Relevant bibliographies by topics / Informality

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  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Books
  4. Book chapters
  5. Conference papers
  6. Reports

Academic literature on the topic 'Informality'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 18 May 2024

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Journal articles on the topic "Informality"

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Phipps, Patricia M. "Informality." Journal of Learning Disabilities 18, no. 3 (March 1985): 130–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002221948501800303.

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Cirolia, Liza Rose, and Suraya Scheba. "Towards a multi-scalar reading of informality in Delft, South Africa: Weaving the ‘everyday’ with wider structural tracings." Urban Studies 56, no. 3 (March 27, 2018): 594–611. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0042098017753326.

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Informality is a critical theme in urban studies. In recent years, ‘the everyday’ has become a focus of studies on informality in African cities. These studies focus on particularity and place. They offer a useful corrective to top-down and universalising readings which exclude the daily experiences and practices of people from analysis. As we show in this article, everyday studies surface valuable insights, highlighting the agency and precarity which operates at the street level. However, a fuller understanding of informality’s (re)production requires drawing together particularist accounts with wider and more structural tracings. These tracings offer insights into the ways in which state and financial processes influence and interface with the everyday. In this article, we use the case of housing in Delft, a township in Cape Town, to demonstrate this approach and argue for a multi-scalar and relational reading of the production of informality.
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Fradejas-García, Ignacio, Abel Polese, and Fazila Bhimji. "Transnational (Im)mobilities and Informality in Europe." Migration Letters 18, no. 2 (March 25, 2021): 121–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.33182/ml.v18i2.1174.

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People around the globe rely on informal practices to resist, survive, care and relate to each other beyond the control and coercive presence of institutions and states. In the EU, regimes of mobility at multiple scales affect various people on the move who are pushed into informality in order to acquire social mobility while having to combat border regimes, racialization, inequalities, and state bureaucracies. This text explores how mobilities and informality are entangled with one another when it comes to responding to the social, political, and economic inequalities that are produced by border and mobility regimes. Within this frame, the ethnographic articles in this special issue go beyond national borders to connect the production of mobility and informality at multiple interconnected scales, from refugees adapting to settlement bureaucracies locally to transit migrants coping with the selective external borders of the EU, or from transnational entrepreneurs’ ability to move between formal and informal norms to the multiple ways in which transnational mobility informally confronts economic, social and political constraints. In sum, this volume brings together articles on informality and mobility that take account of the elusive practices that deal with the inequalities of mobility and immobility.
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Russo, Francesco Flaviano. "Informality: the Doorstep of the Legal System." Open Economics 1, no. 1 (June 1, 2018): 49–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/openec-2017-0004.

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Abstract Many entrepreneurs work informally because it is costly to start and run a business legally. Using a dynamic model of industry equilibrium, I show that the costs of the legal system can explain the cross country variability of the size of the informal economy. The model implies that the business start-up costs are more important than taxes and labor market regulations. Small, less productive, entrepreneurs, facing high entry costs, start informally, waiting to become more productive before legalizing. Informality is often the doorstep of the legal system.
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Law, Christopher. "“Common Informality”." liquid blackness 6, no. 1 (April 1, 2022): 34–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/26923874-954655.

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Abstract This article explores how two key problems of philosophical aesthetics, temporality and form, are rethought in Fred Moten's consent not to be a single being trilogy. The article proposes that Moten's work is notable for its refusal to affirm a link between aesthetic experience, or aesthesis, and the future-bound possibility of political community. This refusal distinguishes Moten's work both from the political philosophy underlying Immanuel Kant's aesthetics and from the dialectical critique of Kant found in contemporary theoretical work prioritizing formal experimentation. The article contends instead that Moten's work is shaped by a sustained attention to “informal” patterns of aesthetic experience, for which the graphic materiality of writing functions as a privileged index. The article then explores the political and temporal implications of writing's materiality in two essays from Moten's Black and Blur. To pursue this task, it draws on Walter Benjamin's understanding of philological interpolation and argues that Moten's work, particularly in its insistence on “renomination” rather than conceptual creation, can likewise be understood as philological. The article concludes, however, by showing how the idea of linguistic freedom advanced in recent philological work is complicated by Moten's recognition of a link between predication and blackness.
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Varley, Ann. "Postcolonialising informality?" Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 31, no. 1 (2013): 4–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1068/d14410.

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Böröcz, József. "Informality Rules." East European Politics and Societies: and Cultures 14, no. 2 (March 2000): 348–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0888325400014002006.

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Maloney, William F. "Informality Revisited." World Development 32, no. 7 (July 2004): 1159–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2004.01.008.

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Costamagna, Rodrigo, Sandra Idrovo Carlier, and Pedro Mendi. "Initial informality as an obstacle to intellectual capital acquisitions." Journal of Intellectual Capital 20, no. 4 (October 11, 2019): 472–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jic-12-2018-0218.

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Purpose Most developing countries are characterized by large informal sectors. A substantial proportion of firms in these countries began operations in the informal sector, eventually becoming formal. The purpose of this paper is to study whether, after formalization, firms that began operations in the informal sector are more or less likely to use intellectual capital in the form of disembodied technology licensing than firms that began operations in the formal sector. The moderating roles of being a downstream firm, age and the country’s per capita income are also analyzed. Design/methodology/approach The effect of initial informality on the probability of licensing is estimated using firm-level data from the World Bank’s Enterprise Survey, conducted in several Latin American countries in 2006–2017. Findings Formal firms that began informally are less likely to use licensed technology, suggesting the existence of long-run effects of informality. The effect of initial informality is more negative among downstream firms. Research limitations/implications The analysis uses cross-sectional data. Unobservable firm fixed effects could be controlled for using longitudinal data. Practical implications Initial informality affecting the innovation strategies of firms should be considered when designing policies that incentivize formality. Social implications If, in light of the results of this analysis, policies are designed which foster a better allocation of resources, there will be a tangible impact in the lives of many people in developing countries. Originality/value This is the first paper that analyzes the relationship between initial informality status and technology licensing, a relevant channel for the international diffusion of technology.
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WILLIAMS, COLIN C., KWAME ADOM, and IOANA ALEXANDRA HORODNIC. "DETERMINANTS OF THE LEVEL OF INFORMALIZATION OF ENTERPRISES: SOME EVIDENCE FROM ACCRA, GHANA." Journal of Developmental Entrepreneurship 25, no. 01 (March 2020): 2050004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s1084946720500041.

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Based on the recognition that enterprises operate at different levels of informality, this paper evaluates the determinants of their degree of informalization. To do so, a 2016 survey of the varying degrees of informalization of 171 entrepreneurs in Ghana is reported. The finding is that only 21% of enterprises were wholly informal and 16% wholly formal. Nearly two-thirds (63%) were neither wholly informal nor wholly formal. Higher levels of informalization are significantly associated with younger entrepreneurs, those with lower levels of educational attainment, lower household incomes and younger enterprises. It is also significantly associated with the wider institutional compliance environment. Higher levels of informality are present among entrepreneurs unaware of the need for registration, who lack vertical trust (i.e., do not believe the state does anything for them, and perceive there to be public sector corruption), view informality as normal (i.e., a normal practice in their family) and view all similar businesses as operating informally (i.e., lack horizontal trust). The paper concludes by discussing the theoretical and policy implications.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Informality"

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Baez, Morales Antonio. "Three Empirical Essays on Informality." Doctoral thesis, Universitat de Barcelona, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/318156.

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Informality is a very complex subject, with the informal workers we see on the streets as only the surface of larger and more complicated issues. The word "informality," when applied to labour, has negative associations. However, it is necessary to identify the economic agents that make up this sector. In this way, studying informality from different perspectives is one of the most important objectives of this thesis. The thesis focuses its analysis on informal labour and economic units, placing the informality of firms at the centre of the study in two chapters. In this way, two main aspects of informality are studied here: labour informality and business informality. Labour informality is analysed in a macroeconomic context and its relationship with investments. Firm informality is analysed from a micro-firm perspective, which has been largely ignored in the literature, with the measurement of micro-firm informality on a per-state basis within a developing country, Mexico, as another objective. A further objective is to ascertain whether there are differences in efficiency between formal and informal micro-firms. The particular objectives and results are as follows: Chapter 2 examines how informal labor markets affect the flows of FDI, and also whether this effect is similar in developed and developing countries. It highlights for the period of study (1996-2009), and the use of panel econometric models in this kind of researches. The sample is made up 65 countries. In addition, this paper uses a dynamic model as an extension of the analysis to establish whether such an effect exists and what its indicators and significance may be. While the results shows that informal labor markets are significant and do positively affect the flow of FDI, these effects are felt up to a certain level of informality, above which the effect becomes negative. The results are similar for developed and developing countries and are robust to several checks. Chapter 3 analyzes the determinants of micro-firms informality in Mexican states inasmuch as the research for micro firms in a developing country has been less noticeable. In this paper, Mexico is taken as case of study by its high level of micro firm informality and the heterogeneity among Mexican states, but also due to data availability. Panel econometric models are estimated for a sample of 32 states over the period 2008-2012. In addition, this paper uses different definitions of informality to check the robustness of the results. The obtained empirical evidence allows us to conclude that, although, economic factors are the main causes of informality variables such as corruption and education have important role to play. Chapter 4 separates formal and informal micro firms in order to test whether there are efficiency differences between them, and to explain these differences. One of the novelties of the study is the use of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method, which enables an analysis of the differences between both groups of firms after controlling for their different allocation of factors. The empirical evidence suggests that output differences can be explained by endowment characteristics, while efficiency differences are explained by endowment returns. The main variables to explain the gap between the groups are the owner’s level of education, the firm’s age, the owner’s motivations, and financing as well.
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Aleman-Castilla, Benjamin. "Informality and temporary migration in Mexico." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2007. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/2042/.

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This thesis studies two characteristics of the Mexican labour markets; informality and migration to the United States. Chapter 1 studies the impact of NAFTA on informality and wages, the former measured in a reduced form through the fraction of workers without any social or health coverage (unregistered workers). Using data on Mexican and U.S. import tariffs with the Mexican National Survey of Urban Labour (ENEU), I find that reductions in tariffs are related to reductions in unregistered labour. Unregistered labour decreases less in high import-penetration industries and more in export oriented ones. The Mexican tariffs are also negatively related to real wages, while the U.S. tariffs are negatively related to the registered-unregistered wage differentials. Chapter 2 is a joint work with Arturo Ramirez. It uses two Mexican tax reforms to test whether the unregistered sector is sensitive to changes in the tax burden. The first is the 1989 implementation of an asset tax, and the second is the 1999 elimination of accelerated depreciation allowances. The data comes from the ENEU, from which estimates of unregistration are derived; and the Annual Industrial Survey (EIA), from which the differential effects of the 1999 reform on each region and industry are implied. It is found that the response of unregistered labour to changes in taxes is heterogeneous, depending both on the economic sector and the nature of the tax policy. Lastly, chapter 3 studies the effect of temporary migration to the U.S. on labour market outcomes of Mexican workers. It uses panel data from the 1994-2002 ENEU, which is ideal for minimizing self-selection biases common to other sources. Fixed-effects estimation indicates that temporary migrants obtain higher earnings in the U.S. labour market during the period of migration. They also work longer hours and face a higher likelihood of non employment. Finally, the gains from migration are lower for more skilled workers and for those migrating from the most distant regions, relative to the U.S.
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Schipper, Tyler. "Aggregate Consequences of Innovation and Informality." Thesis, University of Oregon, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/1794/18437.

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The fundamental question in development economics is what causes some countries to become more prosperous than others. The literature, starting with Hall and Jones (1999), has identified differences in total factor productivity (TFP) as being the driver of cross-country income differences. I investigate policies that may give rise to these differences in TFP. I pay particular attention to the influence of informal economies in developing countries and how macroeconomic policies can distort firm-level incentives to innovate and operate formally. To address these questions, I construct a series of macroeconomic models which have several common elements. First, I model firm-level decisions with regard to innovation. These firm-level decisions ultimately give rise to differences in productivity across countries. Second, I embrace the role of firm heterogeneity in productivity to examine the dynamics of firm choice. Finally, through the use of computational methods, I simulate these models to evaluate the macroeconomic effects of policy distortions on firm-level decision making. Subject to the common elements above, each chapter answers a specific policy question. Chapter II asks whether size-based tax distortions can generate firm-size distributions often observed in developing countries. I find that a model with innovation and firm-level heterogeneity can explain the prevalence of large firms in response to tax distortions, but additional frictions are necessary to explain the ubiquity of small firms in most developing countries. It also illustrates tax distortions may have little impact on aggregate output while dramatically reducing innovation. Chapter III documents that tax rates can negatively affect growth by inducing firms to participate in the informal sector rather than the formal sector. Finally, Chapter IV shows how tax revenues are affected by changes in tax rates given the provision of a productive public good.
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Sanches, Daniel Rocha. "Informality in labor market and welfare." reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/10438/196.

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Made available in DSpace on 2008-05-13T13:16:46Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2085.pdf: 310650 bytes, checksum: e53999278795b18f7c3903c3beb3cfba (MD5) Previous issue date: 2005-06-10
The neoclassical growth model with two sectors in production is employed in this paper in order to investigate how a change in the tax structure affects informality and welfare. We calibrate and simulate the model and find that welfare always increases when we reduce the tax rate on the demand for labor and adjust the tax rate on the value added so that the government revenue remains constant.
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ULYSSEA, GABRIEL LOPES DE. "INSTITUTIONS AND LABOR MARKET INFORMALITY IN BRAZIL." PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2004. http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=5551@1.

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CONSELHO NACIONAL DE DESENVOLVIMENTO CIENTÍFICO E TECNOLÓGICO
Nos últimos 15 anos, o grau de informalidade no mercado de trabalho brasileiro vem aumentando quase que monotonicamente, tendo permanecido estável nos últimos dois anos em torno de 60% da população economicamente ativa. Este fenômeno impressiona não só pela grandeza como também pela persistência, levando a uma pergunta inevitável: o que está acontecendo e por quê? As instituições do mercado de trabalho são freqüentemente apontadas como uma das principais causas do seu mau funcionamento e argumenta-se que seu desenho inadequado estaria gerando incentivos à informalidade tanto para trabalhadores quanto para empregadores. Este trabalho tem por objetivo contribuir para o debate analisando os efeitos destas instituições sobre o grau de informalidade, desemprego e bem-estar da economia. Para tanto, desenvolve-se um modelo de matching com dois setores - formal e informal - em que firmas e trabalhadores negociam salários (através de uma barganha de Nash) e que incorpora as principais características institucionais do mercado de trabalho brasileiro. O modelo é resolvido numericamente, o que permite realizar experimentos de política não só qualitativos como também quantitativos. A partir dos resultados obtidos com estes exercícios é possível observar que variações nos custos de demissão têm impactos mais significativos sobre o grau de informalidade e desemprego do que reduções no custo não salarial do trabalho. Mostra-se também que a legislação não pode ser responsabilizada pelos elevados diferenciais de salários observados entre trabalhadores dos setores formal e informal. Ao contrário, na ausência de qualquer heterogeneidade entre firmas e empregados, o diferencial unicamente induzido pela legislação é amplamente favorável aos trabalhadores informais. Além da análise formal, é feita também uma revisão da literatura relevante.
In the last 15 years, informality in the Brazilian labor market has been rising steadily, having stabilized in the last two years around 60% of the economically active population. The magnitude of this phenomenon is impressive not only for its intensity but also for its persistence, leading to an inevitable question: what is happening and why? Labor market institutions are usually pointed as one of the main causes of informality and it is frequently argued that their poor design would be generating incentives towards informality both for workers and employers. The objective of this work its to contribute for the debate analyzing the effects of these institutions on the informality degree, unemployment and welfare of the economy. To do so, I develop a matching model with two sectors - formal and informal - where workers and firms negotiate wages (through a Nash bargain) and the main institutional characteristics of the Brazilian labor market are included. The model is numerically solved, what allows investigating not only qualitative but also quantitative effects of policy experiments. From the results obtained with these exercises is possible to observe, for instance, that variations in the dismissal costs have more significant impacts on the informality degree and equilibrium unemployment than reductions in non-wage costs of labor. Besides this formal analysis, a review of the relevant literature and of the Brazilian labor legislation is made.
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Papier, Warren. "Support structures as an approach to informality." Master's thesis, University of Cape Town, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/11427/5589.

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Flochel, Thomas Robert Kenneth Lawrence Arthur. "Essays on rent-seeking, corruption and informality." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/28027.

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This thesis compiles three essays on corruption and informality in the developing world. The first chapter focuses on the industrial organisation effects of favouritism in public procurement in the context of Paraguay. It is the first empirical microeconomic study to illustrate the fact that rent-seeking is costly for development by showing how entrepreneurs' economic incentives are distorted toward unproductive activities as the result of favouritism in the allocation of public contracts in Paraguay. Our findings highlight the importance of tackling corruption by shedding light on some of the large dynamic 'hidden' costs of corruption over and above the static costs of bribery and embezzlement. We find that in Paraguay institutions with an important procurement activity are more likely to engage in corrupt dealings. As for firms, they have a greater probability of obtaining a contract directly through an exceptional procedure from an institution with which they have a strong contractual relation, both in terms of the total value and frequency of transactions, particularly when dealing with more corrupt State entities. Finally firms trading more with the public sector are found to be more profitable, even when controlling for their unobserved characteristics, reflecting the misallocation of talent towards this largely unproductive sector induced by favouritism. Large rents linked to the resale of imported goods to the State and the historical absence of an import-substitution strategy have contributed to make Paraguay one of the least industrialised economies in South America as, apart from the soybean and meat sectors, its entrepreneurs have systematically specialised in commercial intermediation, often with the public sector as sole client, rather than in production. The costs of this productive atrophy and biased specialisation are reflected in the poor record of economic growth. Several policy implications emerge from this chapter. First, whilst the existence of an exceptional purchase mechanism is clearly needed to deal with cases of emergency, it is also important that a mechanism of checks and balances ensure its use remains exceptional. Second, more transparency in the allocation of contracts can be achieved by putting together a registry of State providers, including the names of the firm owners and members of the administration board. Third, the move towards greater transparency also includes better data keeping and diffusion. Provided good quality data, an analysis like this one could assess the state of competition in public contracts more frequently, which could also help to target monitoring efforts. These proposals were put to the Paraguayan government in a report which I wrote for Transparency International (Paraguay) and presented to the newly elected government in September 2008. The second chapter analyses the political economy of labour regulatory enforcement in Brazil. In the context of the empirical political economy literature in Brazil, the analysis reveals that, contrary to other areas of the public sector, the work of the labour inspectorate in Brazil is not subject to political manipulation. I test firstly for electoral cycles in the imposition of labour fines, secondly whether labour regulations are selectively enforced according to political motivations and finally, I assess whether 'pork barrel' strategies are used in order to sway voters. Electoral results are matched with a novel dataset of fines imposed on firms for labour infractions to test these considerations. First, the analysis finds that mayors' and the president's political interests are not significantly correlated with the distribution of fines, neither is the alignment of local politicians with governors or the president. Second, the appointment of a new governor is found to be a highly disruptive event for the inspectorate, as evidenced by the steep rise in the number of fines issues in governors' second term. Third, towns where the governor received strong support in the last election have marginally fewer fines on average. This corroborates the evidence from the institutional analysis of the inspectorate, namely that a key channel for political influence on regulatory enforcement is through the regional inspectorate superintendents who are appointed by the state governors. However fourthly, in contrast with Ferraz (2007)'s findings in the context of environmental regulations in Brazil, the pattern of targeting does not vary significantly along the electoral cycle making it unlikely to be an electoral clientelism strategy. The important reforms in the organisation of the labour inspectorate in Brazil since the mid-1990s to guarantee more autonomy to the inspectors have probably had a positive effect in protecting them from the influence of powerful politicians. In this sense, the significant correlation between governors' political interests and the issuance of fines suggests that the appointment of the regional inspectorate director should also be kept independent of the political preferences of the governor. Nonetheless, the availability of other, more efficient and more effective means to sway voters in Brazil suggests that labour inspections are not so much at risk of clientelistic manipulation. In fact, fiscal transfers have received far more attention in the political economy literature precisely for this reason.Finally, the fourth chapter builds a voting model in a dual sector economy to explain the relation between taxation and informality in cross-country data. Voters in countries with high informality rates tend to vote for lower redistribution and taxation rates. This is explained in the model by the poor quality of institutions in such countries, which cause the relative premium from formalising to be low. The elasticity of formal production to taxation is therefore lower where institutional quality is poor: For a given increase in the tax rate, more individuals will hide in the shadow economy. As a consequence, the welfare maximising tax rate is found to be lower than in countries where there are more benefits from formalising. Moreover, comparative statics on the level of labour productivity show that improvements in institutional quality are more important in countries with a less productive labour force, as they lead to greater increases in redistribution and reductions in the informality share. The model integrates political mechanisms as well as economic features and in doing so shows the non-trivial interaction between informality and policy choice. More attention should be paid to this interaction when studying the determinants of informality, instead of taking policy choice as exogenous. Moreover, this chapter contributes a theoretical framework that is well adapted to studying political economy features of developing countries, where informality is a key characteristic of the economy. Several projects and ideas for further research have germinated from work on this thesis. One in particular focuses on the relationship between informality and corruption, which has drawn increasing amounts of research interest lately. One aspect that has however eluded the literature to date is the impact of informality on voting behaviour. In a democratic setting, I argue that widespread informality weakens the effectiveness of elections as a mechanism for selecting and disciplining politicians, essentially because informal voters receive an imperfect signal on politicians types. This research would contribute to explaining the persistence of corruption alongside widespread informality in much of the developing world.
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Kan, Elif Oznur. "Essays On Informality In The Turkish Labor Market." Phd thesis, METU, 2012. http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/12614491/index.pdf.

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This thesis investigates the nature, extent and dynamics of informal employment in the Turkish labor market using 2006-2009 Turkish Income and Living Conditions Survey. It is mainly a collection of three essays. In the first essay, an attempt is made to analyze the relevance and implications of three alternative characterizations of informality which include an enterprise-based definition associating informality with small firms, an extended enterprise-based definition incorporating social security protection, and a definition based exclusively on social security coverage. Using probit analysis, we show that social security criterion is the best measure given its ability to capture key relationships between individual characteristics and informality. In the second essay, we compute Markov transition probabilities of individuals moving across six labor market states, then estimate multinomial logit regressions to identify underlying dynamics of variant mobility patterns. Confirming traditional theory which sees formal employment as the ultimate desirable state, we find that formal-salaried individuals are the most reluctant to move and that the probability of transition from informal-salaried state to formal-salaried state is five times that of reverse transition. In the third essay, we examine formal/informal employment earnings differentials. OLS estimation of standard Mincerian equations reveals an informal penalty, half of which can be explained by observable characteristics. Moreover, applying fixed effects regressions, we show that unobserved individual fixed effects when combined with controls for observable individual and employment characteristics explain the pay differentials entirely.
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Granström, Ola. "Aid, drugs, and informality : essays in empirical economics." Doctoral thesis, Handelshögskolan i Stockholm, Samhällsekonomi (S), 2008. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hhs:diva-455.

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The first three papers of this Ph.D. thesis experimentally study the preferences of individuals making cross-border charitable donations. In Is Foreign Aid Paternalistic? (with Anna Breman and Felix Masiye) subjects choose whether to make a monetary or a tied transfer (mosquito nets) to an anonymous household in Zambia. The mean donation of mosquito nets differs significantly from zero, and paternalistic donors constitute a higher share of the sample than do purely altruistic donors. The second paper, Corruption and the Case for Tied Aid (with Anna Breman), compares the willingness to give money to Zambia's national health budget (CBoH) with the willingness to donate mosquito nets to a health-care clinic in Lusaka. Donors clearly prefer tied aid to untied program aid. Exit questionnaires suggest the reason to be a fear of corruption and misallocation at the CBoH. In Altruism without Borders? (with Anna Breman), we study whether the willingness to give increase with the information given about the recipients. We find no significant effect of identification on donations. Women and Informality: Evidence from Senegal, the fourth paper (with Elena Bardasi), uses household survey data to study women’s work and gender wage gaps in the formal and informal sector in Dakar. Multinomial logit analysis reveals that women are 3-4 times less likely to work formally rather than informally. Wage regressions reveal that little schooling, for instance, explains a considerable part of the gender wage gap. In the informal sector, however, the wage gap between men and women remains at 28%.    The fifth paper, Does Innovation Pay? A Study of the Pharmaceutical Product Cycle, examines how a drug’s life cycle depends on its degree of therapeutic innovation. All New Chemical Entities introduced in Sweden between 1987 and 2000 are rated into one of three innovation classes: A (important gains); B (modest gains); and C (little gains). Over a 15-year life cycle, the average class A drug raises 15% higher revenues than B drugs and 114% higher revenues than C drugs. But yearly class A and C sales differences are rarely significant. When comparing innovative (A and B pooled) and imitative (C) drugs, 15-year life cycle revenues of innovative drugs exceed those of imitative drugs by 100%. This sales difference is significant in 19 out of 20 years after launch.
Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan i Stockholm, 2008 Sammanfattning jämte 5 uppsatser
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Granström, Ola. "Aid, drugs, and informality : essays in empirical economics /." Stockholm : Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics (EFI), 2008. http://www2.hhs.se/efi/summary/756.htm.

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Books on the topic "Informality"

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Soliman, Ahmed M. Urban Informality. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68988-9.

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Mahoney, William F. Informality revisited. Washington, D.C: Office of the Regional Chief Economist, Latin America and the Caribbean Region, World Bank, 2003.

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University of California, Berkeley. Center for Environmental Design Research and International Association for the Study of Traditional Environments, eds. Urban informality. Berkeley, CA: IASTE, 2018.

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Ferroni, Maria Vittoria, Rossana Galdini, and Giovanni Ruocco, eds. Urban Informality. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29827-1.

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Raimo, Antonino Di, Steffen Lehmann, and Alessandro Melis, eds. Informality through Sustainability. New York : Routledge, 2021. | Series: Earthscan series on sustainable design: Routledge, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429331701.

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Surie, Aditi, and Ursula Huws, eds. Platformization and Informality. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11462-5.

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Marinic, Gregory, and Pablo Meninato, eds. Informality and the City. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-99926-1.

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Maiti, Dibyendu S. Skills, informality, and development. Delhi: Institute of Economic Growth, 2010.

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author, Deaton Lyndsey, Harjoko Triatno Yudo author, University of California, Berkeley. Center for Environmental Design Research, and International Association for the Study of Traditional Environments, eds. Legitimacy, informality, and tradition. Berkeley, CA: IASTE, 2016.

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Guillermo, Perry, ed. Informality: Exit and exclusion. Washington, D.C: World Bank, 2007.

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Book chapters on the topic "Informality"

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Hodder, Rupert. "Informality." In Small Business, Big Society, 31–48. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-8875-9_3.

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Sims, David. "Informality." In Development Delusions and Contradictions, 333–53. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-17770-5_20.

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Elgin, Ceyhun. "Informality." In The Informal Economy, 1–6. Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2020. | Series: Routledge frontiers of political economy: Routledge, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429274930-1.

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Hawkins, Daniel. "Informality." In The Routledge Handbook to the Political Economy and Governance of the Americas, 139–50. Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2020.: Routledge, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781351138444-14.

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Elgin, Ceyhun. "Measuring informality." In The Informal Economy, 18–40. Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2020. | Series: Routledge frontiers of political economy: Routledge, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429274930-3.

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Roy, Ananya. "Urban Informality." In Readings in Planning Theory, 524–39. Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781119084679.ch26.

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Young, Michael. "Episodic Informality." In Reality Modeled after Images, 99–129. New York: Routledge, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003149682-7.

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Chambers, Paul, and Srisompob Jitpiromsri. "Frontline informality." In Pathways for Irregular Forces in Southeast Asia, 135–58. London: Routledge, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003143994-8.

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Carrizosa, María. "Urban informality." In Homes at Work, 9–70. London: Routledge, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003297727-2.

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Soliman, Ahmed M. "Pockets of Urban Informality in Lebanon." In Urban Informality, 295–331. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68988-9_9.

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Conference papers on the topic "Informality"

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Hardstone, Gillian, Mark Hartswood, Rob Procter, Roger Slack, Alex Voss, and Gwyneth Rees. "Supporting informality." In the 2004 ACM conference. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1031607.1031632.

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Chandra, Priyank. "Informality and Invisibility." In CHI '17: CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3025453.3025643.

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Turney, Edmund, Carmen Pérez Sabater, and Begoña Montero Fleta. "Formality and informality in electronic communication." In ExLing 2006: 1st Tutorial and Research Workshop on Experimental Linguistics. ExLing Society, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.36505/exling-2006/01/0054/000054.

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Ajdini, Raimonda. "Trend of Informality in the Meat Product." In 11th international conference on Management, Economics, and Humanities. Acavent, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.33422/11th.icmeh.2021.07.42.

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Bahçe, Abdullah Burhan, and Hatice Dayar. "Dimensions of Informality in Transition Economies and Solutions." In International Conference on Eurasian Economies. Eurasian Economists Association, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.36880/c05.00945.

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In most of the former Soviet economies with the start of transformation, revenue loss and lax payments discipline led to low revenue sharing, as well as inefficient tax collection and tax avoidance is common as a major problem has affected economies in transition. In this study, central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union transition countries experienced in tax payments discipline and collection issues are dealt with and a socialist state transformation to a capitalist state in the transition to a market economy from a centrally planned economy with the sustainability of budgetary constraints between state and market are considered. At this point in particular; simple and flat rate tariff preferred in the tax system have considerably reduced the size of the informal economy in transition economies and also the balance has been achieved in fiscal discipline with performance-based budget preferred in the budget system. As a result, about 25 years of the transition-transformation process stages are evaluated in the context of tax system, budgetary and fiscal discipline.
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Christopher Eaglin, F., and Tommy Pan Fang. "Exploring Boundaries: How Firms Choose Informality in Emerging Markets." In COMPASS '21: ACM SIGCAS Conference on Computing and Sustainable Societies. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3460112.3471941.

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Shen, Lu, and Kwong Wing Chau. "Legal Attitudes Towards Informality on City Levels in China." In 25th Annual European Real Estate Society Conference. European Real Estate Society, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.15396/eres2018_218.

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Adair, Philippe, and Vladimir Hlasny. "LABOUR MARKET SEGMENTATION AND FORMALISING INFORMALITY IN MENA COUNTRIES." In 17th Economics & Finance Conference, Istanbul. International Institute of Social and Economic Sciences, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.20472/efc.2022.017.001.

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Mopangga, Herwin, Ghozali Maski, Multifiah, and Dias Satria. "Does Shadow Economy and Informality Exist in Local Tourism?" In Brawijaya International Conference on Economics, Business and Finance 2021 (BICEBF 2021). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.220128.013.

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Pathirana, H. P. W. P., and J. Munasinghe. "INFORMALITY IN FORMAL SPACES THROUGH SELF ORGANIZATION: A STUDY OF THE PEOPLE’S PROCESSES IN PUTTALAM TOWN IN SRI LANKA." In Beyond sustainability reflections across spaces. Faculty of Architecture Research Unit, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.31705/faru.2021.10.

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Informality is an inevitable ingredient in an urban environment. The ‘formally’ established urban built environments are informally shaped by people for the appropriation of spaces for their activities. Within dominant institutionalized urban planning processes, such informalities are often regarded as ‘nuisances’, ‘out-of-place’, and ‘misfits’ in urban spaces. Yet, informally organized spaces are as important as formal spaces for the vitality, equity, and sustainability of all types of urban environments. People's processes in the creation and operation of informal spaces, resisting, contesting, and negotiating the dominant formal networks, have been the subject of many scholarly works over the last few decades, but a lack of empirical work and informative case studies on the subject has distanced mainstream planners and urban designers from learning and integrating such informal space production into institutionalized urban development processes. In order to mend this gap and reorient the prevalent understanding among planning professionals, a people’s endeavor in Puttalam town in Sri Lanka to form and sustain informal spaces is presented in this paper. The paper elaborates on the ‘self-organizing’ behaviour of the small-scale retail vendors and the day-to-day users of the city to withstand interventions by the authorities on the public market space of the town.
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Reports on the topic "Informality"

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Porta, Rafael La, and Andrei Shleifer. Informality and Development. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, June 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w20205.

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Chong, Alberto E., and Mark Gradstein. Inequality, Institutions, and Informality. Inter-American Development Bank, September 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0010954.

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This paper presents theory and evidence on the determinants of the size of the informal sector. We propose a simple theoretical model in which the informal sector's size is negatively related to institutional quality and positively related to income inequality. These predictions are then empirically validated using different proxies of the size of the informal sector, income inequality, and institutional quality. The results are shown to be robust with respect to a variety of econometric specifications.
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Granda, Catalina, and Franz Alonso Hamann-Salcedo. Informality, saving and wealth inequality. Bogotá, Colombia: Banco de la República, March 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.32468/be.873.

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Bachas, Pierre, Lucie Gadenne, and Anders Jensen. Informality, Consumption Taxes, and Redistribution. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, June 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w27429.

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Jensen, Anders, Lucie Gadenne, and Pierre Bachas. Informality, Consumption Taxes and Redistribution. The IFS, June 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1920/wp.ifs.2020.1420.

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Santos, Cezar. Labor Market Regulation and Informality. Inter-American Development Bank, March 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0004809.

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Developing countries are characterized by a high share of informal workers and several types of labor market regulation. We study the effects of the enforcement of this type of regulation on firm dynamics in Brazil, using different linked administrative data sets. Using a difference-in-differences design, we show that firms caught with informal workers experience a slowdown in their growth rates that last several years. Informal workers are present in firms of all sizes. Formal and informal workers exhibit almost identical observable characteristics.
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Meghir, Costas, Renata Narita, and Jean-Marc Robin. Wages and Informality in Developing Countries. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, August 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w18347.

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Almeida, Rita, and Pedro Carneiro. Enforcement of labor regulation and informality. Institute for Fiscal Studies, September 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1920/wp.cem.2011.2911.

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Robin, Jean-Marc, Costas Meghir, and Renata Narita. Wages and informality in developing countries. Cemmap, March 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1920/wp.cem.2013.0813.

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Meghir, Costas, Renata Narita, and Jean-Marc Robin. Wages and informality in developing countries. Institute for Fiscal Studies, September 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1920/wp.ifs.2012.1216.

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