Academic literature on the topic 'Informal institutions'

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Journal articles on the topic "Informal institutions"

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Azari, Julia R., and Jennifer K. Smith. "Unwritten Rules: Informal Institutions in Established Democracies." Perspectives on Politics 10, no. 1 (March 2012): 37–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1537592711004890.

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Scholars of the developing world have driven a surge of interest in unwritten or informal institutions as determinants of political outcomes. In advanced industrial democracies, by contrast, informal institutions often remain consigned to the analytic margins. This article makes a case for greater attention to informal political institutions in established democracies, and it introduces a theoretical framework to support such analysis. Informal institutions, understood as the unwritten rules of political life, are seen to perform three functions: they complete or fill gaps in formal institutions, coordinate the operation of overlapping (and perhaps clashing) institutions, and operate parallel to formal institutions in regulating political behavior. These three roles of informal institutions are associated with different characteristic patterns of institutional stability and change. The article illustrates its theoretical framework with case studies from American politics, the subfield in which formal-institutional analysis has flourished most. These cases are the historical norm of a two-term presidency (a completing institution), the unwritten rules of the presidential nomination process (coordinating institutions), the informal practice of obstruction in the Senate (a parallel institution), and the normative expectation that presidents should address the public directly (which performs all three functions).
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Wang, Jing, Kai Zhao, Yue Cui, and Hui Cao. "Formal and Informal Institutions in Farmers’ Withdrawal from Rural Homesteads in China: Heterogeneity Analysis Based on the Village Location." Land 11, no. 10 (October 19, 2022): 1844. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/land11101844.

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Withdrawal from rural homesteads (WRH) in China is mainly conducted under the guidance of government and follows the principle of farmers’ voluntary participation, in which both formal and informal institutions play essential roles. However, few studies have systematically analyzed the institutional factors in WRH. By introducing both formal and informal institutions into the analysis framework, the aim of this study was to explore the impacts of formal and informal institutions on farmers’ behavior to WRH, and the interaction between formal and informal institution in different villages. Based on survey data from farmers in Jinzhai, China, this study adopted a binary probit model and factor analysis. (1) The study revealed that farmers’ cognition of homesteads property rights and their trust in village cadres are the key formal institutional factors affecting farmers’ behavior to WRH, and farmers’ social networks, reciprocal norms, and trust in villagers are the key informal institutional factors affecting farmers’ WRH; (2) Both formal and informal institutions promote farmers’ WRH, and informal institutions play a more important role. However, there is no interaction between formal and informal institutions in the whole sample. (3) Furthermore, the effect of formal and informal institutions on farmers’ WRH have the heterogeneity of village location: there is a complementary relationship between formal and informal institutions in farmers’ WRH for villages with a medium proximity to the county seat, and a substitution relationship for villages far away from the county seat. Finally, this study discusses the implications of these findings on the new round of WRH policy.
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Ding, Huang. "An Informal Institutional Analysis of Policy Implementation Hindrances in China." Chinese Public Administration Review 2, no. 1-2 (March 2003): 45–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.22140/cpar.v2i1.2.39.

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As the lever by which public authorities regulate social affairs, public policy must function through its implementation. The effectiveness of policy-implementation is affected by many factors, but it fundamentally depends on the institution. For people's behaviors are governed by institutions, and public policy is implemented by people. According to the theory of New Institutional ism, institutions consist of both formal and informal institutions. Based on the theory's explanation of the constraints placed on people's behavior by informal institutions, this paper will explore how informal institutional factors prevent public policies from effective implementation in China, specifically interpersonal relations and the consideration of faces. We must eliminate the negative impacts of informal institutional factors on policy implementation through enforcing hearings, coordinating policies, publicizing policies, strengthening supervision and bettering ideologies.
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Ding, Huang. "An informal institutional analysis of policy implementation hindrances in China." Chinese Public Administration Review 2, no. 1/2 (November 1, 2016): 45. http://dx.doi.org/10.22140/cpar.v2i1/2.39.

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As the lever by which public authorities regulate social affairs, public policy must function through its implementation. The effectiveness of policy-implementation is affected by many factors, but it fundamentally depends on the institution. For people's behaviors are governed by institutions, and public policy is implemente by people. According to the theory of New Institutionalsim, institutions consist of both formal and informal institutions. Based on the theory's explanation of the constratins placed on people's behavior by informal institutions, this paper will explore how informal institutional factos prevent public policies from effective implemetnation in China, specifically interpersonal relations and the consideration of faces. We must eliminate the negative impacts of informal institutional factors on policy implementation through enforcing hearings, coordinating policies, publicizing policies, strengthening supervision and betterign ideologies.
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Waylen, Georgina. "Informal Institutions, Institutional Change, and Gender Equality." Political Research Quarterly 67, no. 1 (November 18, 2013): 212–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1065912913510360.

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Bozhko, Pavlo. "INSTITUTIONAL BUILDING AND ARCHITECTONICS OF POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE INSTITUTIONS." 39, no. 39 (July 10, 2021): 15–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.26565/2220-8089-2021-39-02.

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In the process of modernization, based on the development of the potential of public administration and the growth of social capital, an open type of interaction between the state and society is formed, where institutions act as the necessary conductors of direct and reverse signals within the framework of a flexible political and administrative system. It is pointed out that institution building in order to minimize the risks of falling into institutional traps should take into account the peculiarity of the institutional architecture, which is determined by the hierarchy of formal rules, and provide for the complication of the procedure for changing institutions as their rank grows. Taking into account the hierarchy of rules makes it possible to track the change in the role of formal / informal institutions, when a decrease in the level of the rules of the institutional architecture increases the importance of informal institutions in the management process. It is argued that informal norms play a large role in the functioning of the political market. The state as a subject of management is interested in the formalization of emerging informal practices. The stability and predictability of managerial influences grow when formal institutions absorb informal ones. Two ways of changing the architecture of institutions as a result of such a takeover are considered. The first, administrative-legal way: the gradual consolidation of informal practices as generally recognized in formal institutions, that is, the legalization of informal restrictions.The second way consists naturally in the conditions of a low level of the political and administrative potential of the state: informal practices are embedded in the mechanism of action of formal institutions and destroy them from the inside, creating the effect of subversive institutions, which creates favorable conditions for institutional traps on the way to the formation of political and administrative institutions of modernization. In addition, a situation is possible when formal and informal rules and norms interact as independent (autonomous) entities, and then, as a result, a certain type of institutional environment is formed, which differs in the way of interaction between formal and informal institutions.
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Nikiforov, Petro, Olha Нladchuk, and Sofiia Kucherivska. "FORMAL AND INFORMAL INSURANCE MARKET INSTITUTIONS." INNOVATIVE ECONOMY, no. 5-6 (2021): 105–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.37332/2309-1533.2021.5-6.15.

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Purpose. The purpose of the article is to defining the nature, types, and role of formal and informal insurance market institutions. Methodology of research. The methodological basis of the work has become a systematic approach to the study of the formation and functioning of formal and informal insurance market institutions; as well as a dialectical method of cognition and grouping to determine the types of formal and informal institutions that have formed and ensure the development of insurance relationships. Methods of induction and deduction have been used to generalize the essence and role of insurance market institutions under the provisions of economic theory and insurance business. The differences between formal and informal insurance market institutions have been established by a comparative method. To make theoretical generalizations, to form conclusions from the study, an abstract reasoning method has been used. Findings. The article presents the results of empirical analysis of formal and informal institutions, under the influence of which the insurance market has been formed and is currently functioning. Formal insurance market institutions are clearly defined, regulated by public protection mechanisms, and mandatory for all economic entities involved in the insurance process. Informal insurance market institutions are unwritten and undocumented norms and rules that shape the behaviour of economic entities of the insurance market regarding the creation, purchase and sale, and consumption of insurance services. Both formal and informal insurance market institutions should be divided into basic and specific ones, taking into account the peculiarities of the insurance market and the specifics of insurance relationships. Originality. Given the peculiarities of the insurance business, formal and informal insurance market institutions are clearly distinguished, with their subsequent division into basic and specific ones. Practical value. The results of the study can serve as a basis for further research in this area and will be useful for insurers, supervisory authorities, and other participants in the insurance market in terms of improving the quality of insurance services, identifying areas of the insurance market, and efficiency of its participants, which will increase confidence in the insurance market. Key words: institution, formal institution, informal institution, insurance market, basic insurance market institution, specific insurance market institution.
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Starodubrovskaya, Irina. "Informal institutions and radical ideologies under institutional transformation." Russian Journal of Economics 1, no. 2 (June 2015): 182–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ruje.2015.11.003.

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Williamson, Claudia R. "Informal institutions rule: institutional arrangements and economic performance." Public Choice 139, no. 3-4 (February 19, 2009): 371–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9399-x.

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Manulak, Michael W. "The Networked Diplomacy of Informal International Institutions." Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations 27, no. 3 (September 29, 2021): 410–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02703006.

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Abstract The rise of informal international institutions has been one of the most significant developments in institutional design and choice since the 1990s. While states have increasingly opted for informal governance, little is known about the character of intergovernmental relations in these settings. Scholars, for instance, debate whether great powers dominate such institutions, or whether influence can be exercised by a wider array of players. Drawing from the author’s experience as a government representative within the Proliferation Security Initiative, a leading informal institution, this article provides a theory-driven analysis of intergovernmental interactions within such bodies. It demonstrates that diplomacy within informal institutions tends to assume a decentralized, networked quality that favors actors positioned at the center of intergovernmental networks. In doing so, the article highlights clear means through which central network positions confer influence. The article also sheds new light on the Proliferation Security Initiative and on counterproliferation cooperation more generally.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Informal institutions"

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Goyal, Yugank <1983&gt. "Institutions in Informal Markets." Doctoral thesis, Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, 2016. http://amsdottorato.unibo.it/7695/1/Goyal_Yugank_Tesi.pdf.

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The central questions that motivate this work, concern with understanding how do informal markets function outside the formal contract and property rights framework, and in doing so, what kinds of institutions do these markets develop. I attempt to answer these questions through case studies of three markets in India, namely, footwear cluster in Agra, coal-mines mafia in Dhanbad, and sex work (prostitution) in New Delhi. Locating the study of informal markets and institutions in broad literature of law and development, the thesis advances policy suggestions that would be useful in a general context of developing countries and their unregulated markets. More than 90% of Indian workforce is informal, thus making it a very important economic impulse to be examined. Through primary fieldwork, I collect data in three Indian markets, and understand the micro-institutional framework that guides the functional order of transactions that lie ‘outside the law.’ In general, my findings reveal that every informal market is hinged on an intermediary, who in absorbing the otherwise high transaction costs at a price, affords stability to the market. For relevant policy interventions therefore, it is crucial that the intermediating institutions are examined carefully. At a general level, the thesis narrates the importance of understanding local institutions in presence of global blueprints of law reforms. If law is an effective tool for development, then it has to adequately appreciate the heterogeneous institutions located within the market frameworks.
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Kepple, Rosemary. "Tracing Formal and Informal Institutions in Southern Yemen." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2018. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/scripps_theses/1111.

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The history of southern Yemen has been a unique story of various political factions aligning and realigning themselves in waves of intra-elite conflict, based on the setting of formal and informal institutions. This paper builds on existing literature about informal institutions to analyze the role that political institutions have played in promoting and preventing these conflicts since it became independent in 1967. By using a temporal analysis of historical and contemporary institutions, this paper asks how political institutions have impacted southern Yemen since it gained independence and how these institutions have changed since the start of the current civil war. It additionally looks at the statements of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) in the context of the current civil war to understand how both types of institutions are operating today. This paper will thus argue that the discrepancy between what formal state institutions claim to do and what they are able to creates the space for informal institutions to develop. Furthermore, it will argue that the dialectic between formal and informal institutions can explain periods of relative stability and instability along with the current conditions in the civil war have allowed informal institutions to prosper.
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Sun, Huojun <1983&gt. "Law, Informal Institutions and Trust: an Experimental Perspective." Doctoral thesis, Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, 2015. http://amsdottorato.unibo.it/7248/1/Sun_Huojun_tesi.pdf.

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This dissertation has studied how legal and non-legal mechanisms affect the levels of trust and trustworthiness in an economy, and whether and when subtle psychological factors are crucial for establishing trust and even for recovering trust from a breach of contract. The first Chapter has addressed the question of whether formal legal enforcement crowds out or crowds in the amount of trust in a society. We find that formal legal mechanisms, especially formal contracts backed by a powerful authority, normally undermine trust except when they are perceived as legitimate, or when there are no strong social norms of fairness (i.e. the population in a society is considerably heterogeneous), or when the environment in which repeated commercial relationships take place becomes highly uncertain. The second Chapter has examined whether the endogenous adoption of a collective punishment institution can help a society coordinate on an efficient outcome, characterized by high levels of trust and trustworthiness. The experimental results show that the endogenous introduction of collective punishment by means of a majority-voting rule does not significantly improve coordination on the efficient equilibrium. Not all subjects seem to be able to anticipate the change in behavior induced by the introduction of the mechanism, and a majority of them vote against it. The third Chapter has explored whether high-trustors adapt their behavior in response to others’ trustworthiness or untrustworthiness more quickly, which in turn supports them to maintain higher default expectations of others’ trustworthiness relative to low-trustors. Our experimental results reveal that high-trustors are better than low-trustors at predicting others’ trustworthiness because they are less susceptible to the anticipated aversive emotions aroused by the potential betrayal and thereby have a higher willingness to acquire the valuable information about their partner’s actions.
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Sun, Huojun <1983&gt. "Law, Informal Institutions and Trust: an Experimental Perspective." Doctoral thesis, Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, 2015. http://amsdottorato.unibo.it/7248/.

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This dissertation has studied how legal and non-legal mechanisms affect the levels of trust and trustworthiness in an economy, and whether and when subtle psychological factors are crucial for establishing trust and even for recovering trust from a breach of contract. The first Chapter has addressed the question of whether formal legal enforcement crowds out or crowds in the amount of trust in a society. We find that formal legal mechanisms, especially formal contracts backed by a powerful authority, normally undermine trust except when they are perceived as legitimate, or when there are no strong social norms of fairness (i.e. the population in a society is considerably heterogeneous), or when the environment in which repeated commercial relationships take place becomes highly uncertain. The second Chapter has examined whether the endogenous adoption of a collective punishment institution can help a society coordinate on an efficient outcome, characterized by high levels of trust and trustworthiness. The experimental results show that the endogenous introduction of collective punishment by means of a majority-voting rule does not significantly improve coordination on the efficient equilibrium. Not all subjects seem to be able to anticipate the change in behavior induced by the introduction of the mechanism, and a majority of them vote against it. The third Chapter has explored whether high-trustors adapt their behavior in response to others’ trustworthiness or untrustworthiness more quickly, which in turn supports them to maintain higher default expectations of others’ trustworthiness relative to low-trustors. Our experimental results reveal that high-trustors are better than low-trustors at predicting others’ trustworthiness because they are less susceptible to the anticipated aversive emotions aroused by the potential betrayal and thereby have a higher willingness to acquire the valuable information about their partner’s actions.
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Park, Ji-Yeong. "Role of institutions in nations that have improved their competitiveness." Diss., University of Pretoria, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/2263/22817.

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This study explored the role of institutions in countries that have improved their competitiveness in a short time period, under the framework of institutional theory. This study investigated how informal and formal institutions have evolved and interacted. The purpose of the study was to build on institutional theory by exploring the role and interaction of institutions in nations that have undergone institutional changes. A literature review was done to provide a foundation for the study. Case studies of Singapore and Finland – countries that have improved their competitiveness in a short time period – were done in this study. A number of documents in the public domain were observed: internet resources, reports, and studies on Singapore and Finland. The study concluded that countries that have improved their competitiveness achieved their goals through their own institutional mix and through interactions among institutions. Active interactions among institutions were based on broad coalition among actors and the directions of interactions in each country differed.
Dissertation (MBA)--University of Pretoria, 2012.
Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS)
unrestricted
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Nicolas, Christina. "Formal and informal institutions, bank capital ratios and lending." Thesis, Limoges, 2019. http://www.theses.fr/2019LIMO0042.

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Cette thèse examine l'impact des institutions formelles et informelles sur les ratios de fonds propres et les prêts des banques. Elle est composée de trois essais empiriques. Le premier chapitre explore l'effet de la qualité juridique et institutionnelle formelle sur les ratios de fonds propres pondérés par rapport aux ratios de fonds propres non pondérés des banques dans la région du Moyen-Orient et de l'Afrique du Nord. Les résultats montrent que lorsque les marchés boursiers sont moins développés, les variables institutionnelles affectent de manière significative les ratios de fonds propres réglementaires pondérés par le risque, mais pas les ratios de levier. À l'inverse, lorsque les marchés boursiers sont plus développés, seuls les ratios de levier sont influencés par des facteurs institutionnels. Le deuxième chapitre parcourt la relation entre les ratios de fonds propres des banques, le cadre juridique et institutionnel et les prêts bancaires en utilisant un échantillon mondial de banques commerciales. Les résultats confirment que le développement institutionnel est un moteur important du crédit bancaire, tandis que l’effet des ratios de capital sur le crédit bancaire reste d’une importance mineure. Le troisième chapitre porte sur le rôle de la confiance dans le développement du crédit bancaire dans le monde. Les résultats confirment que la confiance Inter-groupe, la confiance envers les personnes que nous ne connaissons pas, renforce de manière significative les prêts bancaires dans les pays dans lesquels le développement institutionnel et judiciaire est relativement moins développé. En ce qui concerne la confiance intra-groupe, la confiance envers les personnes que nous connaissons, les résultats empiriques montrent qu’elle affecte indirectement le crédit bancaire en favorisant le développement du crédit informel
This dissertation examines the impact of formal and informal institutions on bank capital ratios and lending. It comprises three empirical essays. The first chapter explores the effect of the legal and institutional quality on bank risk-weighted capital ratios versus non risk-weighted capital ratios in the Middle East and North Africa region. The findings show that when stock markets are less developed, institutional variables significantly affect risk-weighted regulatory capital ratios but not leverage ratios. Conversely, when stock markets are more developed, only leverage ratios are influenced by institutional factors. The second chapter explores the relationship between bank capital ratios, the legal and institutional framework, and bank lending using a global sample of commercial banks. The results confirm that institutional development is a significant driver of bank lending while the effect of capital ratios on bank lending remains of minor importance. The third chapter focuses on the role of trust in bank lending development around the world. It provides evidence that Out-group trust, the trust in individuals we do not know, significantly boosts bank lending in countries with relatively lower levels of institutional and judicial development. As for In-group trust, the trust in individuals we know, evidence shows that it affects bank lending indirectly by favoring the development of informal lending
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Hellebrandt, da Silva Denis. "Informal institutions and adaptive livelihoods of fisherfolk in Southern Brazil." Thesis, University of East Anglia, 2010. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.527636.

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Roth, Benjamin N. (Benjamin Nathaniel). "Essays in informal finance and market design under weak institutions." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/111361.

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Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics, 2017.
Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references.
1. Keeping the Little Guy Down: A Debt Trap for Informal Lending -- 2. Targeting High Ability Entrepreneurs Using Community Information: Mechanism Design In The Field -- 3. Voluntary Market Design: Dominant Individual Rationality.
The essays in this thesis span two important and related themes in development economics: understanding and relaxing constraints to small scale entrepreneurship and designing markets in environments with weak institutional enforcement. Methodologically, the essays marshal both theory and field experimentation to study these issues. In joint work with Ernest Liu, Chapter 1 offers a new explanation for why microcredit and other forms of informal finance have so far failed to catalyze business growth among small scale entrepreneurs in the developing world, despite their high return to capital. We present a theory of informal lending that highlights two features of informal credit markets that cause them to operate inefficiently. First, borrowers and lenders bargain not only over division of surplus but also over contractual flexibility (the ease with which the borrower can invest to grow her business). Second, when the borrower's business becomes sufficiently large she exits the informal lending relationship and enters the formal sector - an undesirable event for her informal lender. We show that in Stationary Markov Perfect Equilibrium these two features lead to a poverty trap and study its properties. The theory facilitates reinterpretation of a number of empirical facts about microcredit: business growth resulting from microfinance is low on average but high for businesses that are already relatively large, and microlenders have experienced low demand for credit. The theory features nuanced comparative statics which provide a testable prediction and for which we establish novel empirical support. Using the Townsend Thai data and plausibly exogenous variation to the level of competition Thai money lenders face, we show that as predicted by our theory, money lenders in high competition environments impose fewer contractual restrictions on their borrowers. We discuss robustness and policy implications. In work with Reshmaan Hussam and Natalia Rigol, Chapter 2 explores a different facet of small-scale entrepreneurship. The impacts of cash grants and access to credit are known to vary widely, but progress on targeting these services to high-ability, reliable entrepreneurs is so far limited. We report on a field experiment in Maharashtra, India that assesses (1) whether community members have information about one another that can be used to identify high-ability microentrepreneurs, (2) whether organic incentives for community members to misreport their information obscure its value, and (3) whether simple techniques from mechanism design can be used to realign incentives for truthful reporting. We asked 1,380 respondents to rank their entrepreneur peers on various metrics of business profitability and growth potential. We also randomly distributed cash grants of about $100 to measure their marginal return to capital. We find that the information provided by community members is predictive of many key business and household characteristics including marginal return to capital. While on average the marginal return to capital is modest, preliminary estimates suggest that entrepreneurs given a community rank one standard deviation above the mean enjoy an 8.8% monthly marginal return to capital and those ranked two standard deviations above the mean enjoy a 13.9% monthly return. When respondents are told their reports influence the distribution of grants, we find a considerable degree of misreporting in favor of family members and close friends, which substantially diminishes the value of reports. Finally, we find that monetary incentives for accuracy, eliciting reports in public, and cross-reporting techniques motivated by implementation theory all significantly improve the accuracy of reports. In Chapter 3 I highlight an under appreciated facet of centralized market design of critical importance to developing economies with weak contract enforcement: often market designers cannot force participants to join a centralized market. I present a theory in which centralizing a market is akin to designing a mechanism to which people may voluntarily sign away their decision rights and propose a new desideratum for mechanism and market design, termed e-dominant individual rationality. Loosely, E-dominant individual rationality guarantees participation by assuring participants that each decentralized strategy is approximately dominated by a centralized strategy. I then provide two positive results about centralizing large markets. The first offers a novel justification for stable matching mechanisms and an insight to guide their design to achieve E-dominant individual rationality. The second result demonstrates that in large games, any mechanism with the property that every player wants to use it conditional on sufficiently many others using it as well can be modified to satisfy E-dominant individual rationality while preserving its behavior conditional on sufficient participation. The modification relies on a class of mechanisms we refer to as random threshold mechanisms and resembles insights from the differential privacy literature.
by Benjamin N. Roth.
Ph. D.
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Promise, Catherine Bilra. "Institutions and local government accountability in Uganda: a case study of Ntungamo district." University of the Western Cape, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/11394/7748.

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Magister Administrationis - MAdmin
After decades of seeking answers, without much success, to the development challenges facing third world countries, agencies such as the IMF and World Bank have turned increasingly in recent years to issues governance and accountability. In Africa especially, the failure of most development strategies has been attributed to governance issues such as democratic deficits, corruption and lack of political accountability among others. Uganda like several other African countries has been criticised for corruption - a sign that the country has a problem with the functioning of accountability and governance in general. In an attempt to find out whether the local government institutional mechanisms in Uganda embody possible explanations for weaknesses in political accountability, this study hypothesizes that institutional arrangements impact on downward accountability. While concentrating on the anatomy of institutions and the dimensions of accountability to which they relate, as well as on how the formal and informal institutions relate to each other, the study gives an insight into how institutions impact on downward answerability and enforceability at the local level in Uganda. Based on a thorough consideration of both the theoretical and empirical underpinnings of the concept of accountability, the study develops relevance criteria upon which an assessment of both formal and informal institutions' relevance for each of the dimensions of accountability is based. In both cases, formal institutions are found to be more relevant for accountability than informal ones. Critical issues about the capabilities of informal institutions are however raised, culminating in a discussion on the relationship between formal and informal institutions in the study area. While also considering other variables that interact with institutions in affecting accountability, the study calls for a re examination in the concepts under investigation namely 'institutions' and 'accountability'. The study concludes that problems of accountability can be accounted for by weaknesses in institutional design, conceptual weaknesses in the definition of accountability, as well as contextual factors such as resource constraints. In the light of this recognition, the study offers theoretical as well as policy level recommendation
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Ushakova, Yevgeniya. "The effects of the institutional context on a foreign company´s entry strategy when entering an emerging market : A case study: Väderstad-Verken AB." Thesis, Linköpings universitet, Företagsekonomi, 2015. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-119605.

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Background: More foreign companies expand into emerging markets and such markets differ from developed ones. Emerging markets present opportunities and challenges for foreign companies. Challenges include many environmental factors, cultural differences, economic uncertainties and weak institutions. Emerging markets are often characterized by underdeveloped formal institutions which result in the so called institutional voids. Informal institutions act as formal institutions and fill in these institutional voids. Foreign companies need to pay much attention to emerging economies institutions when selecting entry mode since the institutions affect their strategy and profitability. Aim: The purpose of my thesis is to investigate and analyze how aforeign company is affected by a host country’s institutional context when entering an emerging market. The thesis focuses on the emerging market of Russia and a case company. Conclusions: Institutions affect the steps taken in accordance with the Uppsalamodel. It is important to learn more about the institutions of a host country in choosing an entry mode. The weakness in property rights, risk of corruption, political and economic factors combined with networking were the dominant factors in choosing an entrymode. Väderstad suffers from institutional shocks in the Russian market and they affect the willingness to invest further.
Bakgrund: Mer företag expanderar till tillväxtmarknader och sådana marknader är annorlunda än utvecklade marknader. Tillväxtmarknader presenterar både möjligheter och utmaningar för företagen. Utmaningarna inkluderar omgivningsfaktorer, kulturella skillnader, ekonomisk osäkerhet och svaga institutioner. Tillväxtmarknader karakteriseras ofta av underutvecklade formella institutioner som kan resultera i institutionella tomrum. Informella institutioner verkar som formella för att fylla tomrummet. Utländska företag måste ge uppmärksamhet till institutionerna i tillväxtmarknader när de väljer etableringsform eftersom institutionerna påverkar både strategi och lönsamhet. Syfte: Syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka och analysera hur ett utländskt företag påverkas av ett värdlands institutionella sammanhang när det etablerar sig på en tillväxtmarknad. Uppsatsen fokuserar på tillväxtmarknaden Ryssland och ett fallföretag. Slutsats: Institutioner påverkade stegen i enlighet med Uppsalamodellen. Det är viktigt att lära sig mer om institutionerna för värdlandet när företaget väljer etableringsstrategi. Svag äganderätt, risk för korruption, politiska och ekonomiska faktorer kombinerat med närverksbyggande var dominanta faktorer i valet av etableringsform. Väderstad påverkas av institutionella chocker i Ryssland och det påverkar viljan att investera mer
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Books on the topic "Informal institutions"

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Bjarnegård, Elin. Gender, Informal Institutions and Political Recruitment. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137296740.

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Du, Xingqiang. On Informal Institutions and Accounting Behavior. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4462-4.

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Securing livelihoods: Informal economy practices and institutions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

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Securing livelihoods: Informal economy practices and institutions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.

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Informal institutions and rural development in China. New York, NY: Routledge, 2007.

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1967-, Helmke Gretchen, and Levitsky Steven 1968-, eds. Informal institutions and democracy: Lessons from Latin America. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006.

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Association for Social Advancement (Dhaka, Bangladesh), ed. ASA, innovations in informal finance. Dhaka: ASA, 1999.

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1950-, Webster Leila, and Fidler Peter 1972-, eds. The informal sector and microfinance institutions in West Africa. Washington, D.C: World Bank, 1996.

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Aryeetey, Ernest. Filling the niche: Informal finance in Africa. Nairobi, Kenya: East African Educational Publishers in association with African Economic Research Consortium, 1995.

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Tripp, Aili Mari. Non-formal institutions, informal economies, and the politics of inclusion. Helsinki: United Nations University, World Institute for Development Economics Research, 2001.

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Book chapters on the topic "Informal institutions"

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Isaacs, Rico. "Informal institutions." In A Critical Reader in Central Asian Studies, 98–117. London: Routledge, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003200338-6.

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Isaacs, Rico. "Informal institutions." In A Critical Reader in Central Asian Studies, 98–117. London: Routledge, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003200338-6.

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Espinoza, Vicente, and Emmanuelle Barozet. "Informal Political Institutions." In Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance, 1–6. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5_3167-1.

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Whalin, Douglas. "Formal and Informal Institutions." In Roman Identity from the Arab Conquests to the Triumph of Orthodoxy, 55–114. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-60906-1_3.

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Hedlund, Stefan. "The Elusive Informal Institutions." In Ukraine, Russia and the West, 153–77. London: Routledge, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003350613-10.

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Avritzer, Leonardo. "Informal Governance and Participatory Institutions." In The SAGE Handbook of Political Science, 1023–33. 1 Oliver's Yard, 55 City Road London EC1Y 1SP: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781529714333.n64.

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Henningsen, Troels Burchall. "Betting on institutions or persons?" In Western Intervention and Informal Politics, 179–94. London: Routledge, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003204978-8.

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Greven, Thomas. "Organizing the Informal Economy in Senegal." In Work, Institutions and Sustainable Livelihood, 303–22. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-5756-4_12.

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Li, Peilin. "Informal Institutions and Village Social Networks." In Urban Village Renovation, 79–89. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8971-3_9.

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Kisiel, James. "Reframing Collaborations with Informal Science Institutions." In Putting Theory into Practice, 55–75. Rotterdam: SensePublishers, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6091-964-0_6.

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Conference papers on the topic "Informal institutions"

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Mikhailov, Vyacheslav. "Formation Of Informal Institutions Of Innovative Behavior." In IV International Scientific Conference "Competitiveness and the development of socio-economic systems" dedicated to the memory of Alexander Tatarkin. European Publisher, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.15405/epsbs.2021.04.69.

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Cieslewska, Anna. "Tradition and Poverty Reduction – Mahalla and its Significance in Development Process in Tajikistan." In International Conference on Eurasian Economies. Eurasian Economists Association, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.36880/c01.00200.

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Significance of mahalla as informal social, self-governing institution has increased due to a variety of factors related to the post-transitional changes in Tajikistan. The phenomenon of existence of informal self-government bodies has not been only exclusive to Central Asia or Tajikistan. However, in a case of Central Asia, those institutions have always played significant role in maintaining social order and frequently they are more legitimized in the eyes of local residents than the formally established self-government. Recently, the government of Tajikistan has attempted to incorporate the elements of (indigenous) self-governmental institutions into the formal self-government’s structures. Also, international organizations try to integrate mahalla as important element which would facilitate development’s process. Identification of potential of this old institution could become a good base for poverty reduction and social programs.
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Zhghenti, Tsotne. "Trust as Accelerator of Informal Institutions (The case of Georgian Economy)." In International Conference on Applied Research in Management, Economics and Accounting. ACAVENT, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.33422/iarmea.2018.09.24.

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Xhemaili, Sejdi. "Informal Economy and Its Effects on Institutions in Republic of Macedonia." In University for Business and Technology International Conference. Pristina, Kosovo: University for Business and Technology, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.33107/ubt-ic.2018.298.

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Harvey, Jen, Claire McAvinia, Kevin O'Rourke, and Jason FitzSimmons. "Transforming spaces: Fostering student-centered learning through the intentional design of formal and informal learning spaces." In Learning Connections 2019: Spaces, People, Practice. University College Cork||National Forum for the Enhancement of Teaching and Learning in Higher Education, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.33178/lc2019.24.

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Transforming the academic experience and success of students by building Active Learning Classrooms (ALCs) is increasing, but ALCs are still fewer than traditional classroom spaces. These new learning spaces create an inherent tension between increasing student enrollments and active learning environments. Accommodating increased class sizes does not have to exclude fostering an active learning space. We have an opportunity every time a classroom is renovated or a new building is built to intentionally acknowledge and engage this tension to positively influence student learning and success. As we renovate and construct new learning spaces on our campuses, it is not only important to understand how the “built pedagogy” (Monahan 2000, 2002) and “architecture as pedagogy” (Orr 1993, 1997) of our spaces can help or hinder more active learning pedagogies, but also how to support effective teaching in these spaces (Levesque-Bristol, 2019). While many institutions are prioritizing active learning as old classrooms get renovated, few are doing so at the broad campus-wide scope necessary to affect larger-scale culture change (Park & Choi, 2014). Two such institutions that are developing and supporting large-scale active learning spaces are the Technological University Dublin (TU Dublin) and Purdue University (Indiana, USA). TU Dublin and Purdue are conducting collaborative research focusing on how each institution’s new, large-scale construction of formal and informal learning spaces is impacting teaching and learning.
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Plopeanu, Aurelian-Petruș. "The Role of Informal Institutions in the Spread of Capitalism. The Case of Religion." In The 5th International Virtual Scientific Conference. Publishing Society, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.18638/ictic.2016.5.1.298.

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Konovalova, Maria Evgenievna, and Anton Valerevich Larionov. "AMBIVALENCE OF THE PROCESS OF FORMING AN INTELLECTUAL COMPANY CAPITAL." In Russian science: actual researches and developments. Samara State University of Economics, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.46554/russian.science-2020.03-1-866/870.

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The article is devoted to the study of the process of formation and development of intellectual capital. It is proved that this process is immanent ambivalence, which, on the one hand the formation of new institutions as a result of accumulated intellectual capital, and with another - rulemaking process of intellectual production by using existing formal and informal institutions
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Helling, H. E., and E. M. Solomon. "Bridging the gap between ocean science and education: creating effective partnerships through informal educational institutions." In Oceans 2003. Celebrating the Past ... Teaming Toward the Future (IEEE Cat. No.03CH37492). IEEE, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/oceans.2003.178311.

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Ellis, Ruel. "STIMULATING REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CASE FOR INFORMAL SCIENCE EDUCATION." In International Conference on Emerging Trends in Engineering & Technology (IConETech-2020). Faculty of Engineering, The University of the West Indies, St. Augustine, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.47412/zgpt3042.

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The Purpose of this paper is to propose a collaborative model in support of the sustainable economic development of Small Island Developing States (SIDS) in the Caribbean through the collaboration of The National Institute of Higher Education Research, Science and Technology and Tertiary Level Institutions (TLIs) in the Caribbean in an eco-system which outputs informal science education technologies. The methodology utilized in the development of this paper is mainly desk research of literature which link economic development to education. The findings suggest that the early introduction of students to science education impacts their choice and curricula, and a curricular which supports the knowledge economy is one which will foster economic sustainability in the modern world.
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Dhamo, Sotir, Valerio Perna, and Ledian Bregasi. "Non-Cooperative and Repetitive Games for Urban Conflicts in Tirana: A Playful Collaborative System to Lower Social Tension." In International Conference on the 4th Game Set and Match (GSM4Q-2019). Qatar University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.29117/gsm4q.2019.0039.

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Game Theory (GT) offers a critical lens to understand and analyze the capacity of different actors to make rational decisions linked to complex and emergent situations. Even though developed as a theory to tackle economic issues, GT has found a wider range of applications in heterogeneous fields such as architecture, where this new transdisciplinary tool can be used to address topics such as urban planning and public participation. The objectives of these researches aim for avoiding ghettoization, lowering social tension, and conflicts, and for proposing long-term solutions in a reality where the lack of authority has led to the development of closed informal clusters at the outskirts of the city. In this paper, we present the city of Tirana as a case study to develop our speculative research in an operative field that blends GT, computational design, and morphological/behavioral patterns. Non-cooperative and repetitive games are useful tools to identify generative patterns in the Albanian informal settlements, with the certainty that even the most spontaneous ones carry within them positive enzymes that can be taken into account to re-organize the informal settlements either spatially, socially, and economically (Dhamo, 2017, 2021). We propose a set of operative categories, filtered through the lens of GT and playful dynamics and mechanics, to set the debate for a deeper understanding of the reality of informal areas and foster co-design processes, from the perspective that collective interest is a key to let professionals, institutions and citizens work together in a more informed process of city-making.
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Reports on the topic "Informal institutions"

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Hartman, Alexandra, Robert Blair, and Christopher Blattman. Engineering Informal Institutions: Long-run Impacts of Alternative Dispute Resolution on Violence and Property Rights in Liberia. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, April 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w24482.

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van den Boogaard, Vanessa, and Fabrizio Santoro. Explaining Informal Taxation and Revenue Generation: Evidence from south-central Somalia. Institute of Development Studies, March 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.19088/ictd.2021.003.

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Most people in low-income countries contribute substantially to the financing of local public goods through informal revenue generation (IRG). However, very little is known about how IRG works in practice. We produce novel evidence on the magnitude and regressivity of IRG and its relationship with the state in a fragile context, Somalia. We rely on original data from surveys with over 2,300 households and 117 community leaders in Gedo region, as well as on extensive qualitative research. We first show that IRG is prevalent. Over 70 per cent of households report paying at least one informal tax or fee in the previous year, representing on average 9.5 per cent of annual income. We also find that, among households that contribute, poorer ones contribute larger amounts than richer ones, with higher incidence in relation to their income. Further, in line with theory and expectations, informal payments have inequitable community-level effects, with individuals in wealthier communities making more informal payments than in poorer ones and, correspondingly, having access to a greater number of public goods. We then consider four explanations for the prevalence of IRG. First, IRG clearly fills gaps left by weak state capacity. Relatedly, we show that IRG can bolster perceptions and legitimacy of the state, indicating that sub-national governments may actually benefit from informal taxation. Second, informal taxing authorities are more effective tax collectors than the state, with informal taxing authorities having greater legitimacy and taxpayers perceiving informal payments to be fairer than those levied by the state. Third, dispelling the possibility that informal payments should be classified as user fees, taxpayers overwhelmingly expect nothing in return for their contributions. Fourth, in contrast to hypotheses that informal payments may be voluntary, taxpayers associate informal payments with punishment and informal institutions of enforcement. Our research reinforces the importance of IRG to public goods provision in weak formal institutional contexts, to everyday citizens, and to policymakers attempting to extend the influence of the federal state in south-central Somalia. Foremost, informal tax institutions need to be incorporated within analyses of taxation, service delivery, social protection, and equity. At the same time, our findings of the complementary nature of IRG and district-level governance and of the relative efficiency of revenue generation by local leaders have important implications for understanding statebuilding processes from below. Indeed, our findings suggest that governments may have little incentive to extend their taxing authority in some fragile contexts.
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Hoke, Kelly, and Julie Risien. Grounding Institutional Partnerships in Structures for Broader Impact Design: Summative Evaluation Report. Oregon State University, July 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.5399/osu/1151.

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This report presents summative evaluation results for a National Science Foundation funded project entitled Grounding Institutional Partnerships in Structures for Broader Impacts Design (BID). The project represents a collaboration between five institutions: Institute for Learning Innovation, The STEM Research Center at Oregon State University, Scicenter, University of Washington-Bothell, and University of Wisconsin-Madison. BID aimed at creating an inter-institutional structure and toolkit to assist higher education institutions (HEIs) and informal science education organizations (ISEs) in developing sustainable institutional partnerships through collaboration around the design of informal STEM education-based Broader Impacts (BI) experiences. The project built upon the Portal to the Public (PoP) framework, bringing together research support professionals, STEM education professionals and Principal Investigators at HEIs with practitioners at ISEs (i.e., BID partners) to enhance BI experiences for the public by leveraging human resources through intentional coordination and partnerships. This report addresses the impact of this collective work, serves as a record of the project, and as a resource for future partnerships that support BI.
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van den Boogaard,, Vanessa, and Fabrizio Santoro. Co-Financing Community-Driven Development Through Informal Taxation: Experimental Evidence from South-Central Somalia. Institute of Development Studies (IDS), September 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.19088/ictd.2021.016.

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Community contributions are often required as part of community-driven development (CDD) programmes, with payment encouraged through matching grants. However, little remains known about the impact of matching grants, or the implications of requiring community contributions in order for communities to receive development funding. This paper describes research where we partner with two non-governmental organisations (NGOs) – one international and one Somali – and undertake a randomised control trial of a CDD matching grant programme designed to incentivise informal contributions for local public goods in Gedo region in south-central Somalia. We rely on household survey data collected from 1,297 respondents in 31 treatment and 31 control communities, as well as surveys of village leaders and data on informal contributions from the mobile money platform used by community leaders to collect revenue. Two key findings emerge. First, our research shows that working with communities and incentivising informal revenue generation can be an effective way to deliver public goods and to support citizens and communities. Second, building on research exploring the potential for development interventions to spur virtuous or adverse cycles of governance, we show that development partners may work directly with community leaders and informal taxing institutions without necessarily undermining – and indeed perhaps strengthening – state legitimacy and related ongoing processes of statebuilding in the country. Indeed, despite playing no direct role in the matching grant programme, taxpayer perceptions of the legitimacy of the local government improved as a result of the programme. These findings deepen our understanding of how community contributions may be incentivised through matching grant programmes, and how they may contribute to CDD and public goods provision in a context of weak institutional capacity.
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SUN, JUNJIANG, GUOPING QIAN, Shuqi Yue, and Anna szumilewicz. Factors influencing physical activity in pregnant women from the perspective of a socio-ecological model: A systematic review. INPLASY - International Platform of Registered Systematic Review and Meta-analysis Protocols, November 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.37766/inplasy2022.11.0073.

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Review question / Objective: The main aim of this review is to analyse the impact factors of material physical activity in an ecological model and to analyse differences in influencing factors between pregnant women's PA and moderate-to-vigorous intensity physical activity (MVPA) , provide a reference for the research, intervention, and policy designation of maternal physical activity. Rationale: In combination with McLeroy et al. (1988)behavior is viewed as being determined by the following: (1) Personal level: the internal factors of the individual characteristics,(sociodemographic and biological, behavior, psychological ); (2) interpersonal level: interpersonal processes and primary groups-formal and informal social network and social support systems,(eg: family、public, etc.); (3)organization level: social institutions with organizational characteristics, such as health services, gyms and may also include influences from health care providers and Physical activity consultant, etc.; (4) community level: relationships among organizations, institutions, and informal networks within defined boundaries,(eg: appropriate facilities、living environment, etc.); and finally (5) public policy level: local, state, and national laws and policies.
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Terzyan, Aram. Post-Soviet State - Building in Kyrgyzstan: Behind and Beyond the Revolutions. Eurasia Institutes, April 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.47669/caps-1-2021.

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This paper explores post-Soviet state-building in Kyrgyzstan, with a focus on the root causes of the three revolutions faced by the country. It suggests that the revolutions have not produced significant results in terms of fundamental economic and political reforms. Rather, Kyrgyzstan has turned into the Central Asian “island of instability”. The situation is compounded by deep- rooted inter-ethnic tensions, the prevalence of traditional informal institutions and weakness of democratic institutions, as well as country’s heavy reliance on international donors. The presidential elections and constitutional referendum of 2021 have provided grounds for cautious optimism. A question remains of whether and to what extent Sadyr Japarov’s ambitious agenda will translate into reality, thus leading the country to prosperity and stability.
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Carter, Becky. Women’s and Girls’ Experiences of Security and Justice in Somaliland. Institute of Development Studies (IDS), February 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.19088/k4d.2021.077.

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This rapid review seeks to provide an overview of the publicly available literature from the academic, donor, and non-government organisation sources on women’s and girls’ experiences of statutory and customary security and justice in Somaliland. In Somaliland women and girls experience poor security, with high rates of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), and significant barriers to gender equality in the pluralistic legal system. The predominant clan-based customary justice system, along with conservative social norms and religious beliefs, discriminates against women and girls, while weak formal state institutions are not able to deliver accessible and effective justice for vulnerable and marginalised groups. Social stigma silences SGBV survivors and their families, with many rape crimes resolved through customary compensation or marriage. National and international organisations have undertaken various activities to promote gender equality in security and justice, with support provided to formal and informal security and justice institutions and actors at national and local levels, as well as initiatives to empower women and girls.
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Raei, Lamia. Exploring the Links: Youth participation and employment opportunities in Jordan. Oxfam IBIS, August 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.21201/2021.7981.

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Oxfam partners with the Jordanian Hashemite Fund for Human Development (JOHUD) through its Youth Participation and Employment (YPE) programme in order to connect with communities and train local community-based organizations (CBOs). JOHUD’s aim is to build the job-seeking capacity of youth in four governorates in Jordan. The programme organizes informal activities involving peer-to-peer education to help young people engage in the community as volunteers, and links them to various governmental and non-governmental institutions. COVID-19 and the associated lockdowns have altered the organization’s operations, with most projects shifting online. JOHUD has adopted a youth-led initiative aimed at matching young people’s skills with labour-market demand in each governorate where the programme operates. This case study presents examples of how the programme has helped young people transform into professionals, and how youth-led employment centres can contribute to youth development activities.
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Harriss-White, Barbara, and Gilbert Rodrigo. ‘Pudumai’ - Innovation and Institutional Churning in India's Informal Economy: A report from the field. Unknown, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.35648/20.500.12413/11781/ii212.

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Bano, Masooda, and Zeena Oberoi. Embedding Innovation in State Systems: Lessons from Pratham in India. Research on Improving Systems of Education (RISE), December 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.35489/bsg-rise-wp_2020/058.

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The learning crisis in many developing countries has led to searches for innovative teaching models. Adoption of innovation, however, disrupts routine and breaks institutional inertia, requiring government employees to change their way of working. Introducing and embedding innovative methods for improving learning outcomes within state institutions is thus a major challenge. For NGO-led innovation to have largescale impact, we need to understand: (1) what factors facilitate its adoption by senior bureaucracy and political elites; and (2) how to incentivise district-level field staff and school principals and teachers, who have to change their ways of working, to implement the innovation? This paper presents an ethnographic study of Pratham, one of the most influential NGOs in the domain of education in India today, which has attracted growing attention for introducing an innovative teaching methodology— Teaching at the Right Level (TaRL) – with evidence of improved learning outcomes among primary-school students and adoption by a number of states in India. The case study suggests that while a combination of factors, including evidence of success, ease of method, the presence of a committed bureaucrat, and political opportunity are key to state adoption of an innovation, exposure to ground realities, hand holding and confidence building, informal interactions, provision of new teaching resources, and using existing lines of communication are core to ensuring the co-operation of those responsible for actual implementation. The Pratham case, however, also confirms existing concerns that even when NGO-led innovations are successfully implemented at a large scale, their replication across the state and their sustainability remain a challenge. Embedding good practice takes time; the political commitment leading to adoption of an innovation is often, however, tied to an immediate political opportunity being exploited by the political elites. Thus, when political opportunity rather than a genuine political will creates space for adoption of an innovation, state support for that innovation fades away before the new ways of working can replace the old habits. In contexts where states lack political will to improve learning outcomes, NGOs can only hope to make systematic change in state systems if, as in the case of Pratham, they operate as semi-social movements with large cadres of volunteers. The network of volunteers enables them to slow down and pick up again in response to changing political contexts, instead of quitting when state actors withdraw. Involving the community itself does not automatically lead to greater political accountability. Time-bound donor-funded NGO projects aiming to introduce innovation, however large in scale, simply cannot succeed in bringing about systematic change, because embedding change in state institutions lacking political will requires years of sustained engagement.
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