Academic literature on the topic 'India, Northeastern Politics and government'

Abstract The northeastern states of India have been positioned as India’s postcolonial other in mainstream politics with the aim to create xenophobic binaries between insider and outsider groups. Comprising the eight “sister” states of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim, and Tripura, this region represents India’s amorphous shadowlands in arbitrary political markings between the mainland and the off-centered northeastern periphery. These satellite states have been subjected to the neocolonial governance of the Indian government and its implementation of political terror through abusive laws, militarized violence, protracted wars against civilians and insurgents alike, and gender abuse. Women poets from the region, such as Monalisa Changkija, Temsüla Ao, Mamang Dai, and others, have played a leading role in exposing and denouncing this violence. This essay examines the importance of women’s poetry as a gendered documentation of conflict, a peace narrative, a poet’s reading of history, and a site of memory. Can poetry express the particularized “sorrow of women” (Mamang Dai) without sentimentality and concession? How do these poetic contestations of conflict represent complex interrogations of identity, eco-devastation, and militarization to invalidate an elitist “poetry for poetry’s sake” ethic?

<p>India’s northeastern region has been experiencing the least known but one of the longest-lasting armed conflict situation in South Asia. New Delhi government has been trying to control the situation through some restrictive or economic incentives such as the Armed Forces Special Power Act-1958 (AFSPA) or the Look East Policy (LEP) and others. However, these policies have been contested by many of the human rights activists, civil societies for their disruptive character, who have unmasked the disruptive substance of human rights violation and the militaristic developmentalism. The proposed paper will rather be a <em>tour d’ horizon </em>of India’s political dispensation at its northeastern frontier in general and Manipur in particular, that shapes the political affairs of this region since India’s Independence.</p><p><strong>Published online</strong>: 11 December 2017</p>

Over the years, people’s resistance movements in Assam have protested state policies and actions on the control, appropriation and ownerships of natural resources. Such movements are marked by an active ideological orientation from the time of colonial annexation of this northeastern region to that of the formation of the post-colonial independent Indian state and yet still continues. Resistance against power of the state occurred within a recognized public arena, which is well goes with what present days resistance movements are doing against the coercive role of the state in Assam. Voices are erupted from the grounds that have a direct connection with the neoliberal state policy of neo-extraction of resources by marginalizing local communities who are said to be the traditional right holders over it. Illustrative to this, the resistance movement spearheaded by a peasant-based organization called Krishak Mukti Sangram Samiti (KMSS)in Assam at the grass root level not only mobilizes the voices which are usually unheard, but build a strong counter force against the state power. In its decade long existence, the organization is offering its resistance politics by launching a serious of movements to resist anti-farmer and anti-people policies pursued by the government in the post-liberalization phase and has emerged as a powerful platform for representing voices of the economically-excluded, who fall behind the curtain of the neo-liberal economic paradigm.

The old settlers in Sikkim are a community of mainland Indians whose ancestors had settled at least 15 years before the merger with India in 1975. At present, the total population of the community is less than three thousand individuals, comprising various ethnicities. This qualitative study focuses on the perceived discrimination of the old settlers, who form a demographic minority in the state. Data was collected using telephonic interviews from a sample of 11 old settlers. Thematic analysis indicated racial differences between the northeasterner indigenous community and mainland Indian old settlers as a major reason for perceived discrimination. The participants expressed the experience of negative emotional reactions, such as anger and disappointment, when they faced discrimination. The participants also felt betrayed by the government of India because they did not receive adequate protection for their rights when their identity in Sikkim changed from foreigners to citizens. Reactions to discrimination included migrating out of the state, experiencing negative emotions such as anger, disappointment and fear, and learned helplessness.

The setting up of the National Rural Health Mission is yet another political move by the present government of India to make yet another promise to the long-suffering rural populations to improve their health status. As has happened so often in the past, it is based on questionable premises. It adopts a simplistic approach to a highly complex problem. The Union Ministry of Health and Family Welfare and its advisors, because of ignorance or otherwise, have doggedly refused to learn from the many experiences of the past, either the earlier, somewhat sincere efforts to develop endogenous mechanisms to offer access to health services or the devastating impact on the painstakingly built rural health services of the imposition of prefabricated, ill-conceived, ill-formulated, technocentric vertical programs on the people of India. They also ignore some of the basic postulates of public health practice in a country such as India. That they did not substantiate the bases of some of their contentions with scientific data from health systems research reveals that they are not serious about their promise to rural populations. This is yet another instance of what Romesh Thaper called “Baba Log playing government government.”

Ethnozoological practices to cure various diseases have a long history. Communities that reside near the forest collect wild animals and their derivatives to prepare medicines and get relief from diseases. Northeastern India is home to many tribes with vast traditional ethnobiological knowledge, and there are many reports of zootherapeutic uses in the region. In an attempt to understand primate-based ethnozoologic use in the area a literature survey was carried out using different sources. The findings revealed that Hoolock hoolock was the most used species among the primates (48 %), followed by Macaca assamensis (20 %) and Macaca mulatta (10 %). Among the materials used, the flesh of primates was the most dominant (43 %), followed by the blood (20 %) and brain (14 %). This paper highlights the negative effects of ethno-medicinal uses of primates to draw the attention of conservationists and encourage conservation education to address the damage to primates in the name of health care. Government agencies are also requested to strengthen health care systems to discourage the killing of valuable primate species.

Elite family networks with overlapping economic and political power have been a basic feature of Latin America. Their influence was characteristically strong during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as the export economies expanded and national governments, particularly in the larger nations, advocated order and progress at the expense of participatory democracy. Historically, the influence of the elites has been primarily a regional phenomenon underpinned by ownership of land, mines, or lucrative commercial enterprises. They formed economic, political, and blood alliances to control production of vital products, monopolise local government and, on occasion, initiate bold entrepreneurial initiatives. Examples include the thirty families who dominated henequen production and local government in nineteenth-century Yucatán, the Grupo Monterrey who ran the industrialising economy of northeastern Mexico during the Porfiriato, and the Paraíba oligarchy who controlled cotton production, municipal government, and local tax revenues during the Brazilian Old Republic (1889–1930).

India responded to the COVID-19 measures abruptly and in a tough manner during the early stages of the pandemic. Its response did not take into consideration the socio-economic life of the majority of people in India who work in the informal sector and the sheer diversity of the country. The imposition of a nationwide lockdown using the Disaster Management Act 2005 enabled the Union Government to impose its will on the whole country. India has a federal system, and health is a state subject. Such an overbearing role on the part of the Central Government did not, however, lead to coordinated action. Some states expressed their differences, but eventually all complied with the central guidelines. The COVID-19 pandemic struck at a time when an agitation was going on in the country, especially in New Delhi, against the Citizen Amendment Act. The lockdown was imposed all of a sudden and was extended until 31 May. This led to a humanitarian crisis involving a large number of domestic migrant workers, who were left stranded with no income for survival and no means of transport to go home. Indians abroad who were intending to return also found themselves trapped. Dissenting voices were silenced through arrests and detentions during this period, and the victims included rights activists, students, lawyers, and even some academics. Power tussles and elections continued as usual and the social distancing norms were often compromised. Since COVID-19 containment measures were carried out primarily at the state level, this paper will also selectively draw on their experiences. India also used the opportunity to burnish its credentials as the ‘pharmacy of the world’ by sending medical supplies to over a hundred countries. In the second wave, there were many deaths, but the government was accused of undercounting them and of not doing enough to deliver vaccines to Indians. This paper will deal with the conflicts, contestations and the foreign policy fallout following the onset of the pandemic and the measures adopted by the union government to cope with them, with less focus on the economic and epidemiological aspects of pandemic management. This paper looks at previous studies, press reports, and press releases by government agencies to collect the needed data. A descriptive and analytical approach is followed in the paper.

Starting from the aim of stopping the rebel movement, the enactment of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) of 1958 in practice became a boomerang for security stability in Northeastern India. The privileges granted by the government to soldiers are used as a pretext for discrimination and violations of human rights. The patriarchal tradition, which then considers women as property and weak creatures, causes women and children to suffer the most. Reports of sexual harassment cases, rape, and even murder unilaterally encouraged Meira Paibis as a grassroots women's movement to develop a strategy of resistance. Meira Paibis uses a non-violent approach through symbolic methods that are viewed as extreme and controversial in its mission. This research will describe the significant role of the Meira Paibis women's movement in organizing resistance to AFSPA policies and their efforts to achieve positive peace in Northeastern India. This paper will elaborate on the non-violence approach to see the strategies played by Meira Paibis and the obstacles faced in the process of achieving her goals.

The Political Department and the Indian Political Service stand accused of sins of omission and commission. The evidence suggests that they were badly hampered by ill-conceived training prodecures, a lack of manpower and above all the incoherent policy of the British government towards the Indian states. The failure of the 1935 Federation Act which formally established the Political Department was not due to princely intransigence inspired by political officers. Between 1935 and 1947 the Political Department embarked on a vigorous programme of combining the resources of the smaller states to strengthen them as viable partners in a new India. Their lack of success in effecting the federation of the states with India in 1947 was not a result of the disinclination of political officers to implement reform as much as their inability to do so. Many princes were also unwilling to sacrifice a measure of sovereignty for efficient government and paramountcy precluded forcing internal reform on the princes. Paramountcy was never clearly defined and thus its retraction in 1947 took place amidst confusion and misunderstanding on all sides. The Indian Political Service was always treated as secondary to the Indian Civil Service and the states to British India. Britain's emphasis on constitutional change in British India, reflected in the Cripps Mission of 1942, the Cabinet Mission of 1946 and the rush towards independence in 1947 resulted in her inattention to the Political Department and the princes which culminated in the abandonment of both in 1947.

This analysis addresses the relationship between pre-political cultural identity and political outcomes. It posits that the political mobilization of sub-national groups cannot be understood without an examination of the cultural processes of identity formation. The analysis engages cultural discourse and its organization as an explanatory factor in the examination of the variation in ethnic political outcomes. Hence, important questions about ethnonational conflict can be answered by engaging the levels at which identity is constructed and reshaped through cultural discourse. It shifts the arena of analysis from the state to the ethnic groups themselves. The two empirical cases analyzed are that of Sikh nationalism in Punjab and 'ethnic' Assamese nationalism in Assam.

The principal aim of this thesis is to elaborate a politicized reading of Amartya Sen's Capability Approach. It explores how capabilities are augmented through the forging of contentious political subjectivities. In it, I build on the criticism that Sen's framework can be more sensitive to questions of power and politics. Against some of his critics, however, I argue that its 'politicization' must focus analytical attention on politics as the struggle to produce subjects rather than limiting its understanding to negotiations over authority, resources and allocations. I draw on quantitative and qualitative analysis of ethnographic data from rural eastern India to substantiate my argument. The first two chapters outline the contours of the debates and introduce the social, economic and political life of the study localities. Each of the four subsequent chapters elucidates the manner in which the contentious processes through which political subjectivity are forged augments capabilities. In Chapter 3 I advance the case that any discussion on capabilities needs to analyze how subjects interrogate the relations of domination and subordination which they have hitherto been compelled to inhabit. Based on an analysis of the contentions spawned by the Indian Government's National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, I point to how the notion of cooperative conflict is helpful in understanding these processes. In Chapter 4, I draw attention to the analytic importance that needs to be accorded to 'voice' in order to understand how subjects contest and reconstitute these relationships: I base my analysis on the claims made on elected representatives by different groups of people in respect to 'poverty cards'. This emphasis leads in Chapter 5 to an investigation of the ways in which agonistic exchanges in public spaces augments capabilities: this I do through an examination of two specific disputes involving a variety of local actors. I develop these insights further in Chapter 6 to show how our understanding of the processes through which capabilities may be enhanced gains analytically from an analysis of the manner in which subjects construct their identities. Chapter 7 concludes.

The objective of this study is to understand the logic of popular mobilization in Sao Paulo (Brazil) and New Delhi (India) and to explain why subaltern groups use their political freedoms to mobilize on some issues and not on others. More specifically, the study attempts to address a puzzle: Why do the popular sectors not mobilize to make claims for health when the vast majority of the urban poor experience severe health deficits? My contention is that the nature of public discourse determines both the emergence of popular movements and the issues on which they engage in claims-making. Competing ideas about what democracy is and what it ought to be, the meaning of social justice, and the relationship between democracy and social justice, constitute the 'raw materials' around which mobilization frames are created. The empirical evidence presented in this study supports my claim that the nature of public discourse is crucial for democratic deepening from below.
Based on extensive field research in low-income communities in Sao Paulo and New Delhi, my study explains the differences and similarities in the political actions of the urban poor. In India, the near-absence of a public discourse on health accounts for the lack of mobilization by subaltern groups to seek improvements in their health situation. In contrast, I find that there has been a tradition of public discourse on health in Brazil since the 1970s when "external actors" such as doctors and progressive Church officials became engaged in social causes and contributed to the emergence of health movements. However, since Brazil's transition to democracy, this public discourse has fractured, becoming more receptive to "new" health issues such as violence, even though "old" health problems continue to persist. While the popular sectors experience the dual burden of "old" and "new" health problems, they are perceived to be the cause of many "new" health hazards like violence rather than its victims. The disengagement of "external actors" from "old" health issues and the widespread perception that the popular sectors are themselves to blame for the "new" health problems has inhibited popular mobilization for health in democratic Brazil.

Aim/Purpose: This paper provides the results of the preliminary analysis of the findings of an ongoing study that seeks to examine the social media use, cultural and political awareness, civic engagement, issue prioritization, and social activism of Gen Z students enrolled at four different institutional types located in the Mid-Atlantic region of the United States. The aim of this study is to look at the group as a whole as well as compare findings across populations. The institutional types under consideration include a mid-sized majority serving or otherwise referred to as a traditionally white institution (TWI) located in a small coastal city on the Atlantic Ocean, a small Historically Black University (HBCU) located in a rural area, a large community college located in a county that is a mixture of rural and suburban and which sits on the border of Maryland and Pennsylvania, and graduating high school students enrolled in career and technical education (CTE) programs in a large urban area. This exploration is purposed to examine the behaviors and expectations of Gen Z students within a representative American region during a time of tremendous turmoil and civil unrest in the United States. Background: Over 74 million strong, Gen Z makes up almost one-quarter of the U.S. population. They already outnumber any current living generation and are the first true digital natives. Born after 1996 and through 2012, they are known for their short attention spans and heightened ability to multi-task. Raised in the age of the smart phone, they have been tethered to digital devices from a young age with most having the preponderance of their childhood milestones commemorated online. Often called Zoomers, they are more racially and ethnically diverse than any previous generation and are on track to be the most well-educated generation in history. Gen Zers in the United States have been found in the research to be progressive and pro-government and viewing increasing racial and ethnic diversity as positive change. Finally, they are less likely to hold xenophobic beliefs such as the notion of American exceptionalism and superiority that have been popular with by prior generations. The United States has been in a period of social and civil unrest in recent years with concerns over systematic racism, rampant inequalities, political polarization, xenophobia, police violence, sexual assault and harassment, and the growing epidemic of gun violence. Anxieties stirred by the COVID-19 pandemic further compounded these issues resulting in a powder keg explosion occurring throughout the summer of 2020 and leading well into 2021. As a result, the United States has deteriorated significantly in the Civil Unrest Index falling from 91st to 34th. The vitriol, polarization, protests, murders, and shootings have all occurred during Gen Z’s formative years, and the limited research available indicates that it has shaped their values and political views. Methodology: The Mid-Atlantic region is a portion of the United States that exists as the overlap between the northeastern and southeastern portions of the country. It includes the nation’s capital, as well as large urban centers, small cities, suburbs, and rural enclaves. It is one of the most socially, economically, racially, and culturally diverse parts of the United States and is often referred to as the “typically American region.” An electronic survey was administered to students from 2019 through 2021 attending a high school dual enrollment program, a minority serving institution, a majority serving institution, and a community college all located within the larger mid-Atlantic region. The survey included a combination of multiple response, Likert scaled, dichotomous, open ended, and ordinal questions. It was developed in the Survey Monkey system and reviewed by several content and methodological experts in order to examine bias, vagueness, or potential semantic problems. Finally, the survey was pilot tested prior to implementation in order to explore the efficacy of the research methodology. It was then modified accordingly prior to widespread distribution to potential participants. The surveys were administered to students enrolled in classes taught by the authors all of whom are educators. Participation was voluntary, optional, and anonymous. Over 800 individuals completed the survey with just over 700 usable results, after partial completes and the responses of individuals outside of the 18-24 age range were removed. Findings: Participants in this study overwhelmingly were users of social media. In descending order, YouTube, Instagram, Snapchat, Twitter, Facebook, Pinterest, WhatsApp, LinkedIn and Tik Tok were the most popular social media services reported as being used. When volume of use was considered, Instagram, Snapchat, YouTube and Twitter were the most cited with most participants reporting using Instagram and Snapchat multiple times a day. When asked to select which social media service they would use if forced to choose just one, the number one choice was YouTube followed by Instagram and Snapchat. Additionally, more than half of participants responded that they have uploaded a video to a video sharing site such as YouTube or Tik Tok. When asked about their familiarity with different technologies, participants overwhelmingly responded that they are “very familiar” with smart phones, searching the Web, social media, and email. About half the respondents said that they were “very familiar” with common computer applications such as the Microsoft Office Suite or Google Suite with another third saying that they were “somewhat familiar.” When asked about Learning Management Systems (LMS) like Blackboard, Course Compass, Canvas, Edmodo, Moodle, Course Sites, Google Classroom, Mindtap, Schoology, Absorb, D2L, itslearning, Otus, PowerSchool, or WizIQ, only 43% said they were “very familiar” with 31% responding that they were “somewhat familiar.” Finally, about half the students were either “very” or “somewhat” familiar with operating systems such as Windows. A few preferences with respect to technology in the teaching and learning process were explored in the survey. Most students (85%) responded that they want course announcements and reminders sent to their phones, 76% expect their courses to incorporate the use of technology, 71% want their courses to have course websites, and 71% said that they would rather watch a video than read a book chapter. When asked to consider the future, over 81% or respondents reported that technology will play a major role in their future career. Most participants considered themselves “informed” or “well informed” about current events although few considered themselves “very informed” or “well informed” about politics. When asked how they get their news, the most common forum reported for getting news and information about current events and politics was social media with 81% of respondents reporting. Gen Z is known to be an engaged generation and the participants in this study were not an exception. As such, it came as no surprise to discover that, in the past year more than 78% of respondents had educated friends or family about an important social or political issue, about half (48%) had donated to a cause of importance to them, more than a quarter (26%) had participated in a march or rally, and a quarter (26%) had actively boycotted a product or company. Further, about 37% consider themselves to be a social activist with another 41% responding that aren’t sure if they would consider themselves an activist and only 22% saying that they would not consider themselves an activist. When asked what issues were important to them, the most frequently cited were Black Lives Matter (75%), human trafficking (68%), sexual assault/harassment/Me Too (66.49%), gun violence (65.82%), women’s rights (65.15%), climate change (55.4%), immigration reform/deferred action for childhood arrivals (DACA) (48.8%), and LGBTQ+ rights (47.39%). When the schools were compared, there were only minor differences in social media use with the high school students indicating slightly more use of Tik Tok than the other participants. All groups were virtually equal when it came to how informed they perceived themselves about current events and politics. Consensus among groups existed with respect to how they get their news, and the community college and high school students were slightly more likely to have participated in a march, protest, or rally in the last 12 months than the university students. The community college and high school students were also slightly more likely to consider themselves social activists than the participants from either of the universities. When the importance of the issues was considered, significant differences based on institutional type were noted. Black Lives Matter (BLM) was identified as important by the largest portion of students attending the HBCU followed by the community college students and high school students. Less than half of the students attending the TWI considered BLM an important issue. Human trafficking was cited as important by a higher percentage of students attending the HBCU and urban high school than at the suburban and rural community college or the TWI. Sexual assault was considered important by the majority of students at all the schools with the percentage a bit smaller from the majority serving institution. About two thirds of the students at the high school, community college, and HBCU considered gun violence important versus about half the students at the majority serving institution. Women’s rights were reported as being important by more of the high school and HBCU participants than the community college or TWI. Climate change was considered important by about half the students at all schools with a slightly smaller portion reporting out the HBCU. Immigration reform/DACA was reported as important by half the high school, community college, and HBCU participants with only a third of the students from the majority serving institution citing it as an important issue. With respect to LGBTQ rights approximately half of the high school and community college participants cited it as important, 44.53% of the HBCU students, and only about a quarter of the students attending the majority serving institution. Contribution and Conclusion: This paper provides a timely investigation into the mindset of generation Z students living in the United States during a period of heightened civic unrest. This insight is useful to educators who should be informed about the generation of students that is currently populating higher education. The findings of this study are consistent with public opinion polls by Pew Research Center. According to the findings, the Gen Z students participating in this study are heavy users of multiple social media, expect technology to be integrated into teaching and learning, anticipate a future career where technology will play an important role, informed about current and political events, use social media as their main source for getting news and information, and fairly engaged in social activism. When institutional type was compared the students from the university with the more affluent and less diverse population were less likely to find social justice issues important than the other groups. Recommendations for Practitioners: During disruptive and contentious times, it is negligent to think that the abounding issues plaguing society are not important to our students. Gauging the issues of importance and levels of civic engagement provides us crucial information towards understanding the attitudes of students. Further, knowing how our students gain information, their social media usage, as well as how informed they are about current events and political issues can be used to more effectively communicate and educate. Recommendations for Researchers: As social media continues to proliferate daily life and become a vital means of news and information gathering, additional studies such as the one presented here are needed. Additionally, in other countries facing similarly turbulent times, measuring student interest, awareness, and engagement is highly informative. Impact on Society: During a highly contentious period replete with a large volume of civil unrest and compounded by a global pandemic, understanding the behaviors and attitudes of students can help us as higher education faculty be more attuned when it comes to the design and delivery of curriculum. Future Research This presentation presents preliminary findings. Data is still being collected and much more extensive statistical analyses will be performed.

The largest democracy in the world is now moving towards authoritarianism under the Hindutva civilizational populist prime minister Narendra Modi-led Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)’s rule. This article focuses on digital rights in India that have seen a sharp decline in recent years. It explores the transformation of the internet and social media, from a relatively open and liberal space to a restricted one. This survey of India’s digital landscape finds that the rise of civilizational populist Modi and his eight years long rule have led to an upsurge in digital surveillance and control and has fostered an environment of online harassment and bullying for those who are critical of the BJP’s views and politics. The article uses a four-level framework (Full Network, Sub-Network, Proxies, and Network Nodes) to explore digital authoritarianism by the BJP government. At each of these levels, the Hindutva populist government has closed avenues of open discussion and exchange of views by enforcing new rules and regulations.

Turkey, Pakistan, India, Malaysia, and Indonesia span one of the longest continuously inhabited regions of the world. Centuries of cultural infusion have ensured these societies are highly heterogeneous. As plural polities, they are ripe for the kind of freedoms that liberal democracy can guarantee. However, despite having multi-party electoral systems, these countries have recently moved toward populist authoritarianism. Populism —once considered a distinctively Latin American problem that only seldom reared its head in other parts of the world— has now found a home in almost every corner of the planet. Moreover, it has latched on to religion, which, as history reminds us, has an unparalleled power to mobilize crowds. This report explores the unique nexus between faith and populism in our era and offers an insight into how cyberspace and offline politics have become highly intertwined to create a hyper-reality in which socio-political events are taking place. The report focuses, in particular, on the role of religious populism in digital space as a catalyst for undemocratic politics in the five Asian countries we have selected as our case studies. The focus on the West Asian and South Asian cases is an opportunity to examine authoritarian religious populists in power, whereas the East Asian countries showcase powerful authoritarian religious populist forces outside parliament. This report compares internet governance in each of these countries under three categories: obstacles to access, limits on content, and violations of user rights. These are the digital toolkits that authorities use to govern digital space. Our case selection and research focus have allowed us to undertake a comparative analysis of different types of online restrictions in these countries that constrain space foropposition and democratic voices while simultaneously making room for authoritarian religious populist narratives to arise and flourish. The report finds that surveillance, censorship, disinformation campaigns, internet shutdowns, and cyber-attacks—along with targeted arrests and violence spreading from digital space—are common features of digital authoritarianism. In each case, it is also found that religious populist forces co-opt political actors in their control of cyberspace. The situational analysis from five countries indicates that religion’s role in digital authoritarianism is quite evident, adding to the layer of nationalism. Most of the leaders in power use religious justifications for curbs on the internet. Religious leaders support these laws as a means to restrict “moral ills” such as blasphemy, pornography, and the like. This evident “religious populism” seems to be a major driver of policy changes that are limiting civil liberties in the name of “the people.” In the end, the reasons for restricting digital space are not purely religious but draw on religious themes with populist language in a mixed and hybrid fashion. Some common themes found in all the case studies shed light on the role of digital space in shaping politics and society offline and vice versa. The key findings of our survey are as follows: The future of (especially) fragile democracies is highly intertwined with digital space. There is an undeniable nexus between faith and populism which offers an insight into how cyberspace and politics offline have become highly intertwined. Religion and politics have merged in these five countries to shape cyber governance. The cyber governance policies of populist rulers mirror their undemocratic, repressive, populist, and authoritarian policies offline. As a result, populist authoritarianism in the non-digital world has increasingly come to colonize cyberspace, and events online are more and more playing a role in shaping politics offline. “Morality” is a common theme used to justify the need for increasingly draconian digital laws and the active monopolization of cyberspace by government actors. Islamist and Hindutva trolls feel an unprecedented sense of cyber empowerment, hurling abuse without physically seeing the consequences or experiencing the emotional and psychological damage inflicted on their victims.

Turkey, Pakistan, India, Malaysia, and Indonesia span one of the longest continuously inhabited regions of the world. Centuries of cultural infusion have ensured these societies are highly heterogeneous. As plural polities, they are ripe for the kind of freedoms that liberal democracy can guarantee. However, despite having multi-party electoral systems, these countries have recently moved toward populist authoritarianism. Populism —once considered a distinctively Latin American problem that only seldom reared its head in other parts of the world— has now found a home in almost every corner of the planet. Moreover, it has latched on to religion, which, as history reminds us, has an unparalleled power to mobilize crowds. This report explores the unique nexus between faith and populism in our era and offers an insight into how cyberspace and offline politics have become highly intertwined to create a hyper-reality in which socio-political events are taking place. The report focuses, in particular, on the role of religious populism in digital space as a catalyst for undemocratic politics in the five Asian countries we have selected as our case studies. The focus on the West Asian and South Asian cases is an opportunity to examine authoritarian religious populists in power, whereas the East Asian countries showcase powerful authoritarian religious populist forces outside parliament. This report compares internet governance in each of these countries under three categories: obstacles to access, limits on content, and violations of user rights. These are the digital toolkits that authorities use to govern digital space. Our case selection and research focus have allowed us to undertake a comparative analysis of different types of online restrictions in these countries that constrain space foropposition and democratic voices while simultaneously making room for authoritarian religious populist narratives to arise and flourish. The report finds that surveillance, censorship, disinformation campaigns, internet shutdowns, and cyber-attacks—along with targeted arrests and violence spreading from digital space—are common features of digital authoritarianism. In each case, it is also found that religious populist forces co-opt political actors in their control of cyberspace. The situational analysis from five countries indicates that religion’s role in digital authoritarianism is quite evident, adding to the layer of nationalism. Most of the leaders in power use religious justifications for curbs on the internet. Religious leaders support these laws as a means to restrict “moral ills” such as blasphemy, pornography, and the like. This evident “religious populism” seems to be a major driver of policy changes that are limiting civil liberties in the name of “the people.” In the end, the reasons for restricting digital space are not purely religious but draw on religious themes with populist language in a mixed and hybrid fashion. Some common themes found in all the case studies shed light on the role of digital space in shaping politics and society offline and vice versa. The key findings of our survey are as follows: The future of (especially) fragile democracies is highly intertwined with digital space. There is an undeniable nexus between faith and populism which offers an insight into how cyberspace and politics offline have become highly intertwined. Religion and politics have merged in these five countries to shape cyber governance. The cyber governance policies of populist rulers mirror their undemocratic, repressive, populist, and authoritarian policies offline. As a result, populist authoritarianism in the non-digital world has increasingly come to colonize cyberspace, and events online are more and more playing a role in shaping politics offline. “Morality” is a common theme used to justify the need for increasingly draconian digital laws and the active monopolization of cyberspace by government actors. Islamist and Hindutva trolls feel an unprecedented sense of cyber empowerment, hurling abuse without physically seeing the consequences or experiencing the emotional and psychological damage inflicted on their victims.