Journal articles: 'Ignoranza'

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Lepschy, Giulio. "Conoscenza e ignoranza dell'italiano." Italianist 12, no. 1 (June 1992): 184–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1179/ita.1992.12.1.184.

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Nascimbene, Maurizio. "‘Semplicità’ e ‘ignoranza’ nell’opera di Philippe Jaccottet." Studi Francesi, no. 150 (L | III) (December 31, 2006): 534–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.4000/studifrancesi.27063.

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Ferri, Giampietro. "Il problema della copertura delle sedi giudiziarie disagiate dopo la legge n. 24 del 2010." QUESTIONE GIUSTIZIA, no. 4 (October 2010): 36–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.3280/qg2010-004004.

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Leon, Paolo. "Le istituzioni economiche del capitalismo." QA Rivista dell'Associazione Rossi-Doria, no. 4 (January 2013): 7–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.3280/qu2012-004001.

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Le istituzioni economiche del capitalismo Dopo il crollo del 2008, le principali dottrine economiche - modelli di equilibrio, ciclo reale, modelli di squilibrio - non stanno in piedi. Il problema č in parte nel velo di ignoranza di Smith: gli individui, non sapendolo, fanno l'interesse della societŕ, e perciň ignorano gli effetti macro delle loro decisioni. Non possono apprezzare il moltiplicatore degli investimenti, quello di Leontief o quello dei depositi, non capiscono il senso del termine valore aggiunto, non possono anticipare né il progresso tecnico né la legge di Engel. Un buon modo per capire da dove ripartire č quello di paragonare le istituzioni economiche dopo la Grande Depressione con le politiche di Thatcher e Reagan: la deregolazione, la moneta endogena, lo shadow banking. Semplificando, mentre prima gli impieghi determinavano i depositi e le banche erano un servizio pubblico, dopo sono i depositi che determinano gli impieghi perché le banche sono imprese come tutte le altre: e i depositi creano solo debito, leverage, e le basi del crollo.

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Meglio, Lucio, and Francesco M. Battisti. "Ignoranza della legge ed educazione alla legalitŕ in una societŕ complessa." SOCIOLOGIA DEL DIRITTO, no. 2 (December 2009): 181–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.3280/sd2009-002013.

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- The aim of this article is to detect the opinions that people hold about the law, using the finely-tuned tools available from public opinion surveys. The problem of familiarity with the law, i.e. of laws that not only target the legal experts, but can also be under- stood by everyone, is becoming increasingly pressing in today's multicultural society, which features a far greater social heterogeneity than in a well-ordered, homogeneous society, such as might have been the case of Italy in the sixties. Combating ignorance of the law and facilitating a gradual but constant education for legality is the only way to guarantee that conflicts will be reduced and the rights of all members of society safeguarded.

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Fuller, G. "Ignorant of ignorance?" Practical Neurology 11, no. 6 (November 18, 2011): 365. http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/practneurol-2011-000117.

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SEA, C. "Computer ignorance or ignorant computers?" Annals of Emergency Medicine 15, no. 10 (October 1986): 1238–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0196-0644(86)80877-0.

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Genova, Angela. "I disabili sono "i nostri ragazzi": lo sguardo sociologico sulla violenza epistemica." WELFARE E ERGONOMIA, no. 1 (September 2021): 26–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.3280/we2021-001004.

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La disabilità delinea uno spazio semantico dai confini labili, privo di definizione univoca e universale. Nell'essere socialmente costruita rimanda alle tre dimensioni del potere proposte da Arendt: privato, politico e sociale. Questo lavoro si focalizza sulla dimensione privata del-la costruzione della disabilità all'interno delle interazioni tra care giver/familiari ed educato-ri. L'analisi riguarda un progetto nazionale per la promozione di percorsi di autonomia di cinquantadue persone con disabilità all'interno di tredici organizzazioni, in dodici regioni italiane. La discourse analyis è applicata ai dati raccolti in un focus group realizzato tra i rappresentanti delle organizzazioni coinvolte nei processi di autonomia. Lo studio mette in luce la presenza di una violenza epistemica da parte sia dei familiari/care giver che degli educatori nei confronti delle persone disabile caratterizzata da processi di infantilizzazione. Il tema della costruzione a livello privato della disabilità necessita però di essere messo in rela-zione con la dimensione del contesto istituzionale delle politiche di welfare familistico. Pone infine l'attenzione sul diritto delle persone disabili a superare il silenzio al quale la violenza epistemica li relega, generata da una ignoranza perniciosa che ne definisce la subalternità.

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Klowait, Nils. "Reflexive anthropomorphism: Ontological ignorance, or ignorant ontology?" Sociological Journal 24, no. 1 (2018): 8–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.19181/socjour.2018.24.1.5711.

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10

Liu, Wenjin. "Ignorance in Plato’s Protagoras." Phronesis 67, no. 3 (August 10, 2022): 309–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685284-bja10058.

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Abstract Ignorance is commonly assumed to be a lack of knowledge in Plato’s Socratic dialogues. I challenge that assumption. In the Protagoras, ignorance is conceived to be a substantive, structural psychic flaw—the soul’s domination by inferior elements that are by nature fit to be ruled. Ignorant people are characterized by both false beliefs about evaluative matters in specific situations and an enduring deception about their own psychic conditions. On my interpretation, akrasia, moral vices, and epistemic vices are products or forms of ignorance, and a person who lacks knowledge is not necessarily ignorant.

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Grosz, Daniel. "THE IRRATIONALITY OF PLURALISTIC IGNORANCE." Episteme 17, no. 2 (October 23, 2018): 195–208. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2018.35.

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ABSTRACTPluralistic ignorance is a social-psychological phenomenon in which an agent believes that their attitudes, feelings, and beliefs are different from those of others, despite the fact that their public behavior is identical. I argue that agents in standard cases of pluralistic ignorance are epistemically irrational. I accomplish this, first, by rebutting a recent argument for the rationality of pluralistic ignorance. Next, I offer a defeat-based argument against the epistemic rationality of pluralistic ignorance. Third, I examine a type of case in which the pluralistically ignorant agent's belief is irrational, despite the fact that this belief lacks a defeater. Finally, I consider instances of pluralistically ignorant agents whose beliefs are not irrational, but explain why such cases are not problematic for my main thesis. This critical discussion allows me to offer an important amendment to an extant account of pluralistic ignorance.

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Guerrero, Alexander A. "UNEXCUSED REASONABLE MISTAKES: CAN THE CASE FOR NOT EXCUSING MISTAKES OF LAW BE SUPPORTED BY THE CASE FOR NOT EXCUSING MISTAKES OF MORALITY?" Legal Theory 21, no. 2 (June 2015): 86–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s135232521600001x.

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ABSTRACTIn most common-law and civil-law jurisdictions, mistakes of law do not excuse. That is, the fact that one was ignorant of the content or requirements of some law does not excuse violations of that law. Many have argued that this doctrine is mistaken. In particular, many have argued that if an individual's ignorance or false belief is blameless, if she held the false belief reasonably, then she ought to be able to use that ignorance as an excuse for violating the law. It is much harder to find defenders of the doctrine, despite its prevalence. Pragmatic considerations are occasionally offered on its behalf, but these are generally not impressive. In this paper, I consider a more direct kind of justification for the doctrine, one that attempts to identify something more immediately normatively objectionable about being ignorant of the law. In particular, I consider an argument that suggests that legal ignorance is more like moral ignorance than like nonmoral ignorance and maintains that even nonculpable moral ignorance does not excuse.

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Vaz, André, and André Mata. "Failing to ignore the ignorant: Mistaking ignorance for error." Judgment and Decision Making 17, no. 5 (September 2022): 937–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s193029750000927x.

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AbstractExpertise is a reliable cue for accuracy – experts are often correct in their judgments and opinions. However, the opposite is not necessarily the case – ignorant judges are not guaranteed to err. Specifically, in a question with a dichotomous response option, an ignorant responder has a 50% chance of being correct. In five studies, we show that people fail to understand this, and that they overgeneralize a sound heuristic (expertise signals accuracy) to cases where it does not apply (lack of expertise does not imply error). These studies show that people 1) tend to think that the responses of an ignorant person to dichotomous-response questions are more likely to be incorrect than correct, and 2) they tend to respond the opposite of what the ignorant person responded. This research also shows that this bias is at least partially intuitive in nature, as it manifests more clearly in quick gut responses than in slow careful responses. Still, it is not completely corrected upon careful deliberation. Implications are discussed for rationality and epistemic vigilance.

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14

Medvecky, Fabien. "Public Understanding of Ignorance as Critical Science Literacy." Sustainability 14, no. 10 (May 13, 2022): 5920. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su14105920.

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We are largely ignorant. At least, there are many more things we are ignorant of than knowledgeable of. Yet, the common perception of ignorance as a negative trait has left it rather unloved in debates around making knowledge public, including science communication in its various guises. However, ignorance is a complex and essential part of science; it performs a number of legitimate roles, and is performed in a range of legitimate ways within science. In this paper, I argue that it is vital to understand when ignorance is an appropriate, legitimate part of the scientific process, and when ignorance is misused or abused in science. I argue that understanding ignorance is a central aspect of public understanding of science, especially in terms critical science literacy. Critical science literacy argues that more than simply an understanding of scientific facts and processes, a key component of what scientific literacy should aim for is an understanding of the tacit knowledge of science. I present a typology of ignorance and argue that fostering a greater public understanding of ignorance is a rarely acknowledged, yet essential, aspect of making science public, and that it is a challenge that those engaged in and committed to better public understanding of science should take very seriously.

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Klimova, Svetlana. "Semyon Frank about Leo Tolstoy: "The Knowing Ignorance" (Docta Ignorantia)." Вопросы философии, no. 11 (2018): 152–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.31857/s004287440001901-6.

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16

Pritchard, Duncan. "Ignorance and Normativity." Philosophical Topics 49, no. 2 (2021): 225–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtopics202149223.

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In the contemporary epistemological literature, ignorance is normally understood as the absence of an epistemic standing, usually either knowledge or true belief. It is argued here that this way of thinking about ignorance misses a crucial ingredient, which is the normative aspect of ignorance. In particular, to be ignorant is not merely to lack the target epistemic standing, but also entails that this is an epistemic standing that one ought to have. I explore the motivations for this claim, and show how it can help us make sense of a range of cases concerning ignorance that the conventional, non-normative, accounts of ignorance struggle with. I also use this normative conception of ignorance to help elucidate the specific kind of epistemic standing the lack of which is entailed by ignorance.

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Khan, Manal M., Yasmee Khan, and Rohit Kumar Namdev. "Huge low-grade chondrosarcoma arising from rib cage: a case report." International Surgery Journal 4, no. 10 (September 27, 2017): 3567. http://dx.doi.org/10.18203/2349-2902.isj20174542.

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We report a case of 35 years old male who presented with a huge, gradually progressing swelling of right side of chest and abdomen for 5 years. Dimensions of swelling were 40cmx30cm. Radiological findings suggested characteristic appearance of a chondrosarcoma which was arising from right lower ribs. Lesion has involved whole liver, gall bladder, right half of colon and right kidney. On histopathology, we found low grade chondrosarcoma. Though low-grade chondrosarcoma is a potentially curable neoplasm in its early stages, the present patient reported very late. As famous dictum said “the ignorant are ignorant of their ignorance “, this is a classic example of patient's ignorance which converted a curable disease into incurable.

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18

Meylan, Anne. "Ignorance and Its Disvalue." Grazer Philosophische Studien 97, no. 3 (August 20, 2020): 433–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18756735-000106.

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Abstract It is commonly accepted – not only in the philosophical literature but also in daily life – that ignorance is a failure of some sort. As a result, a desideratum of any ontological account of ignorance is that it must be able to explain why there is something wrong with being ignorant of a true proposition. This article shows two things. First, two influential accounts of ignorance – the Knowledge Account and the True Belief Account – do not satisfy this requirement. They fail to provide a satisfying normative account of the badness of ignorance. Second, this article suggests an alternative explanation of what makes ignorance a bad cognitive state. In a nutshell, ignorance is bad because it is the manifestation of a vice, namely, of what Cassam calls “epistemic insouciance”.

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Aron, Jacob. "‘We need to realise that we are ignorant about our ignorance’." New Scientist 243, no. 3246 (September 2019): 46–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0262-4079(19)31683-5.

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Perner, Josef, and Susan R. Leekam. "Belief and quantity: three-year olds' adaptation to listener's knowledge." Journal of Child Language 13, no. 2 (June 1986): 305–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000900008072.

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ABSTRACTTwo groups of 3-year-old children (3:0–3;6 and 3;6–4;0) observed two actions of a toy. In one condition an older partner was absent while the subject watched both of the toy actions (fully ignorant partner), whereas in the other condition the partner witnessed one of the two actions together with the subject (partially ignorant partner). When asked about the toy's actions by their partially ignorant partner both age groups adjusted their answers to their partner's ignorance and mentioned only that action which was new to their partner. However, in their answers to their fully ignorant partner the younger children tended to provide insufficient information by mentioning only one instead of both actions.

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Marder, Lev. "Adam Smith: So what if the sovereign shares in ignorance?" Journal of International Political Theory 14, no. 1 (May 12, 2017): 20–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1755088217705893.

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Unfortunately, Adam Smith’s undeserved legacy as a proponent of laissez-faire and liberal institutions at the international scope inhibits profiting from his refined analysis of international affairs. I argue that the Wealth of Nations’ chapter on colonies contains Smith’s discussion of the sovereign’s adaptation to ignorance in global politics. I examine the sense in which the sovereign is ignorant according to Smith and how sovereigns adapt to ignorance with varying success. His comparative analysis suggests that reduction of one’s share in ignorance is not always desirable, and a priori rejection of ignorance is impractical because it deprives of a potentially advantageous resource. A careful reading of his work enables learning from his approach to global politics, without filtering it through his ideas on the free market.

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Samoy, Ilse, Evelyne Terryn, Frederik Peeraer, Françoise Auvray, and Pauline Verbiest. "Legal Ignorance in Belgian Private Law." European Review of Private Law 29, Issue 2 (April 1, 2021): 161–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/erpl2021011.

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Legal ignorance typically refers to a situation where one is ignorant of the existence of a certain legal prescript or is ignorant of the precise understanding of a prescript or its consequences. In Belgian law, there is no general provision dealing with legal ignorance or its effects. In principle, one cannot escape the application of law based on the mere fact that one does not know the law or its consequences. However, in specific situations Belgian law and case law deviate from this basic principle, provided that strict conditions are fulfilled. The authors of this article report on the application of the concept of legal ignorance in the areas of contract law, tort law and prescription. As for contract law, the article examines whether a mistake as to the law may qualify as an excusable error leading to the nullification of a contract. Although the Cour de Cassation applies a very strict interpretation and states that mere legal ignorance cannot be an excusable error, some lower courts seem to apply a more lenient interpretation. In tort law, the starting point remains that mere legal ignorance is not excusable. To escape liability despite the infringement of a specific rule, one will have to overcome the difficult task of proving that the mistake was ‘unavoidable’. Lastly, the general provision for prescription periods does not deal explicitly with the issue of legal ignorance. In principle it is not necessary that the person subject to prescription is aware of the fact that the prescription started to run. In specific situations, some statues and case law deviate from this principle.

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Laera, Rodrigo. "Derecho a equivocarse: excusas e inocencia epistémica." Argumentos - Revista de Filosofia, no. 24 (August 3, 2020): 133–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.36517/argumentos.24.9.

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Si un sujeto S atribuye conocimiento ignorando evidencias disponibles, entonces S no será culpable de tal atribución y, por lo tanto, no será epistémicamente irresponsable, cuando: (a) no es consciente de su propia ignorancia y (b) quienes lo juzgan, explícita o implícitamente, se ponen en el lugar de él y reconocen que no serían conscientes de su ignorancia. En este escrito se defenderá la aplicación de semejante principio, no sólo en lo que respecta a las atribuciones de conocimiento en contextos ordinarios, sino también en lo que respecta a los contextos más exigentes.

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Gabriëls, René. "The expertocratic shortcut." Philosophy & Social Criticism 47, no. 1 (January 2021): 35–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0191453720983938.

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Lafont rightly criticizes the expertocratic shortcut, i.e. the expectation that citizens blindly defer to experts. This shortcut is based on the assumptions that citizens are generally politically ignorant. I will argue that it is necessary to address not only the political ignorance of citizens, but also that of politicians, scientific experts and entrepreneurs. Just like politicians, scientific experts often show political ignorance towards citizens. This is the case if they do not consider the perspective of citizens in politically charged research. Unlike Lafont, I believe that if citizens are expected to blindly defer to politicians, there is no expertocratic shortcut, but a form of authoritarianism that fosters populism. Lafont overlooks an expertocratic shortcut: scientific experts who expect politicians to blindly defer to them, i.e. to accept the agenda they set. It is noteworthy that neither Lafont nor her opponents defending an expertocratic shortcut explicitly discuss the tension between capitalism and democracy. They should do so in order to explain which citizens are ignorant and bypassed, and which are not. The socio-economic inequalities inherent in capitalism correspond to the degree of political interest and participation of citizens. Entrepreneurs are often not only politically ignorant towards citizens, but also towards politicians and scientific experts. Their political ignorance is due to the fact that they are most often in a dominant position where politicians, scientific experts and citizens depend on them. This can be traced back to what I call the neoliberal shortcut: the expectation that actors blindly defer to the markets.

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Hœpffner, Bernard. "«Until you understand a writer’s ignorance, presume yourself ignorant of his understanding»." Cahiers Charles V 44, no. 1 (2008): 115–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.3406/cchav.2008.1517.

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Alexandropoulou, Stavroula, Jakub Dotlačil, and Rick Nouwen. "At least ignorance inferences come at a processing cost: Support from eye movements." Semantics and Linguistic Theory 26 (October 25, 2016): 795. http://dx.doi.org/10.3765/salt.v26i0.3944.

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We present results of an eye-tracking reading study that directly probes ignorance effects of the superlative numeral modifier at least in embedding and unembedding environments. We find that interpreting a numeral (phrase) modified by at least in a context with an ignorant speaker is costlier than in a context with a knowledgeable speaker, regardless of whether at least is in an embedding environment or not. In line with online studies testing scalar implicatures using a similar paradigm, this finding is taken to suggest that the observed processing cost is due to the derivation of ignorance interpretations via a pragmatic mechanism. Our results, given the paradigm we employ, further enable us to adjudicate not only between semantic and pragmatic accounts of ignorance, but also among various pragmatic proposals, favouring neo-Gricean accounts that derive ignorance as a quantity implicature (Büring 2008; Cummins & Katsos 2010; Schwarz 2013; Kennedy 2015). We find no evidence indicating that ignorance with at least in interaction with a universal modal involves an extra operation, like covert movement.

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Häusler, Adrian. "D. 50,9,6 (Scaev. 1 dig): Auslegung eines statthalterisch veranlassten Stadtgesetzes?" Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte: Romanistische Abteilung 137, no. 1 (August 21, 2020): 244–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/zrgr-2020-0009.

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AbstractD. 50,9,6 (Scaev. 1 dig): Interpretation of a Municipal Statute Induced by a Governor? The responsum D. 50,9,6 (Scaev. 1 dig) of Q. Cervidius Scaevola contains a municipal law in Greek, punishing anyone requiring justice by avoiding the ordinary legal proceedings before the synhedrion. The inquirer asks if he committed a punishable offence since he acted in ignorance against a decretum. Scaevola replies that only offenders acting intentionally will undergo punishment. Although repudiating his suspicions of interpolations, this paper supports the hypothesis of Staffhorst, who considers the statute not emanating from a municipium, but from a Greek Polis. Furthermore, the analysis confirms that the decretum contains an interdiction to take action within another court than the synhedrion. The ignorantia concerns neither the statute, nor the decision, but the unlawfulness of the behaviour itself (adversus decretum facere) and is a conventional criterion of the Roman jurists in order to exclude bad faith or fault. Finally, the statute could be regarded as a rule originating from the authority of a Roman governor concerning provincial procedural law and its promulgation might have been induced by the governor himself in order to reduce the number of provincial inquiries towards Roman officials.Inhalt: I. Einleitung; II. Zur Datierung der Responsen Scaevolas; III. Interpolationsvermutungen; IV. Zu ignorans adversus decretum facere und zur Auslegung der Strafnorm; V. Ergebnisse

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Parkes, Carole, and John Blewitt. "“Ignorance was bliss, now I'm not ignorant and that is far more difficult”." Journal of Global Responsibility 2, no. 2 (September 27, 2011): 206–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/20412561111166058.

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Gabella, María Clara. "Ignorancia deliberada, ignorancia no imputable y principio de legalidad." Discusiones 25, no. 2 (February 19, 2021): 261–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.52292/j.dsc.2020.2389.

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El texto es una reconstrucción del debate generado en el número XIII de la Revista Discusiones, en torno a la ignorancia deliberada o willful ignorance en derecho penal. En particular, se analizan las opiniones de las/ os autoras/es acerca de la posibilidad de aplicar la teoría -de origen anglosajón- en sistemas jurídicos de tradición continental europeo y los reparos que efectúan ante la ausencia de disposiciones legales expresas que establezcan el modo en el que las conductas de quienes actúan con ignorancia deliberada o culpable debieran ser castigadas. Tales inquietudes, vinculadas al principio de legalidad, constituirán el punto a partir del cual se propone analizar aquellos casos a la luz de una disposición del Código Penal argentino. La misma regula los supuestos que excluyen de pena a un sujeto si, al momento del hecho, no hubiera podido comprender la criminalidad de su conducta por “ignorancia de hecho no imputable”

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Sarch, Alexander. "EQUAL CULPABILITY AND THE SCOPE OF THE WILLFUL IGNORANCE DOCTRINE." Legal Theory 22, no. 3-4 (December 2016): 276–311. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1352325217000088.

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ABSTRACTCourts commonly allow willful ignorance to satisfy the knowledge element of a crime. The traditional rationale for this doctrine is that willfully ignorant misconduct is just as culpable as knowing misconduct. But it is not obvious that this “equal culpability thesis” holds across the board. Is it true in all cases of willful ignorance or only some? This is the question I investigate here.Specifically, I argue against several common versions of the equal culpability thesis before defending my own restricted version. First, I argue that the broadest version of the thesis, adopted by many courts, is overinclusive. Then I argue against several restricted versions of the thesis offered by legal theorists including Doug Husak, David Luban, and Deborah Hellman. My own account, by contrast, is premised on a duty of reasonable investigation. If my account is on the right track, the widely employed willful ignorance doctrine stands in need of reform.

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Borrelli, Lisa Marie. "Using Ignorance as (Un)Conscious Bureaucratic Strategy." Qualitative Studies 5, no. 2 (December 4, 2018): 95–109. http://dx.doi.org/10.7146/qs.v5i2.104421.

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Street-level bureaucrats working in the field of migration enforcement have the uneasy task of finding irregularised migrants and processing their cases – often until deportation. As the encounters are unforeseeable and characterised by tension and emotions, bureaucrats develop practices and strategies, which help them to manage the often very personal encounters. Besides the frequently debated strategies summarised under the term ‘copying mechanisms’ and the problem of ‘dirty’ or many hands, ignorance as a tactic in the daily work of bureaucrats has not been studied to a sufficient extent. This work looks at how ignorance, including deliberate not-knowing or blinding out, as well as undeliberate partial-knowing or being kept ignorant, is used in public administration, through multi-sited, ethnographic fieldwork in migration offices and border police/guard offices of three Schengen Member States: Sweden, Switzerland and Latvia. It distinguishes between structural and individual ignorance, which both have the ability to limit migrant’s agency. Further, by analysing their intertwined relation, this article furthers our understanding of how uncertainty and a lack of accountability become results of everyday bureaucratic encounters. Ignorance thus obscures state practices, subjecting migrants with precarious legal status to structural violence.

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Deutscher, Penelope. "When Feminism Is “High” and Ignorance Is “Low”: Harriet Taylor Mill on the Progress of the Species." Hypatia 21, no. 3 (2006): 136–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2006.tb01117.x.

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This essay considers the important role attributed to education in the writings of nineteenth-century feminist Harriet Taylor Mill. Taylor Mill connected ignorance to inequality between the sexes. She called up the specter of regression into lowness and ignorance when she associated feminism with progress. As she stressed the importance of education, she constructed an‘other’ to feminism, variously associated with lowness, poverty, and the primitive. She made a case for the advantages of civilization (education, enfranchisement, equality) to be opened up to women. Yet Taylor Mill's position that the ignorant poor, like all humans, should be in a position of so-called “perfect equality” drifted intermittently into the view that the elevation of women to perfect equality would refine and elevate the lower classes.

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Tzeng, Jeng-Yi. "Developing and Implementing the “Unknowing-Oriented Teaching Model” in teacher training programs ‐ the concept of ignorance-based instruction." Impact 2022, no. 5 (October 13, 2022): 9–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.21820/23987073.2022.5.9.

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Learning is a key fundamental of life. Professor Jeng-Yi Tzeng, Institute of Learning Sciences and Technologies, National Tsing Hua University, Taiwan, has been investigating the differences between knowledge-based and ignorance-based pedagogy. He believes it is important to recognise the importance of seeking non-knowledge (learning to be ignorant) alongside the pursuit of knowledge (learning to know). Most institutions follow a knowledge-based learning approach that prizes knowledge over non-knowledge but Tzeng believes different learning techniques could help students and teachers alike. He believes the learning journey should include a focus on ignorance, with exploration of the gaps that received knowledge doesn’t cover. Tzeng has studied different paradigms used in pedagogy such as the paradigm of ignorance, which poses ignorance as the focus for meaning and organises learning and the popular paradigm of epistemology, which builds on introducing new knowledge by building on existing knowledge. He has been developing and implementing the “unknowing-oriented teaching model” in the teacher training programmes run at the Centre for Teacher Education with heavy involvement from students, including encouraging students to ask good quality questions to be used in discussion in class. The response from students so far has been profoundly positive and the model has enabled them to develop more critical thinking skills. Having focused on the teaching side of things, Tzeng is now exploring ignorance-based learning.

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Jiang, Asher. "Hume on the Meaning of ‘Power’." Journal of Scottish Philosophy 13, no. 3 (September 2015): 229–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2015.0106.

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Hume frequently states that we are ignorant of genuine power. There is a well-known internal difficulty concerning this claim concerning ignorance. According to Hume, we do not have an impression-based idea of genuine power; on the other hand, every noun needs a corresponding idea to be meaningful. Is his claim concerning ignorance, which makes use of the noun ‘power’, meaningless in light of his own criterion of meaningfulness? I focus on two exegetical approaches to this difficulty proposed in the literature of the ‘New Hume Debate’: 1) we may read Hume's own positive definitions of power (not using any idea of genuine power) back into his claim of ignorance to ensure the meaningfulness of ‘power’; and 2) ‘power’ may correspond to a relative idea of genuine power and derive its meaning from this relative idea. I argue against both of these solutions and offer my own solution that is quite close to the text. However, adopting my proposal demands a price: a considerable part of Hume's argumentative undertaking does not meet his own standard of philosophical precision.

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Córdova Abundis, Patricia. "Construcción de la identidad femenina en programas de belleza radiofónicos." Comunicación y Sociedad, no. 7 (September 18, 2015): 77–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.32870/cys.v0i7.3842.

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Se analiza el concepto de identidad y cómo se construye una identidad femenina en programas radiofónicos de corte frívolo. Lejos de constituir una diversión intrascendente, los programas radiofónicos frívolos contienen una serie de estrategias sociosemióticas que se difunden como constitutivas del grupo femenino. Las estrategias sociosemióticas identificadas son: la actuación, la diversión y la ignorancia. Las hablantes utilizan el discurso directo para “actuar”, las bromas para ser “divertidas” y construcciones discursivas propias de alguien lo suficientemente “ignorante” para parecer lo suficientemente femenina.

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JOHNSON, Katherine. "Uncertainty and Ignorance." International Journal of Theology, Philosophy and Science 2, no. 3 (November 2018): 5–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.26520/ijtps.2018.2.3.5-12.

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Breeur, Roland. "Se persuader de ne penser à rien." KÜLÖNBSÉG 21, no. 1 (March 12, 2022): 111–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.14232/kulonbseg.2021.21.1.300.

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I would like to suggest how Descartes seems to combine two kinds of "idiocy" in his work: In the first, he urges us to strip ourselves of our accumulated knowledge from early childhood, in order to enter again "ignorant into this world". In short, we must cultivate a form of idiocy before we can stimulate our cognitive power. And yet, in his letters to Elizabeth, he advises those who are too persistent in pursuing serious meditations (for example on the relationship between soul and body) to refrain from doing philosophy: instead, like an ignorant, one should "give all one's time to the relaxation of the senses and the rest of the mind" (FA III, 45). What is the relation between these two forms of "ignorance"; this is the content of my article.

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Evans, Woody. "Singularity Terrorism: Military Meta-Strategy in Response to Terror and Technology." Journal of Ethics and Emerging Technologies 23, no. 1 (August 1, 2013): 14–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.55613/jeet.v23i1.2.

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This paper examines the responses to advanced and transformative technologies in military literature, attenuates the conclusions of earlier work suggesting that there is an “ignorance of transhumanism” in the military, and updates the current layout of transhuman concerns in military thought. The military is not ignorant of transhuman issues and implications, though there was evidence for this in the past; militaries and non-state actors (including terrorists) increasingly use disruptive technologies with what we may call transhuman provenance.

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Parageau, Sandrine. "« Colomb ignorant trouva le nouveau monde » : ignorance, découverte fortuite et expérimentation à la première modernité." Revue d'histoire des sciences Tome 74, no. 1 (June 8, 2021): 41–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/rhs.741.0041.

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Lee, Sung-Kyu, and Sanghack Lee. "합리적 무지 대 합리적 유지 : 합리적 무지론의 관점." Review of Institution and Economics 13, no. 1 (February 28, 2019): 107–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.30885/rie.2019.13.1.107.

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Fine, Kit. "Ignorance of ignorance." Synthese 195, no. 9 (April 28, 2017): 4031–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1406-z.

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Pritchard, Duncan. "Omniscience and ignorance." Veritas (Porto Alegre) 66, no. 1 (November 3, 2021): e41050. http://dx.doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2021.1.41050.

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God’s omniscience generates certain puzzles, not least regarding how such omniscience is compatible with human free will. One option in this regard is to impose limitations on the scope of God’s knowledge, but that then poses the further question of how such limitations can be compatible with God’s nature as a perfect being. I offer a novel way of approaching these questions, which appeals to what I claim is an independently motivated distinction between lacking knowledge and being ignorant. In particular, it is contended that God’s omniscience is best understood not as a complete knowledge of all truths, but rather as a kind of deliberate non-knowing (such that the non-knowing does not indicate any cognitive lack on God’s part) that excludes ignorance. God might not know all truths, but that’s not because of any cognitive lack, and there is certainly no truth about which he is ignorant.

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Coletti, Cristian F., Karina B. E. de Oliveira, and Pablo M. Rodriguez. "A stochastic two-stage innovation diffusion model on a lattice." Journal of Applied Probability 53, no. 4 (December 2016): 1019–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/jpr.2016.61.

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Abstract We propose a stochastic model describing a process of awareness, evaluation, and decision making by agents on the d-dimensional integer lattice. Each agent may be in any of the three states belonging to the set {0, 1, 2. In this model 0 stands for ignorants, 1 for aware, and 2 for adopters. Aware and adopters inform its nearest ignorant neighbors about a new product innovation at rate λ. At rate α an agent in aware state becomes an adopter due to the influence of adopters' neighbors. Finally, aware and adopters forget the information about the new product, thus becoming ignorant, at rate 1. Our purpose is to analyze the influence of the parameters on the qualitative behavior of the process. We obtain sufficient conditions under which the innovation diffusion (and adoption) either becomes extinct or propagates through the population with positive probability.

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Adler, Sabine. "Ukraine-Ignoranz." osteuropa 72, no. 6-8 (2022): 159. http://dx.doi.org/10.35998/oe-2022-0150.

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Lynch, Barbara. "What Hirschman’s Hiding Hand Hid in San Lorenzo and Chixoy." Water 11, no. 3 (February 26, 2019): 415. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/w11030415.

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Implementation of big water projects requires that their funders, contractors, and government officials will move projects forward ignorant of their potential social and environmental costs. Economist Albert O. Hirschman raised the issue of ignorance in a widely-read analysis of the factors driving the project process in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and southern Europe. This ignorance, which Hirschman referred to as ‘the hiding hand,’ led to creativity in the case of the San Lorenzo irrigation system in northern Peru, but had lethal consequences in the case of Guatemala’s Chixoy dam project. While Hirschman saw what he called ‘the hiding hand’ as accidental, examination of documents related to large hydraulic infrastructure projects in Peru and Guatemala suggests that in the late twentieth century it was systematically produced by resistance on the part of international financial institutions to addressing the broader political context for project development, or to adequately addressing potential social and environmental impacts early in the project process.

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Charpentier, Caroline J., Ethan S. Bromberg-Martin, and Tali Sharot. "Valuation of knowledge and ignorance in mesolimbic reward circuitry." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 115, no. 31 (June 28, 2018): E7255—E7264. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1800547115.

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The pursuit of knowledge is a basic feature of human nature. However, in domains ranging from health to finance people sometimes choose to remain ignorant. Here, we show that valence is central to the process by which the human brain evaluates the opportunity to gain information, explaining why knowledge may not always be preferred. We reveal that the mesolimbic reward circuitry selectively treats the opportunity to gain knowledge about future favorable outcomes, but not unfavorable outcomes, as if it has positive utility. This neural coding predicts participants’ tendency to choose knowledge about future desirable outcomes more often than undesirable ones, and to choose ignorance about future undesirable outcomes more often than desirable ones. Strikingly, participants are willing to pay both for knowledge and ignorance as a function of the expected valence of knowledge. The orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), however, responds to the opportunity to receive knowledge over ignorance regardless of the valence of the information. Connectivity between the OFC and mesolimbic circuitry could contribute to a general preference for knowledge that is also modulated by valence. Our findings characterize the importance of valence in information seeking and its underlying neural computation. This mechanism could lead to suboptimal behavior, such as when people reject medical screenings or monitor investments more during bull than bear markets.

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Woś, Tomasz. "Trybunalskie i sądowe stosowanie zasady „ignorantia iuris nocet” na gruncie praktyki orzeczniczej w Polsce." Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna 7, no. 1 (September 10, 2018): 181–205. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/fped.2018.7.1.8.

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The article discusses the issue of the Constitutional Court’s and other courts’ application of the principle of ignorantia iuris nocet in the practice of issuing rulings. Based on the analysis of the case law, it presents the Constitutional Court’s standpoint concerning the role of the principle of ignorantia iuris nocet in the Polish system of law and its application in the Constitutional Court’s case law. At the same time, it discusses other courts’ application of this principle, i.e. its influence on the decision-making processes of the application of law by the Supreme Court, courts of appeal and administrative courts. The analysis of the case law show that the principle of ignorantia iuris nocet plays a special role in the Polish system of law. In their decisions, both the Constitutional Court and other courts concerned emphasise that the Polish system of law, like other contemporary systems of law, is based on this principle, and its violence would lead to unpredictable results in the practice of issuing rulings. There are no major differences between the application of the principle of ignorantia iuris nocet by the Constitutional Court and other courts concerned. In cases involving the ignorance of the law, both the Constitutional Court and other courts commonly recognise and apply, within the scope of their competence, the principle of ignorantia iuris nocet. Administrative law takes a particular stance on the application of this principle. In the Supreme Administrative Court’s judicature, a jurisdictional approach has been adopted that recognises that the operation of this principle is reduced in administrative procedure. In turn, the study of the case law of provincial administrative courts shows that these courts still have not adopted a uniform jurisdictional pattern in this respect.

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Rodríguez de las Heras Ballell, Teresa. "The Rule of Legal Ignorance in Spanish Law: Relevance, Meaning, and Scope." European Review of Private Law 29, Issue 2 (April 1, 2021): 363–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/erpl2021018.

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The rule ignorantia juris non excusat constitutes a historical principle in Spanish law as a key pillar of the collective organization of the legal system. The rule embodies the assumption that the effectiveness of the laws cannot rely on subjective elements, such as knowledge or ignorance, interest or carelessness, but it is based on an objective and social component of the legal system aimed to ensure that the enforcement of the laws is general and unconditional. Today, it is still inspiring the legal system and expressly enshrined in Article 6.1 CC, but their meaning must be duly contextualized in the current exuberance of legislation and regulations. Last decades, continuous efforts have been made to enhance the publicity of laws, improve comprehensibility, and implement technological solutions aimed to ensure accessibility of legislation, case law, and public authorities’ decisions. This article traces the origin and the evolution of the principle in Spanish law and the current expressions and applications of legal ignorance in private law. The analysis of the state of the doctrinal debate and the latest case law invites two reflections. First, the excessive use of legal ignorance as an invalidating mistake as a tool to alleviate contractual unfairness, inadequate institutional practices, or commercial abuse blurs its contours, debilitates the principle of contract preservation, deteriorates legal certainty, and discourages transactions. Second, the regulation of increasing information duties as a strategy to attenuate the impact of legal ignorance is making preand contractual processes complex, overinformed, and formalistic, with the risk of inviting purely formal compliance.

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Matheson, David. "A DUTY OF IGNORANCE." Episteme 10, no. 2 (May 24, 2013): 193–205. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2013.16.

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AbstractConjoined with the claim that there is a moral right to privacy, each of the major contemporary accounts of privacy implies a duty of ignorance for those against whom the right is held. In this paper I consider and respond to a compelling argument that challenges these accounts (or the claim about a right to privacy) in the light of this implication. A crucial premise of the argument is that we cannot ever be morally obligated to become ignorant of information we currently know. The plausibility of this premise, I suggest, derives from the thought that there are no epistemically ‘non-drastic’ ways in which we can cause ourselves to become ignorant of what we already know. Drawing on some recent work in the epistemology and psychology of self-deception and forgetting, I seek to undermine this thought, and thus provide a defense against the challenging argument, by arguing that there are indeed such ways.

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Shapira, Reuven. "Prevalent concealed ignorance of low-moral careerist managers." Management Decision 53, no. 7 (August 17, 2015): 1504–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/md-10-2014-0620.

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Purpose – Organizational research missed managerial ignorance concealment (MIC) and the low-moral careerism (L-MC) it served, leaving a lacuna in managerial stupidity research: MIC serving L-MC was not used to explain this stupidity. The purpose of this paper is to remedy this lacuna. Design/methodology/approach – A semi-native longitudinal multi-site ethnography of automatic processing plants, their parent inter-kibbutz co-operatives (I-KC-Os) and their kibbutz field context enabled a Strathernian ethnography that contextualized the prevalence of MIC and L-MC. Findings – I-KC-Os’ oligarchic context encouraged outsider executives’ MIC and L-MC that caused vicious distrust and ignorance cycles, stupidity and failures. A few high-moral knowledgeable mid-managers prevented total failures by vulnerable involvement that created virtuous trust and learning cycles. This, however, furthered dominance by ignorant ineffective L-MC executives and furthered use of MIC. Practical implications – As managerial know-how portability is often illusory and causes negative dominance of ignorant outsider executives, new CEO succession norms and new yardsticks for assessing fitness of potential executives are required, proposed in the paper. Social implications – Oligarchic contexts encourage MIC and L-MC, hence democratization is called for to counter this negative impact and promote efficiency, effectiveness and innovation. Originality/value – Untangling and linking the neglected topics of MIC and L-MC explains, for the first time, the prevalence of these related phenomena and their unethical facets, particularly among outsider executives and managers, emphasizing the need for their phronetic ethnographying to further explain the resulting mismanagement.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Ignoranza'

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