Journal articles: 'Informal institutions'

1

Azari, Julia R., and Jennifer K. Smith. "Unwritten Rules: Informal Institutions in Established Democracies." Perspectives on Politics 10, no. 1 (March 2012): 37–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1537592711004890.

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Scholars of the developing world have driven a surge of interest in unwritten or informal institutions as determinants of political outcomes. In advanced industrial democracies, by contrast, informal institutions often remain consigned to the analytic margins. This article makes a case for greater attention to informal political institutions in established democracies, and it introduces a theoretical framework to support such analysis. Informal institutions, understood as the unwritten rules of political life, are seen to perform three functions: they complete or fill gaps in formal institutions, coordinate the operation of overlapping (and perhaps clashing) institutions, and operate parallel to formal institutions in regulating political behavior. These three roles of informal institutions are associated with different characteristic patterns of institutional stability and change. The article illustrates its theoretical framework with case studies from American politics, the subfield in which formal-institutional analysis has flourished most. These cases are the historical norm of a two-term presidency (a completing institution), the unwritten rules of the presidential nomination process (coordinating institutions), the informal practice of obstruction in the Senate (a parallel institution), and the normative expectation that presidents should address the public directly (which performs all three functions).

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Wang, Jing, Kai Zhao, Yue Cui, and Hui Cao. "Formal and Informal Institutions in Farmers’ Withdrawal from Rural Homesteads in China: Heterogeneity Analysis Based on the Village Location." Land 11, no. 10 (October 19, 2022): 1844. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/land11101844.

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Withdrawal from rural homesteads (WRH) in China is mainly conducted under the guidance of government and follows the principle of farmers’ voluntary participation, in which both formal and informal institutions play essential roles. However, few studies have systematically analyzed the institutional factors in WRH. By introducing both formal and informal institutions into the analysis framework, the aim of this study was to explore the impacts of formal and informal institutions on farmers’ behavior to WRH, and the interaction between formal and informal institution in different villages. Based on survey data from farmers in Jinzhai, China, this study adopted a binary probit model and factor analysis. (1) The study revealed that farmers’ cognition of homesteads property rights and their trust in village cadres are the key formal institutional factors affecting farmers’ behavior to WRH, and farmers’ social networks, reciprocal norms, and trust in villagers are the key informal institutional factors affecting farmers’ WRH; (2) Both formal and informal institutions promote farmers’ WRH, and informal institutions play a more important role. However, there is no interaction between formal and informal institutions in the whole sample. (3) Furthermore, the effect of formal and informal institutions on farmers’ WRH have the heterogeneity of village location: there is a complementary relationship between formal and informal institutions in farmers’ WRH for villages with a medium proximity to the county seat, and a substitution relationship for villages far away from the county seat. Finally, this study discusses the implications of these findings on the new round of WRH policy.

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Ding, Huang. "An Informal Institutional Analysis of Policy Implementation Hindrances in China." Chinese Public Administration Review 2, no. 1-2 (March 2003): 45–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.22140/cpar.v2i1.2.39.

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As the lever by which public authorities regulate social affairs, public policy must function through its implementation. The effectiveness of policy-implementation is affected by many factors, but it fundamentally depends on the institution. For people's behaviors are governed by institutions, and public policy is implemented by people. According to the theory of New Institutional ism, institutions consist of both formal and informal institutions. Based on the theory's explanation of the constraints placed on people's behavior by informal institutions, this paper will explore how informal institutional factors prevent public policies from effective implementation in China, specifically interpersonal relations and the consideration of faces. We must eliminate the negative impacts of informal institutional factors on policy implementation through enforcing hearings, coordinating policies, publicizing policies, strengthening supervision and bettering ideologies.

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Ding, Huang. "An informal institutional analysis of policy implementation hindrances in China." Chinese Public Administration Review 2, no. 1/2 (November 1, 2016): 45. http://dx.doi.org/10.22140/cpar.v2i1/2.39.

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As the lever by which public authorities regulate social affairs, public policy must function through its implementation. The effectiveness of policy-implementation is affected by many factors, but it fundamentally depends on the institution. For people's behaviors are governed by institutions, and public policy is implemente by people. According to the theory of New Institutionalsim, institutions consist of both formal and informal institutions. Based on the theory's explanation of the constratins placed on people's behavior by informal institutions, this paper will explore how informal institutional factos prevent public policies from effective implemetnation in China, specifically interpersonal relations and the consideration of faces. We must eliminate the negative impacts of informal institutional factors on policy implementation through enforcing hearings, coordinating policies, publicizing policies, strengthening supervision and betterign ideologies.

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5

Waylen, Georgina. "Informal Institutions, Institutional Change, and Gender Equality." Political Research Quarterly 67, no. 1 (November 18, 2013): 212–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1065912913510360.

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Bozhko, Pavlo. "INSTITUTIONAL BUILDING AND ARCHITECTONICS OF POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE INSTITUTIONS." 39, no. 39 (July 10, 2021): 15–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.26565/2220-8089-2021-39-02.

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In the process of modernization, based on the development of the potential of public administration and the growth of social capital, an open type of interaction between the state and society is formed, where institutions act as the necessary conductors of direct and reverse signals within the framework of a flexible political and administrative system. It is pointed out that institution building in order to minimize the risks of falling into institutional traps should take into account the peculiarity of the institutional architecture, which is determined by the hierarchy of formal rules, and provide for the complication of the procedure for changing institutions as their rank grows. Taking into account the hierarchy of rules makes it possible to track the change in the role of formal / informal institutions, when a decrease in the level of the rules of the institutional architecture increases the importance of informal institutions in the management process. It is argued that informal norms play a large role in the functioning of the political market. The state as a subject of management is interested in the formalization of emerging informal practices. The stability and predictability of managerial influences grow when formal institutions absorb informal ones. Two ways of changing the architecture of institutions as a result of such a takeover are considered. The first, administrative-legal way: the gradual consolidation of informal practices as generally recognized in formal institutions, that is, the legalization of informal restrictions.The second way consists naturally in the conditions of a low level of the political and administrative potential of the state: informal practices are embedded in the mechanism of action of formal institutions and destroy them from the inside, creating the effect of subversive institutions, which creates favorable conditions for institutional traps on the way to the formation of political and administrative institutions of modernization. In addition, a situation is possible when formal and informal rules and norms interact as independent (autonomous) entities, and then, as a result, a certain type of institutional environment is formed, which differs in the way of interaction between formal and informal institutions.

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Nikiforov, Petro, Olha Нladchuk, and Sofiia Kucherivska. "FORMAL AND INFORMAL INSURANCE MARKET INSTITUTIONS." INNOVATIVE ECONOMY, no. 5-6 (2021): 105–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.37332/2309-1533.2021.5-6.15.

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Purpose. The purpose of the article is to defining the nature, types, and role of formal and informal insurance market institutions. Methodology of research. The methodological basis of the work has become a systematic approach to the study of the formation and functioning of formal and informal insurance market institutions; as well as a dialectical method of cognition and grouping to determine the types of formal and informal institutions that have formed and ensure the development of insurance relationships. Methods of induction and deduction have been used to generalize the essence and role of insurance market institutions under the provisions of economic theory and insurance business. The differences between formal and informal insurance market institutions have been established by a comparative method. To make theoretical generalizations, to form conclusions from the study, an abstract reasoning method has been used. Findings. The article presents the results of empirical analysis of formal and informal institutions, under the influence of which the insurance market has been formed and is currently functioning. Formal insurance market institutions are clearly defined, regulated by public protection mechanisms, and mandatory for all economic entities involved in the insurance process. Informal insurance market institutions are unwritten and undocumented norms and rules that shape the behaviour of economic entities of the insurance market regarding the creation, purchase and sale, and consumption of insurance services. Both formal and informal insurance market institutions should be divided into basic and specific ones, taking into account the peculiarities of the insurance market and the specifics of insurance relationships. Originality. Given the peculiarities of the insurance business, formal and informal insurance market institutions are clearly distinguished, with their subsequent division into basic and specific ones. Practical value. The results of the study can serve as a basis for further research in this area and will be useful for insurers, supervisory authorities, and other participants in the insurance market in terms of improving the quality of insurance services, identifying areas of the insurance market, and efficiency of its participants, which will increase confidence in the insurance market. Key words: institution, formal institution, informal institution, insurance market, basic insurance market institution, specific insurance market institution.

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Starodubrovskaya, Irina. "Informal institutions and radical ideologies under institutional transformation." Russian Journal of Economics 1, no. 2 (June 2015): 182–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ruje.2015.11.003.

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9

Williamson, Claudia R. "Informal institutions rule: institutional arrangements and economic performance." Public Choice 139, no. 3-4 (February 19, 2009): 371–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9399-x.

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10

Manulak, Michael W. "The Networked Diplomacy of Informal International Institutions." Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations 27, no. 3 (September 29, 2021): 410–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02703006.

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Abstract The rise of informal international institutions has been one of the most significant developments in institutional design and choice since the 1990s. While states have increasingly opted for informal governance, little is known about the character of intergovernmental relations in these settings. Scholars, for instance, debate whether great powers dominate such institutions, or whether influence can be exercised by a wider array of players. Drawing from the author’s experience as a government representative within the Proliferation Security Initiative, a leading informal institution, this article provides a theory-driven analysis of intergovernmental interactions within such bodies. It demonstrates that diplomacy within informal institutions tends to assume a decentralized, networked quality that favors actors positioned at the center of intergovernmental networks. In doing so, the article highlights clear means through which central network positions confer influence. The article also sheds new light on the Proliferation Security Initiative and on counterproliferation cooperation more generally.

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HARRISS-WHITE, BARBARA. "Rethinking Institutions: Innovation and institutional change in India's informal economy." Modern Asian Studies 51, no. 6 (November 2017): 1727–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0026749x16000603.

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AbstractIndia has the largest informal, unregistered economy in the world, infrastructurally backward, yet vital for both growth and livelihoods. In the first section of this article, five economic institutions that shape this economy are introduced: small firms, informality, non-metropolitan towns, innovation and innovation systems, and the state's regulative impact on the economy it does not directly regulate. In the second section, we trace the development of the commodity economy of a South Indian town taken for case study over 40 years, before exploring three kinds of innovation in the third section: invention, adaptive, and adoptive innovation. In the fourth section, the formal and informal institutions that nurture informal innovation are analysed: family business, business associations, banks and finance, informal insurance and gold, hybrid state–private institutions, and informal innovation inside the state. The conclusion confirms the innovative dynamism of the informal economy and the complex pathways of institutional change that both shape, and are shaped by, innovation.

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Chung, Kee Hoon, and DaEun Kim. "Explaining Asian growth paradox through interaction between informal and formal institutions." Asian Education and Development Studies 10, no. 4 (March 10, 2021): 600–614. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/aeds-10-2020-0235.

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PurposeMuch of existing research has attempted to explain Asian Growth Paradox through formal institution – role of the government or rule of law. Therefore, this paper attempts to empirically explain the paradox with informal institution including interaction between informal and formal institutions. Two interrelated research questions summarize this research. First, how can we capture the relationship between informal and formal institutions? Then, how is that relationship different for Asian Paradox states vs non-paradox states?Design/methodology/approachTo capture the relationship between informal and formal institutions, we use Helmke and Levitsky (2004)'s framework to categorize the interaction as complementing, competing, substituting and accommodating. We perform cross-sectional regression analysis for more than 130 countries.FindingsWe find that the developed, developing and the Asian Paradox states display different patterns of interaction between informal and formal institutions. However, we also find that the interaction effect has a limited value explaining growth for most of these countries, suggesting that Helmke and Levitsky (2004)'s framework has limitations. Finally, we challenge the notion of Asian Paradox states, as countries outside of Asia also qualify as the Paradox states.Originality/valueNot much empirical effort has examined how different relationships between informal and formal institutions can explain growth internationally across countries. We show that different institutional patterns explain growth across the Paradox states and non-Paradox states.

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Gevorgyan, Gayane, and Ruben Gevorgyan. "Incorporated opportunistic informal institutions." International Journal of Economics and Business Research 1, no. 1 (2023): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/ijebr.2023.10046499.

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14

Lauth, Hans‐Joachim. "Informal Institutions and Democracy." Democratization 7, no. 4 (December 2000): 21–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510340008403683.

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Rauhut, Daniel. "Integration and Informal Institutions." Society 57, no. 2 (March 11, 2020): 211–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12115-020-00467-6.

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ÖZER, Muhammed Yusuf. "INFORMAL SECTOR AND INSTITUTIONS." Theoretical and Practical Research in the Economic Fields 13, no. 2 (December 31, 2022): 180. http://dx.doi.org/10.14505/tpref.v13.2(26).07.

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In this paper, I investigate the relationship between informal sector size and various institutional quality variables: government stability, external conflict, internal conflict, corruption control, military influence over politics, religious tensions, ethnic tensions, law-and-order, democratic quality, and bureaucratic accountability. To this end, I use annual cross-country panel data covering 130 countries from 1990 to 2018. Having conducted a correlation analysis, the size of informal economy and institutional quality indicators are inversely linked. The most crucial institutional quality determinants are law-and-order (-0.53), bureaucratic quality (-0.51), military in politics (-0.45), corruption control (-0.42), and internal conflict (-0.35).

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Zhang, Mingqiong Mike, Ying Lu, Jiuhua Cherrie Zhu, and Hui Zhou. "Navigating the Web of Informal Institutions When Investing in a Strange Land: Chinese Multinational Enterprises in Australia." American Business Review 23, no. 2 (November 2020): 316–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.37625/abr.23.2.316-334.

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Multinational enterprises (MNEs) need to understand and handle various informal institutions in host countries to survive and succeed. How MNEs effectively manage informal institutional characteristics of host countries is an important question for both practitioners and scholars. This paper addresses this important but neglected topic based on an in-depth longitudinal qualitative study. It identifies some key informal institutions in Australia, examines how such institutional distinctiveness shapes the behaviour of Chinese expatriates and MNEs and how they handle such informal institutional differences between China and Australia. Our findings challenge some taken-for-granted assumptions regarding informal institutions in the literature and demonstrate that informal institutions of host countries significantly shape the behaviour of expatriates and firm-level strategies of MNEs.

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Jiren, Tolera Senbeto, Maraja Riechers, Arvid Bergsten, and Joern Fischer. "A leverage points perspective on institutions for food security in a smallholder-dominated landscape in southwestern Ethiopia." Sustainability Science 16, no. 3 (March 14, 2021): 767–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11625-021-00936-9.

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AbstractDespite concerted efforts, achieving the goal of universal food security remains challenging. Food security interventions occur at different levels of systemic depth. Some interventions target visible supply-side gaps, while others focus on deeper systemic problems in the food system. Here, we used a leverage points perspective to ask how multiple types of more superficial (shallow) and more fundamental (deep) interventions in the food system interact. Focusing on a case study in southwestern Ethiopia, we examined (1) recent changes in formal and informal institutions related to food security; (2) the effects of formal and informal institutions on the food system at different levels of systemic depth (i.e., on parameters, feedbacks, design, and intent); and (3) issues of institutional interplay between formal and informal institutions. We surveyed 150 rural households and analyzed key policy documents. Both formal and informal institutions were perceived to improve food security. However, at the intent level, formal institutions primarily aimed to enhance food supply, while informal institutions additionally sought to build trust among farmers. At the design level, formal interventions targeted information flow through a newly created agricultural extension system, while informal institutions facilitated labor sharing and communication. In terms of institutional interplay, new formal institutions had partly undermined pre-existing informal institutions. We conclude that both visible supply-side gaps and deeper drivers of food insecurity should be targeted through food security interventions. Interventions need to be cognizant of potentially unexpected ways of institutional interplay, especially between formal and informal institutions.

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Bolshanik, Petr Vladimirovich, Yevgeny Anatolevich Yevlanov, Vadim Faruarovich Islamutdinov, Dina Faizrakhmanovna Islamutdinova, Vladimir Zakharovich Kovalev, Vladlena Borisovna Rybina, Dmitry Vasilievich Sannikov, et al. "ANALYSIS OF INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS AFFECTING THE DEVELOPMENT OF BRANCHES OF THE ECONOMY OF THE NORTH RESOURCE-BREACHING REGION (ON THE EXAMPLE OF THE KHANTY-MANSIYSK AUTONOMOUS OKRUG - UGRA)." Yugra State University Bulletin 13, no. 4 (December 15, 2017): 34–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.17816/byusu20170434-42.

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The subject of the study are informal institutions that influence the development of the Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug - Ugra. The aim of the study is to identify the composition of informal institutions and the direction of their influence. The scientific significance of the work is to use an institutional approach to study the economy of the northern resource-producing region. The practical importance of the work lies in the possibility of the executive bodies of the state power applying the management of the region's branches to draw conclusions about the degree of influence of informal institutions on the development of the industry. The objectives of the study are: - studying the respondents' opinion on the impact of informal institutions; - study of the composition of informal institutions; - study of the direction of their influence. The research methodology includes comparative institutional analysis, questionnaires. The result of the work is an institutional analysis of the composition of informal institutions and their impact on the development of the economy of Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug - Ugra.

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Nandang Triyana, Fitriyana, and Oon Darmansyah. "Studi Identifikasi Kelembagaan Sosial Masyarakat Nelayan Di Desa Muara Pasir Kecamatan Tanah Grogot Kabupaten Paser." Jurnal Pembangunan Perikanan dan Agribisnis 9, no. 1 (March 29, 2022): 102–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.30872/jppa.v9i1.10.

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A Study on the Identification of Social Institutions for the Fishermen Community in Muara Pasir Village, Tanah Grogot District, Paser Regency. Faculty of Fisheries and Marine Sciences, Mulawarman University. (Supervised by Hj. Fitriyana and Oon Darmansyah). This study aims to identify the social institutions that exist in the fishing community in Muara Pasir village, both formal and informal social institutions. This research was conducted for 19 months starting from October 2019 to January 2021. The sample method used was purposive sampling with a sample of 49 respondents. The analytical method used is descriptive qualitative analysis in the form of a narrative. The results of this study indicate that the social institutions in Muara Pasir Village consist of formal institutions, namely the Fishermen Partners Institute, the Sinar Pasifik fishing group, and the Leger fishermen group. Furthermore, the informal social institutions found in the fishing community in Muara Pasir Village are Community Service or mutual assistance. Keywords: Social Institution, Institutional Type, Formal and Informal.

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Tsai, Kellee S. "Adaptive Informal Institutions and Endogenous Institutional Change in China." World Politics 59, no. 1 (October 2006): 116–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/wp.2007.0018.

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Under certain circumstances, the etiology of endogenous institutional change lies in the informal coping strategies devised by local actors to evade the restrictions of formal institutions. With repetition and diffusion, these informal coping strategies may take on an institutional reality of their own. The author calls the resulting norms and practicesadaptiveinformal institutions because they represent creative responses to formal institutional environments that actors find too constraining. Adaptive informal institutions may then motivate elites to reform the original formal institutions. This contention is illustrated by three major institutional changes that have occurred in the course of China's private sector development since the late 1970s—the legalization of private enterprise, the admission of capitalists into the Chinese Communist Party, and the amendment of the state constitution to promote the private economy.

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Garg, Shilpa. "Evolution of Institutional Environment in India:Formal and Informal Institutions." PRAGATI : Journal of Indian Economy 6, no. 2 (December 1, 2019): 61. http://dx.doi.org/10.17492/pragati.v6i2.188855.

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Sami, Lylia, and Moundir Lassassi. "Investigating the effect of trust in institutions on the decision of young people in selected MENA countries to opt for an informal economic activity: Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia." International Journal of Technology Management & Sustainable Development 19, no. 2 (June 1, 2020): 173–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1386/tmsd_00021_1.

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Several empirical studies have analysed the determinants of being in the informal sector. Most of these studies have focused on the effect of demographic and socio-economic factors such as level of education, regions of residence, skills acquired and gender and household characteristics such as parents’ education level. Other authors have found that institutional factors, such as corruption, regulations, legislation and tax burden can influence the decisions to undertake activities in the informal sector. More recent studies have also highlighted the effect of institutional trust (considered as informal institution) on the emergence of informality. This article attempts to explain the behaviour that motivates individuals to engage in the informal sector. It presents an empirical analysis of the determinants of being in informality for youth in the selected MENA countries (Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia) focusing on the effect of institutional trust. Our results confirm that the general level of young people’s trust in the different institutions is low. Furthermore, we note that youth’s trusts in institutions have a significant effect on the likelihood of being in informality. However, it seems to differ according to which institutions are considered and by which countries.

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Enabulele, Osamuyimen, and Eghosa O. Ekhator. "Improving environmental protection in Nigeria: a reassessment of the role of informal institutions." Journal of Sustainable Development Law and Policy (The) 13, no. 1 (May 24, 2022): 162–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/jsdlp.v13i1.7.

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The success of an approach or strategy for the implementation of legal instruments in one country does not imply that the same approach or strategy would be successful when replicated in another country because there is no ‘one-size-fits-all approach’ to policy implementation. The rationale for the above assertion is that institutions play a major role in the success of any policy. Undoubtedly, institutional approach provides a solid foundation to explore the interplay between formulation of policies and their effective implementation. Therefore, for an environmental policy to be successfully implemented, the institutional peculiarity of the country must be considered. This article explores the role of informal institutions (embedded institutions) in policy implementation focusing on Sub-Saharan Africa with specific focus on Nigeria. It provides theoretical basis for an informal institutional approach in environmental policy implementation. This article suggests that the institutional approach can be extended to environmental protection and management through informal institutions. Keywords: Environment; Institutions; Informal institutions; Indigenous knowledge; Taboos; Environmental protection

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Стрижак, Анна, and Anna Strizhak. "Methodology of Institutional Traps Neutralization in USA and Canada." Scientific Research and Development. Economics 5, no. 4 (September 7, 2017): 45–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.12737/article_59816e5cd6eaa3.26235604.

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Causal connection between ineffective transitive processes in economy and institutional traps is substantiated. Institutional trap is presented as a stable inefficient institution formed by asynchrony institutional changes under conditions of transformation of social and economic systems, by hypertrophy of separate forms of behavioral forecast for economic agents at the macro level, by weakness of formal institutions and enforcement mechanism. Institutes providing effective economic development of USA and Canada are found out. The characteristics of the institutions providing effective economic development of the successful North American countries is given: peculiarities and reforms, the most developed sectors of economy, anti-corruption measures, anti-bureaucratic measures, taxation, education, enforcement, technical means of control, informal institutions. A set of institutions for newly developing economies based on the analysis of institutions providing effective economic development of the successful countries is formed. The conclusion about the necessity of engagement of effective reforms experience from successful North American states, taking into account institution’s peculiarities of countries with developing markets is made.

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Jusufi, Islam. "When Informal Institutions Change. Institutional Reforms and Informal Practices in the Former Soviet Union." Europe-Asia Studies 71, no. 2 (February 7, 2019): 326–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2019.1584456.

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Domjahn, Thomas. "Informal institutions and economic development." Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 5, no. 2 (November 23, 2012): 151. http://dx.doi.org/10.23941/ejpe.v5i2.114.

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Pirozhkova, I. G., and L. V. Tarabrina. "Informal Names of Penitentiary Institutions." Pravo istoriya i sovremennost, no. 2(15) (2021): 131–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.17277/pravo.2021.02.pp.131-136.

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The article deals with the study of the emergence of informal names of institutions of the penitentiary system. A brief description of the most famous places of detention, the history of their origin and the reasons for the occurrence of their names are given. The penetration of “prison culture” into society is studied. The deep meaning of informal names of institutions of the penitentiary system is considered. The names of famous figures of Russia, whose fate is somehow connected with places of imprisonment, are given. A conclusion about the relationship between the breadth of distribution of informal names of prison institutions and their purpose for life imprisonment is drawn.

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Fracasso, Andrea, Giuseppe Vittucci Marzetti, and Diego Coletto. "Informal economy and extractive institutions." Review of Economics and Institutions 9, no. 1 (July 13, 2018): 36. http://dx.doi.org/10.5202/rei.v9i1.240.

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Ghadassi, Maryam. "Informal financial institutions in Bazaar." CEMOTI 26, no. 1 (1998): 293–305. http://dx.doi.org/10.3406/cemot.1998.1435.

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Eeckhout, Jan, and Kaivan Munshi. "MATCHING IN INFORMAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS." Journal of the European Economic Association 8, no. 5 (September 2010): 947–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1542-4774.2010.tb00545.x.

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Eeckhout, Jan, and Kaivan Munshi. "Matching in Informal Financial Institutions." Journal of the European Economic Association 8, no. 5 (September 2010): 947–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jeea_a_00012.

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de Mesquita, Ethan Bueno, and Matthew Stephenson. "Legal Institutions and Informal Networks." Journal of Theoretical Politics 18, no. 1 (January 2006): 40–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0951629806059595.

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VOIGT, STEFAN. "How to measure informal institutions." Journal of Institutional Economics 14, no. 1 (June 21, 2017): 1–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1744137417000248.

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AbstractThere have been repeated claims that informal institutions play an important or even crucial role in economic development. Yet measuring informal institutions entails serious challenges. This paper identifies the difficulties in measuring informal institutions, critically discusses some attempts hitherto taken and encourages the more intensive use of experiments to measure them.

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Hartwell, Christopher A., and Anna P. Malinowska. "Informal institutions and firm valuation." Emerging Markets Review 40 (September 2019): 100603. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ememar.2019.03.001.

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Muralidharan, Etayankara, and Saurav Pathak. "Informal institutions and international entrepreneurship." International Business Review 26, no. 2 (April 2017): 288–302. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ibusrev.2016.07.006.

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Rahman, Saif Ur, and Zhao Shurong. "Governing through Informal Mechanisms." Asian Survey 61, no. 6 (October 4, 2021): 942–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2021.1433283.

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In their post-authoritarian period, civilian governments in transitional democracies have often been battered by unelected power centers. Where do these unelected forces derive their power? This article addresses this question through a case study of Pakistan. Since the 2018 elections, a decade after leaving formal political office, the Pakistani military has asserted greater control over civilian government. Using the concept of informal institutions of political participation as an analytical framework, we argue that when formal forms of control become untenable due to legitimacy and/or functional constraints, the military turns into a Janus-faced institution, visibly acting as a formal state organ while invisibly protecting its institutional interests through what we call “informal mechanisms.” The article explains how Pakistan’s pre-2018 political situation dictated a quasi-military regime more suited to the military’s interests than direct military rule.

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Gruszewska, Ewa. "Changes in Informal Institutions in Poland and Transition Countries." Equilibrium 9, no. 1 (March 31, 2014): 39–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/equil.2014.003.

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The research paper presents institutional systems of economies in the following transforming countries: Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia. The article aims at indicating the changes which have taken place in informal institutions' structures since the early nineties. It also attempts to determine how informal institutions are supporting formal institutions. Heading towards building new institutional systems, transforming countries face a barrier of slowly evolving informal institutions. A mismatch between institutional structures can be noticed in transforming countries. Low level of trust in people, resistance to new ideas, strong attachment to traditional behavioural patterns and excessive role of “connections”, relatively low level of self-expression, high expectations towards the state and its welfare functions, and low social activity within the society, can be observed. The institutional changes in informal components have been presented using data from World Values Survey, CEPII and G.Hofstede research.

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McCabe, J. Terrence, Paul W. Leslie, and Alicia Davis. "The Emergence of the Village and the Transformation of Traditional Institutions: A Case Study from Northern Tanzania." Human Organization 79, no. 2 (June 2020): 150–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.17730/1938-3525.79.2.150.

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In this paper, we examine how the 2008–2009 drought in northern Tanzania contributed to and catalyzed the transformation of governance concerning the management of natural resources from traditional informal institutions among the Maasai to formal village-based institutions. Our central argument is that village governance in northern Tanzania represents a new, formal institution that is supplementing and in some important ways obviating traditional, informal institutions. Further, this replacement is central to what appears to be a transformation of the social-ecological system embracing the rangelands and pastoral/agro-pastoral people in northern Tanzania. In this paper, we document the basis for our claims concerning the institutional shift and discuss its implications for livelihoods and social relationships.

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Borkowski, Mateusz. "Institutional equilibrium in EU economies in 2008 and 2018: SEM-PLS models." Statistics in Transition New Series 23, no. 2 (June 1, 2022): 107–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/stattrans-2022-0019.

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Abstract The aim of the research is to identify the strength and direction of the development of the relationship between formal and informal institutions and to assess the institutional equilibrium of modern economies. The structural equations modelling based on partial least squares (SEM-PLS) is applied to achieve the purpose of the article. It is an econometric method that allows the measurement and analysis of the dependencies between latent variables (measures that cannot be directly observed). The study included 27 EU economies and the research period covered the years 2008 and 2018. The results of the study demonstrate that the quality of informal institutions strongly, positively determines the quality of formal institutions. The conducted analyses indicate that modern economies are diversified in terms of the quality of informal and formal institutions and, consequently, in institutional equilibrium. Considerable institutional disparities also translate into a large diversification in economic development. The article proposes a different meaning of institutional equilibrium, understood as the achieved state of institutional structure characterised by high quality informal institutions which interact with each other to improve the efficiency of formal institutions. The article presents a comprehensive model of the institutional structure and a unique method of measuring institutional equilibrium.

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Ostapenko, Nataliia. "Do informal institutions affect entrepreneurial intentions?" Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development 24, no. 3 (August 21, 2017): 446–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jsbed-12-2016-0192.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to empirically define the ways in which informal institutions influence entrepreneurial intentions. It tests the statement that informal institutions can have an impact on people’s decisions, directly and indirectly, by affecting their perceptions of the external world. Design/methodology/approach The paper develops a theoretical model of the probability of starting a business by a potential entrepreneur. The model takes into account a comparison of current wages and future profits. The empirical analysis is based on European social survey data at the individual level. Three-stage least squares regression helps to overcome the endogeneity problem since perceptions of government actions are individual specific. Findings Informal institutions can affect expectations about future activities in a person’s lifetime utility maximisation problem. The paper empirically concludes that these institutions are connected with a person’s satisfaction with government and can indirectly affect the probability to be self-employed. Research limitations/implications Research limitations are related to employing proxies for informal institutions, using only the “satisfaction with government” as a perceptions indicator, and cross-sectional data while defining the causal effect. Practical implications Policymakers should consider that institutional settings affect people in a different manner when developing their policies. Originality/value The paper makes a novel contribution by analysing the effect of informal institutions on the probability to start a business by using both theoretical arguments and empirical tests. Building upon insights from a broader informal institutions’ effect on entrepreneurial intentions, this paper is the first to study a linkage between informal institutions and their indirect effect on people’s profit expectations.

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Wang, Hongdi, Weisheng Lu, Jonas Söderlund, and Ke Chen. "The Interplay Between Formal and Informal Institutions in Projects." Project Management Journal 49, no. 4 (July 17, 2018): 20–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/8756972818781629.

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In projects, various kinds of formal and informal institutions are crucial for imprinting and controlling behavior. The interplay and potential conflict between these two types of institutions have attracted increasing scholarly and managerial attention, but conventional institutional analyses are hampered by the lack of effective methodological instruments for understanding these institutions and examining their fit (or misfit). Underpinned by the theoretical argument that institutions governing projects are networks, this study employs the methodology of social network analysis (SNA) to capture and analyze institutional interplay. We use four construction projects to illustrate the interplay between formal and informal institutions in projects and to show how this interplay affects project performance. Our findings reveal that, in general, performance is better when there is a better fit—which indicates the extent of interplay—between a project’s formal and informal guiding institutions. We also show how project managers can use SNA to diagnose formal and informal institutions, enhancing their fit and thereby improving project performance. The results presented here have implications for the role of these two institutional types and for how the fit between them can be improved through conscious effort.

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Busch, Rainer, Karim Gassemi, Julie Papastamatelou, Alexander Unger, and Christian May. "Perception of formal and informal institutions by entrepreneurs in China, Morocco, and Germany – A cross-cultural pilot study." International Journal of Management and Economics 56, no. 4 (November 6, 2020): 324–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/ijme-2020-0026.

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AbstractIntroduction and AimsEntrepreneurship and the business environment, in general, are being influenced by the existence of formal and informal institutions. This study focuses on the negative versus positive perceptions of Moroccan, Chinese, and German entrepreneurs to formal and informal institutions, and the associations of these perceptions with self-efficacy and market versus network orientation of the business environment.MethodsIn a sample of n = 319 female and male entrepreneurs, we have examined similarities and differences in the perception of informal and formal institutions and their effects on self-efficacy and business strategy, while conducting t-tests and linear regressions.ResultsIn all three cultural contexts, both formal and informal institutions play a significant role because of different reasons.ConclusionThe nature of entrepreneurship is complex as both formal and informal institutional factors are differently associated with businesses. The results could enhance the understanding regarding the coexistence of formal or informal institutions within the business environments of different countries and the connections between business orientation and self-efficacy.

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Effiom, Lionel, and Peter Ubi. "Informal Institutions: The Binding Constraint on Institutional Efficiency in Nigeria." British Journal of Economics, Management & Trade 5, no. 3 (January 10, 2015): 258–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.9734/bjemt/2015/12243.

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Cleaver, Frances, Tom Franks, Faustin Maganga, and Kurt Hall. "ASR FORUM: ENGAGING WITH AFRICAN INFORMAL ECONOMIES." African Studies Review 56, no. 3 (November 20, 2013): 165–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/asr.2013.84.

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Abstract:This article furthers our understanding of how state and citizens interact to produce local institutions and examines the effects of these processes. It brings critical institutional theory into engagement with ideas about everyday governance to analyze how hybrid arrangements are formed through bricolage. Such a perspective helps us to understand governance arrangements as both negotiated and structured, benefiting some and disadvantaging others. To explore these points the article tracks the evolution of the Sungusungu, a hybrid pastoralist security institution in the Usangu Plains, Tanzania. It also considers the wider implications of such hybrid arrangements for livelihoods, social inclusion, distributive justice, and citizenship.

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Onyshko, S. V., and D. O. Savenko. "A Theoretical Conceptualization of Institutional Provision of the Financial Market." Business Inform 9, no. 512 (2020): 219–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.32983/2222-4459-2020-9-219-228.

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The article is concerned with the problems of formation and development of institutional provision of the financial market. The relevance of the problem is caused by the relationship of formal and informal norms of economic processes and phenomena, the understanding of which provides the key to achieving the effectiveness of the financial market development. Understanding the essence of institutional provision of the financial market and the factors of its formation and development makes it possible to make more informed and effective decisions in the sphere of financial market development. The article is aimed at substantiating the conceptual approaches to the structuring of institutional provision of the financial market. It is substantiated that institutional provision of the financial market includes both formal and informal institutions. The formal institutions, in turn, consist of institutions-organizations and institutions-norms. The factors of occurrence of institutional deformations in the financial market are systematized. The institutions of the financial market are structured, in particular, in the composition of the institutions-norms the authors allocate the formal (international legal framework for concluding and implementing agreements in financial markets, national regulatory framework for concluding and implementing agreements in financial markets, norms of related national and international law, ensuring the conclusion and implementation of agreements in financial markets) and the informal norms (norms stipulated by religion, informal agreements and conspiracies between the financial market participants, unofficial (shadow) markets for the conclusion and implementation of financial agreements). In the composition of institutions-organizations the authors allocate the institutions-buyers of financial resources; institutions – sellers of financial resources; institutions that serve the functioning of institutions-sellers and institutions – buyers of financial resources; institutions-regulators. The institutional provision of the financial market is structured and the relationship between institutions-norms, institutions-rules and the State is defined. The principles of institutional provision of the financial market are substantiated and its functions are defined.

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Khan, Zafir Ullah, Anwar Hussain, and Nasir Iqbal. "Institutions and Innovation: Evidence from Countries at Different Stages of Development." Pakistan Development Review 56, no. 4 (December 1, 2017): 297–317. http://dx.doi.org/10.30541/v56i4pp.297-317.

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This paper empirically analyses the impact of institutions, both formal and informal, on innovation performance of sampled countries at different stages of development. Data of 72 sampled countries on Research and Development Expenditures, numbers of article published, human capital, trade openness, internet users are collected from United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and World Bank database. Formal and informal institutions indexes are constructed using data from Country Risk Guide and The World Value Survey (WVS). Fixed effect and System GMM technique are used to estimate the dynamic relationship between innovation performance and institutional indexes. The study finds positive significant effect of institutions on innovation in case of aggregate sample of developed and developing countries. However, the effects of formal institutions are more significant in case of sample of developed countries, while in developing countries informal institutions are found more effective than formal institutions in affecting innovation performance. The results also show that both formal and informal institutions are supplementary to each other in case of developing countries. Therefore, it is suggested that focus should be given to informal institutions. Moreover, collective initiatives be encourage in developing countries to have diverse ideas from different sectors of the countries. In addition, developing countries should initiate collaborative research projects with technologically advanced countries research and education institutions so as to learn from each other’s ideas and experiences. Keywords: Formal Institutions, Informal Institutions, Innovation

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MERSHON, CAROL A. "Expectations and Informal Rules in Coalition Formation." Comparative Political Studies 27, no. 1 (April 1994): 40–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414094027001002.

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Why do informal rules emerge alongside—and at variance with—the formal constitutional constraints that shape bargaining over coalition governments? The presence of informal rules at odds with formal rules appears as an anomaly within both institution-free and institution-focused theories of coalitions. The author argues that politicians create informal rules in order to alter formal institutions that do not function to their benefit. The costs of a formal change in institutions offer incentives to politicians to invent informal rules as alternatives to such change, and repeated interactions teach politicians what to expect and then invent. The author's emphasis on the manipulability of rules echoes long-standing themes in the study and practice of politics.

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SEIDLER, VALENTIN. "Copying informal institutions: the role of British colonial officers during the decolonization of British Africa." Journal of Institutional Economics 14, no. 2 (September 4, 2017): 289–312. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1744137417000443.

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AbstractInstitutional reforms in developing countries often involve copying institutions from developed countries. Such institutional copying is likely to fail, if formal institutions alone are copied without the informal institutions on which they rest in the originating country. This paper investigates the role of human actors in copying informal institutions. At independence, all British African colonies imported the same institution intended to safeguard the political neutrality of their civil services. While the necessary formal provisions were copied into the constitutions of all African colonies, the extent to which they were put into practice varies. The paper investigates the connection between the variation in the legal practice and the presence of British colonial officers after independence. A natural experiment around compensation payments to British officers explains the variation in the number of officers who remained in service after independence. Interviews with retired officers suggest that the extended presence of British personnel promoted the acceptance of imported British institutions among local colleagues.

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Haag, Maximilian. "Bargaining power in informal trilogues: Intra-institutional preference cohesion and inter-institutional bargaining success." European Union Politics 23, no. 2 (December 19, 2021): 330–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/14651165211064485.

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Informal trilogue meetings are the main legislative bargaining forum in the European Union, yet their dynamics remain largely understudied in a quantitative context. This article builds on the assumption that the negotiating delegations of the European Parliament and the Council play a two-level game whereby these actors can use their intra-institutional constraint to extract inter-institutional bargaining success. Negotiators can credibly claim that their hands are tied if the members of their parent institutions hold similar preferences and do not accept alternative proposals or if their institution is divided and negotiators need to defend a fragile compromise. Employing a measure of document similarity (minimum edit distance) between an institution's negotiation mandate and the trilogue outcome to measure bargaining success, the analysis supports the hypothesis for the European Parliament, but not for the Council.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Informal institutions'

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