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1
Craig, Edward. "David Hume." Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series 20 (March 1986): 91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0957042x00004041.
Full textAbstract:
David Hume (1711–1776) was born in Scotland and attended Edinburgh University. In 1734, after a brief spell in a merchant's office in Bristol, he went to France to write A Treatise of Human Nature, published anonymously in 1739 (Books I and II) and 1740 (Book III). An Abstract, also anonymous and written as if by someone other than the author of the Treatise, appeared about the same time, and provides an invaluable account, in a brief compass, of what Hume thought most important about the Treatise. The Treatise was not well received, and Hume was unsuccessful in his candidature for the chair of moral philosophy at Edinburgh. He rewrote Book I of the Treatise, adding a controversial discussion of miracles and providence; and a revision of this was published as An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding in 1748. His Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, which was a rewriting of Book III of the Treatise, was published in 1751, and his Dissertation on the Passions, corresponding to Book II of the Treatise, but with significant omissions, such as the account of the psychological mechanism of sympathy, in 1757. In 1752 he had been made keeper of the Advocates' Library at Edinburgh, and wrote his History of England which, at the time, brought him more approbation than his philosophy. During this time, he wrote the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, published posthumously in 1779. In 1763 he became secretary to the British Embassy in Paris. He returned to London in 1766, and a year later was Undersecretary of State. In 1769 he returned to Edinburgh and worked on final editions of his writings, and on an autobiography, dated 18 April 1776, a few months before his death.
2
Waldmann, Felix. "David Hume in Chicago: A Twentieth-Century Hoax." Journal of British Studies 59, no. 4 (October 2020): 793–820. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/jbr.2020.127.
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AbstractThis article alleges that two letters attributed to the philosopher David Hume (1711–1776) were forged in the twentieth century. The letters were first published in 1972 and 1973 by Michael Morrisroe, an assistant professor of English in the University of Illinois, Chicago Circle, after which they became monuments of conventional scholarship on Hume's life and writings. Both letters are cited without qualification by scholars of Hume's thought in dozens of publications, including Ernest Campbell Mossner's celebrated Life of David Hume (1980), and John Robertson's entry for Hume in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (2004). This article reconstructs the history and transmission of Hume's extant letters and attempts to account for why the forgeries published by Morrisroe were accepted as genuine. It makes a systematic case against the authenticity of the letters, and focuses in particular on the question of whether Hume met the Jansenist homme de lettres Noël-Antoine Pluche (1688–1761) and had access to his library, in Reims, in 1734. The article concludes with a discussion of the implications of the exposé for modern editorial scholarship and intellectual history.
3
King, Peter, and Nathan Ballantyne. "Augustine on Testimony." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39, no. 2 (June 2009): 195–214. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/cjp.0.0045.
Full textAbstract:
Philosophical work on testimony has flourished in recent years. Testimony roughly involves a source affirming or stating something in an attempt to transfer information to one or more persons. It is often said that the topic of testimony has been neglected throughout most of the history of philosophy, aside from contributions by David Hume (1711-1776) and Thomas Reid (1710-1796). True as this may be, Hume and Reid aren't the only ones who deserve a tip of the hat for recognizing the importance of testimony: Augustine of Hippo (354-430) affirms the place of testimony in human cognition, at least in his later writings.In what follows, we consider three questions raised by Augustine's thinking about testimony: the analytical question of what sources count as testimony (Section I); the epistemological question about the status of testimony-based belief (Section II); and the doxastic question about the circumstances in which it is appropriate to believe on the basis of testimony (Section III).
4
Schabas, Margaret, and Carl Wennerlind. "Retrospectives: Hume on Money, Commerce, and the Science of Economics." Journal of Economic Perspectives 25, no. 3 (August 1, 2011): 217–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.25.3.217.
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David Hume (1711–1776) is arguably the most esteemed philosopher to have written in the English language. During his lifetime, however, Hume was as well if not better known for his contributions to political economy, particularly for the essays published as the Political Discourses (1752). Hume left his mark on the economic thought of the physiocrats, the classical economists, and the American Federalists. Adam Smith, who met Hume circa 1750, was his closest friend and interlocutor for some 25 years. Among modern economists, Hume's essays on money and trade have informed theorists of both Keynesian and Monetarist persuasions. In this essay, we begin by discussing Hume's monetary economics, and then spell out his theory of economic development, noting his qualified enthusiasm for the modern commercial system. We end with an assessment of his views on the scientific standing of economics, specifically his counterintuitive argument that economics could be epistemologically superior to physics.
5
Orsi, Cosma. "THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INCLUSION: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE WORKHOUSE SYSTEM." Journal of the History of Economic Thought 39, no. 4 (October 2, 2017): 453–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1053837216000249.
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The aim of this article is to describe the rise and fall of the workhouse system in connection with the developments that took place in economic thought in the transition from mercantilism to the Classical tradition. By examining the economic debate about wages, efficiency, labor market, workers’ mobility, and unemployment, we discuss whether the social policy shift epitomized by institutional reforms like the Gilbert Act (1782), the Rose Act (1793), and the Speenhamland system (1795) was accompanied and eventually inspired by a change in the perception of major political economy issues. In doing so, we review the writings of Jacob Vanderlint (d. 1740), George Berkeley (1685–1753), Malachy Postlethwayt (1707?–1767), Josiah Tucker (1713–1799), David Hume (1711–1776), and Adam Smith (1723-1790), among others. Although a direct influence by these writers cannot be proven, the originality of the present work rests on the effort to put into perspective the arguments elaborated by economic thinkers and the proposals made by social reformers so as to identify possible connections between economic theorizing and social legislation.
6
Vesey, Godfrey. "Hume on Liberty and Necessity." Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series 20 (March 1986): 111–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100004069.
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David Hume (1711–1776) described the question of liberty and necessity as ‘the most contentious question of metaphysics, the most contentious science’ (Hume [1748] 1975, p. 95). He was right about it being contentious. Whether it is metaphysical is another matter. I think that what is genuinely metaphysical is an assumption that Hume, and a good many other philosophers, make in their treatment of the question. The assumption is about language and reality. I call it ‘the conformity assumption’. But more about that shortly. Let us begin at the obvious beginning, by considering what the terms ‘liberty’ and ‘necessity’ mean in the expression ‘liberty and necessity’.
7
Vesey, Godfrey. "Hume on Liberty and Necessity." Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series 20 (March 1986): 111–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0957042x00004065.
Full textAbstract:
David Hume (1711–1776) described the question of liberty and necessity as ‘the most contentious question of metaphysics, the most contentious science’ (Hume [1748] 1975, p. 95). He was right about it being contentious. Whether it is metaphysical is another matter. I think that what is genuinely metaphysical is an assumption that Hume, and a good many other philosophers, make in their treatment of the question. The assumption is about language and reality. I call it ‘the conformity assumption’. But more about that shortly. Let us begin at the obvious beginning, by considering what the terms ‘liberty’ and ‘necessity’ mean in the expression ‘liberty and necessity’.
8
Emerson, Roger L. "The Philosophical Society of Edinburgh 1768–1783." British Journal for the History of Science 18, no. 3 (November 1985): 255–303. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007087400022391.
Full textAbstract:
The Philosophical Society of Edinburgh Throughout the years 1768–1783 looked to the outside world like a flourishing and important body. By 1771 it had sponsored the publication of five volumes of papers which had gone through several printings and translations. It had a distinguished foreign membership which assured its recognition abroad as one of the important academic bodies in the cosmopolitan Republic of Letters. From its foundation in 1737 until his death in 1768, its President had been the Earl of Morton, better known as the President of the Royal Society of London and as an astronomer who had been active in the practical work of the London society. Another member, Sir John Pringle, became President of the Royal Society in 1772. It was also known abroad that among the Edinburgh philosophers were to be found the most important professors of the town's university, not only those of its distinguished medical faculty but also men like William Robertson, Adam Ferguson and later John Robison. David Hume had been at one time a Secretary of the Society and probably remained a member to the end of his life in 1776. In the British colonies, the Society could point to members in Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Jamaica and other West Indian islands and it had contacts in a far-flung network reaching from China and Siberia in the east to places less remote in Europe and America. Within Britain, the Society had members in London and in provincial towns of whom William Brownrigg was the most important. From these men and from others scattered in Scotland, the Society drew information and projected its image as a successful learned society. These appearances, however, are far clearer than the Society's record of accomplishment during its last years. It is not accidental that so little pertaining to its work survives. The Society in reality had a career far from brilliant and by 1778 hardly deserved the reputation it had acquired. During its last five years it revived but even then it probably did not reach the level of activity seen in the early and mid 1750s.
9
Reis, Nilo Henrique Neves dos. "Maquiavel na Inglaterra: O leitor David Hume." Pensando - Revista de Filosofia 10, no. 21 (January 24, 2020): 79. http://dx.doi.org/10.26694/.v10i21.8953.
Full textAbstract:
Os escritos de Nicolau Maquiavel foram lidos por várias pessoas de modo não confessional desde a sua divulgação. Indícios apontam que os ingleses tiveram acesso as suas obras já no reinado de Henrique VIII, ainda que de forma restrita à elite inglesa, que tinha familiaridade com o idioma italiano. Decerto que as obras do florentino ofereceram uma sólida contribuição ao pensamento político inglês, o que, por sua vez, estimulou uma reflexão crítica ao fenômeno político, bem como aos valores vigentes, pois, como se sabe, suas ideias serviram de inspiração para muitos escritores. A bem da verdade, cotejando as produções inglesas, principalmente após a guerra civil, sente-se a influência de Maquiavel. David Hume, que viveu entre 1711 a 1776, dois séculos depois da circulação dos escritos na Inglaterra, quando o florentino já era um referencial ali, não tinha como desconhecer as contribuições dos escritos políticos de Maquiavel, já que uma série de autores faziam referência diretas a ele, muitos dos quais, comentados pelo escocês. Em uma época em que era pernicioso fazer menções louváveis ao pensamento do florentino, há vestígios de que Hume usou estratégias para colocar suas posições próximas, e dado aos indícios encontrados neste escrito, defende-se a posição de que a familiaridade do escocês com os textos de Maquiavel era grande, visto que ele conhecia bem o “corpus machiavellicus”.
10
Botero Camacho, Manuel. "To dream or not to dream: incursión en la lógica de la canción de S. T. Coleridge." Razón Crítica, no. 1 (August 29, 2016): 122–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.21789/25007807.1139.
Full textAbstract:
<p align="justify">A lo largo de este artículo se expone una serie de posibilidades que puede ofrecer la lectura del poema de Samuel Taylor Coleridge titulado “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner” (1798). Los argumentos aquí expuestos carecen de intención distinta de aquella que consiste en señalar elementos que acaso no sean accidentales dentro del texto. David Hume (1711-1776) será quien proporcione las relaciones que deban examinarse. En este escrito se ofrecen tres posibilidades interpretativas y, al menos, dos de ellas pueden verse como contaminadas por las teorías de Hume. Aunque la tercera no está directamente tratada en la filosofía que aquí se maneja, es fácil hacer la inferencia del origen de tal relación. El objetivo es presentar el poema de Coleridge como una objeción a la teoría de la causalidad enunciada por Hume.</p>
11
Monteiro, Ricardo Rodrigues. "A SEMIÓTICA DE PEIRCE A PARTIR DE JOHN LOCKE E DAVID HUME: O ÍCONE, ÍNDICE E SÍMBOLO." Divers@! 11, no. 1 (June 30, 2018): 2. http://dx.doi.org/10.5380/diver.v11i1.52373.
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O objetivo deste trabalho é apresentar alguns conceitos fundamentais da semiótica de Peirce (1839-1914), em especial a relação do signo com o objeto, demonstrando-a como uma evolução em relação ao pensamento de John Locke (1632-1704) e David Hume (1711-1776). Pretende-se assim fornecer subsídios aos interessados em conhecer ou aprofundar seus estudos sobre a semiótica de Peirce, de maneira introdutória, ou que estejam no início de um aprofundamento mais teórico-conceitual sobre o assunto. No início apresentamos conceitos essenciais que influenciaram Peirce, tais como a ideia de signo sonoro, em Locke, ou o conceito de associação de ideias por semelhança, contiguidade ou causa e efeito, em Hume. Tentaremos demonstrar que esse conceito, bem como a provocação feita por Hume aos filósofos, foram decisivos para o desenvolvimento da teoria geral dos signos de Peirce, em especial a relação entre signo e objeto (S-O), vindo a culminar na tricotomia clássica: ícone, índice e símbolo. Outrossim, vale destacar que o signo sonoro em Locke possivelmente influenciou a ideia de signo enquanto imagem acústica, em Saussure. Ainda, apresentaremos várias provas para atestar que a teoria de Peirce não é antropocêntrica e, por essa razão, pode muito bem ser utilizada, além da comunicação entre humanos, para os estudos de comunicação entre humanos e não humanos, e entre não humanos e não humanos
12
Silva, Carlos Campelo da. "A ortodoxia do “grande infiel”: ou sobre o uso do ceticismo Humeano por Kierkegaard e Hamann." Revista Ética e Filosofia Política 2, no. 22 (July 4, 2020): 94–114. http://dx.doi.org/10.34019/2448-2137.2019.31111.
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Este trabalho tem como objetivo analisar a apropriação que Hamann e Kierkegaard fazem de alguns aspectos do ceticismo desenvolvido por Hume. Em 1744, David Hume (1711-1776), até então, autor do Tratado da Natureza Humana (1739) e dos Ensaios Morais e Políticos (1741) é rejeitado para o cargo de professor da cadeira de Ética da Universidade de Edimburgo, sob a alegação de que ele era um “notório infiel”. Desse modo, parece estranho pensar que Hamann que tão energicamente combateu a ilustração, sendo um defensor implacável de um cristianismo baseado somente na fé, tenha algo a ver com o ceticismo de Hume. Do mesmo modo, que não parece crível pensar que o autor de Escola do Cristianismo (1850), Obras do Amor (1847) e Discursos edificantes possa de alguma forma estar relacionado com este “notório infiel”. Entretanto, as afirmações de Hume de que: “[...] a religião cristã não só foi inicialmente acompanhada de milagres, como até hoje não é possível que uma pessoa razoável lhe dê crédito sem milagre [...]”, bem como a afirmativa de Hume, segundo a qual ser um cético filosófico é o primeiro e mais importante passo no sentido de se tornar um cristão verdadeiro, parecem ter provido as armas que Kierkegaard e Hamann tanto necessitavam para combater o racionalismo filosófico e teológico que se imiscuíam na religião e minavam a fé. Desse modo, essa comunicação pretende apontar as consequências do pensamento humeano para a concepção de um cristianismo cético desenvolvido por Hamann e Kierkegaard.
Palavras-chave: Hume. Ceticismo. Hamann. Kierkegaard. Cristianismo.
13
"David Hume." Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series 20 (March 1986): 91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100004045.
Full textAbstract:
David Hume (1711–1776) was born in Scotland and attended Edinburgh University. In 1734, after a brief spell in a merchant's office in Bristol, he went to France to write A Treatise of Human Nature, published anonymously in 1739 (Books I and II) and 1740 (Book III). An Abstract, also anonymous and written as if by someone other than the author of the Treatise, appeared about the same time, and provides an invaluable account, in a brief compass, of what Hume thought most important about the Treatise. The Treatise was not well received, and Hume was unsuccessful in his candidature for the chair of moral philosophy at Edinburgh. He rewrote Book I of the Treatise, adding a controversial discussion of miracles and providence; and a revision of this was published as An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding in 1748. His Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, which was a rewriting of Book III of the Treatise, was published in 1751, and his Dissertation on the Passions, corresponding to Book II of the Treatise, but with significant omissions, such as the account of the psychological mechanism of sympathy, in 1757. In 1752 he had been made keeper of the Advocates' Library at Edinburgh, and wrote his History of England which, at the time, brought him more approbation than his philosophy. During this time, he wrote the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, published posthumously in 1779. In 1763 he became secretary to the British Embassy in Paris. He returned to London in 1766, and a year later was Undersecretary of State. In 1769 he returned to Edinburgh and worked on final editions of his writings, and on an autobiography, dated 18 April 1776, a few months before his death.
14
Koch, Carl Henrik. "Den mangfoldige Hume." Fund og Forskning i Det Kongelige Biblioteks Samlinger 51 (December 18, 2015). http://dx.doi.org/10.7146/fof.v51i0.41277.
Full textAbstract:
The Scot David Hume (1711–1776) and Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677) in Holland were two of the greatest philosophers of the European Enlightenment. Whereas Spinoza’s Bible criticism was the inspiration behind the often clandestine tradition known as radical Enlightenment, Hume tried with all his might to wrest the science of mankind from the grip of theology and religion. Since the mid 19th century Hume’s philosophy has been interpreted as either scepticism, naturalism or first and foremost criticism of religion. In my article I describe these three very different interpretations and argue that, although Hume was in a certain sense a sceptic and strongly concerned to criticize the clergy and Christianity, yet both these traits of his thought are connected with his naturalistic and secularist philosophy. The title of the article is explained in its introduction, which describes his manifold interests.
15
Zaterka, Luciana. "A reconfiguração do empirismo: química, medicina e história natural a partir do programa baconiano de conhecimento." DoisPontos 15, no. 1 (July 18, 2018). http://dx.doi.org/10.5380/dp.v15i1.57190.
Full textAbstract:
O conceito de empirismo evoca tanto uma tradição histórica quanto uma rede de questões filosóficas. Ambas frequentemente associadas a nomes como os de Francis Bacon (1561-1626), John Locke (1632-1704), George Berkeley (1685-1753) e David Hume (1711-1776). Porém, lembremos que nenhum desses filósofos utilizaram o termo empirismo, e nem compartilharam de uma única escola epistemológica. Do ponto de vista histórico é comum encontrarmos estudos de História e Filosofia da Ciência que relacionam o conceito de ‘empirismo’ com a chamada Escola Empírica Médica, desenvolvida na Grécia Antiga (século III a.C.). Porém, mais uma vez, temos que ter cautela com essas simplificações históricas, afinal se por uma Escola médica compreendemos um número de médicos que se reconhecem como pertencentes a um grupo que defendem exatamente as mesmas ideias e conceitos, a Escola Empírica Médica é simplesmente uma invenção histórica. De fato, observaremos alguns elementos comuns dentro dessas escolas, mas não correntes unívocas. Essa postura historiográfica usualmente acarreta sérias consequências. Assim, por exemplo, os estudos que marcam a diferença entre as filosofias do continente europeu e as da Inglaterra do século XVII, distinguindo-a por meio de noções amplas, tais como racionalismo e empirismo, podem cair em reducionismos importantes. Se, por um lado, vincular o empirismo moderno à escola médica antiga acarreta numa compreensão histórica equivocada; por outro lado, aceitar a dicotomia empirismo x racionalismo como a única narrativa possível para compreendermos a gênese da filosofia moderna carrega consigo problemas de cunho epistemológico. Dos vários problemas que surgem dessa perspectiva historiográfica, isto é, de aceitarmos acriticamente a narrativa padrão, dois deles nos importam mais de perto: ela fornece uma ênfase às questões de cunho epistemológico, subestimando, então, a importância dos debates em outras áreas, como filosofia natural, ética e política, por exemplo; e deixa de lado pensadores que combinam elementos das duas correntes e, portanto, não operam stricto sensu com a dicotomia entre razão e experiência. Nesse sentido, objetivamos problematizar e aprofundar essa questão, ao discutir aspectos epistêmicos e metodológicos do chamado “programa baconiano” de conhecimento, bem como alguns de seus desdobramentos, especialmente no âmbito da química e da medicina no século XVII inglês.