typ-exempel för att visa hur en sådan applikation kan byggas, men resultaten kan överföras till andra områden där känslig data delas mellan parter, eller där ett bevis för korrekthet krävs. Först presenteras problemet, varför medikationsplaner behöver digitaliseras och varför blockkedje teknologi är väl anpassat för att implementera en sådan applikation. Sedan förklaras blockkedje teknologi något djupare i detalj, eftersom det är ett relativt nytt koncept. Därefter föreslås en design för att lösa problemet.  Ett system av smarta kontrakt är byggt för att visa hur en medikationsplan kan byggas, och riktlinjer ges för hur ett blockkedje system bör se ut för att stödja systemet av smarta kontrakt. Till slut hålls en kortare diskussion om hur olika blockkedje-designer kan användas för att appliceras på problemet med känslig information.

Presentation held externally at Technical University Munich on the 29-5-2017 10.50.

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Books on the topic "Information contracts"

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Feltham, Gerald A., Amin H. Amershi, and William T. Ziemba, eds. Economic Analysis of Information and Contracts. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1988. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2667-7.

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Nl̲deke, Georg. Unverifiable information, incomplete contracts, and renegotiation. Cambridge, Mass: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1992.

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Schmitz, Patrick. Investment incentives under asymmetric information and incomplete contracts. Aachen: Shaker, 1999.

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Halvey, John K. Information technology outsourcing transactions: Process, strategies, and contracts. New York: Wiley, 1996.

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National Institutes of Health (U.S.). Division of Research Grants. Grants Inquiries Office. Information from the NIH on grants and contracts. Bethesda, Md.?]: Division of Research Grants ... Grants Inquiries, Public Health Service, National Institutes of Health, Department of Health and Human Services, 1986.

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Pemberton, James. Efficient contracts and incentive compatibility with asymmetric information. Reading: University of Reading.Department of Economics, 1988.

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Halvey, John K. Information technology outsourcing transaction: Process, strategies, and contracts. 2nd ed. Somerset, NJ: J. Wiley, 2006.

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United States. General Accounting Office. Health, Education, and Human Services Division. Information on the Davis-Bacon Act. Washington, D.C: The Office, 1996.

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United States. General Accounting Office. Health, Education, and Human Services Division. Information on the Davis-Bacon Act. Washington, D.C: The Office, 1996.

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United States. General Accounting Office. Health, Education, and Human Services Division. Information on the Davis-Bacon Act. Washington, D.C: The Office, 1996.

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Book chapters on the topic "Information contracts"

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Dawson, R. L. "Contracts." In Teacher Information Pack 5: Techniques and Information, 14–21. London: Macmillan Education UK, 1985. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-09005-1_2.

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Suurmond, Coen. "Business, Contracts, Information." In Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing, 3–17. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94214-8_1.

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Azariadis, Costas. "Implicit Contracts." In Allocation, Information and Markets, 132–40. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1989. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20215-7_14.

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Lazear, Edward P. "Incentive Contracts." In Allocation, Information and Markets, 152–62. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1989. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20215-7_16.

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Hart, Oliver. "Incomplete Contracts." In Allocation, Information and Markets, 163–79. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1989. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20215-7_17.

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Shaik, Khader. "Derivatives and Information Technology." In Managing Derivatives Contracts, 355–68. Berkeley, CA: Apress, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4302-6275-6_17.

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Beulen, Erik, and Pieter M. Ribbers. "Transitions and contracts." In Managing Information Technology Outsourcing, 110–42. 3rd ed. London: Routledge, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003223788-7.

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Corbett, Charles J., and Christopher S. Tang. "Designing Supply Contracts: Contract Type and Information Asymmetry." In International Series in Operations Research & Management Science, 269–97. Boston, MA: Springer US, 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-4949-9_9.

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Callea, M., L. Campagna, M. G. Fugini, and P. Plebani. "Contracts for Defining QoS Levels." In Mobile Information Systems, 1–14. Boston, MA: Springer US, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/0-387-22874-8_1.

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Eschenbruch, Klaus, and Jörg L. Bodden. "Integrating BIM in Construction Contracts." In Building Information Modeling, 303–14. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92862-3_17.

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Conference papers on the topic "Information contracts"

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Athamena, Belkacem, Zina Houhamdi, and Ghaleb El Refae. "Retention Contracts under Hidden Information." In 2021 22nd International Arab Conference on Information Technology (ACIT). IEEE, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/acit53391.2021.9677284.

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Ma, Zhonghua. "Trade Credit Contracts under Asymmetric Information." In 2009 International Conference on Wireless Networks and Information Systems (WNIS). IEEE, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/wnis.2009.85.

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Li, Jianing, and Houcai Shen. "Procurement Contracts Under Asymmetric Yield Information." In 2018 15th International Conference on Service Systems and Service Management (ICSSSM). IEEE, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icsssm.2018.8465060.

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Kobayashi, Shinji, and Shigemi Ohba. "Technology licensing contracts and private information." In Technology. IEEE, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/picmet.2009.5261801.

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Iizuka, Kayo, and Chihiro Suematsu. "Psychological Contracts in Business Process Transformation Effect: Structure of Psychological Contracts." In 23rd International Conference on Enterprise Information Systems. SCITEPRESS - Science and Technology Publications, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.5220/0010526304290435.

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Xinhui Wang and Xianyu Wang. "Supply chain contracts with endogenous information structure." In 2010 2nd International Conference on Information Science and Engineering (ICISE). IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icise.2010.5689509.

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Alon, Tal, Ron Lavi, Elisheva S. Shamash, and Inbal Talgam-Cohen. "Incomplete Information VCG Contracts for Common Agency." In EC '21: The 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3465456.3467608.

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Dounas, Theodoros, Wassim Jabi, and Davide Lombardi. "Smart Contracts for Decentralised Building Information Modelling." In eCAADe 2020: Anthropologic : Architecture and Fabrication in the cognitive age. eCAADe, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.52842/conf.ecaade.2020.2.565.

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Papireddygari, Maneesha, and Bo Waggoner. "Contracts with Information Acquisition, via Scoring Rules." In EC '22: The 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3490486.3538261.

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Zhang, Hao, Mahesh Nagarajan, and Greys Sošić. "Dynamic supplier contracts under asymmetric inventory information." In the Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807446.

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Reports on the topic "Information contracts"

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Allen, Julia, Lisa Cunningham, Gary Ford, Barbara Fraser, and John Kochmar. Security for Information Technology Service Contracts. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, January 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada336329.

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DoD Office of Inspector General. Summary Report: DoD Information Technology Contracts Awarded Without Competition Were Generally Justified. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, September 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ad1001815.

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Finkelshtain, Israel, and Tigran Melkonyan. The economics of contracts in the US and Israel agricultures. United States Department of Agriculture, February 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.32747/2008.7695590.bard.

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Research Objectives 1) Reviewing the rich economic literature on contracting and agricultural contracting; 2) Conducting a descriptive comparative study of actual contracting patterns in the U.S. and Israeli agricultural sectors; 3) Theoretical analysis of division of assets ownership, authority allocation and incentives in agricultural production contracts; 4) Theoretical analysis of strategic noncompetitive choice of agricultural production and marketing contracts, 5) Empirical studies of contracting in agricultural sectors of US and Israel, among them the broiler industry, the citrus industry and sugar beet sector. Background Recent decades have witnessed a world-wide increase in the use of agricultural contracts. In both the U.S. and Israel, contracts have become an integral part of production and marketing of many crops, fruits, vegetables and livestock commodities. The increased use of agricultural contracts raises a number of important economic policy questions regarding the optimal design of contracts and their determinants. Even though economists have made a substantial progress in understanding these issues, the theory of contracts and an empirical methodology to analyze contracts are still evolving. Moreover, there is an enormous need for empirical research of contractual relationships. Conclusions In both U.S. and Israel, contracts have become an integral part of production and marketing of many agricultural commodities. In the U.S. more than 40% of the value of agricultural production occurred under either marketing or production contracts. The use of agricultural contracts in Israel is also ubiquitous and reaches close to 60% of the value of agricultural production. In Israel we have found strategic considerations to play a dominant role in the choice of agricultural contracts and may lead to noncompetitive conduct and reduced welfare. In particular, the driving force, leading to consignment based contracts is the strategic effect. Moreover, an increase in the number of contractors will lead to changes in the terms of the contract, an increased competition and payment to farmers and economic surplus. We found that while large integrations lead to more efficient production, they also exploit local monopsonistic power. For the U.S, we have studied in more detail the choice of contract type and factors that affect contracts such as the level of informational asymmetry, the authority structure, and the available quality measurement technology. We have found that assets ownership and decision rights are complements of high-powered incentives. We have also found that the optimal allocation of decision rights, asset ownership and incentives is influenced by: variance of systemic and idiosyncratic shocks, importance (variance) of the parties’ private information, parameters of the production technology, the extent of competition in the upstream and downstream industries. Implications The primary implication of this project is that the use of agricultural production and marketing contracts is growing in both the US and Israeli agricultural sectors, while many important economic policy questions are still open and require further theoretical and empirical research. Moreover, actual contracts that are prevailing in various agricultural sectors seems to be less than optimal and, hence, additional efforts are required to transfer the huge academic know-how in this area to the practitioners. We also found evidence for exploitation of market powers by contactors in various agricultural sectors. This may call for government regulations in the anti-trust area. Another important implication of this project is that in addition to explicit contracts economic outcomes resulting from the interactions between growers and agricultural intermediaries depend on a number of other factors including allocation of decision and ownership rights and implicit contracting. We have developed models to study the interactions between explicit contracts, decision rights, ownership structure, and implicit contracts. These models have been applied to study contractual arrangements in California agriculture and the North American sugarbeet industry.
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Severud, K. J. Project management plan for Contract Management Information System (CONTRACT). Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), January 1995. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/10118756.

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Shah, Ayesha, Jan Olek, and Rebecca S. McDaniel. Real Life Experience with Major Pavement Types. Purdue University, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.5703/1288284317371.

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Pavement performance is a complex issue which depends on many contributing factors. Examining the performance of real-life pavements across the state determines what the actual service lives are for the pavements. For the purposes of this study, only selected LTPP projects were examined, along with a database containing all the historic repair projects completed in Indiana. Pertinent information present in the Indiana Historic Contracts Database was extracted concerning the types of pavement repair and treatments options commonly employed within the state, the time between repairs, etc. These data were used to determine descriptive statistical parameters and was summarized in graph form. Similarly, data about selected LTPP GPS and SPS sites were downloaded from the online website, LTPP InfoPave and a comparative study between companion sites was performed. These data included study site and pavement-related information, such as construction dates, pavement structure details, maintenance and repair history, and pavement distress surveys. These data were used to draw conclusions about the impact of treatment applications, climatic and geologic factors, traffic volume, and pavement structures on pavement performance. Gaps in knowledge about pavement failure modes, distress data, and effectiveness of treatment applications mentioned in the contracts database file hampered efforts to form a complete picture of the effectiveness of treatment options and their timely (or untimely) application. Similarly, details about pavement mixture design and differentiating factors between companion sites prevented researchers from narrowing down the causes leading to the observed pavement distress.
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Crabtree, Donald J. Contract Pricing Handbook PMO Tactical Management Information Systems. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, April 1985. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada156174.

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Schembri, Philip, and Jillian O'Neel. MDMi contract discussion and preliminary information for planning. Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), October 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/1893656.

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Flandreau, Marc, Stefano Pietrosanti, and Carlotta Schuster. Why do Sovereign Borrowers Post Collateral? Evidence from the 19th Century. Institute for New Economic Thinking Working Paper Series, October 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.36687/inetwp167.

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This paper explores the reasons why sovereign borrowers post collateral. Such behavior is paradoxical because conventional interpretations of collateral stress repossession of the assets pledged as the key to securing lenders against information asymmetries and moral hazard. However, repossession is generally difficult in the case of sovereign debt and in some cases impossible. Nevertheless, such sovereign “hypothecations” have a long history and are again becoming very popular today in developing countries. To explain sovereign collateralization, we emphasize an informational channel. Posting collateral produces information on opaque borrowers by displaying borrowers’ behavior and resources. We support this interpretation by examining the hypothecation “mania” of 1849-1875, when sovereigns borrowing in the London Stock Exchange pledged all kinds of intangible revenues. Yet, at that time, sovereign immunity fully protected both sovereigns and their assets and possessions. Still, we show that hypothecations significantly decreased the cost of sovereign debt. To explain how, we stress the pledges’ role in documenting sovereigns’ wealth and the management of revenue streams. Based on an exhaustive library of bond prospectuses collected from primary sources, matched with a panel of sovereign bond yields and an innovative measure of sovereign fiscal transparency, we show that collateral minutely described in debt covenants served to document and monitor sovereign resources and development prospects. Encasing this information in contracts written by lawyers served to certify the quality of the resulting data disclosure process, explaining investors’ readiness to pay a premium.
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Cao, Shoufeng, Uwe Dulleck, Warwick Powell, Charles Turner-Morris, Valeri Natanelov, and Marcus Foth. BeefLedger blockchain-credentialed beef exports to China: Early consumer insights. Queensland University of Technology, May 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.5204/rep.eprints.200267.

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The BeefLedger Export Smart Contracts project is a collaborative research study between BeefLedger Ltd and QUT co-funded by the Food Agility CRC. This project exists to deliver economic value to those involved in the production, export and consumption of Australian beef to China through: (1) reduced information asymmetry; (2) streamlined compliance processes, and; (3) developing and accessing new data-driven value drivers, through the deployment of decentralised ledger technologies and associated governance systems. This report presents early insights from a survey deployed to Chinese consumers in Nov/Dec 2019 exploring attitudes and preferences about blockchain-credentialed beef exports to China. Our results show that most local and foreign consumers were willing to pay more than the reference price for a BeefLedger branded Australian cut and packed Sirloin steak at the same weight. Although considered superior over Chinese processed Australian beef products, the Chinese market were sceptical that the beef they buy was really from Australia, expressing low trust in Australian label and traceability information. Despite lower trust, most survey respondents were willing to pay more for traceability supported Australian beef, potentially because including this information provided an additional sense of safety. Therefore, traceability information should be provided to consumers, as it can add a competitive advantage over products without traceability.
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON DC. Military Standard: Contractor Integrated Technical Information Service (CITIS). Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, August 1993. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada289778.

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