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1
Gozetlik, Servet. "Husserl." Phd thesis, METU, 2003. http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/2/1070978/index.pdf.
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Husserl&rsquos phenomenology can be analyzed simply by relying on the conception of intentionality. What I want to do is to put forward the logical grounds on which I can construct an acceptable account of Husserl&rsquo
s theory of intentionality. For this aim, firstly, I need to put some light on the nature of intentional acts or experiences.This suggests us that there is a close connection between the acts and what they are directed towards. Actually many have specified the relation between the act and the object, but what they have ignored was to give an exclusive explication of how such a relation can be connected with the content component. The penomenological content mediates between the intentional act and the intended object. There are some disagreements as regards whether the act is also directed towards the content or not. One of the significant aims of this research is to shed some light on the adequate arguments by which I will try to clarify that one can speak of such a directedness of intentional acts. In other words I believe that one can not only describe an intentional relation between the act and the intended object but also similar relations between the act and the content. There seem to be three parts to be examined interconnectedly: these, namely, are act, content and the object. For, the act is directed towards the object with the intermediation of the content. So his theory is not the same as the object theory of intentionality of which there are some defenders. Husserl&rsquo
s content theory is firstly examined in Logical investigations and Ideas respectively.
2
Hunt, Jonathan. "Husserl on history." Thesis, Manchester Metropolitan University, 2010. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.526943.
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Clarke, Evan. "Kant, Husserl, and Analyticity." Thesis, Boston College, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/2345/bc-ir:103735.
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Thesis advisor: Andrea StaitiThis study concerns the nature and role of analyticity in the work of Immanuel Kant and Edmund Husserl. Its initial goal is that of clarifying the place of analytic judgment in Kant's critical project. Against the widely held assumption that analytic judgment has no role to play in the critical project, I show that analytic judgment has a precise and genuinely important role to play in the context of Kant's metaphysics. Analytic judgment has the role of clarifying our a priori conceptual repertoire and thus of making possible the synthetic a priori judgments that are properly constitutive of metaphysics. The next goal of the study is that of unifying and defending Kant's various characterizations of analytic judgment. Whereas a number of commentators have suggested that Kant is vague or ambivalent as regards the properties of analytic judgment, I show that we can extract a clear, consistent picture of analytic judgment from his work. The key to seeing this, I argue, is becoming clear on Kant's basic assumptions concerning concepts, logic, and propositional form. Subsequently, I turn to Husserl. Picking up on the fact that for Husserl, too, analyticity has metaphysical, or ontological significance, I spell out his conception of analyticity in detail. I show that analyticity for Husserl embraces two essentially symmetrical domains of law: the a priori laws of objective givenness and the a priori laws of propositional form. I then bring Husserl and Kant together. After showing that Husserl fails to capture the essence of Kant's theory of analytic judgment, and so fails to see exactly where he stands relative to Kant, I argue that what ultimately distinguishes Husserl from Kant is the claim that analytic truth is properly articulated in a purely formal context. I show that this departure from Kant has extremely significant consequences. For example, it enables Husserl to describe whole systems of judgment, such as mathematics or logic, as analytic; and it enables Husserl to defend the possibility of analytic judgments having empirical content
Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2014
Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Discipline: Philosophy
4
Ohlsson, Jakob. "Husserl, Heidegger och intersubjektivitet." Thesis, Södertörns högskola, Filosofi, 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:sh:diva-37373.
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The discussion about Husserl's intersubjectivity theory is well established, the discussion about the same from Heidegger is not as extensive. Above all, there is little discussion about Heidegger as a critic of Husserl's intersubjectivity theory. Thus, the present paper describes Husserl's and Heidegger’s intersubjectivity theories in order to be able to account for Heidegger's criticism of Husserl's theory. The paper shows that Husserl bases his theory on empathy, while Heidegger bases it on the care of the equipment world, the They, everyday existence and the public. Heidegger criticizes Husserl for assuming the subject with an inner authentic core on which social and cultural life is incorporated. According to Heidegger, the most primary condition for humans is that we live in a shared world with other people.
5
Rizo-Patrón, de Lerner Rosemary. "Husserl, lector de Descartes." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú - Departamento de Humanidades, 2013. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/113240.
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6
Lavigne, Jean-François. "Husserl : chose et espace." Poitiers, 1987. http://www.theses.fr/1987POIT5021.
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Premiere partie (t. I) : traduction francaise de la dingvorlesung de husserl (cours du semestre d'ete 1907), et de textes complementaires, publies dans l'edition originale de m. U. Claesges (hua. Vol. 16). Husserl y definit les concepts fondamentaux de sa phenomenologie de la perception : exposition et auto-position; apparition en propre et impropre; donnee optimale, direction de l'interet; orientation kinesthesique; coordination des champs sensoriels et de la motivation kinesthesique sur l'exemple visuel. Apres l'analyse fondamentale du cas de la perception inchangee, husserl degage les composantes intentionnelles de la synthese perceptive cinetique; l'inadequation essentielle de toute perception de chose est ainsi mise en evidence. Les deux dernieres sections de l'ouvrage sont consacrees a l'exploration de la coordination kinesthese-champ sensoriel, et de sa typique determinee. Seconde partie (t. Ii) : 1) commentaire succinct du traducteur, sous forme de notes renvoyant au t. I. 2) essai synthetique sur la theorie husserlienne de la constitution de la chose. L'a. Definit l'enjeu ultime de la phenomenologie de la synthese passive, comme double question du sens de l'etre et de l'etre-ainsi du monde reel. Rectifiant la mesinterpretation de l'attitude phenomenologique comme "reduction", il montre que celle-ci n'est nullement un geste cartesien; d'ou suit la determination des exigences methodiques du concept de constitution; l'analyse des presupposes de l'a priori transcendantal constitutif devoile alors l'a priori genetique et l'aporie correspondante. L'a. Situe egalement, par rapport a la constitution. .First part : french translation of husserl's dingvorlesung (1907 summer term course) and of complementary texts, as published in the original ed. By u. Claesges (hua, 16) husserl defines there the fundamental notions of his phenomenology of perception. Then, after a fundamental analysis of the simpler case of perceptions wherein sense data remain unchanged, he develops the intentional implications of cinetically synthetized perceptions; it leads to pointing out the essential inadequateness of every perception of a thing. The last two divisions of the work are dedicated to the study of the kinesthesis-sense field coordination, and to its definite type. Second part : 1) translator's brief comments and critical remarks, related to the first part text. 2) a synthetic essay on husserl's theory of the constitution of material things in perception : the a. Sets forth the decisive import of passive synthesis and its phenomenology. He traces the double fundamental question of the meaning of "being" and "being-so" in the case of material reality. He criticizes the wrong understanding of "phenomenological attitude" as a "reductive" operation --a typically cartesian gesture. Hence the methodological and logical requirements of the concept of constitution. Analyzing the presuppositions of the latter, the a. Shows that founding the constitutive a priori upon a "genetical" a priori ultimately leads to contradiction : phenomenology, as transcendental, proves to be either a modern empiricism,. .
7
Mawhūb, Muḥammad. "Heidegger critique de Husserl." Paris 8, 1997. http://www.theses.fr/1997PA081869.
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Désobstruant la phénoménologie husserlienne de l'impasse où l'a menée son attachement à l'ego cartésien, Heidegger s'est ainsi donné les moyens de penser l'autre. Dès lors, tout un réseau de concepts et de procédés qui tourne autour de la représentation est déconstruire : objet, sujet, intentionnalité, science, vérité, évidence, scepticisme, historicisme et psychologisme
8
Gmainer-Pranzl, Franz. "Heterotopie der Vernunft : Skizze einer Methodologie interkulturellen Philosophierens auf dem Hintergrund der Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls /." Münster [u.a.] : LIT, 2007. http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&doc_number=015591880&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA.
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9
Tyradellis, Daniel. "Untiefen : Husserls Begriffsebene zwischen Formalismus und Lebenswelt /." Würzburg : Königshausen & Neumann, 2006. http://deposit.ddb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?id=2704196&prov=M&dok_var=1&dok_ext=htm.
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10
MacDonald, Paul S. "Descartes, Husserl and radical conversion." Thesis, Durham University, 1996. http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/5244/.
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Phenomenology has been one of the most influential and far-reaching developments in 20th Century Philosophy and has had a great impact on the disciplines of philosophy of logic and math, theory of knowledge, and theory of meaning. The most profound influence on Edmund Husserl (1859 - 1938), the founder of phenomenology, was Rene Descartes (1596 - 1650), whose radical rethinking of philosophy’s overall project provided Husserl with both the historical and conceptual point of departure for his foundation of prima philosophia. Despite this explicit and well-known influence, there is no book- length study of their thematic parallels; numerous Journal articles focus almost entirely on the phenomenological reduction and, aside from this, are fairly unsatisfactory. The purpose of the present work is to elucidate systematic convergences (and divergences) between Descartes and Husserl throughout their respective philosophical developments. This comprises explication of several central topics: 1. The parallel between 17th C. skepticism, which Descartes attempted to overthrow, and 19th C. psychologism and relativism, which Husserl reacted against. 2. The striking similarity at the level of formal ontology between Descartes' simple and complex natures and Husserl's part-whole theory. 3. A clarification of the Cartesian sense of methodical doubt and how Husserl's mistaking of this shaped the initial formulation of the reduction. 4. Convergence in the maturation of the primitive notion of intuition as "clear and distinct seeing" and "seeing of essences" for both thinkers. 5. An analysis of the modes of methodical doubt, in terms of steps in the cognitive act of doubting, and not merely in the content of that which is doubted. 6. Far-reaching divergences in that Descartes was motivated to establish with scientific certainly an entirely new world of being, whereas Husserl was concerned to disclose an entirely new sense of the world. As such, thematic convergences between Descartes and Husserl are not due to accidental intersections of interest, nor are they curiosities of the comparative method in historical research. These parallels are intrinsic and systematic due to an overarching congruence in their visions of the starting point, methodological procedures, and reaction to pseudo-scientific matters-of-fact in the founding of a genuine philosophical project.
11
Rizo-Patrón, de Lerner Rosemary. "Husserl, Mundo, Conciencia y Temporalidad." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú - Departamento de Humanidades, 2013. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/112932.
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12
Arce, Jorge, María Balarín, Gonzalo Cobo, Juan Ccoyllo, Mariana Chu, Henry Galecio, Gonzalo Gamio, et al. "Repertorio Bibliográfico sobre Edmund Husserl." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2012. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/119554.
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Este repertorio registra información de Husserl en la Internet, una breve historia sobre los Nachlaß, el índice de la Husserliana, un listado de las publicaciones de y sobre Husserl disponibles en la Biblioteca Central de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, y los artículos sobre Husserl que se encuentran en la Hemeroteca. El listado abarca las publicaciones existentes hasta el año 1997.
13
Perreau, Laurent. "Le monde social selon Husserl." Paris 1, 2006. http://www.theses.fr/2006PA010624.
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"Cette étude est consacrée à l'examen des différentes figures de la théorie husserlienne du monde social: dans quelle mesure la phénoménologie husserlienne est-elle à même de dire les phénomènes sociaux, sur quel mode et avec quels résultats? Dans un premier moment, nous reconstituons le propos des deux « ontologies sociales» qui s'efforcent de penser le monde social en son essence et en ses essences: d'une part, l'ontologie de la région « monde social », subordonnée à la région de 1'« esprit » et élaborée à partir d'une phénoménologie de la communication; d'autre part, l'ontologie morphologique et eidétique des formes essentielles de communautés sociales. Dans un second moment, nous suivons l'élaboration d'une « sociologie transcendantale » qui reconsidère le rapport de la subjectivité transcendantale au monde social. Nous montrons comment Husserl a d'abord différé le traitement « transcendantal» de l'intersubjectivité personnelle des Ideen II pour travailler la théorie de la personne dans un registre exclusivement égologique. Les développements de la théorie de la personne, qui semblent détourner de la considération de sa socialité, précisent en réalité le rapport du sujet personnel au monde social sous l'angle de sa « mienneté », de l'habitualité et de la familiarité d'une part, et dans la perspective d'une éthique sociale d'autre part. Nous montrons enfin comment, autour de la Krisis, la théorie du monde de la vie a pu constituer le cadre théorique d'une « sociologie transcendantale » qui se développe, sur le fond d'une anthropologie du monde commun, comme théorie de la générativité. De l'ontologie sociale à la sociologie transcendantale, cette recherche doit donc être conçue comme une investigation des ressources et des difficultés de la voie par l'ontologie d'accès à la réduction transcendantale. Remarquable enquête menée sur l'expérience sociale du sujet, la phénoménologie husserlienne du monde social peut également être considérée comme le paradigme des théories intersubjectivistes du monde social ; par là se révèle l'intérêt qu'elle peut présenter pour la discipline sociologique comme pour la philosophie du "social" en général"
14
Rinofner-Kreidl, Sonja. "Edmund Husserl : Zeitlichkeit und Intentionalität /." Freiburg : K. Alber, 2000. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb37209441j.
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15
Bianchin, Matteo. "Intenzionalità e interpretazione: Husserl sull'intersoggettività." Doctoral thesis, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia, 1999. http://hdl.handle.net/10579/762.
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16
Dang, Huy Trinh. "Der Raum in der Phänomenologie Husserls zur Grundlegung der Geometrie." Berlin wvb, Wiss. Verl. Berlin, 2005. http://www.wvberlin.de/data/inhalt/dang.htm.
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17
Rhéaume, Michel. "Le langage comme habitus chez Husserl." Thesis, Université Laval, 2013. http://www.theses.ulaval.ca/2013/30007/30007.pdf.
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La question qui nous intéresse est celle de savoir si et comment le langage peut avoir une influence sur la manière dont le monde se « donne » à une conscience. La phénoménologie développée par Husserl au début de son œuvre permet d’expliquer comment le langage est employé pour fixer et articuler la manière dont une conscience intentionnelle s’ouvre au monde et se rapporte à lui. Par contre, Husserl ne se donne pas encore les moyens de penser l’importance de l’ancrage historique des langues réelles, c’est-à-dire leur caractère irréductiblement situé, facticiel. Nous soutiendrons qu’il est possible d’élaborer, à partir des œuvres tardives de Husserl, un concept de langage comme « habitus », qui permettra de comprendre la manière dont le langage évolue, se modifie et se transmet au sein d’une tradition. La maîtrise parfaite et la transparence du langage apparaîtront au bout du compte comme des idéaux, possibles seulement pour une conscience radicalement auto-responsable.
18
Walton, Roberto J. "Monadología y teleología en Edmund Husserl." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú - Departamento de Humanidades, 2016. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/113178.
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lribarne, Julia Valentina. "Dios en la fenomenología de Husserl." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú - Departamento de Humanidades, 2013. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/112965.
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Este estudio de la idea de Dios en la fenomenología de Husserl, intenta, amodo de propedéutica, ordenar, según cuatro enfoques, textos husserlianos en que se hace referencia a Dios. En primer lugar, se trata de Dios considerado como un objeto de cuya constitución hay que dar razón. En segundo lugar, se reúnen las referencias a Dios usado para destacar la universalidad de los rasgos de las operaciones constitutivas.A continuación se estudian textos referidos a la experiencia religiosa, ellugar que da Husserl a la experiencia mística, a la creencia y la plegaria. Paraterminar, se considera la idea de Dios en relación con las preguntas y hechosúltimos, las notas de la divinidad y el método que autoriza al filósofo areferirse a ella.
20
Alarcón, Castillo Vania Micaela. "Husserl. Prolegómenos para una normatividad ética." Bachelor's thesis, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12404/18677.
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El propósito de este trabajo es ofrecer una justificación del carácter normativo de la
intencionalidad según Husserl e ilustrarlo con la explicación de la normatividad del primer
tipo de actos, esto es, los cognitivos, lo cual será un primer paso para, en un siguiente trabajo,
dar cuenta, análogamente, de la normatividad ética, correspondiente a los actos emocionales
y volitivos. La estructura del trabajo es la siguiente: en el primer capítulo, discutiré el método
y problema de la fenomenología husserliana. Para esto, hago un repaso de las etapas de su
pensamiento a partir de la evolución de la delimitación de los conceptos de lo inmanente y
trascendente, y una descripción de la epojé y la reducción como herramientas metodológicas,
así como del concepto de constitución. En un segundo capítulo, discuto dos distinciones
pertinentes para el concepto de intencionalidad: aquella entre la intención vacía (mención) e
intención llena, que en adelante llamaré intuición, y aquella entre los tipos de actos
intencionales. Respecto a la primera, hago una genealogía del concepto de evidencia,
rastreando los tres sentidos de este concepto –los cuales corresponden a los tres sentidos de
los conceptos “inmanente” y “trascendente” que analizo en el primer capítulo–, en virtud de
su relevancia para la plenificación o cumplimiento de la intención. Además, explico el
carácter normativo que se obtiene de esta descripción considerando el elemento
intersubjetivo. Respecto a la segunda distinción, en primer lugar, diferencio los actos
cognitivos de los actos emocionales y los actos volitivos a partir de dos criterios de
clasificación que corresponden a diferentes etapas del pensamiento de Husserl; en segundo
lugar, discuto la demarcación de los conceptos de intencionalidad, constitución y
objetivación. En un tercer capítulo, trato los actos cognitivos, en analogía a los cuales,
Husserl dará cuenta de la normatividad de los actos éticos. Este último capítulo se divide en
dos partes: en la primera detallo la estructura de este primer tipo de actos, describiendo sus
diferentes tipos, horizontes, la evidencia u óptimo al que tienden y la normatividad de los
mismos, y, en la segunda parte, exploro su origen genético y aspecto intersubjetivo.
Finalmente, mis conclusiones vinculan lo presentado con elementos de la filosofía
husserliana que pertenecen a su concepción de razón y responsabilidad.
21
Kassis, Raymond. "Transcendantalité et intersubjectivité chez E. Husserl." Paris 10, 1997. http://www.theses.fr/1997PA100018.
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Transcendantalite et intersubjectivite est une etude a la fois historique et structurale de la phenomenologie de husserl dans sa progression vers une philosophie transcendantale. Il s'agit generalement d'examiner le transcendantal selon deux plans intimement lies l'un a l'autre. Le premier consiste a en chercher la genese ideelle et la motivation rationnelle a partir de la periode pre-transcendantale de la philosophie de husserl. Cela necessitait une lecture attentive tendant a montrer la continuite, non seulement entre les deux periodes contrastees d'avant et d'apres l'irruption de la methode de reduction transcendantale, mais aussi a travers les multiples travaux a caractere antithetique de l'oeuvre pre-transcendantale (philo. De l'arithmetique, prolegomenes a la logique pure, la suite des recherches logiques etc. ). La definition du transcendantal dans ses multiples caracteristiques necessitait, tant au niveau de la constitution du monde qu'a celui de la logique pure et du monde mathematise, des comparaisons avec descartes, galilee, leibniz, locke, berkeley, hume. Une confrontation avec kant etait indispensable tout au long du travail. Le deuxieme plan consiste a chercher la justification du transcendantal lui-meme au-dela de sa progression dans l'oeuvre de husserl. La dimension intersubjective apparait a ce niveau comme l'une des caracteristiques fondamentales sans lesquelles la position transcendantale ne pourrait etre maintenue. Elle rendait indispensable la recherche d'un concept d'un ego transcendantal, different de celui de kant, mais a l'abri du piege du solipsisme transcendantal. La discussion critique du concept d'ego chez husserl a partir des theses neo-kantiennes amenait a etudier le concept d'intropathie (einfuhlung) dans toute son envergure, a travers les ecrits de husserl, puisque le phenomene d'intropathie est l'unique moyen qui restait a la disposition de la phenomenologie pour surmonter le solipsisme de l'egologie. La conclusion de la recherche devoile dans l'eidetique transcendantal, qui s'exerce dans les immenses et tortueuses voies de l'oeuvre posthume, le moyen de voir en l'ego de l'egologie un ego transsubjectif et originellement intersubjectif avant d'etre individuelTranscendentality and intersubjectivity is both a historical and structural study of the philosophy of husserl in its progression towards a transcendental philosophy. It presents a general examination of the transcendental following two closely interrelated dimensions. The first consists in tracing its genesis and rational motivation from the pre-transcendental period of husserl's philosophy. This required a close reading which shows the continuity not only between the two contrasting periods before and after the adoption of the method of transcendental reduction, but also through the many works of an antithetical nature of the pre-transcendental writings (philosophie de l'arithmetique, prolegomenes a la logique pure. The continuation of the recherches logiques etc). The definition of the main features of the notion of the transcendental necessitated, both on the level of the constitution of the world and on that of pure logic and the mathematised world, comparisons with descartes, galileo, leibniz, locke, berkeley and hume. Throughout the study there is a permanent confrontation with the ideas of kant. The second dimension consists in an investigation into the justification of the transcendental itself beyond the progression of husserl's work. The intersubjective element appears on this level to be one of the fundamental characteristics without which the transcendental position could not be maintained. This required a concept of a transcendental ego, different from kant's but avoiding the trap of transcendental solipsism. The critical discussion of husserl's concept of the ego based on neo-kantian theses led to a detailed study of the concept of empathy (einfuhlung), in husserl'swritings, since the phenomenon of empathy is the only means phenomenology still has at its disposal to surmount the solipsism of egology. The conclusion of the research shows in the transcendental eidetic, at work in the immense and tangled paths of the posthumous writings, the means to seein the ego of egology an ego which is transsubjective and originally intersubjective before being individual
22
Schnell, Alexander. "Le probleme du temps chez husserl." Paris 12, 2001. http://www.theses.fr/2001PA120053.
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L'etude de la phenomenologie husserlienne du temps que nous essayons de livrer dans le present travail a un double interet : elle permet a la fois d'etablir l'importance cruciale de husserl en matire de la philosophie du temps - notamment dans son debat implicite avec kant - et, en meme temps, de montrer que, a l'interieur du champ phenomenologique, l'approfondissement de la question de la constitution de la conscience du temps implique de reconsiderer la structure de l'intentionialite, d'un cote, et le statut de l'idealisme transcendantal husserlien, de l'autre. Notre approche est a son tour double : elle essaie de retracer, en en isolant les moments forts, les etapes decisives de l'acquisition des outils essentiels de la phenomenologie husserlienne du temps (les differents types d'objets temporels, le schema apprehension / contenu d'apprehension, l'intentionnalite retentionnelle et protentionnelle, l'auto-constitution du flux absolu de la conscience, etc. ) et de deployer, a l'aide d'une interpretation originale du texte decisif des manuscrits de bernau (qualifies de husserl comme son << oeuvre majeure >>), la conception definitive de la constitution, au niveau de la sphere immanente, des objectites temporelles avec leurs orientations temporelles, et de celle, au niveau de la sphere pre- imanente, de l'auto-apparition du << processus originaire >>, dont nous decrivons en detail la structure en << noyaux >>. La philosophie husserlienne du temps s'avere ainsi etre un idealisme transcendantal d'une nouvelle sorte : loin de se reduire a une approche solipsiste s'apparentant a un << idealisme de production >> ou a une construction metaphysique se heurtant aux evidences de l'experience, elle rend compte des vecus originaires des phenomenes constitutifs de la constitution de la conscience du temps - des << tempo-phenomenes >> - qui ne sont pas seulement des << conditions de possibilite >> de l'experience, mais s'attestent << en chair et en os >> dans la description phenomenologique.
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Beltechi, Ligia. "La phénoménologie de l'imagination chez Husserl." Paris 12, 2006. http://www.theses.fr/2006PA120058.
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L'imagination est un acte de consciences originaire qui institue une pluralité des mondes imaginaires dont la distinction est fondée sur la différente constitution intentionnelle des images. Opposée à la perception qui requiert une visée toujours remplie par le sensible, l'image est une visée à vide, qui procède d'un ou plusieurs conflits intentionnels. Le concept traditionnel d'image s'efface afin de faire place à une réalité dynamique, fondée sur la simultanéité constitutive d'un objet physique, d'un "Bildobjet" et d'un "Bildsujet". Husserl fait la différence entre images qui supposent la triple constitution d'objets (la photographie et le portrait en tant qu'images conçues par ressemblance, le tableau en tant qu'image symbolique, la rêverie ou la fiction littéraire en tant que fictum d'action, le rêve en tant que fictum pur)The imagination is an originary act of conscience that creates a multiplicity of imaginary worlds, based on the distinction between the different types of intentional constitution of images. Opposed to the perception that requires a sensible saturation of the intentional act, the image has no intuitive appearance and supposes an intentional conflict. The traditional concept of image has no meaning anymore, the image is understood as a dynamic reality that requires a triple intentional constitution as a physical object a "Bildoject" and a "Bildsubject". Husserl makes a difference between the images that suppose the simultaneous constitution of all three objects (photography and memories as images created by association and art as a symbolic image) and images that require the simultaneous constitution of two objects (the theater as perceptive and symbolic fictum, the fiction as action fictum, and the dream as pure fictum)
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Serban, Claudia-Cristina. "Le possible selon Husserl et Heidegger." Thesis, Paris 4, 2013. http://www.theses.fr/2013PA040179.
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Le présent travail propose de caractériser le projet philosophique de Husserl et de Heidegger comme une phénoménologie de la possibilité. Il s’agit, ce faisant, de démontrer qu’il existe un concept phénoménologique de possibilité, qui ne se confond ni avec le concept métaphysique ni avec le concept modal, et de reconstruire ce concept à l’aide de Husserl et de Heidegger. Il apparaît ainsi que la phénoménologie, non seulement renverse le primat traditionnel de l’effectif sur le possible, mais accomplit le dépassement de leur opposition statique pour mettre au jour leur co-appartenance dynamique. Si donc, pour la phénoménologie, « plus haut que l’effectivité se tient la possibilité », c’est pour autant qu’elle découvre l’entrelacement de l’effectif et du possible dans le réelWhile describing Husserl’s and Heidegger’s philosophical project as a phenomenology of possibility, we intend to prove the existence of a phenomenological concept of possibility that cannot be reduced to a metaphysical or a mere modal concept. For phenomenology not only inverts the traditional primacy of effectivity on possibility, but also, and most importantly, overcomes the static opposition of the two by bringing to light the fact that they dynamically belong together. Therefore, phenomenology has the right to assert that « higher than effectivity stands possibility » insofar it discovers their constant and irreducible intertwining within reality
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Shiau, Yuh An. "Wachen und Schlaf in der Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls." [S.l. : s.n.], 2004. http://deposit.ddb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?idn=972446648.
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Devynck, Jean-Christophe. "Logique du phénomène : études sur les "Recherches" de Husserl /." Sèvres : Presses académiques Diakom, 2000. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb399551220.
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Pefaur, Poza Miguel. "Dos Escritos Sobre La Percepción en Husserl. Informe final de Seminario de Grado: “Husserl, Heidegger y Levinas”." Tesis, Universidad de Chile, 2005. http://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/110232.
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Informe de Seminario para optar al grado de Licenciado en Filosofía.Dedicamos estas pocas líneas a la aclaración de la naturaleza del presente trabajo. Éste se compone de dos escritos nacidos de la lectura de algunos de los libros fundamentales del filósofo Edmund Husserl. Este par de escritos son independientes en su tratamiento, pero no por ello inconexos. Se titulan “El mundo, la percepción y el cuerpo”, el primero, y “Una lectura de “La Fenomenología del la Conciencia Interna del Tiempo” desde los diversos sentidos de la noción de “percepción” ”, el segundo. Como se puede ver en los títulos, ambos escritos se mueven en torno a la noción de “percepción”, pieza clave de los análisis fenomenológicos encaminados a fundamentar el conocimiento científico. Que la percepción sea tomada como hilo conductor de nuestras reflexiones, se motiva, además, por el carácter introductorio de las mismas y por ser quien escribe un principiante. Escoger como punto de partida de nuestras reflexiones a la percepción no es una pura arbitrariedad, quien se adentra como principiante en reflexiones acerca de la realidad del mundo y acerca de nuestro acceso a dicha realidad, no puede sino partir de la percepción sensible, en la cual el mundo se nos hace presente. A través de la percepción sensible tenemos conciencia del mundo como una realidad que me hace frente. Este tener conciencia se diferencia de otros modos de conciencia, tales como el recuerdo la fantasía el deseo, etc., en él experimentamos el mundo. Hablamos de experiencia en sentido amplio, entendiendo por ésta el contacto con algo que nos es ajeno, que está afuera (ex-), que es externo, y hacia lo cual nos dirigimos cuando percibimos y conocemos. Asumimos la enseñanza kantiana de que todo conocimiento del mundo comienza con la experiencia, aun que no tenga en ella su origen. Nos parece así apropiado partir, como principiantes que somos, desde el principio, desde la percepción sensible como experiencia del mundo y de las cosas del mundo.
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Taguchi, Shigeru. "Das Problem des "Ur-Ich" bei Edmund Husserl : die Frage nach der selbstverständlichen "Nähe" des Selbst /." Dordrecht : Springer, 2006. http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&doc_number=014952326&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA.
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Martin, Noah Gabriel. "Husserl and Derrida : the origins of history." Thesis, University of Sussex, 2016. http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/61302/.
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Jacques Derrida's deconstruction of the metaphysical priority of the present simultaneously validates presence as the absolute form of meaning. In order to succeed, deconstruction is bound to offer the most robust defence of transcendental phenomenology's systematic articulation of the very constitution of experience in its absolute and irrecusably present form. Edmund Husserl's late philosophy of history accounts for the contradiction of atemporal truth—how it is created in time, and how it is possible for the historical investigation of this truth to determine its meaning with absolute certainty. Through the necessity of an ideal and phenomenologically reduced history—not only for the work of historical investigation in its own right, but as a constituent of the meaning of any truth— Derrida explains why Husserl devotes so much effort to explicating the structure and process of the formation of ideal objects in the course of what is ostensively an explanation of the origination of the geometrical science itself out of subjective experience. The purpose of this is only ever implied in Husserl's own work “The Origin of Geometry”, and the implications are subtle. The purpose of this thesis is to detail how the structures of Husserl's system serve the end clearly elucidated by Derrida. It first explains how objective truth is constituted and an ideal history made possible through Husserl's examination of their appearance in the living present, and following this it examines the problems raised by Derrida's deconstruction itself.
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Costa, Valmir de. "Estatuto da imanência na fenomenologia de Husserl." Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo, 2015. https://tede2.pucsp.br/handle/handle/11700.
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This thesis aims to contribute to the deepen uhe understanding of immnence in the thought of Husserl, its length and constituition, fundamentally, from descriptive psychology (1900) and transcendental philosophy (1913). Phenomenology is characterized by the free exercise of reason, which through its own research method, performs ideal self apprehension of pure objects in consciousness. The immanence designates a region to be in those objects that assume the conditions of possibility of a pure manifestation, constituting the very identity of phenomenology as the theory of knowledge. Conceptually, at the beginning of phenomenological research, the immanence of psychic acts is opposed to all kinds of transcendent objects to those acts, which turns out to phenomenology as science of ideal objects (First and Second Chapters). His method of investigation, as determined by the specificity of its object, differs totally from the method of the natural sciences. Phenomenology, by the method of reduction and intuition, investigates the region to be the transcendent consciousness to the world with their pure and ideal objects, which, by their levels of incorporation and links actually the philosophical discourse to a rigorous science. The natural sciences, the empirical and deduction methods, are immanent to the world and constitute a 'real' objective relationship with his research object, therefore relative (Third Chapter). It will be seen that the immanence of the status of the position of pure object is consolidated, conversely, by the suspension of the entire thesis of the world, as opposed by epistemological phenomenology to empiricism. Husserl, in his way of consolidation of phenomenological research, constitutes, according to the evolution of his thinking, different levels of description of the acts of consciousness. He leaves thus the origin of a real immanence (Real), the logical inheritance and psychologism, through immanence 'Reell', referring to the descriptive psychology, to reach its highest level of development, with the pure immanence. If the level of last description that aims to phenomenology is achieved only when it comes to the transcendental, as a definitive break from all order of nature, the 'reduction' is the inaugural gesture that takes place every phenomenological analysis (Four Chapter). The immanence seeks to resolve a problem which, in the phenomenological theory, breaks the link with the world, is indispensable to the establishment of its meaning, manifested only by an absolute being. The apprehension of being in the world is only possible as well, in suspension and consequent denial. Phenomenology becomes thus a strict science of pure objects held by the inaugural gesture of epoché in the world, reduced their intentional manifestation, it consists, for an idea of time itself, transcendentally in consciousness (Fifth Chapter). The immanence of the statute is effected itself in the psychology which turns into pure phenomenology, and this to transcendental philosophy
A presente tese pretende contribuir para o aprofundamento da compreensão da imanência no pensamento de Husserl, sua extensão e constituição, fundamentalmente, da psicologia descritiva (1900) à filosofia transcendental (1913). A fenomenologia se caracteriza pelo exercício livre da razão, que através de um método de investigação próprio, executa a autoapreensão ideadora de objetos puros na consciência. A imanência designa uma região de ser em que os objetos assumem as condições de possibilidade de sua manifestação pura, constituindo a própria identidade da investigação fenomenológica como teoria do conhecimento. Conceitualmente, no início de sua investigação, a imanência dos atos psíquicos se contrapõe a toda ordem de objetos transcendentes a tais atos, o que acaba por constituir a fenomenologia como ciência de objetos ideais (Primeiro e Segundo Capítulos). Seu método de investigação, determinado pela especificidade de seu objeto, se distingue totalmente do método das ciências da natureza. A fenomenologia, pelo método da redução e da intuição, investiga a região de ser da consciência transcendente ao mundo, com seus objetos puros e ideais, em que, pelos seus níveis de constituição e verdade, vincula o discurso filosófico a uma ciência de rigor. As ciências da natureza, pelo método empirista e da dedução, são imanentes ao mundo e constituem uma relação objetiva real de investigação com seu objeto, por isso relativa (Terceiro Capítulo). Ver-se-á que a posição do estatuto da imanência de objetos puros se consolida, inversamente, pela suspensão de toda tese do mundo, como contraposição epistemológica da fenomenologia ao empirismo. Husserl, em seu percurso de consolidação da investigação fenomenológica, constitui, conforme a evolução de seu pensamento, níveis distintos de descrição dos atos de consciência. Parte, assim, na origem, de uma imanência real (Real), herdeira da lógica e do psicologismo, passando pela imanência Reell , referente à psicologia descritiva, até chegar a seu nível mais alto de elaboração, com a imanência pura. Se o nível de descrição último que visa à fenomenologia é alcançado somente quando se chega ao transcendental, como ruptura definitiva de toda ordem de natureza, a redução é o gesto inaugural em que se realiza toda análise fenomenologia (Quarto Capítulo). O estudo da imanência procura dirimir um problema, de que, na teoria fenomenológica, a ruptura do vínculo com o mundo é indispensável à constituição de seu sentido, manifestada, unicamente, por um ser absoluto. A apreensão do ser do mundo só é possível assim, por sua suspensão e consequente negação. A fenomenologia torna-se, desse modo, uma ciência estrita de objetos puros, realizada pelo gesto inaugural da epoché, em que o mundo, reduzido a sua manifestação intencional, é constituído, por uma ideia de tempo própria, transcendentalmente na consciência (Quinto Capítulo). O estatuto da imanência é o próprio resultado em que a psicologia se transforma em fenomenologia pura, e esta em filosofia transcendental
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Rizo-Patrón, de Lerner Rosemary. "Análisis y fundamento. Husserl y la tradición." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú - Departamento de Humanidades, 2013. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/113077.
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Rizo-Patrón, Rosemary, and Jorge Arce. "Edmund Husserl. El origen de la geometría." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2012. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/119639.
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Granel, Gerard. "Métaphysique et politique: l' 'Europe' selon Husserl." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú - Departamento de Humanidades, 2013. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/112822.
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Waldenfels, Bernhard. "Fenomenología de la experiencia en Edmund Husserl." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú - Departamento de Humanidades, 2017. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/112964.
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Ricoeur, Paul. "Introducción a Ideen I de Edmund Husserl." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú - Departamento de Humanidades, 2014. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/112805.
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Le, Quitte Samuel. "Phénoménologie et éthique des valeurs selon Husserl." Thesis, Rennes 1, 2013. http://www.theses.fr/2013REN1S174.
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La philosophie de Husserl est guidée par la volonté d'atteindre une connaissance objective du monde. La description de l'expérience de la conscience qu'elle propose porte en effet d'abord sur l'expérience des vécus par lesquels nous prenons connaissance du monde et sur les différences qu'il existe entre une connaissance authentique et une simple présomption, une croyance ou une illusion. Mais cette priorité de la connaissance objective dans l'ordre de la méthode ne doit pas occulter l'antériorité, dans l'ordre réel, de l'expérience non-conceptuelle et inobjective des biens. En effet, le monde se donne à nous d'abord comme un monde de biens et comme la manifestation sensible de certaines valeurs. Nous voyons de beaux objets, nous trouvons l'espace utile ou pratique, nous sommes attirés par un bruit, gênés par une lumière, etc. Comment concilier ces deux exigences, celle de la méthode et celle de l'expérience ? Cette question porte sur les conditions de possibilité de la phénoménologie elle-même, puisque cette méthode, pour intégrer le nouveau genre de problèmes que posent les valeurs, dans l'ordre esthétique ou éthique, doit s'amender en permanence. Les valeurs touchent en effet aux limites de la description des actes objectivants, car elles relèvent d'une dimension qui n'est pas assimilable à celle de la nature objective des choses. Les valeurs éthiques, plus précisément, touchent aux limites de l'exigence phénoménologique de l'unité de la raison et du strict parallélisme entre les différents types d'actes correspondant aux divers registres de l'expérience (théorique, axiologique et pratique). Ainsi, l'injustice ou la vertu ne se donnent pas à la manière dont se donnent les choses dans la perception sensible et ne sauraient faire l'objet d'une « constitution intentionnelle » depuis les prestations subjectives. Le sens d'une valeur ne dépasse-t-il pas toujours et par principe les possibilités constitutives du sujet ? En d'autres termes, peut-on penser les valeurs éthiques comme des « analoga » des propriétés empiriques des objets, dont il faudrait rendre compte et qu'il faudrait parvenir à connaître de manière objective, ou bien n'y a-t-il pas là un ordre qui échappe à la description, voire au rêve husserlien d'une science de tous les phénomènes et d'une description pure de tous les types d'expérience ? Pour répondre à cette question, nous procédons en deux temps. Le premier s'interroge sur les conditions de possibilité d'une théorie des valeurs élaborée au fil de la méthode phénoménologique, c'est-à-dire au moyen d'un double réquisit – analogique et transcendantal. Le second montre comment la compréhension du sens des valeurs éthiques implique des glissements et des réélaborations de cette méthode qui ont pour fonction de révéler, à la racine des actes d'évaluation et de volition qui se rapportent aux valeurs, la vie et l'œuvre du sujet éthiqueHusserl's philosophy is an attempt to obtain objective knowledge on the world, which offers a description of the cognitive consciousness, in order to distinguish a presumptive or an illusory belief and an authentic knowledge. However, such a methodological precedence of the objective knowledge should not hide the actual priority of a non-objective and pre-predicative experience of the world. Indeed, the world first appears to us as a practical and valuable world. We can see beautiful objects, useful tools, pleasant landscapes. One is drawn by a sound or disturbed by a light. How are these two points of view to be reconciled? May we conciliate the methodological priority of theoretical consciousness and the empirical precedence of values and goods? This question deals with the possibility of phenomenology itself, because this philosophical method has to transform itself in order to take into account the idiosyncratic kinds of problems that raise the experience of values. Values reach the limits of the “objectifying consciousness's” possibilities. Because they do not belong to the realm of nature, values are not one of the empirical properties of things. More precisely, ethical values query the need of unity in Reason and the need of a strict parallelism between different intentional acts. May injustice or virtue appear as do so colours or shapes in the sensible world? Can these values be intentionally constituted? Does the meaning of values ever exceed the constitutive capabilities in the subject? In order to answer these questions, two fields shall be developed. The first one questions the possibility of a value theory, which is brought by the phenomenological method, that is to say, through a demand of analogy and a demand of transcendental constitution. The second one indicates how the understanding of ethical values implies some shifting and new elaborations in the methodology itself, in order to show, behind the rationality of emotional and volitional acts, the life and work of the ethical subject
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Cavallin, Jens. "Content and object : Husserl, Twardowski and psychologism /." Stockholm : Department of philosophy, University of Stockholm, 1990. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb354594273.
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Fontana, Vanessa Furtado. "Presentificação de fantasia na fenomonologia de Husserl." reponame:Repositório Institucional da UFSC, 2013. https://repositorio.ufsc.br/xmlui/handle/123456789/122678.
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Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Centro de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia, Florianópolis, 2013.Made available in DSpace on 2014-08-06T17:13:57Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 323392.pdf: 1891791 bytes, checksum: 6189e43d42c2dbb7e8cc4a85625ad069 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013
A tese trata do conceito de fantasia na fenomenologia de Edmund Husserl a partir dos manuscritos intitulados: Phantasie, Bildbewusstsein und erinnerung. Zur Phänomenologie des anchaulichen VergegenWärtigungen. Texte aus dem nachlass (1898-1925). A tese trata da fundamentação do conceito de fantasia a partir da novidade deste conceito na história da filosofia e como está novidade está argumentada na fenomenologia. A tese de apoio é pensar o privilégio metodológico da fantasia na construção da fenomenologia como ciência descritivas de essências. O método utilizado contou com a análise das obras: "Investigações Lógicas", "Ideias I" e "Lições para uma Fenomenologia da Consciência Interna do Tempo". Os principais conceitos definidores da fantasia são: intuição, intencionalidade, presentificação e neutralidade. Mostra-se qual a importância da fantasia na consciência pura e suas relações na consciência temporal. A fantasia atua como intencionalidade privilegiada na busca das essências. Ela se opõe ontologicamente à percepção, mas isto implica antes na sua importante tarefa de neutralizar as vivências para alcançar um âmbito transcendental de fundamento.
Abstract : The thesis deals with the concept of fantasy in the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl from the manuscript entitled: ?Phantasie, Bildbewusstsein und erinnerung. Zur Phänomenologie des anchaulichen VergegenWärtigungen.?(1898-1925). The thesis deals with the foundation of the concept of fantasy from the newness of this concept in the history of philosophy and how is newness is argued in Husserl?s phenomenology. The groundwork support the privilege methodological thinking is fantasy in the construction of phenomenology as a descriptive science of essences. The method used involved the analysis of the works: "Logical Investigations", "Ideas I" and "Lessons for a Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness". The main concepts defining fantasy are: intuition, intentionality, re-presentification and neutrality. It is shown that the importance of fantasy in pure consciousness and their relationship in temporal consciousness. The fantasy acts as prime intentionality in pursuit of essences. She is ontologically opposed to perception, but this means before in their important task of neutralizing the experiences to achieve a framework transcendental foundation.
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Afeissa, Hicham-Stéphane. "L'habitant du monde selon Kant et Husserl." Thesis, Lyon 3, 2012. http://www.theses.fr/2012LYO30041.
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Le projet de cette thèse est d’examiner ce que nous avons appelé le problème du monde, en entendant par là le problème du mode d’apparition d’une totalité intotalisable qui ne se réduit pas à la somme de ce qui apparaît, et le problème du mode d’être de celui qui appartient au monde et qui est également celui pour lequel le monde comme totalité apparaît. Le problème a été examiné dans le cadre de deux philosophies privilégiées : la philosophie kantienne et la phénoménologie husserlienne. La thématique de l’homme comme habitant du monde apparaît au croisement de trois grandes entreprises kantiennes : l’élaboration d’une épistémologie de la géographie physique en tant qu’elle comporte nécessairement un examen des modalités de l’existence de l’homme sur Terre ; le projet d’une réfutation de l’idéalisme, qui conduit à définir l’homme par son appartenance au monde ; la constitution d’une anthropologie pragmatique qui, tout en unifiant les thématiques précédentes les élargit en les intégrant dans la perspective de la destination pratique de l’homme auquel incombe la tâche de réaliser les conditions de son existence mondaine d’agent moral. Chez Husserl, le mode d’apparition du monde comme totalité est expressément élucidé dans le cadre de la phénoménologie de la perception au moyen de la doctrine de l’intentionnalité horizontale, au terme d’un assez long parcours que nous nous efforçons de reconstituer. En revanche, le mode d’être de celui pour lequel le monde apparaît en tant que tel ne fait l’objet de sa part que d’analyses programmatiques, auxquelles nous proposons de donner un prolongement dans la perspective d’une philosophie de l’environnementThe objective of this study is to inquire into what has been called the problem of the world, i.e. the problem of the mode of apparition of an intotalisable totality which cannot be reduced to the addition of what appears, and the problem of the mode of being of the subject who belongs to the world and to whom the world as totality appears. This problem has been examined with reference to two privileged philosophies : Kant’s philosophy and Husserl’s phenomenology. The theme of the inhabitant of the world appears at the meeting-point of three major Kantian undertakings, which are (1) the elaboration of an epistemology of geographical physics that necessarily contains an examination of the modalities of existence of man on Earth ; (2) the project of refuting idealism, which leads to defining man in his belonging to the world ; (3) the constitution of a pragmatic anthropology which, while unifying the foregoing topics, broadens them by integrating them into the perspective of the practical destination of man, upon whom falls the task of realising the conditions of his worldly existence as moral agent. In Husserl’s phenomenology, the concept of horizontal intentionality, developed in the phenomenology of perception, helps to explain the mode of apparition of the world as totality, at the end of a long run of thought which we try to reconstitute from the beginning. By contrast, the mode of being of the subject to whom the world as such appears is only programmatically examined in Husserl’s phenomenology. Our study seeks to give a prolongation to Husserl’s insights on this topic, in the direction of an environmental philosophy
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Chakraborty, Nirankush. "World subjectivity and life-world ala Husserl`s phenomenology." Thesis, University of North Bengal, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/1459.
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Settura, Matteo. "Noema und Sinn. Logica del senso e filosofia trascendentale in Edmund Husserl. Con un'appendice su Gilles Deleuze lettore di Husserl." Doctoral thesis, Università degli studi di Padova, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/11577/3426204.
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The thesis focuses on the relation between the concept of Sinn and the idea of transcendental philosophy in the works of Edmund Husserl between 1901 and 1913, paying particular attention to unpublished manuscript as "Noema und Sinn" and "Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins". The first chapter contains an analysis of the concepts of Bedeutung and Auffassungssinn in the LU. The second chapter deals with Husserl's rethinking of phenomenological giveness between 1903 and 1905. The third chapter exposes Husserl's introduction of the intentional object in the domain of phenomenological field in 1906 and the correlative revision of the concept of phenomenological immanence. The fourth chapter takes on the concepts of noema and noetic-noematic parallelism in Ideen I. The central idea of the dissertation is that the concept of sense is the pivotal point in order to understand Husserl's phenomenological-transcendental idealism. In particular, Husserl's so-called "transcendental turn" depends on the progressive clarification of two fundamentals laws of sense. The first law expresses the continuity between intentional ways of consciousness and intensional modus of giveness; the second law expresses the inextricable tangle between identical objectual reference and transcendental ways of manifestation.
The intepretative perspective is based on Gilles Deleuze Logic of Sense and the thesis also contains an appendix on Deleuze's critique of Husserl's concept of transcendental.La tesi consiste in una ricostruzione storico-teoretica dello sviluppo del concetto di senso in Edmund Husserl, con l'obiettivo di farne emergere la centralità per la definizione dell’idea di filosofia trascendentale. Si assume come filo conduttore l’interpretazione di Gilles Deleuze il quale, in Logique du sens, definisce la «scoperta del senso» come caratteristica distintiva della filosofia trascendentale. A partire da questa chiave di lettura, l’originalità del lavoro si configura nei termini di una presa di distanza dalla «detrascentalizzazione» (English) della fenomenologia proposta da numerosi allievi ed interpreti di Husserl. La ricerca mira quindi alla riaffermazione del carattere necessariamente trascendentale del pensiero di Husserl e individua nel concetto di senso il punto archimedico su cui poggia tale necessità. Il lavoro ripercorre lo sviluppo di questo concetto a partire dalla V Ricerca Logica per arrivare ad Ideen I (1913). Lungo questo percorso è possibile rintracciare, sulla base di circostanziate analisi testuali, l’intrinseca connessione tra la progressiva autonomizzazione della sfera del senso e la “svolta” trascendentale operata da Husserl (databile tra il 1907 ed il 1908), che apre alla definizione della struttura della coscienza in termini di correlazione noetico-noematica. Il concetto di senso esprime il tentativo di pensare il carattere “proteiforme” del «Logos» fenomenologico (Ms. B III 12 VIII), come dimensione irriducibile tanto al versante puramente logico-semantico della Bedeutung, quanto alla dimensione della Wahrnehmung ordinaria. Nel primo capitolo, viene dunque tracciata una genealogia del concetto fenomenologico di senso, mostrando come esso sorga da una fusione tra un modo intenzionalista (Brentano, Twardowski) e un modo non-intenzionalista (Bolzano, Frege) di pensare la struttura del discorso (Rede), organizzato secondo la tripartizione Vorstellung, Sinn, Gegenstand. In questo contesto, il concetto di senso mostra la sua intrinseca connessione con la definizione stessa dell’intenzionalità fenomenologica, nella misura in cui permette ad Husserl di contrapporsi tanto al rischio di una ipostatizzazione del significato, quanto a quello, opposto e complementare, di una riduzione del significato ad immagine, raffigurazione o copia psichico-coscienziale dell’oggetto. Nel secondo capitolo, viene messa in luce la “crisi metodologica” che seguì alla pubblicazione delle LU, la quale determinò una profonda ristrutturazione del concetto di datità fenomenologia e di datità immanente. Questa crisi si connette a sua volta, da un lato, ad una rinnovata problematizzazione del compito gnoseologico della fenomenologica, dall’altro, ai risultati delle analisi sulle presentificazioni intuitive (fantasia, rimemorazione) e sulla coscienzainterna del tempo del 1904/05. Questi risultati spinsero Husserl a rivedere la concezione ancora fondamentalmente psicologico-descrittiva ed empirico-scientifica dell’evidenza del dato fenomenologico e lo obbligarono quindi a superare la definizione della fenomenologia come «psicologia descrittiva», ancora valida nelle LU. Nel terzo capitolo, si mostra come l’insoddisfazione rispetto all’incompletezza della Erkenntniskritik condotta nelle LU porti Husserl a porre in termini radicali il problema del Triftigkeitsanspruch conoscitivo e ad un conseguente allargamento dell’indagine fenomenologica dalla dimensione ancora prevalentemente logico-verificazionista delle LU alla dimensione propriamente gnoseologica di una teoria differenziata delle molteplici modalità della coscienza intenzionale. In questo contesto si verifica un corrispettivo riassestamento della definizione stessa della fenomenologia, con l’introduzione dell’oggetto intenzionale (il senso come Gegenstand “als solcher” distinto dal Gegenstand schlechthin) nell’ambito dell’immanenza fenomenologica (WS 1906/07) e una conseguente ridefinizione di tale immanenza non più nei termini di una immanenza reell-coscienziale, ma di una immanenza intenzionale-trascendentale. Nel quarto capitolo, dedicato al concetto di noema e di correlazione noetico-noematica in Ideen, si ripercorre lo sviluppo della III e IV Sezione di Ideen I con l’obiettivo di mettere in luce la centralità del concetto di noema per la comprensione trascendentale della fenomenologia. Si procede inoltre ad una disamina delle principali interpretazioni di questo concetto, orientate, da un lato alla sua comprensione in termini puramente logico-analitici (Føllesdal, Smith, Mc Intyre), dal lato opposto alla sua riconduzione alla sfera percettivo-fenomenalista (Gurwitsch, Dreyfus). Su questa linea, l’appendice, su Gilles Deleuze lettore di Husserl, accenna al passaggio di Husserl al metodo della fenomenologia genetica (databile intorno al 1917/18) che viene interrogato dal punto di vista della funzione del concetto di senso oggettuale nella ricostruzione della genesi della predicazione e della costituzione delle oggettualità percettive e categoriali. La retrocessione husserliana dalla dimensione logico-formale alla dimensione geneticotrascendentale incrocia la critica di Deleuze a Kant, incentrata sulla necessità di non ricalcare le strutture trascendentali, da un lato, sulle strutture empirico-ordinarie dell’esperienza, dall’altro, sulle strutture logico-formali del giudizio predicativo.
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Yegin, Arzu. "A Non-egological Interpretation Of Husserl'." Phd thesis, METU, 2008. http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/12609783/index.pdf.
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In this thesis, I defend a non-egologic pure consciousness which is the initial position of Husserl in the Logical Investigations. There is anti transcendental ego argumentations in which I claim that self alienation of the "transcendental ego"
, incomplete reduction, the presence of the pre-reflective transcendental ego are the reasons to leave the claim about the existence of the "
transcendental ego"
. I also claim that the possible solution of the mind-body problem depends on the denial of the "
transcendental ego"
in the frame of phenomenology. I defend the non-egologic pure consciousness which is not identical and reducible to whatever is material, including brain. Qualia, intentionality, intuition, philosophizing constitution acts of pure consciousness are used to support the claim about immaterial nature of non-egologic pure consciousness.
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Knudsen, Sven Erik. "Luhmann und Husserl Systemtheorie im Verhältnis zur Phänomenologie." Würzburg Königshausen und Neumann, 2006. http://deposit.d-nb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?id=2834121&prov=M&dok_var=1&dok_ext=htm.
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Stamos, Yannis. "Speech, writing and phenomenology : Derrida's reading of Husserl." Thesis, University of Warwick, 2008. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/35513/.
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This thesis is a study of the two major texts of Derrida on Husserl's phenomenology. Engaging in a close reading of Introduction to the Origin of Geometry (1962) and Speech and Phenomena (1967), this thesis tries to bring together, and reconstruct, under the title of speech and writing, those Husserlian questions which never stop occuping, motivating and intriguing Derrida's thought, from his student studies and the Introduction to Rogues (2003) These were the questions or themes of origin and of historicity, of scientific objectivity and truth, of reason and responsibility, as well as of the living present, of living speech, of egological subjectivity and the alter ego. The question that this thesis raises is the following: why are these Husserlian themes of historicity, of the idea of the infinite task, of the living speech, etc., not simply the first objects or targets, subsequently to be abandoned, of Derridean deconstruction? Why is deconstruction, the event, the advent or invention of deconstruction, irreducible to some methodical or theoretical procedure, or to an operation of problematization or delegitimation of transcendental questioning? As we show in the first part of the thesis, these questions were investigated and developed by Husserl as a "responsible" response to the Crisis of the European sciences and humanity. Our investigation into Husserl's teleological discourse of history and responsibility shows that this crisis, which is anything but an empirical accident, threatens the very thing that Husserl wants to keep safe and sound (or to immunize, as Derrida writes in Rogues): the transcendental freedom of an egological subjectivity. For Husserl the possibility of crisis (of the subject) remains linked with the moment of truth, i.e., with the production and tradition of scientific objectitivities, and in fact has an essential link to writing. Husserl's teleological determination of writing as phonetic writing is an attempt to limit, tame and economize the essential ambiguity of writing: it threatens with passivity, forgetfulness and irresponsibility the very thing that makes possible, i.e., the transcendental and ideal community of a we-human-subjects- investigators-responsible-for-the-history-of-truth/reason. In the second part of the thesis, following Derrida's reading of Husserl in Speech and Phenomena, in Form and Meaning, Signature Event Context, and Eating Well, we show that Husserl's phenomenology of language and of phone is also a great philosophy of the transcendental subject. The essential and phenomenological distinctions between nonlinguistic and linguistic signs, sense and meaning, expression and indication, which are at the centre of Husserl's doctrine of signification, have also a teleological character: they are destined to define the limit, the arche and telos of language, as human language or human (i.e., phonetic) writing. In our reading we give great emphasis to Derrida's phenomenological analysis and deconstruction of this unique experience of auto-affection, the experience of hearing oneself speak. This is the experience of the human subject, the experience of a free, voluntary, auto-affecting egological subjectivity conscious of its voice, its speech and its humanity. Denying the possibility of phonic auto-affection of the human subject, in favour of the hetero-affection of writing was never the point of Derridean deconstruction. Deconstruction, the concept of writing or arche-writing, the graphics of differance, of iterability, are not imposed from the outside on Husserl's discourse on the human subject, the zoon logon echon. Rather, phenomenology itself interrupts or deconstructs itself, according to Derrida, as soon as it addresses the question of time and of the other, of the alter ego. Deconstruction was never only a thcoretico-philosophical, or academic affair. In our conclusion, we argue for the right of deconstruction, i.e., the right or demand to deconstruction. This right or demand to deconstruction, to ask questions about truth, consciousness, language, responsibility and so forth - so many powers, capacities or possibilities of which the animal is said to be deprived and poor - and the right or demand to do so performatively, by writing, by transforming and producing new analyses, new events and texts, new events of thought in the history of the concepts of man, of truth, of the subject and of human rights, is according to Derrida, an ethical and political demand.
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Togni, Alice. "Fenomenologia e psicologia in Husserl : la « riduzione psicologica »." Thesis, Sorbonne université, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018SORUL194.
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Parmi les nombreuses questions que soulève la phénoménologie husserlienne une concerne en particulier la relation complexe avec la psychologie. À cet égard, la notion de réduction psychologique peut offrir une clé de lecture féconde pour rendre compte de cette complexité en clarifiant la connexion entre les différents niveaux dans lesquels se déroule l'analyse phénoménologique. Dans cette perspective, il faut retracer le parcours du projet philosophique husserlienne depuis le début jusqu'à la fin : le premier chapitre porte donc sur le rapport de Husserl à Brentano et Stumpf, ses maîtres, ainsi que sur sa confrontation avec Lipps, Dilthey et Natorp, ses interlocuteurs privilégiés dans le cadre de la psychologie au début du XXème siècle. Ensuite, il faut montrer que Husserl élabore sa propre phénoménologie comme réalisation véritable de la philosophie et, corrélativement, comme science du fondement de toutes les sciences, y compris de la psychologie : c'est dans cette optique que s'inscrit le projet husserlien d'une psychologie “phénoménologique”, auquel est consacré le deuxième chapitre. Cette psychologie pure intentionnelle a la double fonction de réformer la psychologie traditionnelle et de jouer le rôle d'intermédiaire et de facilitateur pour assurer le bon déroulement de la phénoménologie transcendantale. Il s'agit d'une question de méthode que le troisième chapitre vise à résoudre en prenant comme fil conducteur la réduction psychologique : revenir sur les étapes de l'élaboration de la réduction (phénoménologique-)psychologique permet d'interpréter correctement l'évolution du rapport entre phénoménologie et psychologie tout en préservant l'unité et la cohérence intime de la pensée de Husserl. Le quatrième chapitre procède enfin à enrayer les nombreux malentendus qui sont à l'origine des paradoxes relatifs aux opérations méthodiques d'épochè et de réduction qui caractérisent la phénoménologie husserlienne. Cette clarification ouvre des perspectives de recherche bien fondées au niveau philosophique comme au niveau psychologiqueAmong the many questions raised by Husserl's phenomenology, one concerns in particular the complex relationship with psychology. In this regard, the concept of psychological reduction can offer a key to successful understanding of this complexity by clarifying the connection between the different levels phenomenological analysis consists of. It is in this perspective that we need to look at Husserl's philosophical project as a whole in order to retrace his steps from beginning to end : the first chapter is therefore focused on Husserl's connection with Brentano and Stumpf, his masters, as well as with his confrontation with Lipps, Dilthey and Natorp, his privileged dialogue partners in the framework of early twentieth-century psychology. Then, it must be shown that Husserl develops his own phenomenology as genuine fulfillment of the idea of philosophy and, correlatively, as truly foundational science compared to all the other sciences, including psychology. Husserl's project of a “phenomenological” psychology, to which the second chapter is devoted, arises exactly in this context. Phenomenological psychology as pure intentional psychology has the twofold task of reforming traditional psychology and playing the role both of mediator and facilitator for ensuring a phenomenological inquiry properly performed in transcendental terms. This is a matter of method that the third chapter intends to resolve by focusing on psychological reduction : presenting all the different making levels of (phenomenological)- psychological reduction to allow a proper interpretation of the development of the relation between phenomenology and psychology in Husserl, without affecting the coherence and unity of his philosophical purpose, this is the main aim of the current study. The fourth chapter deals, finally, with the eradication of the misunderstandings which cause paradoxes concerning Husserl's phenomenological method of epoché and reduction, even at the level of psychological phenomenology. This clarification opens up new research prospects both in philosophy and in psychology
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BARCO, Aron Pilotto. "A constituição do espaço na fenomenologia de Husserl." Universidade Federal de Goiás, 2012. http://repositorio.bc.ufg.br/tede/handle/tde/787.
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Previous issue date: 2012-09-17The aim of this dissertation is to study the constutive theory of space as developed in Edmund s Husserl work Ding und Raum, which include his most complete description of spatial experience. The theory is drawn from the analysis of material thinghood con-stitution, accounted as the most basic level of objectivity. In it, Husserl presents the the-sis that spatiality is co-given in the perception of bodies, specifically for its ability to move, whose multiplicity of possible positions coalesce into a field of possibilities ex-perienced as three-dimensional space. The present study aims to explore this theory as a stage in the context of transcendental phenomenology development that maintains con-nections with the earliest Husserl s incursions in problems concerning geometry and mathematical theory of multiplicities, and also explore some consequences and internal problems of the theory.
O objetivo da dissertação é o estudo da teoria constitutiva do espaço como desenvolvida por Edmund Husserl na obra Ding und Raum, onde consta sua mais completa descrição sobre a experiência espacial. A teoria é extraída da análise da constituição da coisa ma-terial, tida como a objetividade de nível mais básico. Nela, Husserl apresenta a tese de que a espacialidade é co-doada na percepção dos corpos, especificadamente por sua ca-pacidade de movimento, cuja multiplicidade de posições possíveis coalescem em um campo de possibilidades vivenciado como o espaço tridimensional. O presente estudo visa explorar essa teoria como uma etapa no contexto de desenvolvimento da fenomeno-logia transcendental que mantém conexões com as primeiras incursões de Husserl em problemas da geometria e da teoria matemática das multiplicidades, e também explorar algumas consequências e problemas internos da teoria.
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Fontana, Vanessa Furtado. "O estatuto do idealismo na fenomenologia de Husserl." Universidade Estadual do Oeste do Parana, 2007. http://tede.unioeste.br:8080/tede/handle/tede/2074.
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Previous issue date: 2007-02-12The goal of this dissertation is reflect on the concepts that validate the reasoning of transcendental idealism in the work of Husserl Ideas for a phenomenology pure and phenomenological philosophy. This work does not represent a radical change from part of the philosopher as portraying the commentators, but the apex of idealistic conception of science transcendental. The term idealism accumulates meanings expressed in many different currents of modern philosophy, which are all suspended by reducing philosophical in favor of a transcendental idealism inaugurate responsible for the problem of contemporary philosophy. The focus of the research is to think about the relevance of this idealism through the conceptual framework that surrounds the work cited. Among the topics investigated are the essences of intuition as intuition semantics of the transcendental experience. The intent as entrelaçamento needed between subjectivity and objectivity, which represents the overcoming of any dichotomy. What I like pure subjectivity and dissolution of the opening of the semantic field of possibility. And the formation of transcendental spheres of the world under the transcendental pure possibility of sense. These concepts show the importance of understanding the phenomenology as transcendental idealism. A phenomenological science there is as transcendental idealism or semantic, incorporating the issues ontológicas through descriptive analysis of the essences of donor direction to the plane factual
O objetivo da dissertação é refletir acerca dos conceitos que validam a fundamentação do idealismo transcendental de Husserl na obra Idéias para uma fenomenologia pura e filosofia fenomenológica. Tal obra não representa uma mudança radical de vertente do filósofo como retratam os comentadores, mas o ápice da concepção idealista da ciência transcendental. O termo idealismo acumula muitas significações expressas nas diferentes correntes da filosofia moderna, as quais são todas suspensas através da redução filosófica em favor de um idealismo transcendental responsável por inaugurar a problemática da filosofia contemporânea. O enfoque da pesquisa é pensar sobre a relevância deste idealismo através do arcabouço conceitual que circunda a obra citada. Dentre os temas investigados estão a intuição de essências como intuição semântica da experiência transcendental. A intencionalidade como entrelaçamento necessário entre subjetividade e objetividade, que representa a superação de qualquer dicotomia. O eu puro como dissolução da subjetividade e abertura do campo semântico de possibilidade. E a constituição transcendental das esferas do mundo no âmbito transcendental da pura possibilidade de sentido. Estes conceitos revelam a importância de compreender a fenomenologia como idealismo transcendental. A ciência fenomenológica se instaura como idealismo transcendental ou semântico que retoma as questões ontológicas através da análise descritiva das essências doadoras de sentido ao plano factual
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Rizo-Patrón, de Lerner Rosemary. "La intersubjetividad en Husserl: Bosquejo de una teoría." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú - Departamento de Humanidades, 2013. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/113263.
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Mendoza, Canales Ricardo. "Carta de Edmund Husserl a von Hofmannsthal, 12.01.1907." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú - Departamento de Humanidades, 2017. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/113068.
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Rizo-Patrón, de Lerner Rosemary. "Diferencia y otredad desde la fenomenología de Husserl." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú - Departamento de Humanidades, 2012. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/112903.
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El tema del pluralismo”, frecuentemente abordado desde la sola perspectiva de los retos éticos, políticos y culturales que la era de la globalización plantea a las comunidades humanas en todo el orbe, nos enfrenta a profundos dilemas racionales sobre los que ha reflexionado la humanidad desde la aurora de la filosofía griega. El texto se refiere a dos de ellos: a la relación, por un lado, entre unidad y multiplicidad; y, por el otro, entre semejanza” y otredad”, a saber, entre identidad” y diferencia”. Sin su reconocimiento, colapsaría la posibilidad misma del pensamiento teórico, de las reglas prácticas y de la valoración ética y estética. El texto reconsidera esta antigua tensión a un nivel menos abstracto, proponiendo plantear algunos problemas en torno a la diferencia” y la otredad” desde la perspectiva de la teoría husserliana de la intersubjetividad cultural y social, a saber, de los problemas superiores de la comunidad intermonádica.---Difference and Otherness from Husserl’s Phenomenology”. The issue of pluralism”, often approached exclusively from the perspective of ethical, political, and cultural challenges that the era of globalization lays at the door of human communities all over the world, faces us in fact with deep rational dilemmas upon which humanity has reflected since the dawn of Greek philosophy. The A. refers to two of them: the relationship, on the one side, between unity and multiplicity; and, on the other, between sameness” and otherness”, namely, between identity” and difference”. Without their recognition, the possibility itself of theoretical thought, practical rules, and ethical or esthetical valuation would collapse. This paper reconsiders this ancient tension on a less abstract level, proposing to lay down some problems on difference” and otherness” from the perspective of Husserl’s theory of cultural and social intersubjectivity, namely, of the higher problems of intermonadic community.