Relevant bibliographies by topics / Husserl; Heidegger; Merleau-Ponty

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  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Books
  4. Book chapters

Academic literature on the topic 'Husserl; Heidegger; Merleau-Ponty'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 20 February 2023

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Journal articles on the topic "Husserl; Heidegger; Merleau-Ponty"

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Schnell, Alexander. "Beyond Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty." Symposium 20, no. 1 (2016): 213–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/symposium201620112.

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Sturzenegger, Karen Freme Duarte, Vera Fátima Dullius, and Clélia Peretti. "A contribuição da fenomenologia de Husserl para pesquisa em ciências humanas." Revista Eclesiástica Brasileira 79, no. 313 (2019): 426. http://dx.doi.org/10.29386/reb.v79i313.1881.

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O artigo em questão trata da relevância da fenomenologia no século XIX e início do século XX no âmbito das ciências humanas. Apresenta o conceito fenomenológico em Husserl, aspectos da trajetória histórica da construção do método fenomenológico e sua contribuição para a pesquisa. O artigo discorre sobre o contexto da crise europeia no século XIX no que tange ao conceito de ciências e a contribuição da fenomenologia diante das visões positivista, racionalista e da psicologia. Apresenta, também aspectos teóricos da fenomenologia de Martin Heidegger, Edith Stein, Max Scheler e Merleau Ponty. O artigo faz menção a crítica de Husserl à ciência e introduz a questão da intencionalidade da consciência.Abstract: The article in question deals with the relevance of phenomenology in research in the humanities. It highlights the phenomenological concept in Husserl, aspects of the historical trajectory of concept construction, as well as its contribution to the research. To this end, the article discusses the context of the European crisis in the nineteenth century with regard to the concept of science, questions the positivist, rationalist and psychology views that have just emerged. Some aspects of important theorists that deal with the concept of phenomenology from the initial assumptions of phenomenology developed by Husserl are presented, such as: Martin Heidegger, Edith Stein, Max Scheler and Merleau Ponty. The article also announces Husserl’s critique of science; introduces the question of the intentionality of consciousness.Keywords: Phenomenology; Method; Humanities.
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Aguirre, Antonio. "El pensamiento de Husserl en la reflexión filosófica contemporánea." Areté 9, no. 1 (1997): 145–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.18800/arete.199701.007.

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Los trabajos reunidos en este volumen pertenecen a pensadoras y pensadores de varios países, todos ellos a su vez conocedores profundos tanto de la obra de Husserl como de la de los representantes máximos del movimiento fenomenológico -Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty. De lo sartículos hemos elegido seis para nuestro trabajo de presentación crítica.
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de Saint Aubert, Emmanuel. "Merleau-Ponty face à Husserl et Heidegger : illusions et rééquilibrages." Revue germanique internationale, no. 13 (May 15, 2011): 59–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.4000/rgi.1122.

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Taminiaux, Jacques. "Was Merleau-Ponty on the Way from Husserl to Heidegger?" Chiasmi International 11 (2009): 21–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/chiasmi2009114.

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Sini, Carlo. "El sujeto en carne y hueso." Studia Heideggeriana 10 (March 17, 2021): 27–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.46605/sh.vol10.2021.157.

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En Husserl y Heidegger el sujeto fenomenológico no es una categoría lógica o una teoría filosófica, como en Kant o Fichte. Su naturaleza es existencial y está siempre vinculada a la corporeidad viva, como también argumentaron Merleau-Ponty, Paci y Sartre. En este sentido, tanto Husserl al final de su vida, como Heidegger ya al comienzo de su enseñanza, entendieron la fenomenología como una superación del horizonte filosófico tradicional. Su diferencia está en la interpretación del dato fenomenológico: objeto de una intuición a la vez activa y pasiva del Sí mismo en Husserl; objeto, en cambio, de una hermenéutica del encuentro en Heidegger. De ahí también una manera diferente de entender la historicidad del sujeto, que en Husserl implica una reconstrucción operativa, un despertar de la conciencia ética de las operaciones subjetivas mientras que en Heidegger se trata de una exposición de la oscuridad de la fuente y del destino del interpretar.
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Barbaras, Renaud, and Manfredi Moreno (traductor). "MERLEAU-PONTY Y LA PSICOLOGÍA DE LA FORMA." Investigaciones Fenomenológicas, no. 14 (February 3, 2021): 13. http://dx.doi.org/10.5944/rif.14.2017.29631.

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A partir del análisis de la relación de Merleau-Ponty con la psicología de la forma, se intenta dar una lectura de su fenomenología como una lectura ontológica de la forma. De este modo, Merleau-Ponty no solo puede pensar una alternativa a la fenomenología de Husserl, sino que le permite elaborar su propia idea de Ser y dar una nueva interpretación de la diferencia ontológica de Heidegger. Desde una descripción fenomenológica de la experiencia perceptiva, a partir de las nociones de comportamiento, forma y estructura, se mostrará enseguida el sentido de ser que moviliza una filosofía de la forma que implicará proyectar un pensamiento de una pertenencia radical de la fenomenalidad a la existencia, y además renovar el sentido de una fenomenología genética que considera toda conciencia trascendental en el marco de una facticidad originaria.On the basis of the relationship Merleau- Ponty establishes with Gestalt psychology, I seek to provide an interpretation his phenomenology as an ontological reading of the notion of form. Therefore, I claim that Merleau-Ponty is able, not only to develop an alternative to Husserl’s phenomenology, but also to elaborate his own idea of Being; in addition, he can offer a new understanding of the Heidegger's ontological difference. From a phenomenological description of perceptive experience, and starting with the notions of behavior, form and structure, I will then show the sense of being mobilized by a philosophy of form. This sense of being implies a projection of a thinking of phenomenality's radical belonging to the existence and, also, renewal of a genetic phenomenology that considers the whole of transcendental consciousness within the framework of an originary facticity
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Gamboa, Leonardo Verano. "Dialéctica de la experiencia en Merleau-Ponty y Adorno." Trans/Form/Ação 45, no. 3 (2022): 105–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0101-3173.2022.v45n3.p105.

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Resumen: El texto propone un diálogo entre fenomenología y teoría crítica, concretamente en Merleau-Ponty y Adorno. Sostenemos que la labor asignada por ellos a la filosofía pone en evidencia una concepción dialéctica de la experiencia en la que se reivindica el sentido de ésta como experiencia viva (lebendige Erfahrung). No obstante las fuertes objeciones dirigidas a la fenomenología por Adorno, Horkheimer y Marcuse, identificamos a modo de introducción la negatividad de la experiencia como rasgo característico en Husserl, Heidegger y Merleau-Ponty. En segundo lugar, nos ocupamos de la concepción de percepción como experiencia sensible en Merleau-Ponty, con el fin de precisar el sentido dialéctico de esta. En tercer lugar, señalamos la importancia que Adorno asigna al trabajo conceptual de la filosofía con el propósito de ver el sentido dialéctico de este que lo vincula a la experiencia viva de las cosas. Por último, identificamos a modo de conclusión puntos de encuentro en la concepción de la dialéctica en ambos autores y presentamos una reflexión sobre la actualidad de esta.
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Ferreira González, Jesús Emmanuel. "El problema de la resistencia de lo irreflejo a la reflexión. Un encuentro indirecto entre Maurice Merleau-Ponty y Emmanuel Levinas." Revista Valenciana, estudios de filosofía y letras, no. 15 (September 13, 2014): 97. http://dx.doi.org/10.15174/rv.v0i15.66.

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En este trabajo se expone el encuentro indirecto entre Merleau-Ponty y Levinas a propósito de la resistencia de lo irreflejo a la reflexión, y se realizan algunas reflexiones críticas en torno a los planteamientos de ambos autores para mostrar un nuevo tipo de significación: las «significaciones en alteridad», que quizás pueden articular una «racionalidad de lo irreflejo». Primeramente se presentan los pormenores contextuales del encuentro indirecto entre estos dos filósofos en el Coloquio de Roayaumont de 1957, sobre la obra y vida de Husserl. Después se desarrolla el planteamiento de Merleau-Ponty en el que nos habla de la resistencia de lo irreflejo como una adversidad que merece ser pensada, puesto que es el ápice de una experiencia que no es solamente la de la conciencia reducida que describe Husserl, marco en el que destaca la pregunta: ¿de dónde procede la resistencia de lo irreflejo a la reflexión?, misma que será retomada por Levinas para nutrir su teoría de la alteridad del prójimo y para criticar la idea de Merleau-Ponty de que la fuente del sentido es la sensibilidad fenomenológica, crítica que desembocará en la defensa de la sensibilidad ética, misma que implica un modo de significar más allá de la significación originada en la “diferencia ontológica” (ser-ente) de Heidegger y que la de la percepción de Merleau-Ponty, a saber, la Sinngebung ética. Posteriormente, se compone una respuesta que quizás Merleau-Ponty hubiese expresado ante la postura de Levinas, desde el interior de sus escritos filosóficos, poniendo en relieve las “significaciones corpóreas” del filósofo de la percepción para contrastar con las “significaciones éticas” de Levinas, y así derivar un nuevo tipo de significación, las significaciones en alteridad, que sostenemos es la configuración significativo-conceptual más simple, o más básica, para comprender el sentido de lo irreflejo.
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Grondin, Jean. "La tension de la donation ultime et de la pensée herméneutique de l'application chez Jean-Luc Marion." Dialogue 38, no. 3 (1999): 547–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300046898.

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La phénoménologie a connu trop peu de sommets créateurs depuis Husserl et Heidegger pour qu'il soit possible d'ignorer le dernier ouvrage de Jean-Luc Marion, aussi superbement écrit qu'il est ambitieux. Certes, de très exhaustives encyclopédies conçues par nos collègues américains, pour lesquels le terme de phénoménologie sert un peu d'équivalent à celui de philosophie continentale (c'est-à-dire «non analytique»!), recenseront des légions de phénoménologues depuis Husserl et Heidegger, mais aucun n'aura eu d'impact vraimentdéterminantsur la conception même de la discipline. Ces listes comprendront de redoutables penseurs comme Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Emmanuel Levinas et Paul Ricœur, où l'on reconnaîtra les plus illustres représentants de la tradition de la phénoménologie française (les autres traditions dites phénoménologiques étant beaucoup moins riches).
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Husserl; Heidegger; Merleau-Ponty"

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Robert, Franck. "Phénoménologie et ontologie, Merleau-Ponty lecteur de Husserl et Heidegger." Nice, 2002. http://www.theses.fr/2002NICE2012.

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Des premières oeuvres jusqu'au visible et l'invisible, Merleau-Ponty conquiert le sens de sa pensée en lisant Husserl et Heidegger. D'abord essentiellement lecteur de Husserl, guide également par la réflexion heideggerienne sur l'existence, l'être au monde et la temporalité, Merleau-Ponty voit dans la pensée du dernier Husserl et dans une phénoménologie de la perception la contestation de l'idéalisme transcendantal husserlien. Pour décrire le sens du sensible avant qu'il ne soit recouvert des couches d'idéalisations du langage et de la pensée logique, il faut donc effectuer une réduction du langage qui rende possible une description du sens à l'état naissant. Empruntant à Husserl le concept de Stiftung, institution, Merleau-Ponty découvre que le sens est institué, pris dans un mouvement de temporalisation qui met en jeu l'institution même de ce sens, et dans une histoire. Au début des années 50, ce concept d'institution permet à Merleau-Ponty de contester radicalement l'idée husserlienne de constitution. Dans la seconde moitié des années 50, la découverte du second Heidegger, avec la lecture du poème de Parménide présenté par Beaufret, conduit Merleau-Ponty à afirmer l'orientation ontologique de sa pensée, déjà engagée dans les réflexions sur le langage et l'histoire. Husserl et Heidegger sont désormais lus ensemble en un sens ontologique. Dans une pensée renouvelée du sensible, du langage, du temps et de l'histoire, l'ontologie ultime de la chair cherche ainsi à décrire le sens de l'apparaître comme sens de l'être même, être sensible, être qui demeure cache dans son apparaître même : l'ontologie heideggerienne vient alors soutenir l'effort incessant de Merleau-Ponty pour surmonter l'idéalisme husserlien tout en préservant l'audace de ses descriptions. Dans cette lecture en chiasme de Husserl et Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty conquiert le sens de sa propre pensée, dévoile l'impense ontologique de la phénoménologie qui se dit alors dans une ontologie de la chair.
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Robert, Franck. "Phénoménologie et ontologie : Merleau-Ponty lecteur de Husserl et Heidegger /." Paris ; Budapest ; Torino : l'Harmattan, 2005. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb39986398n.

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Khatchatourov, Armen. "La technique, le corps, l'espace : Une lecture de Husserl, Heidegger et Merleau-Ponty." Compiègne, 2005. http://www.theses.fr/2005COMP1557.

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Penser l'entrelacement de la technique et du corps vivant, telle est la question posée aujourd'hui par la profusion des dispositifs techniques. Traditionnellement, cette articulation est pensée à partir du corps propre constituant et originaire, ce qui revient en un sens à maintenir la figure du Sujet, et, corrélativement, à voir la technique comme simple instrument qui prolonge ou modifie son pouvoir. Fondée dans le primat classique de la conscience et de la temporalité, cette voie ne permet pas de penser l'entrelacement de la technique et du corps. Car le corps, d'emblée spatial, ne peut être saisi en termes de synthèse temporelle. Dès lors, l'entrelacement doit être pensé à travers la spatialité, comme le lieu même de la constitution du corps. La technique y joue un rôle essentiel, et il ne s'agit pas de la modification, par l'outil saisi, du corps propre originaire, mais de son organisation (en tant que pouvoir d'action, voire sensibilité) par le complexe technique déjà-là<br>The intertwining between technics and the living body, such is the question addressed by the profusion of technical devices. Traditionally, this articulation is conceived on the basis of the lived body, seen as original and constitutive. This perpetuates to some extent the figure of Subject, and, correlatively, views technics as a mere instrument prolonging its power. Grounded in the traditional primacy of consciousness and temporality, this approach does not conceptualize the intertwining between technics and body. The body, intrinsically spatial, cannot be understood in terms of temporal synthesis alone ; the intertwining should be approached through the spatiality, as the very place of the constitution of the body. Technics play here an essential role; it is not a mere modification of the original lived-body by an instrument in-hand, but rather the organisation of the body (as a power of action, furthermore as a sensibility) by the technics already-there
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Jensen, Max Joakim Mouritzen. "De andra hos Merleau-Ponty : Om fenomenologisk intersubjektivitet." Thesis, Södertörn University College, The School of Culture and Communication, 2008. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:sh:diva-1701.

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<p>I Logische Untersuchungen formulerade Edmund Husserl sin fenomenologi – ”en filosofi som sträng vetenskap”. Fenomenologin med dess metod, epochén, skall utövas under parollen ”Till sakerna själva!” Genom att ifrågasätta invanda tankesätt skall vi sätta världen inom parentes och därigenom nå objektiv kunskap.</p><p>Denna uppsats behandlar intersubjektivitetsproblemet hos fenomenologin. Genom en studie av Husserls Cartesianische Meditationen, Martin Heideggers Sein und Zeit och Maurice Merleau-Pontys Phénoménologie de la perception närmar jag mig frågan om ”De andra hos Merleau-Ponty”. Hur kan vi förstå den andre och annanheten när fenomenologins epoché är en metodisk solipsism som berövar subjektet dess värld?</p><p>Merleau-Ponty gör oförnuftet, tvetydigheten och slumpen till tema för sitt tänkande. Genom perceptionen varseblir vi världen och subjektet är (i) sin värld genom den levda kroppen. Det finns inget ”inre” utan det är genom världen, och vår verksamhet däri, som vi känner oss själva. Merleau-Pontys subjekt är ”vikt åt världen”.</p><br><p>In Logische Untersuchungen Edmund Husserl defined his phenomenology as a science for finding objectivity. The method of phenomenology, the phenomenological reduction, would provide knowledge on indubitable grounds by going back “to the things themselves”. We must put the world aside if we want to find objective knowledge.</p><p>This essay is a reading of Edmund Husserls Cartesianische Meditationen, Martin Heideggers Sein und Zeit and Maurice Merleau-Pontys Phénoménologie de la perception, and their theories of the others. How can we understand other in our mind when phenomenology in the course of its methodological solipsism, thought the phenomenological reduction, would seem to deprive the subject from the world?</p><p>Merleau-Ponty makes ambiguity and accidental existence a theme for his philosophy. Through perception we apprehend the world, as lived through with our bodies. There is no “inner man”. With some else’s words: ”Your abode is your act itself. Your act is you.”</p>
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Walls, E. "A Dialogue between Phenomenology and Poetry : Reading Heaney and Hopkins through Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty." Thesis, Queen's University Belfast, 2010. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.517636.

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Fernandez, Anthony Vincent. "Phenomenology and the Crisis of Contemporary Psychiatry: Contingency, Naturalism, and Classification." Scholar Commons, 2016. http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/6235.

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This dissertation is a contribution to the contemporary field of phenomenological psychopathology, or the phenomenological study of psychiatric disorders. The work proceeds with two major aims. The first is to show how a phenomenological approach can clarify and illuminate the nature of psychopathology—specifically those conditions typically labeled as major depressive disorder and bipolar disorder. The second is to show how engaging with psychopathological conditions can challenge and undermine many phenomenological presuppositions, especially phenomenology’s status as a transcendental philosophy and its corresponding anti-naturalistic outlook. In the opening chapter, I articulate the three layers of the subject matter of phenomenological research—what I refer to as “existentials,” “modes,” and “prejudices.” As I argue, while each layer contributes to what we might call the “structure” of human existence, they do not do so in the same way, or to the same degree. Because phenomenological psychopathology—and applied phenomenology in general—aims to characterize how the structure of human existence can change and alter, it is paramount that these layers be adequately delineated and defined before investigating these changes. In chapters two through five, I conduct hermeneutic and phenomenological investigations of psychopathological phenomena typically labeled as major depressive disorder or bipolar disorder. These investigations address the affective aspects of depression and mania, and the embodied aspects of depression. In addition to clearly articulating the nature of these phenomena, I show how certain psychopathological conditions involve changes in the deepest or most fundamental layer of human existence—what I refer to as existentials. As I argue, many of the classical phenomenologists (including Husserl and Heidegger) believed that these structural features were necessary, unchanging, and universal. However, this presupposition is challenged through the examination of psychopathological and neuropathological conditions, undermining the status of phenomenology as a transcendental philosophy. While this challenge to classical phenomenology is only sketched in the early chapters, in chapters six and seven I develop it in more detail in order to achieve two distinct ends. In chapter six I argue that psychopathology and neuropathology not only challenge phenomenology’s status as a transcendental philosophy, but also supply a key to developing a phenomenological naturalism (which I contrast with a naturalized phenomenology). Phenomenological naturalism, as I articulate it, is a position in which phenomenology is not subsumed by the metaphysical and methodological framework of the natural sciences, but nonetheless maintains the capacity to investigate how the natural world stands independent of human subjectivity (and how events in the natural world can bring about changes in the most fundamental structures of human existence). In the seventh chapter I argue that a phenomenology in which existentials are contingent and variable rather than necessary and unchanging allows phenomenologists to contribute to new dimensional approaches to psychiatric classification. Rather than begin from distinct categories of disorder, these approaches begin from distinct core features of human existence. These features, referred to as either dimensions or constructs, can vary in degree and are studied in both normal and pathological forms.
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Liu, Guoying. "Merleau-Ponty ou la tension entre Husserl et Heidegger : le sujet et le monde dans la phénoménologie de la perception." Paris 1, 1993. http://www.theses.fr/1993PA010578.

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Dans la phenomenologie de la perception de merleau-ponty, non seulement husserl est constamment cite et discute, mais la presence de heidegger y est aussi deja entiere meme si elle reste souvent implicite. L'emploi du terme meme de l'etre-au-monde pour mettre en relief la structure ontologique du sujet charnel par merleau-ponty montre que ce dernier releve sans hesitation le defi ontologique lance a la phenomenologie husserlienne par heidegger dans sein und zeit. Cependant, dans son attachement a certains themes chers a husserl tels que le corps propre, le monde vecu, la nature primordiale et surtout a l'interconnexion entre les trois, merleau-ponty nous rappelle que certaines exigences phenomenologiques ne peuvent pas etre abandonnees. Tout en reconnaissant a heidegger l'immense merite d'avoir introduit la dimension ontologique dans la phenomenologie et d'avoir integre la facticite dans le champ phenomenologique, merleau-ponty cherche a rehabiliter un husserl soucieux de la rigueur phenomenologique dans ses pratiques inlassables pour nous faire voir le monde dans son concret. Ce constant va et vient entre husserl et heidegger temoigne de la tension qui existe entre la pensee de ces deux maitres du mouvement phenomenologique, tension dans laquelle se situe toujours l'oeuvre de merleau-ponty. Il montre aussi qu'il y a continuite de husserl a heidegger<br>In phenomenology of perception of merleau-ponty, not only husserl is constantly cited and discussed, but the presence of heidegger is also already entire even if it remains often implicit. The use of the very term being-in-the-world to emphasis the ontological structure of the body-subject by merleau-ponty shows that he does not hesitate to pick up the ontological challenge raised towards husserlian phenomenology by heidegger in sein und zeit. However, in his attachment to husserlian themes such as the body-propre, the world of lived experience, the primordial nature and especially the interconnection between the three, merleau-ponty reminds us that certain phenomenological requirements cannot be abandonned. While recognizing heidegger's immense merite of introducing the ontological dimension into phenomenology and integrating facticity in the phenomenological field, merleau-ponty endeavours to rehabilitate the husserl who never gives up phenomenological vigour in his untiring efforts to let see the world concretely. This constant coming and going between husserl and heidegger testifies the tension which existes between the thinking of the two masters of the phenomenological movement, tension in which the work of merleau-ponty is always situated. It also shows that there is continuity from husserl to heidegger
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Grant, Stuart. "Gathering to Witness." University of Sydney, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/2057.

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Doctor of Philosophy<br>People gather. Everywhere. They gather to witness. To tell and to listen to stories. To show what was done, and how what is to be done might best be done. To perform the necessary procedures to make sure the gods are glorified and the world continues to be made as it should. To dance, to heal, to marry, to send away the dead, to entertain, to praise, to order the darkness, to affirm the self. People are gathering. As they always have—everywhere. Doctors, lawyers, bankers and politicians don evening wear to attend performances in which people sing in unearthly voices in languages they do not understand, to sit in rows, silent, and to measure the appropriate length of time they should join with each other in continuing to make light slapping noises by striking the palms of their hands together to show their appreciation at the end of the performance. One hundred thousand people gather on the last Saturday of September every year in a giant stadium in the city of Melbourne, Australia at the “hallowed turf” of the Melbourne Cricket Ground, to watch 36 men kick, punch and catch an oval shaped ball with each other, scoring points by kicking it between long sticks planted in the ground. The gathered multitude wears the same ritual colours as the men playing the game. They cry out, stand and sing anthems. This game is played and understood nowhere else in the world, but in the Melbourne cultural calendar it is the most important day of the year. It is what makes Melbourne Melbourne. Before the whitefella came, aborigines from the clans of the Yiatmathang, Waradjuri Dora Dora, Duduroa, Minjambutta, Pangerang, Kwatt Kwatta—the wombat, kangaroo, possum, Tasmanian tiger, echidna, koala and emu, would gather on the banks of the Murray River, near what is now the twin cities of Albury/Wodonga to organize marriages, perform initiations, to lay down weapons, to dance, to settle debts and disputes, to tell stories, to paint their bodies, and to request permission from the Yiatmathang to cross the river and make the climb to the top of Bogong High Plains in late spring, to feast on the Bogong moths arriving fully grown after their flight from Queensland, ready to be sung, danced and eaten. On the island of Sulawesi, a son of a family bears the responsibility of providing the largest possible number of buffalo to be sacrificed at the funeral of his father. A sacrifice which will condemn the son to a life of debt to pay for the animals which must be slaughtered in sufficient number to affirm the status of his family, provide enough meat to assure the correct distributions are made, and assure that his father has a sufficiently large herd in Puya, the afterworld. Temporary ritual buildings for song and dance must be constructed, effigies made, invitations issued. Months are spent in the preparations. And then the people will arrive, family, friends, colleagues and tourists, in great numbers, from surrounding villages, from Ujung Pandang, from Jakarta, from Australia, from Europe, from the USA, to sing, dance, talk, look and listen. And if the funeral is a success, the son will gain respect, status and honour for himself, and secure a wellprovided journey to the afterlife for his father. In a primary school playground, in an outer suburb of any Australian city, thirty parents sit in a couple of rows of metal and plastic chairs on a spring afternoon to watch their own and each other’s children sing together in hesitant or strident voices, in or out of time and tune versions of well-known popular songs praising simple virtues are applauded; the younger the children, the greater the effort, the longer and louder the applause. Some of these people are the same doctors, bankers and lawyers who had donned evening wear the night before at opera houses, now giving freely of the appreciative palm slapping sound held so precious in that other environment. And they will gather and disperse and regather, at times deemed appropriate, at the times when these gatherings have always occurred, these lawyers, doctors, sons, mothers, sports fans, when and where they can and should and must, to sing, to dance, to tell stories, to watch and listen, to be there with and among each other bearing witness to their faith, their belief, their belonging, their values. But what, in these superficially disparate, culturally diverse and dispersed groups of people, what draws them, what gathers an audience, what gathers in an audience, and what in an audience is salient for the audience members? What gathers, what gathers in an audience?
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Hackermeier, Margaretha. "Einfühlung und Leiblichkeit als Voraussetzung für intersubjektive Konstitution zum Begriff der Einfühlung bei Edith Stein und seine Rezeption durch Edmund Husserl, Max Scheler, Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty und Bernhard Waldenfels." Hamburg Kovač, 2007. http://d-nb.info/989238547/04.

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Hackermeier, Margaretha. "Einfühlung und Leiblichkeit als Voraussetzung für intersubjektive Konstitution : zum Begriff der Einfühlung bei Edith Stein und seine Rezeption durch Edmund Husserl, Max Scheler, Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty und Bernhard Waldenfels /." Hamburg : Kovač, 2008. http://d-nb.info/989238547/04.

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Books on the topic "Husserl; Heidegger; Merleau-Ponty"

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Four phenomenological philosophers: Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty. Routledge, 1993.

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Phénoménologie et ontologie: Merleau-Ponty lecteur de Husserl et Heidegger. L'Harmattan, 2005.

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Spisi iz postfenomenologije: Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Derrida, Deleuze, Nancy. Rabic, 2013.

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The humanization of transcendental philosophy: Studies on Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty. Tulika, 1997.

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J, Silverman Hugh, ed. The Horizons of continental philosophy: Essays on Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty. Kluwer Academic, 1988.

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Paisana, Jo~ao. História da filosofia e tradiç~ao filosófica: Estudos sobre: Dilthey, Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty. Ediç~oes Colibri, 1993.

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EDITUS, SciELO. Ensaios sobre fenomenologia: Husserl, Heidegger e Merleau-Ponty. 2014.

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Christopher, Macann. Four Phenomenological Philosophers: Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty. Taylor & Francis Group, 2005.

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Macann, Christopher. Four Phenomenological Philosophers: Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty. Taylor & Francis Group, 2005.

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Macann, Christopher. Four Phenomenological Philosophers: Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty. Taylor & Francis Group, 2005.

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Book chapters on the topic "Husserl; Heidegger; Merleau-Ponty"

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Dastur, Françoise, and Robert Vallier. "Temporality and Existence." In Questions of Phenomenology. Fordham University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.5422/fordham/9780823233731.003.0009.

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This chapter brings Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, whose different phenomenological styles are normally opposed, into dialogue with Maurice Merleau-Ponty's claim that temporality is not a contingent attribute of existence. According to Merleau-Ponty, consciousness and the world, the inside and the outside, sense and non-sense, are interdependent beings. For Merleau-Ponty, the problem of time is the problem of the subject's relation to time. The chapter examines how Merleau-Ponty's position in Phenomenology of Perception becomes the intermediary position between, on the one hand, the completion of the tradition and the fulfillment of modernity represented by Husserl's transcendental phenomenology and, on the other hand, the “new beginning for thought” that Heidegger wants to promote, insofar as he attempts to assume or take on metaphysics.
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F. Filho, José Luiz de. "Acerca da fenomenologia existencial de Maurice Merleau-Ponty." In Ensaios sobre fenomenologia: Husserl, Heidegger e Merleau-Ponty. EDITUS, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.7476/9788574554440.0004.

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Guimarães, Carlos Roberto. "Heidegger e a excelência da questão do ser." In Ensaios sobre fenomenologia: Husserl, Heidegger e Merleau-Ponty. EDITUS, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.7476/9788574554440.0003.

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Lima, Antonio Balbino Marçal. "Apresentação - O que é fenomenologia?" In Ensaios sobre fenomenologia: Husserl, Heidegger e Merleau-Ponty. EDITUS, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.7476/9788574554440.0001.

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Santos, Sanqueilo de Lima. "Originalidade e precariedade do método fenomenológico husserliano." In Ensaios sobre fenomenologia: Husserl, Heidegger e Merleau-Ponty. EDITUS, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.7476/9788574554440.0002.

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Lima, Antonio Balbino Marçal. "A relação sujeito e mundo na fenomenologia de Merleau-Ponty." In Ensaios sobre fenomenologia: Husserl, Heidegger e Merleau-Ponty. EDITUS, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.7476/9788574554440.0005.

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Lima, Antonio Balbino Marçal. "Notas sobre a questão da superação da metafísica em Merleau- Ponty." In Ensaios sobre fenomenologia: Husserl, Heidegger e Merleau-Ponty. EDITUS, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.7476/9788574554440.0006.

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Golob, Sacha. "Self-Awareness and the “I” in the Phenomenological Tradition." In The Self. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190087265.003.0013.

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The Phenomenological tradition is defined by its attempt to rethink the self and self-awareness. This chapter provides an overview of some of the fundamental developments within that tradition running from Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty to later writers such as Henry. I begin by sketching the key features: its relationship to naturalistic and transcendental approaches, the centrality of the first person perspective, and the hierarchical model which is central to Phenomenology’s vision of experience. I next introduce the specifics of Phenomenology’s picture of self-awareness, positioning it between the spectatorial model found in Brentano and a Kantian intellectualism. I then turn to some key innovations: Sartre’s notion of non-positional self-consciousness, Heidegger on the links between the self and the social, and finally Merleau-Ponty’s conception of embodiment.
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Morin, Marie-Eve. "Introduction The Speculative Realist Challenge And The Limits Of Phenomenology." In Merleau-Ponty and Nancy on Sense and Being. Edinburgh University Press, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9781474492423.003.0001.

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The starting point for the present study is the speculative realist critique of what Meillassoux has called correlationism. Focusing on the critique of phenomenology as anti-realist, the Introduction explains the disagreement between speculative realism and phenomenology in terms of their respective understanding of the relation between being and sense. Rather than adopting a defensive posture, the book proposes to take the speculative realist challenge seriously and show how Merleau-Ponty and Nancy resist the collapse of being into sense we find in the phenomenologies of Husserl and Heidegger. After laying the context for the present study, the author outlines the possible influence and resonances between the two thinkers.
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"II. Phänomenologie? – »Zurück zu den Sachen selbst!« (Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty)." In Phänomenologische Soziologie. transcript-Verlag, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.14361/9783839414644-001.

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