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Kozin, Sergey, and Oksana Medvedeva. "Criticism of E. Husserl's Naturalism and the Problem of the Lifeworld." Bulletin of Kemerovo State University. Series: Humanities and Social Sciences 2019, no. 3 (December 13, 2019): 264–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.21603/2542-1840-2019-3-3-264-270.
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The paper features the term "lifeworld" coined in 1910 by E. Husserl. The research objective was to describe the ideological content of Husserl's phenomenology, which determined the content and categorical design (type) of phenomenological sociology. E. Husserl introduced a systematic concept of the "lifeworld" and used it as a basis for a branch of social science now referred to as "understanding sociology". In addition, Husserl’s socio-philosophical and epistemological research helped to resolve the "crisis" of science, which he himself discovered, and to recreate the trampled dignity of human subjectivity. The research generalizes and clarifies various scientific views on the criticism of E. Husserl's naturalism and the problem of "lifeworld". Its results can be used in courses of sociology, philosophy, and history.
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Molotokienė, Ernesta. "AR HETEROFENOMENOLOGIJA ĮVEIKIA AUTOFENOMENOLOGIJĄ?" Problemos 77 (January 1, 2010): 70–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.15388/problemos.2010.0.1900.
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Straipsnyje aptariamas Danielio C. Dennetto pasiūlytas heterofenomenologijos metodas, pretenduojantis sąmonės patirtis tirti iš trečiojo asmens perspektyvos, ir analizuojamas argumentų už šio metodo pranašumą autofenonomenologijos, arba Edmundo Husserlio fenomenologijoje taikomo introspekcijos metodo iš pirmojo asmens perspektyvos atžvilgiu, korektiškumas. Dennettas, įvesdamas trečio asmens perspektyvą, heterofenomenologijos metodui siekia suteikti gamtos mokslų metodams būdingo objektyvumo, kurio nepavyko pasiekti Husserlio autofenomenologijos projektui dėl neišvengiamo subjektyvumo veiksnio. Todėl Dennettas subjektų pranešimams apie sąmonės patirtis suteikia įsitikinimų statusą, kurį legitimuoja jau ne pats subjektas, o stebėtojas (heterofenomenologas), šitaip atlikdamas mokslinį subjektų įsitikinimų apie sąmonės patirtis tyrimą. Bet ar subjektų pranešti įsitikinimai gali būti neutralūs, be subjektyvios interpretacijos apvalkalo, kaip to tikisi Dennettas? Straipsnyje tvirtinama, kad ambicingas Dennetto heterofenomenologijos metodas neišvengia Husserlio fenomenologijai būdingo subjektyvumo, nes Dennettas nekorektiškai interpretuoja Husserlį, iškreipdamas, bet neišvengdamas autofenomenologijai priskiriamų trūkumų.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: heterofenomenologija, autofenomenologija, sąmonė, metodas, intencionalumas, patyrimas.Does Heterophenomenology Surmount Autophenomenology?Ernesta Molotokienė SummaryDaniel C. Dennett’s heterophenomenological method for analyzing the experiences of one’s consciousness using the third person approach, as well as an analysis of the argument correctness of its superiority over the autophenomenology or introspective method of the first person approach applied in Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology are presented. By introducing the third person perpective, Dennett seeks to bestow the impartiality which is typical of the nature sciences, to heterophenomenological method. The Husserl autophenomenology project had failed in this field because of its inevitable subjectivity. Therefore, Dennett provides the subject’s messages about experiences of consciousness with the conviction status, which is legitimated not by the subject but by the observer (the heterophenomenologist), and in this way he carries out the scientific research of the subject’s convictions about the experiences of consciousness. But can the subject’s convictions be neutral, without a shell of subjective interpretation, as Dennett expects them to be? The article argues that the ambitious heterophenomenologic method of Dennett is unable to avoid the subjectivity typical of Husserl’s phenomenology, because Dennett interprets Husserl incorrectly by twisting his ideas, but is unable to elude the drawbacks of autophenomenology.Keywords: heterophenomenology, autophenomenology, consciousness, method, intentionality, experience.
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Poleščuk, Irina. "NUO HUSSERLIO PRIE LEVINO: HILETINIŲ DUOMENŲ, PRIERAIŠUMO, JUSLUMO IR KITO VAIDMUO LAIKIŠKUME." Problemos 76 (January 1, 2009): 112–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.15388/problemos.2009.0.1938.
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Straipsnyje Kito išankstinės duotybės bei pasikeitimo klausimas keliamas analizuojant ir lyginant sąmonės laikiškumą bei prieraišumo ir juslumo vaidmenį Husserlio ir Levino filosofijoje. Autorė teigia, kad intencionaliame sąmonės sraute galima įžvelgti ne-intencionalias struktūras, t. y. prieraišumą ir hiletinius duomenis – abu pastarieji dalykai žymi sąmonės pasyvumą, nutraukia intencionalaus akto tolydumą ir sveikina kitą. Aptariant laikinę sąmonės struktūrą specialus dėmesys skiriamas diskusijai apie pirminius įspūdžius.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: Husserlis, Levinas, sąmonės laikiškumas, intencionalumas, prieraišumas, hiletiniai duomenys, juslumas.From Husserl to Levinas: the Role of Hyletic Data, Affection, Sensation and the Other in TemporalityIrina Poleshchuk SummaryThis article discloses the question of the pre-giveness of the other and alterity by analyzing and comparing the temporality of consciousness and the role of affection and sensation in Husserl and Levinas.I argue that within the intentional flow of consciousness one can find non-intentional structures, i.e. affection and hyletic data which mark a passivity of consciousness, break intentional act and welcome the other. While discussing the temporal structure of consciousness the special attention is given to the discussion of pra-impression.Keywords: Husserl, Levinas, temporality of consciousness, intentionality, affection, hyletic data, sensation.">
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HARTIMO, MIRJA. "HUSSERL AND GÖDEL’S INCOMPLETENESS THEOREMS." Review of Symbolic Logic 10, no. 4 (July 3, 2017): 638–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755020317000089.
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AbstractThe paper examines Husserl’s interactions with logicians in the 1930s in order to assess Husserl’s awareness of Gödel’s incompleteness theorems. While there is no mention about the results in Husserl’s known exchanges with Hilbert, Weyl, or Zermelo, the most likely source about them for Husserl is Felix Kaufmann (1895–1949). Husserl’s interactions with Kaufmann show that Husserl may have learned about the results from him, but not necessarily so. Ultimately Husserl’s reading marks on Friedrich Waismann’s Einführung in das mathematische Denken: die Begriffsbildung der modernen Mathematik, 1936, show that he knew about them before his death in 1938.
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Himanka, Juha. "Husserl's two truths: Adequate and apodictic evidence." Phänomenologische Forschungen 2005, no. 1 (2005): 93–112. http://dx.doi.org/10.28937/1000107913.
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Edmund Husserl’s Logical Investigations was the breakthrough of phenomenology. What made it a breakthrough was the new way of explicating truth or evidence as self-givenness or adequacy. Husserl did however also have another interpretation of truth: evidence as indubitability or certainty of apodicticity. Originally Husserl thought that apodicticity increases the evidence of something already adequately given. Yet, in the first Cartesian Meditation Husserl differentiates the two modes of evidence. In this article the way to this split up of evidence is elaborated with the help of some recent publications in Husserliana. It is also suggested that the fact that Husserl has two separate views on truth is one reason for the dispersed state of Husserl- research. This article argues that Husserl’s early view on evidence adequacy is more original and interesting. The real philosophical challenge, however, is to be able to join the two modes of evidence under one strenge Wissenschaft.
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Byrne, Thomas. "A “Principally Unacceptable” Theory." Studia Phaenomenologica 20 (2020): 357–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/studphaen20202016.
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This paper accomplishes two goals. First, the essay elucidates Husserl’s descriptions of meaning consciousness from the 1901 Logical Investigations. I examine Husserl’s observations about the three ways we can experience meaning and I discuss his conclusions about the structure of meaning intentions. Second, the paper explores how Husserl reworked that 1901 theory in his 1913/14 Revisions to the Sixth Investigation. I explore how Husserl transformed his descriptions of the three intentions involved in meaningful experience. By doing so, Husserl not only recognized intersubjective communication as the condition of possibility of linguistic meaning acts, but also transformed his account of the structure of both signitive and intuitive acts. In the conclusion, I cash out this analysis, by showing how, on the basis of these new insights, Husserl reconstructs his theory of fulfillment.
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Villela-Petit, Maria Da Penha. "UMA FILOSOFIA A DESCOBRIR OU A RE-DESCOBRIR: A FENOMENOLIGA HUSSERLIANA." Síntese: Revista de Filosofia 37, no. 118 (September 9, 2010): 197. http://dx.doi.org/10.20911/21769389v37n118p197-214/2010.
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Se o movimento fenomenológico foi dos mais fecundos do século XX, isto porém não significou que a filosofia de Husserl tivesse sido bem conhecida nem mesmo pelos seus colaboradores. Tal limite deve-se em parte ao fato que só em nossos dias, graças ao trabalho constante dos Arquivos Husserl de Louvain, os milhares de manuscritos deixados por Husserl e que revelam aspectos inéditos de seu pensamento, puderam ser melhor conhecidos. Mas existiram outros motivos para que a filosofia de Husserl fosse deixada de lado, ou mesmo estigmatizada, tanto nos meios católicos neo-tomistas quanto em meio aos pensadores existenciais. O motivo comum a uns e a outros foi a denominação de «idealismo transcendental» atribuída pelo próprio Husserl a sua filosofia. O exame dos malentendidos daí decorrentes pareceu-nos uma boa via de acesso a uma apresentação da fenomenologia husserliana visando mostrar em que o pensamento de Husserl é incontornável, dado que nos possibilita compreender as razões filosóficas profundas da crise civilizacional que atravessamos.Abstract: Although the phenomenological movement was one of the most fecund in the XX century, it does not mean that Husserl’s philosophy was well known, even by his collaborators. This failure of understanding is partly due to the fact that it is only recently that the thousands of manuscripts Husserl left us, and in which fresh aspects of his thought are revealed, could be better known, thanks to the constant work undertaken by the Husserl-Archives in Leuven. But, there have also been other reasons why Husserl’s philosophy was left aside, or even stigmatized by both the neo-Thomist Catholics and the existentialist thinkers. Their common reason was the denomination of “transcendental idealism” that Husserl himself gave to his philosophy. The examination of the subsequent misunderstandings seems to be a good way to introduce Husserlian philosophy, showing that we cannot do without Husserl’s thought, for it allows us to comprehend the deep philosophical reasons behind the civilizational crisis we are going through.
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Siemek, Marek J. "HUSSERL E A HERANÇA DA FILOSOFIA TRANSCENDENTAL." Síntese: Revista de Filosofia 28, no. 91 (June 17, 2010): 189. http://dx.doi.org/10.20911/21769389v28n91p189-202/2001.
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Os tópicos da filosofia de Husserl, que sobressaem à frente da sua filosofia, tornam-se hoje atuais. E são esses tópicos, também, que unem Husserl à herança do passado, em particular à tradição da filosofia transcendental de Kant e de Fichte.Abstract: The Husserl’s Philosophy issues wich exceed his Philosophy nowadays became topical. They connect Husserl to the heritage of there past, notably to Kant’s and Fichte’s Transcendental philosophical tradition.
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Rabanaque, Luis Román. "Fenómeno, trascendencia y trascendental. Reflexiones husserlianas." Methodus 9, no. 2 (2020): 145–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.5771/0718-2775-2020-2-145.
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This text analyses the meaning that Husserl gives to the term "transcendental". To do this the author analyses Husserl's texts in two stages. First, he lists some central features that characterise the transcendental. Second, he relates these features to the phenomenological method and the notion of phenomenon. Together with this the author analyses the Kantian motifs that Husserl collects, giving an account of the critical extension that Husserl makes of them
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Byrne, Thomas. "Husserl on Impersonal Propositions." Problemos 101 (April 26, 2022): 18–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.15388/problemos.101.2.
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The young Edmund Husserl stressed that the success of his philosophy hinged upon his ability to determine the subject and the predicate of impersonal propositions and their expressions, such as ‘It is raining’. This essay accordingly investigates the tenability of Husserl’s early thought, by executing the first study of his analysis of impersonal propositions from the late 1890s. This examination reshapes our understanding of the inception of phenomenology in two ways. First, Husserl pinpoints the subject by outlining why impersonal expressions are employed during communication. This contravenes interpretations of the early Husserl as uninterested in intersubjectivity. Second, by studying how Husserl determines the predicate by investigating existential propositions, I show that Husserl , in the late 1890s, came to his final view on the concept of being.
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Varga, Peter Andras. "Die Einflüsse der Brentano’schen Intentionalitätskonzeptionen auf den frühen Husserl." Phänomenologische Forschungen 2014, no. 1 (2014): 83–116. http://dx.doi.org/10.28937/1000107778.
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Both the current research literature and a tradition stemming from Husserl himself agree that it was Brentano’s notion of intentionality which „gave rise“ to Husserl’s phenomenology. I rely on extensive primary materials, including unpublished sources from four archives, to revisit this thesis. Already a survey of the historical circumstances of Brentano’s second decade in Vienna, when Husserl studied under him, hints at possible discrepancies in the reception of Brentano’s thought, which are further deepened by the editing policy employed by his orthodox students. I analyze an unpublished lecture manuscript of Brentano to find three different notions of intentionality, including a strikingly a-phenomenological one, which I then relate to the discussion by modern scholarship and try to identify those notions of intentionality which were encountered by Husserl as a student of Brentano. Given this heterogeneous matrix of influences, it is far from surprising that a closer look at Husserl’s philosophical juvenilia shows that he misunderstood Brentano’s notion of intentionality and attempted to employ it in a different theoretical context (maybe motivated by an idiosyncratic notion of inner perception). Finally, the notion of intentionality Husserl later attributed to Brentano was probably mitigated to him by indirect sources, including lecture manuscripts copied by the extravagant and less-know student of Brentano, Hans Schmidkunz, and a debate between a contemporary logician Christoph Sigwart and Brentano’s orthodox disciples. The analysis of these transmission mechanisms could reveal a distinct transformation which proved to be instrumental in the development of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. The allegedly decisive influence of Brentano’s notion of intentionality at Husserl thus seems to consist in a productive misunderstanding (which apparently corresponds to Brentano’s surprisingly dismissive evaluation of Husserl after Husserl’s departure from Vienna).
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Thomasson, Amie L. "Husserl on Essences." Grazer Philosophische Studien 94, no. 3 (August 8, 2017): 436–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18756735-09403008.
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The common thought that Husserl was committed to a Platonist ontology of essences, and to a mysterious epistemology that holds that we can ‘intuit’ these essences, has contributed substantially to his work being dismissed and marginalized in analytic philosophy. This paper aims to show that it is misguided to dismiss Husserl on these grounds. First, the author aims to explicate Husserl’s views about essences and how we can know them, in ways that make clear that he is not committed to a traditional Platonism, or a mystical epistemology. Second, the author argues that Husserl’s approach was an important source for Carnap in “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology”, where Carnap tried to overcome the empiricists’ qualms about referring to abstracta. Finally, the author will argue that Husserl’s approach can be reconstructed in contemporary analytic terms by appeal to the idea of pleonastic transformations. By seeing both Husserl’s views and their influences on later analytic work more clearly, the hope is to build bridges and make clear that the approach is of lasting value and interest.
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Nakamura, Takuya. "Die Phänomenologie des Unbewussten als Grenzproblem bei Husserl." Phänomenologische Forschungen 2019, no. 1 (2019): 99–115. http://dx.doi.org/10.28937/1000108307.
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In this paper, I attempt to elucidate Husserl’s later phenomenological approach to the unconscious as a limit problem of phenomenology. Husserl had encountered the kind of problem as the unconscious earlier on and it continued to come up throughout his work. There are references to the unconscious in Ideas II and in the Analyses Concerning Passive Synthesis, and even in early lectures. Nonetheless, the unconscious as a severe problem of Husserl’s phenomenology emerged only in his mature phase. In this paper, I first discuss how Husserl treats the unconscious in relation to affection in Analyses Concerning Passive Synthesis, in order to shed light on the process of how the unconscious is problematized in phenomenology. Then, I rely on his later manuscripts on the unconscious in Husserliana XLII, where Husserl deals with the unconscious in relation to waking and sleeping. At the end, I explain how Husserl explores the multi-layered structure of consciousness as a result of his treatment of the unconscious as limit problem of phenomenology
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Walsh, Philip J. "Husserl’s Concept of Motivation: The Logical Investigations and Beyond." History of Philosophy and Logical Analysis 16, no. 1 (April 5, 2013): 70–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.30965/26664275-01601004.
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Husserl introduces a phenomenological concept called “motivation” early in the First Investigation of his magnum opus, the Logical Investigations. The importance of this concept has been overlooked since Husserl passes over it rather quickly on his way to an analysis of the meaningful nature of expression. I argue, however, that motivation is essential to Husserl’s overall project, even if it is not essential for defining expression in the First Investigation. For Husserl, motivation is a relation between mental acts whereby the content of one act make some further meaningful content probable. I explicate the nature of this relation in terms of “evidentiary weight” and differentiate it from Husserl’s notion of Evidenz, often translated as “self-evidence”. I elucidate the importance of motivation in Husserl’s overall phenomenological project by focusing on his analyses of thing-perception and empathy. Through these examples, we can better understand the continuity between the Logical Investigations and Husserl’s later work.
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Migasiński, Jacek, and Marek Pokropski. "Edmund Husserl i filozofia radykalnego początku." Stan Rzeczy, no. 1(16) (April 1, 2019): 263–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.14394/srz.16.10.
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W artykule omawiamy na podstawie prac Edmunda Husserla oraz korespondencji z jego uczniem Arnoldem Metzgerem wybrane idee fenomenologii, pokazując, jak bardzo radykalny i maksymalistyczny był to projekt, który w skrócie można scharakteryzować jako próbę rozpoczęcia filozofii od nowa. Wychodząc od skrajnie pesymistycznej oceny filozofii i nauki, Husserl opisuje kryzys racjonalności, który dotknął Europę. Rozwiązaniem ma być stworzenie nowej, ściśle naukowej filozofii, czyli fenomenologii. Wedle zamysłów Husserla, miała ona stanowić całkiem nową fundamentalną dyscyplinę naukową dającą podstawę innym naukom, w tym m.in. psychologii. Zadanie, jakie sobie Husserl postawił, wymagało radykalnych środków, dlatego dużą część swoich rozważań poświęcił na opracowanie nowej metody filozoficznej, której celem było m.in. zawieszenie całej uprzednio nabytej wiedzy. Maksymalistyczny projekt Husserla zmagał się z wewnętrznymi ograniczeniami i sprzecznościami, doprowadził jednak do przełomu teoretycznego w filozofii XIX i XX wieku. Cel tak pomyślanej nowej filozofii nie był wyłącznie naukowy, lecz również cywilizacyjny. Fenomenologia miała doprowadzić do odnowy duchowej ludzkości poprzez transformację nauki i odkrycie nieskończonej idei racjonalności leżącej u podstaw kultury europejskiej.
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Berdaus, S. V. "Early and Late Ethics of E. Husserl." Siberian Journal of Philosophy 16, no. 3 (2018): 238–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.25205/2541-7517-2018-16-3-238-249.
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The author follows the common division of Husserl’s ethics into early and late periods, and gives a description of each period, indicating their leitmotifs, goals and objectives. The early stage of Husserl’s ethics is viewed from two aspects – transcendental and disciplinary. It is shown that the early stage is characterized by the homogeneity of the three kinds of mind (theoretical, practical and axiological). The consequence of this homogeneity is the parallelism (Parallelismus) of logic and ethics and Husserl’s intention to construct ethics following the pattern of logic. The late stage is characterized by the intention of Husserl to arrange the interaction of practical philosophy with specific problems of actual practice. Husserl did not turn away from acute social problems and even participated in a kind of patriotic propaganda. The presented review shows how heterogeneous in structure and original in its content and genesis is the ethical thought of Husserl.
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Ahimsa-Putra, Heddy Shri. "FENOMENOLOGI AGAMA: PENDEKATAN FENOMENOLOGI UNTUK MEMAHAMI AGAMA." Walisongo: Jurnal Penelitian Sosial Keagamaan 20, no. 2 (December 15, 2012): 271–304. http://dx.doi.org/10.21580/ws.20.2.200.
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In this article the author explains what is called ‘phenomenological approach’ in the study of religion. Starting from Husserl’s philosophy of phenomenology, the author tracing its influences in social science through one of Husserl’s students, Alfred Schutz. Based on Husserl’s ideas developed by Schutz, the author presents his views how those ideas can be applied in the study of religion, and how religion can be defined phenomenologically. The author further explains some methodological ethical implications of doing phenomenological research on religion.***Dalam tulisan ini penulis menjelaskan apa yang disebut ‘pendekatan fenomenologi’ dalam kajian agama. Berangkat dari filsafat fenomenologi Husserl, penulis melacak pengaruhnya pada ilmu sosial melalui salah seorang murid Husserl, Alfred Schultz. Berdasarkan ide Husserl yang dikembangkan oleh Schultz, penulis menyajikan pandangannya bagaimana ide-ide itu dapat diterapkan dalam kajian agama, dan bagaimana agama dapat didefinisikan secara fenomenologis. Penulis selanjutnya menjelaskan beberapa implikasi etis metodologis jika melakukan kajian fenomenologis terhadap agama.
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Moran, Dermot. "Husserl and Ricoeur: The Influence of Phenomenology on the Formation of Ricoeur’s Hermeneutics of the ‘Capable Human’." Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy 25, no. 1 (September 15, 2017): 182–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/jffp.2017.800.
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The phenomenology of Edmund Husserl had a permanent and profound impact on the philosophical formation of Paul Ricoeur. One could truly say, paraphrasing Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s brilliant 1959 essay ‘The Philosopher and his Shadow’,that Husserl is the philosopher in whose shadow Ricoeur, like Merleau-Ponty, also stands, the thinker to whom he constantly returns. Husserl is Ricoeur’s philosopher of reflection, par excellence. Indeed, Ricoeur always invokes Husserl when he is discussing a paradigmatic instance of contemporary philosophy of ‘reflection’ and also of descriptive, ‘eidetic’ phenomenology. Indeed, I shall argue in this chapter that Husserl’s influence on Ricoeur was decisive and provided an eidetic, descriptive methodology which is permanently in play, even when it has to be concretized and mediated by hermeneutics, as Ricoeur proposes after 1960.
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Ortega Rodríguez, Iván. "La crítica de Patocka a Husserl: subjetividad trascendental frente al mundo como trascendental." Investigaciones Fenomenológicas, no. 5 (February 12, 2021): 255. http://dx.doi.org/10.5944/rif.5.2015.29820.
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Jan Patočka (1907-1977) desarrolló un original trabajo fenomenológico pese a circunstancias adversas. En él, pasó de defender unas tesis muy cercanas a Ideas I a sostener unos planteamientos notablemente alejados. Para el filósofo checo, Husserl habría localizado la esfera trascendental pero habría errado al tomarla por un ente o preente subjetivo. Por el contrario, una aplicación consecuente hasta el final de la epojé nos permite ir hasta la auténtica esfera trascendental, que es el mundo como proto-estructura universal de aparición. En consecuencia, Patočka diverge muy notablemente de Husserl al tiempo que mantiene la propuesta de una fenomenología trascendental (aunque “a-subjetiva”). Asimismo, esta noción de la esfera trascendental permite profundizar la crítica a Husserl, pues su subjetivismo vendría dado por haber confundido la realización concreta del aparecer en cada sujeto concreto con la esfera pura del aparecer. Husserl no habría sido, a ojos de Patočka, lo suficientemente trascendental.Jan Patočka developed an original phenomenological research in spite of adverse circumstances. He underwent a profound evolution. If at first his theses were very close to Husserl’s Ideas, at the end of his life his position was notably different of his master’s. For the Czech philosopher, Husserl was right to speak about a transcendental sphere but was wrong to take it as an entity or pre-entity of subjective nature. On the contrary, a consequent use of epokhe enables us to get to the true transcendental sphere. This sphere is the “world” as the universal structure of appearing as such. Consequently, Patočka diverges from Husserl but he keeps the idea of a transcendental phenomenology (though “a-subjective”). Furthermore, Patočka thinks that Husserl mistook the realisation of appearing in each particular subject with the pure sphere of appearance. According to Patočka, then, Husserl’s Phenomenology would not have been transcendental enough.
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Cavallaro, Marco. "LAS RAÍCES EMPIRIOCRITICISTAS DEL CONCEPTO DE MUNDO NATURAL EN E. HUSSERL." Investigaciones Fenomenológicas, no. 12 (February 2, 2021): 33. http://dx.doi.org/10.5944/rif.12.2015.29583.
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En este artículo queremos investigar la relación entre las filosofías de Edmund Husserl y Richard Avenarius. A pesar de que este tema ha sido prácticamente ignorado por los estudiosos de Husserl, es de suma importancia si uno quiere iluminar los orígenes del pensamiento fenomenológico de Husserl. Nuestra tesis es que el concepto de Husserl de actitud natural y su correlato, el mundo natural (Umwelt) -tal y como ellos surgen en diferentes conferencias durante la década de 1910 y especialmente en Ideas I con respecto a la reducción fenomenológica- se derivan de una temprana confrontación con el punto de vista del empiriocriticismo de Avenarius como fue expuesto en su libro Der menschliche Weltbegriff. Con el fin de mantener esta afirmación, discutiremos el acercamiento gradual de Husserl a las teorías del filósofo suizo-alemán así como su última crítica al mismo. Aunque, de hecho, Husserl concibió el punto de vista den Avenarius como un principio valioso, al final de sus reflexiones pone en cuestión algunas de las premisas de la filosofía empiriocriticista.In this paper I investigate the relationship between the philosophies of Edmund Husserl and Richard Avenarius. Despite this tapie has been almost disregarded by Husserlian scholars, it is of uttermost importance if one aims at illuminating the origins of Husserl's phenomenological thinking. My thesis is that Husserl's concept of natural attitude and its correlate, the natural world (Umwe/t) -as they emerge in various lectures during the 1910s and especially in Ideen I with respectmto the phenomenological reduction- stem from an early confrontation with Avenarius' "empiriocriticist" standpoint as laid out in his book Der menschliche Weltbegriff. In order to up hold this claim, I will discuss in my paper Husserl's gradual approach to the theories of the Swiss-German philosopher as well as his late critique of the same. Although Husserl in fact conceived of Avenarius' standpoint as a valuable beginning, he was decisively prompted in his late reflections to call into question sorne of the premises of the "empirio-criticist" philosophy.
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Atten, Mark van, and Juliette Kennedy. "On the Philosophical Development of Kurt Gödel." Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 9, no. 4 (December 2003): 425–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.2178/bsl/1067620090.
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It is by now well known that Gödel first advocated the philosophy of Leibniz and then, since 1959, that of Husserl. This raises three questions:1.How is this turn to Husserl to be interpreted? Is it a dismissal of the Leibnizian philosophy, or a different way to achieve similar goals?2.Why did Gödel turn specifically to the later Husserl's transcendental idealism?3.Is there any detectable influence from Husserl on Gödel's writings?Regarding the first question, Wang [96, p.165] reports that Gödel ‘[saw] in Husserl's work a method of refining and consolidating Leibniz' monadology’. But what does this mean? In what for Gödel relevant sense is Husserl's work a refinement and consolidation of Leibniz' monadology?The second question is particularly pressing, given that Gödel was, by his own admission, a realist in mathematics since 1925. Wouldn't the uncompromising realism of the early Husserl's Logical investigations have been a more obvious choice for a Platonist like Gödel?The third question can only be approached when an answer to the second has been given, and we want to suggest that the answer to the first question follows from the answer to the second. We begin, therefore, with a closer look at the actual turn towards phenomenology.Some 30 years before his serious study of Husserl began, Gödel was well aware of the existence of phenomenology. Apart from its likely appearance in the philosophy courses that Gödel took, it reached him from various directions.
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Bojanic, Petar. "To institute, to primally institute (Stiften, Urstiften): Husserl’s first readers and translators in France: A possible origin of continental philosophy." Filozofija i drustvo 18, no. 2 (2007): 235–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/fid0702235b.
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(nemacki) In diesem Text wird die Bedeutung von Husserls ph?nomenologischen Forschungen zur (urspr?nglichen) Institution und zur Institutionalisierung (neben den Verben "stiften" und "urstiften" verwendet Husserl die Nomen "Stiftung", "Urstiftung" und "Endstiftung"). Es wird angenommen, dass die Bedeutung dieser nicht ausreichend bekannten Strategien nur in den unver?ffentlichten Handschriften gefunden werden kann, dass die unterschiedlichen Generationen der Konsultanten von Husserls Archiven (in Leuven und Paris) eine identische ?berzeugung von der Bedeutung der Husserlschen Entdeckungen bezeugt, dass Merleau- Pontys ?bersetzung von Stiftung als "institution" dominiert und dass eben diese ?bersetzung bewirkt hat, dass Husserl zu einer franz?sischen Angelegenheit wurde. Die Idee des Artikels ist, dass diese Theater der Lekt?re, der ?bersetzung und des Einflusses Husserls die kontinentale Philosophie begr?ndet. Das bedeutet, dass Husserls Strategie der Stiftung/Urstiftung am Ursprung dieses Syntagmas liegen kann, da das Denken einer Institution der Philosophie als Denken Europas strukturiert ist, als Denken von Menschheit und als Denken der Begegnung mit dem Anderen (Intersubjektivit?t).
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Trizio, Emiliano. "Husserl’s Timaeus. Plato’s Creation Myth and the Phenomenological Concept of Metaphysics as the Teleological Science of the World." Studia Phaenomenologica 20 (2020): 77–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/studphaen2020204.
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According to Husserl, Plato played a fundamental role in the development of the notion of teleology, so much so that Husserl viewed the myth narrated in the Timaeus as a fundamental stage in the long history that he hoped would eventually lead to a teleological science of the world grounded in transcendental phenomenology. This article explores this interpretation of Plato’s legacy in light of Husserl’s thesis that Plato was the initiator of the ideal of genuine science. It also outlines how Husserl sought conceptual resources within transcendental phenomenology to turn the key elements of Plato’s creation myth into rigorous scientific ideas.
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Albuquerque, José Fábio da Silva. "AS CRÍTICAS HEIDEGGERIANAS AO STATUS FILOSÓFICO DA CONSCIÊNCIA EM HUSSERL DIANTE DA PROBLEMÁTICA DO CONHECIMENTO DO SÉCULO XIX." Síntese: Revista de Filosofia 38, no. 120 (June 30, 2011): 91. http://dx.doi.org/10.20911/21769389v38n120p91-115/2011.
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Neste artigo apresentamos as críticas que Heidegger direciona à consciência pura em Husserl como horizonte específico e primeiro da filosofia. Com a finalidade de dar uma resposta à crise na Filosofia ocorrida no século XIX e, consequentemente, estabelecer os parâmetros para o conceito científico, Edmund Husserl – combatendo o Psicologismo e o Neokantismo – apresenta a Fenomenologia enquanto ciência rigorosa e os atos da consciência transcendental como o campo de sua investigação. Heidegger, por sua vez, radicaliza a corrente fenomenológica e critica esse status da consciência pura como uma permanência de Husserl sob o influxo dos preconceitos da filosofia moderna.Abstract: This paper aims at presenting the criticisms that Heidegger addresses to Husserl’s pure consciousness, understood as the primary specific horizon of philosophy. In order to answer the crisis of 19th century Philosophy and, consequently, establish parameters for the scientific concept, Edmund Husserl – combating Psychologism and Neokantism – presents Phenomenology as a rigorous science and the acts of transcendental consciousness as his field of research. Heidegger, in turn, radicalizes the phenomenological trend and criticizes the status of pure consciousness as Husserl’s continuance under the prejudices of modern philosophy.
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Schuhmann, Karl. "Malvine Husserls ?Skizze eines Lebensbildes von E. Husserl?" Husserl Studies 5, no. 2 (August 1988): 105–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00579106.
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Luft, Sebastian. "Von der mannigfaltigen Bedeutung der Reduktion nach Husserl." Phänomenologische Forschungen 2012, no. 1 (2012): 5–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.28937/1000107805.
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This paper takes a renewed look at Husserl’s method of the phenomenological reduction. It interprets “the reduction” as shorthand for the meaning of Husserl’s entire phenomenology in its mature stage. In the same way, the method of reduction might have different manners of execution but they are nevertheless guided by a common intent. The text takes its starting point by considering the different metaphors Husserl uses – the “flatland creatures” and the reduction as akin to a religious conversion – and spells out their implications, which lead me to consider their metaphilosophical significance. In this way, this article attempts a metaphilosophical reading of the meaning of the reduction in Husserl, which is equal to considering the meaning philosophy has for Husserl in the most general terms. In this way, some unorthodox reflections are carried out that shed new light on central phenomenological concepts, such as vidence and eidetic variation, phenomenology as a form of transcendental idealism, and the notorious problem of the lifeworld. In this way, Husserl’s phenomenology is interpreted as a peculiar representative of Enlightenment philosophy that restitutes a special notion of responsibility.
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De Palma, Vittorio. "Ist Husserls Assoziationstheorie transzendental?" Phänomenologische Forschungen 2011 2011, no. 1 (2011): 87–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.28937/1000107822.
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This paper deals with Husserl’s theory of association and tries to show that this theory originates from a critical confrontation with Hume and represents a development of the idea of eidetic material legality, since for Husserl associative connections are relations of ideas based on the peculiarity of contents. I stress that Husserl distinguishes two types of conditions of possibility of associative synthesis: subjective-formal (pertaining to consciousness) and objective-material (pertaining to contents) conditions. Thus the last grounds of the associative constitution (and therefore of the constitution of the world, that for Husserl as for Hume is based on association) don’t lie in subjectivity, which is only the formal condition of the associative synthesis, but in the particularity of the sensuous contents and in their immanent legality. This also follows from the hypothesis of world-annihilation. After a discussion of Husserl’s thesis that associative contents are immanent and of the phenomenological concept of constitution, I conclude that – properly speaking – Husserl’s theory of association cannot be defined as transcendental.
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Ahimsa-Putra, Heddy Shri. "FENOMENOLOGI AGAMA: PENDEKATAN FENOMENOLOGI UNTUK MEMAHAMI AGAMA." Walisongo: Jurnal Penelitian Sosial Keagamaan 20, no. 2 (February 26, 2016): 271. http://dx.doi.org/10.21580/ws.2012.20.2.200.
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<p class="IIABSBARU">In this article the author explains what is called ‘phenomenological approach’ in the study of religion. Starting from Husserl’s philosophy of phenomenology, the author tracing its influences in social science through one of Husserl’s students, Alfred Schutz. Based on Husserl’s ideas developed by Schutz, the author presents his views how those ideas can be applied in the study of religion, and how religion can be defined phenomenologically. The author further explains some methodological ethical implications of doing phenomenological research on religion.</p><p class="IKa-ABSTRAK">***</p>Dalam tulisan ini penulis menjelaskan apa yang disebut ‘pendekatan fenomenologi’ dalam kajian agama. Berangkat dari filsafat fenomenologi Husserl, penulis melacak pengaruhnya pada ilmu sosial melalui salah seorang murid Husserl, Alfred Schultz. Berdasarkan ide Husserl yang dikembangkan oleh Schultz, penulis menyajikan pandangannya bagaimana ide-ide itu dapat diterapkan dalam kajian agama, dan bagaimana agama dapat didefinisikan secara fenomenologis. Penulis selanjutnya menjelaskan beberapa implikasi etis metodologis jika melakukan kajian fenomenologis terhadap agama.
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Delamare, Alexis. "The Power of Husserl’s Third Logical Investigation." Studia Phaenomenologica 21 (2021): 295–316. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/studphaen20212114.
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The peculiar legacy of Husserl’s mereology, chiefly studied by analytic philosophers interested in ontology, has led to a partial understanding of the III. LU, which is too often reduced to a chapter of “formal ontology”. Yet, the power of this Investigation goes far beyond: it enabled Husserl to deal, in the framework of a unified theory, with a vast range of particular problems. The paper focuses on one of these issues, namely abstraction, so as to expose how Husserl instrumentalizes his formal tools in order to tackle material issues. The existence of an up and down pattern is uncovered: Husserl first reinterprets the psychological problem of abstraction in ontological terms (“bottom-up”), before coming back to the original problem with new insights (“top-down”). The second, correlative aim of the paper is to emphasize the key role played by Friedrich Schumann, a forgotten yet crucial character for Husserl’s conception of abstraction.
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Byrne, Thomas. "Husserl’s Semiotics of Gestures." Studia Phaenomenologica 22 (2022): 33–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/studphaen2022222.
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By examining the evolution of Husserl’s philosophy from 1901 to 1914, this essay reveals that he possessed a more robust philosophy of gestures than has been accounted for. This study is executed in two stages. First, I explore how Husserl analyzed gestures through the lens of his semiotics in the 1901 Logical Investigations. Although he there presents a simple account of gestures as kinds of indicative signs, he does uncover rich insights about the role that gestures play in communication. Second, I examine how Husserl augmented his theory of gestures in his 1914 Revisions to the Sixth Logical Investigation. Husserl describes some gestures as signals, which are experienced as intersubjective communication, as having a temporally diachronic structure, and as possessing an obliging tendency. Husserl also contrasts gestures to language by showing how language habitually leaves traces on us.
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Payo, Francis. "Husserl and Stein on Empathy: Paving a Way Towards Integration." Philippiniana Sacra 50, no. 150 (2015): 247–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.55997/ps2003l150a2.
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Edith Stein is apparently better known than Edmund Husserl when it comes to a phenomenological understanding of empathy. Husserl served as her mentor in phenomenological studies, especially in her dissertation, On the Problem of Empathy, which introduced Stein as an important phenomenologist to reckon with in the world of philosophy. She continued to work closely with Husserl as his assistant, particularly in preparing to publish his Ideas II, the locus of the brewing controversy between Husserl and Stein concerning the phenomenological constitution of empathy. Some would argue that Husserl was influenced by Stein. However, she herself acknowledges that her consideration of empathy stays within the general framework of his phenomenology. With certain confidence, we can say that Husserl and Stein must have mutually influenced each other, but up to what extent? How can we delineate the grounds where they converge and diverge in constituting empathy? Can we find a way to integrate their phenomenological understanding of empathy? These questions revolve around the problem: How do we arrive at a synthesis of Edith Stein’s and Edmund Husserl’s understanding of empathy? This essay simply presents a preliminary context to this problem in the hope of finding salient aspects of their respective understanding, thus paving the way towards a possible integration, and perhaps a richer understanding of empathy.
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Breuer, Irene. "La actualidad de la distinción entre fenómeno y cosa en sí para la fenomenología. Los diferences significados de la cosa en sí en Kant y Husserl." Revista de Estudios Kantianos 5, no. 2 (October 23, 2020): 331. http://dx.doi.org/10.7203/rek.5.2.13941.
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Kant’s and Husserl’s philosophies both ground on the distinction between the things in themselves and the phenomenon. While for Kant, this distinction rests in the respective faculties and the mediating function of imagination, for Husserl it is a function of the perceptual process itself. Concerning the thing in itself, its main sense for Kant is that of noumenon or intelligible being, while for Husserl it is mainly the ideal of the adequate givenness of a particular reality of the thing. This contribution aims at developping Husserl’s critical reformulation of Kant’s thing in itself by analysing its different senses and interpretations at both authors.
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Giovannangeli, Daniel. "Derrida et le Temps Husserlien." Phainomenon 20-21, no. 1 (October 1, 2010): 63–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/phainomenon-2010-0004.
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Abstract The author examines the several phases of Derrida’s interpretation of Husserl phenomenology of time consciousness. The main issue is a–non-husserlian–thesis about the deferred action of primordial impression, always intermingled with retention, allowing a of Husserl’s metaphysics of presence, and an approximation with Freud’s views about the Nachträglichkeit structure of psychic life. Consequently, the author stresses that Freud will allow, despite Husserl’s explicit assertions, a completion of phenomenology beyond the limits Husserl imposes on it (and on himself) as he remains dominated by the assumption of the absolute priority of primordial impression over retention.
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BYRNE, THOMAS. "INGARDEN’S HUSSERL: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE 1915 REWIEW OF THE LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS." HORIZON / Fenomenologicheskie issledovanija/ STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE / STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY / ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES 9, no. 2 (2020): 513–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.21638/2226-5260-2020-9-2-513-531.
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This essay critically assesses Roman Ingarden’s 1915 review of the second edition of Edmund Husserl’s Logical Investigations. I elucidate and critique Ingarden’s analysis of the differences between the 1901 first edition and the 1913 second edition. I specifically examine three tenets of Ingarden’s interpretation. First, I demonstrate that Ingarden correctly denounces Husserl’s claim that he only engages in an eidetic study of consciousness in 1913, as Husserl was already performing eidetic analyses in 1901. Second, I show that Ingarden is misguided, when he asserts that Husserl had fully transformed his philosophy into a transcendental idealism in the second edition. While Husserl does appear to adopt a transcendental phenomenology by asserting–in his programmatic claims–that the intentional content and object are now included in his domain of research, he does not alter his actual descriptions of the intentional relationship in any pertinent manner. Third, I show Ingarden correctly predicts many of the insights Husserl would arrive at about logic in his late philosophy. This analysis augments current readings of the evolution of Ingarden’s philosophy, by more closely examining the development of his largely neglected early thought. I execute this critical assessment by drawing both from Husserl’s later writings and from recent literature on the Investigations. By doing so, I hope to additionally demonstrate how research on the Investigations has matured in the one hundred years since the release of that text, while also presenting my own views concerning these difficult interpretative issues.
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Himanka, Juha. "Reduction in Practice: Tracing Husserl's Real-Life Accomplishment of Reduction as Evidenced by his Idea of Phenomenology Lectures." Phenomenology & Practice 13, no. 1 (May 31, 2019): 7–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.29173/pandpr29371.
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Husserl claimed that reduction is the true starting point of phenomenological research, but to figure out how this deed should actually be accomplished has turned out to be a very challenging task. In this study, I explicate how Husserl accomplished reduction during his series of lectures entitled The Idea of Phenomenology. He does not state it explicitly, but what actually happened on the last day of the lectures can be seen as consistent with his descriptions of reduction as an act. Understood in this way, reduction is the model of how to do philosophy. The result of Husserl’s reduction is the correlation between appearance and “that which appears” or, to use Husserl’s later terminology, between noēsis and noēma. When this correlation is understood as an outcome of reduction and not as a result of an analysis, we, asreaders of Husserl, will be in a better position to avoid natural attitude in our interpretations.
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da Silva, Rui Sampaio. "A Critica Heideggeriana da Fenomenologia de Husserl." Phainomenon 20-21, no. 1 (October 1, 2010): 227–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/phainomenon-2010-0012.
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Abstract The philosophical relation between Husserl and Heidegger is a milestone in the 20th century philosophy. On the one hand, Husserl preserved the notions of subject and consciousness, avoiding naïve misconceptions of these notions and clearing new paths for philosophical investigation. On the other hand, Heidegger, departing from a criticai dialogue with Husserl’s phenomenology, challenged key presuppositions of modern philosophy by investigating the social and pragmatic dimension ofkllowledge and intentionality.
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Blomberg, Johan. "Interpreting the concept of sedimentation in Husserl’s Origin of Geometry." Public Journal of Semiotics 9, no. 1 (October 26, 2020): 78–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.37693/pjos.2019.9.22182.
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In the influential text Origin of Geometry, Edmund Husserl argues that even the invariant meaning found in theoretical disciplines like geometry has a historical becoming: through gradual abstraction and stabilization, ending in a completely rational discipline. This is a process which Husserl proposes is due to language and other symbolic systems. In the absence of a system allowing for stable communication of meaning, geometry or any other tradition would constantly have to begin anew. At the same time Husserl also sees the historical process of meaning stabilization in linguistic form as detrimental. It allows for a reception of an established meaning, which simultaneously entails the forgetfulness of the experiential basis and intuitive knowledge that made ideality possible in the first place. Husserl calls this Janus-faced dialectical process between discovery and forgetfulness sedimentation. This paper analyzes this concept in Origin of Geometry and places it in the context of Husserl’s thought more generally. In contrast to Husserl’s negative view of the effects that sedimentation has for an authentic meaning, I discuss four interpretations of sedimentation that provide more constructive perspectives on the concept. These interpretations also differ considerably from one another, a fact which speaks both to the richness and the tensions in Origin of Geometry.
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Nenon, Thomas. "A Fundamental Difference: Husserl and Heidegger on the Grounding of Ethics." Investigaciones Fenomenológicas, no. 4-II (February 11, 2021): 191. http://dx.doi.org/10.5944/rif.4-ii.2013.29793.
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This essay begins by retracing the relationship between the early Heidegger and Edmund Husserl during the period when Heidegger’s thought was still closely aligned with Husserl’s phenomenological project. It then shows how a fundamental difference emerged over the question of what the ultimate grounds for action. When Heidegger says that Husserl has failed to address the real question about the meaning of Being, he is referring to the meaning of Dasein. Whereas Husserl maintains that willing and action must remain grounded in the intention/fulfillment structure of reason, Heidegger comes to the view that Dasein must resolutely accept its calling as the groundless ground of significance that is ulti-mate source of meaning in the world.El presente ensayo empieza retrocediendo hacia la relación del Heidegger temprano con Edmund Husserl, en el periodo en el que el pensamiento heideggeriano estaba todavía alineado con el proyecto fenomenológico de Husserl. A continuación, se muestra cómo a raíz de la pregunta por el sustrato último de toda acción emerge una diferencia fundamental. Cuando Heidegger dice que Husserl no ha conseguido hacer la verdadera pregunta acerca del sentido del ser, se refiere al sentido del Dasein. Mientras Husserl mantiene que la voluntad y la acción tienen que perma-necer fundamentadas en la estructura de intención/cumplimiento propia de la razón, Heidegger llega a la postura de que Dasein tiene que aceptar con determinación la llamada del fundamento abismático del significado, la últi-ma fuente del significado en el mundo.
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Luft, Sebastian. "Husserl's Phenomenological Reduction Revisited: An Attempt of a Renewed Account." Anuario Filosófico 37, no. 1 (October 3, 2018): 65–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.15581/009.37.29395.
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This essay attempts a renewed, critical exposition of Husserl’s theory of the phenomenological reduction, incorporating manuscript material that has been published since the defining essays of the first generation of Husserl research. The discussion focuses on points that remain especially crucial, i. e. the concept of the natural attitude, the ways into the reduction, and the question of the “meaning of the reduction”. The reading attempted here leads to two, not necessarily related, focal points: a Cartesian and a Life-world tendency. In following these two paths, Husserl was consistent in pursuing two evident leads in his philosophical enterprise; however, he was at the same time unable to systematically unify these two strands. Thus, I am offering an interpretation which might be called a modified “departure from Cartesianism” reading that Landgrebe proposed in his famous essay from the nineteen-fifties (a reading that is still valid in many contemporary expositions of Husserl’s thought). This discussion should make apparent that Husserl’s theory of the phenomenological reduction deserves a renewed look in light of material that has since appeared in the Husserliana and by incorporating the most important results of recent tendencies in Husserl research.
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Liu, Zihao. "Phenomenology After Deconstruction: Voice and Phenomenon as a Prolegomenon to Husserl’s Genetic Method." Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai Philosophia 68, Special Issue (November 23, 2023): 89–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.24193/subbphil.2023.sp.iss.06.
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"Reading Voice and Phenomenon from a phenomenological perspective, this paper argues that the book is an internal criticism of Husserlian phenomenology that, among other things, can serve as an introduction to Husserl’s genetic method. Derrida’s most powerful arguments are delivered by turning the Cartesian method of Logical Investigations and Ideas I to Husserl’s inquiries into time-consciousness; as such, it is a phenomenological criticism through and through. An analysis of Husserl’s later manuscripts and lectures published posthumously shows that driven by what Derrida calls the radicality of intuitionism, Husserl has developed a genetic phenomenological method that breaks free from the metaphysics of presence and arrived at a conception of meaning and language that is similar to Derrida’s. Keywords: genetic phenomenology; Edmund Husserl; Jacques Derrida; Voice and Phenomenon"
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Gyllenhammer, Paul. "Normality in Husserl and Foucault." Research in Phenomenology 39, no. 1 (2009): 52–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156916408x389631.
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AbstractHusserl and Foucault appear to have little in common when it comes to the question of normality. Husserl often discusses the emergence or constitution of norms from a subjective perspective whereas Foucault targets norms as a coercive problem. But if we recognize that the body is the locus of concern for both thinkers, then we can see that Husserl's interest in norm optimization is at home with Foucault's genealogical critique of bio-power. The essay draws a line of comparison between Husserl and Foucault around the idea of an optimizing practice.
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Janoušek, Hynek. "Časové vědomí a Husserlova kritika Brentana." FILOSOFIE DNES 8, no. 2 (July 11, 2017): 58–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.26806/fd.v8i2.239.
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Článek analyzuje původní verzi Husserlovy kritiky Brentanova pojetí časového vědomí, která je obsažena v Husserlových Přednáškách k fenomenologii vnitřního časového vědomí, a Husserlovu snahu vyřešit Brentanův argument nekonečně nekonečného regresu v rukopisném textu O primární modifikaci paměti. Z Husserlovy kritiky si všímá jen dvou bodů. Za prvé kritiky Brentanova prezentismu, tj. názoru, že časové vědomí je založeno v bodu přítomnosti, v němž jsou psychické fenomény, které názor času konstituují, dány současně. Za druhé Husserlovy výtky, že Brentano nepoužívá pro výklad vědomí času schéma počitkový obsah – pojetí počitkového obsahu. Za tímto účelem rekonstruuje text Brentanovu teorii v podobě, v které ji znal Husserl, a vykládá jak Brentanovy důvody pro odmítnutí časové povahy vnitřního vnímání, tak nedořešené problémy Brentanova hlediska. Následně se pokouší dokázat, že Husserl Brentanův prezentismus podcenil a že věcné problémy, které s jeho odmítnutím souvisely, musel řešit zavedením absolutně „kvazi-prezentního“ vědomí a odmítnutím schématu obsah – pojetí pro výklad konstituce imanentních časových jednot. Oba zvolené body Husserlovy kritiky Brentana se tak v pozdějších vrstvách přednášek ukazují jako částečně neoprávněné.The article discusses the original version of Husserl’s critique of Brentano’s concept of time consciousness, which forms a part of Husserl’s Lectures on the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time. Next, it gives an overview of Husserl’s attempt to solve Brentano’s argument from the infinitely infinite regress against the consciousness of internal time. Two points of Husserl’s critique of Brentano are analyzed. The first point concerns Husserl’s critique of Brentano’s presentism. Brentano holds that consciousness of time is contained in the time point of the present now, in which psychical phenomena constituting our time consciousness are given simultaneously. The second point concerns the lack of content – apprehension scheme in Brentano’s explanation of the time consciousness. The article reconstructs Brentano’s position in the form known to Husserl and explains Brentano’s reasons for refusing the internal consciousness of time as well as problems connected with this refusal. An analysis of Husserl’s text proves that Husserl underestimated Brentano’s presentism and that he was forced to introduce a concept of the absolute time consciousness to solve the problems connected with his refusal of Brentano’s position. Since Husserl had to eventually give up the content – apprehension scheme in his explanation of immanent time unities, his original critique of Brentano is shown to be partly unjustified.
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Janoušek, Hynek. "Časové vědomí a Husserlova kritika Brentana." FILOSOFIE DNES 8, no. 2 (July 11, 2017): 58–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.26806/fd.v8i2.378.
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Článek analyzuje původní verzi Husserlovy kritiky Brentanova pojetí časového vědomí, která je obsažena v Husserlových Přednáškách k fenomenologii vnitřního časového vědomí, a Husserlovu snahu vyřešit Brentanův argument nekonečně nekonečného regresu v rukopisném textu O primární modifikaci paměti. Z Husserlovy kritiky si všímá jen dvou bodů. Za prvé kritiky Brentanova prezentismu, tj. názoru, že časové vědomí je založeno v bodu přítomnosti, v němž jsou psychické fenomény, které názor času konstituují, dány současně. Za druhé Husserlovy výtky, že Brentano nepoužívá pro výklad vědomí času schéma počitkový obsah – pojetí počitkového obsahu. Za tímto účelem rekonstruuje text Brentanovu teorii v podobě, v které ji znal Husserl, a vykládá jak Brentanovy důvody pro odmítnutí časové povahy vnitřního vnímání, tak nedořešené problémy Brentanova hlediska. Následně se pokouší dokázat, že Husserl Brentanův prezentismus podcenil a že věcné problémy, které s jeho odmítnutím souvisely, musel řešit zavedením absolutně „kvazi-prezentního“ vědomí a odmítnutím schématu obsah – pojetí pro výklad konstituce imanentních časových jednot. Oba zvolené body Husserlovy kritiky Brentana se tak v pozdějších vrstvách přednášek ukazují jako částečně neoprávněné.The article discusses the original version of Husserl’s critique of Brentano’s concept of time consciousness, which forms a part of Husserl’s Lectures on the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time. Next, it gives an overview of Husserl’s attempt to solve Brentano’s argument from the infinitely infinite regress against the consciousness of internal time. Two points of Husserl’s critique of Brentano are analyzed. The first point concerns Husserl’s critique of Brentano’s presentism. Brentano holds that consciousness of time is contained in the time point of the present now, in which psychical phenomena constituting our time consciousness are given simultaneously. The second point concerns the lack of content – apprehension scheme in Brentano’s explanation of the time consciousness. The article reconstructs Brentano’s position in the form known to Husserl and explains Brentano’s reasons for refusing the internal consciousness of time as well as problems connected with this refusal. An analysis of Husserl’s text proves that Husserl underestimated Brentano’s presentism and that he was forced to introduce a concept of the absolute time consciousness to solve the problems connected with his refusal of Brentano’s position. Since Husserl had to eventually give up the content – apprehension scheme in his explanation of immanent time unities, his original critique of Brentano is shown to be partly unjustified.
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Cassara, Bruno. "Phenomenology and Transcendence: On Openness and Metaphysics in Husserl and Heidegger." Religions 13, no. 11 (November 21, 2022): 1127. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel13111127.
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In this paper I examine the relationship between phenomenology and metaphysics by reassessing the relationship between phenomenological and metaphysical transcendence. More specifically, I examine the notion of phenomenological transcendence in Husserl and the early Heidegger: Husserl defines transcendence primarily as the mode of givenness of phenomena that do not appear all at once, but must be given in partial profiles; Heidegger defines transcendence primarily as Dasein’s capacity to go beyond entities toward being. I argue that these divergent understandings of phenomenological transcendence have resulted in a significant difference in reception among French phenomenologists of religion. These thinkers assert that phenomenology, when properly conceived and utilized, can make room for the divine and its revelation, i.e., for a metaphysical transcendence. I further argue that these thinkers prefer Heidegger’s phenomenology to Husserl’s because they understand Heidegger’s transcendence as the subject’s openness to being, while they understand Husserl’s transcendence as a limit, as the inability to capture worldly objects. I take up Jean-Luc Marion’s phenomenology of givenness as a “case study” to illustrate this point. Finally, I argue that this preference for Heidegger over Husserl is misplaced and should be reversed. A close reading of Heidegger’s Phenomenology of Religious Life shows that Dasein is confined to its own possibilities and cannot be open to a relationship with the divine. By contrast, Husserl’s phenomenology provides the radical openness necessary to welcome revelation. While Husserl cannot envision a “worldly God,” the structures of horizonality and temporality characterize a subject capable of an authentic openness to revelation.
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McIntyre, Ronald, and David Bell. "Husserl." Philosophical Review 102, no. 1 (January 1993): 112. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2185664.
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Dummett, Michael, and David Bell. "Husserl." Philosophical Quarterly 41, no. 165 (October 1991): 483. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2220082.
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Kersten, Fred. "Husserl." International Studies in Philosophy 23, no. 3 (1991): 96–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/intstudphil199123381.
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Hardy, Lee. "Husserl." International Studies in Philosophy 27, no. 4 (1995): 104–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/intstudphil199527437.
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Hutt, Curtis M. "Husserl." Philosophy Today 43, no. 4 (1999): 370–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtoday19994345.
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Tieszen, Richard, and David Bell. "Husserl." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52, no. 4 (December 1992): 1010. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2107932.
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