Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Incentive provision'
Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles
Consult the top 29 dissertations / theses for your research on the topic 'Incentive provision.'
Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.
You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.
Browse dissertations / theses on a wide variety of disciplines and organise your bibliography correctly.
Costa, Cristiano Machado. "Organizational design and incentive provision." reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/10438/71.
Full textWe model the trade-off between the balance and the strength of incentives implicit in the choice between hierarchical and matrix or- ganizational structures. We show that managerial biases determine which structure is optimal: hierarchical forms are preferred when biases are low, while matrix structures are preferred when biases are high. Moreover, the results show that there is always a level of bias for which matrix design can achieve the expected profit obtained by shareholders if they could directly control the firm. We also show that the main trade-off, i.e., hierarchical versus matrix structure is preserved under asymmetric levels of bias among managers and when low-level workers perceive activities with complementary efforts.
Gu, Bon-Sung. "Incentive provision and monitoring in financial contracting and trade." Thesis, University of York, 1994. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.239813.
Full textLi, Bingqin. "Housing reforms and work incentive effects : a case study of Tianjin, People's Republic of China." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2002. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.272283.
Full textKusterer, David Jakob [Verfasser], Patrick [Akademischer Betreuer] Schmitz, and Oliver [Akademischer Betreuer] Gürtler. "Incentive provision with multiple tasks and multiple agents / David Jakob Kusterer. Gutachter: Patrick Schmitz ; Oliver Gürtler." Köln : Universitäts- und Stadtbibliothek Köln, 2014. http://d-nb.info/105376250X/34.
Full textKusterer, David J. [Verfasser], Patrick [Akademischer Betreuer] Schmitz, and Oliver [Akademischer Betreuer] Gürtler. "Incentive provision with multiple tasks and multiple agents / David Jakob Kusterer. Gutachter: Patrick Schmitz ; Oliver Gürtler." Köln : Universitäts- und Stadtbibliothek Köln, 2014. http://d-nb.info/105376250X/34.
Full textOrtega, Pacheco Daniel Vicente. "Investigating the role and scale of transactions costs of incentive-based programs for provision of environmental services in developing countries." The Ohio State University, 2010. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1292450247.
Full textBarrenechea, Méndez Marco A. "The provision of incentives and organization design." Doctoral thesis, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/117322.
Full textThis dissertation comprises three essays on the economic analysis of organizations. The first essay provides further evidence on the role of uncertainty and job complexity in blue-collar workers’ pay-for-performance and autonomy decisions. It proposes an econometric approach that encompasses previous procedures taken in the related literature in order to explain the differences in the resulting outcomes that may be due to differing methodological approaches. Although our evidence comes from a distinct institutional context, a dataset of Spanish plants, they are nevertheless fairly consistent with previous analyses. The main stylized fact is that workers’ autonomy and pay-for-performance strength are interrelated decisions. Additionally, autonomy is positively related to job complexity and uncertainty, which suggests that the relationship between these latter variables and the pay-for-performance strength could be through autonomy. When we control for autonomy, the positive and significant relationship between pay-for-performance strength and job complexity disappears, while that between pay-for-performance strength and uncertainty becomes more negative. The theoretical implications of these results are discussed. The second essay argues that the design of job is the result of a set of interrelated decisions: the worker autonomy to decide the tasks to be carried out, the way in which the work will be monitored and the compensation associated with the information generated by the monitoring process. It provides empirical evidence on the design of jobs for blue collar workers in Spanish industrial establishments by analysing the relations among and determinants of autonomy, monitoring and wages. We present a theoretical model that is consistent with the empirical evidence and allows us to rationalize the relations among these variables. In short, the model predicts that autonomy permits workers to introduce innovative tasks that are more difficult to monitor and that the level of monitoring determine the quality of information on workers’ effort and ultimately their compensation. The third essay provides evidence on the role of mission congruence for reliance on pay-for-performance and autonomy. Using a dataset of childcare facilities in Minnesota, we find that mission congruence between teachers and employers is negatively related to the likelihood of reliance on pay-for-performance and positively related to teacher autonomy. These results support the idea that the identity of workers plays an important role in the design of organizations. In addition, as in previous empirical studies, we find that pay-for-performance and autonomy tend to be given together.
Li, Jianpei. "Three essays on efficiency and incentives in teams and partnerships." Doctoral thesis, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, 2007. http://www.gbv.de/dms/zbw/561396469.pdf.
Full textGomes, Paulo Ernesto Monteiro. "Incentivos fiscais na provisão de bens públicos : estudo para o caso brasileiro." reponame:Repositório Institucional da UnB, 2014. http://repositorio.unb.br/handle/10482/17737.
Full textSubmitted by Ana Cristina Barbosa da Silva (annabds@hotmail.com) on 2015-02-13T17:13:27Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_PauloErnestoMonteiroGomes.pdf: 267563 bytes, checksum: a44b94796402494b77646b1edcad4532 (MD5)
Approved for entry into archive by Raquel Viana(raquelviana@bce.unb.br) on 2015-02-27T19:26:41Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_PauloErnestoMonteiroGomes.pdf: 267563 bytes, checksum: a44b94796402494b77646b1edcad4532 (MD5)
Made available in DSpace on 2015-02-27T19:26:41Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_PauloErnestoMonteiroGomes.pdf: 267563 bytes, checksum: a44b94796402494b77646b1edcad4532 (MD5)
Este trabalho segue o estudo de Zhuravskaya (2000) e analisa o efeito de um aumento marginal da arrecadação per capita dos impostos estaduais e municipais na diferença do volume de transferências per capita repassadas pela União a estados e municípios no período seguinte. Dado que a maior parte das transferências recebidas pelas unidades subnacionais são constitucionais, a qual não há discricionariedade por parte do governo federal no seu repasse, esse estudo utiliza as transferências voluntárias para efeito de análise. Também testa-se se o fato de o governante local ser aliado político do presidente implica que haverá algum favorecimento no repasse de renda. Os resultados obtidos apontam que os incentivos fiscais no Brasil não são tão fracos, pois a arrecadação tributária local pouco influencia o repasse de transferências voluntárias. E que não há evidências que o apoio político tenha impacto no repasse das transferências. ________________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACT
This present work studies the dynamics between local tax base and shared revenue. Zhuravskaya (2000) finds that fiscal incentives in Russia are weak, because any change in local government's own revenues is almost entirely offset by changes in shared revenues. This paper shows that Brazilian municipalities and states own's revenues has no influence on the voluntary transfers from the federal government, so that the fiscal incentives of public goods provision cannot be declared weak. Moreover, we could not identify an impact of political alignment between the mayors or the governors and the Brazilian President on the voluntary intergovernmental transfers.
Tsitinidis, Alexandros, and Kenneth Duru. "Managerial Incentives and Earnings Management : An Empirical Examination of the Income Smoothing in the Nordic Banking Industry." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Företagsekonomiska institutionen, 2013. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-202105.
Full textMaredza, Andrew. "Profit incentives and technical efficiency in the provision of health care in Zimbabwe: an application of data envelopment analysis and econometric methods." Thesis, University of Fort Hare, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/10353/294.
Full textJönsson, Amanda, Anna Lennartsson, and Ebba Waldau. "Provisionsbaserad ersättning för fastighetsmäklare : “Kan provision ses som ett belöningssystem och motivationsdrivare?”." Thesis, Linnéuniversitetet, Institutionen för ekonomistyrning och logistik (ELO), 2020. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:lnu:diva-98089.
Full textAbstract Course: Bachelor Thesis, Financial Control, 15 hp (2FE24E) Title: Commission based compensation for real estate agents "Can commission-based salary be seen as a reward system and motivator?" Authors: Anna Lennartsson, Amanda Jönsson & Ebba Waldau Examiner: Pia Nylinder Advisor: Cristoffer Lokatt Background and problem discussion: A common view of the profession as a real estate agent is considered by many to be a more status profession than a tiring profession. There are no specific rules for the size of the commission based salary paid to a real estate agent and the basic idea for commission based salary is referred to that individuals should be motivated by being able to influence what they get in salary and thereby perform a better job. For individuals to do a better job, a reward system can be optimal because it can work to change behaviours. To be able to change behaviour, the individual must feel motivated, which is added by different rewards. The interesting thing about the study will thus be to investigate whether commissions- based salary is motivating and how real estate agents’ reason for commissions as a reward system. Purpose: The purpose of this thesis is based on examining the real estate agent's view of having a one hundred percent commission-based salary. We want to examine real estate agents' reasoning about commissions-based salary as a reward system. Finally, we want to analyse how the commission-based salary affects real estate agents' motivation, based on the theory model Maslow's hierarchy of needs. Method: The study is based on a qualitative structure and the empirical data collection comes from six established real estate agents around Sweden. The interview format chosen was a semi-structured interview that was conducted digitally through the Zoom software with all respondents. The method also presents a brief description of the profession as a real estate agent. Conclusion: In summary, we can state that the real estate agents' reasoning on commission-based salary as a reward system is different. They believe that commission-based salary is a reward system because the commission-based salary they receive is a reward for the work done. Others argue, however, that commission-based salary is not a reward system because it considers the commission to be the income to which everyone is entitled after performance. Here the focus is increasingly on the non-monetary reward, which is more about status, rankings, recommendations and satisfied customers because this is what rewards the respondents to a maximized performance.The commission-based salary can thus be found to be motivating for certain respondents because they are motivated by the commission's impact on its salary depending on their performance. But not all respondents see commission-based salary as the main motivation because a satisfied and returning customer is what gives motivation to the profession as a real estate agent. Keywords: Reward system, commission-based salary, motivation, real estate agent, financial incentives, a flexible salary system, variable compensation and Maslow's hierarchy of needs.
Kleynhans, Marike. "Anti-avoidance, amendments and anomalies: The impact of select anti-avoidance provisions and their subsequent amendments on employee share incentive schemes operating through trusts." Master's thesis, Faculty of Commerce, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/11427/30101.
Full textStoudt, Michael J. "An investigation of relationships between the implementation and funding of performance based financial incentives and the provision of core services by Pennsylvania community colleges." Instructions for remote access. Click here to access this electronic resource. Access available to Kutztown University faculty, staff, and students only, 2002. http://www.kutztown.edu/library/services/remote_access.asp.
Full textSource: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 45-06, page: 2773. Typescript. Abstract precedes thesis as preliminary leaves [1-2]. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 97-99).
Mentor, Johan, and Nicholas Heyman. "Komplexiteten kring försäljning av kompletterande tjänster." Thesis, Högskolan i Borås, Institutionen Handels- och IT-högskolan, 2013. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hb:diva-17161.
Full textProgram: Civilekonomprogrammet
Reis, Cláudio José Oliveira dos. "Parcerias público-privadas (PPP) na provisão de arenas esportivas para a Copa do Mundo FIFA Brasil 2014." Escola de Administração, 2015. http://repositorio.ufba.br/ri/handle/ri/24042.
Full textApproved for entry into archive by Maria Angela Dortas (dortas@ufba.br) on 2017-08-18T19:38:00Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Claudio josé Oliveira dos Reis.pdf: 5489592 bytes, checksum: acb5556cf58151cc8f305b086c2a86ed (MD5)
Made available in DSpace on 2017-08-18T19:38:00Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Claudio josé Oliveira dos Reis.pdf: 5489592 bytes, checksum: acb5556cf58151cc8f305b086c2a86ed (MD5)
Megaeventos esportivos frequentemente exigem elevados investimentos para reforma e/ou construção de arenas esportivas. No caso do Brasil, país-sede da Copa do Mundo FIFA 2014, o setor público teve um papel preponderante na provisão de nove dos 12 estádios utilizados, destacando-se o ineditismo da utilização da modalidade de Parcerias Público-Privadas (PPP) para a provisão de cinco das 12 arenas esportivas, o que representa 42% das escolhas contratuais e caracteriza-se como uma nova experiência para a Administração Pública Brasileira. Diante do atual debate sobre a eficiência do setor público e da iniciativa privada na provisão de infraestrutura, optou-se no presente estudo como recorte de pesquisa pela análise em profundidade das cinco arenas esportivas construídas sob a lógica da PPP, com o objetivo de investigar como a escolha dessa modalidade de investimento influencia na provisão dos novos equipamentos públicos esportivos. Para tanto, utilizou-se a abordagem metodológica qualitativa, inserida numa perspectiva exploratória e comparativa através de estudo de casos múltiplos. Desta forma, os cinco projetos de PPP são analisados criticamente à luz da literatura sobre PPP e descritos à luz da relação contratual firmada entre os parceiros públicos e privados, destacando-se a análise das seguintes dimensões: (1) contexto do projeto e necessidade pública; (2) estudo de viabilidade e consulta pública; (3) gestão e alocação de riscos; (4) modelagem financeira; e (5) modelagem operacional. Por fim, embora não possam ser considerados como uma panaceia, os resultados sugerem que os projetos de PPP analisados contribuíram para a geração de um maior Value for Money (valor adicional) para a Administração Pública Brasileira, sobretudo no que se refere aos aspectos de prazo, custos, alocação de riscos e receitas diversificadas, quando comparados com a modalidade de provisão pública tradicional. Os resultados também sugerem que tais fatores decorrem das estruturas de incentivos oriundas dos contratos de PPP e da própria flexibilidade inerente aos atores privados
Mega sporting events frequently require high investment for refurbishment and / or construction of new sports arenas. In Brazil, the host country of the 2014 FIFA World Cup, the public sector played a major role in providing nine of the 12 stadiums built, highlighting the uniqueness of the use of Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) for the provision of five sports arenas, which is 42% of the contractual choices and is characterized as a new experience for the Brazilian Public Administration. In today's debate on the efficiency of the public and the private sectors in the provision of infrastructure, this dissertation focus its analysis on the five sports arenas built under the PPP approach in order to investigate how this mode of provision influences the building of new sports arenas in the mega sporting event context. In order to achieve the purpose of this study, it adopts a qualitative methodological approach, inserted in an exploratory and comparative perspective through multiple case study. Thus, the five PPP projects are analyzed in the light of the literature on PPP and described in the light of the contractual relationship established between the public and private partners, especially analyzing the following dimensions: (1) the public need; (2) study of economic feasibility; (3) risk management and allocation; (4) financial modeling; and (5) operational modeling. Finally, although it cannot be regarded as a panacea, the results suggest that PPP contributed to the generation of a larger Value for Money to the Brazilian Public Administration, especially in terms of time schedule, costs, risk allocation and diversified revenues as compared to the traditional mode of public provision. The results also suggest that these factors result from the incentive structures from the PPP contracts and from the inherent flexibility of the private partners.
Sanderson, Marie. "The impact of incentives for competition and co-operation on the behaviour of health care organisations : a case study of the planning and provision of diabetes services in the English NHS." Thesis, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (University of London), 2016. http://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk/2528923/.
Full textHsiung, Di-Yu, and 熊第祐. "Incentive Provision in Oligopoly." Thesis, 2004. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/yy3atj.
Full text國立暨南國際大學
經濟學系
92
Following Güth and Yarri (1992), the main purpose of this thesis is to examine the evolutionary stability of sales volume, consumer surplus and interdependent preferences. In particular, we employ the models of Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Skilivas (1987) to analyze the evolutionary stability of the three incentive schemes. In this thesis we analyze the special linear demand case in Stackelberg model. We find that the advantages of quantity-leader can be eliminated in some cases. Our main conclusion is that the profits reversal occurs if the incentive contract of quantity-follower is based on sales volume or interdependent preference. In addition, we extend the model of indirect evolutionary approach to the multi-dimensional stimuli cases and discuss its robustness with respect to generalizations of the mutant space. Some other results of indirect evolutionary approach are verified as well, such as collusion, location problems, the incentive inconsistency of private firms and the government…etc.
Shu, Yao. "Learning, favoritism and incentive provision within organizations." Thesis, 2016. https://hdl.handle.net/2144/19579.
Full textYu-Kai, Lin. "FuzRep: A Community-Oriented P2P Reputation System with a Fuzzy Technique for Incentive Provision." 2006. http://www.cetd.com.tw/ec/thesisdetail.aspx?etdun=U0016-0109200613404975.
Full textLin, Yu-Kai, and 林于凱. "FuzRep: A Community-Oriented P2P Reputation System with a Fuzzy Technique for Incentive Provision." Thesis, 2006. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/93055639767454539305.
Full text國立清華大學
科技管理研究所
94
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networks have shown their great strength as an information sharing architecture what we witness from the popularity and the variety of P2P-related applications. Lack of incentives, however, makes most peers unwilling to cooperate and lead to free-riding behavior. The prevalence of free riders will, eventually, bring P2P networks performance and security issues as what traditional client-server architecture encountered. One way to encourage cooperation is through service differentiation based on each peer’s contributions. This paper presents FuzRep, a reputation system that incorporates virtual community and fuzzy logic techniques for P2P networks. Without using information hubs or DHT-like pre-sorting structure, we utilize the clustering effect of virtual communities for reputation management. Furthermore, we treat service discrimination for resource request as a decision-making process so that a fuzzy-based mechanism is adopted in FuzRep to facilitate that process. Finally, the experimental results of this reputation system positively indicate the feasibility of our design.
Praphul, Chandra *. "Incentive Design for Crowdfunding and Crowdsourcing Markets." Thesis, 2017. http://etd.iisc.ernet.in/2005/3594.
Full textWang, Lin-lu, and 王琳祿. "INCENTIVES FOR BANKS TO USE LOAN LOSSES PROVISIONS FOR REDUCING EARNINGS VARIABILITY." Thesis, 2008. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/36042304862475011511.
Full text大同大學
事業經營學系(所)
96
This article intends to examine the incentives for bank managers to use discretionary loan losses provisions as a method to lower earnings variability. Three potential incentives are verified in this study, need for external financing, alternatives for income smoothing, restrictions by regulatory agency. Through income smoothing, a bank manager may reduce financing costs. This study also examines whether or not a bank manager would use discretionary loan losses provisions for earnings management to reduce earnings variability, because the bank’s discretionary loan losses are an earning accrued item that is most common manipulated and can be solely used for study of income smoothing. According to the study’s empirical results, a bank with high original earnings does use loan losses provisions for income smoothing. Based on an empirical model on bank samples with preferable performance, the study supports the realize gains and losses on securities for sale as a substitute for the discretionary loan losses provisions. It is found in this study that a bank with poorer earnings also use discretionary loan losses provisions in addition to realized gains and losses on securities for sale.
Truskinovsky, Yulya. "Essays on the Role of Government Incentives in the Private Provision of Social Goods." Diss., 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10161/12156.
Full textThe economic rationale for public intervention into private markets through price mechanisms is twofold: to correct market failures and to redistribute resources. Financial incentives are one such price mechanism. In this dissertation, I specifically address the role of financial incentives in providing social goods in two separate contexts: a redistributive policy that enables low income working families to access affordable childcare in the US and an experimental pay-for-performance intervention to improve population health outcomes in rural India. In the first two papers, I investigate the effects of government incentives for providing grandchild care on grandmothers’ short- and long-term outcomes. In the third paper, coauthored with Manoj Mohanan, Grant Miller, Katherine Donato, and Marcos Vera-Hernandez, we use an experimental framework to consider the the effects of financial incentives in improving maternal and child health outcomes in the Indian state of Karnataka.
Grandmothers provide a significant amount of childcare in the US, but little is known about how this informal, and often uncompensated, time transfer impacts their economic and health outcomes. The first two chapters of this dissertation address the impact of federally funded, state-level means-tested programs that compensate grandparent-provided childcare on the retirement security of older women, an economically vulnerable group of considerable policy interest. I use the variation in the availability and generosity of childcare subsidies to model the effect of government payments for grandchild care on grandmothers’ time use, income, earnings, interfamily transfers, and health outcomes. After establishing that more generous government payments induce grandmothers to provide more hours of childcare, I find that grandmothers adjust their behavior by reducing their formal labor supply and earnings. Grandmothers make up for lost earnings by claiming Social Security earlier, increasing their reliance on Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and reducing financial transfers to their children. While the policy does not appear to negatively impact grandmothers’ immediate economic well-being, there are significant costs to the state, in terms of both up-front costs for care payments and long-term costs as a result of grandmothers’ increased reliance on social insurance.
The final paper, The Role of Non-Cognitive Traits in Response to Financial Incentives: Evidence from a Randomized Control Trial of Obstetrics Care Providers in India, is coauthored with Manoj Mohanan, Grant Miller, Katherine Donato and Marcos Vera-Hernandez. We report the results from “Improving Maternal and Child Health in India: Evaluating Demand and Supply Side Strategies” (IMACHINE), a randomized controlled experiment designed to test the effectiveness of supply-side incentives for private obstetrics care providers in rural Karnataka, India. In particular, the experimental design compares two different types of incentives: (1) those based on the quality of inputs providers offer their patients (inputs contracts) and (2) those based on the reduction of incidence of four adverse maternal and neonatal health outcomes (outcomes contracts). Along with studying the relative effectiveness of the different financial incentives, we also investigate the role of provider characteristics, preferences, expectations and non-cognitive traits in mitigating the effects of incentive contracts.
We find that both contract types input incentive contracts reduce rates of post-partum hemorrhage, the leading cause of maternal mortality in India by about 20%. We also find some evidence of multitasking as output incentive contract providers reduce the level of postnatal newborn care received by their patients. We find that patient health improvements in response to both contract types are concentrated among higher trained providers. We find improvements in patient care to be concentrated among the lower trained providers. Contrary to our expectations, we also find improvements in patient health to be concentrated among the most risk averse providers, while more patient providers respond relatively little to the incentives, and these difference are most evident in the outputs contract arm. The results are opposite for patient care outcomes; risk averse providers have significantly lower rates of patient care and more patient providers provide higher quality care in response to the outputs contract. We find evidence that overconfidence among providers about their expectations about possible improvements reduces the effectiveness of both types of incentive contracts for improving both patient outcomes and patient care. Finally, we find no heterogeneous response based on non-cognitive traits.
Dissertation
Chen, Chao-Fu, and 陳兆夫. "A review of incentives for private provision of public car parks-Case study of Taipei." Thesis, 2002. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/vn76h2.
Full text國立成功大學
都市計劃學系碩博士班
90
Giving incentives to the private sector to encourage them to build public car parks is one of the most important policies in today’s urban transportation improvement plans. The advantages of this policy is that it can reduce government spends on wage and park repair which can be used to provide other infrastructures and in doing so, making the use of money more efficient and also reduce the government’s financial pressures. For the private sector, this is another way of good investment and making money. From the residents’ point of view, this policy can give them more parking spaces. Thus, making this policy a win for everyone. But up to this point there have not been many successful projects. Take Taipei for instance, it is the first to use this policy and only four parks have been constructed. Since there are needs for this policy to be put forward, we must find out the problems that is making the opposite outcome and try to correct them. We use three ways to approach this problem. First, we review other relative papers and laws to get the big picture of this policy. Next, we do financial analysis on finished projects to see if the incentives are enough and if these parks earn enough profits. Finally, we make a questionnaire on private investors to find out their willingness and attitude towards this policy. From these findings, we try to provide suggestions to improve the use of this policy. We find that: 1.The private sector has a higher efficiency then the public sector on providing car parks. 2.The problems of this policy are not because the incentives provided are not enough. 3. The main problems of this policy are: legislative of laws aren’t complete, there isn’t an efficient way of managing the giving of incentives, there is no rule about the time of management and pricing of tickets, advanced planning and feasible evaluation isn’t done thoroughly, important information isn’t told to investors, the price of tickets of public owned parks are too low, the whole parking environment isn’t well planned, and the citizens don’t have correct parking habits. From our findings we suggest some ways to improve the situation: 1.Establish a single window to administer the giving of incentives. 2. Legislate new laws needed to advance this policy in more detail ways. 3.Take importance and carry out advance planning and feasible evaluation and also bulletin important investment information thoroughly. 4.Take importance on unequal competition caused by the external environment and find ways to improve it. 5.Widely spread correct parking concepts through the media. 6.More actively set into action the two policies of authorizing private groups to run government car parks and for private groups to build public car parks through incentives. At the same time giving the firms incentives on investment interval, income taxes and discounts on rent according to the park’s characteristics. If the above is carried out, we believe it will do great help to the policy.
Schmalbach, Heidi Parker. "Fostering arts based revitalization in small and rural communitites through the provision on artist housing and relocation incentives." Thesis, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/2152/ETD-UT-2011-12-4714.
Full texttext
Wu, Weu-Yuan, and 吳文淵. "The Performance on Incentives for Private Provision for Public Facilities Lands in Urban Planning──The Case of Market Land in Taipei." Thesis, 2008. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/v8jhr8.
Full text國立臺北科技大學
建築與都市設計研究所
96
Public facilities land is one of the most important items of urban planning, and it is most closely related with the daily life of the general public. Also because of the basic feature of public facilities, unless the government has conducted programmed construction and management of operation with plan it is foreseeable that public facilities land would be deserted. Of the speculative nature of complex-purpose regulations, it would render public and private sector to focus on the development of traditional market, and display less active attitude towards subsequent management. As such, legal provisions of regulations are inclined to be unbeneficial to public sector, leading to most of the market space renewed and completed lay in dormant. This study attempts to resort to illustration and relevant legal provisions to investigate the initial results of complex purpose market lands in Taipei County, and has concluded reference items of evaluation of the business establishment for the citation of subsequent development, market management, and government. 1. Before the implementation of floor area control, investor would merely place their focus on the sales of apartment, and after such implementation investors would have to place more focus on the design and management of supermarket so as to reduce external economic interference upon the market 2. In the business potential analysis of environment, those areas in short of local advantage should rely on the design of commercial space to enhance shopping quality; as for the planning of supermarket, it could better accommodate to the size needed, and could be more oriented to size-optimization and reduce space to maintain cost. 3. In terms of architectural aspect, it can be divided, and partially transformed to enhance the utility of market, and create shopping atmosphere. In terms of management and operation, a dynamic flexible balance model can be added in the compromise mechanism.
Chou, Hua-Yu, and 周化宇. "The Application of Agile Supply Chain to Analyze The Exercise of Cross-function Provisional Organization of Grand Incentive Tour." Thesis, 2015. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/89099644858116356870.
Full text國立臺灣大學
商學組
104
No matter in planning, human resource placement, organization reform ,or even execute aspect, Taiwanese travel industry are still inexpert in the field of MICE travel. Via the agile supply chain, the practice of and observe on a given large-scale MICE project, the dissertation is to provide some views and solutions toward MICE tour, finally make contribution to Taiwanese travel industry. First, in order to reaching the promises that we have made to customer, travel agent must make quality of service under control. Setting reliable person, who is full of experience and domain know-how, as a quality checkpoint is a considerable way. Second, the large-scale project needs a great amount of human power. It might do some harm to original organization. To make recruit schedule earlier would ease the tension between project and original organization. Besides, it is crucial to make an effective communicative access between project leader and original organizations. And the last, travel agent must build a business culture and regulative formation which is flexible in response to every specific need of MICE project, especially since the market of MICE rapidly grow.
Zavala, Carlos Gustavo Villela. "Determinants for the effective provision of public goods by honduran hometown associations in the United States: the Garífuna case." 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/11394/3779.
Full textThe study concludes that the existence of HTAs in the USA is explained by the socially enforced institution of the hijos del pueblo (sons of the town) having a duty to help their hometowns, as well as the private benefits of preserving Garífuna traditions and the possibility of helping repatriate dead immigrants. Fulfilling this duty (and the consequent prestige attained) provides the incentives to send CRs home. In the cases studied, CRs were used to partly finance potable water projects, electricity projects, road paving, a community centre and the construction of a Catholic temple. In most of the cases HTAs worked with a local development organisation, known as Patronato, which formed specific committees for executing projects, for example the water and the electricity committees. For the construction of the temple, a religious organisation known as Pastoral was the local partner. The term Collective Remittances (CRs) refers to the money sent by migrant associations, known as Hometown Associations (HTAs), to Community-Based Organisations (CBOs) in their hometowns for financing public works projects. Few cases of CR are known in Honduras. The only ones reported are among the Garífunaethnic group living on the Caribbean Coast, and with a large migrant community in New York City (NYC). This mini-master’s thesis is the first study written on CRs in Honduras. It studies CR experiences in four Garífuna hometowns and their corresponding HTAs in NYC. It answers three questions: How do CRs work in each case? What are the determinants for HTAs to provide CRs to the hometowns? And what are the determinants for local CBOs in the hometowns to use the CRs effectively to provide public goods in the hometowns? CR is conceptualised as a that chooses which local group and project to finance, and the local CBO, which is the agent