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Leonov, Andrii. "THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM(S) IN DESCARTES’ “MEDITATIONS” AND HUSSERL’S “CRISIS” (Part 2)." Filosofska dumka (Philosophical Thought) -, no. 5 (December 4, 2020): 117–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.15407/fd2020.05.117.
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The main topic of this paper is the mind-body problem. The author analyzes it in the context of Husserlian phenomenology. The key texts for the analysis and interpretation are Descartes’ magnum opus “Meditations on the First Philosophy” and Husserl’ last work “The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology”. The author claims that already in Descartes’ text instead of one mind-body problem, one can find two: the ontological mind-body problem (mind-brain relation) and conceptual one (“mind” and “body” as concepts). In Descartes’ “Meditations”, the ontological level is explicit, while the conceptual level is implicit. In Husserl’s “Crisis”, on the other hand, the situation is different: the conceptual level of the problem (as the opposition between transcendental phenomenology and natural sciences) is explicit, while the ontological level is implicit. Nevertheless, it seems that Husserl has answers to both the “traditional” as well as the “conceptual” mind-body problems.
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LIMA, Andrea de Alvarenga, and Jean Carlo Kurpel DIOGO. "Reflexões sobre a afinidade de Jung com a fenomenologia." PHENOMENOLOGICAL STUDIES - Revista da Abordagem Gestáltica 15, no. 1 (2009): 13–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.18065/rag.2009v15n1.2.
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Considering Jungs position in the national academic context, the present paper presents an epistemological analysis of the relationship between Jung and Phenomenology. First, the historical development of the concept of Phenomenology was revised, in order to outline the meaning in which Husserl, founder of Phenomenology as a philosophical movement, applies the term. After that, it tries to understand in Jungs work how he used the term and how he personally related to the phenomenological movement. In conclusion, it suggests that the resemblance between Jung and Husserls Phenomenology is established not in terms of philosophical radicals but from a similar methodological attitude.
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Pereña, Francese. "Recepción y “Crítica inmanente” de Heidegger de la Fenomenología Husserliana." Phainomenon 16-17, no. 1 (October 1, 2008): 39–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/phainomenon-2008-0013.
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Abstract At the beginning of Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs (Gesamtausgabe, volume 20), Heidegger extensively puts forward his views against phenomenology, especially that of Husserl, which is the one we are going to consider. By means of what he calls the “fundamental discoveries of phenomenology”, that is, intentionality, categorial intuition and the meaning of the a priori in Husserl’s Logical!nvestigations, Heidegger reaches a definition of phenomenology: “the analytic description of intentionality in its a priori”. Next, Heidegger proceeds to what he characterizes as an “ immanent critique” of phenomenology, that consists in highlighting that in Ideas Husserl does make but omits the fundamental question on “the being of consciousness” and on “the sense of being”, in a way that ends up in being un-phenomenological. We go into Heidegger’ S text in order to consider the legitimacy of its critique and, particularly, its alleged immanence.
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Leonov, Andrii. "The mind-body problem(s) in Descartes’ “meditations” and Husserl’s “crisis” (Part1)." Filosofska dumka (Philosophical Thought) -, no. 4 (November 4, 2020): 91–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.15407/fd2020.04.091.
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The main topic of this paper is the mind-body problem. The author analyzes it in the context of Hus- serlian phenomenology. The key texts for the analysis and interpretation are Descartes’ magnum opus “Meditations on the First Philosophy” and Husserl’ last work “The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology”. The author claims that already in Descartes’ text instead of one mind-body problem, one can find two: the ontological mind-body problem (mind-brain relation) and conceptual one (“mind” and “body” as concepts). In Descartes’ “Meditations”, the ontological level is explicit, while the conceptual level is implicit. In Husserl’s “Crisis”, on the other hand, the situation is different: the conceptual level of the problem (as the opposition between transcendental phenom- enology and natural sciences) is explicit, while the ontological level is implicit. Nevertheless, it seems that Husserl has answers to both the “traditional” as well as the “conceptual” mind-body problems.
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Goto, Tommy Akira. "A (re)constituição da Psicologia Fenomenológica em Edmund Husserl." PHENOMENOLOGICAL STUDIES - Revista da Abordagem Gestáltica 14, no. 1 (2008): 137–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.18065/rag.2008v14n1.20.
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The German philosopher Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), founding father of Phenomenology, was one of the most prominent thinkers of the 20th century, who not only influenced the philosophical trends of his time but also the sciences in general. Nevertheless, psychology was the science which strongly had direct influence of phenomenology which, in its turn, provided the possibility of developing a phenomenological psychology. The aim of this thesis is to (re)constitute, from a historical-critical point of view, the conception of phenomenological psychology in Husserls last work: The Crisis of European Sciences and the Transcendental Phenomenology (Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenchaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie). At present, psychologists are developing a large number of versions of phenomenological psychology, particularly in Brazil; however, none of them have rigorously been based on Husserls concepts. Thus, in order to have an understanding of what constitutes to Husserl a phenomenological psychology, we present, to start with, a brief introduction to the transcendental phenomenology, explaining the variations of the phenomenological method (i. e. phenomenological levels). After that, we point out the most meaningful aspects of Husserls last piece of writing, concentrating our efforts on the revelation the philosopher makes concerning a crisis of the sciences and of reason, as well as his phenomenological criticism on epistemology of Psychology. At last, following Husserls analyses of phenomenology and psychology, we conclude that the conception of phenomenological psychology will constitute a universal science of human beings whose object of study is the animistic being. This science will have basic functions such as: a) the rebuilding of the scientific psychology and the explanation of the psychological concepts; b) the constitution of a universal science of the psychic; c) the description of the intentional experiences and d) be a propaedeutic discipline for the transcendental phenomenology. For Husserl, the authentic and genuine conception of the phenomenological psychology is important to the psychologists since that it is through the development of this discipline that they will recover the subjectivity as the original source of human life and its correlation with the world-life.
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Alebastrova, A. A. "Experience of «The Other» in Husserl`s Phenomenological Project." Izvestiya of Saratov University. Philosophy. Psychology. Pedagogy 12, no. 3 (2012): 3–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.18500/1819-7671-2012-12-3-3-6.
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Article is devoted to consideration of experience in late Husserl`s works through the appeal to Descartes’ philosophical heritage. Through judgment of experience the philosophy of the 20th century opens the relations the person to «The Other» individual. Addressing to E. Husserl experience, saw in it phenomenology bases as sciences of higher formation.
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Shiyan, Anna. "Reflection as the basis of E. Husserl's phenomenological methodology." Studies in Transcendental Philosophy 4, no. 1 (2023): 0. http://dx.doi.org/10.18254/s271326680025762-8.
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The article analyses reflection as a methodology of Husserl's phenomenology. Husserl used reflection as a method in his research, but did not always specifically consider it when describing his own methodology. He paid much more attention to essential intuition, epoché (reduction) and intentional analysis. The author develops the thesis that reflection is inextricably linked with these methods and requires special study. The article discusses the specifics of reflexive analysis used in Husserl's phenomenology to study consciousness and solve problems of cognition of the external world. The author takes into account its goals and objectives, which determine the terminological apparatus for fixing its results and are based on a certain understanding of the experience of consciousness.
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Sidoncha, Urbano Mestre. "Da possibilidade de Uma Fenomenologia implícita em Kant e Descartes Uma breve perspectiva." Phainomenon 16-17, no. 1 (October 1, 2008): 93–108. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/phainomenon-2008-0016.
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Abstract In this paper, we will consider the following issue: the innovative dimension of E. Husserl’s phenomenology repeatedly finds in the philosophies of Descartes and Kant a clear obstacle for its full comprehension. After all, is it not the case that the former discipline is just an extension of the perspectives stated by those earlier philosophers? But, to state the idea of a hidden phenomenology in the philosophies of Descartes and Kant has not, as its unavoidable counterpart, the dependence and the full commitment of Husserl ‘s phenomenology with positive doctrines as the one sponsored by Descartes and Kant? And, if so, how can we rescue the idea of phenomenology as prima philosophia?
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Kebuladze, Vakhtang. "Phenomenological Subjects. Apostolescu, I. (Ed.). (2020). The Subject(s) of Phenomenology: Rereading Husserl. Cham: Springer Nature." Sententiae 40, no. 1 (April 1, 2021): 128–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.31649/sent40.01.128.
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Ahn, Myung-jin. "Analysis on the Psychology of Husserl?�s Transcendental Phenomenology." Korean Philosophical Society 138 (May 23, 2016): 145–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.20293/jokps.2016.138.145.
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Nikolic, Olga. "Husserl’s theory of noematic sense." Filozofija i drustvo 27, no. 4 (2016): 845–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/fid1604845n.
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After Husserl?s transcendental turn and the discovery of the correlation between consciousness and the world the concept of the noema becomes one of the constant leitmotifs of Husserl?s philosophy. My paper will be devoted to the clarification of this concept and its implications for Husserl?s theory of sense. The leading question will be: How can the noema play the role of both the sense and the objective correlate of the intentional act? I will start with presenting the problematic of sense in Husserl?s phenomenology from the Logical Investigations to the Ideas I. The central part of my paper will be devoted to the influential debate regarding the interpretation of the noema. Finally, I intend to point out the most important ways in which the notion of the noema becomes enriched in later Husserl?s philosophy, as well as the difference between linguisitic and non-linguistic sense, based on the Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis. I hope to show that Husserl?s phenomenological theory of sense offers a valuable alternative to the exclusively language-oriented theories of sense.
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SHMERLINA, IRINA. "ON THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL HORIZONS OF THE METHODOLOGY OF HISTORY OF A. S. LAPPO-DANILEVSKY." HORIZON / Fenomenologicheskie issledovanija/ STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE / STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY / ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES 11, no. 2 (2022): 689–710. http://dx.doi.org/10.21638/2226-5260-2022-11-2-689-710.
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The article problematizes the relatively recent tradition (initiated by O.M. Medushevskaya and picked up by a number of researchers) of a phenomenological interpretation of A. S. Lappo-Danilevskii’s historical and methodological work. The article aims to find out whether, and if so, in what sense (senses) it is possible to talk about the phenomenology of Lappo-Danilevskii. It shows the grounds on which this interpretation can, within certain limits, be accepted, and the moments of principal divergence between classical phenomenology and Lappo-Danilevskii’s methodology of history. The key point of these discrepancies is the phenomenological reduction, which is the essence of the phenomenological method, and, in the author’s opinion and contrary to the opinion of some researchers, is absent in the methodology of history of Lappo-Danilevskii. The theoretical positions that provoke the comparison of the views of Lappo-Danilevskii and Husserl are reduced to two main points: the problem of the psychological impenetrability of someone else’s Self and the understanding of the historical source as a construction of the historian. The article suggests that the “phenomenological motives” of Lappo-Danilevskii’s work are determined by the general philosophical and epistemological search of his time, perceived by Lappo-Danilevskii through the works of I. G. Droysen, Russian Neo-Kantianism and W. Dilthey, but hardly directly from Husserl’s philosophy, with which he could not be thoroughly familiar. The author suggests qualifying Lappo-Danilevskii’s methodological work as an original version of historical phenomenology, which was formed outside the direct influence of the classical phenomenology of Husserl. The article outlines the directions of further development of the problems laid down in Lappo-Danilevskii’s methodology of history, in particular, O. M. Medushevskaya’s “cognitive history,” A. L. Yurganov’s “historical phenomenology” and the sociological turn in the methodology of historical knowledge (turn from a subject to an actor) fixed by M. F. Rumyantseva. The latter, according to the author of the article, actualizes the key problem of the phenomenological tradition—that of intersubjectivity.
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Borges-Duarte, Irene. "Husserl e a fenomenologia heideggeriana da fenomenologia." Phainomenon 7, no. 1 (October 1, 2003): 87–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/phainomenon-2003-0047.
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Abstract Heidegger’ s Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriff offers what could be called a phenomenology of Phenomenology itself, that is: an investigation of its history. The husserlian discovery of the “categorial intuition” appears as the second moment of this history, after Brentano’s “intentionality” and before Heidegger’s own discovery of the “original sense of the a priori”, which constitutes the third moment. Our paper seeks to understand this sequence as a way to answer the leading question of how it may be possible that “to be a intentional object can have any relationship with the being itself”. Or, to put it in another formulation: how is intentionality itself ontologically possible?
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Choi, Woo-Sok. "Comparison between Kant and Husserl in transcendental philosophy - Possibility of “openness“ in Husserl"s phenomenology -." Journal of the New Korean Philosophical Association 88 (April 30, 2017): 295–319. http://dx.doi.org/10.20433/jnkpa.2017.04.88.295.
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Briedis, Mindaugas. "E. HUSSERLIO FENOMENOLOGINIS PROJEKTAS IRPSICHOTERAPIJOS PROBLEMOS." Problemos 79 (January 1, 2011): 129–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.15388/problemos.2011.0.1321.
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Nors fenomenologinė filosofija jau kurį laiką daro įtaką psichoterapeutų darbo metodams, galima teigti, kad pastarieji naudojasi egzistencialistinėmis fenomenologijos traktuotėmis, o štai pirminis, dar Edmundo Husserlio inicijuotas projektas išleidžiamas iš akių. Straipsnyje kaip tik ir užsibrėžiama grįžti prie pastarojo fenomenologijos supratimo, nagrinėjant metodologines psichologijos problemas bei nužymint galimas psichoterapijos perspektyvas. Pirmoje dalyje aptariamos metodologinės ir tipologinės psichoterapijos problemos. Teigiama, kad empirinė psichoterapija neteikia galimybių iš esmės užčiuopti ego struktūros – tikrosios žmogiškojo patyrimo ir atitinkamai psichinių konfliktų erdvės. Sykiu pateikiama fenomenologinė žinojimo traktuotė, psichologinio bet transcendentalinio ego perskyra bei kitos pamatinės, psichoterapijos uždavinius reformuluojančios fenomenologijos temos. Antroje dalyje kaip viena iš galimų fenomenologijos ir psichologijos koreliacijos perspektyvų pateikiama kritinė lyginamoji Sigmundo Freudo sąmonės ir pasąmonės bei „atitinkama“ Husserlio impresinės (produktyvios) ir reproduktyvios sąmonės teorijų analizė, nepamirštant, kad Freudo psichoanalizės jokiu būdu negalima tapatinti su psichoterapija apskritai. Parodoma, kad Husserlio žodynas leidžia naujai konstruktyviai perskaityti Freudo pastabas apie instinktyvaus skatulio teorijos dėsningumus bei represavimo mechanizmą. Trečioje dalyje glaustai suformuluojamos bendros fenomenologinės hermeneutikos rekomendacijos psichoterapeutams. Straipsnyje jokiu būdu neteigiama, kad fenomenologija gali ar turi pakeisti psichoterapiją, tačiau numatoma, kad kaip ir kiekviena teorinė-praktinė disciplina, psichoterapija gali ir turi atrasti fenomenologiją kaip savo atspirties ir plėtotės tašką.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: fenomenologija, psichoterapija, psichologinis ir transcendentalinis ego, instinktyvus skatulys, psichiniai sutrikimai, reproduktyvi sąmonė.E. Husserl’s Phenomenological Project and the Problems Concerning PsychotherapyMindaugas Briedis SummaryThough phenomenological philosophy has influenced practitioners of psychotherapy for a long time, it is also true, that it was precisely existentialist approach to phenomenology that was exploited, while the whole initial project of phenomenology initiated by E. Husserl was almost forgotten. In this article I beckon to re-enter this initial understanding of phenomenology, considering methodological problems of psychology and laying down possible perspectives for psychotherapy.First part of the article deals with the methodological problems of psychotherapy while raising the thesis that empirical psychotherapy in principle cannot grasp the ego-structure, misses the true depth of the human experience, which in turn is the real sphere of mental disorders. Hand in hand goes the phenomenological critique of the scientific approach and other phenomenological issues relevant to the reformulation of the goals of psychotherapy.Second part of the article is dedicated to the one of many possible perspectives stemming from the correlation between phenomenology and psychotherapy, i.e. critical comparison of S. Freud’s consciousness and unconsciousness and “corresponding” theory of impressional (productive) and reproductive consciousness presented by Husserl. It is indicated that Husserl’s approach enables new and constructive reading of Freud’s theory of instinctual drive while keeping in mind, that Freud’s psychoanalysis cannot be identified with psychotherapy in general. However, the final part of the article suggests some methodological advices for mental care practice from the perspective of phenomenological hermeneutics.Keywords: phenomenology, psychotherapy, psychological and transcendental ego, instinctive drive, mental disorders, reproductive consciousness.
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Kinkaid, James. "What Would a Phenomenology of Logic Look Like?" Mind 129, no. 516 (October 1, 2019): 1009–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzaa031.
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Abstract The phenomenological movement begins in the Prolegomena to Husserl’s Logical Investigations as a philosophy of logic. Despite this, remarkably little attention has been paid to Husserl’s arguments in the Prolegomena in the contemporary philosophy of logic. In particular, the literature spawned by Gilbert Harman’s work on the normative status of logic is almost silent on Husserl’s contribution to this topic. I begin by raising a worry for Husserl’s conception of ‘pure logic’ similar to Harman’s challenge to explain the connection between logic and reasoning. If logic is the study of the forms of all possible theories, it will include the study of many logical consequence relations; by what criteria, then, should we select one (or a distinguished few) consequence relation(s) as correct? I consider how Husserl might respond to this worry by looking to his late account of the ‘genealogy of logic’ in connection with Gurwitsch’s claim that ‘[i]t is to prepredicative perceptual experience … that one must return for a radical clarification and for the definitive justification of logic’. Drawing also on Sartre and Heidegger, I consider how prepredicative experience might constrain or guide our selection of a logical consequence relation and our understanding of connectives like implication and negation.
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Shiyan, Anna. "Kant's Project of Descriptive Metaphysics and Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology." Studies in Transcendental Philosophy, no. 1 (2020): 0. http://dx.doi.org/10.18254/s271326680009002-3.
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Prole, Dragan. "Collective ethos. Phenomenology, early avant-garde and new anthropology." Zbornik Matice srpske za drustvene nauke, no. 163 (2017): 459–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/zmsdn1763459p.
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In the first part of the article, the author discusses the basic outlines of romantic and avant-garde anthropology. The crucial concept is related to the motives that drove the romantics in their journey toward individuation, whereas the members of avant-garde movement brought new visions of community into being. Unlike the romantics, early avant-garde movements advocated for ideals of general, globalized man mediated by technology and media. In the second part of the paper, the author analyses Husserl?s concept of all-community (Allgemeinschaft) bearing in mind the attempts of his phenomenology to extend our idea of community as much as it is possible by means of including everything that discloses the very foundations of our lifeworld into the concept of community. By doing so, Husserl encompassed not only the real and the past, but the possible intersubjectivity as well.
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Casey, Edward S. "Phenomenology at the Edge of its Orbit." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 42, no. 1-2 (March 3, 2015): 213–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15406253-0420102014.
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Although cultures far away and with other languages and customs are felt to be exotic by many in one s own culture, all cultures recognize the importance of a consistent bodily praxis as a basis for ethical behavior. I show that thinkers as diverse as Aristotle, Dewey, James, Peirce, Husserl, and Merleau-Ponty all acknowledge this habitual-bodily basis as well as its deeply social character. So does Confucius, even if he emphasizes ceremonial aspects more than Aristotle, the American pragmatists, and phenomenologists. Linking these thinkers is a common emphasis on the performative dimension of reliably repetitive bodily actions that engender effective social actions and interactions.
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Anuchina, Vlada. "Problematization and modification of phenomenological concept of experience in Martin Heidegger`s fundamental ontology." Filosofska dumka (Philosophical Thought) -, no. 3 (September 7, 2021): 138–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.15407/fd2021.03.138.
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The aim of the paper is to justify the view of Martin Heidegger’s concept of Dasein as a recon- ceptualization and modification of Edmund Husserl’s concept of experience (Erfahrung). The subject of analysis is Heidegger's concept “Dasein”, which is one of the most problematic concepts of the entire Heidegger's legacy due to ambiguity of its meaning and the resulting variability of possible interpretations. Specific attention is paid to examining the ontological reading of Heidegger's philosophy as opposed to both existentialist and anthropological ones; the author also textually argues for its legitimacy. Author textually proves that Dasein indeed is a modification of Husserl`s concept of experience. Moreover, she claims that not only the concept of Dasein but fundamental ontology itself may be seen to some extent as an original modification of Husserl’s phenomenology. For not only one of the key phenomenological concepts gets modified, but also its method of exploration and some crucial topics (e. g. the temporality of consciousness) get modified and incorporated in Heidegger’s fundamental ontology project.
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de Sousa, Ana Paula Loureiro. "Traços fenomenológicos no pensamento jurídico de Luís Cabral de Moncada." Phainomenon 22-23, no. 1 (October 1, 2011): 119–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/phainomenon-2011-0005.
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Abstract In this paper, I stress the importance of Luís Cabral de Moncada for the resettlement of the Philosophy of Law in the Portuguese university. I focus my attention on the overthrown of Positivism, and, as a consequence, on the reintroducing of axiological and ethical issues in the foundations of positive law. In so doing, I consider the relevance Phenomenology had for Moncada’ s theory of law, namely the theory of eidetic insight, and, particularly, the phenomenology of values. Moncada’s appropriation of some phenomenological themes and concepts was developed in a close contact with Husserl, Scheler, and Nicolai Hartrnann.
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Osswald, Andrés. "Fenomenología de la sensación. Un estudio sobre los Analysen zur passiven Synthesis de Husserl." Thémata Revista de Filosofía, no. 56 (2017): 91–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.12795/themata.2017.i56.03.
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Pavlovits, Tamás. "Descartes et le tournant théologique de la phénoménologie française." Filozofija i drustvo 25, no. 2 (2014): 31–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/fid1402031p.
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I will analyse Descartes? role in the ?theological turn? of French phenomenology. Although in Husserl?s phenomenology the Cartesian cogito was the central element, in the phenomenologists of the ?theological turn? (Janicaud) it was exchanged for the idea of the infinite. I examine why Marion and L?vinas are interested in the Cartesian idea of the infinite. In the phenomenology of Marion this idea is interpreted as a ?conceptual icon? and a ?saturated phenomenon? ,in the phenomenology of L?vinas this idea represents the structure that provides the possibility of the phenomenological description of transcendence. In order to see if Marion and L?vinas turn back to the onto-theological tradition of the metaphysics, like Janicaud affirms, we have to see how Descartes describes 31 the idea of infinite and how Marion and L?vinas interpret it.
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Tabile, Sheldon. "Phenomenological and Dialogic Thinking in Spiritual Reading: Spiritual Paradigms of Selected Biblical Figures." Scientia - The International Journal on the Liberal Arts 12, no. 1 (March 31, 2023): 70–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.57106/scientia.v12i1.147.
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The paper explores spiritual reading through the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, Dialogue of Martin Buber, and Emmanuel Levinas, as the transition from phenomenology to dialogic thinking. This is fundamentally anchored on Kees Waaijman’s design for the discipline of spirituality in his book Spirituality. Forms, Foundations and Methods. The investigation centers on the movements, moments, and layers involved in the spiritual dynamic relationship. This is articulated more through the examination of selected biblical figures. As the paper draws to an end, it describes phenomenologically what spiritual reading is, including the layers involved both in the reality of God and the human person.ReferencesBuber, M., I and Thou. New York 1970, (First Touchstone Edition 1996).The Cambridge Companion to Husserl, (Ed. B. Smith & D. Smith), Cambridge, 1995.Catholic Church., Catechism of the Catholic Church: Revised in Accordance with the Official Latin Text Promulgated by Pope John Paul II., Washington, DC: United States Catholic Conference, 2000.Husserl, E., Experience and Judgment. Investigation in the Genealogy of Logic. Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1973.______., Cartesian Mediations, the Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967.______., Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy (1st book), The Hague -Boston-Lancaster: Springer, 1983.______., The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970. Levinas, E., Beyond the Verse. Talmudic Readings and Lectures, Bloomington-Indianapolis, 1994.______., Emmanuel Levinas. Basic Philosophical Writings, (Ed. A Peperzak, S. Critchley, & R. Bernasconi), Bloomington-Indianapolis, 1996.______. Of God who comes to Mind, Stanford, 1998.______., Totality and Infinity, Pittsburgh, 1969.John of the Cross, The Living Flame of Love, in Collected Works of St. John of the Cross, (transl. K. Kavanaugh & O. Rodriguez), Washington D.C.,1979.Moran, D., Introduction to Phenomenology, New York, 2000.The New American Bible, Washington, DC: United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, 2002.New Revised Standard Version, Nashville: Thomas Nelson Publishers, 1989.Welzen, H., Biblical Spirituality, Contours of a Discipline, Leuven: Peeters, 2018.______., Contours of Biblical Spirituality as a Discipline, Acta Theologica, 15 (2011), 37-60.Waaijman, K., Spirituality. Forms, Foundations, Methods., Leuven: Peters, 2002.
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PARK, Hyun Jung. "Husserl and Heidegger"s different understanding of the state of affairs for phenomenology." Phenomenology and Contemporary Philosoph 98 (September 30, 2023): 1–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.35851/pcp.2023.09.98.1.
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Janoušek, Hynek. "Časové vědomí a Husserlova kritika Brentana." FILOSOFIE DNES 8, no. 2 (July 11, 2017): 58–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.26806/fd.v8i2.239.
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Článek analyzuje původní verzi Husserlovy kritiky Brentanova pojetí časového vědomí, která je obsažena v Husserlových Přednáškách k fenomenologii vnitřního časového vědomí, a Husserlovu snahu vyřešit Brentanův argument nekonečně nekonečného regresu v rukopisném textu O primární modifikaci paměti. Z Husserlovy kritiky si všímá jen dvou bodů. Za prvé kritiky Brentanova prezentismu, tj. názoru, že časové vědomí je založeno v bodu přítomnosti, v němž jsou psychické fenomény, které názor času konstituují, dány současně. Za druhé Husserlovy výtky, že Brentano nepoužívá pro výklad vědomí času schéma počitkový obsah – pojetí počitkového obsahu. Za tímto účelem rekonstruuje text Brentanovu teorii v podobě, v které ji znal Husserl, a vykládá jak Brentanovy důvody pro odmítnutí časové povahy vnitřního vnímání, tak nedořešené problémy Brentanova hlediska. Následně se pokouší dokázat, že Husserl Brentanův prezentismus podcenil a že věcné problémy, které s jeho odmítnutím souvisely, musel řešit zavedením absolutně „kvazi-prezentního“ vědomí a odmítnutím schématu obsah – pojetí pro výklad konstituce imanentních časových jednot. Oba zvolené body Husserlovy kritiky Brentana se tak v pozdějších vrstvách přednášek ukazují jako částečně neoprávněné.The article discusses the original version of Husserl’s critique of Brentano’s concept of time consciousness, which forms a part of Husserl’s Lectures on the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time. Next, it gives an overview of Husserl’s attempt to solve Brentano’s argument from the infinitely infinite regress against the consciousness of internal time. Two points of Husserl’s critique of Brentano are analyzed. The first point concerns Husserl’s critique of Brentano’s presentism. Brentano holds that consciousness of time is contained in the time point of the present now, in which psychical phenomena constituting our time consciousness are given simultaneously. The second point concerns the lack of content – apprehension scheme in Brentano’s explanation of the time consciousness. The article reconstructs Brentano’s position in the form known to Husserl and explains Brentano’s reasons for refusing the internal consciousness of time as well as problems connected with this refusal. An analysis of Husserl’s text proves that Husserl underestimated Brentano’s presentism and that he was forced to introduce a concept of the absolute time consciousness to solve the problems connected with his refusal of Brentano’s position. Since Husserl had to eventually give up the content – apprehension scheme in his explanation of immanent time unities, his original critique of Brentano is shown to be partly unjustified.
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Janoušek, Hynek. "Časové vědomí a Husserlova kritika Brentana." FILOSOFIE DNES 8, no. 2 (July 11, 2017): 58–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.26806/fd.v8i2.378.
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Článek analyzuje původní verzi Husserlovy kritiky Brentanova pojetí časového vědomí, která je obsažena v Husserlových Přednáškách k fenomenologii vnitřního časového vědomí, a Husserlovu snahu vyřešit Brentanův argument nekonečně nekonečného regresu v rukopisném textu O primární modifikaci paměti. Z Husserlovy kritiky si všímá jen dvou bodů. Za prvé kritiky Brentanova prezentismu, tj. názoru, že časové vědomí je založeno v bodu přítomnosti, v němž jsou psychické fenomény, které názor času konstituují, dány současně. Za druhé Husserlovy výtky, že Brentano nepoužívá pro výklad vědomí času schéma počitkový obsah – pojetí počitkového obsahu. Za tímto účelem rekonstruuje text Brentanovu teorii v podobě, v které ji znal Husserl, a vykládá jak Brentanovy důvody pro odmítnutí časové povahy vnitřního vnímání, tak nedořešené problémy Brentanova hlediska. Následně se pokouší dokázat, že Husserl Brentanův prezentismus podcenil a že věcné problémy, které s jeho odmítnutím souvisely, musel řešit zavedením absolutně „kvazi-prezentního“ vědomí a odmítnutím schématu obsah – pojetí pro výklad konstituce imanentních časových jednot. Oba zvolené body Husserlovy kritiky Brentana se tak v pozdějších vrstvách přednášek ukazují jako částečně neoprávněné.The article discusses the original version of Husserl’s critique of Brentano’s concept of time consciousness, which forms a part of Husserl’s Lectures on the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time. Next, it gives an overview of Husserl’s attempt to solve Brentano’s argument from the infinitely infinite regress against the consciousness of internal time. Two points of Husserl’s critique of Brentano are analyzed. The first point concerns Husserl’s critique of Brentano’s presentism. Brentano holds that consciousness of time is contained in the time point of the present now, in which psychical phenomena constituting our time consciousness are given simultaneously. The second point concerns the lack of content – apprehension scheme in Brentano’s explanation of the time consciousness. The article reconstructs Brentano’s position in the form known to Husserl and explains Brentano’s reasons for refusing the internal consciousness of time as well as problems connected with this refusal. An analysis of Husserl’s text proves that Husserl underestimated Brentano’s presentism and that he was forced to introduce a concept of the absolute time consciousness to solve the problems connected with his refusal of Brentano’s position. Since Husserl had to eventually give up the content – apprehension scheme in his explanation of immanent time unities, his original critique of Brentano is shown to be partly unjustified.
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Barata, André. "O Outro e a Relação. O contributo das fenomenologias da intersubjectividade." Phainomenon 16-17, no. 1 (October 1, 2008): 295–314. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/phainomenon-2008-0029.
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Abstract Historically, phenomenology started to face the phenomenon of intersubjectivity as an objection to its own transcendental aspiration to constitute apodicticity. In fact, since Husserl’s very influential Fifth Cartesian Meditation, the risk of solipsism threatened the possibilities of a genuine phenomenology of the other. This problem ‘s discussion was continued by all of the most significant phenomenologists, such as Max Scheler, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Marc Richir, Ricœur, Lévinas, and others, all having made explicit reference to that starting reflection by Husserl in The Cartesian Meditations. In this paper, I will approach the problem of intersubjectivity, not by attending to the already mentioned traditional phenomenological motive, but, instead, by trying to bring to light the variety of ways of how relationships to others are faced phenornenologically, and its implications for a debate about the psychotherapeutic relationship. Under the assumption that there is no psychotherapy without a psychotherapist/client relationship, it is particularly relevant the contribution of phenornenologies of intersubjectivity to the effort of answering the question «What do our relational experiences with others mean?»
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Lapatin, Vadim Al'bertovich. "Phenomenological reduction of E. Husserl through the prism of Buddhist meditation." Философская мысль, no. 3 (March 2021): 81–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.25136/2409-8728.2021.3.33324.
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The subject of this research is the method of phenomenological reduction developed by E. Husserl. The article examines the difficulties faced by this method, as well as observes the reception of Husserl’s ideas by the adherents of phenomenology in the XX century. It is substantiated that the phenomenological reduction is unrealizable by theoretical means due to impossibility to comply in the with the initial requirements of directness and non-prerequisiteness in the verbal expression. At the same time, the author proves that the phenomenological reduction could be implemented as a practice. Buddhist meditation is taken as an example. The goal is set to examine the phenomenological reduction through the prism of meditative practice. The research methodology is based on the comparative study of phenomenological and Buddhist philosophy with regards to the subject matter. The scientific novelty lies in examination of the problem of implementation of phenomenological reduction in the context of a completely different, non-Western tradition. The analysis demonstrates that Buddhism and phenomenology, proceeding from similar ideological prerequisites and studying the same subject, come to the markedly different conclusions. The examination of meditative practice indicated the differences between the phenomenology and Buddhism in their interpretation of the problem of consciousness. The fundamental difference pertains to the problem of “Self”: Buddhism does not recognize the apodictic evidence of the empirical and transcendental ego. This opinion is grounded on observation of the variable nature of the mind in the process of meditation. Other differences considered in this article consists in the discrepancy between the phenomenology and Buddhism regarding the interpretation of such concepts as “intentionality” and “ideation”.
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O.P, REV FR Joseph T. Ekong,. "A Contrastive Analysis of Descartes’ Methodic Doubt and Husserl’s Transcendental Phenomenology." Journal of Advances in Education and Philosophy 6, no. 9 (September 9, 2022): 455–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.36348/jaep.2022.v06i09.003.
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This work is expository, analytic, critical and evaluative in its methodology. Admittedly, both thinkers were dualists. But, where Descartes turned out to be a dualist in the stronger sense, Husserl had brought the Ego closer to the objects it perceives, constituting them through intentionality. More specifically, through h the intertwinement between the intentional act and the intentional object. The goal of Descartes’ method was to arrive at an inconcussum quid, at something which cannot be subjected to doubt: his own existence as a thinking substance, in addition to the proof(s) of the existence of God. So, he methodically doubted all the things he had been certain about, in order to reaffirm their existence. Husserl’s method, on the other hand, employs what is sometimes seen as a twofold approach: phenomenological ἐποχή, (epoche) or “suspension of belief,” and phenomenological reduction. Husserl’s main philosophical problem had nothing to do with being certain about reality. He understood our certitude about reality as a basic fact of our everyday experience, as something to be taken at face value. Therefore, he did not need to doubt whether reality is as it seems to be, or even exists at all. Although there are many ways to explain Husserl’s main issue, but to take the epistemological route, the one he took in his first public communication on this topic, The idea of phenomenology, it pertains to the manner in which exterior objectivity, as something whose existence transcends the subject, can reach an immanent subject.
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Embree, Lester. "La crítica de Dorion Cairns a las "Ideen" de Husserl." Investigaciones Fenomenológicas, no. 5 (February 12, 2021): 61. http://dx.doi.org/10.5944/rif.5.2015.29810.
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En el presente artículo analizo la lectura que hace Dorion Cairns, probablemente el más cercano de los seguidores de Husserl, del libro de Ideen y pondré de relieve las críticas que mi maestro le hizo a lo que Husserl había considerado una especie de manual de su filosofía fenomenológica. Lo que sigue es un resumen del seminario de 1964, dedicado a las Ideas. Siguiendo la estructura del libro, Cairns hace las siguientes observaciones: (a) consideraciones sobre la comprensión adecuada del título del libro, (b) reflexiones de Cairns sobre la relación entre la fenomenología trascendental y la psicología empírica y la relación entre lo eidético y lo trascendental. En tercer lugar, abordaré lo que probablemente sea la mayor diferencia entre la fenomenología de Cairns y las Ideas de Husserl, esto es, (c) la importancia de la “preconstitución”, un rico sustrato de los actos o acciones humanas, la cual desemboca en una critiqua de la noción de la intencionalidad presente en Ideas, como objetivadora. Cairns rechaza también la distinción hyle/ morphé y la sustituye por una más fundamental, la de sentir y sensa. También considera los aspectos fundamentales del (e) tiempo. En cuanto a la tercera parte de Ideas, Cairns pone de relieve algunas dificultadaes a la hora de clasificar los actos. Otro aspecto de la lectura de Ideas es la (f) insistencia en analizar los componentes subjetivos o irracionales en la teoría de la práxis, valores y conocimiento.In this paper I shall analyse Dorion Cairns´s, arguably Husserl´s closest follower, reading of the Ideen and I will emphasize criticisms that my teacher had of what Husserl considered a sort of manual for his phenomenological philosophy. What follows is a summary of the seminar from 1964, devoted to the Ideas. Following the structure of the book, Cairns points out the following remarks: (a) concerns about the proper understanding of the very title of the work, (b) Cairn´s consideration of the relation of transcendental phenomenology to empirical psychology and the relation of the eidetic and the transcendental. In the third place, probably the biggest difference between Cairn´s phenomenology and Husserl´s Ideas, that is, (c) the importance of the “preconstitution”, a rich substratum of human act or actions. This emphasis amounts to the critique of intentionality in Ideen as objectivating. Cairns also rejects (d) the hylē/morphē distinction and substitutes it by a more fundamental one of sensing and sensa. He also considers some fundamental aspects of (e) time. As to the third part of the Ideas, Cairns points out some difficulties in classification of acts. Other aspect of Cairn’s reading of Ideen is (f) the insistence on analysing the subjective or irrational components in the theory of praxis, values and knowledge.
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Paic, Zarko. "What does it mean to be an alien? Bernhard Waldenfels and politics of responsive interculturalism." Filozofija i drustvo 29, no. 3 (2018): 355–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/fid1803355p.
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The author analyzes the politics of responsive interculturalism in Bernhard Waldenfels? thought, starting from the assumption that after Husserl?s phenomenology only two fundamental concepts - body and the Other - should be considered. In contemporary German ?post-phenomenology? the first concept was systematically articulated by Hermann Schmitz, while the latter theme has been advanced in Waldenfels? works as the phenomenology of the alien, up until the end of Western metaphysics. In the two parts of the discussion, the author draws on his fundamental hypothesis about aporias and paradoxes of interculturalism, since responsiveness and xenology cannot reach the positive definition of the concept of culture in the era of global entropy. The analysis, therefore, deals with the questions: (1) what is the responsiveness of man in relation to the Other, including the different ways of his presence in the world; and (2) whether the Other as alien and uncanny (Unheimlich) calls into question the basic assumption of phenomenology as such - the intentionality of consciousness?
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Llorente Cardo, Jaime. "La Invisibilidad Sonora: Sobre la Narración del Pathos Vital en las Fenomenologías de la Música de Michel Henry y Jean-Luc Marion." Philosophy of Music 74, no. 4 (December 30, 2018): 1149–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.17990/rpf/2018_74_4_1149.
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The present study tries to expound the contributions that the recent French Phenomenology can provide concerning a possible philosophical approach to the phenomenon of music. We will focus particularly on Michel Henry´s aesthetic reflection which considers the musical event as an immaterial art, extraneous to the objective world and that seeks basically to make visible the invisible par excellence: the inwardness of the auto-affected subjective life. We will also attend to the examination of the categories that are characteristic of Jean-Luc Marion´s “phenomenology of the gift” in order to justify the affiliation of the musical phenomenon to that kind of phenomena so-called “saturated phenomena” or “paradoxes” by Marion. A type of phenomenon that is alien to the power of the concept and that infringes (as the music itself does) the laws of empirical perception themselves. Therefore, it is about showing the relevance of a “phenomenology of music as such” understood as a way of receive that singular resounding phenomenon as it gives itself, but also – according to Husserl´s suggestion – “within the limits in which it is presented there”.
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CREMASCO, Maria Virginia Filomena. "Algumas contribuições de Merleau-Ponty para a Psicologia em “Fenomenologia da percepção”." PHENOMENOLOGICAL STUDIES - Revista da Abordagem Gestáltica 15, no. 1 (2009): 51–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.18065/rag.2009v15n1.7.
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This essay consists of the authors theoretical examination in the Selection Process of Assistant Professor for the Department of Psychology at the Federal University of Paraná, submitted in June, 2002. It succinctly presents contributions to psychology in Merleau-Pontys doctoral thesis of 1945, entitled Phenomenology of Perception. Merleau-Ponty sets out to discover original meanings as a road for perceiving human understanding. In his proposal, rationality takes on the status of science by preserving both subject and object. In other words, one finds in the world what it is fact and, on this basis, what perceptions can be confirmed or denied. Merleau-Ponty re-posits Husserls transcendental question: based on the natural and the social we discover the ambiguity of life, of being in the world and being of the world. We are questioned by it and we are free to choose. Contributions to psychology are discussed based on Merleau-Pontys perspective of the organization of the perspective field carried out by subject-body in situation.
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Walter, Hans-Jürgen P. "Nicolai Hartmanns Kritische Ontologie („wie sie als Grundlage der Gnoseologie anzustreben ist“) und der Kritische Realismus der Gestaltpsychologie („Berliner Schule“/Gestalttheorie)." Gestalt Theory 40, no. 3 (November 1, 2018): 337–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/gth-2018-0021.
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Abstract The author exemplifies the congruency of essential foundations between the critical realism of the Berlin School of Gestalt Psychology (Gestalt theory) and Nicolai Hartmann`s Critical Ontology. For instance, this congruency manifests in the importance given to critical-realistic epistemology - purified from idealistic prejudices, not least prejudices such as production-theoretical ones - connected with an unconditional phenomenology. Altogether, it results in a shared critical distance from scholars of Brentano, such as Husserl and Meinong, as well as from Neo-Kantianism.
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Orlova, Yulia. "The concepts of apperception and reflection in Kant and the concept of reflection in Husserl." Studies in Transcendental Philosophy 4, no. 1 (2023): 0. http://dx.doi.org/10.18254/s271326680025802-2.
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The article considers reflection as a method and condition of the transcendental philosophy of Kant and Husserl. At the beginning, the author refers to Kant's predecessors who used the term reflection (Wolf, Baumgartner) and concludes that Kant, when referring to reflection, rather adheres to the tradition laid down by Leibniz. Based on the text of the “Critique of Pure Reason”, the article argues that it is with the help of reflection that the formation of a priori categories and a priori synthetic principles can be explained. The author distinguishes between reflection and the transcendental unity of apperception and examines, within the framework of the phenomenological interpretation of the “Critique of Pure Reason”, the role of this unity in the predilection of sensory diversity. The article shows the continuity in the understanding of reflection between transcendental phenomenology and Kant's philosophy. In Husserl's philosophy, reflection as a method is associated with reduction and contemplation. The author dwells on the features of the use of reflection in Husserl's studies, which include, first of all, the temporal language of description and the dependence of reflection on the phenomena to which it is directed. Orlova Yulia Olegovna (1970 2011) – is a Russian philosopher, Ph.D., in 1998 - 2011 worked at the Department of Ontology and Theory of Cognition of the Faculty of Philosophy of St. Petersburg State University.
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Prole, Dragan. "Passivity and leveling Husserl, Heidegger and Hugo Ball." Filozofija i drustvo 27, no. 1 (2016): 225–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/fid1601225p.
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The first part of this paper explores the kinship in diagnosis of contemporaneity of Hugo Ball and Martin Heidegger. Both thinkers recognize leveling as an important trait of their age. In Ball?s terms, leveling is identified with the apocalyptic abolishment of humanity. That happens by equalizing all of human creation, which becomes possible only after the abolishment of the hierarchy of values, thanks to which it was previously possible to distinguish a work of art from an average work. With Heidegger, leveling is equated with the perverted forms of curiosity. Unlike the former forms of curiosity, coupled by the common desire for deeper insight, modern curiosity is fairly superficial, let loose with no boundaries to all the impressions which supersede the expected and already seen. In the second part of the paper, Husserl?s term of passive synthesis is examined, so we can observe the intervention of phenomenology from the perspective of deconstruction of the effects of leveling. I conclude with a warning that we cannot protect ourselves from the world to which we are exposed by natural subjectivity and conventional forms of knowledge. Which insight leads us to revert to the sources of subjectivity, the idea common to both the avant-garde and the phenomenologists.
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Popovic, Brankica. "Cognitive dualism of intuition and reason in Huserls phenomenology." Theoria, Beograd 60, no. 3 (2017): 92–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo1703092p.
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From the title itself is transparent issues being discussed in this paper, and this is the attitude of intuition and science, processed phenomenological method. This issue is important when it comes to the interest of the authors in this subject and attachment to Edmund Husserl. The reasons are still some situations and the author Faced with adequate problems. In this case, the crisis in which we find along with the author that a similar crisis in which he was Edmund Husserl. Return the original, the one fundamental common in times of crisis - as well as that of her mother?s lap. As there are reasons that led to it time their inevitable reduction in order to clear the path to move ahead more effectively with prospects. These reasons are cognitive-methodological, because knowing them and guided methodology lead to the creation of the human world, mostly poor and inhumane, and the necessary correction. The cognitive method that offers to the phenomenological method, the core of which consists of intuition, reduction of intentionality, as opposed to those methods that dominate the rational basis. In fact, in a dualistic relationship rational and intuitive knowledge lies the possibility of establishing a better foothold as a refuge or unity of the world and man, and providing opportunities for their improvement or humane given. Thoroughness is the knowledge, the cognitive experience as such it contains always one intentio, a ?producing? a moment which is always related to some objectivity, and that it is not this objectivity nor mere subjectivity, but one in which the both meet. Thus, the intention and the secret lies the foundation for understanding the world, and she in turn in its nakedness is always a straightforward procedure as the immediate unity of subject and object of knowledge or something intuitive.
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Compaan, Auke. "The revelation of Christ as an impossible impossibility: a critical reading of Jean-Luc Marion’s contribution to the post-modern debate in phenomenology, philosophy of religion and theology." STJ | Stellenbosch Theological Journal 1, no. 1 (July 31, 2015): 57. http://dx.doi.org/10.17570/stj.2015.v1n1.a3.
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This article is an attempt to establish the phenomenological and theological value of the concept of Revelation in the work of the French philosopher Jean-Luc Marion in a post-modern cultural and intellectual context. Is it possible to speak of revelation in a phenomenological sense and more radically, about the Revelation of God, after the critique of metaphysics and phenomenology by Derrida, Caputo and others? Marion argues that by overcoming metaphysics and broadening the limits of traditional phenomenology to include phenomena of Revelation, the Revelation of Christ is a phenomenological impossible impossibility. Using Marion’s reinterpretation of Husserl and Heidegger`s understanding of “givenness”, “the given” and the “gift” and his concept of Revelation as a saturated phenomenon, I want to critically illuminate his contribution to the concept of r/Revelation as a post-metaphysical and theological possibility.
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Morujão, Carlos. "A Genealogia da Lógica e a Filosofia da Lebenswelt." Phainomenon 20-21, no. 1 (October 1, 2010): 179–200. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/phainomenon-2010-0009.
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Abstract This paper is divided into three parts. The first part addresses the main tenets of Husserl ‘s conception of formal logic, its different levels and its relationship with formal mathematics and formal ontology. It will, therefore, undertake a delimitation of the logical domain, in its autonomy, taking as its point of departure the presentation Husserl makes of this subject in his works of maturity, particularly in Forma/e und. transzendentale Logik. The second ·part shows why, for phenomenology, the analysis of objective logical configurations has to be completed by a subjective analysis of the intentional achievements in which these configurations have their genesis. ln other words, we will try to ground such an autonomy in. the very nature of logical reason. Finally, the third and last part, following the text of the first two sections of Erfahrung und Urteil, adresses the roots of the logical-categorical activity in the ante-predicative passive experience.
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Juric, Andrija. "Husserl’s early egology." Theoria, Beograd 65, no. 1 (2022): 51–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo2201051j.
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Phenomenological egology presents a fruitful area for examining the concept of the I (ego) and its relation with consciousness. It is possible to distinguish as many as four stages in the development of Husserl?s egological views. Logical Investigations [1900/1] represents a prominently nonegological, Humean position, which is reflected in the denial of the pure I in the phenomenological stream of consciousness, and which is formulated in relation to the neo-Kantians. The unity of consciousness is based on the phenomenological I understood as the ?core? of the empirical I, for which the latter appears as the phenomenal I. The shortcomings of such an attitude, some of which Husserl himself will point out, will motivate the transition to the egological position in Ideas [1913], which will mark the entire further development of his phenomenology. The explication of these shortcomings is of wider significance for the discussion between egological and nonegological theories of consciousness.
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Menéndez, Roberto C. F. "La indiscreta presencia de sí. La génesis de las habitualidades y el problema de la reflexión en Husserl." Investigaciones Fenomenológicas, no. 5 (February 12, 2021): 193. http://dx.doi.org/10.5944/rif.5.2015.29817.
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Este trabajo tiene como objetivo presentar la cuestión de las habitualidades en la fenomenología de Husserl para pensar la génesis de la reflexión en nuestro mundo actual. En un primer momento, y principalmente a partir de libros primero y segundo de las Ideas relativas a una fenomenología pura y una filosofía fenomenológica, se revisarán el concepto de yo en Husserl en dos de sus dimensiones principa-les: el yo como polo idéntico de las vivencias y el yo como substrato de las habitualidades. Después realizaremos un análisis sobre la génesis de las habitualidades y su repercusión en el concepto de yo puro. Por último se ejemplificará esta cuestión en el caso de la reflexión, especialmente en el caso de una posible génesis negativa de la reflexión en forma de reflexi-vidad ritual o hiperreflexividad. Con ello se quiere establecer una línea de conexión entre la subjetividad trascendental y nuestro mundo concreto, así como entre la fenomenología y la psicopatología.The aim of this work is to present the question regarding to the habitualities in Husserl´s Phenomenology in order to think the genesis of reflection in our present world. In a first stage, and specially acording to the first and second book of Ideas [...] the concept of "I" will be considered in its two main dimen-sions: the I as identical pole of the lived-experiences and the "I" as substratum of habitualities. Afterwards, I will perfom an analysis on the genesis of the habitualities and its consecuences in the in the concept of pure I. In the last part this question will be ejemplied though the case of reflection in the form of a Ritual Reflectivity or Hypereflectivity. Whitin I would like to suggest the link conection be-tween the trascendental subjectivity and our concrete world, and the phenomenology and psychopathology relationship as well.
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LEE, Eun Young. "Edith Stein"s Position in Phenomenology : Related to Adolf Reinach, Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Meister Edmund Husserl." Phenomenology and Contemporary Philosoph 93 (June 30, 2022): 35–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.35851/pcp.2022.06.93.35.
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Sanzhenakov, Alexander A. "Wittgenstein and Husserl as the Reformers of Social Science." Epistemology & Philosophy of Science 57, no. 3 (2020): 40–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eps202057338.
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The article is devoted to the rule-following problem and its impact on the sociology of science as K.A. Rodin presents them in his article. It is known that L. Wittgenstein in “Philosophical Studies”, using the rule of arithmetic addition as an example, formulated the rule-following problem, which has acquired the ultimate form of skepticism thanks to S. Kripke. This problem was transferred to the sociology of science by D. Bloor, where it received the following sociological explanation: rule-amenably activity can be understood only by incorporating rules into social institutions. P. Winch rejected a skeptical interpretation of this problem, and as K.A. Rodin shows in the article, most adequately showed the consequences of Wittgenstein’s ideas for sociology. In his answer, A.A. Sanzhenakov draws attention to two circumstances. Firstly, sociology was influenced not only by late but also early ideas of Wittgenstein. Secondly, the rule-following problem as an important factor in the sociological turn can also be found in the phenomenology of E. Husserl. The author concludes about the need for additional research, which will draw a line between the influence of Wittgenstein and Husserl on sociology.
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Husain, Hafiz Syed, Mustafa Hyder, and Mariam Sultana. "A Phenomenological Perspective On Feminist Critique Of Reason." Pakistan Journal of Gender Studies 20, no. 1 (March 8, 2020): 39–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.46568/pjgs.v20i1.419.
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This study expounds a phenomenological perspective on feminist critique of reason. Following the lead of Nagl-Docekal, a hypothesis is reached by which a possibility is recognized that the feminist argument which is founded on gendering the unity of reason is mistaken. This gendering ultimately results in identifying the traditional manifestations of reason as a structure of oppressive power dynamics which feminist philosophy deems masculine. Although, this investigation admits that some of the main premises of feminist argument are supported by evidence, however, the main contention is that its conclusion is problematic. A phenomenology of reason is proposed, after Edmund Husserl‟s transcendental phenomenology, with the intention of providing support for the validity of hypothesis and offer better prospects for a critique of reason. Furthermore, It is also argued that phenomenology of reason so outlined already incorporates the valid aspects of feminist critique of reason. The methodology of this investigation is comparative-analytic. The purpose of this study is to provide a philosophical foundation for feminist critique of reason which is aimed at unmasking the illicit pretensions of the oppressive dynamics exhibited in the name of reason.
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Kormin, Nikolai Aleksandrovich. "Color as a problem of phenomenological aesthetics." Философия и культура, no. 9 (September 2020): 9–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.7256/2454-0757.2020.9.33776.
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The goal of this research is to clarify the aesthetic concept of color perception from the perspective of phenomenological reasoning of Edmund Husserl. Currently, the vector of phenomenological research is formed in various zoned: from theological to naturalistic. Which of these zones allocate the structure of phenomenological analysis of the color is quite difficult. The coloristic region is constituted in proportion to consciousness, including the aesthetic consciousness. It is extremely difficult to encounter the phenomenon of color, as its evidence is fulfilled by the passion of contemplative consciousness with its aesthetic pathos, consciousness that pursues parallels between the givenness of transcendent color and aesthetic “continent of the givenness”. According to Husserl, it refers to aureole of consciousness, which is associated with essence of perception, realized in the mode of turning to the beauty of color. This article is firs to determine the approaches towards studying a complex phenomenological topic, such as the description of the coloristic orientation, eidetics of color experiences in Husserl's philosophy, and reveal the importance of its development for comprehension of aesthetic and artistic consciousness. The main conclusions are associated with the philosophical interpretation of the idea of color as included by phenomenology in the philosophical experience of astonishment, which translates into acquisition of essence of the “phenomenological color” overall; in aesthetics, it directly correlates with the emergence of its structures on the horizon of harmonic synthesis of the acts of perceptive realization in imagination, “pristinely giving perception” of color, with creation of the pattern of color experiences as cognitive emotions, reduced pure color perception, with understanding of how the art clarifies the very conditions of visibility of color, and how its artistic synthesis is carried out, within the structure of which the correlation analysis can detect the analogue of the aprioristic empiricism – this determines in the national research fundamental characteristic of the truly Husserl’s synthesis and method.
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Conill, Jesús. "Fenomenología lingüística y filosofía práctica para la paz en la trayectoria intelectual de Vicent Martínez Guzmán." Investigaciones Fenomenológicas, no. 16 (February 8, 2021): 179. http://dx.doi.org/10.5944/rif.16.2019.29681.
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En este artículo expongo las tres etapas del pensamiento de Vicent Martínez Guzmán: 1) la fenomenología lingüística, primero en estrecha conexión con Fernando Montero y John L. Austin, y luego transformada por la pragmática trascendental (Apel) y la teoría de la acción comunicativa (Habermas); 2) la teoría filosófica de Europa, basada en Kant, Husserl, Ortega y Gasset y la Ética comunicativa o discursiva; y 3) la filosofía de la paz, que se convierte en una filosofía para hacer las paces, superando la violencia, la guerra y las injusticia: una investigación interdisciplinar basada en la intersubjetividad con sentido ético y político.In this paper I set forth the three stages of Vicent Martínez Guzmán’s thought: 1) the Linguistic Phenomenology, first closely connected with Fernando Montero and John L. Austin, but later transformed by the Transcendental Pragmatics (Apel) and the Theory of Communicative Action (Habermas); 2) the philosophical theory of Europe, based on Kant, Husserl, Ortega y Gasset and the communicative or discursive ethics; and 3) Philosophy of Peace that becomes in philosophy for making peace(s), overcoming violence, war and injustice: an interdisciplinary research based on intersubjectivity with ethical and political sense.
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Borisenko, Nadezhda Nikolaevna. "The concept of the "Other" in the historical and philosophical retrospective." KANT 43, no. 2 (June 2022): 89–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.24923/2222-243x.2022-43.16.
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The purpose of the study is to iidentification of socio-philosophical interpretations of the concept "Other" in the works of philosophers of the XVIII-XX centuries. Scientific novelty. A comparative analysis of the understanding of the "Other" in the philosophical research of G.V.F. Hegel, M. Heidegger, E. Husserl, J.-P. Sartre, S. Frank, M. Bakhtin, M, Merleau-Ponty, M. Buber, E. Levinas, J. Derrida, J. Deleuze, A. Schutz, and also reveals the essential characteristics of the "Other" in he philosophical works of each author, and also defines the conceptual approaches to the "Other" in the philosophy of existentialism and phenomenology. As a result, it is concluded that the "Other" is one of the central categories of social philosophy, mainly in the 19th-20th centuries, however, since the time of Aristotle, philosophers have been interested in the analysis of otherness.
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Dua, Mikhael. "MASALAH PEMAHAMAN COVID-19 DAN TUGAS FILSAFAT." Jurnal Ledalero 20, no. 2 (December 21, 2021): 217. http://dx.doi.org/10.31385/jl.v20i2.244.217-234.
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<em>Public understanding of Covid 19 is often seen as a source of problems in pandemic time. This article presents a discussion that the logic of understanding is different from the logic of explanation. If in scientific explanation, law and scientific theory are regarded as the premises, all human understanding departs from the historical experience of the world which belongs to the community. In a phenomenological perspective, human understanding is rational because it is oriented toward convergence without coincidence, unification without equivalence, commonality without identity, and cooperation without uniformity. The Study of the musical experiences of East Nusa Tenggara shows that the people of East Nusa Tenggara have a transverse rationality, in a sense that is convergent with the health protocol, although is based on the mythical cosmology. Based on this kind of logos, any effort in solving Covid 19's problem as a point of convergence needs interpretation of local community different understanding.</em><br /><br /><strong>Key words:</strong> Covid 19, Edmund Husserl, Phenomenology, rationality, transversality.
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Ruales Tobón, Camilo Fernando. "Las emociones y la dación de sentido en los objetos de uso." Kepes 12, no. 11 (October 14, 2015): 140–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.17151/10.17151/kepes.2015.12.11.8.
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Al analizar los objetos de uso cotidiano se entiende la manera como emerge el sentido emocional que los seres humanos le atribuyen a éstos. Por ello, es preciso establecer un modelo de análisis para observarlos y detallarlos en su totalidad. Una de las maneras de hacerlo es a partir de las herramientas que brinda la fenomenología, especialmente desde la propuesta de Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, la cual tiene una rigurosidad metodológica de análisis, que posibilita entender cómo los seres humanos interactúan con objetos de uso. El modelo que se describe aquí, nace a partir de los postulados de Edmund Husserl, quien se pregunta cómo el ser humano piensa en movimiento, describiendo esta situación a partir de los procesos de interacción que se presentan el un fluir afectivo-kinestésico. La idea de este trabajo no es solamente ver cómo el modelo propuesto puede ser utilizado, sino además dotar de herramientas al diseño industrial en la creación de objetos.ResumenWhen analyzing objects of daily use, the way the emotional sense that humans attribute to them emerges. It is for this reason, that it is essential to establish a model of analysis to observe and elaborate them in their entirety. One way to do this is to start from the tools provided by phenomenology, especially from Maxine Sheets-Johnstone’s proposal, which has a methodological rigor of analysis th at allows understanding how human beings interact with objects of daily use. The model described here comes from from Edmund Husserl´s postulates that question how human beings think about movement, describing this situation form the interaction processes present in the affectice-kinesthetic flow. The idea of this work is not only to see how the proposed model can be used, but also to provide industrial design with tools for the creation of objects.