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Journal articles on the topic 'Hume and Kant'

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Published: 18 May 2024

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1

Danko, Christina. "Hume, Kant and Kierkegaard." Philotheos 17 (2017): 84–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philotheos2017179.

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2

Banham, Gary. "Kant, Hume And Causation." British Journal for the History of Philosophy 16, no. 4 (November 2008): 801–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09608780802407605.

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Railton, Peter. "Normative Force and Normative Freedom: Hume and Kant, But Not Hume versus Kant." Ratio 12, no. 4 (December 1999): 320–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9329.00098.

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4

Cvejic, Igor. "Was hat Kant Rousseau zu verdanken?" Filozofija i drustvo 23, no. 3 (2012): 163–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/fid1203163c.

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Zwei Philosophen, denen Kant am meisten zu verdanken hat, wie man mit dem Recht nimmt, sind Hume und Rousseau. W?hrend man ?ber den Hume?s Einfluss einfach und eindeutig antworten kann, ist es mit dem Rousseau?s Einfluss viel mehr kompliziert. Der Haupteinfluss auf Kant hat Rousseau in der Ethik und auf der Ansicht der Menschen gemacht, deshalb es einen Anfangspunkt ist, durch welchem die Antwort auf diese Frage gesucht wird. Nach dieser Analyse wird eine einfache und eindeutige Antwort zu geben versucht, die ?hnlich wie diese, die man auf dem Hume?s Einfluss geben kann, ist: welchen Einfluss hat Rousseau auf dem ganzen Kritische System gemacht.
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5

Shaw, Gisela. "Hume and Kant. Interpretation and Discussion." Philosophy and History 18, no. 1 (1985): 3. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philhist198518119.

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6

Nurkic, Petar. "Hume’s and Kant’s understanding of epistemic normativity." Theoria, Beograd 64, no. 3 (2021): 91–112. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo2103091n.

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Question (d) how do we form beliefs?, implies descriptive answers. On the other hand, the question (n) how should we form beliefs?, implies normative answers. Can we provide answers to (n) questions without answering (d) questions? This (n) - (d) relation can be characterized as epistemic normativity. Hume and Kant provide answers to both questions. Hume is more inclined to psychologize these answers through an empirical approach to questions related to beliefs. While Kant is more inclined to consider a priori conditions of our reasoning. Through general rules and epistemic maxims, Hume and Kant provide normative guidelines in accordance which we should form beliefs. However, in order to be able to talk about normativity, at all, we need to answer questions related to doxastic voluntarism. For Kant, the question of freedom is, to some extent, an obvious precondition for his critiques (especially of the practical mind). While with Hume, precisely because of his empirical approach to beliefs and desires, the matter is more obscure, and it seems as if Hume advocates doxastic involuntarism. In this paper, I will try to present the similarities between Hume and Kant in terms of epistemic normativity. Where it seems as if their views are incompatible, I will try to examine why this is the case. I will focus on Hume?s Treatise of Human Nature and Kant?s Second Analogy. In the end, I will present a couple of thought experiments and try to ?test? Hume and Kant. If I manage to confirm the initial hypotheses, then this paper will be a successful epistemic endeavor. However, if I fail to find the expected similarities between Hume?s and Kant?s understanding of epistemic normativity, then this work can be characterized as a historical approach to the normative framework of ?dogmatic slumber?.
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7

Smith, Steven G. "Hume, Kant, And Road Runner On Causation." Film and Philosophy 14 (2010): 63–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/filmphil2010147.

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8

Kulenkampff, Jens. "The Objectivity of Taste: Hume and Kant." Noûs 24, no. 1 (March 1990): 93. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2215615.

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9

Peter Thielke. "Hume, Kant, and the Sea of Illusion." Hume Studies 29, no. 1 (2003): 63–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/hms.2011.0150.

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10

MILBANK, JOHN. "HUME VERSUS KANT: FAITH, REASON AND FEELING." Modern Theology 27, no. 2 (March 7, 2011): 276–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0025.2011.01676.x.

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11

Engstrom, Stephen. "Reflection and Reason in Hume and Kant." Hegel Bulletin 36, no. 1 (April 21, 2015): 15–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2015.2.

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12

Bertman, Martin. "Hobbes and Hume in relation to Kant." History of European Ideas 30, no. 3 (September 2004): 295–314. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.histeuroideas.2004.06.001.

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13

Nunes Carneiro de Oliveira, Gregory Wagner. "DEBATE DE KANT E HUME EM TORNO DA CAUSALIDADE." PÓLEMOS – Revista de Estudantes de Filosofia da Universidade de Brasília 4, no. 8 (December 6, 2016): 44–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.26512/pl.v4i8.11696.

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Este trabalho busca entender e expor de que maneira David Hume questionou o problema da conexão causal, de que maneira Immanuel Kant respondeu Hume e, ao fim, quais foram as lições filosóficas que remanesceram. Tudo, obviamente, envolto com uma apresentação apropriada do empirismo humeano e do idealismo transcendental de Kant.
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14

Van Eekert, Geert. "Pas de deux met een theologische erfenis." Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 113, no. 2 (July 1, 2021): 279–301. http://dx.doi.org/10.5117/antw2021.2.007.vane.

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Abstract Pas de deux with a theological legacy. Jürgen Habermas on David Hume and Immanuel Kant In his latest opus magnum, Jürgen Habermas reconsiders the history of philosophy from a peculiar perspective: the true and unique nature of philosophy is shown to have been given shape in philosophy’s dispute with Christian theology. This article reviews Habermas’ chapter on the Enlightenment, in which Habermas casts David Hume and Immanuel Kant dancing their own pas de deux with that theological legacy. After having sketched the historical scripts in which Hume and Kant are involved by Habermas, I will critically assess the author’s claim that while Hume ends up refusing the dance and (hence) betraying (enlightened) philosophy’s nature, Kant accepts and transforms the heritage, yet ends up failing to give his pas de deux a genuine modern and enlightened twist.
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Sljukic, Slavenko. "The contstructivistic defence of the objectivity of moral standards and natural law that does not require the debate on moral realism." Filozofija i drustvo 28, no. 3 (2017): 653–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/fid1703653s.

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The main goal of Kenneth R. Westphal?s How Hume and Kant Reconstruct Natural Law: Justifying Strict Objectivity without Debating Moral Realism is to defend the objectivity of moral standards and natural law and thus avoid the discussion about moral realism and its alternatives by interpreting Hume and Kant in a constructivistic sense. The reason behind the author?s disagreement with both: moral realism and non-realism (its alternative) is our inability to properly understand and answer one of the two parts in Socrates? question to Euthyphro: ?Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved?? Moral realists cannot provide an answer to its second part, since it is not possible to prove that moral standards are not artificial; conversely, moral non-realists cannot provide an answer to its first part, since it is not possible to avoid the relatitvity of moral standards. The author tends to solve this problem by avoiding the confrontation between moral realism and non-realism and thus choosing the constuctivistic stance that, as he argues, can be found in both Hume?s and Kant?s theories. The main point of this stance is that moral standards are indeed artificial, yet not arbitrary. He proves this by pointing out that both Hume and Kant treat the moral standards as a social fact (that is, artificial), but also as objective. Westphal points out that Hume explicitly writes about moral standards as a social fact, while showing that, at the same time, his theory of justice, which precedes all of the moral standards, is established independently of his theory of moral sentiments (potentially leading to moral relativism). In this manner, he provides the objectivity of those standards. On the other hand, Kant?s theory is interpreted as advanced, yet similar to Hume?s in its structure. The crucial similarity is that both Hume and Kant interpret the moral standards as a social fact (that is, as an artificial) and, at the same time, as the objective ones. Kant, unlike Hume, provides this objectivity by using a specific moral criterion - a categorical imperative. Those assumptions will be used as the main premises of a distinctively inspiring interpretation of Hume?s and Kant?s theories of justice.
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박종훈. "The Concept of Imagination in Hume and Kant." Journal of Ethics 1, no. 74 (September 2009): 163–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.15801/je.1.74.200909.163.

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17

Langsam, Harold. "Kant, Hume, and Our Ordinary Concept of Causation." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54, no. 3 (September 1994): 625. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2108584.

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18

Rohlf, Michael. "The Rationality of Induction in Kant (and Hume)." Idealistic Studies 43, no. 3 (2013): 153–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/idstudies2014111212.

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19

Baier, Annette C. "Moralism and Cruelty: Reflections on Hume and Kant." Ethics 103, no. 3 (April 1993): 436–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/293520.

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20

Landy, David. "Sellars on Hume and Kant on Representing Complexes." European Journal of Philosophy 17, no. 2 (June 2009): 224–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0378.2008.00301.x.

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21

Simanjuntak, Mardohar Batu Bornok. "Memeriksa Inkonsistensi Estetika Dampak Immanuel Kant versus Gagasan Proto-Naturalisme Non-Deterministik David Hume dalam Etika Kantian." Dekonstruksi 10, no. 02 (March 18, 2024): 31–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.54154/dekonstruksi.v10i02.228.

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Teori estetika yang digagas Immanuel Kant mempergunakan pendekatan dampak, sebaliknya etika Kantian menempuh pendekatan proses. Teks kajian estetik Kantian diterbitkan oleh Kant setelah dua teks yang pertama, termasuk di dalamnya argumentasi Kant tentang ontologi moral. Inkonsistensi ini dicoba untuk dibedah dari perspektif estetika analitis, dan terutama kajian dari pemeriksaan teks yang dilakukan oleh Sally Sedgwick dan Dabney Townsend. Dari penelusuran yang dilakukan, ketidakkonsistenan Kant terjadi karena ada dua ragam relasi, yaitu relasi kausal spasio-temporal dan relasi non-kausal non-spasio-temporal. Pelacakan lebih lanjut menunjukkan bahwa gagasan Kant tentang non-kausal non-spasio-temporalitas dikembangkan dari karakter aksidental dalam persepsi-rasawi yang digagas oleh David Hume. Penelitian ini sampai pada kesimpulan bahwa pengembangan gagasan yang dilakukan Kant didasarkan pada bangun argumentasi Hume yang memiliki karakteristik Proto-Naturalisme non-Deterministik.
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22

Gomes, Paulo Uiris da Silva. "A DÍVIDA DE POPPER PARA COM KANT: OS DOIS PROBLEMAS FUNDAMENTAIS DA TEORIA DO CONHECIMENTO." REVISTA APOENA - Periódico dos Discentes de Filosofia da UFPA 1, no. 1 (December 7, 2021): 117. http://dx.doi.org/10.18542/apoena.v1i1.11583.

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Este trabalho tem como objetivo refletir sobre os dois problemas fundamentais da teoria do conhecimento: o problema da demarcação científica, ou problema de Kant; e o problema da indução, ou problema de Hume. O primeiro refere-se a questão acerca do critério da demarcação, isto é, que critério devemos usar para distinguir enunciados das ciências empíricas de afirmações metafísicas e pseudocientíficas. Popper afirma que Kant foi o primeiro a formular tal problema, e com ele, a demarcação científica tornou-se o problema central da teoria do conhecimento. Discutiremos a solução de Kant e de Popper para essa questão. O segundo problema fundamental da teoria do conhecimento é o problema da indução, que se refere a questão a respeito da validade ou justificação das inferências indutivas nas ciências empíricas. Popper atribui a Hume a autoria dessa indagação. Discutiremos a abordagem de Hume sobre o tema e a solução de Kant e Popper para o problema da indução.
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23

Evstigneev, Maksim D. "Strawson P.F.: From Hume to Kant and Back Again." RUDN Journal of Philosophy 27, no. 3 (September 15, 2023): 644–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.22363/2313-2302-2023-27-3-644-658.

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P.F. Strawson is one of the most famous Kantian philosophers and interpretators of Kant’s “Critique of Pure Reason”. This study is dedicated to reconstruction of this interpretation. It is also dedicated to the analysis of the story and place of Strawson’s interpretation in the history of his own philosophical career. I show how Strawson reads Kant’s text, what strategies of interpretation he adopts and what problems he faces. In “Individuals” and “The Bounds of Sense” Strawson explicitly associates himself with Kant and considers himself as Kantian philosopher. Kantian philosophy for Strawson is the descriptive, anti-sceptical metaphysics that seeks to explicate our basic conceptual sсheme. However, due to various criticism, Strawson had to abandon descriptive metaphysics and to change his intellectual figures. On of the main heroes of “Skepticism and Naturalism” - his late book - becomes Hume. The second part of the paper is dedicated to the explanation of the transition from Kant to Hume. In this work, Strawson argues for some kind of soft Hume-like naturalism instead of previously held descriptive metaphysics. This kind of naturalism is more modest than metaphysics. It does not pretend to be the main and the most fundamental of all the philosophical studies. It is simply an analysis of one of the possible philosophical perspective. The stand point of ordinary believes.
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24

Salgueiro, Inês. "O conhecimento sintético a priori da moralidade." Especiaria: Cadernos de Ciências Humanas 19, no. 34 (December 5, 2019): 113–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.36113/especiaria.v19i34.2546.

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Este artigo examina o impacto do problema de causalidade na filosofia moral de Kant, mais especificamente a influência de Hume na visão de Kant sobre o livre arbítrio. Em uma investigação sobre o entendimento humano, Hume argumenta que não podemos saber apenas por meio de nossas capacidades intelectuais que efeito um determinado evento trará sem uma base empírica. A causalidade, portanto, equivale apenas a um hábito, que não tem fundamento lógico. Este é o primeiro problema levantado por Hume, ao qual Kant dedica grande parte de sua Crítica da razão pura. Um segundo problema tem a ver com a questão da liberdade, particularmente o dilema colocado pelo determinismo, que consiste na aparente impossibilidade de saber se nossas ações são ou não uma conseqüência das escolhas livres. Kant procura responder a este segundo problema em sua filosofia moral, notadamente nos Fundamentos da metafísica da moral e na Crítica da razão prática. Afirmo que em Kant o conceito de "transcendental" é a chave não apenas para responder ao problema teórico da causalidade, mas também para enfrentar o problema prático da liberdade. O que distingue o exame moral de Kant é precisamente uma análise crítica da razão. Seu projeto moral faz parte de um projeto crítico abrangente, em que o conhecimento teórico e prático está entrelaçado.
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Ergün, Elif. "Etik Bir Tartışma Konusu: Hume ve Kant Örneğinde İntihar." Beytulhikme An International Journal of Philosophy 9, no. 9:1 (January 1, 2019): 121–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.18491/beytulhikme.1421.

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Röd, Wolfgang. "Kant und Hume: Die Transzendentalphilosophie als Alternative zum Naturalismus." Dialectica 49, no. 2-4 (May 23, 2005): 317–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.1995.tb00167.x.

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Stevenson, Leslie. "Freedom of judgement in Descartes, Hume, Spinoza and Kant." British Journal for the History of Philosophy 12, no. 2 (May 2004): 223–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09608780410001676476.

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28

Costelloe, Timothy M. "Hume, Kant, and the "Antinomy of Taste"." Journal of the History of Philosophy 41, no. 2 (2003): 165–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/hph.2003.0007.

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29

Fosl, Peter S. "Cavell and Hume on Skepticism, Natural Doubt, and the Recovery of the Ordinary." Conversations: The Journal of Cavellian Studies, no. 3 (March 27, 2015): 32–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.18192/cjcs.v0i3.1298.

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One curious aspect of Stanley Cavell’s investigations into skepticism is his relative neglect of one of philosophy’s most important skeptics, David Hume. Cavell’s thinking about skepticism is located in relation to Wittgenstein, Kant, Emerson, Austin, and others. But while Hume is occasionally mentioned, those encounters are brief and generally dismissive. In “Aesthetic Problems of Modern Philosophy,” for example, Cavell remarks that while “Hume is always a respectable place to begin,” Kant is “deeper and obscurer” (MWM, 88). The important Cavell scholar Timothy Gould follows Cavell in this, writing that: “Hume’s tactic of playing billiards as a relief from the melancholy of reflection and skepticism is a relatively unsophisticated strategy, compared to some that I know of.”
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30

Marques, José Oscar de Almeida, and Andrea Faggion. "Causality, antinomies, and Kant's way to the Critique." Studia Kantiana 11, no. 15 (November 14, 2013): 72. http://dx.doi.org/10.5380/sk.v11i15.88869.

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De acordo com os Prolegômenos, Kant foi despertado de seu "sono dogmático", não uma, mas duas vezes. No Prefácio, ele se referiu ao impacto da crítica de Hume a causalidade em suas investigações metafísicas, mas, na Terceira Parte da Questão Transcendental Principal, ele creditou seu despertar a descoberta das antinomias como um produto da razão em seu uso transcendental. Tradicionalmente, essas duas abordagens levam a duas explicações mutuamente exclusivas da origem da filosofia crítica de Kant, uma que confere grande importãncia a influência de Hume, e outra em que essa influência é vista como mínima ou mesmo como não-existente. Neste artigo, propomos que ambos os assuntos - antinomias e causalidade - podem ser remetidos a Hume e têm um papel complementar no desenvolvimento crítico de Kant, como questões distintas que dão ensejo, cada uma, a um estágio distinto no longo caminho que levou a Crítica da razão pura.
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Carneiro, Marcelo Carbone. "Considerações sobre a idéia de tempo em Sto. Agostinho, Hume e Kant." Interface - Comunicação, Saúde, Educação 8, no. 15 (August 2004): 221–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/s1414-32832004000200003.

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Discute-se sobre o tempo buscando entendê-lo a partir dos referenciais que o tomam como elaboração subjetiva, ou seja, como não possuindo qualquer realidade fora do sujeito. Entende-se que, na história da Filosofia, esta reflexão inicia-se com a filosofia de Sto. Agostinho e tem seu ápice no pensamento moderno, sobretudo em Hume e Kant. O tempo seria uma construção ou elaboração do espírito, sem existência fora dele (Sto. Agostinho) ou uma apreensão empírica regular de relações causais de antes e depois (Hume) ou uma intuição pura do espírito (Kant). Pretende-se, com esta análise, evidenciar uma forma clássica de conceber o tempo como elaboração realizada pelo sujeito (subjetiva).
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Martins Ferreira, Gabriel. "DA CRÍTICA À METAFÍSICA À METAFÍSICA CRÍTICA." PÓLEMOS – Revista de Estudantes de Filosofia da Universidade de Brasília 6, no. 11 (August 3, 2017): 70–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.26512/pl.v6i11.11724.

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Tomando por fio condutor uma importante questão para a teoria do conhecimento na filosofia moderna, a saber, é possível um conhecimento racional da realidade? O presente trabalho tem por objetivo analisar um importante debate realizado no século XVIII entre David Hume e Immanuel Kant na tentativa de dar resposta a esta pergunta. De modo que num primeiro momento nos ocuparemos com a objeção humeana aos procedimentos adotados pela tradição metafísica nas Investigações sobre o entendimento humano. Após apresentar a objeção de Hume, concentrar-nos-emos em apresentar o modo pelo qual Kant por um lado, recepciona a crítica feita por Hume, e por outro recusa as conclusões humeanas conduzindo o problema com vistas a oferecer uma resposta mais sistemática
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Ponce Andaur, Arnaldo, and Héctor Muñoz Valdés. "LA CAUSALIDAD DESDE HUME A KANT: DE LA DISOLUCIÓN ABSOLUTA DEL CONCEPTO A SU CONSTITUCIÓN COMO LEY." Praxis Filosófica, no. 38 (May 30, 2014): 7–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.25100/pfilosofica.v0i38.3522.

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En el presente artículo exponemos las reflexiones desarrolladas por Kant y Hume sobre la filosofía (metafísica) de la causalidad, sin insistir en los aspectos problemáticos de aquella comparación. Más bien se señala que ambas filosofías desarrollan extremos diferentes de un único a priori. No tomaremos en cuenta, para empezar, la terminología comúnmente aceptada: la contraposición entre racionalismo y empirismo. Por el contrario, no dando por establecidas caracterizaciones generales, exponemos idea tras idea en su significado inmediato. No obstante, se verá que la perspectiva de Hume se acerca a la perspectiva trascendental; y no intentaremos evaluar la filosofía de Kant desde el punto de vista psicológico de la causalidad, que supuestamente es decisivo en Hume.
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Roa, Santiago. "Provisionalidad, prudencia y resolución: el espíritu del escepticismo académico en las críticas de Hume y Kant a la metafísica tradicional." Con-Textos Kantianos. International Journal of Philosophy 17 (July 6, 2023): 139–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.5209/kant.88704.

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35

Vasil'ev, V. V. "Kant, Hume, and Problems of the Deduction of the Categories." Russian Studies in Philosophy 34, no. 4 (April 1996): 51–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.2753/rsp1061-1967340451.

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36

Andreotta, Adam. "A. Anderson, Kant, Hume, and the interruption of dogmatic slumber." Phenomenological Reviews 6 (2020): 82. http://dx.doi.org/10.19079/pr.6.82.

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37

Maris, Cees. "Leve de goede dood. Een gesprek tussen Kant en Hume." Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 114, no. 2 (July 1, 2022): 172–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.5117/antw2022.2.008.mari.

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38

Lobos Zuzunaga, Miguel. "Metafisica dogmatica e metafisica critica: ancora su Hume e Kant." Quaestio 20 (January 2020): 534–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1484/j.quaestio.5.122876.

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39

James King. "The Moral Theories of Kant and Hume: Comparisons and Polemics." Hume Studies 18, no. 2 (1992): 441–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/hms.2011.0416.

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40

Djuric, Drago. "Kant: Dogmatism, scepticism, criticism." Theoria, Beograd 47, no. 3-4 (2004): 17–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo0404017d.

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In this article the author tries to present the place and significance of Kant's critical philosophy, starting from the relationship set in his claim that there are "three phases that which philosophy should run through in the purpose of metaphysics", and they are dogmatism, skepticism and criticism. Then he stresses the importance of Kant's claim that the relation is not only systemic but also "temporal sequence grounded in the nature of human cognitive ability". In the article, furthermore, the attention is devoted to the relation of Hume to the ancient skepticism, as well as to the relation of Kant to the ancient and Hume's skepticism. Finally, the author considers the significance of the influence of Hume's skepticism on Kant's criticism and transcendentalism, and tries to indicate some differences of principle between these philosophical standpoints.
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Monteiro, J. P. G. "Sobre a interpretação da epistemologia de Hume." Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia 52, no. 124 (December 2011): 279–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/s0100-512x2011000200002.

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Na filosofia de Hume há uma nítida distinção entre a obra da juventude e a obra da maturidade. Mas seu Tratado da Natureza Humana não está no mesmo caso que essas outras obras de juventude que justificam falar de um jovem Hegel ou de um jovem Marx, ou de um Kant pré-crítico em contraste com o Kant da filosofia transcendental. Trata-se de um caso intermédio: a filosofia do autor é sempre a mesma, mas o Tratado apresentava, segundo o próprio autor, tais imprecisões e negligências que o levaram, na década seguinte, a publicar novas versões de suas principais teorias (do entendimento, das paixões, da moral) onde a filosofia, repito, ainda era a mesma, mas com vastas correções, notadamente na teoria do entendimento, sua epistemologia, que é o objeto do presente estudo. É preciso examinar cuidadosamente cada texto, sem pretender que haja um modelo único de leitura, de modo a fazer justiça tanto às geniais imperfeições do Tratado quando à argumentação mais sólida da Investigação sobre o Entendimento Humano. O resultado de tais leituras poderá indicar, por exemplo, não haver na primeira Investigação qualquer argumentação em favor de alguma forma de associacionismo a respeito da causação. Também não aparece ali compatibilidade da epistemologia de Hume com o empirismo comum, ou mesmo com qualquer espécie de pirronismo. Tais conclusões apóiam a interpretação de que Hume, em sua obra de maturidade, operou modificações relevantes de conteúdo, que deveriam ser reconhecidas como revisões definitivas das posições do autor.
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FUGATE, Courtney D. "KANT AND LEIBNIZ ON NEGATIVE MAGNITUDES." Estudos Kantianos [EK] 4, no. 02 (January 25, 2017): 149–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.36311/2318-0501.2016.v4n2.10.p149.

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The essay entitled An Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy has often (although not always) been interpreted as the sudden eruption of Humeinspired doubts in the middle of Kant’s otherwise rationalist projects, and as heralding the view of metaphysics later expressed in Dreams of a Spirit-seer.1 For this reason nearly all the attention given to this work is focused on Kant’s final and quite brief General Remark, which constitutes less than one-tenth of the essay. The real heart of the text, however, lies elsewhere, and once this becomes clear it also becomes evident that Hume is really irrelevant to the entire issue. Indeed, what strikes many readers as reminiscent of Hume in the General Remark is nearly a paraphrase of a few passages from Crusius’s famous Dissertatio philosophica de usu et limitibus principii rationis determinantis (1743), and the general tendency of the whole is not essentially different from what is seen in Kant’s earlier New Elucidation. The truth of the matter – or so I will argue in this paper – is that in this essay Kant actually approaches closer to the original ideas of Leibniz than at any other moment in his career, even closer than did Wolff or his followers. Moreover, I argue that in doing so Kant raises precisely the kinds of difficulties with the Wolffian position on the principle of sufficient reason that, I suspect, Leibniz himself would have raised.
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Chance, Brian A. "Sensibilism, Psychologism, and Kant's Debt to Hume." Kantian Review 16, no. 3 (September 28, 2011): 325–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415411000185.

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AbstractHume's account of causation is often regarded a challenge Kant must overcome if the Critical philosophy is to be successful. But from Kant's time to the present, Hume's denial of our ability to cognize supersensible objects, a denial that relies heavily on his account of causation, has also been regarded as a forerunner to Kant's critique of metaphysics. After identifying reasons for rejecting Wayne Waxman's recent account of Kant's debt to Hume, I present my own, more modest account of this debt, an account that seeks to unite the two very different pictures of Kant's relationship to Hume sketched above.
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Rojas Jiménez, Alejandro. "De Kant a Fichte." Claridades. Revista de Filosofía 8, no. 1 (December 24, 2017): 105–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.24310/claridadescrf.v8i0.3790.

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uticamente la recepción de Kant por parte de Fichte para mostrar en qué sentido la filosofía de Fichte, con la que se inicia el idealismo alemán, no es ninguna desviación de la línea que va de Hume hasta Kant (como propone por ejemplo el positivismo y su defensa de que la filosofía debía dejar de ser metafísica), sino por el contrario una “continuación” bien fundada de la filosofía kantiana, en la que los límites de la razón son la condición de posibilidad del ejercicio mismo del pensamiento libre que, como acción (Handeln), se concibe como distinto aunque inseparable de la imagen determinada (Nachbild) que el pensamiento mismo produce y del que se debe liberar estableciendo el ideal (Vorbild), proyectándose, reconociéndose -en palabras de Trías- “desgarrado entre su carácter fundacional y originario de actividad pura del pensamiento que se piensa y el resultado derivado de esa acción.”
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Vidal, Elie, John C. Laursen, and Elisabeth Caron. "The Politics of Skepticism in the Ancients: Montaigne, Hume, and Kant." Sixteenth Century Journal 27, no. 1 (1996): 155. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2544280.

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Hundert, E. J., and John Christian Laursen. "The Politics of Scepticism in the Ancients, Montaigne, Hume, and Kant." American Historical Review 99, no. 1 (February 1994): 185. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2166173.

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Gressis, Robert. "Kant, Hume, and the Interruption of Dogmatic Slumber by Abraham Anderson." Hume Studies 44, no. 2 (2018): 275–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/hms.2018.0012.

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Landy, David. "Kant, Hume, and the Interruption of Dogmatic Slumber by Abraham Anderson." Journal of the History of Philosophy 60, no. 1 (2022): 167–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/hph.2022.0015.

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Popkin, Richard H. "The Politics of Scepticism in the Ancients, Montaigne, Hume and Kant." International Studies in Philosophy 27, no. 4 (1995): 120–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/intstudphil199527448.

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Southgate, Beverley C. "The politics of skepticism in the Ancients, Montaigne, Hume and Kant." History of European Ideas 18, no. 5 (September 1994): 778–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0191-6599(94)90445-6.

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