Academic literature on the topic 'Indipendenti directors'

This research is focused on the independent directors and on the powers they have in more small companies, in companies with concentrated ownership and in listed companies, where they receive more attention. The thesis starts analyzing the rise and development of independent directors in common law systems, where they first born. In Italy the first appearance of the independent directors is recorded in 1999 in the Code of self-regulation for listed companies (issuers, therefore in a source of self-regulating soft law), which merely provided that a sufficient number of directors were independent. Our country, as well as most of Continental European legal systems, is characterized by the concentration of share ownership by a limited number of members, or of a single shareholder, thus giving rise to a kind of "imperfect overlapping" between ownership and control where shareholders meet the standards of the right of ownership by directly controlling the corporate bodies actions. This starting postulate ensures that the independent administrator carries out a different function in our country: it is a matter of establishing a body counterbalancing the majority shareholders and able to verify that they do not get private benefits detrimental to the company, since the independent directors represent a means to ensure the objectivity and impartiality of assessment inside an administrative body that could become the suitable place for reference shareholders decisions. In this context, the most obvious agency problems arise in the relationship between majority and minority shareholders. Discipline concerning this issue is inadequate and incoherent and mainly focuses on the two aspects of the board of director composition and the definition of independence requirements. But one fact is irrefutable: today in our legal system, the independent directors are in charge of "controlling - monitoring (not intended as ex post verification) as immediate control of the management being proposed." Then the survey goes to analyzing Italian law (in the traditional systems, in the one-tier systems or two-tier systems) and the different notions of independence which can be found in the soft law, civil law and in other statutes. The essence of independence is concerned that being independent means being able to judge independently the decision proposed by executives, thus resisting to the “groupthink” phenomena and challenging effectively what the CEO does. As regard powers and duties the thesis will show that independent directors will carry out their duties adequately and effectively, if they will receive complete and timely information. Therefore, according to the regulations reconstruction, the central issue will see its main object in the flows of information inside the company and in the mechanisms provided for by the legislator to ensure that all directors can act on a fully informed basis. What are, then, the powers belonging to the independent directors in the traditional Italian system and in other statutes to regularly act on a fully informed basis? And when is it legitimate to recognize a criminal liability due to an improper crime of omission committed by the independent directors, pursuant to Art. 40 cpv Italian Penal Code (according to which "not preventing an event that the parties have a legal duty to prevent means causing it")? The study aims is to built the powers/duties of independent directors information an consequently investigating the possibility of an extension of criminal liability to independence directors.

This thesis is focused on independent directors and on the role they can play in companies characterized by concentrated ownership. Particular attention is dedicated to independent directors in listed companies and in banks. The survey starts analyzing the rise and development of independent directors in common law systems – that is, in the systems where they were first born – in order to highlight the role these directors have and the interests of shareholders they are asked to protect as against the power of management. The author suggests that these directors play a different role in companies characterized by concentrated ownership, there being different agency conflicts. Then the survey continues analyzing Italian law and the different notions of independence which can be found in the Civil Code and in other statutes. The author highlights the lack of specific provisions dedicated to independent directors, making it difficult to distinguish between an independent director and a non-executive director, the former being flattened on the latter. The only provisions which distinguish between the two types of directors, giving independent directors specific functions and powers, are the regulatory provisions published by the supervising authorities (Bank of Italy and Consob). The specific role given to independent directors by both authorities is in the committees to be estabilished inside the board, thus suggesting that independent directors can have effective powers inside the committees rather than inside the board. The author suggests that independent directors in listed companies – and in companies carrying out banking activity - shall protect the interests of stakeholders and of the market itself, rather than just the interests of minority shareholders. As far as the essence of independence is concerned, the author suggests that being independent means being able to judge independently the decisions proposed by executives, thus resisting to the “groupthink” phenomenon and challenging effectively what the CEO does. This independence in judgement is also a summary of the lack of material relationships with the company which may affect the ability to challenge and of the specific skills the independent director is required to have in order to fully understand the business of the company.
Questa tesi è dedicata all’approfondimento dell’istituto degli amministratori indipendenti e del ruolo che essi possono concretamente svolgere nelle società caratterizzate dalla concentrated ownership, con particolare riguardo alle società quotate e a quelle che svolgono attività bancaria. L’analisi inizia esaminando la nascita e l’evoluzione della figura dell’ amministratore indipendente negli ordinamenti di common law per metterne in luce le caratteristiche e la funzione di tutela degli interessi degli azionisti rispetto all’operato del management. Prosegue con l’analisi della disciplina italiana, focalizzandosi dapprima sulla nozione di indipendenza e, poi, sui compiti demandati agli amministratori indipendenti. Dalla disamina delle fonti si ricava la mancanza di una disciplina ad hoc quanto ai poteri e ai compiti specificamente affidati agli amministratori indipendenti di società che adottino il sistema di amministrazione tradizionale, confondendosi quindi tale categoria con quella più ampia degli amministratori non esecutivi. La previsione di compiti specifici affidati agli indipendenti si ha ad opera delle Autorità di Vigilanza, che ne esaltano il ruolo all’interno dei comitati costituiti in seno all’organo amministrativo, con ciò suggerendo che è all’interno di questi, più che nel plenum, che gli amministratori indipendenti possono esercitare un potere più pregnante nel processo decisionale della società. Nelle conclusioni si suggerisce che l’interesse tutelato da questa tipologia di amministratori nelle società quotate sui mercati regolamentati italiani e nelle società che svolgono attività bancaria e finanziaria sia più ampio rispetto all’interesse dei soci di minoranza – da alcuni individuato quale interesse che gli indipendenti devono perseguire per proteggere la minoranza dagli abusi della maggioranza in un sistema caratterizzato dal fenomeno della concentrated ownership – e coincida, piuttosto, con l’interesse degli stakeholders e della tutela del mercato in generale. Quanto al requisito dell’indipendenza, si suggerisce che esso sia, nella sostanza, l’autonomia di giudizio richiesta ai consiglieri, appunto, indipendenti, essenziale ad evitare di uniformarsi alle decisioni proposte dagli esecutivi e ad esercitare, rispetto a queste ultime, un’attività di “contrasto costruttivo”. L’autonomia di giudizio richiesta agli amministratori indipendenti va inoltre intesa quale sintesi dell’assenza dei legami che minano l’indipendenza di un soggetto e della presenza di competenze specifiche rispetto al business svolto dall’impresa.

Il lavoro analizza la disciplina delle operazioni con parti correlate applicabile alle società quotate o con azioni diffuse ai sensi del Regolamento Consob n. 17221/2010 (tenendo conto della disciplina inglese da cui quella italiana trae spunto). Previa una generale analisi dei contenuti del citato Regolamento ed alcuni approfondimenti circa la compatibilità delle sue norme rispetto a quanto previsto dalla disciplina del codice civile e del TUF, ivi inclusa l analisi del fenomeno delle OPC infragruppo, viene approfondito il tema relativo al ruolo degli amministratori (esecutivi, non esecutivi e indipendenti) nel contesto di una OPC nonché quello delle OPC di competenza assembleare (c.d. whitewash). Il lavoro si conclude con una disamina delle sanzioni civili, penali ed amministrative applicate in recenti casi di OPC sia in Italia che in UK.