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Journal articles on the topic 'Inferentialsm'

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Author: Grafiati

Published: 10 December 2022

Last updated: 28 January 2023

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1

Bonilla, Jesús Zamora. "Science as a Persuasion Game: An Inferentialist Approach." Episteme 2, no. 3 (October 2006): 189–201. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/epi.2005.2.3.189.

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ABSTRACTScientific research is reconstructed as a language game along the lines of Robert Brandom's inferentialism. Researchers are assumed to aim at persuading their colleagues of the validity of some claims. The assertions each scientist is allowed or committed to make depend on her previous claims and on the inferential norms of her research community. A classification of the most relevant types of inferential rules governing such a game is offered, and some ways in which this inferentialist approach can be used for assessing scientific knowledge and practices are explored. Some similarities and differences with a game-theoretic analysis are discussed.

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2

Lo Presti, Patrizio. "Leave inference alone: Direct inferential social cognition." Theory & Psychology 30, no. 2 (March 5, 2020): 186–201. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0959354320908337.

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Direct perception and theory–theory approaches to social cognition are opposed with respect to whether social cognition is inferential. The latter argues that it is inferential, the former that it is not. This article argues that the opposition in terms of inference is mistaken. A sense of inference is specified on which social cognition can be inferential and directly perceptual. Arguing for inferential social cognition does not commit to a defense of indirect social cognition if inferential access to other minds can be direct. Contrary convictions are symptomatic of working with too simplistic a notion of inference. The dispute between direct and inferentialist social cognition is one in which both sides can be right. The argument, then, is that inferentialism should not be called on to witness in favor or disfavor of advocates of either direct or indirect social cognition.

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Veluwenkamp, Herman. "Inferentialist Truth Pluralism." Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24, no. 1 (February 3, 2021): 107–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10677-020-10145-5.

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AbstractMetasemantic inferentialism has gained popularity in the last few decades. Traditionally, inferentialism is combined with a deflationary attitude towards semantic terms such as truth and reference, i.e., many inferentialists hold that when we use these semantic terms we do not purport to refer to substantive properties. This combination makes inferentialism attractive for philosophers who see themselves as antirealists. Although the attractions of combining inferentialism and deflationism are easy to see, deflationism is also a controversial position. For one, deflationists maintain that truth is an insubstantive property, but it is not altogether clear what an insubstantive property is. Secondly, as deflationists maintain that truth does not play an explanatory role, it is incompatible with the position that truth can explain the normativity of truth talk. Given that deflationism faces these objections, it would be preferable if the success of inferentialism did not depend on the deflationist’s ability to respond to these objections. I argue that someone attracted to inferentialism for its ability to accommodate antirealist intuitions about a domain (e.g. morality) is not committed to deflationism about truth. More specifically, I will show that inferentialism combined with a straightforward account of inferentialist truth-conditions is compatible with a version of truth pluralism. I call this position Inferentialist Truth Pluralism.

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4

Calude, Andreea S., and Gerald P. Delahunty. "Inferentials in spoken English." Pragmatics. Quarterly Publication of the International Pragmatics Association (IPrA) 21, no. 3 (September 1, 2011): 307–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/prag.21.3.02cal.

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Although there is a growing body of research on inferential sentences (Declerck 1992, Delahunty 1990, 1995, 2001, Koops 2007, Pusch 2006), most of this research has been on their forms and functions in written discourse. This has left a gap with regards to their range of structural properties and allowed disagreement over their analysis to linger without a conclusive resolution. Most accounts regard the inferential as a type of it-cleft (Declerck 1992, Delahunty 2001, Huddleston and Pullum 2002, Lambrecht 2001), while a few view it as an instance of extraposition (Collins 1991, Schmid 2009). More recently, Pusch’s work in Romance languages proposes the inferential is used as a discourse marker (2006, forthcoming). Based on a corpus study of examples from spoken New Zealand English, the current paper provides a detailed analysis of the formal and discoursal properties of several sub-types of inferentials (positive, negative, as if and like inferentials). We show that despite their apparent formal differences from the prototypical cleft, inferentials are nevertheless best analysed as a type of cleft, though this requires a minor reinterpretation of “cleft construction.” We show how similar the contextualized interpretations of clefts and inferentials are and how these are a function of their lexis and syntax.

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Peregrin, Jaroslav. "Inferentialism Naturalized." Philosophical Topics 50, no. 1 (2022): 33–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtopics20225013.

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Brandom’s inferentialism explains meaning in terms of inferential rules. As he insists that “the normative” (including meanings) is not reducible to “the natural,” inferentialism would seem an unlikely ally of naturalism. However, in this paper I suggest that Brandom’s theory of language harbors insights which can promote a naturalistic theory of meaning and language, and that a naturalistic version of Brandom’s inferentialism might have great potential. Also I sketch the lines along which such a theory could be built.

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6

McDowell, John. "Motivating inferentialism." Pragmatics of Making it Explicit 13, no. 1 (August 8, 2005): 121–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/pc.13.1.10mcd.

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Brandom’s attempt to motivate inferentialism is found wanting on a number of grounds, including a skepticism about how much recommendation for inferentialism can be derived from the evident unsatisfactoriness of the representationalism Brandom contrasts it with, which seems to be a straw man. Brandom’s appeal to authorities (Sellars, Frege, Dummett) falls flat; in particular, his reading of Frege’s early work as inferentialist in Brandom’s sense is a misinterpretation. Given the programmatic character of Brandom’s recommendation for inferentialism, the quality of the motivation he offers for it matters more than he has acknowledged.

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Khalifa, Kareem, Jared Millson, and Mark Risjord. "Scientific Representation: An Inferentialist-Expressivist Manifesto." Philosophical Topics 50, no. 1 (2022): 263–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtopics202250112.

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This essay presents a fully inferentialist-expressivist account of scientific representation. In general, inferentialist approaches to scientific representation argue that the capacity of a model to represent a target system depends on inferences from models to target systems (surrogative inference). Inferentialism is attractive because it makes the epistemic function of models central to their representational capacity. Prior inferentialist approaches to scientific representation, however, have depended on some representational element, such as denotation or representational force. Brandom’s Making It Explicit provides a model of how to fully discharge such representational vocabulary, but it cannot be applied directly to scientific representations. Pursuing a strategy parallel to Brandom’s, this essay begins with an account of how surrogative inference is justified. Scientific representation and the denotation of model elements are then explained in terms of surrogative inference by treating scientific representation and denotation as expressive, analogous to Brandom’s account of truth. The result is a thoroughgoing inferentialism: M is a scientific representation of T if and only if M has scientifically justified surrogative consequences that are answers to questions about T.

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8

Tebben, Nicholas. "Inferentialism is as Compositional as it Needs to be." Contemporary Pragmatism 18, no. 3 (November 17, 2021): 263–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18758185-bja10015.

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Abstract Normative inferentialism is a semantic theory according to which the meaning of an expression is, or is determined by, its proper inferential role. Critics of inferentialism often argue that it violates the principle of compositionality, and that it is therefore unable to explain some important linguistic data. I have two tasks in this paper: the first is to demonstrate that inferentialism, appearances perhaps to the contrary, does not violate the principle of compositionality, and the second is to explain why this demonstration is unlikely to mollify critics of inferentialism. The dispute between inferentialists and their critics, I shall argue, is not about compositionality, it is a more fundamental dispute about the nature of representations.

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9

Warren, Mark Douglas. "Building bridges with words: an inferential account of ethical univocity." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48, no. 3-4 (2018): 468–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2017.1422630.

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AbstractExplaining genuine moral disagreement is a challenge for metaethical theories. For expressivists, this challenge comes from the plausibility of agents making seemingly univocal claims while expressing incongruent conative attitudes. I argue that metaethical inferentialism – a deflationary cousin to expressivism, which locates meaning in the inferential import of our moral assertions rather than the attitudes they express – offers a unique solution to this problem. Because inferentialism doesn’t locate the source of moral disagreements in a clash between attitudes, but instead in conflicts between the inferential import of ethical assertions, the traditional problem for expressivism can be avoided. After considering two forms of inferentialism that lead to revenge versions of the problem, I conclude by recommending that we understand the semantics of moral disagreements pragmatically: the source of univocity does not come from moral or semantic facts waiting to be described, but instead from the needs that ethical and semantic discourses answer – a solution to the problems of what we are to do and how we are to talk about it.

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10

Delahunty, Gerald P., and Laura Gatzkiewicz. "On the Spanish inferential construction ser que." Pragmatics. Quarterly Publication of the International Pragmatics Association (IPrA) 10, no. 3 (September 1, 2000): 301–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/prag.10.3.01del.

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Spanish (along with English and many other languages) has inferential sentences such as No es que no quiera: Es que no sabe querer, ‘It’s not that she doesn’t love; it’s that she doesn’t know how to love.’ We describe the grammar and pragmatics of these sentences and show how their pragmatic characteristics follow from their grammar and the principles of relevance theory. Inferentials consist of a finite clause embedded as the complement of an expletive copular matrix clause, which may be modified by a focusing particle and/or a negator. Inferentials function as metalinguistic devices which characterize the relevance of the proposition represented by their clause to the processing of an utterance. Negative inferentials characterize that proposition as likely to be considered in the processing but they deny its relevance; positive inferentials characterize the proposition as unlikely to be considered but they assert its relevance. The inferential proposition may be interpreted as an implicated premise or conclusion. If it is taken as an implicated premise then it may be further interpreted as an explanation, reason, or cause; if it is taken as an implicated conclusion then it may be further interpreted as a result, consequence, or conclusion. It may also be taken as a (re)interpretation or reformulation of the target utterance.

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11

Kambartel, Friedrich. "Meaning, justification, and truth." Pragmatics of Making it Explicit 13, no. 1 (August 8, 2005): 109–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/pc.13.1.09kam.

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In order to compare two forms of radical pragmatism, inferentialism (as developed by Robert Brandom) and constructivism (as developed by Paul Lorenzen), the paper shows how we can represent states of affairs in the world by corresponding symbols in a metaphysically harmless, though seemingly non-inferential way, why not all justifications are inferential transitions, for example those that make heavy use of constructions, and why a prosentential analysis of truth is helpful but not sufficient.

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12

Seidouvy, Abdel, and Maike Schindler. "An inferentialist account of students’ collaboration in mathematics education." Mathematics Education Research Journal 32, no. 3 (May 18, 2019): 411–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13394-019-00267-0.

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Abstract Collaboration is an increasingly popular topic in mathematics education due to its potential to foster students’ learning. The purpose of this article is to draw attention to the semantic philosophical theory of inferentialism and its value for investigating students’ collaboration. We suggest that Brandom’s inferentialism can serve as a valuable theoretical resource to overcome certain issues of existing theoretical viewpoints on student collaboration. In particular, we argue that inferentialism may help to understand the individual and social nature of collaboration as intertwined. We illustrate our inferentialist approach using data from two scenes taken from video-recorded group work sessions from a fifth and seventh grade primary school class in Sweden. The topic in both classes was data generation in statistics.

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13

McCullagh, Mark. "Inferentialism and Singular Reference." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35, no. 2 (June 2005): 183–220. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2005.10716587.

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In Making It Explicit (1994) Robert Brandom claims that we may distinguish those linguistic expressions with object-representational purport — the singular terms — from others merely by the structure of their inferential relations. A good part of his inferentialist program rests on this claim. At first blush it can seem implausible: linguistic expressions stand in inferential relations to each other, so how could we appeal to those relations to decide on the obtaining of what seems to be relation between linguistic expressions and objects in general (viz., x purports to represent y)? It is perhaps not surprising then that Brandom's proposal fails. But it definitely is surprising how it fails. The problem is that in order to specify the sort of generality there is to an expression's inferential role, one must appeal to some version of the traditional distinction between extensional and nonextensional occurrences of expressions, and there appears to be no way to draw anything like that distinction in inferentialist terms. For the inferential proprieties governing the different occurrences an expression can have are so varied that they do not determine a binary partition of those occurrences.

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14

Hlobil, Ulf. "Teleo-Inferentialism." Philosophical Topics 50, no. 1 (2022): 185–211. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtopics20225019.

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The paper presents teleo-inferentialism, which is a novel meta-semantic theory that combines advantages of teleosemantics and normative inferentialism. Like normative inferentialism, teleo-inferentialism holds that contents are individuated by the norms that govern inferences in which they occur. This allows teleo-inferentialism to account for sophisticated concepts. Like teleosemantics, teleo-inferentialism explains conceptual norms in a naturalistically acceptable way by appeal to the broadly biological well-functioning of our innate capacities. As a test-case for teleo-inferentialism, I discuss how the view handles Kripkenstein-style meaning skepticism.

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15

McCuliagh, Mark. "MOTIVATING INFERENTIALISM." Southwest Philosophy Review 21, no. 1 (2005): 77–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview200521132.

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16

Radford, Luis. "On inferentialism." Mathematics Education Research Journal 29, no. 4 (October 14, 2017): 493–508. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13394-017-0225-3.

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17

Frápolli, María J. "Tracking the World Down." Philosophical Topics 50, no. 1 (2022): 83–107. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtopics20225015.

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The background of this paper is what I call “pragmatic inferentialism,” a view that I attribute to Robert Brandom. Here, I develop Brandom’s view and argue (i) that it is a kind of subject naturalism, in Price’s sense, and (ii) that the charge of idealism sometimes addressed against it is unwarranted. Regarding (i), I show that pragmatic inferentialism finds support from evolutionary psychology and developmental psychology. Regarding (ii), I present what I call “level 0 expressivism,” which I take to be the semantic counterpart of some aspects of evolutionary psychology and developmental psychology. Besides, I resort to Brandom’s defense of Hegel’s conceptual realism. The conclusion of the paper is a vindication of objective truth in the inferentialist framework.

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18

Beisecker, David. "(Re)Motivating Inferentialism Commentary on Mark McCullagh's "Motivating Inferentialism"." Southwest Philosophy Review 22, no. 2 (2006): 151–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview200622247.

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19

Laurier, Daniel. "Making “Reasons” Explicit. How Normative is Brandom's Inferentialism?" Forum Philosophicum 13, no. 1 (June 1, 2008): 127–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.35765/forphil.2008.1301.10.

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This paper asks whether Brandom has provided a sufficiently clear account of the basic normative concepts of commitment and entitlement, on which his normative inferentialism seems to rest, and of how they contribute to explain the inferential articulation of conceptual contents. I show that Brandom's claim that these concepts are analogous to the concepts of obligation and permission cannot be right, and argue that the normative character of the concept of commitment is dubious. This leads me to replace Brandom's conception of inferential relations as relations between deontic statuses with one according to which they are to be seen as relations between entitlements and acknowledgements of commitments.

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20

STREUMER, BART. "Inferential and Non-Inferential Reasoning." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74, no. 1 (January 2007): 1–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00001.x.

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21

Szmuc, Damián. "Inferentialism and Relevance." Análisis Filosófico 41, no. 2 (November 1, 2021): 317–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.36446/af.2021.458.

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This paper provides an inferentialist motivation for a logic belonging in the connexive family, by borrowing elements from the bilateralist interpretation for Classical Logic without the Cut rule, proposed by David Ripley. The paper focuses on the relation between inferentialism and relevance, through the exploration of what we call relevant assertion and denial, showing that a connexive system emerges as a symptom of this interesting link. With the present attempt we hope to broaden the available interpretations for connexive logics, showing they can be rightfully motivated in terms of certain relevantist constraints imposed on assertion and denial.

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22

Griffiths, Owen. "Inferentialism and Quantification." Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 58, no. 1 (2017): 107–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00294527-3768059.

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23

Peregrin, Jaroslav. "Is inferentialism circular?" Analysis 78, no. 3 (November 10, 2017): 450–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/anx130.

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24

Veber, Michael. "Not too Proud to Beg (the Question): Why Inferentialism Cannot Account for the a Priori." Grazer Philosophische Studien 73, no. 1 (April 1, 2006): 113–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18756735-073001007.

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The inferentialist account of the a priori says that basic logical beliefs can be justified by way of rule circular inference. I argue that this account of the a priori fails to skirt the charge of begging the question, that the reasons offered in support of it are weak and that it makes justifying logical beliefs too easy. I also argue that recent modifications to inferentialism spell doom for it as a general theory of a priori justification.

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25

Graham, Peter J. "TESTIMONIAL JUSTIFICATION: INFERENTIAL OR NON-INFERENTIAL?" Philosophical Quarterly 56, no. 222 (January 2006): 84–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2005.00430.x.

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26

Turbanti, Giacomo. "A Paradox of Inferentialism." المخاطبات, no. 16 (2015): 163–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.12816/0028071.

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27

Rockmore, Tom. "Brandom, Hegel and Inferentialism." International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10, no. 4 (January 2002): 429–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09672550210167405.

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28

ZAHARIA, Corina-Mihaela, Dumitru GRIGORE, and Magda MOLDOVAN. "DETERMINING PERSONALITY PROFILE THROUGH INFERENTIAL METHOD BY EDA NEUROSIGNALS." SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND EDUCATION IN THE AIR FORCE 19, no. 2 (July 31, 2017): 241–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.19062/2247-3173.2017.19.2.35.

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29

READ, STEPHEN. "SEMANTIC POLLUTION AND SYNTACTIC PURITY." Review of Symbolic Logic 8, no. 4 (August 7, 2015): 649–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755020315000210.

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AbstractLogical inferentialism claims that the meaning of the logical constants should be given, not model-theoretically, but by the rules of inference of a suitable calculus. It has been claimed that certain proof-theoretical systems, most particularly, labelled deductive systems for modal logic, are unsuitable, on the grounds that they are semantically polluted and suffer from an untoward intrusion of semantics into syntax. The charge is shown to be mistaken. It is argued on inferentialist grounds that labelled deductive systems are as syntactically pure as any formal system in which the rules define the meanings of the logical constants.

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30

Parr, Thomas. "Inferential dynamics." Physics of Life Reviews 42 (September 2022): 1–3. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.plrev.2022.05.006.

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31

Quilty-Dunn, Jake, and Eric Mandelbaum. "Inferential Transitions." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96, no. 3 (August 27, 2017): 532–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2017.1358754.

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32

Allua, Shane, and Cheryl Bagley Thompson. "Inferential Statistics." Air Medical Journal 28, no. 4 (July 2009): 168–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.amj.2009.04.013.

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33

Malinowski, Grzegorz. "Inferential Intensionality." Studia Logica 76, no. 1 (2004): 3–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/b:stud.0000027465.12589.75.

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Malinowski, Grzegorz. "Inferential paraconsistency." Logic and Logical Philosophy 8 (January 18, 2004): 83. http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/llp.2000.005.

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35

Douven, Igor, Shira Elqayam, Henrik Singmann, and Janneke van Wijnbergen-Huitink. "Conditionals and inferential connections: A hypothetical inferential theory." Cognitive Psychology 101 (March 2018): 50–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2017.09.002.

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36

Landy, David. "Inferentialism and the Transcendental Deduction." Kantian Review 14, no. 1 (March 2009): 1–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415400001321.

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One recent trend in Kant scholarship has been to read Kant as undertaking a project in philosophical semantics, as opposed to, say, epistemology, or transcendental metaphysics. This trend has evolved almost concurrently with a debate in contemporary philosophy of mind about the nature of concepts and their content. Inferentialism is the view that the content of our concepts is essentially inferentially articulated, that is, that the content of a concept consists entirely, or in essential part, in the role that that concept plays in a system of inferences. By contrast, relationalism is the view that this content is fixed by a mental or linguistic item's standing in a certain relation to its object. The historical picture of Kant and the contemporary debate about concepts intersect in so far as contemporary inferentialists about conceptual content often cite Immanuel Kant not only as one of the founding fathers of a tradition that leads more or less straightforwardly to contemporary inferentialism, but also as the philosopher who first saw the fatal flaws in any attempt to articulate the content of our concepts relationally.

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Pereplyotchik, David. "Generative Linguistics Meets Normative Inferentialism." Croatian journal of philosophy 21, no. 61 (May 21, 2021): 179–222. http://dx.doi.org/10.52685/cjp.21.1.10.

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This is the second installment of a two-part essay. Limitations of space prevented the publication of the full essay in a previous issue of the Journal (Pereplyotchik 2020). My overall goal is to outline a strategy for integrating generative linguistics with a broadly pragmatist approach to meaning and communication. Two immensely useful guides in this venture are Robert Brandom and Paul Pietroski. Squarely in the Chomskyan tradition, Pietroski’s recent book, Conjoining Meanings, offers an approach to natural-language semantics that rejects foundational assumptions widely held amongst philosophers and linguists. In particular, he argues against extensionalism—the view that meanings are (or determine) truth and satisfaction conditions. Having arrived at the same conclusion by way of Brandom’s deflationist account of truth and reference, I’ll argue that both theorists have important contributions to make to a broader anti-extensionalist approach to language. Part 1 of the essay was largely exegetical, laying out what I see as the core aspects of Brandom’s normative inferentialism (1) and Pietroski’s naturalistic semantics (2). Now, in Part 2, I argue that there are many convergences between these two theoretical frameworks and, contrary to first appearances, very few points of substantive disagreement between them. If the integration strategy that I propose is correct, then what appear to be sharply contrasting commitments are better seen as interrelated verbal differences that come down to different—but complementary—explanatory goals. The residual disputes are, however, stubborn. I end by discussing how to square Pietroski’s commitment to predicativism with Brandom’s argument that a predicativist language is in principle incapable of expressing ordinary conditionals.

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38

Pergrin, Jaroslav, and Matej Drobňak. "Introduction: Inferentialism on Naturalized Grounds." Philosophical Topics 50, no. 1 (2022): 1–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtopics20225011.

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39

Marchettoni, Leonardo. "Inferentialism, culture and public deliberation." Philosophy & Social Criticism 40, no. 1 (January 2014): 25–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0191453713513789.

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40

FODOR, JERRY, and ERNIE LEPORE. "Brandom's Burdens: Compositionality and Inferentialism." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63, no. 2 (September 2001): 465–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00119.x.

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41

Whiting, Daniel. "Inferentialism, Representationalism and Derogatory Words." International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15, no. 2 (June 2007): 191–205. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09672550701383483.

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42

Causton, Edward. "Bringing Inferentialism to Science Education." Science & Education 28, no. 1-2 (February 7, 2019): 25–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11191-019-00027-3.

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Apelt, T. A., S. P. Asprey, and N. F. Thornhill. "Inferential measurement of SAG mill parameters III: inferential models." Minerals Engineering 15, no. 12 (December 2002): 1055–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0892-6875(02)00230-3.

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44

Clark, Philip. "Practical Steps and Reasons for Action." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27, no. 1 (March 1997): 17–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1997.10717472.

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There is an idea, going back to Aristotle, that reasons for action can be understood on a parallel with reasons for belief. Not surprisingly, the idea has almost always led to some form of inferentialism about reasons for action. In this paper I argue that reasons for action can be understood on a parallel with reasons for belief, but that this requires abandoning inferentialism about reasons for action. This result will be thought paradoxical. It is generally assumed that if there is to be a useful parallel, there must be some such thing as a practical inference. As we shall see, that assumption tends to block the fruitful exploration of the real parallel. On the view I shall defend, the practical analogue of an ordinary inference is not an inference, but something I shall call a practical step. Nevertheless, the practical step will do, for a theory of reasons for action, what ordinary inference does for an inferentialist theory of reasons for belief. The result is a general characterization of reasons, practical and theoretical, in terms of the correctness conditions of the relevant sorts of step.

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Novianti, Novianti. "PENGARUH IMBAL JASA DAN BEBAN KERJA TERHADAP PRESTASI KERJA KARYAWAN PT AGAPE PRATAMA INDONESIA." Jemasi: Jurnal Ekonomi Manajemen dan Akuntansi 14, no. 2 (December 31, 2018): 165–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.35449/jemasi.v14i2.29.

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Research is a scientific study that aims to determine the effect of service rewards and workload on employee performance of PT Agape Pratama Indonesia. The number of samples used were 26 respondents. Through the questionnaires the data were collected and analyzed using descriptive statistics and parametric inferential statistics.Descriptively the three research variables showed a good tendency. Inferentially parametric, multiple linear regression results show simultaneously significant influence of variable yield and workload to employee performance variable. However, the partial two variables did not show any significant effect on employee performance variable.

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Johnson, Daniel M. "Skepticism and Circular Arguments." International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3, no. 4 (2013): 253–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22105700-03011094.

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Perhaps the most popular and historically important way of responding to skepticism is by an appeal to non-inferential justification. A problem with this sort of response is that while it may constitute a response to skepticism, it does not constitute a response to the skeptic. At some point, the anti-skeptic must simply fall silent, resigned to the fact that his or her non-inferential justification for the belief challenged by the skeptic is not communicable. I want to point out a possible solution to this problem. I will argue that, in certain circumstances, it is possible to adduce circular arguments which are nevertheless rationally persuasive, and that the anti-skeptic may employ these arguments in lieu of simply falling silent when a non-inferentially justified belief is challenged. The almost universal assumption among philosophers that epistemically circular arguments are rationally useless is mistaken, and this fact can be utilized by the clever anti-skeptic.

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Pavlicic, Jelena. "Williams’ inferential contextualism." Theoria, Beograd 57, no. 3 (2014): 43–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo1403043p.

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This paper is concerned with version of epistemic contextualism known as inferential contextualism which cheif proponent is Michael Williams. The general contextualist strategy attempts to interpret the cognitive claims as expressing statements which meaning is sensitive to the context in which they are uttered, which implies that the truth-value of these claims may differ from context to context. Versions of epistemic contextualism that explain context sensitivity of cognitive claims by referring to conversational factors of the participants in the given conversational context are usually called simple conversational contextualism. Williams accepts the basic contextualists assumptions, but, in contrast to simple conversational contextualists, insists that explanation of contextual sensitivity of cognitive statements is to be found in differences (which are mainly the differences in the methodological assumptions and inferential patterns) between the thematic areas which are the subject of knowledge in different contexts. We will try to show that Williams? contextualism, despite some difficulties, does have certain advantages over the simple conversational contextualism.

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Alexander, David. "Weak Inferential Internalism." Journal of Philosophical Research 37 (2012): 357–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jpr20123717.

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Shenton, Andrew K. "Inferential information‐seeking." Library Review 58, no. 5 (May 22, 2009): 353–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/00242530910961774.

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Ryfe, David. "Journalism’s Inferential Community." Journalism & Communication Monographs 21, no. 4 (November 6, 2019): 354–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1522637919878732.

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