Academic literature on the topic 'Indigenous peoples – Legal status, laws, etc'

Introduction. The main objective of this article is to study the historical and legal aspects of the formation and development of international standards in the field of linguistic rights of indigenous peoples. This topic is particularly relevant in connection with the proclamation of the period 2022–2032 International Decade of Indigenous Languages by UN General Assembly. Materials and Methods. The research methodology is based on a systematic approach that incorporates the historical, formal-legal, system-structural methods of scientific knowledge. The material was provided by the main international legal documents in the field of the linguistic rights of indigenous peoples, research by Russian and international authors on the legal status of indigenous peoples, and the protection of their linguistic rights in particular. Results and Discussion. Based on the analysis of international legal acts, the following can be distinguished among the linguistic rights of indigenous peoples: the right to preserve and use native languages in private and publicly; the right to education in the mother tongue; the right to create and have access to the media in their native languages; the right to recognize indigenous languages in constitutions and national laws; the right to a life free of linguistic discrimination and other rights. The article also discusses the main UN mechanisms and tools in the field of ensuring and protecting the rights of indigenous peoples. The protection of the linguistic rights of indigenous peoples is currently carried out by numerous specialized agencies such as UNESCO, United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, UN Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples and etc. An important mechanism for promoting the theme of languages of indigenous peoples, the unification of partners and resources for joint action around the world was the proclamation by the UN General Assembly of the International Year of Indigenous Languages (2019) and the International Decade of Indigenous Languages (2022–2032). Conclusion. At the level of the international community, it formed a serious understanding of the need to preserve and develop languages, the realization of the linguistic rights of indigenous peoples, which will be facilitated by the International Decade of Indigenous Languages.

This chapter deals with controversial Russian legislation on indigenous peoples’ rights and its practical application. First, the issue of defining indigenous peoples is discussed and the main criteria for distinguishing indigenous peoples are given. Second, indigenous peoples’ special rights under international law are presented. Third, the author describes indigenous peoples’ status and rights in the Russian Federation. Collective and individual recognition of indigenous peoples and their land rights are the main focus. Apart from the rights explicitly provided by existing legal acts, the crucial concept of free prior informed consent (FPIC) is explored. The issues under discussion mostly follow from the incoherence of Russian laws and their inconsistency with international specialized legal instruments. The author proposes ways to resolve some major problems that indigenous peoples in Russia face. For the most part the solutions focus on making changes in Russian laws on indigenous peoples’ issues.

Articles 27 and 34 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) recognise Indigenous Peoples’ laws. Art. 34 gives Indigenous Peoples the right to maintain their juridical systems or customs in accordance with international human rights standards. Although the UNDRIP is soft law, its core is arguably customary law and, therefore, a binding source of law. For States with Indigenous People, such as Norway, the UNDRIP is of paramount importance, from a legal, political, and not least moral perspective. This paper discusses norm hierarchies and tensions that are created in the meeting between the Indigenous customary law of the Sámi and statutory domestic Norwegian law. The introduction of customary, commonly unwritten, Indigenous rules into the judicial portfolio of a State creates an obvious challenge: what is their legal status? Can Indigenous law set aside domestic statutory norms? Some might argue that due to historical wrong, Indigenous law should always take precedence when domestic law conflicts with it. While Norwegian domestic law acknowledges the precedence of certain core human rights treaties over domestic laws, the same is not valid for Indigenous rights. How then should Indigenous custom be dealt with before a court of law, and how do the different legal systems relate to each other? This paper is foremost based on theoretical, to a lesser degree also on empirical material. It discusses on a general level the relationship between different legal systems within the same State and, on a specific level, the dealing of the Norwegian courts with Sámi Indigenous laws and customs.

For many years, the indigenous peoples had been experiencing various acts of marginalisation and discrimination. However, to this day, the definitions and rights of the indigenous peoples in certain jurisdictions are still left ambiguous. These rights includes the right to self-determination which, on the surface, is linked to freedom to choose political status and cultural or economical development and can be considered as one of the vital rights for indigenous peoples as it allows the community to decide on various aspects of their lives. Looking beyond that, this concept can be further classified into external and internal self-determination and each country may adopt a different approach to this right. As Greenland has a relatively higher population of indigenous peoples, the laws and regulations on indigenous peoples can be distinct. Therefore, this study examines the availability of self-determination policies and possible issues on it’s implementation in Greenland in comparison to the rights of the Orang Asli in Peninsular Malaysia. By using critical legal analysis, this study provides an insight to the exercise of self-determination rights of the indigenous peoples in other jurisdiction and the relevancy of the same right in Malaysia which can help to identify certain aspects to be improved on in the existing national indigenous peoples’ rights laws.

Keywords: Indigenous peoples, indigenous peoples of Ukraine, Crimean Tatars, Karaites, Krymchaks, Gagauz people, Crimean Platform, Crimean Khanate, Crimean People's Republic, Autonomous Republic of Crimea, city of Sevastopol, Crimea, Sevastopol, Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar people, selfdetermination, occupation, deoccupation, genocide, deportation, deportation of the Crimean Tatars, Surgun The article analyzes in detail the process of formation and development of the rights of indigenous peoples in independent Ukraine. Particular attention is paid to the provisions of the Constitution of Ukraine in this context and their interpretation. The legislative process and legislative initiatives that preceded the adoption of the Law of Ukraine “On the Legal Status of Indigenous Peoples of Ukraine” on July 21, 2021 are described.The peculiarities of the legal acts of Ukraine, which regulate the rights of indigenous peoples, their connection and further impact on the overall development of the studied issues, are clarified. A retrospective analysis of the legislation of the last 30 years, highlighting the main stages and elements, provides an opportunity to formulate a perspective on the further development of the indigenous peoples’ rights’ issue in Ukraine in the field of normative consolidation of their legal status and implementation of rights guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of Ukraine. The rights of indigenous peoples are depicted through the prism of modern legal and political processes, in particular, the Crimean Platform, as the most effective mechanism for de-occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, ensuring the rights of Ukrainian citizens violated by the temporary Russian occupation of the peninsula. Particular attention is paid to the place of the indigenous peoples of Crimea and the issue of restoringtheir rights under this mechanism. The restoration of such rights seems particularly important, given the particular persecution of indigenous peoples and their individual representatives by the occupying power today, as well as the perpetration of genocideagainst these peoples in the past.

ABSTRACT The Kayan Mentarang National Park (KNPM) area located in the Heart of Borneo (HoB) in North Kalimantan lives various Dayak sub-tribes. They inhabit and keep the forest so that the forest remains safe and sustainable. Indigenous and tribal peoples who have customary forest areas in which their status of appointment as KMNP initially may receive, so that the process can continue in the inaugural process. But with the development of information and circumstances the situation was changed and now the indigenous people reject the pegat which will be doneThe legal issues that serve as the purpose of this paper are: the recognition of traditional rights of indigenous and tribal communities and the recognition of local wisdom in the management of Kayan Mentarang National Park. Using the normative juridical and customary law approaches that this method is expected to address the issue of law.The dynamics of the development of society and law can change the legal status of both government and customary law community to a legal fact. Forests as natural resources and the environment are constitutionally the government's obligation to regulate them. Inauguration of customary forest as a national park brings legal consequences to rights and obligations. Implementation of laws and regulations is limited by Human Rights. It is necessary to harmonize the law, so that both the interests of indigenous and tribal peoples, as the inhabitants as well as the natural resources, the environment, and the biodiversity as the interests of mankind are not mutually harmful. Keywords: Customary Law Community, Traditional Rights, National Park

Исследуются отдельные вопросы правового статуса коренных малочисленных народов Российской Федерации и примеры судебной практики оспаривания реализации правомочий представителями коренных народов. Автор приводит сравнительный анализ понятия «коренные народы» в международном праве, «коренные малочисленные народы», «коренные малочисленные народы Се-вера, Сибири и Дальнего Востока Российской Федерации» в российском праве, обосновывает необходимость применения Декларации Организации Объединенных Наций о правах коренных народов 2007 г. как акта непосредственного действия. В статье описана система правового регулирования статуса коренных малочисленных народов, сделан вывод о её многоуровневости и сложности. Автор отмечает практическую невозможность распространить действие названного международного акта на все коренные народы, населяющие территорию России. В работе исследуется судебная практика как судов общей юрисдикции, так и принятое в 2019 г. По-становление Конституционного Суда Российской Федерации № 21-П по делу гражданина Щукина Г. К. Автор делает вывод, что выведенный конституционно-правовой смысл статьи 19 Федерального закона «Об охоте и о сохранении охотничьих ресурсов», которая наряду с другими законами и подзаконными актами имеет значение для закрепления правового статуса коренных малочисленных народов, поможет не только единообразному применению названного закона, но и послужит образцом для распространения его на иные сферы традиционного природопользования общин коренных малочисленных народов, рыболовство, которые регулируются другими федеральными законами. Помимо проблем реализации правомочий, вытекающих из статуса коренных малочисленных народов, в судебном по-рядке зачастую устанавливается факт принадлежности к коренному народу в связи с отсутствием в Российской Федерации единого документа, подтверждающего национальность. В этой связи позитивным, по мнению автора, следует признать принятие 06.02.2020 изменений в Федеральный закон № 82-ФЗ «О гарантиях прав коренных малочисленных народов Российской Федерации», которые устанавливают централизованную систему учёта представителей коренных малочисленных народов РФ. Этот акт пока не вступил в силу, настоящая статья впервые описывает новеллы законодательства. The article explores certain issues of the legal status of the small indigenous peoples of the Russian Federation and examples of judicial practice in exercising indigenous rights. The author makes the comparative analysis of the concept «indigenous people» of international law, «indigenous small-numbered peoples», «indigenous small-numbered peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East of the Russian Federation» in Russian law, proves the necessity of applying the United Nations Declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples of 2007 (UNDRIP) as the act of direct action. The article describes the system of the legal regulation of the status of small-numbered indigenous peoples, the author concludes about its complexity. The author notes the practical impossibility of extending the application of the said international act to all indigenous peoples who inhabit the territory of Russia. The work examines the judicial practice of both the courts of general jurisdiction and the Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation No. 21-P of 2019 in the case of citizen Schukin G.K. The author concludes that the constitutional and legal meaning of article 19 of the Federal Law "On Hunting and Conservation of Hunting Resources," which, together with other laws and regulations, is relevant to the legal status of small-numbered indigenous peoples, not only will the uniform application of the Act, but it will also serve as a model for extending to other areas of traditional environmental management of small-numbered indigenous communi-ties, fisheries regulated by the other federal laws. In addition to the problems of exercising the powers arising from the status of small-numbered indigenous peoples, the fact of belonging to an indigenous people is often established in court, because of the absence of the unified document confirming the nationality in the Russian Federation. In this regard as positive, according to the author, it is necessary to recognize acceptance on the 6th of February 2020 changes in federal law No. 82-FZ "About guarantees of the rights", which install the centralized system of accounting of representatives of indigenous small-numbered peoples of the Russian Federation. This act has not yet entered into force, but this article for the first time describes the innovations of the legislation.

Full TextThe first law enacted in Canada to protect existing Aboriginal rights was section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.2 The first law in Canada to recognize the rights of non-human animals as anything other than property has yet to be enacted. The first Supreme Court of Canada (hereafter referred to as the Court) case to interpret section 35 was R. v. Sparrow.3 The 1990 case confirmed an Aboriginal right of the Musqueam peoples of British Columbia to fish for food, social and ceremonial purposes. Since this precedent-setting case, many similar claims have been brought before the courts by way of the fluctuating legal space created by s.35. Many of these cases have been about establishing rights to fish4, hunt5, and trap non-human animals (hereafter referred to as animals). The Court has developed, and continues to develop tests to determine the existence and scope of Aboriginal rights. These tests primarily embody cultural, political and, to a surprisingly lesser degree, legal forces. One of the principal problems with these tests is that they privilege, through the western philosophical lens, the interests of humans. Animals are, at best, the resources over which ownership is being contested. The Euro-centric legal conceptualization of animals as 'resources' over which ownership can be exerted is problematic for at least two reasons. First, the relegation of animals solely to a utilitarian role is antithetical to Indigenous-animal relationships and therefore demonstrates one of the fundamental ways the Canadian legal system is ill equipped to give adequate consideration to Indigenous law. Second, failure to consider animals' inherent value and agency in this context reproduces the human-animal and culture-nature binaries that are at the root of many of western Euro-centric society's inequities. This paper argues that Aboriginal peoples' relationships with animals are a necessary, integral and distinctive part of their cultures6 and, therefore, these relationships and the actors within them are entitled to the aegis of s.35. Through the legal protection of these relationships, animals will gain significant protection as a corollary benefit. If the Court were to protect the cultural relationships between animals and Aboriginal groups, a precondition would be acceptance of Indigenous legal systems. Thus, this paper gives a brief answer to the question, what are Indigenous legal systems and why are animals integral to them? The Anishinabe (also known Ojibwe or Chippewa) are Indigenous peoples who have historically lived in the Great Lakes region. The Bruce Peninsula on Lake Huron is home to the Cape Croker Indian Reserve, where the Chippewas of Nawash First Nation live. The people of this First Nation identify as Anishinabe. The Anishinabek case of Nanabush v. Deer is a law among these people and is used throughout the paper as an example of Indigenous-animal relationships. Making the significant assumption that s.35 has the capacity to recognize Indigenous law, the subsequent section of the paper asks why we should protect these relationships and how that protection should be achieved. Finally, the paper concludes that both the ability of s.35 to recognize Indigenous-animal relationships, and the judicial and political will to grant such recognition, are unlikely. Indigenous-animal relationships are integral to the distinctive culture of the Anishinabek, however the courts would be hesitant to allow such an uncertain and potentially far-reaching right. This is not surprising given that such a claim by both Indigenous and animal groups would challenge the foundations upon which the Canadian legal system is based. There are many sensitive issues inherent in this topic. It should be noted the author is not of Indigenous ancestry, but is making every effort to learn about and respect the Indigenous legal systems discussed. While this paper focuses on a number of Anishinabek laws; it is neither a complete analysis of these practices, nor one that can be transferred, without adaptation, to other peoples. Finally, Indigenous peoples and animal rights and Indigenous law scholars, such as Tom Regan and Mary Ellen Turpel-Lafond, respectively, may insist on an abolitionist approach to animal 'use' or reject the legitimacy of s.35 itself.7 These perspectives are worthy and necessary. This paper positions itself amongst these and other sources in order to reflect upon the timely and important issue of the legal status of Indigenous-animal relationships. I:WHAT ARE INDIGENOUS LEGAL SYSTEMS? The Law Commission of Canada defines a legal tradition as “a set of deeply rooted, historically conditioned attitudes about the nature of law, the role of law in the society and the polity, the proper organization and operation of a legal system, and the way law is or should be made, applied, studied, perfected and taught.”8 Indigenous legal traditions fit this description. They are living systems of beliefs and practices, and have been recognized as such by the courts.9 Indigenous practices developed into systems of law that have guided communities in their governance, and in their relationships amongst their own and other cultures and with the Earth.10 These laws have developed through stories, historical events that may be viewed as ‘cases,’ and other lived experiences. Indigenous laws are generally non-prescriptive, non-adversarial and non-punitive and aim to promote respect and consensus, as well as close connection with the land, the Creator, and the community. Indigenous laws are a means through which vital knowledge of social order within the community is transmitted, revived and retained. After European ‘settlement’ the influence of Indigenous laws waned. This was due in part to the state’s policies of assimilation, relocation and enfranchisement. 11 Despite these assaults, Indigenous legal systems have persevered; they continue to provide guidance to many communities, and are being revived and re-learned in others. For example, the Nisga’a’s legal code, Ayuuk, guides their communities and strongly informs legislation enacted under the Nisga’a Final Agreement, the first modern treaty in British Columbia.12 The land and jurisdiction claims of the Wet’suwet’en and Gitxsan Nations ultimately resulted in the Court’s decision in Delgamuukw,13 a landmark case that established the existence of Aboriginal title. The (overturned) BC Supreme Court’s statement in Delgamuukw14 reveals two of the many challenges in demonstrating the validity of Indigenous laws: “what the Gitxsan and Wet’suwet’en witnesses[es] describe as law is really a most uncertain and highly flexible set of customs which are frequently not followed by the Indians [sic] themselves.” The first challenge is that many laws are not in full practice, and therefore not as visible as they could be and once were. What the courts fail to acknowledge, however, is that the ongoing colonial project has served to stifle, extinguish and alter these laws. The second challenge is that the kind of law held and practiced by Indigenous peoples is quite foreign to most non-Indigenous people. Many Indigenous laws have animals as central figures. In Anishinabek traditional law, often the animals are the lawmakers15: they develop the legal principles and have agency as law givers. For instance, the Anishinabek case Nanabush v. Deer, Wolf , as outlined by Burrows, is imbued with legal principles, lessons on conduct and community governance, as well as ‘offenses’ and penalties. It is not a case that was adjudicated by an appointed judge in a courtroom, but rather one that has developed over time as a result of peoples’ relationships with the Earth and its inhabitants. An abbreviated summary of the case hints at these legal lessons: Nanabush plays a trick on a deer and deliberately puts the deer in a vulnerable position. In that moment of vulnerability, Nanabush kills the deer and then roasts its body for dinner. While he is sleeping and waiting for the deer to be cooked, the Wolf people come by and take the deer. Nanabush wakes up hungry, and out of desperation transforms into a snake and eats the brains out of the deer head. Once full, he is stuck inside the head and transforms back into his original shape, but with the deer head still stuck on. He is then chased and nearly killed by hunters who mistake him for a real deer. This case is set within the legal context of the Anishinabek’s treaty with deer. In signing the treaty, the people were reminded to respect beings in life and death and that gifts come when beings respect each other in interrelationships.16 Nanabush violated the rights of the deer and his peoples’ treaty with the deer. He violated the laws by taking things through trickery, and by causing harm to those he owed respect. Because his actions were not in accordance with Anishinabek legal principles, he was punished: Nanabush lost the thing he was so desperately searching for, and he ended up nearly being killed. This case establishes two lessons. The first is that, like statutory and common law, with which Canadians are familiar, Indigenous law does not exist in isolation. Principles are devised based on multiple teachings, pre- vious rules and the application of these rules to facts. That there are myriad sources of Indigenous law suggests that the learning of Indigenous law would require substantial effort on the part of Canadian law-makers.17 The second is that animals hold an important place in Indigenous law, and those relationships with animals – and the whole ‘natural’ world – strongly inform the way they relate to the Earth. II: CAN CANADIAN LAW ACCEPT INDIGENOUS LEGAL SYSTEMS? If there were a right recognized under s.35 concerning the Indigenous-animal relationship, what would it look like? Courts develop legal tests to which the facts of each case are applied, theoretically creating a degree of predictability as to how a matter will be judged. Introduced in Sparrow, and more fully developed in Van der Peet, a ‘test’ for how to assess a valid Aboriginal right has been set out by the Court. Summarized, the test is: “in order to be an Aboriginal right an activity must be an element of a practice, custom or tradition integral to the distinctive culture of the Aboriginal group claiming the right.”18 There are ten, differently weighted factors that a court will consider in making this assessment. The right being ‘tested’ in this discussion is the one exemplified in Nanabush v. Deer: the ability of Indigenous peoples to recognize and practice their laws, which govern relationships, including death, with deer and other animals. The courts have agreed that a generous, large and liberal construction should be given to Indigenous rights in order to give full effect to the constitutional recognition of the distinctiveness of Aboriginal culture. Still, it is the courts that hold the power to define rights as they conceive them best aligning with Canadian society19; this is one way that the Canadian state reproduces its systems of power over Indigenous peoples.20 The application of the Aboriginal right exemplified in Nanbush v. Deer to the Sparrow and Van der Peet tests would likely conclude that the Anishinabek do have an integral and distinctive relationship with animals. However, due to the significant discretion of the Court on a number of very subjective and politically sensitive factors, it is uncertain that the Nanabush v. Deer case would ‘pass’ Van der Peet’s required ten factors.21 This is indicative of the structural restraints that s.35 imposes. 22 The questions it asks impair its ability to capture and respect the interrelationships inherent in Indigenous peoples’ interactions with animals. For example, the Court will characterize hunting or fishing as solely subsistence, perhaps with a cultural element. Shin Imai contends these activities mean much more: “To many…subsistence is a means of reaffirming Aboriginal identity by passing on traditional knowledge to future generations. Subsistence in this sense moves beyond mere economics, encompassing the cultural, social and spiritual aspects for the communities.”23 Scholar Kent McNeil concludes that: “regardless of the strengths of legal arguments in favour of Indigenous peoples, there are limits to how far the courts […] are willing to go to correct the injustices caused by colonialism and dispossession.”24 It is often not the legal principles that determine outcomes, but rather the extent to which Indigenous rights can be reconciled with the history of settlement without disturbing the current economic and political structure of the dominant culture. III:WHY PROTECT THE ANIMAL-INDIGENOUS RELATIONSHIP? Legally protecting animal-Indigenous relationships offers symbiotic, mutually respectful benefits for animals and for the scope of Aboriginal rights that can be practiced. For instance, a protected relationship would have indirect benefits for animals’ habitat and right to life: it would necessitate protecting the means necessary, such as governance of the land, for realization of the right. This could include greater conservation measures, more contiguous habitat, enforcement of endangered species laws, and, ideally, a greater awareness and appreciation by humans of animals and their needs. Critical studies scholars have developed the argument that minority groups should not be subject to culturally biased laws of the mainstream polity.24 Law professor Maneesha Deckha points out that animals, despite the central role they play in a lot of ‘cultural defences,’ have been excluded from our ethical consideration. Certainly, the role of animals has been absent in judicial consideration of Aboriginal rights.26 Including animals, Deckha argues, allows for a complete analysis of these cultural issues and avoids many of the anthropocentric attitudes inherent in Euro-centric legal traditions. In Jack and Charlie27 two Coast Salish men were charged with hunting deer out of season. They argued that they needed to kill a deer in order to have raw meat for an Aboriginal religious ceremony. The Court found that killing the deer was not part of the ceremony and that there was insufficient evidence to establish that raw meat was required. This is a case where a more nuanced consideration of the laws and relationships with animals would have resulted in a more just application of the (Canadian) law and prevented the reproduction of imperialist attitudes. A criticism that could be lodged against practicing these relationships is that they conflict with the liberty and life interests of animals.28 Theoretically, if Indigenous laws are given the legal and political room to fully operate, a balance between the liberty of animals and the cultural and legal rights of Indigenous peoples can be struck.29 Indeed, Indigenous peoples’ cultural and legal concern for Earth is at its most rudimentary a concern for the land, which is at the heart of the challenge to the Canadian colonial system. If a negotiated treaty was reached, or anti-cruelty and conservation laws were assured in the Indigenous peoples’ self government system, then Canadian anti-cruelty30 and conservation laws,31 the effectiveness of which are already questionable, could be displaced in recognition of Indigenous governance.32 Indigenous peoples in Canada were – and are, subject to imposed limitations – close to the environment in ways that can seem foreign to non-Indigenous people.33 For example, some origin stories and oral histories explain how boundaries between humans and animals are at times absent: Animal-human beings like raven, coyote and rabbit created them [humans] and other beings. People …acted with respect toward many animals in expectation of reciprocity; or expressed kinship or alliance with them in narratives, songs, poems, parables, performances, rituals, and material objects. 34 Furthering or reviving these relationships can advance the understanding of both Indigenous legal systems and animal rights theory. Some animal rights theorists struggle with how to explain the cultural construction of species difference: Indigenous relationships with animals are long standing, lived examples of a different cultural conception of how to relate to animals and also of an arguably healthy, minimally problematic way to approach the debate concerning the species divide.35 A key tenet of animal-Indigenous relationships is respect. Shepard Krech posits that Indigenous peoples are motivated to obtain the necessary resources and goals in ‘proper’ ways: many believe that animals return to the Earth to be killed, provided that hunters demonstrate proper respect.36 This demonstrates a spiritual connection, but there is also a concrete connection between Indigenous peoples and animals. In providing themselves with food and security, they ‘manage’ what Canadian law calls ‘resources.’37 Because of the physical nature of these activities, and their practical similarity with modern ‘resource management,’ offering this as ‘proof’ of physical connection with animals and their habitat may be more successful than ‘proving’ a spiritual relationship. Finally, there are health reasons that make the Indigenous-animal relationship is important. Many cultures have come to depend on the nutrients they derive from particular hunted or fished animals. For example, nutrition and physical activity transitions related to hunting cycles have had negative impacts on individual and community health.38 This shows the multidimensionality of hunting, the significance of health, and, by extension, the need for animal ‘resources’ to be protected. IV: HOW SHOULD WE PROTECT THESE ABORIGINAL RIGHTS? If the Anishinabek and the deer ‘win’ the constitutional legal test (‘against’ the state) and establish a right to protect their relationships with animals, what, other than common law remedies,39 would follow? Below are ideas for legal measures that could be taken from the human or the animal perspective, or both, where benefits accrue to both parties. If animals had greater agency and legal status, their needs as species and as individuals could have a meaningful place in Canadian common and statutory law. In Nanabush v. Deer, this would mean that the deer would be given representation and that legal tests would need to be developed to determine the animals’ rights and interests. Currently the courts support the view that animals can be treated under the law as any other inanimate item of property. Such a legal stance is inconsistent with a rational, common-sense view of animals,40 and certainly with Anishinabek legal principles discussed herein.41 There are ongoing theoretical debates that inform the practical questions of how animal equality would be achieved: none of these in isolation offers a complete solution, but combined they contribute to the long term goal. Barsh and James Sákéj Youngblood Henderson advocate an adoption of the reasoning in the Australian case Mabo v. Queensland,42 where whole Aboriginal legal systems were imported intact into the common law. Some principles that Canada should be following can also be drawn from international treaties that Canada has or should have signed on to.43 Another way to seek protection from the human perspective is through the freedom of religion and conscience section of the Charter. Professor John Borrows constructs a full argument for this, and cites its challenges, in Living Law on a Living Earth: Aboriginal Religion, Law and the Constitution.44 The strongest, but perhaps most legally improbable, way to protect the animal- Indigenous relationship is for Canada to recognize a third, Indigenous order of government (in addition to provincial and federal), where all three orders are equal and inform one another’s laws. This way, Indigenous laws would have the legal space to fully function and be revived. Endowing Indigenous peoples with the right to govern their relationships would require a great acquiescence of power by governments and a commitment to the establishment and maintenance of healthy self-government in Indigenous communities. Louise Mandell offers some reasons why Canada should treat Aboriginal people in new ways, at least one of which is salient to the third order of government argument: To mend the [E]arth, which must be done, governments must reassess the information which the dominant culture has dismissed. Some of that valuable information is located in the oral histories of Aboriginal Peoples. This knowledge will become incorporated into decisions affecting the [E]arth’s landscape when Aboriginal Peoples are equal partners in decisions affecting their territories.45 V: CONCLUSION A legal system that does not have to justify its existence or defend its worth is less vulnerable to challenges.46 While it can be concluded that s.35 has offered some legal space for Indigenous laws and practices, it is too deeply couched in Euro-centric legal traditions and the anthropocentric cultural assumptions that they carry. The most effective strategy for advancing Indigenous laws and culture, that would also endow many animals with greater agency, and relax the culture-nature, human-animal binaries, is the formal recognition of a third order of government. Lisa Chartrand explains that recognition of legal pluralism would be a mere affirmation of legal systems that exist, but which are stifled: “…this country is a multijuridical state, where the distinct laws and rules of three systems come together within the geographic boundaries of one political territory.” 47 Revitalizing Indigenous legal systems is and will be a challenging undertaking. Indigenous communities must reclaim, define and understand their own traditions: “The loss of culture and traditions caused by the historic treatment of Aboriginal communities makes this a formidable challenge for some communities. Equally significant is the challenge for the Canadian state to create political and legal space to accommodate revitalized Indigenous legal traditions and Aboriginal law-making.”48 The project of revitalizing Indigenous legal traditions requires the commitment of resources sufficient for the task, and transformative change to procedural and substantive law. The operation of these laws within, or in addition to, Canadian law would of course cause widespread, but worthwhile controversy. In Animal Bodies, Cultural Justice49 Deckha argues that an ethical relationship with the animal Other must be established in order realize cultural and animal rights. This paper explores and demonstrates the value in finding legal space where cultural pluralism and respect for animals can give rise to the practice of Indigenous laws and the revitalization of animal-Indigenous relationships. As Borrows writes: “Anishinabek law provides guidance about how to theorize, practice and order our association with the [E]arth, and could do so in a way that produces answers that are very different from those found in other sources.”50 (see PDF for references)

The article is devoted to the prerequisites and directions for the development of federal legislation and legislation of the subjects of the Russian Federation regulating the peculiarities of the legal status of peoples who preserve a nomadic or semi-nomadic lifestyle, and identifies general provisions in regional laws on northern (traditional) reindeer husbandry. The differences in regional practices in the financial, organizational and personnel support of nomadic reindeer husbandry are established, three educational trajectories for the indigenous inhabitants of the Russian Arctic are proposed.

The Anglo-Australian legal system has not readily recognised Indigenous constitutions. The absence of such recognition does not, however, deny that Australia's Indigenous nations have had constitutions for thousands of years and continue to do so. In this article, we explain how Indigenous laws, institutions and systems of authority are constitutional. Using the constitutions of the Gunditjmara peoples and Ngarrindjeri nation as examples, we identify three dimensions of Indigenous constitutions in Australia: first, the foundation of Indigenous constitutions in the continuing and inherent authority of Indigenous nations; secondly constitutional features deriving from Indigenous law; and thirdly the use in Indigenous constitutions of institutions and processes that also have status under Australian law. We suggest that this new understanding of Indigenous constitutions provides a basis for contributing to current efforts in Indigenous constitution-making and to the development of a more inclusive understanding of the Australian constitutional system.

On December 15, 1999, the people of Venezuela approved a new Constitution, which is the first Venezuelan constitution to entrench the rights of indigenous peoples. The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the different theoretical issues raised by the problem of rights for indigenous peoples. It is argued that indigenous rights are collective rights based on the value of cultural membership. This implies both an investigation of the value of cultural membership and of the criticisms that the multicultural perspective has offered against that point of view.
Indigenous peoples have the moral right to preserve their cultures and traditions. It is submitted that indigenous peoples have a double moral standing to claim differential treatment based on cultural membership, because they constitute cultural minorities and they were conquered and did not lend their free acceptance to the new regime imposed upon them. Therefore, they constitute a national minority, with moral standing to claim self-government and cultural rights.

This paper discusses the legal principles which are relevant in determining the appropriate level of compensation for infringements to aboriginal and treaty rights. This issue has been left open by the Supreme Court of Canada in the seminal case of Delgamuukw. The nature of aboriginal and treaty rights as well as the fiduciary relationship and duties of the Crown are briefly described. The basic constitutional context in which these rights evolve is also discussed, including the federal common law of aboriginal rights and the constitutional position of these rights in Canada. Having set the general context, the paper then reviews the legal principles governing the infringement of aboriginal and treaty rights, including the requirement for just compensation. Reviews of the legal principles applicable to compensation in cases of expropriation and of the experience in the United States in regards to compensation in cases of the taking of aboriginal lands are also carried out. Six basic legal principles relevant for determining appropriate compensation in cases of infringement to aboriginal and treaty rights are then suggested, justified and explained. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)

In Mabo v. State of Queensland (No. 2) (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1, the majority of the High Court held that ???native title??? had survived the acquisition of sovereignty over the Australian continent and is ???recognised??? by the common law. However, all the judgments failed to articulate clearly either the nature of native title as a legal form, and the relationship of that legal form to the common law, or what is meant by ???recognition???. Twelve years later the High Court has still not provided a satisfactory understanding of any of these matters. The central problem investigated by this thesis is the nature of that relationship and of the legal interest of native title. It is contended that this relationship can be understood and ordered as a matter of jurisdiction. This thesis seeks to recuperate a substantive concept of jurisdiction, and specifically of a particular jurisdiction, that of the common law, and to demonstrate how the interest of native title results from the jurisdictional relationship between common law and indigenous law. Part I is a genealogy of native title, drawn out through a history of ideas about common law jurisdiction. It is an account of the legal practice of jurisdiction, through a conceptual elaboration of a particular jurisdiction: the common law. This part traces the history of the common law from its origins in a pluralistic, fragmented, jurisdictional landscape, to its current position as the ???law of the land???. It considers the traditional mechanisms and techniques through which the common law has ordered its relationships with other jurisdictions, and how it has appropriated matters traditionally within the purview of other jurisdictions, accommodating them within the common law as ???custom???. The thesis demonstrates that the same gestures and practices can be seen in modern native title decisions, and contends that the ordering which underpins both native title, and the Australian legal system, is jurisdictional. Part II examines the practice of jurisdiction through an examination of three technologies of jurisdiction, all of which contributed to the construction of the legal entity of native title as an act of jurisdiction: mapping, accommodation and categorisation.

Within the framework of international trade liberalization which has given rise to considerable thought about the fundamental contribution of cultural diversity to sustainable development, we explore the upholding of the educational rights of recognized linguistic minorities and of the aboriginal and treaty rights of First Nations under the Constitution Act, 1982. We examine these rights in the light of relevant judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada in order to confirm our initial hypothesis that the highest court in the land can show governments here and abroad the steps to take to ensure that the cultural rights specific to some communities and the citizenship common to the population as a whole can coexist in a free and democratic nation.
Our analysis shows that, while relying on the historical, equality and cultural-based justification of the existence of these rights, the Court favours an approach centred on three fundamental principles: the duty of the State to act equitably in the "best interest" of cultural minorities through a flexible approach to the interpretation of established rights; a fair participation in the management of and access to resources by minority groups; and finally, the fostering of social cohesion in order for unity in diversity to be maintained through a reconciliation of existing rights which must be achieved, first and foremost, by political discussion aimed at finding durable solutions.
From a cultural sustainable development perspective, the specific cultural rights of minority groups must thus favour a common citizenship within a context of respect for cultural diversity, while still being compatible with and promoting the values of a liberal democracy.

This dissertation attempts to show that Aboriginal peoples' ways of thinking have not been recognized by early colonial European political thinkers. I begin with an examination of Kymlicka's political theory of minority rights and show that, although Kymlicka is a strong advocate of the right of Aboriginal self-government in Canada, he fails to consider Aboriginal ways of thinking within his own political system. From an Aboriginal perspective this is not surprising. However, I claim that Kymlicka opens the conceptual space for the inclusion of Aboriginal voices. The notion of "incorporation" means that Aboriginal peoples became included in the Canadian state and in this process their Aboriginal sovereignty was extinguished. Aboriginal peoples question the legitimacy of such a claim. A consequence of the Canadian government unilaterally asserting its sovereignty over Aboriginal peoples is that Aboriginal ways of thinking are not recognized as valuable within the legal and political discourse of sovereignty. In chapters two through five, respectively, I examine the Valladolid debate of 1550 between the Spanish monk Bartolome de Las Casas and Juan Sepulveda, The Great Law of Peace of the Iroquois Confederacy, Thomas Hobbes's distinction between the state of nature and a civil society, and Alexis de Tocqueville's account of democracy in America. Each of the examples, except for The Great Law of Peace, generate a philosophical dialogue that includes judgments about Aboriginal peoples. However, none of these European thinkers considers the possibility that Aboriginal voices could play a valuable role in shaping their political thought. To show the value of an Aboriginal exemplar of political thinking I consider the Iroquois Great Law of Peace. The Iroquois view of political sovereignty respects the diversity of voices found within a political relationship. This was put into practice and enforced in early colonial northeast America until the power dynamic shifted betwe

The purpose of this dissertation was to compare British policy towards Ireland/Northern Ireland and United States and Canadian Indian policies. Despite apparent differences, it was hypothesized that closer examination would reveal significant similarities. A conceptual framework was provided by the utilization of Hartzian fragment theory and the theory of internal colonialism. Eighteen research questions and a series of questions concerned with the applicability of the theoretical constructs were tested using largely historical data and statistical indices of social and economic development. The research demonstrated that Gaelic-Irish and North American Indian societies came under pressure from, and were ultimately subjugated by colonizing fragments marked by their high level of ideological cohesiveness. In the Irish case the decisive moment was the Ulster fragmentation of the seventeenth century which set in juxtaposition a defiant, uncompromising, zealously Protestant, "Planter" community and an equally defiant, recalcitrant, native Gaelic-Catholic population. In the United States traditional Indian society was confronted by a largely British-derived, single-fragment regime which was characterized by a profound sense of mission and an Indian policy rooted in its liberal ideology. In Canada the clash between two competing settler fragments led to the victory of the British over the French, and the pursuit of Indian policies based on many of the same premises that underlay United States policies. The indigenous populations in each of the cases under consideration suffered enormous loss of land, physical and cultural destruction, racial discrimination, economic exploitation and were stripped of their political independence. They responded through collective violence, by the formation of cultural revitalization movements, and by intense domestic and international lobbying. They continue to exist today as internal colonies of the developed fragment states within which they are subsumed.

The thesis is an exploration of how indigenous knowledge has emerged as a subject within Australian intellectual property law. It uses the context of copyright law to illustrate this development. The work presents an analysis of the political, social and cultural intersections that influence legal possibilities and effect practical expectations of the law in this area. The dilemma of protecting indigenous knowledge resonates with tensions that characterise intellectual property as a whole. The metaphysical dimensions of intellectual property have always been insecure but these difficulties come to the fore with the identification of boundaries and markers that establish property in indigenous subject matter. While intellectual property law is always managing difference, the politics of law are more transparent when managing indigenous concerns. Rather than assume the naturalness of the category of indigenous knowledge within law, this work interrogates the politics of its construction precisely as a ???special??? category. Employing a multidisciplinary methodology, engaging theories of governmental rationality that draws upon the scholarship of Michel Foucault to appreciate strategies of managing and directing knowledge, the thesis considers how the politics of law is infused by cultural, political, bureaucratic and individual factors. Key elements in Australia that have pushed the law to consider expressions of indigenous knowledge in intellectual property can be located in changing political environments, governmental intervention through strategic reports, cultural sensitivity articulated in case law and innovative instances of individual agency. The intersection of these elements reveals a dynamic that exerts influence in the shape the law takes.

This thesis discussed the subjects of bioprospecting and the protection of traditional knowledge. At first the international approach to the subjects was elaborately discussed. The focus was on the respective provisions of the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity and the related Bonn Guidelines, stressing the matter of access to genetic resources and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from their utilization. Enclosed in this discussion was the examination of different legislatory approaches to tackle the subject with an emphasis on national intellectual property rights laws and the role and potential merit of national registers of and databases for specific traditional knowledge. The way national legislators have implemented the concerned obligations of the convention, and their peculiarities as for example the restriction of scope of law to indigenous biological resources, was exemplified with the respective Bolivian, South African as well as Indian laws.

The main objectives of this study were to identify the role that customary law and traditional leadership can play, without compromising their current positions or future recognition through legislation, in creating a better life for their constituents. The study analysed diverse issues such as legislative reform, the future role and functions of traditional leaders, training needs of traditional leaders, and the impact of a possible lack of commitment by national and provincial government on the training of traditional leaders to fulfill their functions within the ambit of the Constitution.

This chapter explores the development of international law on indigeneity. It reviews the legal protections endowed by key documents, such as International Labor Organizations Convention No. 169 and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). The chapter also provides a short comparative legal perspective on land rights of indigenous peoples which helps to situate the Israeli case within other settler colonial situations and to address the status of the relevant international legislation and norms. It concludes that several components of the UNDRIP have gained a status of international customary law, and hence with growing relevance to Israeli jurisprudence and to the Bedouins. The chapter ends by addressing the question of indigenous peoples’ rights in Israeli law and how Israeli basic laws should expand to incorporate the legal protection of the Bedouins.

This chapter explores the law of Australian colonization and its relationship with the laws of Australia's Indigenous peoples. A line of legal continuity links the Australian Constitution to the imposition of British law made during the colonization of Australia and to the decisions of colonial courts that treated the Australian colonies as colonies of settlement. Those decisions, after some initial doubts, displaced the diverse and intricate laws of Australia’s Indigenous peoples, who have occupied the continent for tens of thousands of years. Only in relation to native title to land have later courts made a major reassessment of the status of Indigenous laws. There, the High Court has challenged the factual assumptions of earlier decisions and found accommodation for Indigenous land ownership within the common law, but left the legal framework of colonization otherwise intact.

Indigenous Peoples, local communities, and Afro-Descendant Peoples (IP, LC & ADP) — roughly 2.5 billion people — customarily manage over 50% of the global land mass, but governments currently recognize their legal ownership to just 10% (RRI, 2015). Fortunately, there has been progress in addressing this historic injustice in recent years as governments have begun to pass legislation and achieve court decisions to recognize the historic and customary use and ownership of these lands. A recent stock-taking finds that since 2002, at least 14 additional countries have passed legislation that require governments to recognize these rights. Similarly, there have been positive national and regional level court decisions in numerous countries supporting the formal recognition of the collective land and forest rights of Indigenous Peoples, local communities, and Afro-descendant Peoples. RRI research demonstrates that if only 7 countries implemented these new laws, policies, and court decisions, over 176 million hectares would be transferred from government to Indigenous, local community, and Afro-descendant ownership, benefitting over 200 million people (RRI, 2018). The focus of this report, and the Framework itself, is limited to formal recognition of land and forest rights (i.e. delimitation, mapping, registry, etc.). It does not assess the important and subsequent steps of strengthening community or territorial governance, the enforcement of these rights by governments, or the capacities necessary to enable Indigenous, local community, and Afro-descendant organizations to manage or exploit their resources or engage in enterprises or economic development activities – all of which are essential for sustained and self-determined conservation and development. This Framework focuses on the first step in this longer process.