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Journal articles on the topic 'Incentive provision'

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Published: 10 December 2022
Last updated: 28 January 2023

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1

Müller, Daniel, and Philipp Weinschenk. "Rater Bias and Incentive Provision." Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 24, no. 4 (October 2015): 833–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jems.12118.

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2

Handayani, Riaty. "Tax Minization as a Moderator on the Effect of Tunnelling Incentive and Bonus Mechanism on Transfer Pricing Provisions." European Journal of Business and Management Research 6, no. 4 (July 9, 2021): 88–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.24018/ejbmr.2021.6.4.930.

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This study is a proof-of-concept of important analytical and experimental functions and / or characteristics. Transfer pricing is a company action that can increase potential tax loss for state revenue. The purpose of this study was to analyze the effect of tunneling incentive, bonus mechanism on transfer pricing. In addition, this study also examines tax minimization as a moderating variable for the effect of tunneling incentive, the bonus mechanism on transfer pricing. The samples used in this research are manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for the period 2016-2019. This study uses multiple regression analysis and moderate regression analysis with statistical product and service solution version 23. The benefit of this research is to improve the literature related to transfer pricing. The result of this research is that tunneling incentive has a significant effect on the provision of transfer pricing, while the bonus mechanism has no significant effect on the provision of transfer pricing. Tax minimization cannot moderate the effect of tunneling incentives and bonus mechanics on transfer pricing provisions.
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3

Latham, Stephen R. "Regulation of Managed Care Incentive Payments to Physicians." American Journal of Law & Medicine 22, no. 4 (1996): 399–432. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0098858800011904.

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A large and growing number of physicians in today’s managed care market are paid for their services according to incentive schemes that offer financial rewards for the provision of less, and less expensive, medical care. Such schemes typically reward physicians for reducing their own costs of care and reward primary care physicians for reducing the number and cost of referrals for inpatient and specialty care. Consumers, fearful that such schemes will prompt physicians to deny them medically necessary care, have protested the implementation of such incentive plans. Various states are considering bills to ban or to limit physician incentive payments.Federal policy with regard to incentive schemes has been confused and contradictory. On one hand, regulators concerned with controlling health care costs and limiting the provision of unnecessary care have encouraged such financial incentives. For example, federal Stark regulations, which ban referrals tied to physician compensation, include explicit exceptions for incentive schemes.
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4

유소진, Lee Junyoup, and 이은서. "CEO Equity Incentive and Antitakeover Provision." Korea International Accounting Review ll, no. 83 (February 2019): 229–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.21073/kiar.2019..83.010.

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5

Kvaløy, Ola, and Trond E. Olsen. "Incentive Provision when Contracting is Costly." Economica 83, no. 332 (April 8, 2016): 741–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecca.12179.

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6

Susilawati, Neni, Citra Yadin Ramadhena, Mayang Permatasari Syahputri, and Regina Canda Wardhani. "EVALUATING COVID-19’ TAX INCENTIVES: MEASURING THE POLICY EFFECTIVENESS AND PROSPECTIVE POLICY ANALYSIS ON THE EXTENDED PROVISION." Sebatik 26, no. 1 (June 1, 2022): 87–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.46984/sebatik.v26i1.1813.

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Policy-making strength is an integral part of the government vigor. When policies fail, monetary and fiscal costs would significantly increase. Covid-19's Tax Incentive is one of the costs that must be incurred due to the Covid-19 pandemic. However, the absorption of this tax incentive has not been optimal, as indicated by the large gap between the budget and the realization of the tax incentives absorption. This research's aims are to evaluate the policy effectiveness of the Covid-19's tax incentives and analyzing the prospective policy of extended provision based on the evidences. This qualitative research was conducted with literature study as data collection technique. The qualitative data was processed using NVivo software. As the result, the policy aims of Covid-19's Tax Incentives are to maintain the economic growth stability, maintain people's purchasing power, maintain the productivity of certain sectors, support the handling of the Covid-19's impact, and maintain stock market stability. Covid-19's Tax Incentives provides quite effective results in dealing with the negative impacts of the pandemic. Most of the tax incentive policy targets appear to have been achieved, step by step. However, some policies have not been optimally absorbed. The provision of tax incentives can have a positive impact on the economy. However, on the other hand, evidence of increasing national debt can be an indicator that these incentives can also harm financial conditions. The government must be more effective. According to the data, not all types of tax incentives have a level of leverage for national economic recovery.
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7

Ederer, Florian, Richard Holden, and Margaret Meyer. "Gaming and strategic opacity in incentive provision." RAND Journal of Economics 49, no. 4 (September 26, 2018): 819–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12253.

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8

Brunner, Markus, and Kai Jörg Sandner. "Social comparison, group composition, and incentive provision." International Journal of Game Theory 41, no. 3 (October 5, 2011): 565–602. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0303-9.

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9

Costa, Cristiano M., Daniel Ferreira, and Humberto Moreira. "Biased managers, organizational design, and incentive provision." Economics Letters 86, no. 3 (March 2005): 379–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2004.10.001.

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10

Roemer, John E. "Incentive provision and coordination as market functions." Zeitschrift für ArbeitsmarktForschung 43, no. 1 (February 2010): 6–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12651-010-0027-5.

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11

Tamblay, Sebastián, Antonio Gschwender, Marina Dragicevic, and Juan Carlos Muñoz. "Risks Involved in Transit Provision of Bus Contracts." Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board 2649, no. 1 (January 2017): 89–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.3141/2649-10.

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To design and evaluate contractual arrangements for transit service delivery, it is crucial to understand the risks assumed by the actors involved. This understanding in turn clarifies the incentive structures of the contracts and their expected effects as well as explains the performance and development of public transport systems. This study examined urban bus contracts and presented a framework that grouped the risks inherent in any transit system, extended the usual dimensions of the analysis, and allowed for the examination of more complex contracts. This methodology was applied to current contracts of Transantiago, in Chile, which had been in effect since mid-2012, and showed that various contractual mechanisms transferred risks to the transit authorities. These mechanisms were shown to reduce operators’ revenue risk from 70% to around 25%, to weaken incentives, and to move the system further away from the 2012 reform objectives. This situation contributed to the persistence of a serious problem of buses skipping stops and fare evasion. In addition, a large proportion of users were captive to a single operator; this setup generated incentive issues in service planning. The analysis advised against the inclusion of demand risk reduction clauses because they might guarantee part of the operators’ income. Instead, stronger incentives could be generated by reducing the importance of the passengers transported in the payment formula while increasing that of service indicators. Complementarily, new solutions to the system’s remaining problems are suggested for further research, such as direct penalties for skipping stops or payments directly linked to fare evasion rates.
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12

A. Peace, Kristine, and Victoria E.S. Richards. "Faking it: incentives and malingered PTSD." Journal of Criminal Psychology 4, no. 1 (March 12, 2014): 19–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jcp-09-2013-0023.

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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to address how context for malingering and the provision of incentives influence malingered symptom profiles of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Design/methodology/approach – A 2 (case context)×3 (incentive) factorial design was utilized. Participants (n=298) were given an incentive (positive, negative, or no incentive), randomly assigned to a criminal or civil context, and asked to provide a fake claim of child abuse with corresponding malingered symptoms of PTSD. Under these conditions, participants completed several questionnaires pertaining to symptoms of trauma and PTSD. Findings – Results indicated that negative incentives were primarily associated with lower symptom scores. Therefore, “having something to lose” may result in more constrained (and realistic) symptom reports relative to exaggeration evidenced with positive incentives. Originality/value – These results have implications for forensic settings where malingered claims of PTSD are common and incentives for such claims (e.g. having something to gain or lose) frequently exist. Previous studies have failed to address incentives (positive and negative) in relation to a crime (i.e. abuse) that can span both criminal and civil contexts.
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13

Lisciandra, Maurizio. "The Impact of Technological Change on Incentive Provision." STUDI ECONOMICI, no. 95 (March 2009): 5–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.3280/ste2008-095001.

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- The simple trade-off between incentive and risk, which is crucial to the agency problem, is not a sufficient explanation for the ineffectiveness of a specific output-related pay such as the contract system adopted in the US iron and steel industry during the second half of the nineteenth-century. The high rate of technological innovation along with workers' extensive bargaining power made output-related pay a sub-optimal solution. This stylised fact unveils the conflicting nature of piece-rate pay compared to fixed pay as new technology is introduced and stimulates an analysis of the interaction between technological change, bargaining powers, and payment systems which can be conducive to a better understanding of the agency problem and the use of incentive pay. Key words: Incentive Contracts, Inside Contracting, Unions, Technological Change. JEL Classification: J33, J51, N31, O33
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14

Morgenstern, Albrecht. "Efficiency concerns and incentive provision—an experimental study." Economics Letters 83, no. 3 (June 2004): 335–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2003.11.016.

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15

Levin, Jonathan. "Relational Incentive Contracts." American Economic Review 93, no. 3 (May 1, 2003): 835–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/000282803322157115.

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Standard incentive theory models provide a rich framework for studying informational problems but assume that contracts can be perfectly enforced. This paper studies the design of self-enforced relational contracts. I show that optimal contracts often can take a simple stationary form, but that self-enforcement restricts promised compensation and affects incentive provision. With hidden information, it may be optimal for an agent to supply the same inefficient effort regardless of cost conditions. With moral hazard, optimal contracts involve just two levels of compensation. This is true even if performance measures are subjective, in which case optimal contracts terminate following poor performance.
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16

Meilawati, Dian, Rais Dera Pua Rawi, Ramli Lewenussa, and Wisang Candra Bintari. "PENGARUH PEMBERIAN INSENTIF TERHADAP KINERJA KARYAWAN PADA PT TELESINDOSHOP KOTA SORONG." MANAJEMEN DEWANTARA 2, no. 1 (April 16, 2019): 128. http://dx.doi.org/10.26460/md.v3i1.4284.

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This study knows wheter or not there is an effect of giving incentives to employee performance. Type of quantitative research with an associative approach. The research conducted in PT.Telesindoshop Sorong city. The sample us of 65 people. As for the data sources used are primary data and secondary data. Data analysis uses simple linear regression with Statistical Product and Service Solution (SPSS). Based on the results of this study indicate that the provision of PT.Telesindo’s incentives has an influence on employee performance and significantly influence. Based on the results of data analysis, the incentive variable coefficient (X) is 0.564 while the constant is 28,282, so the regression equation can be obtained as follows: Y = 28,282 + 0,564 X. The provision of incentives influences the performance of PT. Telesindoshop employees. The results of the analysis indicate that the provision of incentives has a positive and significant effect on the performance of PT. Tesindoshop employees. With a significant value of 0.042, in this study used a significant level is 0.05 or 5% means 0.042 <0.05, Ho is rejected and Ha is accepted, Ha is the effect of giving incentives to employee performance. Every increase in the provision of incentives to PT. Telesindo employees will increase employee performance by 0.564.
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17

Takwate, Kwaji Tizhe. "Psychosocial Effect of Motivational Incentives on Senior Secondary Schools Teachers’ Work Effectiveness in Adamawa State, Nigeria." Britain International of Linguistics Arts and Education (BIoLAE) Journal 3, no. 3 (November 1, 2021): 165–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.33258/biolae.v3i3.520.

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This study investigated the psychosocial effect of motivational incentives on Senior Secondary Schools teachers’ work effectiveness in Adamawa State, Nigeria. The study adopted survey research design. The population of this study consisted of 162 school administrators and 74 teachers selected from 58 Government owned Senior Secondary Schools in Adamawa State, from a which a sample of 40 respondents were selected using purposive sampling technique. Motivational Incentives and Teachers’ Effectiveness Questionnaire (MITEQ) was used for data collection. The findings of the study revealed that there is lack of service improvement, seminars, and inadequate provision of teaching and learning materials. Teachers are always internally motivated, inconsistent performance evaluation, promotions are not awarded as at when due, and issuance of query letters at slightest provocations by principals. The also revealed that, motivation is the backbone of effective service delivery. This study also revealed that motivational incentive has significant effect on teachers’ work effectiveness and that there is no significant difference between male and female teachers’ reaction and response to motivational incentives. No significant difference was found between different types of motivation incentives and their effect on senior secondary school teachers’ work effectiveness in Adamawa State. The study recommended others that the government as a matter of urgency The study recommends the provision of regular performance enhancement seminars for teachers, adequate provision of teaching and learning materials, prompt payment of teachers’ salary and other monetary incentives and teachers should be internally motivated on the job. For the incentive to have the intended impact on teachers the study recommend that it should be awarded only to those teachers who actually exhibit the intended behaviours and such incentives should be distributed based on collaborative performance rather than on individual performance.
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18

Bonner, Sarah E., Reid Hastie, Geoffrey B. Sprinkle, and S. Mark Young. "A Review of the Effects of Financial Incentives on Performance in Laboratory Tasks: Implications for Management Accounting." Journal of Management Accounting Research 12, no. 1 (January 1, 2000): 19–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/jmar.2000.12.1.19.

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Management accounting information plays an important role in motivating individuals to improve performance (cf., Atkinson, Banker, Kaplan, and Young 1997). This role tends to be operationalized by linking compensation to performance, typically through the provision of financial incentives. Theoretically, financial incentives motivate people to exert additional effort, which in turn should improve task performance. However, a large body of empirical evidence indicates that financial incentives frequently do not lead to increased performance (e.g., Young and Lewis 1995; Jenkins et al. 1998). Consequently, it is important to examine variables that may interact with financial incentives in affecting task performance. This paper presents an extensive review of laboratory studies on financial incentives and examines the relations between type of task and type of incentive scheme, respectively, and task performance. We posit that performance in tasks of varying types (which we view as a surrogate for the gap between task complexity and skill) is differentially sensitive to the increases in effort induced by financial incentives and that not all incentive schemes elicit the same level of effort. Our review reveals that incentives improve performance in only about one half of the experiments. Further, as tasks become more cognitively complex, and thus as the average subject's skill level decreases, it is less likely that incentives improve performance. Finally, quota schemes have the highest likelihood of evincing positive incentive effects, followed by piece-rate schemes, tournament schemes, and fixed-rate schemes. Overall, our findings suggest that the type of task being performed and the type of incentive scheme being employed affect the efficacy of financial incentives and therefore may influence the design of management accounting and control systems.
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19

Giusti, Giovanni, and Roberto Dopeso-Fernández. "Incentive magnitude and reference point shifting: a laboratory experiment." International Journal of Manpower 41, no. 8 (June 26, 2020): 1157–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijm-09-2019-0428.

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PurposeThis paper analyzes how different dynamics of changes in piece-rate incentives affect individuals' exerted effort.Design/methodology/approachThe authors constructed an across-subjects three-period laboratory setting where, for each period, they exogenously manipulate the amount of piece-rate incentive paid for correct answer. The same experimental conditions were separately applied to two different laboratory tasks, one boring and the other entertaining.FindingsIt was found that performance contingent incentives affect participants' effort provision, while the effect is task dependent and it is much stronger for the boring task. Moreover, a unique increase in the amount of piece rate between periods leads to an increase in performance only for the boring task. A decrease in piece rate incentive between periods negatively affects subjects' performance on both tasks, but only provided that the decrease follows a previous increase.Originality/valueThe paper is the first to study the effect of a sequence of changes in the amount of piece rate incentives on individual effort provided. Our main result highlights the relevance of the order in which the sequence of changes in piece-rate incentive occurs. Results could be useful for the designing of performance rewards in organizations.
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20

Kunimoto, Takashi, and Cuiling Zhang. "On incentive compatible, individually rational public good provision mechanisms." Social Choice and Welfare 57, no. 2 (March 24, 2021): 431–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-021-01329-8.

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21

Saha, Bibhas. "Red tape, incentive bribe and the provision of subsidy." Journal of Development Economics 65, no. 1 (June 2001): 113–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0304-3878(01)00130-4.

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22

Yu Zhang and M. van der Schaar. "Incentive Provision and Job Allocation in Social Cloud Systems." IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications 31, no. 9 (September 2013): 607–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/jsac.2013.sup.0513053.

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23

Zulhaimi, Hanifa, and Ida Farida Adi Prawira. "Income Tax Installment Incentive Article 25 "Not Attractive for Entrepreneurs?"." Asia Proceedings of Social Sciences 8, no. 2 (June 11, 2021): 126–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.31580/apss.v8i2.1936.

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The COVID-19 pandemic has led to a decline in economic growth and tax receipts. To overcome this, the government has implemented a policy by provided provision of tax installment incentives on pph article 25. However, the absorption incentive is not in line with the government's expectations. This study analyzes the factors that cause the low absorption of tax installment incentives article 25. This research is qualitative study with an interpretive paradigm with phenomenological method. The research data comes from literature review, news and survey results of business people and the general public as taxpayers. The research find there are several factors that cause the utilization of the article 25 income tax incentive did not reach the target, namely: Economic conditions are still weak, level of beneficiary taxpayers is still low, socialization by the government has not been maximized, incentive schemes are not suitable for business sectors, slowness of the rules or guidelines for the implementation of the policies at the beginning of the insetif enforcement period, policies have not been driven by ease of processing requirements, lack of public understanding of the incentive delivery mechanism, time span is too close between the issuance of policies and the enactment of policies.
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24

Dorgushaova, A. K., and T. S. Kuzina. "Formation of an effective labor incentive system to increase the efficiency of an enterprise (on the example of the Tuapse department of the Azovo-Chernomorsky basin branch)." New Technologies 16, no. 6 (February 20, 2021): 89–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.47370/2072-0920-2020-16-6-89-98.

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The article discusses some approaches to the system of incentives for employees to achieve the target indicators of enterprise development. Effective labor incentive systems attract and retain highly qualified workers, which positively affects the quality of services provided. The importance of dividing the types of incentives and their impact on the wages of workers has been noted. The greatest effect of incentives for personnel is achieved when the goals of the enterprise and the needs of employees are balanced. The company expresses its gratitude and interest to an employee and evaluates his/her work using material and non-material incentives. This article substantiates the effectiveness of incentives for employees, notes the appropriateness of the forms and methods of incentives chosen by the enterprise. The factors influencing the formation of a highly professional and effective team have been identified. The object of the study is the Tuapse Department of the Azovo-Chernomorsky Basin Branch of FSUE «Rosmorport» (hereinafter – the Enterprise). The purpose of the research is to determine promising directions for the development of the labor incentive system. The article considers the main activities of the Tuapse Department of the Azovo-Chernomorsky Basin Branch of FSUE «Rosmorport» represented by the following types of services: navigation, information, pilotage, dredging, tugboat services, services for the provision of berths for anchorage of ships and provision of crew vessels. A wide range of specialized services requires professionally trained personnel of the enterprise. The qualitative indicators of the personnel of the enterprise have been analyzed according to the following characteristics: education level, suitability for the position held, level of qualifications. The ratio of employees of the enterprise depending on the functional composition has been revealed. The total number of employees of the enterprise, retraining and advanced training, dependence of incentive payments on the length of service have been considered in dynamics for 5 years. Measures to increase the efficiency of the personnel of the Tuapse Department of the FSUE «Rosmorport» Azovo-Chernomorsky Basin Branch have been developed and proposed.
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25

Granlund, David, and Magnus Wikström. "Public Provision and Cross-Border Health Care." Forum for Health Economics and Policy 19, no. 2 (December 1, 2016): 157–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/fhep-2014-0024.

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Abstract We study how the optimal public provision of health care depends on whether or not individuals have an option to seek publicly financed treatment in other regions. We find that, relative to the first-best solution, the government has an incentive to over-provide health care to low-income individuals. When cross-border health care takes place, this incentive is solely explained by that over-provision facilitates redistribution. The reason why more health care facilitates redistribution is that high-ability individuals mimicking low-ability individuals benefit the least from health care when health and labor supply are complements. Without cross-border health care, higher demand for health care among high-income individuals also contributes to the over-provision given that high-income individuals do not work considerably less than low-income individuals and that the government cannot discriminate between the income groups by giving them different access to health care.
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26

Indrawati, Renny, Parulian Hutagaol, and Joko Affandi. "Peningkatan Efektivitas Sistem Insentif Pegawai Divisi Retail Banking pada Bank XY." MANAJEMEN IKM: Jurnal Manajemen Pengembangan Industri Kecil Menengah 10, no. 2 (October 29, 2015): 112–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.29244/mikm.10.2.112-122.

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Bank XYZ is bank that already launched credit card in 2007. In their operations, Bank XYZ applying the provision of insentive for the sale of a credit card with the aim that can improve employee motivation to high performing better. Basically every company hopes to reach the target of predetermined sales. But in reality the sale of a credit card to the Bank XYZ Bogor branch has not yet reached the set target. Not achieve the target that is supposed to identify that there is a problem in the achievements of employee performance whereby the employee has not been motivated to work optimally. While Bank XYZ strategy are already making the provision of incentives for retail banking staff who performs the sale of the credit card.The purpose of this research is: 1. Indentify the influence of incentives on employee motivation retail banking division in Bank XYZ in the target of credit card sales. 2. Indentify the influence of an incentive against the employee performance retail banking division. 3. Formulate efforts to improve the effectiveness of incentive system in order to increase the employee performance retail banking division. The process of data analysis begins with some of the stage where the first stage is a test of validity and reability instrument. Descriptive statistic analysis conducted to determine how perceptions of respondents to statements in the questionnaire through analysis rataan score. Through descriptive of statistical analysis can be seen how perceptions of respondents to incentives, motivation and performance. Next after the statistical analysis descriptive done testing SEM (Structural equation model) operated through the LISREL program. The results of the analysis show that the incentive effect significantly against the major motivation of employees. Motivational variables on performance demonstrates that a significant effect on performance the motivation of employees. When compared to the value of the charge factor of motivation on performance, different values looks at factors variable charge directly on performance incentives that show the influence of the small and insignificant. This incentive has the role of small shows a factor in improving the performance of staff Bank XYZ retail banking division. This is shows that employees incentive to affect the performance of retail banking division through motivation, demonstrable of indirect influence more motivation than through direct influence on the performance.
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27

Robinson, Kenneth, and Steven M. Ross. "Incentives as a Treatment Variable for Facilitation Performance of Elderly Adults on Concrete Piagetian Tasks." International Journal of Behavioral Development 10, no. 4 (December 1987): 501–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/016502548701000408.

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Reduced cognitive functioning of older adults is viewed by some researchers as mainly a problem of performance rather than of competence. To further explore this issue, the present study assessed performance of 52 elderly subjects on Piagetian tasks, with or without provision of incentives as a motivating condition. Although the incentive group scored higher than the no-incentive group on all tasks, differences did not reach significance. Contrary to the expected pattern, conservation of volume scores were higher than conservation of surface area scores. One interpretation is that elderly adults might be more influenced than younger age groups by extrinsic properties of conservation task stimuli. Implications of these and other findings for further research with the elderly are discussed.
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28

Opp, Karl-Dieter. "Soft Incentives and Collective Action: Participation in the Anti-Nuclear Movement." British Journal of Political Science 16, no. 1 (January 1986): 87–112. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123400003811.

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The standard explanation of collective action in modern political economy can be outlined as follows: a collective (or public) good is only an incentive for a joint contribution to its provision, if those who benefit from the good at least perceive some influence arising from their contribution, the costs of contributing being otherwise greater than the benefits derived from it; otherwise joint efforts for the provision of the collective good will not ensue. If the good itself does not stimulate collective action, contributions will nevertheless occur when selective incentives become effective. These are benefits arising from contributing and/or costs resulting from no contribution being made.
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29

Noviyanti, Putu Ledyari, and Anak Agung Inten Paraniti. "PENGARUH PEMBERIAN INSENTIF TERHADAP KINERJA KEPALA SEKOLAH DASAR SE-KOTA DENPASAR." Jurnal Santiaji Pendidikan (JSP) 9, no. 1 (January 25, 2019): 25–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.36733/jsp.v9i1.179.

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The Regional Government of Denpasar City issued a policy regarding the provision of incentives. The incentives provided are in the form of additional incentives for teachers and headmaster, especially for public elementary schools in the Denpasar City area. The provision of incentives aims to make the headmaster more maximal in carrying out assigment or workloads, and to optimize the potentials that can be developed in the school (both in aspects of teacher and student achievement). Based on this background, a study was conducted which aimed to determine the effect of giving incentives on the performance of elementary school headmaster throughout Denpasar. The analysis technique used in this study is simple linear regression. Based on the data analyzed, it was obtained 1) the variability of the dependent variable (primary school principal's performance) which can be explained by the variability of the independent variable (incentive giving) of 15.5% and the remaining 84.5% explained by other variables not included in the regression model and 2) giving headmaster incentives has a significant positive effect on the performance of elementary school principals throughout Denpasar.
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30

FUKUYAMA, Kei, Ryohei TAKAHASHI, and Hideyuki KITA. "INCENTIVE OF PARTICIPATION TO CITIZEN-BASED PROVISION OF SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTUTRE." INFRASTRUCTURE PLANNING REVIEW 17 (2000): 93–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.2208/journalip.17.93.

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31

Gisdakis, Stylianos, Thanassis Giannetsos, and Panagiotis Papadimitratos. "Security, Privacy, and Incentive Provision for Mobile Crowd Sensing Systems." IEEE Internet of Things Journal 3, no. 5 (October 2016): 839–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/jiot.2016.2560768.

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32

Hellwig, Martin F. "Nonlinear incentive provision in Walrasian markets: a Cournot convergence approach." Journal of Economic Theory 120, no. 1 (January 2005): 1–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2004.01.003.

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33

Sulistyorini, Sulistyorini, and Dwi Songgo Panggayudi. "Pengaruh Kompetensi Dan Pemberian Insentif Terhadap Disiplin Kerja Sopir PT. Sriputa Surabaya." Improvement: Jurnal Manajemen dan Bisnis 1, no. 2 (September 30, 2021): 173. http://dx.doi.org/10.30651/imp.v1i2.11823.

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Human Resources participate very much in developing the employee potential for the company benefit. The achievement of company success can be done by increasing the employee performance through work discipline. The following research aims to determine the effect of competence and provision of incentives on the driver work discipline of PT. Sriputra Surabaya. This research used a quantitative approach and analysis method with multiple linear regressions. The data collection technique used was a questionnaire with a sample of 50 drivers. The results of the research showed that the variables of competence and incentive provision simultaneously and significantly influence the variable of work discipline with the results of F- test obtained Fcount 31,890 > Ftable of 3.20 with a significance value of 0,000. While partially the variable of competence has a significant effect on the variable of work discipline due to the significance value of 0.004 > 0.05 or or smaller than 5%. The variable of incentive provision partially influences significantly on the variable of work discipline due to a significance value of 0.002 > 0.05 or or smaller than 5%. Both competence and incentive provision influence about 57.6% against work discipline while the remaining of 42.4% is influenced by other variables not studied in this resaerch.Sumber Daya Manusia sangat berperan serta dalam mengembangkan potensi karyawan untuk kepentingan perusahaan. Pencapaian keberhasilan perusahaan dapat dilakukan dengan meningkatkan kinerja karyawan melalui disiplin kerja. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui pengaruh kompetensi dan pemberian insentif terhadap disiplin kerja pengemudi PT. Sriputra Surabaya. Penelitian ini menggunakan pendekatan kuantitatif dan metode analisis dengan regresi linier berganda. Teknik pengumpulan data yang digunakan adalah kuesioner dengan sampel sebanyak 50 pengemudi. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa variabel kompetensi dan pemberian insentif berpengaruh secara simultan dan signifikan terhadap variabel disiplin kerja dengan hasil uji F diperoleh Fhitung 31,890 > Ftabel 3,20 dengan nilai signifikansi 0,000. Sedangkan secara parsial variabel kompetensi berpengaruh signifikan terhadap variabel disiplin kerja karena nilai signifikansi 0,004 > 0,05 atau lebih kecil dari 5%. Variabel pemberian insentif secara parsial berpengaruh signifikan terhadap variabel disiplin kerja karena nilai signifikansi 0,002 > 0,05 atau lebih kecil dari 5%. Baik kompetensi maupun pemberian insentif berpengaruh sebesar 57,6% terhadap disiplin kerja sedangkan sisanya sebesar 42,4% dipengaruhi oleh variabel lain yang tidak diteliti dalam penelitian ini.Keywords:Competence, Incentives, Work Discipline, Regression
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34

GIESECKE, MATTHIAS, and GUANZHONG YANG. "Are financial retirement incentives more effective if pension knowledge is high?" Journal of Pension Economics and Finance 17, no. 3 (December 14, 2017): 278–315. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1474747217000439.

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AbstractWe study the combined effects of financial incentives and information provision on retirement behavior. To elicit preferences for retirement timing in the laboratory, we ask subjects to make retirement choices under different payoff schemes that introduce variation in financial incentives. Testing ceteris paribus conditions of the financial incentive alone shows a considerable delay of retirement once early retirement becomes financially less attractive. However, varying available information as another treatment parameter reveals considerable heterogeneity in the functioning of these incentives. Subjects who are explicitly informed about the expected pension wealth respond more strongly to financial incentives compared with those who only know their pension annuity. Being informed about a forward-looking measure of pension benefits makes the financial consequences of retirement choices more salient to the decision maker.
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35

Fehr, Ernst, and Simon Gächter. "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity." Journal of Economic Perspectives 14, no. 3 (August 1, 2000): 159–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.14.3.159.

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This paper shows that reciprocity has powerful implications for many economic domains. It is an important determinant in the enforcement of contracts and social norms and enhances the possibilities of collective action greatly. Reciprocity may render the provision of explicit incentive inefficient because the incentives may crowd out voluntary co-operation. It strongly limits the effects of competition in markets with incomplete contracts and gives rise to noncompetitive wage differences. Finally, reciprocity it is also a strong force contributing to the existence of incomplete contracts.
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36

Selywati, Selywati, Syawaluddin Syawaluddin, Aidil Putra, and Thomas Sumarsan Sumarsan Goh. "Pengaruh Kompetensi dan Insentif Terhadap Prestasi Kerja Karyawan PT. Kartika Swarna Dwipa." Jesya 6, no. 1 (January 1, 2023): 156–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.36778/jesya.v6i1.892.

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Kartika Swarna Dwipa is a company engaged in the marketing of Tupperware products. Employee work performance is starting to experience a decline which is indicated by the low morale of employees in completing work. Low competence because employees tend to only graduate from high school and have not been given training. The provision of incentives in fact has problems such as commissions and overtime incentives that are not as promised. This research uses quantitative descriptive research. The total population in the study was 39 employees with a sampling technique using saturated samples. Simultaneously there is a significant influence between the variables of competence and incentives on the work performance of employees of PT. Kartika Swarna Dwipa. While partially, it was found that the competence variable had a significant effect on the work performance of PT. Kartika Swarna Dwipa. Partially, it was found that the incentive variable had a significant effect on the work performance of PT. Kartika Swarna Dwipa. The results of this study indicate that the competence variable has more influence than incentive on the work performance of PT. Kartika Swarna Dwipa.
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37

Irwansyah, Iwan, Dwikora Harjo, W. Septa Zahran, and Natasya Priscilla Putri. "Analysis of the Effectiveness of Policy on Provision of Article 21 Income Tax Incentives borne by the Government during the Covid-19 Pandemic in the KPP Pratama West Bekasi Region 2020." Asian Journal of Community Services 1, no. 1 (July 23, 2022): 23–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.55927/ajcs.v1i1.780.

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The Covid-19 pandemic has a negative impact on the economic sector and the taxation sector and also has reduced company income that causing many employees to be affected by salary cuts or layoffs. This dire situation inspired the government to grant Article 21 Income Tax borne by the government incentives in order to ease the burden of mandatory taxes and can help restore people's purchasing power. Objective: To analyze the Article 21 Income Tax borne by the government Incentive Policy in the context of handling Covid-19 at West Bekasi Small Tax Office based on an analysis of effectiveness, obstacles faced, and efforts made to overcome obstacles. Methods: This research was descriptive qualitative. The data collection methods were Observation, Documentation, and interviews. Result: The provision of Article 21 Income Tax borne by the government incentive at West Bekasi Small Tax Office is still not effective because there are still many taxpayers who have not taken advantage of this incentive due to lack of information and socialization provided, this is based on achieving goals, integration, and adaptation. The obstacles faced are the lack of comprehensive socialization because there are still many taxpayers who do not have the information about the incentive so many taxpayers do not take advantage of this policy. There is also a lack of awareness of taxpayers in reporting the realization of the use of Article 21 Income Tax borne by the government incentive. The efforts made by West Bekasi Small Tax Office are by conducting comprehensive socialization and maintaining synergy/cooperation between the Tax Office and taxpayers.
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38

Nelson, Robert G., and Richard O. Beil. "When Self-interest is Self-Defeating: The Public Goods Experiment as a Teaching Tool." Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics 26, no. 2 (December 1994): 580–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1074070800026481.

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AbstractThis simple classroom experiment demonstrates many of the behavioral phenomena associated with the voluntary provision of a public good. The mechanics of the game are explained in detail and complete instructions are provided, as well as suggestions for follow-up lectures. Influences such as anonymous voting, persuasion, returns to free-riding, and duration of association can be explored in connection with concepts of incentives, individual rationality and group welfare. A number of variations and extensions can be used to incorporate prisoners' dilemmas, incentive compatible mechanisms, negative externalities, and Coasian bargaining.
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39

Viswanathan, N., and Edison T. S. Tse. "Monopolistic Provision of Congested Service with Incentive-Based Allocation of Priorities." International Economic Review 30, no. 1 (February 1989): 153. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2526555.

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40

von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig. "Intermediated versus Direct Investment: Optimal Liquidity Provision and Dynamic Incentive Compatibility." Journal of Financial Intermediation 7, no. 2 (April 1998): 177–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jfin.1998.0239.

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41

Hong, Hao, and Tsz-Ning Wong. "Authoritarian election as an incentive scheme." Journal of Theoretical Politics 32, no. 3 (May 5, 2020): 460–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0951629820910563.

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Authoritarian rule requires teamwork of political elites. However, elite class members may lack incentive for the contribution of their efforts. In this paper, we develop a model to study the decision of authoritarian rulers to introduce elections. Our model suggests that elections can motivate the ruling class to devote more effort to public good provision. As a result, elections alleviate the moral-hazard-in-teams problem within the authoritarian government. Excessive electoral control hinders the introduction of elections, but mild electoral control facilitates it. Our findings offer a new perspective on understanding authoritarian elections and explain many stylized facts in authoritarian regimes.
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42

Römeis, Fabio, Fabian Herweg, and Daniel Müller. "Salience Bias and Overwork." Games 13, no. 1 (January 26, 2022): 15. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g13010015.

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In this study, we enrich a standard principal–agent model with hidden action by introducing salience-biased perception on the agent’s side. The agent’s misguided focus on salient payoffs, which leads the agent’s and the principal’s probability assessments to diverge, has two effects: First, the agent focuses too much on obtaining a bonus, which facilitates incentive provision. Second, the principal may exploit the diverging probability assessments to relax participation. We show that salience bias can reverse the nature of the inefficiency arising from moral hazard; i.e., the principal does not necessarily provide insufficient incentives that result in inefficiently low effort but instead may well provide excessive incentives that result in inefficiently high effort.
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43

Amir, Aprilianto. "Pengaruh Pemberian Insentif terhadap Motivasi Kerja Pegawai pada Kantor Lembaga Penjaminan Mutu Pendidikan (LPMP) Bandar Lampung." Business Perspective Journal 1, no. 1 (June 18, 2021): 11–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.37090/bpj.v1i1.418.

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Human resources have a very important role in an agency, for that in order for the agency to achieve goals as expected, high employee motivation is needed. Generating a high employee motivation is not easy to implement. Therefore, employees should be given appropriate incentives so that the desired employee motivation can be achieved. The provision of incentives can be done by providing annual bonuses, employee welfare, and promotions. As for the main problem with this research is "does the provision of incentives affect the work motivation of employees at the Office of the Education Quality Assurance Institute (LPMP) Bandar Lampung?" In line with the main problem, the authors propose the hypothesis "There is a positive influence between the provision of incentives on employee motivation at the Office of the Education Quality Assurance Institution (LPMP) Bandar Lampung". In the research that the author did, the research variable was the provision of incentives as the independent variable (X) while employee motivation as the dependent variable (Y). Furthermore, the proposed sample is 26 employees which is 25% of the total population, namely 105 employees. The type of research in this writing is qualitative and quantitative research with the method used is to collect data by means of surveys or field research. While the data collection techniques by means of observation, documentation, interviews and questionnaires. Then to test the hypothesis using qualitative and quantitative analysis which is the type of this writing, with statistical formulas. Quantitative analysis using the product moment formula and obtained: rxy product moment = 0.714. Confused with the level of evenness of the 2 variables being at a high level of closeness, it means that the incentive distribution has a very high relationship with employee performance. To find out the effect of giving incentives on employees' work motivation, using a determinant coefficient with a result of 51%, while other factors 49% were not examined including leadership style, office layout, atmosphere (work climate) of employees. Keywords: incentives, work motivation, Education Quality Assurance Institute
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44

Alimansyah, Yenny Sariasih, and Yulianti. "ANALISIS IMPLEMENTASI PP NO. 12 TAHUN 2012 TENTANG INSENTIF PERLINDUNGAN LAHAN PERTANIAN PANGAN BERKELANJUTAN DI KAWASAN DANAU DUSUN BESAR KOTA BENGKULU." Jurnal AGRISEP 14, no. 1 (March 21, 2015): 120–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.31186/jagrisep.14.1.120-130.

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This study aims to describe how the implementation of incentives as stipulated in Government Regulation No. 12 of 2012 concerning the protection of agricultural land incentives sustainable food in the Dusun Besar Lake area of the city of Bengkulu. This research is a descriptive study with a qualitative approach. Informants determination use purposive sampling. Data collection techniques consist of observation, interviews and discussions as well as documentation. Data analysis are conducted by inductively starting from data collection, data reduction, data presentation and data verification. Based on the results of a couple of aspects studied, namely communication, resources, disposition, and bureaucratic structures, further seen from the form of the provision of incentives in the form of : agricultural infrastructure development has not been run, the financing of research and development of improved varieties of seeds and no ease of access to information and existing technology (extension), the provision of production facilities, guarantee certificate issuance of land rights on agricultural land are not sustainable food and / or rewards for high achievers existing farmers, government programs. It was concluded that the implementation of the Regulation no 12tahun 2012 in incentives for farmers land owners in the Dusun Besar Lake area of the city of Bengkulu is not already running. While the constraints faced by the lack of regulations governing the area of land protection sustainable food. Therefore, intensive provision for sustainable food future land owners should be budgeted and city government programs through agencies or institutions concerned.Keywords: implementation, incentive, PP, Agricultural land
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45

Akinina, Ksenia O., and Olga A. Rasskazova. "Features of Personnel Motivation and Incentivization in the Electric Power Industry." Vestnik Tomskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Ekonomika, no. 55 (2021): 89–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.17223/19988648/55/6.

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The article discusses the role of human resources in the efficiency of an organization. Employees influence the result of the company’s activities and make the company competitive in the market. The authors consider incentives as part of the HR management system and analyze the relationships between an incentive scheme and labor productivity, an incentive scheme and staff turnover, an incentive scheme and competitiveness. The authors note the importance of the electric power industry in the economy of the Russian Federation, investigate the labor market in electrical engineering in St. Petersburg, and determine a range of problems. Incentives are classified into types. The incentive system of the enterprise includes material incentives and non-material incentives. Material incentives are divided into material monetary incentives and material non-monetary incentives. Material monetary incentives consist of basic wages and additional wages. Material non-monetary incentives are material benefits and rights, as well as non-monetary forms of remuneration. Features of material incentives in the industry are noted. Enterprises in the industry use a lot of material incentives. The study shows that the majority of workers in the electric power industry are satisfied with the material incentives. Non-material incentives consist of moral incentives, organizational incentives, and work time incentives. Systematic informing of staff, organization of corporate events, official recognition of achievements, and regulation of relationships in the team are moral incentives. Improving the quality of employees’ working life, managing an employee’s career, involving the team in the management process, and organizing labor competitions are organizational incentives. Provision of additional rest time, establishment of flexible working hours, and use of flexible forms of employment are work time incentives. Features of non-material incentives for personnel in the electric power industry are analyzed. Leading enterprises of the electric power industry use company websites to inform staff. Organization of corporate events is a common incentivization method at Russian enterprises. Sports activities are most effective for increasing productivity. Enterprises of the industry do not organize creative competitions, but such competitions are necessary for satisfying the need in the implementation of employees’ creative abilities. Official recognition of merit in the power industry is manifested in the placement of the best employees’ photos on the honor board and in the granting of awards. Relationships in the team are regulated by codes of corporate ethics. The results of a special assessment of jobs at enterprises of the industry demonstrate that there are no optimal working conditions in the electric power industry. Practice shows that the opportunity of career advancement depends on the scale of the enterprise: the larger the number of staff, the more ramified the management structure and the more opportunities for career advancement. Involvement of teams in the management is difficult due the large number of enterprises in the industry. Labor competitions for teams are organized, and they are very efficient for the industry. Enterprises do not give work time incentives. The authors make recommendations on how to use various incentives at enterprises of the energy industry and name the factors influencing the incentive system.
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46

Squazzoni, Flaminio, Giangiacomo Bravo, and Károly Takács. "Does incentive provision increase the quality of peer review? An experimental study." Research Policy 42, no. 1 (February 2013): 287–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2012.04.014.

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47

Thomson, Gill, Heather Morgan, Nicola Crossland, Linda Bauld, Fiona Dykes, and Pat Hoddinott. "Unintended Consequences of Incentive Provision for Behaviour Change and Maintenance around Childbirth." PLoS ONE 9, no. 10 (October 30, 2014): e111322. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0111322.

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48

Huang, Song, Xu Guan, and Binqing Xiao. "Incentive provision for demand information acquisition in a dual-channel supply chain." Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review 116 (August 2018): 42–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tre.2018.05.012.

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49

Chen, Yan, and Fang‐Fang Tang. "Learning and incentive‐Compatible Mechanisms for Public Goods Provision: An Experimental Study." Journal of Political Economy 106, no. 3 (June 1998): 633–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/250024.

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50

Adi Prawiraa, Ida Farida, and Hanifa Zulhaimi. "Phenomenology of Employee Income Tax Policies During the Covid – 19 in Indonesia." 11th GLOBAL CONFERENCE ON BUSINESS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 11, no. 1 (December 9, 2020): 160. http://dx.doi.org/10.35609/gcbssproceeding.2020.11(160).

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Covid-19 is a disaster that impacts various sectors of life, one of which has an impact on a country's tax revenue. Tax incentives are one of the policy steps that the Indonesian government has taken to face the economic strike due to the Covid-19 pandemic. This study aims to examine the factors that influence the implementation of employee income tax policies during the Covid-19. This is a qualitative research using interpretive paradigm with phenomenological methods. The data of this study are the results of observations and interviews with Corporate Taxpayers, Tax Experts, and Tax Officers . Based on the results of the interview, there are several factors that affect taxpayers willing to take advantage of this policy, including the ease of submitting incentives, certainty not to be audited, and not adding to the company's burden. Employers take advantage of this incentive, namely the company has an interest in maintaining internal stability of the company. The provision of this incentive will increase (at least maintain) the purchasing power of workers and create a conducive business atmosphere. So it is true that entrepreneurs will flock to take advantage of this facility. This policy is expected to reduce the burden on business activities and help improve the condition of the company's cash flow, particularly during and after the epidemic. Thus, the company is expected not to terminate employment. If this condition occurs, there is potential for the national economy to keep moving, both in terms of production and consumption. Keywords: Employee Income Tax, Tax Policy, Tax Incentive, Covid-19
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