Relevant bibliographies by topics / Incentive provision

Academic literature on the topic 'Incentive provision'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 10 December 2022
Last updated: 28 January 2023

Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles

Select a source type:

Contents

Consult the lists of relevant articles, books, theses, conference reports, and other scholarly sources on the topic 'Incentive provision.'

Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.

You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.

Journal articles on the topic "Incentive provision"

1

Müller, Daniel, and Philipp Weinschenk. "Rater Bias and Incentive Provision." Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 24, no. 4 (October 2015): 833–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jems.12118.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Handayani, Riaty. "Tax Minization as a Moderator on the Effect of Tunnelling Incentive and Bonus Mechanism on Transfer Pricing Provisions." European Journal of Business and Management Research 6, no. 4 (July 9, 2021): 88–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.24018/ejbmr.2021.6.4.930.

Full text
Abstract:
This study is a proof-of-concept of important analytical and experimental functions and / or characteristics. Transfer pricing is a company action that can increase potential tax loss for state revenue. The purpose of this study was to analyze the effect of tunneling incentive, bonus mechanism on transfer pricing. In addition, this study also examines tax minimization as a moderating variable for the effect of tunneling incentive, the bonus mechanism on transfer pricing. The samples used in this research are manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for the period 2016-2019. This study uses multiple regression analysis and moderate regression analysis with statistical product and service solution version 23. The benefit of this research is to improve the literature related to transfer pricing. The result of this research is that tunneling incentive has a significant effect on the provision of transfer pricing, while the bonus mechanism has no significant effect on the provision of transfer pricing. Tax minimization cannot moderate the effect of tunneling incentives and bonus mechanics on transfer pricing provisions.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Latham, Stephen R. "Regulation of Managed Care Incentive Payments to Physicians." American Journal of Law & Medicine 22, no. 4 (1996): 399–432. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0098858800011904.

Full text
Abstract:
A large and growing number of physicians in today’s managed care market are paid for their services according to incentive schemes that offer financial rewards for the provision of less, and less expensive, medical care. Such schemes typically reward physicians for reducing their own costs of care and reward primary care physicians for reducing the number and cost of referrals for inpatient and specialty care. Consumers, fearful that such schemes will prompt physicians to deny them medically necessary care, have protested the implementation of such incentive plans. Various states are considering bills to ban or to limit physician incentive payments.Federal policy with regard to incentive schemes has been confused and contradictory. On one hand, regulators concerned with controlling health care costs and limiting the provision of unnecessary care have encouraged such financial incentives. For example, federal Stark regulations, which ban referrals tied to physician compensation, include explicit exceptions for incentive schemes.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

유소진, Lee Junyoup, and 이은서. "CEO Equity Incentive and Antitakeover Provision." Korea International Accounting Review ll, no. 83 (February 2019): 229–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.21073/kiar.2019..83.010.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Kvaløy, Ola, and Trond E. Olsen. "Incentive Provision when Contracting is Costly." Economica 83, no. 332 (April 8, 2016): 741–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecca.12179.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Susilawati, Neni, Citra Yadin Ramadhena, Mayang Permatasari Syahputri, and Regina Canda Wardhani. "EVALUATING COVID-19’ TAX INCENTIVES: MEASURING THE POLICY EFFECTIVENESS AND PROSPECTIVE POLICY ANALYSIS ON THE EXTENDED PROVISION." Sebatik 26, no. 1 (June 1, 2022): 87–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.46984/sebatik.v26i1.1813.

Full text
Abstract:
Policy-making strength is an integral part of the government vigor. When policies fail, monetary and fiscal costs would significantly increase. Covid-19's Tax Incentive is one of the costs that must be incurred due to the Covid-19 pandemic. However, the absorption of this tax incentive has not been optimal, as indicated by the large gap between the budget and the realization of the tax incentives absorption. This research's aims are to evaluate the policy effectiveness of the Covid-19's tax incentives and analyzing the prospective policy of extended provision based on the evidences. This qualitative research was conducted with literature study as data collection technique. The qualitative data was processed using NVivo software. As the result, the policy aims of Covid-19's Tax Incentives are to maintain the economic growth stability, maintain people's purchasing power, maintain the productivity of certain sectors, support the handling of the Covid-19's impact, and maintain stock market stability. Covid-19's Tax Incentives provides quite effective results in dealing with the negative impacts of the pandemic. Most of the tax incentive policy targets appear to have been achieved, step by step. However, some policies have not been optimally absorbed. The provision of tax incentives can have a positive impact on the economy. However, on the other hand, evidence of increasing national debt can be an indicator that these incentives can also harm financial conditions. The government must be more effective. According to the data, not all types of tax incentives have a level of leverage for national economic recovery.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Ederer, Florian, Richard Holden, and Margaret Meyer. "Gaming and strategic opacity in incentive provision." RAND Journal of Economics 49, no. 4 (September 26, 2018): 819–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12253.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Brunner, Markus, and Kai Jörg Sandner. "Social comparison, group composition, and incentive provision." International Journal of Game Theory 41, no. 3 (October 5, 2011): 565–602. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0303-9.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Costa, Cristiano M., Daniel Ferreira, and Humberto Moreira. "Biased managers, organizational design, and incentive provision." Economics Letters 86, no. 3 (March 2005): 379–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2004.10.001.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Roemer, John E. "Incentive provision and coordination as market functions." Zeitschrift für ArbeitsmarktForschung 43, no. 1 (February 2010): 6–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12651-010-0027-5.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
More sources

Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Incentive provision"

1

Costa, Cristiano Machado. "Organizational design and incentive provision." reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/10438/71.

Full text
Abstract:
Made available in DSpace on 2008-05-13T13:16:11Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 1847.pdf: 405094 bytes, checksum: 02d7abfa691a8d69c5022e083e4e3a83 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2004-06-30
We model the trade-off between the balance and the strength of incentives implicit in the choice between hierarchical and matrix or- ganizational structures. We show that managerial biases determine which structure is optimal: hierarchical forms are preferred when biases are low, while matrix structures are preferred when biases are high. Moreover, the results show that there is always a level of bias for which matrix design can achieve the expected profit obtained by shareholders if they could directly control the firm. We also show that the main trade-off, i.e., hierarchical versus matrix structure is preserved under asymmetric levels of bias among managers and when low-level workers perceive activities with complementary efforts.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Gu, Bon-Sung. "Incentive provision and monitoring in financial contracting and trade." Thesis, University of York, 1994. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.239813.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Li, Bingqin. "Housing reforms and work incentive effects : a case study of Tianjin, People's Republic of China." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2002. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.272283.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Kusterer, David Jakob [Verfasser], Patrick [Akademischer Betreuer] Schmitz, and Oliver [Akademischer Betreuer] Gürtler. "Incentive provision with multiple tasks and multiple agents / David Jakob Kusterer. Gutachter: Patrick Schmitz ; Oliver Gürtler." Köln : Universitäts- und Stadtbibliothek Köln, 2014. http://d-nb.info/105376250X/34.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Kusterer, David J. [Verfasser], Patrick [Akademischer Betreuer] Schmitz, and Oliver [Akademischer Betreuer] Gürtler. "Incentive provision with multiple tasks and multiple agents / David Jakob Kusterer. Gutachter: Patrick Schmitz ; Oliver Gürtler." Köln : Universitäts- und Stadtbibliothek Köln, 2014. http://d-nb.info/105376250X/34.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Ortega, Pacheco Daniel Vicente. "Investigating the role and scale of transactions costs of incentive-based programs for provision of environmental services in developing countries." The Ohio State University, 2010. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1292450247.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Barrenechea, Méndez Marco A. "The provision of incentives and organization design." Doctoral thesis, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/117322.

Full text
Abstract:
Esta tesis se compone de tres ensayos sobre el análisis económico de las organizaciones. El primer ensayo proporciona evidencia empírica adicional a la existente sobre el efecto de la incertidumbre y la complejidad del puesto de trabajo en las decisiones sobre el pago por rendimiento y autonomía de los obreros. El artículo propone un enfoque econométrico que abarca los procedimientos adoptados en la literatura anterior, con el fin de explicar las diferencias en los resultados que puedan deberse a los diferentes enfoques metodológicos. Aunque nuestra evidencia proviene de un contexto institucional distinto, plantas españolas, es sin embargo bastante consistente con los resultados de los análisis anteriores. El hecho estilizado principal es que la autonomía de los trabajadores y el pago por rendimiento son decisiones interrelacionadas. Además, la autonomía se relaciona positivamente con la complejidad del trabajo y la incertidumbre, lo que sugiere que la relación entre estas últimas variables y el pago por desempeño podría ser a través de la autonomía. Cuando controlamos por autonomía, la relación positiva y significativa entre el pago por rendimiento y la complejidad del trabajo desaparece, mientras que entre la del pago por rendimiento y la incertidumbre se hace más negativa. Las implicaciones teóricas de estos resultados son discutidas. El segundo ensayo argumenta que el diseño del trabajo es el resultado de una serie de decisiones interrelacionadas: la autonomía de los trabajadores para decidir las tareas a realizar, la forma en que el trabajo será supervisado y la compensación asociada a la información generada por el proceso de supervisión. El ensayo proporciona evidencia empírica sobre el diseño de puestos de trabajo para los trabajadores de “cuello azul” en los establecimientos industriales españoles mediante el análisis de las relaciones entre la autonomía, la supervisión y los salarios. Además, se presenta un modelo teórico que es consistente con la evidencia empírica y nos permite racionalizar las relaciones entre estas variables. En resumen, el modelo predice que la autonomía permite a los trabajadores introducir tareas innovadoras que son más difíciles de controlar y que el nivel de supervisión determina la calidad de la información sobre el esfuerzo de los trabajadores y, finalmente, su compensación. El tercer ensayo proporciona evidencia sobre el papel de la congruencia entre los objetivos de las empresas y los trabajadores en el uso del pago por rendimiento y la autonomía de los trabajadores. Basados en datos de los servicios de guardería de Minnesota, encontramos que la congruencia entre la misión de los profesores y la de los empleadores se relaciona negativamente con la probabilidad de pagar en base al rendimiento y positivamente con la probabilidad de otorgar autonomía. Estos resultados apoyan la idea de que la identidad de los trabajadores desempeña un papel importante en el diseño de las organizaciones. Además, como en anteriores estudios empíricos, encontramos que la remuneración basada en el desempeño y la autonomía tienden a darse juntas.
This dissertation comprises three essays on the economic analysis of organizations. The first essay provides further evidence on the role of uncertainty and job complexity in blue-collar workers’ pay-for-performance and autonomy decisions. It proposes an econometric approach that encompasses previous procedures taken in the related literature in order to explain the differences in the resulting outcomes that may be due to differing methodological approaches. Although our evidence comes from a distinct institutional context, a dataset of Spanish plants, they are nevertheless fairly consistent with previous analyses. The main stylized fact is that workers’ autonomy and pay-for-performance strength are interrelated decisions. Additionally, autonomy is positively related to job complexity and uncertainty, which suggests that the relationship between these latter variables and the pay-for-performance strength could be through autonomy. When we control for autonomy, the positive and significant relationship between pay-for-performance strength and job complexity disappears, while that between pay-for-performance strength and uncertainty becomes more negative. The theoretical implications of these results are discussed. The second essay argues that the design of job is the result of a set of interrelated decisions: the worker autonomy to decide the tasks to be carried out, the way in which the work will be monitored and the compensation associated with the information generated by the monitoring process. It provides empirical evidence on the design of jobs for blue collar workers in Spanish industrial establishments by analysing the relations among and determinants of autonomy, monitoring and wages. We present a theoretical model that is consistent with the empirical evidence and allows us to rationalize the relations among these variables. In short, the model predicts that autonomy permits workers to introduce innovative tasks that are more difficult to monitor and that the level of monitoring determine the quality of information on workers’ effort and ultimately their compensation. The third essay provides evidence on the role of mission congruence for reliance on pay-for-performance and autonomy. Using a dataset of childcare facilities in Minnesota, we find that mission congruence between teachers and employers is negatively related to the likelihood of reliance on pay-for-performance and positively related to teacher autonomy. These results support the idea that the identity of workers plays an important role in the design of organizations. In addition, as in previous empirical studies, we find that pay-for-performance and autonomy tend to be given together.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Li, Jianpei. "Three essays on efficiency and incentives in teams and partnerships." Doctoral thesis, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, 2007. http://www.gbv.de/dms/zbw/561396469.pdf.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Gomes, Paulo Ernesto Monteiro. "Incentivos fiscais na provisão de bens públicos : estudo para o caso brasileiro." reponame:Repositório Institucional da UnB, 2014. http://repositorio.unb.br/handle/10482/17737.

Full text
Abstract:
Dissertação (mestrado)—Universidade de Brasília, Departamento de Economia, 2014.
Submitted by Ana Cristina Barbosa da Silva (annabds@hotmail.com) on 2015-02-13T17:13:27Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_PauloErnestoMonteiroGomes.pdf: 267563 bytes, checksum: a44b94796402494b77646b1edcad4532 (MD5)
Approved for entry into archive by Raquel Viana(raquelviana@bce.unb.br) on 2015-02-27T19:26:41Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_PauloErnestoMonteiroGomes.pdf: 267563 bytes, checksum: a44b94796402494b77646b1edcad4532 (MD5)
Made available in DSpace on 2015-02-27T19:26:41Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_PauloErnestoMonteiroGomes.pdf: 267563 bytes, checksum: a44b94796402494b77646b1edcad4532 (MD5)
Este trabalho segue o estudo de Zhuravskaya (2000) e analisa o efeito de um aumento marginal da arrecadação per capita dos impostos estaduais e municipais na diferença do volume de transferências per capita repassadas pela União a estados e municípios no período seguinte. Dado que a maior parte das transferências recebidas pelas unidades subnacionais são constitucionais, a qual não há discricionariedade por parte do governo federal no seu repasse, esse estudo utiliza as transferências voluntárias para efeito de análise. Também testa-se se o fato de o governante local ser aliado político do presidente implica que haverá algum favorecimento no repasse de renda. Os resultados obtidos apontam que os incentivos fiscais no Brasil não são tão fracos, pois a arrecadação tributária local pouco influencia o repasse de transferências voluntárias. E que não há evidências que o apoio político tenha impacto no repasse das transferências. ________________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACT
This present work studies the dynamics between local tax base and shared revenue. Zhuravskaya (2000) finds that fiscal incentives in Russia are weak, because any change in local government's own revenues is almost entirely offset by changes in shared revenues. This paper shows that Brazilian municipalities and states own's revenues has no influence on the voluntary transfers from the federal government, so that the fiscal incentives of public goods provision cannot be declared weak. Moreover, we could not identify an impact of political alignment between the mayors or the governors and the Brazilian President on the voluntary intergovernmental transfers.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Tsitinidis, Alexandros, and Kenneth Duru. "Managerial Incentives and Earnings Management : An Empirical Examination of the Income Smoothing in the Nordic Banking Industry." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Företagsekonomiska institutionen, 2013. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-202105.

Full text
Abstract:
Prior empirical research, mainly conducted in US under the US GAAP, has indicated that managers in listed banks use loan loss provisions as a primary tool for income smoothing activities. Since 2005 the accounting environment in the European Union (EU) changed, as all listed companies are required to comply with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Some arguments envisage that IFRS is a set of high quality standards that plug some inconsistencies relative to national General Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). The overall objective of the present study is to examine earnings management and in particular income smoothing through the use of loan loss provisions (LLP) to manage earnings under IFRS and national GAAPs. The sample consists of twenty large commercial banks listed in the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden) for the years 2004-2012 (including early adopters) and sixteen banks for the years 1996-2003 under each country’s national reporting regime. Furthermore we present the body of earning management literature in conjunction with agency theory in order to grasp managers’ opportunistic behavior. Finally we assess the institutional role of financial reporting standards and the arguments of how IFRS could restrict earnings management activities as proposed by some authors. Overall, our results indicate some degree of income smoothing activities through loan loss provisions by bank managers both under national GAAPs and IFRS. The study contributes to the broad literature body on earnings management, while testing income-smoothing activities on a single industry compared to previous studies where the samples comprises a variety of firms in different industries.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
More sources

Books on the topic "Incentive provision"

1

Hoppe-Fischer, Eva I. Essays on Contract Design and Incentive Provision. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-24133-9.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Laffont, Jean-Jacques. Provision of quality and power of incentive schemes in regulated industries. Cambridge, Mass: Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1989.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Social entrepreneurship business models: Incentive strategies to catalyze public goods provision. Houndsmill, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Lacetera, Nicola. Individual preferences, organization, and competition in a model of R&D incentive provision. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2011.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Holmström, Bengt. Aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives. Stanford, Calif: Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University, 1985.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Fick, Gary J. Time-related incentive and disincentive provisions in highway construction contracts. Washington, D.C: Transportation Research Board, 2010.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Trost, Steve, Gary Fick, Ells Tom Cackler, and Lee Vanzler. Time-Related Incentive and Disincentive Provisions in Highway Construction Contracts. Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.17226/14392.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Work incentives and welfare provision: The 'pathological' theory of unemployment. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Eckardt, Martina, Jörg Dötsch, and Stefan Okruch, eds. Old-Age Provision and Homeownership – Fiscal Incentives and Other Public Policy Options. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75211-2.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Personal provision of retirement income: Meeting the needs of older people? Cheltenham, U.K: Edward Elgar, 2009.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
More sources

Book chapters on the topic "Incentive provision"

1

Hoppe-Fischer, Eva I. "Introduction." In Essays on Contract Design and Incentive Provision, 1–7. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-24133-9_1.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Hoppe-Fischer, Eva I. "Public versus Private Ownership: Quantity Contracts and the Allocation of Investment Tasks." In Essays on Contract Design and Incentive Provision, 11–43. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-24133-9_2.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Hoppe-Fischer, Eva I. "Public-Private Partnerships versus Traditional Procurement: Innovation Incentives and Information Gathering." In Essays on Contract Design and Incentive Provision, 45–77. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-24133-9_3.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Hoppe-Fischer, Eva I. "The Costs and Benefits of Additional Information in Agency Models with Endogenous Information Structures." In Essays on Contract Design and Incentive Provision, 79–90. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-24133-9_4.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Hoppe-Fischer, Eva I. "Can Contracts Solve the Hold-Up Problem? Experimental Evidence." In Essays on Contract Design and Incentive Provision, 93–128. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-24133-9_5.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Hoppe-Fischer, Eva I. "Conflicting Tasks and Moral Hazard: Theory and Experimental Evidence." In Essays on Contract Design and Incentive Provision, 129–84. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-24133-9_6.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Hoppe-Fischer, Eva I. "Behavioral Biases and Cognitive Reflection." In Essays on Contract Design and Incentive Provision, 185–95. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-24133-9_7.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Inoue, Hiroshi, Masatoshi Miyake, and Li Guan. "Influence of Risk Incentive by Limited Dividend Provision." In Advances in Intelligent and Soft Computing, 255–62. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-22833-9_30.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Digilina, Olga B., and Daria V. Lebedeva. "Resource Provision for Innovation: State and Incentive Measures." In Lecture Notes in Networks and Systems, 1254–63. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69415-9_137.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Lin, Li, Jinpeng Huai, Yanmin Zhu, Chunming Hu, and Xianxian Li. "A Multi-agents Contractual Approach to Incentive Provision in Non-cooperative Networks." In On the Move to Meaningful Internet Systems: OTM 2008, 231–48. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-88871-0_17.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Conference papers on the topic "Incentive provision"

1

Park, Jaeok, and Mihaela van der Schaar. "Incentive provision using intervention." In IEEE INFOCOM 2011 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications. IEEE, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/infcom.2011.5935229.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Qiao, Dandan, Shun-Yang Lee, Andrew Whinston, and Qiang Wei. "Incentive Provision and Pro-Social Behaviors." In Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences. Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.24251/hicss.2017.675.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Vermillion, Sean D., and Richard J. Malak. "A Theoretical Look at the Impact of Incentives on Design Problem Effort Provision." In ASME 2018 International Design Engineering Technical Conferences and Computers and Information in Engineering Conference. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/detc2018-85845.

Full text
Abstract:
Searching for and selecting among design solutions is not an effortless task. The principle of least effort suggests people seek to minimize the amount of effort they apply towards completing their tasks. In the context of engineering design, it is conceivable that expending more effort on the design problem yields a design solution with greater performance. In this paper, we investigate the impact of incentives on motivating engineering designers to increase the amount of effort they apply to solving design problems. Specifically, we formulate an analytical model of effort provision towards design tasks to compare two incentive structures: a probabilistic incentive and a deterministic incentive. With the probabilistic incentive, a designer’s final reward or penalty is uncertain, e.g. it is uncertain if a proposed design solution will meet requirements. With the deterministic incentive, a designer’s final reward or penalty is tied directly to the quality of the design solution as it is presented, e.g. a proposed design solution meets requirements with a certain probability as the figure of merit and the designer is directly rewarded or penalized on producing a design solution with that figure of merit. We parameterize the proposed analytical model and perform a parameter study to determine which incentive produces a more optimal design solution in the parameter space. Results show that there is no one dominant incentive structure, and the preferred incentive structure depends on how intense the reward or penalty is and how a designer subjectively valuates his effort.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Chen, Yishan, Shuiguang Deng, and Jianwei Yin. "Incentive-driven Edge Cooperation for Service Provision." In 2021 IEEE International Conference on Web Services (ICWS). IEEE, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icws53863.2021.00080.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Kumar, Suraj, Deep Kiran, and Rinkesh Meena. "Incentive-Based Flexibility Provision in Centralized Home Energy Management System." In 2021 IEEE 8th Uttar Pradesh Section International Conference on Electrical, Electronics and Computer Engineering (UPCON). IEEE, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/upcon52273.2021.9667616.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

McCombie, Charles, Neil Chapman, and Thomas H. Isaacs. "The Crucial Importance of the Back-End in Multinational Initiatives to Enhance Fuel Cycle Security." In The 11th International Conference on Environmental Remediation and Radioactive Waste Management. ASMEDC, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/icem2007-7208.

Full text
Abstract:
There have been repeated proposals for establishing multinational cooperation approaches that could reduce the security concerns of spreading nuclear technologies. Most recently, there have been initiatives by both Russia (GNPI) and the USA (GNEP) – each aimed at promoting nuclear power whilst limiting security concerns. In practice, both initiatives place emphasis on the supply of reactors and enriched fuel but neither has made clear and specific proposals about the back-end part of the arrangement. The primary incentive offered to the user countries is “security of supply” of the front end services. However, there is no current shortage of supply of front end services, so that the incentives are not large. A much greater incentive could be the provision of a spent fuel or waste disposal service. The fuel supplied to Tier 2 countries could be shipped back (with no return of wastes) to the supplier or else to an accepted third party country that is trusted to operate safe and secure disposal facilities. If a comprehensive service that obviates the need for a national deep repository is offered to small countries then there will be a really strong incentive for them to sign up to GNEP or GNPI type deals.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Makarov, Anton Dmitrievich, and Anastasiia Valeryevna Sedova. "The development of cycling and the construction of sports facilities as an incentive for the development of the cycling infrastructure of the city." In 2022 33th All-Russian Youth Exhibition of Innovations. Publishing House of Kalashnikov ISTU, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.22213/ie022131.

Full text
Abstract:
New trends of reasonable consumption, healthy lifestyle, and reduction of carbon dioxide emissions in the urban environment popularize the bicycle as a new type of vehicle. In comparison with European countries in Russia, the bicycle has not yet achieved much attention from the citizens. However, in Russia, according to social surveys, there is a request for the development of bicycle infrastructure. This study examines how the growth of cycling infrastructure may depend on the development of cycling in the country. The article presents both a comparison of various cities according to the index of the provision of bicycle paths for the population, and the identification of leading countries in the statistics of sports victories, the number of indoor bike tracks and the world championships held. The city of Izhevsk acts as an object for comparison in the study. Based on open data on the cycling infrastructure of the city and the document on the development strategy of the Udmurt Republic, the article discusses the identified criteria and how they can affect the development of cycling infrastructure in Russia.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Petrović, Jovana. "PRUŽANjE JAVNIH USLUGA ELEKTRONSKIM PUTEM – EUPRAVA." In XVIII Majsko savetovanje. University of Kragujevac, Faculty of Law, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.46793/xviiimajsko.755p.

Full text
Abstract:
In addition to the undoubted progress compared to the previous period, the small space won by e-government is underutilized. Progress in the normative aspect is not always accompanied by adequate activities in the technical- technological segment. Excessive complexity of procedures for providing public services electronically, poor information literacy of citizens and employees in administrative bodies, awareness and culture, insufficient technological equipment, lack of adequate coordination and cooperation of administrative bodies and many other problems hinder mass application. And that is exactly what is needed to realize the immeasurable benefits of e-government. Faster and better provision of public services, which e-government strives for, is the best incentive for its further development. Although it should be borne in mind that e- government is not a panacea for all the ills of public administration - as evidenced by the many challenges facing even countries that are far ahead of Serbia in this regard - in many examples has proven to be a powerful catalyst for reform. Given that the modernization of public administration is a long-term process, its effects will be visible only in the period ahead, so it is difficult and somewhat ungrateful to make forecasts regarding the further direction of development. However, what is considered imperative in the coming period, and especially because of the importance of efficient public administration for the functioning of society as a whole, is to direct the attention of the professional and political public towards more efficient removal of e-government and better and fuller use of existing potentials.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Damle, Sankarshan, Moin Hussain Moti, Praphul Chandra, and Sujit Gujar. "Civic Crowdfunding for Agents with Negative Valuations and Agents with Asymmetric Beliefs." In Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-19}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2019/30.

Full text
Abstract:
In the last decade, civic crowdfunding has proved to be effective in generating funds for the provision of public projects. However, the existing literature deals only with citizen's with positive valuation and symmetric belief towards the project's provision. In this work, we present novel mechanisms which break these two barriers, i.e., mechanisms which incorporate negative valuation and asymmetric belief, independently. For negative valuation, we present a methodology for converting existing mechanisms to mechanisms that incorporate agents with negative valuations. Particularly, we adapt existing PPR and PPS mechanisms, to present novel PPRN and PPSN mechanisms which incentivize strategic agents to contribute to the project based on their true preference. With respect to asymmetric belief, we propose a reward scheme Belief Based Reward (BBR) based on Robust Bayesian Truth Serum mechanism. With BBR, we propose a general mechanism for civic crowdfunding which incorporates asymmetric agents. We leverage PPR and PPS, to present PPRx and PPSx. We prove that in PPRx and PPSx, agents with greater belief towards the project's provision contribute more than agents with lesser belief. Further, we also show that contributions are such that the project is provisioned at equilibrium.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Vybihal, Vaclav. "FISCAL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROVISION OF INVESTMENT INCENTIVES." In 2nd International Multidisciplinary Scientific Conference on Social Sciences and Arts SGEM2015. Stef92 Technology, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.5593/sgemsocial2015/b23/s7.037.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Reports on the topic "Incentive provision"

1

Lacetera, Nicola, and Lorenzo Zirulia. Individual Preferences, Organization, and Competition in a Model of R&D Incentive Provision. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, May 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w17031.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Camous, Antoine, and Russell Cooper. Political Activism and the Provision of Dynamic Incentives. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, January 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w26654.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Poterba, James, and Todd Sinai. Income Tax Provisions Affecting Owner-Occupied Housing: Revenue Costs and Incentive Effects. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, August 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w14253.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Shah, Ashni, and Rob Mills. Funding Mechanisms to Incentivize Sustainable and Inclusive Water Provision in Kenya’s Arid Lands. Oxfam; Social Finance, August 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.21201/2018.3279.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Agan, Amanda, Matthew Freedman, and Emily Owens. Is Your Lawyer a Lemon? Incentives and Selection in the Public Provision of Criminal Defense. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, May 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w24579.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Hotz-Hart, Beat. Thematic synthesis “Market Conditions and Regulation” of the NRP “Energy”. Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF), November 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.46446/publication_nrp70_nrp71.2019.4.en.

Full text
Abstract:
It will not be possible to transform the Swiss electricity system with technological solutions alone. The shaping of market conditions and regulations will be at least as important. These market conditions and regulations need to guide economic resources in the right direction through the provision of incentives and possible solutions. And it is here that action needs to be taken.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

van den Boogaard, Vanessa, and Fabrizio Santoro. Explaining Informal Taxation and Revenue Generation: Evidence from south-central Somalia. Institute of Development Studies, March 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.19088/ictd.2021.003.

Full text
Abstract:
Most people in low-income countries contribute substantially to the financing of local public goods through informal revenue generation (IRG). However, very little is known about how IRG works in practice. We produce novel evidence on the magnitude and regressivity of IRG and its relationship with the state in a fragile context, Somalia. We rely on original data from surveys with over 2,300 households and 117 community leaders in Gedo region, as well as on extensive qualitative research. We first show that IRG is prevalent. Over 70 per cent of households report paying at least one informal tax or fee in the previous year, representing on average 9.5 per cent of annual income. We also find that, among households that contribute, poorer ones contribute larger amounts than richer ones, with higher incidence in relation to their income. Further, in line with theory and expectations, informal payments have inequitable community-level effects, with individuals in wealthier communities making more informal payments than in poorer ones and, correspondingly, having access to a greater number of public goods. We then consider four explanations for the prevalence of IRG. First, IRG clearly fills gaps left by weak state capacity. Relatedly, we show that IRG can bolster perceptions and legitimacy of the state, indicating that sub-national governments may actually benefit from informal taxation. Second, informal taxing authorities are more effective tax collectors than the state, with informal taxing authorities having greater legitimacy and taxpayers perceiving informal payments to be fairer than those levied by the state. Third, dispelling the possibility that informal payments should be classified as user fees, taxpayers overwhelmingly expect nothing in return for their contributions. Fourth, in contrast to hypotheses that informal payments may be voluntary, taxpayers associate informal payments with punishment and informal institutions of enforcement. Our research reinforces the importance of IRG to public goods provision in weak formal institutional contexts, to everyday citizens, and to policymakers attempting to extend the influence of the federal state in south-central Somalia. Foremost, informal tax institutions need to be incorporated within analyses of taxation, service delivery, social protection, and equity. At the same time, our findings of the complementary nature of IRG and district-level governance and of the relative efficiency of revenue generation by local leaders have important implications for understanding statebuilding processes from below. Indeed, our findings suggest that governments may have little incentive to extend their taxing authority in some fragile contexts.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Birch, Izzy. Financial Incentives to Reduce Female Infanticide, Child Marriage and Promote Girl’s Education: Institutional and Monitoring Mechanisms. Institute of Development Studies (IDS), December 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.19088/k4d.2021.005.

Full text
Abstract:
The focus of this paper is on the complementary mechanisms and interventions likely to increase the effectiveness and impact of conditional cash transfer (CCT) schemes in South Asia that aim to reduce female infanticide and child marriage and promote girls’ education. The literature on the institutional aspects of these particular schemes is limited, but from this and from the wider literature on CCT programmes in similar contexts, the following institutional mechanisms are likely to enhance success: a strong information and communication strategy that enhances programme reach and coverage and ensures stakeholder awareness; advance agreements with financial institutions; a simple and flexible registration process; appropriate use of technology to strengthen access, disbursement, and oversight; adequate implementation capacity to support processes of outreach, enrolment, and monitoring; monitoring and accountability mechanisms embedded in programme design; coordination mechanisms across government across social protection schemes; an effective management information system; and the provision of quality services in the sectors for which conditions are required. There is a very limited body of evidence that explores these institutional issues as they apply to the specific CCT programmes that are the focus of this report, however, there is more available evidence of the potential impact of ‘cash-plus’ programmes, which complement the transfers with other interventions designed to enhance their results or address the structural barriers to well-being
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Alvarez Pagliuca, Claudia, Juan Martínez Álvarez, Pablo Pereira Dos Santos, Tomás Serebrisky, and Ancor Suárez-Alemán. Financiamiento sostenible de la infraestructura económica y social en América Latina y el Caribe: tendencias, actores e instrumentos. Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, October 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0004497.

Full text
Abstract:
Mientras que la región presenta un amplio potencial de mejora de eficiencia en inversión pública (hacer más con menos recursos disponibles) resulta crucial potenciar mecanismos que incentiven a una inversión más activa y sostenible por parte del sector privado. La participación del sector privado puede contribuir al mejor desarrollo, operación y mantenimiento de los activos y provisión de servicios de infraestructura en tiempos de crisis, así como a preservar niveles de inversión adecuados ante un contexto de enormes dificultades fiscales, contribuyendo al crecimiento económico de la región y a reducir la desigualdad entre sus habitantes mediante el acceso a más y mejores oportunidades. Entender cómo se fondea y financia la infraestructura económica y social en la región, y cómo potenciar y diversificar la presencia de inversores públicos y privados de diferente perfil es un paso fundamental para generar y/o mejorar las condiciones para atraer un mayor y mejor financiamiento, y de este modo cubrir las necesidades de inversión no cubiertas.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Uchitel, Aleksandr D., Ilona V. Batsurovska, Nataliia A. Dotsenko, Olena A. Gorbenko, and Nataliia I. Kim. Implementation of future agricultural engineers' training technology in the informational and educational environment. [б. в.], June 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.31812/123456789/4440.

Full text
Abstract:
The article presents the implementation of future agricultural engineers’ training technology in the informational and educational environment. To train future agricultural engineers, it is advisable to form tutorials for the study of each discipline in the conditions of informational and educational environment. Such tutorials are an assistance in mastering both theoretical material and course navigation, where interactive electronic learning tools are presented to perform tasks in the informational and educational environment. Higher education applicants perform such tasks directly in the classroom with the help of gadgets or personal computers. The final grade is formed from the scores obtained in the classroom and the rating of higher education applicants while studying in the informational and educational environment. The outlined approach is able to help in the quality of learning content. The use of interactive audiovisual online tools allows to get acquainted with the theoretical, practical and experimental provisions clearly, it is important for the training of future agricultural engineers. At the end of the experiment, it can be argued that the developed technology increases the level of motivation and self-incentive to work in the informational and educational environment. The application of the presented technology provides an opportunity to combine the educational process in the classroom with learning in the informational and educational environment, forms analytical abilities and competencies in professional activity. The reliability of the obtained results was checked using the λ Kolmogorov-Smirnov criterion. It is determined that when using this technology in the educational process, the indicators in the experimental group increased, which displays the effectiveness of training bachelors in agricultural engineering in the conditions of informational and educational environment.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
You might also be interested in the extended bibliographies on the topic 'Incentive provision' for particular source types:
Journal articles Dissertations / Theses Books
We offer discounts on all premium plans for authors whose works are included in thematic literature selections. Contact us to get a unique promo code!

To the bibliography