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1
Fernández Polanco, Valentín. "La visión de André de Muralt sobre la influencia de la teología medieval en la evolución histórica del pensamiento metafísico." Carthaginensia 39, no. 76 (January 25, 2024): 637–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.62217/carth.437.
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En las líneas que siguen se expone la visión de la evolución del pensamiento metafísico que se puede obtener a partir de la obra de André de Muralt. Según esa visión, la historia de la metafísica se puede dividir en dos períodos fundamentales: el período antiguo y medieval, por un lado, y el moderno y contemporáneo, por otro. El primero de ellos se edifica sobre las soluciones platónica y aristotélica a la aporía parmenídea, y entra en crisis con la limitación impuesta al conocimiento metafísico por la teología crítica del siglo XIV. El segundo se presenta escindido en dos líneas paralelas: una línea que, al edificarse sobre cimientos escotistas, nace condenada a no poder superarlos, y otra que, aceptando las conclusiones de Guillermo de Ockham, declara resueltamente la completa imposibilidad de la metafísica. Ambas líneas confluyen en la segunda mitad del siglo XX en la misma era postmetafísica. Abstract: This paper aims to show a view of the evolution of metaphysical thinking based on André de Muralt’s work. This view differentiates two main periods in the history of metaphysics: the ancient and medieval one and the modern and contemporary. The first period is founded on Platonic and Aristotelian different solutions to the Parmenidean impossibility of metaphysics, and falls into crisis with the limitations imposed to metaphysical thinking by the XIV century critical theology. The second period presents two parallel lines: the one who, based on Duns Scot’s presuppositions, finds itself in the impossibility of getting over them; and the one who, accepting William of Ockham’s conclusions, declares the complete impossibility of metaphysics. Both lines converge, in the second half of XX century, in the same postmetaphysical age.
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Compaan, Auke. "The revelation of Christ as an impossible impossibility: a critical reading of Jean-Luc Marion’s contribution to the post-modern debate in phenomenology, philosophy of religion and theology." STJ | Stellenbosch Theological Journal 1, no. 1 (July 31, 2015): 57. http://dx.doi.org/10.17570/stj.2015.v1n1.a3.
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This article is an attempt to establish the phenomenological and theological value of the concept of Revelation in the work of the French philosopher Jean-Luc Marion in a post-modern cultural and intellectual context. Is it possible to speak of revelation in a phenomenological sense and more radically, about the Revelation of God, after the critique of metaphysics and phenomenology by Derrida, Caputo and others? Marion argues that by overcoming metaphysics and broadening the limits of traditional phenomenology to include phenomena of Revelation, the Revelation of Christ is a phenomenological impossible impossibility. Using Marion’s reinterpretation of Husserl and Heidegger`s understanding of “givenness”, “the given” and the “gift” and his concept of Revelation as a saturated phenomenon, I want to critically illuminate his contribution to the concept of r/Revelation as a post-metaphysical and theological possibility.
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Robu, Gabriel-Iulian. "Il nome di dio, tra metafisica, fenomenologia e teologia. La prospettiva di Jean-Luc Marion e l’influsso di Edmund Husserl." DIALOG TEOLOGIC XXVI, no. 51 (June 1, 2023): 135–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.53438/brwi2493.
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This article presents the evaluation that Marion makes of the onto- theological determination of metaphysics and of conceptual idolatry, and the resolution that is proposed through the phenomenology of the gift. The new name of God, in the logic of this phenomenology of Marion, no longer starts from the language of being, esse, but from gift and love. “Love purifies our heart from every idol, since it alone is given and said as the name of God and yet it alone occurs in the experience of this world”. God is a Gift, is donation; he is Love, and his revelation is the saturated phenomenon par excellence which shows the impossibility of impossibility by God. In past times the dialogue of theology with other sciences and atheists was partly supported by arguments provided by classical metaphysics. The cry of triumph of nihilism calls for the very end of this metaphysics and the death of its God (Nietzsche). By what name, then, do we call God after “the death of God”, in today’s philosophical background? Also, if God is really God, how can he die? Only a God who is only a “god” can die. If metaphysics has come to its end, who will assume his task and duty? These are some questions which, following Marion’s and Husserl’s indications, we will briefly try to answer, after a short presentation of the status quaestionis.
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Gravina, Irina V. "Rethinking the One: A.F. Losev and Twentieth-century European Henology." Voprosy Filosofii, no. 10 (2022): 76–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.21146/0042-8744-2022-10-76-85.
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The attention of modern philosophy to the ancient concept of the One has led to the emergence of an independent intellectual stream – henology. Although the concept came out from European studies, within Russian philosophy it is best developed by Alexey Losev, Losev characterized “The One” as fundamental category of philosophical knowledge. In this article analyzes the importance of the topic and pays attention to its value for modern ontology and the state of metaphysics in general. It is noted that the discussion of the Oneness is built around one aspect – the crisis of metaphysics and solutions to this problem. Due to the fundamentality of the question, it revolves around the figure of Plato and the Platonic philosophy, but goes different ways. It is noted that, on the one hand, apologists for the One find in Platonism new and valuable ways to justify the position on the impossibility of overcoming metaphysics – the apophatic henology. On the other hand, postmodernists criticise Plato for idealism and apology of hierarchical worldview. In this point of view, concept of the One closes to totalitarian mythologies. It is shown that the concept of henology is contradictory, there are several disputable positions about that. Some authors tend to understand the One only as radical structurally indistinguishable apophatic, others, following the tradition of Christian metaphysics, on the contrary, as a complex system of apophatic and cataphatic character. It is made the conclusion that the systems of henologists in the XX century are united by the attention to ontology in general. Henology thus unites in its dialogue european and russian thought, metaphysical and post-metaphysical, bringing back twentieth-century thinkers to contemplate the foundations of being.
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Hermens, Ronnie. "The problem of contextuality and the impossibility of experimental metaphysics thereof." Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 42, no. 4 (November 2011): 214–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsb.2011.06.001.
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Giovannoni, Elena, and Paolo Quattrone. "The Materiality of Absence: Organizing and the case of the incomplete cathedral." Organization Studies 39, no. 7 (June 22, 2017): 849–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0170840617708005.
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This study explores the role of absences in making organizing possible. By engaging with Lefebvre’s spatial triad as the interconnections between conceived (planned), perceived (experienced through practice) and lived (felt and imagined) spaces, we challenge the so-called metaphysics of presence in organization studies. We draw on the insights offered by the project of construction of Siena Cathedral during the period 1259–1357 and we examine how it provided a space for the actors involved to explore their different (civic, architectural and religious) intentions. We show that, as the contested conceived spaces of the cathedral were connected to architectural practices, religious powers and civic symbols, they revealed the impossibility for these intentions to be fully represented. It was this impossibility that provoked an ongoing search for solutions and guaranteed a combination of dynamism and persistence of both the material architecture of the cathedral and the project of construction. The case of Siena Cathedral therefore highlights the role of absence in producing organizing effects not because absence eventually takes form but because of the impossibility to fully represent it.
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Żak, Wojciech. "Granice poznania a kształt bytu na podstawie myśli Karla Jaspersa." Principia 68 (2021): 167–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.4467/20843887pi.21.007.18697.
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The Limits of Cognition and the Shape of Being Based on the Thought of Karl Jaspers The article points out the elements of Karl Jaspers’ epistemological conception that cross out the possibility of a comprehensive account of being. The key issue here is the limits of cognition, which take the form of object cognition. The theme of limits points to the inadequacies of human thinking in the context of quantifiable and absolutist representations of reality. The impossibility of adequately grasping the totality of reality will be illustrated here by means of the criticism Jaspers levelled at absolutising metaphysics. In connection with the description of the structure of cognition proposed by Jaspers, the article points out the conceptual proximity of the issue of worldview and metaphysics in the light of the thought of the cited author.
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Rosa Maria, Marafioti. "Ein Logos für das Sein und den Gott. Heideggers Auseinandersetzung mit der Theologie ab den dreißiger Jahren. II." Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai Philosophia 65, no. 3 (December 10, 2020): 99–118. http://dx.doi.org/10.24193/subbphil.2020.3.05.
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"A Logos for Being and God. Heidegger’s Confrontation with Theology from the 1930s. II. Heidegger’s entire itinerary is characterised by the search for a living relationship with God, and thus for a Logos able to think and name the divine without objectifying its divinity. Getting into a dialogue with Western philosophers and theologians and distinguishing the fields of thinking, faith and science one from the other, since the 1930’s Heidegger claims that, if the traditional theology has seen God as the supreme being, metaphysics, on its part, has identified it with Being as such. According to Heidegger, the “onto-theo-logical” constitution of metaphysics has developed itself by means of the reception of the Jewish-Christian concept of an almighty God as creator. This process has led to the “fulfilment” of the “machination” in the totalitarian regimes of the 20th century. Heidegger speaks about the “poverty” of thought and about the consequent impossibility of building an ontology as well as a theology. Nevertheless, he still waits for the hint of a “last God”, in so far as he assumes that a renewed manifestation of the divine must be prepared through the “overcoming” of the “forgetfulness” of Being and God. Keywords: God, faith, thinking, theology, metaphysics. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG. Die Suche nach einem lebendigen Verhältnis mit Gott und deshalb auch nach einem Logos, der imstande sei, das Göttliche zu denken und auszudrücken, ohne es zu vergegenständlichen, prägt den ganzen heideggerschen Denkweg. Während Heidegger ein fruchtbares Gespräch mit Philosophen und Theologen der abendländischen Tradition führt und die Sachgebiete von Denken, Glauben und Wissenschaft voneinander abgrenzt, ab den 1930er Jahren vertritt er die Ansicht, dass die traditionelle Theologie Gott für das höchste Seiende gehalten habe, das wiederum von der Metaphysik mit dem Sein als solchen identifiziert worden sei. Die „onto-theo-logische“ Verfassung der Metaphysik habe sich gleichzeitig mit der Rezeptionsgeschichte des jüdisch-christlichen Begriffs vom allmächtigen Schöpfergott gestaltet, die in die Vollendung der „Machenschaft“ während der Totalitarismen des 20. Jahrhunderts gemündet sei. Heideggers Anerkennung der „Dürftigkeit“ des Denkens und damit der Unmöglichkeit, eine Ontologie sowie eine Theologie auszuarbeiten, hindert ihn daran nicht, auf den Wink eines „letzten Gottes“ zu warten, indem er durch die „Verwindung“ der Seins- und Gottesvergessenheit die Vorbereitung einer erneuten Erscheinung des Göttlichen bezweckt. Schlüsselwörter: Gott, Glaube, Denken, Theologie, Metaphysik."
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JABAL, Nadira Khairallah. "THE SOPHYAN THE (AL-REFAA) BETWEEN THE META-PHYSICS AND REALITY." RIMAK International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 04, no. 02 (March 1, 2022): 500–509. http://dx.doi.org/10.47832/2717-8293.16.33.
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The Metaphysics as a branch of the philosophy has be come the interest of the Arab philosophers in cluding the sophyan, so it appeared in their literary texts from which the "the" (AL-Refaa) texts since it includes the meaning of separation from reality. When we stop at it we find it as s trip that makes the spirit moves towards the divine, it requires the approaching despite the impossibility to do that. Allah is the subject of the meta-physics as Ava Sina claimed this research deals with the trip texts as it includes meanings that pass the difficulties, eagerness, love depending on the analytical aspects trying to approach the sounding of the sophyan text.
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Karpovich, V. N. "Rational Reasons, Counterfactual Statements and “Impossible Worlds” in the Philosophical Justifications of Thought Experiments." Siberian Journal of Philosophy 19, no. 3 (January 11, 2022): 33–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.25205/2541-7517-2021-19-3-33-43.
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In his theory of natural laws David Lewis rejects the authenticity of impossible worlds on the grounds that the contradiction contained within his modifier "in (the world) w" is tantamount to a contradiction in the whole theory, which seems unacceptable. At the same time, in philosophical discourse very often researchers use counterfactual situations and thought experiments with impossible events and objects. There is a need to apply the theory of worlds to genuine, concrete, but impossible worlds. One way to do this is to reject Lewis's classical negation on the grounds that it leads to problems of completeness and inconsistency inside the worlds. The proposed extension for impossibility is compatible with Lewis's extensional metaphysics, although it leads to some loss for description completeness in semantics.
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Crowell, Steven. "Phenomenology, Ontology, Nihilism: Løgstrup, Levinas, and the Limits of Philosophical Anthropology." Monist 103, no. 1 (January 1, 2020): 16–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/monist/onz025.
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Abstract Despite recent interest in his work, little has been written about Løgstrup’s relation to phenomenology—what he thinks phenomenology is, how it informs his approach to ethics, and what he believes it can accomplish. Here I hope to stimulate further discussion of these matters. In this, consideration of Levinas’s understanding of phenomenology will be useful. While sharing many of Løgstrup’s concerns, Levinas insists on a distinction between phenomenological ontology and “metaphysics,” one that Løgstrup tends to blur in support of his argument that “absolute nihilism is an impossibility.” After showing why this distinction matters, I will argue that Løgstrup’s goal is better achieved if we embrace Heidegger’s transcendental version of phenomenology rather than follow Løgstrup or Levinas, despite much that remains phenomenologically valuable in both.
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Mihailović, Miloš. "Two mysterious guests: E. A. Poe's "The raven" and L. Kostić's "In memory of ruvarac"." Reci Beograd 12, no. 14 (2021): 100–111. http://dx.doi.org/10.5937/reci2114100m.
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Laza Kostić is one of the most distinguished poets in Serbian literature. "Spomen na Ruvarca"/"In memory of Ruvarac", chosen by Bogdan Popović for his famous Anthology, is one of Kostić's poems where tendencies for suprising motifs and inovations of form are extremely prominent. In this paper I offered a comparative reading of "Spomen na Ruvarca" and Edgar Allan Poe's "The Raven"; Poe's poem is similar to Kostić's in regard to the atmosphere, motifs and theatrical narration and dialogue. In order to understand "The Raven", I have analysed Poe's autopoetic essay "The Philosophy of Composition". The explanation of "The Raven's" genesis offered in this essay is not necessarily indisputable, as I explained in the paper. Bearing this in mind, I declined the evident yet superficial connection between "The Raven" and Kostić's "Santa Maria della Salute", based on the formal similarities, and chose to follow Srba Ignjatović's suggestion that "Spomen na Ruvarca" should be read in comparison with "The Raven". I have compared the formal characteristics of these poems, showing both their differences and similarities. However, I found the most profound link between the poems in the atmosphere of mystery and horror, suggestive symbols and examination of metaphysics. By using the characters of 'mysterious guests' - the Raven and the skeleton of Kosta Ruvarac -these poets offered a meditation on the problem of the life after death. Neither Poe nor Kostić gave any ultimate answer, choosing to accentuate the impossibility of communication with the dead and determining the truth about life after death. The contact with the dead thus serves a role of a mere counterpoint which just further emphasizes the said impossibility.
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Fahey, Carolyn. "Autonomy and presupposition in architecture: Lebbeus Woods' Berlin and Sarajevo projects." Architectural Research Quarterly 17, no. 2 (June 2013): 131–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1359135513000481.
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The architectural theories of Lebbeus Woods present a number of philosophical problems. Of particular interest in this paper is Woods' thinking about autonomy and self-determinism in architecture. He claims that the architect should ‘recognise his own autonomy’ before ‘designing for other self-determining individuals’. The logical impossibility inherent in the juxtaposition of these claims is investigated with reference to the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein.Wittgenstein provides a critique of metaphysics that is based on a strong valuing of socio-cultural context. Woods, on the other hand, proposes theoretical accounts of architecture that contain the fallacious appeal to autonomy. The appeal, however logically false, is critical to the theoretical position cast in terms of ‘heterarchy’. The appeal also supports the presupposition of society and culture that in turn allows for a sense of architectural solution. In the case of Woods' proposals for Berlin and Sarajevo projects, it is shown that the sense of architectural solution cannot amount to a real solution to the socio-cultural problems facing the people of these war torn cities.
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Denkova, Lidia. "Heart and Ashes – the ‘Next’ Ciphers." Sledva : Journal for University Culture, no. 40 (April 7, 2020): 6–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.33919/sledva.20.40.2.
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The question “What next?” is a key one to all philosophical theories that consider causality, continuum, discontinuity, potentiality, and, more generally, probability. The notion of "cause" (aitia) and the rigid causality are based on what was said in the Fifth Book of Aristotle's Metaphysics, but ancient atomists, especially Plato, introduced the possibility of free "bifurcation of consequences", of symmetry and asymmetry of "next", which commence from an absolute new beginning. The principle of an absolute new beginning follows the interpretation of the myth of the deluge in De sapientia Veterum (1609) by Francis Bacon. The "logical pluralism" of numerous cause and effect relationships as well as the continuity principle (as formulated by Leibniz) are encompassed in two ciphers in accordance with the classical definition of cipher by Karl Jaspers. The cipher “sameness” and the cipher “change” suggest that we ask ourselves once again about Aristotle's "probable impossibility", and the starting point is the little-known myth of Dionysus, torn to pieces and restored to a new body thanks to his heart, as well as the creation of humanity from the ashes of the stricken Titans.
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Pospolita, Anastasiia. "THE METAPHYSICAL MOTIVES IN THE POETRY OF BOLESŁAW LEŚMIAN." Polish Studies of Kyiv, no. 35 (2019): 503–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/psk.2019.35.503-509.
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The research is devoted to the metaphysical motives in the poetry of Bolesław Leśmian. This is an important milestone in the history of Polish literature. The legacy of such poets determines not only the nature of national poetry, but also has a significant impact on the development of world literature. Bolesław Leśmian created his unique metaphysical world. Its structure, organization and other features and innovations are the subject of our study. The aim of the study is to show the metaphysical motives in the poetry of Bolesław Leśmian, based on the critical reception of the representatives of the Polish and Ukrainian literary studies from the past and present century. The main features of the soul topos in Lesmian’s poetry are its transcendent origin, connection to corporalness, death, individuality, permanent motion. In our study, we came to the conclusion that Man can exist only in conjunction with nature. With its help, he can know the otherworldly, God, but when he merges with it, he becomes a different form of being, but does not die. Because man can not know God, he is afraid of the unknown and the unconscious she suffers. Man seeks to know God, but he is not her guardian or ruler. The other world is a redeveloped, separate world, there are travels, the poet is constantly looking for similarities to the earth. It is fictional, therefore, M. Glovinsky calls it “represented”. B. Leśmian’s poetic world is sensational and the perception and understanding of his world is through our senses. The dream in poetry of Bolesław Leśmian is not only a leading motive but also an element of the composition and often acts as the theme of the poem. To represent his metaphysical world, Bolesław Leśmian uses the technique of installation, introduces new words, oxymorons and other artistic techniques characteristic of the epoch of modernism. According to metaphysics, the highest value is earthly existence, and vice versa: the impossibility of being, the inability to become bodily, which feels thinking, is the fundamental source of all suffering. Bolesław Leśmian seems to open the opposite world to us, the unceasing motion of that which does not exist, unmanaged in the side of existence, and realizes the painfulness of the unassembled form of existence, which is as strong as the suffering of the body.
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Shcherbakova, Galina I. "The Image of Peter the Great in the Context of Progress Metaphysics – Russian Conservative Social and Political Journalism Opinion." Almanac “Essays on Conservatism” 3 (July 30, 2022): 109–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.24030/24092517-2022-0-3-109-122.
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The article examines the views of the 19th-century Russian publicists, who professed a conservative ideology, on the image of Peter the Great in the context of the metaphysics of reforms. The role of conservatives in the public space of the 19th century remains poorly explored, as well as the following issues: how, in what form and to what extent the conservatives allowed progress; whether the conservative worldview meant refusal to move forward; what the movement forward implied for the conservatives. The article also explores the question of the historical conditionality of Peter's desire to integrate Russia into Europe, what measures and what changes the people were ready to support, and which they did not accept. The author consistently analyzes the complication of the position of conservative publicists with the development of the political processes in Russia after the liberation of the peasants. The author compares the similarities and differences of the views of such publicists as Karamzin, Uvarov, Meshchersky, Katkov and Dostoevsky, establishes the continuity of positions and explains the existing contradictions. The specific nature of the journalistic image, reflecting reality in a specific way, as well as the ideology of the writers, are taken into account. In addition, individual creative features and abilities of the publicists are taken into account. In conclusion, the author outlines the prospects of further studies, involving the speeches of the writers and religious philosophers in the pre-revolutionary era, when the impossibility of peaceful resolution of political, economic and cultural contradictions in the country became obvious.
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Robertson, John. "Enlightenment and Modernity, Historians and Philosophers." International Journal for History, Culture and Modernity 8, no. 3-4 (November 11, 2020): 278–321. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22130624-20200002.
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Abstract Since the 1990s, historians of the Enlightenment have been notably keen to emphasise their subject’s contribution to modernity. In doing so, they have not shied away from ground usually occupied by philosophers, identifying Enlightenment’s modernity with a system of values and even with specific philosophical positions. This article asks how this has come about, and what have been its consequences. It does so by offering an account of Enlightenment historians’ relations with philosophy since the 1960s, when Franco Venturi repudiated Ernst Cassirer’s philosophical understanding of Enlightenment and urged historians to adopt a different approach. Before 1989, it will be argued, historical study of Enlightenment expanded rapidly but with little reference to philosophers, or interest in demonstrating the modernity of Enlightenment. It was the challenge of Postmodernism (however intellectually chaotic it seemed) in the 1980s, and still more Jürgen Habermas’s vigorous espousal of modernity, which gave historians their cue. Three dimensions of the ensuing association of Enlightenment with modernity are identified: Enlightenment and the public sphere; Radical Enlightenment and one-substance metaphysics; and Enlightenment as cosmopolitan and global. In conclusion, it is argued that while this enthusiasm for modernity appears to be on the wane, the episode has underlined the impossibility of separating historical and philosophical study of Enlightenment.
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Siddiqui, Naseeb Ahmed. "CREATION – FROM PRE-ETERNITY TO PROBABILITY (AL-JADID TAHAFUT AL-FALASIFAH) A CONTRIBUTION TO THE HISTORY OF MUSLIM PHILOSOPHY." Ar-Raniry, International Journal of Islamic Studies 4, no. 1 (June 30, 2017): 117. http://dx.doi.org/10.20859/jar.v4i1.129.
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<p>It is not the physical world consist in itself as to what reality is, but proof of ultimate reality. Reality does not change by changing the process rather attributable quality named from A to B or This to that but essence remains the same. Process in metaphysics has two inseparable parts according to philosophers, cause and effect, which in any case intrinsic to every event coming into being. Denying either one makes impossibility of event. Once cause with all necessary condition fulfilled, cannot delay its effect by necessity, which is the sole premise with philosophers to assume worlds pre-eternity. On the contrary, according to Islamic theologians, it is not necessary and condition for event to have causal connection and it is possible to delay effect in presence of cause also and this is possible in conventional as well as rational and reasoning level. The central issue rose by Imam Al-Gazali (rahmatullahali) in his `Tahafut Al-falasifa concerning the world’s pre-eternity rotate around the cause and effect. He showed the incoherence of arguments posed by philosophers and proposed that it’s possible to delay the effect. Now, after 800 years, creation already unveiled mysteries in the form, which both the parties (Philosophers and theologians) did not know. However, who won the debate over world’s pre-eternity is still open. This paper will try to fill that gap by attempting direct discussion of Tahafut Al-falasifa on the issue of world pre-eternity, considering cause and effect as central debate and will show that what Imam Al-Gazali (rahmatullahali) proposed was correct: The delay in effect with cause is possible. This will be a contribution to the Islamic theology collecting physical facts from science, which anyhow reached to the same level where it meets metaphysics. This will be the latest debate on the issue, and provide new insights on some of core results of scientific theories, which are not considered yet.</p>
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Nagdyan, Ruben M. "Metaphysical unity of transcendental psychology and quantum mechanics. Part 1." Yaroslavl Pedagogical Bulletin 3, no. 120 (2021): 87–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.20323/1813-145x-2021-3-120-87-99.
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Since the beginning of the XXI st century, there has been a process of intense convergence and interpenetration of two seemingly opposing sciences – quantum mechanics and psychology. In accordance with it, the question arises about a common methodological foundation for these sciences. The article shows that the “first philosophy” of Aristotle can serve as a general philosophical methodology for these sciences. In the context of the metaphysical triad necessarypossible-real, the “intersection points” of A. I. Mirakyan’s transcendental psychology and A. Yu. Sevalnikov’s interpretation of quantum mechanics. The article examines the features of the formation of a new direction in modern psychology, which studies the problem of mental phenomena generation. At the same time, a comparison is made with the transcendentalism of Descartes, in which its limitations and incompleteness are revealed. It is shown that both in transcendental psychology and in quantum mechanics (W. Heisenberg) epistemological problems arise associated with the impossibility of using the language of their classical predecessors. In both sciences, it becomes necessary to apply a new language, a new way of thinking and a new logic of understanding the phenomena under study. All this allows us to conclude that both in transcendental psychology and in quantum mechanics, researchers are dealing with a new ontology of reality that differs from the reality studied in classical physics and in the phenomenology of classical psychology. The article substantiates that the main methodological reason limiting the possibilities of carrying out theoretical studies of deeper layers of reality is the use of the product (physical) approach. The product approach is based on the language used to describe the observed reality. It became necessary to divide reality into observable and unobservable. In the language of metaphysics of modalities, this is translated as «being in possibility» and «being in reality.» One of the “intersection points” of quantum mechanics and transcendental psychology is the category ofpossibility, in which the essence of reality is expressed, which both disciplines compared in this article seek to describe and explain
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Heubel, Fabian. "Being Between." Asian Studies 11, no. 1 (January 10, 2023): 15–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.4312/as.2023.11.1.15-25.
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This essay argues that comparative and transcultural philosophy are interdependent, and so opting for only one of the two is an impossibility. The comparative approach persists as long as we distinguish identities and make differences. As long as people do not speak only one language, the need to move between different languages and to translate, and thus the need to relate and compare different possibilities of philosophical articulation, will remain. Any attempt to free oneself from the problem of cultural identity is doomed to failure, as it leads to further entrapment in the very same problem. Comparative philosophy works with more or less fixed identities, transcultural philosophy transforms them and thereby creates new identities. Those two approaches combined constitute what I call intercultural philosophy. In this essay I try to explain the relation between comparative and transcultural philosophy by connecting François Jullien’s “comparative” and Martin Heidegger’s “transcultural” understanding of “Being” (Sein) and “Between” (Zwischen). In part 1 I argue that by turning Between and Being into opposing paradigms of Chinese and Greek thinking, respectively, Jullien causes both to become more or less fixed representatives of different cultural identities within a comparative framework: Greek thinking ossifies into traditional metaphysics, and Chinese thinking ossifies into the non-metaphysical thinking of immanence. Part 2 argues that Heidegger takes a decisively different direction. He explores the Between in Being, and even makes an attempt to think of Being as Between. Heidegger’s invocation of “Greekdom” is undoubtedly Eurocentric. But, ironically, Heidegger’s “Greek thinking” is less Eurocentric than Jullien’s “Chinese thinking”, because he discovers the “Chinese” Between in the midst of “Greek” Being. Part 3 touches upon the task of speaking about European philosophy in Chinese terms. While modern Chinese philosophers frequently speak about Chinese philosophy in European terms, Heidegger’s work points to the possibility of speaking about European philosophy in Chinese terms. Because Jullien and Heidegger both connect Greek and Chinese thought, it seems to me that the discussion of their different approaches is helpful in clarifying perspectives for intercultural philosophy between China and Europe.
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Nazarenko, Ivan I. "Metaphysical self-identification of an emigrant woman in Vasily Yanovsky’s story "The Second Love" and Boris Poplavsky’s novel Apollo Bezobrazov." Vestnik Tomskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta, no. 485 (2022): 44–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.17223/15617793/485/5.
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The aim of the research is to understand the “male” version of a woman in the prose of young emigrants: firstly, the metaphysical intuitions of female characters, and, secondly, the discovery of the metaphysical essence of a woman in the perception of characters and authors. The material of research is Vasilyy Yanovsky’s story “The Second Love” (1933) and Boris Poplavsky’s novel Apollo Bezobrazov (1932), and episodically Poplavsky’s novel Home From Heaven (1935). The main aspects of comparative analysis are the image of an emigrant woman (Yanovsky’s nameless heroine and Poplavsky’s Teresa) and the plot of her personal and metaphysical selfidentification (building a myth about her connection with God and the transcendent). The attitude towards explaining the female consciousness appears in the narration: the main narrators, carriers of the male consciousness, introduce the female “voice” (the heroines’ diaries) that objectifies and mythologizes women. In both works, the picture of the world is built in accordance with the world image of female characters: in the opposition “earth/heaven”, close to the symbolist dual world. The plots of the heroines recreate their personal and metaphysical self-identification – the search for their place in the earthly and metaphysical realities, identification of themselves in relation to God, and not to society – and the author’s test of the salvation of the metaphysical myth both for the women and for the male characters. Based on the classifications of the image of a woman in Russian culture (traditional type, demonic type, woman- heroine), the author has established that the image of an emigrant woman in Yanovsky and Poplavsky is closer to the traditional type. Although the heroines are not allowed to realize themselves in the sphere of the family, to fulfill their biological destiny, they are not the carriers of Eros, but victims of the male world, open to metaphysical spirituality. Allusions to the Mother of God bring together the heroines of Yanovsky and Poplavsky (Teresa’s intercession for other characters, the pregnancy of Yanovsky’s heroine). The author interprets the key event of Yanovsky’s story – the transformation of the heroine on the top of the Notre Dame Cathedral as a result of the appearance of God to her – as a rewriting of real events for the aim of self-justification and self-persuasion. Transformation is associated with the expectation of a child, pregnancy, and the divine meaning she has acquired is a miracle of a new life that has arisen inside her. However, the modern “Mother of God” does not fulfill her mission: the heroine of Yanovsky does not give birth to a new life and does not find her place in the world; she remains an emigrant in an existential sense. Teresa in Poplavsky’s novel is unable to overcome the collapse of the “paradise of friends”, to cement the existence of a small circle of people with spiritual efforts. In the novel Home from Heaven, Poplavsky shows a really established type of a modern woman: “earthly” temptresses Katya and Tanya, who do not become a salvation for the central character, like Teresa in the first novel. Poplavsky finds a tragic gap between corporality and the metaphysics of the feminine, Yanovsky sees in a woman the connection between the physicality and the metaphysical. Both authors agree on the idea of the doom of a woman in modern reality and the impossibility of transforming the world with the Eternal Femininity.
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Guimarães, José Luis De Barros. "DO EGOÍSMO PSICOLÓGICO À COMPAIXÃO METAFÍSICA: CONTRIBUIÇÕES SCHOPENHAUERIANAS PARA O DEBATE METAÉTICO CONTEMPORÂNEO." Cadernos do PET Filosofia 5, no. 9 (September 15, 2014): 8–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.26694/cadpetfil.v5i9.2047.
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No livro IV, de O mundo como vontade e representação, Arthur Schopenhauer afirma que as ações humanas podem acontecer por motivos e quietivos. As ações que levam em consideração uma cadeia de motivações são sempre auto-dirigidas, tendo em mente que os indivíduos agem pra satisfação dos seus quereres particulares. Tais ações são classificadas pelo autor de egoístas por não levarem em consideração o outro, mas os desejos que preenchem a consciência humana no ato de agir. Nesse primeiro momento a leitura schopenhaueriana da “natureza humana” corrobora com o egoísmo psicológico, pois os indivíduos procuram afirmar a sua vontade de vida por entenderem intuitivamente que a impossibilidade de efetivação dessa pulsão vital denominada vontade promove carência, sofrimento. Porém, Schopenhauer reconhece que existem ações, embora raras, desinteressadas. Nesse momento o egoísmo é suprimido e o agente moral é tomado por uma compreensão metafísica do mundo que o faz agir por compaixão. Nossa pretensão é clarificar como se dá essa passagem do egoísmo psicológico à compaixão metafísica, segundo a visão de mundo schopenhaueriana, recolocando o autor no debate metaético contemporâneo.Abstract: In Book IV of The World as Will and Representation, Arthur Schopenhauer asserts that human actions can happen for reasons and quietivos. The actions that take into account a chain of motives are always self-addressed, bearing in mind that individuals act to the satisfaction of his wants private. Such actions are classified by the author as selfish by not taking into consideration the other, but the desires that fill the human consciousness in the act of acting. In that first moment reading Schopenhauer's "human nature" corroborates psychological egoism, since individuals seek to assert their will to live because they understand intuitively that the impossibility of effecting this vital instinct called deficiency promotes ease suffering. But Schopenhauer recognizes that there are actions, although rare, disinterested. At that moment the selfishness and deleted and moral agent is taken by a metaphysical understanding of the world that makes him act out of compassion. Our intention is to clarify how is this passage from psychological egoism to compassion metaphysics, according to Schopenhauer's worldview, placing the author in contemporary meta-ethical debate. Keywords: Will. Representation. Selfishness. Compassion.
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Nagdyan, Ruben M. "Metaphysical unity of transcendental psychology and quantum mechanics. Article 2." Yaroslavl Pedagogical Bulletin 4, no. 121 (2021): 64–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.20323/1813-145x-2021-4-121-64-75.
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This article is a continuation of the previous one, published in this journal under the same title. The article continues the theoretical consideration of signs of the unity of transcendental psychology (TP) and quantum mechanics (QM) in the vision of Aristotle's metaphysics. In the context of the metaphysical triad necessary-possible-real, the «intersection points» of A. I. Mirakyan’s transcendental psychology and the interpretation of quantum mechanics by A. Yu. Sevalnikov. It is shown that in the both transcendental psychology and quantum mechanics epistemological problems are associated with the impossibility of using the language of their classical predecessors. In both sciences, it becomes necessary to use a new language, a new way of thinking and a new logic of understanding the phenomena under study. All this allows us to conclude that both in transcendental psychology and in quantum mechanics, researchers are dealing with a new ontology of reality that differs from that studied in classical physics and in the phenomenology of classical psychology. It became necessary to divide reality into observable and unobservable. This allows us to say that we are talking about polyontic (or modal) philosophy – different modalities or modes of being, within the framework of which it is necessary to consider the relationship between the necessary, the possible and the real things. Both sciences are the sciences of becoming. If QM is the science of the formation of the observed world, then TP is the science of the generation of phenomena of psychical reality. This is one of the reasons for the unity of their methodological foundations. There is a fairly close similarity in the understanding of the concept of «coexisting opportunities» (or «potential opportunities»). In TP, it coincides with the concept of the coexistence of functionally equal opportunities for reflecting various concomitant properties of objects, and in QM – with the principle of superposition of states of elementary particles. The relative nature of the formation of the phenomenon in the reality of the real follows it. In TP, this is expressed in the realization of one of the coexisting possibilities of reflecting any of the presented properties of the object, and in QM this is expressed as a result of the reduction of the wave function to one of the possible states of a quantum object. The relativity of the formation of a specific phenomenon, determined by the existence of «coexisting possibilities», is realized according to the principle of relativity to the means of observation.
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Vacek, Martin. "Impossibilia." Principia: an international journal of epistemology 20, no. 1 (September 22, 2016): 81. http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2016v20n1p81.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2016v20n1p81The paper defends the so-called extended modal realism, a theory according to which there are concrete impossible worlds. Firstly, modal realism is presented. Next, the way of how its ontology enriched by impossible worlds should look like in order to save its main theoretical virtues is pursued. Finally, I argue for a claim that metaphysical impossibility equals to dissimilarity between worlds instantiating distinct metaphysical structures.
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Sudakov, Andrey K. "Affection of Law: Fichte on the Place and Boundaries of Pure Ethics of the Imperative." Kantian journal 38, no. 3 (2019): 56–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.5922/0207-6918-2019-3-3.
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In his popular 1806 lectures on religion Fichte considered five possible worldviews in the second of which, “the standpoint of legality”, one can readily recognise the ethics of law of the Stoical and Kantian type. Fichte stresses that in his youth he himself shared this worldview. However, he hastens to adduce a series of original arguments to show that this position is essentially incapable of delivering a pure and higher moral doctrine. I examine the substance of these critical arguments in the context of his later metaphysics. Fichte maintains that in the “second type” of worldview man himself feels and understands, respects and loves himself only as a subject of unconditional law, therefore the pathos and “affection of law” pervades all his assessments and motivations. This affects the impartiality of moral assessment if the requirements of the law are diverged from. The “man of law”, the Stoic and Kantian who is not conscious of direct violations of the law, can at most not despise himself, but he cannot, according to Fichte, positively respect himself: that would require surpassing the requirement of the law through action. Meanwhile the affection of the self-sufficient law conceals even this impossibility from such a person. Finally, I show that the ethics of the Stoical and Kantian type retains, according to Fichte’s diagnosis, a refined interest in preserving and indulging the sensual self and hence the idea of God as the warrantor of empirical happiness / bliss. Accordingly, the “overturn in the state of mind” sought by the Kantian himself implies “the highest act of freedom”, which is inaccessible to him and beyond which the perspective of the world as law is replaced for the subject by the perspective of the Kingdom of the Spirit in which the “selfhood” of each moral agent is practically overcome.
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Efthimiou, Christoforos. "The Concept of Political Difference in Oliver Marchart and its Relationship with the Heideggerian Concept of Ontological Difference." Conatus 4, no. 1 (October 31, 2019): 61. http://dx.doi.org/10.12681/cjp.18863.
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The concept of political difference concerns the distinction between politics and the political. The political refers to the ontological making possible of the different domains of society, including the domain of politics in the narrow sense. Political difference was introduced as a reaction to the theoretical controversy between foundationalism and anti-foundationalism. This reaction took the form of post-foundationalism. According to Marchart, post-foundationalism does not entirely deny the possibility of grounding. It denies only the possibility of an ultimate transcendent foundation insofar as this ontological impossibility makes possible the historical and contingent grounds in plural.The Heideggerian concept of ontological difference also undermines the possibility of an ultimate ontical ground which establishes the presence of all the other beings. If one wants to think beyond the concept of ground, one should obtain a clear understanding of Being as Being, namely one should grasp the Being in its difference from beings. All the same, Heidegger tends to replace the ontical grounds of metaphysics with Being itself as a new kind of ultimate ontological foundation.On the other hand, one can detect in many points of Heideggerian argumentation traces of a second alternative understanding of ontological difference which does not belong in Heidegger’s intentions and which undermines the primordiality of Being. This alternative understanding establishes a reciprocity between Being and beings. In our view, political difference not only is based in this second way of understanding but, at the same time, develops more decisively the mutual interdependence between Being and beings.In political difference the grounding part, namely the political, possesses both a grounding character and a derivative one. Politics and political both grounds and dislocate each other in an incessant and oscillating, historical procedure which undermines any form of completion of the social.
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Hicks, Michael Townsen. "Counterparts and Counterpossibles: Impossibility without Impossible Worlds." Journal of Philosophy 119, no. 10 (2022): 542–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jphil20221191035.
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Standard accounts of counterfactuals with metaphysically impossible antecedents take them to by trivially true. But recent work shows that nontrivial countermetaphysicals are frequently appealed to in scientific modeling and are indispensable for a number of metaphysical projects. I focus on three recent discussions of counterpossible counterfactuals, which apply counterpossibles in both scientific and metaphysical modeling. I show that a sufficiently developed modal counterpart theory can provide a semantics for a wide range of counterpossibles without any inconsistent possibilities or other forms of impossible worlds. But such a view faces problems: in order for the metaphysical views I discuss to bear weight, there must be a significant difference between the metaphysical possibilities and impossibilities. I will show how the counterpart-theoretic view delineates the possible from impossible, while still making room for the impossible.
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Semyonov, Valeriy E. "How is the practical deduction possible?" SHS Web of Conferences 161 (2023): 01004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/shsconf/202316101004.
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In the Critique of Pure Reason, Immanuel Kant asserts the impossibility of the principles of practical reason, as “the objective reality of the moral law cannot be proved by any deduction” (KpV, АА 05: 47). This is the case if deduction is understood as the procedure Kant follows in the “Transcendental Analytic” of the first Critique. Yet, Kant himself points out that “deduction […] is the justification (Rechtfertigung) of its objective and universal validity” (KpV, AA 5:46). This justification of the principles of practical reason can be found in Kant’s works and has a certain structure. Firstly, in the Critique of Pure Reason, he justifies the existence of an intelligible world where the determining ground of causality is freedom. In the intelligible domain, the principles of pure reason possess objective reality. Thus, in the first Critique, Kant justifies the existence of (i) an intelligible world, (ii) freedom as the ground of causality and (iii) the ought as a reason for practical action. Secondly, in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant demonstrates that freedom carries one to an intelligible world where the good will resides. The good will rests upon freedom and brings forth human autonomy. And it is the good will from which the categorical imperative and morality in general emanate. Thirdly, it is explicated in the second Critique that freedom is the keystone (Schlußstein) of practical reason. Here, the moral law (= “a fact of reason”) is instrumental in deducing transcendental freedom itself. This means that the reality of transcendental freedom manifests itself through the moral law. The moral law exists and is effective; therefore, there is transcendental freedom behind it. Thus, the structure of transcendental deduction of practical reason consists of the successive justification of (i) the intelligible world, (ii) freedom, (iii) the good will, (iv) duty (categorical imperative), (v) the moral law as a “fact of reason”. Consequently, the practical deduction is possible only through a synthetic union between the Copernican Revolution,transcendental idealism and criticism.
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Nescolarde-Selva, J., J. L. Usó-Doménech, and M. J. Sabán. "Linguistic Knowledge of Reality: A Metaphysical Impossibility?" Foundations of Science 20, no. 1 (February 22, 2014): 27–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10699-014-9347-1.
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Hanna, Robert. "Essentially Embodied Kantian Selves and The Fantasy of Transhuman Selves." Studies in Transcendental Philosophy 3, no. 3 (2022): 0. http://dx.doi.org/10.18254/s271326680021060-6.
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By “essentially embodied Kantian selves,” I mean necessarily and completely embodied rational conscious, self-conscious, sensible (i.e., sense-perceiving, imagining, and emoting), volitional or willing, discursive (i.e., conceptualizing, judging, and inferring) animals, or persons, innately possessing dignity, and fully capable not only of free agency, but also of a priori knowledge of analytic and synthetic a priori truths alike, with egocentric centering in manifestly real orientable space and time. The basic theory of essentially embodied Kantian selves was spelled out by Kant over the course of slightly less than two decades, between 1768 and 1787, but above all, it flows from an empirical realist and metaphysical reading of the “Refutation of Idealism” that Kant inserted into the Postulates of Empirical Thought section in the 1787 edition of the first Critique. In my opinion, all rational but also “human, all-too-human” creatures like us are, synthetic a priori necessarily, essentially embodied Kantian selves. Let’s call that the essentially embodied Kantian selves thesis, or for short, EEKST. If EEKST is true, then it’s synthetic a priori impossible for the selves of creatures like us to exist independently of our own living organismic animal bodies or beyond the deaths of those bodies, whether temporarily or permanently, by any means whatsoever. Indeed, the very ideas of disembodied selves, their survival after death, and of human immortality, while minimally logically consistent, are in fact conceptually empty and incoherent, even over and above the synthetic a priori impossibility of such things, since the term “myself” indexically picks out an essentially embodied Kantian self, all of whose core features require grounding in a particular living organismic animal body. According to the recent and contemporary movement of transhumanism, the selves of creatures like us can not only exist independently of our bodies, as functional systems of representational content that are inherently able to be implemented or realized in digital-mechanical technology and uploadable to servers, but also to survive accidental or natural human death in server-limbo, then be downloaded into technologically enhanced partially mechanical humanoid bodies or even into wholly artificially-created completely mechanical non-humanoid bodies, survive in these new implementations or realizations for an indefinitely long time, repeat that process, and possibly even become immortal. Transhumanism is in fact metaphysically equivalent to Swedenborgianism, which Kant so effectively criticizes and wittily derides in his 1766 book, Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Elucidated by Dreams of Metaphysics. Moreover, and more importantly, if EEKST is true, then, just like Swedenborgianism, transhumanism is not only conceptually empty and incoherent, but also synthetic a priori impossible. And what’s more, it’s also existentially and morally reprehensible. In short, then, the belief in transhuman selves is nothing but a reprehensible noumenal fantasy or Hirngespinst.
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Tonkov, Dmitrii E. "METHOD OF "SOCIAL WELFARE" OF VILHELM LUNDSTEDT." Proceedings of the Institute of State and Law of the RAS 15, no. 1 (April 30, 2020): 125–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.35427/2073-4522-2020-15-1-tonkov.
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Critical attitude of Axel Hägerström was enthusiastically carried by his follower Vilhelm Lundstedt, who, according to Scandinavian legal realism, sought to make jurisprudence a science based on verifiable facts. He sharply criticized any inclusion of metaphysics into law, especially considerations of justice. In V. Lundstedt’s opinion, law is an intricate machinery which is kept going by means of psychological impulses of man, his senses, instincts and emotions and which is controlled by legislation, administration of law, courts, administrative activities on the part of persons elected or appointed to fulfill certain functions in society and the application of some other measures of coercion. Traditional legal theories, including positivism and sociological jurisprudence, V. Lundstedt considered to be unscientific and completely irrational, based on ideological conceptions unrelated to verifiable facts. According to him, concepts of traditional jurisprudence do not correspond to the real world and exist only as feelings in our mind: these "false ideas" can only be used as "labels" denoting certain realities. However, V. Lundtstedt’s concept consisted not only of criticism but also offered constructive elements for improving jurisprudence and legal method in a more natural-scientific sense. Instead of the rejected ideologized "method of justice", that uses only different concepts of objectively non-existent justice, V. Lundstedt offers his "method of social welfare", that is understood as the encouragement in the best possible way of that which people in general actually strive to attain. According to this method the reason for the existence and operation of law is the satisfaction of social needs: law creates new and changes old legal relations for a social purpose, that is, for the benefit of society, or "social welfare". Despite V. Lundstedt’s rather extensive presentation and passionate defense of constructed method, it caused reasonable criticism regarding its originality, sufficient elaboration and coherence. Analysis of the content of the method of "social welfare" and its criticism in relation to utilitarianism, the falsity of the highlighted human strivings, insufficiency of the method in some judicial cases, as well as the impossibility of solving simultaneously theoretical and practical problems, raises doubts about the success of V. Lundstedt’s desirable "basic reshaping of legal thinking", but inspires for further researches in the field of law.
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Trebaul, Dewi. "Redefining the Status of Philosophical Statements." Epistemology & Philosophy of Science 61, no. 1 (2024): 94–105. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eps20246119.
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In his foreword to the Philosophical papers by Hans Hahn, Karl Menger mentions a controversy about the possibility or impossibility to speak about language within the Vienna Circle in the early 1930’s. He then adds: “Waismann proclaimed that one could not speak about language. Hahn took strong exception to this view. Why should one not – if perhaps in a higher-level language – speak about language? To which Waismann replied essentially that this would not fit into the texture of Wittgenstein’s latest ideas.”1 Thanks to the publication of the protocols of the Vienna Circle by Friedrich Stadler in his book The Vienna Circle – Studies in the origins, development and influence of logical empiricism, we have access to some discussions within the circle in the years 1930 and 1931, that allow us a partial reconstruction of the controversy. In these minutes we attend a very lively discussion on the topic of ‘talking about language’. We would like to make more explicit the tenets of this controversy, starting from the discussions within the circle. We will then focus on the evolution of the positions of different members of the Circle, that reflect different attitudes towards this problem, that are expounded in articles published until 1936. Although its members strived to stay the closest, they could to the landmarks laid down by the Tractatus logico-philosophicus, some of its members broke with them in many respects. The need to admit the possibility of talking theoretically about language became more pressing as the works of Tarski and Godel began to exert an influence on the researches of its members. Two options emerged: talking about a language in another language (Hahn) or in the same language (Carnap). Hahn’s positions, despite their originality, stand close to those of Carnap, who presents in 1931 his meta-logical project. Disagreements with Waismann occured frequently. Neurath remained skeptical about such a development that could, according to him, lead back to metaphysical considerations. The protocols by Rosa Rand give us precious insights on the premises of this debate, symptomatic of the diversity of the positions and of the fruitfulness of the exchanges within the Vienna Circle at that time. However, this debate takes place in a broader setting, namely the discussion of the status of philosophical statements once the rejection of metaphysics is accomplished. The answers provided reflect strong dissenting currents within the circle. For Neurath, to conceive of philosophy as providing elucidations is mistaken. Science shall take the form of an encyclopedia, that contains heterogeneous discourses – exact formulated sentences, as well as piece of ordinary language – and is taken in a dynamic process. No discourse outside science can be accepted. For Schlick and Waismann, there is still room for philosophy as providing elucidations about language. For Carnap, the aim is to attain a logically suitable language for science; discussions in a natural language have only a provisional role, in order to attain an adequate language, in which the logic of science can be formulated.
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Onwuatuegwu, Ignatius Nnaemeka. "THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF LIVING AN ISOLATED EXISTENCE: METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS." Journal of Advanced Sociology 2, no. 1 (April 2, 2020): 1–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.47941/jas.388.
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Man has since his evolution grown one stage of his socio-economic and socio-political existence to another. Through the ages of man’s development, one thing has remained sacrosanct; that is man’s interaction with one another. The existence of man has shown that in the nature of man, man has unlimited wants or insatiable needs, howbeit, his limited resources cannot proffer all that man may want or need at any given time, place and circumstances. The fact that man has limited resources which are unequally distributed by nature, invention and innovation, it follows that what one man has but does not need it, another man lacks, and needs it. This became the inception of trade, exchange and eventual confirmation of the impossibility of living an isolated existence. From the foregoing; it is ideal to assert that ‘no man is an island’, which implies that no man can exist on his own, providing all he may need and want and still survives in the average expectation of survival. The statement that ‘no man can exist on his own’ should rather be read as “it is impossible for a man to exist on his own”. This is to say, although one may live an isolated existence, it is impossible for one to live in an isolated existence and even in situations where it happens, it is accompanied with serious metaphysical implications. Therefore, this paper tends to make a discourse on the impossibility of living an isolated existence, with peculiar attention on the metaphysical implications of such.
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Seager, William. "Concessionary Dualism and Physicalism." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 67 (July 7, 2010): 217–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246110000147.
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AbstractModern physicalists frequently offer the generous concession that although dualism is false, it is not a metaphysical impossibility. And it appears that the proper formulation of physicalism allows for this concessionary position. It would be expected that dualists also could accept that while physicalism is false, it too is a metaphysical possibility. I will argue that a careful analysis of physicalism and dualism shows that in fact these concessionary positions cannot be maintained. In particular, the nature of the metaphysical determination relation which holds between matter and mind on both physicalist and dualist views precludes either from allowing that the other is a metaphysical possibility.
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Hübner, Johannes. "‚Ein Fundament für tautologische Modalitäten? Zur vermögensbasierten Theorie der Möglichkeit von Barbara Vetter." Philosophisches Jahrbuch 129, no. 2 (2022): 307–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.5771/0031-8183-2022-2-307.
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The paper discusses Barbara Vetter’s strategy of grounding metaphysical modalities in the capacities or potentialities of individual things. The first concern is the direction of explanation in tautological and contradictory potentialities. It is argued that the possible and necessary truth of tautologies grounds the possession of tautological potentialities, not vice versa; and that the impossibility of contradictions explains why nothing has contradictory potentialities, not vice versa. It is also argued that Vetter cannot adhere to providing constraints on the existence of uninstantiated properties. Keywords: metaphysical modality, dispositional account of modality, grounding, tautological potentiality, uninstantiated properties
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Dubakov, Leonid V. "Buddhist aspects of the image of Baron Ungern von Sternberg in the story Horsemen of the Sands by Leonid Yuzefovich." Vestnik Tomskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta, no. 483 (2022): 16–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.17223/15617793/483/2.
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The article explores the Buddhist components of the image of Baron Roman Ungern von Sternberg in the works of Leonid Yuzefovich. The analysis is carried out within the framework of the concept of the “Buddhist text” in modern Russian literature. The author of the article discovers and comprehends Buddhist ideas and motifs present in the story Horsemen of the Sands and the documentary novel The Autocrat of the Desert. Indirectly, the article also uses the essay “The Six-Armed God and His ‘Sons’ ” from Yuzefovich’s The Most Famous Impostors. The story and the novel were reprinted several times, and each time the writer made significant edits to them, which fixed significant changes in the image of the main character and reflected the writer’s deepening knowledge about Buddhism. The image of Baron Ungern in the story and in the novel is a complex and synthetic image, it combines the signs of a positive hero and of an infernal being, each of which is rooted in Buddhist metaphysics. The image of the baron as a character in Yuzefovich’s fiction correlates with the image of the real Roman Ungern von Sternberg. The real Baron Ungern looks no less exotic than his literary reflection. He is a participant in the White Movement, a religiously motivated warrior for the Buddhist faith, who comes into conflict with the West. He realizes himself inspired by Buddhist hierarchies and exists in the space of the approaching apocalypse. At the same time, in connection with the image of Baron Ungern in the story Horsemen of the Sands, the writer turns to the problems rooted in Buddhist philosophy, in particular, he raises questions of the illusory nature of being, karma and nonviolence. The image of horsemen of the sands fixed in the title of the story is a metaphor of time absorbing people and events, of the illusory space, of the unreliable human ontology, and of the unseemly vanity. Another idea of the story is the impossibility of avoiding the consequences of what has been done both at the level of the history of nations and of the fate of an individual due to karma, that is, the Buddhist law of created causes and matured consequences. The writer interprets both the appearance of Ungern in Mongolia and his passing away as a manifestation of bad karma. Finally, another important idea of the story is the idea of the essential discrepancy between the ethics of Buddhism and the idea of its violent, military propagation. The convergence of Buddhism and war in Horsemen of the Sands looks wrong and inappropriate, and leads people who have embarked on such a road to collapse at the level of their own destiny and to a historical defeat.
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Mousavian, Seyed N. "AVICENNA ON THE IMPOSSIBILIA THE LETTER ON THE SOUL REVISITED." Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 33, no. 2 (August 9, 2023): 163–213. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0957423923000024.
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AbstractThe Letter on the Soul is interesting and significant; it attempts to tackle fundamental problems that fall on the borderlines of psychology, epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and logic. The consensus among Avicenna scholars is that The Letter is Avicenna’s. In this paper, I will argue against this consensus. I will examine the philosophical and logical content of The Letter, as well as Avicenna’s view on the impossible forms in his authentic works, and construct a content-based argument against the authenticity of The Letter. This study, I hope, sheds some light on Avicenna’s view on the impossibilia, what they are, and how they can be apprehended.
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Booth, Anthony R. "Doxastic voluntarism and self-deception." Disputatio 2, no. 22 (May 1, 2007): 115–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/disp-2007-0003.
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Abstract Direct Doxastic Voluntarism — the notion that we have direct (un-mediated) voluntary control over our beliefs — has widely been held to be false. There are, however, two ways to interpret the impossibility of our having doxastic control: as either a conceptual/ logical/metaphysical impossibility or as a psychological impossibility. In this paper I analyse the arguments for (Williams 1973; Scott-Kakures 1993; Adler 2002) and against (Bennett 1990; Radcliffe 1997) both types of claim and, in particular, evaluate the bearing that putative cases of self-deception have on the arguments in defence of voluntarism about belief. For it would seem that if it is the case that self-induced cases of self-deception are indeed possible, then voluntarism about belief could be true after all. Bennett claims that Williams’ argument for the impossibility case proves too much in that if it is successful in ruling out direct doxastic voluntarism, it is also successful in ruling out cases of indirect doxastic voluntarism. If cases of self-deception can also be cases of indirect doxastic voluntarism, then such cases support the argument against the impossibility case. I argue that Bennett is right in claiming that Williams’ argument proves too much, that cases of self-deception are indeed also sometimes cases of indirect self-deception and so that they cause genuine trouble for the conceptual impossibility case. However, I also argue that this is the only genuine worry for Williams’ argument. I end, while considering whether cases of self-deception can tell us anything about the psychological possibility of direct doxastic control, by suggesting a way of establishing the conceptual impossibility of direct doxastic control that circumvents Bennett’s counter-argument.
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Müller, Wolfgang Erich. "Zur Problematik des Verantwortungsbegriffes bei Hans Jonas." Zeitschrift für Evangelische Ethik 33, no. 1 (February 1, 1989): 204–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.14315/zee-1989-0130.
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Abstract In his restitution of metaphysical founded ethics Hans Jonas replied to the challenges of modern technology. His reperception of the immanent teleology of nature tries to prevent the technological overkill. This article shows in opposition to Jonas the impossibility to deduct a moral obligation (>>Prinzip Verantwortung«) from the teleology of nature. Moreover in theological thoughts it is illegitime to talk obout a good nature in which men ought to incorporate themselves.
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Mele, Vincenzo. "In Search of a Unity or Persistence of Tragedy? On Simmel’s City Writings." Simmel Studies 27, no. 1 (December 21, 2023): 105–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1108384ar.
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<p>This article is devoted to an analysis of Simmel’s “metaphysical longing” (metaphysische Sehnsucht) and its consequences for his cultural and sociological analysis of the city and, consequently, modernity. Simmel’s “metaphysical longing” expresses itself equally in the sought-after relationship between part and whole, surface and depth, reality and idea. It intends to explore especially how this approach is developed in Simmel’s so-called minor essays, including the essays on historic Italian cities that are often referred to as those most characteristic of this metaphysical longing for unity. However, to understand the essence and characteristics of this approach, it is necessary to explore other minor, preparatory essays, coeval with and following the Philosophy of Money, which attest to Simmel’s path toward the construction of what he himself had defined as “sociological aesthetics,” that is, a space of analysis intermediate between philosophy and empirical sociological science. At the end of this path, we will see some stages of Simmel’s conceptual journey from nostalgia as Sehnsucht toward acceptance of the tragedy of culture, that is, the impossibility for man to find the lost unity of nature and spirit, form and life.</p>
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Jarvis, Edward. "“Men” and “Women” in Everyday English." Journal of Controversial Ideas 2, no. 1 (April 29, 2022): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.35995/jci02010005.
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What kind of distinction are the words “men” and “women” used to mark in everyday English—one of biological sex, social role, or something else, such as gender identity? Consensus on this question would clarify and thereby improve public discussions about the relative interests of transgender and cisgender people, where the same sentence can seem to some to state an obvious truth but to others a logical or metaphysical impossibility (“Transwomen are women” and “Some men have cervixes” are topical examples). It is with this in view that I report here the results of five recent surveys.
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Nosthoff, Anna-Verena. "Beckett, Adorno, and the hope for nothingness as something: Meditations on theology in the age of its impossibility." Critical Research on Religion 6, no. 1 (April 2018): 35–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2050303218757320.
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This article discusses the theological implications of Adorno’s writings on Beckett by specifically examining their constellative motifs of death, reconciliation, and redemption. It addresses not only their content but also their form, suggesting a mutually stimulating relationship between the two as based both on a negative-dialectical approach and an inverse-theological trajectory. Focusing on Adorno’s discussion of Beckett’s oeuvre as a “metaphysical entity,” the author argues that Adorno’s reading of Beckett is peculiar because it is inextricably tied to his own critical–theological venture. The article claims that Adorno’s reflections on Beckett contain, at their most basic level, meditations on theology in the age of its impossibility.
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Hanke, Miroslav. "Hurtado de Mendoza on the “Moral” Modality." Studia Neoaristotelica 18, no. 1 (2021): 69–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/studneoar20211813.
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One of the prominent debates of post-Tridentine scholasticism addressed probability, often expressed by the term “moral” (or adverbially, “morally”), originally motivated by the epistemology of decision-making and the debates on predestination and “middle knowledge”. Puente (or Pedro) Hurtado de Mendoza (1578–1641), an Iberian Jesuit and the author of one of the earliest Jesuit philosophy courses, entered this debate in the early-seventeenth century. This paper presents his 1610s and 1620s analyses of different forms or degrees of evidence, certainty, and necessity or impossibility, addressing the commonly-used trichotomy of the “metaphysical”, “physical”, and “moral”, in which “moral” is the weakest form of a modality, together with the paradigmatic examples and interesting applications of the framework.
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Martínez, Sergio. "La objetividad del azar en un mundo determinista." Crítica (México D. F. En línea) 22, no. 65 (December 13, 1990): 3–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.1990.741.
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This paper deals with the notion of objective randomness in classical deterministic theories. After the introduction, section 2 establishes an important distinction between a strictly metaphysical thesis of determinism (as characterized in the Montague-Earman definition, for example), and the doctrine of determinism, which can be roughly characterized as a methodological set of principles. The doctrine of determinism is associated with the idea that probability assignments can only reflect our ignorance of facts, and it also grounds the (ontological) thesis of separability: A system or process can be characterized completely in terms of the properties that a system has when in a given state, independently of the properties of other systems, The key notions of "completeness" and "independence" are only briefly discussed, as they are examined more in depth elsewhere.
Section three examines attempts to characterize a notion of objective randomness in ergodic theory. The characterization can be seen to be equivalent to the formulation of a notion of a "physically impossible process". One way of expressing this idea is grounded on the thesis of the "coarse graining" of our measuring instruments. This leads to the problem of distinguishing "objective" from "apparent" randomness. The problem seems to be intrinsic to any attempt of characterizing the required notion of physical impossibility (and thus of objective randomness) in terms of an ideal observer. The alternative of trying to characterize physical impossibility in terms of a theory of algorithms suffers from the difficulty that it is not clear what would be the required notion of (non-epistemic) computability.
The "coarse graining" approach, as well as the alternative in terms of a theory of algorithms seem to share the usual confusion between a strictly metaphysical thesis of determinism and the (methodological) doctrine of determinism. In section four an alternative approach is suggested. It is noticed that a denial of the thesis of separability is compatible with a strict deterministic theory, and thus that at least some classical systems (the "statistical" ones) can be described in terms of non-separable states. We do not have to think that the impossibility of preparing a classical state is too only possible explanation for physical (objective) randomness in deterministic theories. This proposal is an elaboration of an idea of Blatt (1959), although Blatt was still trying to understand objective randomness within an ideal-observer framework.[S.M.]
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Pecere, Paolo. "Reconsidering the ignorabimus: du Bois-Reymond and the hard problem of consciousness." Science in Context 33, no. 1 (March 2020): 1–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0269889720000095.
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ArgumentIn this paper I present an interpretation of du Bois-Reymond’s thesis on the impossibility of a scientific explanation of consciousness and of its present importance. I reconsider du Bois-Reymond’s speech “On the limits of natural science” (1872) in the context of nineteenth-century German philosophy and neurophysiology, pointing out connections and analogies with contemporary arguments on the “hard problem of consciousness.” Du Bois-Reymond’s position turns out to be grounded on an epistemological argument and characterized by a metaphysical skepticism, motivated by the unfruitful speculative tendency of contemporary German philosophy and natural science. In the final sections, I show how contemporary research can benefit from a reconsideration of this position and its context of emergence, which is a good vantage point to trace open problems in consciousness studies back to their historical development.
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Smets, Alexis, and Christoph Lüthy. "Words, Lines, Diagrams, Images: Towards a History of Scientific Imagery." Early Science and Medicine 14, no. 1-3 (2009): 398–439. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/157338209x425632.
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AbstractThis essay examines the problems encountered in contemporary attempts to establish a typology of medieval and early modern scientific images, and to associate apparent types with certain standard meanings. Five particular issues are addressed here: (i) the unclear boundary between words and images; (ii) the problem of morphologically similar images possessing incompatible meanings; (iii) the converse problem of comparable objects or processes being expressed by extremely dissimilar visual means; (iv) the impossibility of matching modern with historical iconographical terminologies; and (v) the fact that the meaning of a given image can only be grasped in the context of the epistemological, metaphysical and social assumptions within which it is embedded. The essay ends by concluding that no scientific image can ever be understood apart from its philosophical preconditions, and that these preconditions are often explained during disputes between the protagonists of different iconographical types.
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Martin, Christopher J. "The Theory of Natural Consequence." Vivarium 56, no. 3-4 (October 15, 2018): 340–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685349-12341357.
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Abstract The history of thinking about consequences in the Middle Ages divides into three periods. During the first of these, from the eleventh to the middle of the twelfth century, and the second, from then until the beginning of the fourteenth century, the notion of natural consequence played a crucial role in logic, metaphysics, and theology. The first part of this paper traces the development of the theory of natural consequence in Abaelard’s work as the conditional of a connexive logic with an equivalent connexive disjunction and the crisis precipitated by the discovery of inconsistency in this system. The second part considers the accounts of natural consequence given in the thirteenth century as a special case of the standard modal definition of consequence, one for which the principle ex impossibili quidlibet does not hold, in logics in which disjunction is understood extensionally.
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Lomako, Leonid, Konstantin Maltsev, and Anna Maltseva. "Disciplinary discourses of globalization in the horizon of lack of meaning: “challenge” and the search for an “response”." SHS Web of Conferences 128 (2021): 01037. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/shsconf/202112801037.
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The overlapping disciplinary discourses of globalization are built in the perspective of the absence of its concept; the concept presupposes the disclosure of meaning, that is, a philosophical interpretation. The representation of the globalization of the form of modernity actualizes its philosophical understanding and sets the perspective for defining its concept; concepts of the “third era of liberation” I.G. Fichte, “the era of nihilism” F. Nietzsche and M. Heidegger’s “closing period of modern times” are presented as the horizon of the philosophical interpretation of globalization as planetarism, the essential (conceptual) features of which are “destruction of space” as the removal of boundaries and “compression of time” to total modernity, provided by technology as the arche of modernity. In a metaphysical concept, there is a combination of the real and the actual, which for the new time is essentially subjective; the new European subject and the idea of technology are one essence and there is a beginning from which modernity unfolds and is interpreted, which remains for modernity itself both “unnecessary” and “impossible” (M. Heidegger). The article demonstrates the impossibility of the concept of globalization for the dominant view of modernity in the economic paradigm (J. Agamben) and the essential non-reality of Heidegger’s concept of planetarism for modern disciplinarily arranged science. It is concluded that the real challenge is the impossibility of comprehension with the absolute exclusion of the possibility of a response.
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Bakeeva, Elena V., and Ekaterina V. Biricheva. "“I” and collective responsibility." Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Philosophy and Conflict Studies 37, no. 1 (2021): 41–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.21638/spbu17.2021.104.
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The article discusses the link of collective moral responsibility with “I” as an act of the realization of subjectness. The authors provide and verify the thesis about the primacy of “I” to any forms and cases of collective responsibility. The notion of “I” is reexamined taking into account the critique of the subject undertaken in the so-called “post-metaphysical” (J.Habermas) philosophy. The key point of this critique is the rejection of the understanding of “I” and of the subject as unchanging metaphysical entities. In this situation, it is of paramount importance to distinguish the dynamic core of “I”, which is free from any metaphysical connotation. In addressing this issue, the authors build on the concept of “I” as a responsible act (deed) as presented in works of Mikhail Bakhtin. According to this concept, “I” does not precede the act but is born in the actual responsible act in the face of an Other. This action turns out to be devoid of content here and is interpreted as an act of accepting responsibility in the face of the Absolute instance. Such an interpretation of “I” makes it possible to retain the possibility of a responsible act within the growing anonymity of a contemporary social being and to substantiate manifestations of collective responsibility in collective actions. The final part of the article lists the basic features that characterize the link of “I” as an act and collective responsibility. Of these features, the main one is associated with the impossibility of “external” vesting of responsibility to anyone due to his/her belonging to a certain community. Collective responsibility may be recognized only in the “inner” dimension of a personal act. Hence follows a fundamental asymmetry that characterizes the phenomenon of responsibility in general and collective responsibility in particular.
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ABIZADEH, ARASH. "Does Collective Identity Presuppose an Other? On the Alleged Incoherence of Global Solidarity." American Political Science Review 99, no. 1 (February 2005): 45–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055405051488.
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Two arguments apparently support the thesis that collective identity presupposes an Other: the recognition argument, according to which seeing myself as a self requires recognition by an other whom I also recognize as a self (Hegel); and the dialogic argument, according to which my sense of self can only develop dialogically (Taylor). But applying these arguments to collective identity involves a compositional fallacy. Two modern ideologies mask the particularist thesis's falsehood. The ideology of indivisible state sovereignty makes sovereignty as such appear particularistic by fusing “internal” with “external” sovereignty; nationalism imagines national identity as particularistic by linking it to sovereignty. But the concatenation of internal sovereignty, external sovereignty, and nation is contingent. Schmitt's thesis that “the political” presupposes an other conflates internal and external sovereignty, while Mouffe's neo-Schmittianism conflates difference (Derrida) with alterity. A shared global identity may face many obstacles, but metaphysical impossibility and conceptual confusion are not among them.