Relevant bibliographies by topics / Infinitely repeated game

Academic literature on the topic 'Infinitely repeated game'

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Published: 10 December 2022
Last updated: 29 January 2023

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Journal articles on the topic "Infinitely repeated game"

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PETROSJAN, L. A., and L. V. GRAUER. "STRONG NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN MULTISTAGE GAMES." International Game Theory Review 04, no. 03 (September 2002): 255–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198902000689.

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Infinite multistage games G with games Γ(·) played on each stage are considered. The definition of path and trajectory in graph tree are introduced. For infinite multistage games G a regularization procedure is introduced and in the regularizied game a strong Nash Equilibrium (coalition proof) is constructed. The approach considered in this paper is similar to one used in the proof of Folk theorems for infinitely repeated games. The repeated n-person "Prisoner's Dilemma" game is considered, as a special case. For this game a strong Nash Equilibrium is found.
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Andersen, Garrett, and Vincent Conitzer. "Fast Equilibrium Computation for Infinitely Repeated Games." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 27, no. 1 (June 30, 2013): 53–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v27i1.8573.

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It is known that an equilibrium of an infinitely repeated two-player game (with limit average payoffs) can be computed in polynomial time, as follows: according to the folk theorem, we compute minimax strategies for both players to calculate the punishment values, and subsequently find a mixture over outcomes that exceeds these punishment values. However, for very large games, even computing minimax strategies can be prohibitive. In this paper, we propose an algorithmic framework for computing equilibria of repeated games that does not require linear programming and that does not necessarily need to inspect all payoffs of the game. This algorithm necessarily sometimes fails to compute an equilibrium, but we mathematically demonstrate that most of the time it succeeds quickly on uniformly random games, and experimentally demonstrate this for other classes of games. This also holds for games with more than two players, for which no efficient general algorithms are known.
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Rubinstein, Ariel, and Asher Wolinsky. "Remarks on Infinitely Repeated Extensive-Form Games." Games and Economic Behavior 9, no. 1 (April 1995): 110–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1995.1007.

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Watson, Joel. "Cooperation in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoners′ Dilemma with Perturbations." Games and Economic Behavior 7, no. 2 (September 1994): 260–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1994.1049.

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Dal Bó, Pedro, and Guillaume R. Fréchette. "On the Determinants of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: A Survey." Journal of Economic Literature 56, no. 1 (March 1, 2018): 60–114. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jel.20160980.

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A growing experimental literature studies the determinants of cooperation in infinitely repeated games, tests different predictions of the theory, and suggests an empirical solution to the problem of multiple equilibria. To provide a robust description of the literature's findings, we gather and analyze a metadata set of experiments on infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games. The experimental data show that cooperation is affected by infinite repetition and is more likely to arise when it can be supported in equilibrium. However, the fact that cooperation can be supported in equilibrium does not imply that most subjects will cooperate. High cooperation rates will emerge only when the parameters of the repeated game are such that cooperation is very robust to strategic uncertainty. We also review the results regarding the effect of imperfect monitoring, changing partners, and personal characteristics on cooperation and the strategies used to support it. (JEL C71, C73, D81, D83)
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Lehrer, Ehud. "Finitely Many Players with Bounded Recall in Infinitely Repeated Games." Games and Economic Behavior 7, no. 3 (November 1994): 390–405. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1994.1058.

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Häckner, Jonas. "Endogenous product design in an infinitely repeated game." International Journal of Industrial Organization 13, no. 2 (June 1995): 277–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0167-7187(94)00451-7.

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Liu, Jian, Yinzhen Li, and Jun Li. "Coopetition in Intermodal Freight Transport Services." Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 2015 (2015): 1–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2015/680685.

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The paper studies the coopetition of the downstream different carriers by providing complementary transport services in intermodal freight transport chain. Considering different information structure, a two-stage dynamic game model with simultaneous actions on investment and price is first formulated. Equilibria show both parties have motivation to select coopetition even if the agreement for cooperation investment is reached in advance. When both firms agree on the specific allocation, the new coopetition with higher efficiency would be emerged. Moreover, we analyze the complexity and evolution of coopetition by repeated pricing game with finitely and infinitely time horizon. In the finitely repeated pricing game, both firms have incentive to reach a tacit understanding to alternate choosing price cooperation and competition after setting suitable allocation scheme; the repeated periodstare then going to be an issue. In the infinitely repeated pricing game, the perfect cooperation is realized by designing the suitable trigger strategy.
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Kufel, Tadeusz, Sławomir Plaskacz, and Joanna Zwierzchowska. "Strong and Safe Nash Equilibrium in Some Repeated 3-Player Games." Przegląd Statystyczny 65, no. 3 (January 30, 2019): 271–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0014.0540.

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The paper examines an infinitely repeated 3-player extension of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. We consider a 3-player game in the normal form with incomplete information, in which each player has two actions. We assume that the game is symmetric and repeated infinitely many times. At each stage, players make their choices knowing only the average payoffs from previous stages of all the players. A strategy of a player in the repeated game is a function defined on the convex hull of the set of payoffs. Our aim is to construct a strong Nash equilibrium in the repeated game, i.e. a strategy profile being resistant to deviations by coalitions. Constructed equilibrium strategies are safe, i.e. the non-deviating player payoff is not smaller than the equilibrium payoff in the stage game, and deviating players’ payoffs do not exceed the nondeviating player payoff more than by a positive constant which can be arbitrary small and chosen by the non-deviating player. Our construction is inspired by Smale’s good strategies described in Smale’s paper (1980), where the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma was considered. In proofs we use arguments based on approachability and strong approachability type results.
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Dargaj, Jakub, and Jakob Grue Simonsen. "Discounted Repeated Games Having Computable Strategies with No Computable Best Response under Subgame-Perfect Equilibria." ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation 10, no. 1 (March 31, 2022): 1–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3505585.

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A classic result in computational game theory states that there are infinitely repeated games where one player has a computable strategy that has a best response, but no computable best response. For games with discounted payoff, the result is known to hold for a specific class of games—essentially generalizations of Prisoner’s Dilemma—but until now, no necessary and sufficient condition is known. To be of any value, the computable strategy having no computable best response must be part of a subgame-perfect equilibrium, as otherwise a rational, self-interested player would not play the strategy. We give the first necessary and sufficient conditions for a two-player repeated game \( G \) to have such a computable strategy with no computable best response for all discount factors above some threshold. The conditions involve existence of a Nash equilibrium of the repeated game whose discounted payoffs satisfy certain conditions involving the min–max payoffs of the underlying stage game. We show that it is decidable in polynomial time in the size of the payoff matrix of \( G \) whether it satisfies these conditions.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Infinitely repeated game"

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Tse, Tsz Kwan. "Strategy Analysis of Infinitely Repeated Public Goods Game and Infinitely Repeated Transboundary Public Goods Game." Kyoto University, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/2433/245306.

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付記する学位プログラム名: グローバル生存学大学院連携プログラム
Kyoto University (京都大学)
0048
新制・課程博士
博士(経済学)
甲第22111号
経博第604号
新制||経||291(附属図書館)
京都大学大学院経済学研究科経済学専攻
(主査)教授 依田 高典, 教授 岡 敏弘, 講師 五十川 大也
学位規則第4条第1項該当
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Ben, Henda Noomene. "Infinite-state Stochastic and Parameterized Systems." Doctoral thesis, Uppsala University, Department of Information Technology, 2008. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-8915.

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A major current challenge consists in extending formal methods in order to handle infinite-state systems. Infiniteness stems from the fact that the system operates on unbounded data structure such as stacks, queues, clocks, integers; as well as parameterization.

Systems with unbounded data structure are natural models for reasoning about communication protocols, concurrent programs, real-time systems, etc. While parameterized systems are more suitable if the system consists of an arbitrary number of identical processes which is the case for cache coherence protocols, distributed algorithms and so forth.

In this thesis, we consider model checking problems for certain fundamental classes of probabilistic infinite-state systems, as well as the verification of safety properties in parameterized systems. First, we consider probabilistic systems with unbounded data structures. In particular, we study probabilistic extensions of Lossy Channel Systems (PLCS), Vector addition Systems with States (PVASS) and Noisy Turing Machine (PNTM). We show how we can describe the semantics of such models by infinite-state Markov chains; and then define certain abstract properties, which allow model checking several qualitative and quantitative problems.

Then, we consider parameterized systems and provide a method which allows checking safety for several classes that differ in the topologies (linear or tree) and the semantics (atomic or non-atomic). The method is based on deriving an over-approximation which allows the use of a symbolic backward reachability scheme. For each class, the over-approximation we define guarantees monotonicity of the induced approximate transition system with respect to an appropriate order. This property is convenient in the sense that it preserves upward closedness when computing sets of predecessors.

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Books on the topic "Infinitely repeated game"

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Datta, Saikat. On connections betwen renegotiation proof sets of long finitely and infinitely repeated games with low discounting. London: Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, 1996.

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Book chapters on the topic "Infinitely repeated game"

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Velner, Yaron. "The Complexity of Infinitely Repeated Alternating Move Games." In Automata, Languages, and Programming, 816–27. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-39206-1_69.

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Lam, Ka-man, and Ho-fung Leung. "Formalizing Risk Strategies and Risk Strategy Equilibrium in Agent Interactions Modeled as Infinitely Repeated Games." In Agent Computing and Multi-Agent Systems, 138–49. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/11802372_16.

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"Infinitely repeated games." In The Theory of Social Situations, 146–56. Cambridge University Press, 1990. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139173759.010.

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Conference papers on the topic "Infinitely repeated game"

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Fang, Yong. "Optimal Strategy of Service Recovery for On-line Shops: Based on Infinitely Repeated Game." In 2011 Fourth International Joint Conference on Computational Sciences and Optimization (CSO). IEEE, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/cso.2011.191.

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Feldotto, Matthias, and Alexander Skopalik. "A Simulation Framework for Analyzing Complex Infinitely Repeated Games." In 4th International Conference on Simulation and Modeling Methodologies, Technologies and Applications. SCITEPRESS - Science and Technology Publications, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.5220/0005110406250630.

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Zhang Xianzhe and Ni Yanling. "Mechanism of agent evaluation based on infinite repeated game." In 2016 13th International Conference on Service Systems and Service Management (ICSSSM). IEEE, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icsssm.2016.7538545.

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Dong, Hongcheng, and Yifen Mu. "The optimal strategy against Fictitious Play in infinitely repeated games." In 2022 41st Chinese Control Conference (CCC). IEEE, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.23919/ccc55666.2022.9902863.

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Madhumidha, K., N. Vijayarangan, K. Padmanabhan, B. Satish, N. Kartick, and Viswanath Ganesan. "Probabilistic Tit-for-Tat Strategy versus Nash Equilibrium for Infinitely Repeated Games." In 2017 International Conference on Computational Science and Computational Intelligence (CSCI). IEEE, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/csci.2017.26.

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Jianye Hao and Ho-Fung Leung. "Incorporating Fairness into Infinitely Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests for Conflicts Elimination." In 2012 IEEE 24th International Conference on Tools with Artificial Intelligence (ICTAI 2012). IEEE, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ictai.2012.50.

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Lam, Ka-man, and Ho-fu Leung. "Incorporating Risk Attitude and Reputation into Infinitely Repeated Games and an Analysis on the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma." In 19th IEEE International Conference on Tools with Artificial Intelligence(ICTAI 2007). IEEE, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ictai.2007.61.

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Wang, Zhen, Chunjiang Mu, Shuyue Hu, Chen Chu, and Xuelong Li. "Modelling the Dynamics of Regret Minimization in Large Agent Populations: a Master Equation Approach." In Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-22}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2022/76.

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Understanding the learning dynamics in multiagent systems is an important and challenging task. Past research on multi-agent learning mostly focuses on two-agent settings. In this paper, we consider the scenario in which a population of infinitely many agents apply regret minimization in repeated symmetric games. We propose a new formal model based on the master equation approach in statistical physics to describe the evolutionary dynamics in the agent population. Our model takes the form of a partial differential equation, which describes how the probability distribution of regret evolves over time. Through experiments, we show that our theoretical results are consistent with the agent-based simulation results.
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Dargaj, Jakub, and Jakob Grue Simonsen. "A Complete Characterization of Infinitely Repeated Two-Player Games having Computable Strategies with no Computable Best Response under Limit-of-Means Payoff." In EC '20: The 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3391403.3399520.

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