Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Human genetics – Philosophy'

The study analyzes the ethical implications of human gene transfer technology for enhancement. Although human gene transfer technology is widely accepted on therapeutic grounds the non-therapeutic use of gene transfer technology remains to be a gray zone for moral deliberation. The present discussion addresses several ethical issues concerning the impacts of human gene transfer technology on individuals, the society, and future people. Accordingly, the study examines major ethical issues concerning the use of human gene transfer technology in general and genetic enhancement in particular, and reliability of the putative demarcation between therapy and enhancement, and further proposes ethical guidelines for non-therapeutic application of human gene transfer technology. A special attention is given to three major ethical issues, such as our obligation to future generations, problems concerning justice, fairness, and equality, and the problem of uncertainty.

Since the Neolithic period and the rise of agriculture along Mesopotamia’s “Fertile Crescent,” greater societies have formed thus requiring laws and governance to ensure their continued preservation. The Babylonian Code of Hammurabi is one such example of how agricultural technologies directly created new social and institutional structures in codifying slavery into law, or how mercantile transactions are to be conducted. Similarly, GMOs are the result of modern agricultural technologies that are altering laws and society as a result of their implementation. This transformation informs the central inquiries of my research question: Why are GMOs necessary, and what influences do they have on the project of human rights? As our age is defined by the products of bioluminescent – or glow-in-the-dark – cats and goats that can excrete spider silk proteins from their mammary glands, these questions become essential. I conclude that the technology does not, at least conceptually, conflict with or undermine human rights. Instrumental reason has firm limitations in biological applications as well as conflict with its inherent anarchical nature. We are now compelled to question the utility of genetic engineering and if it merely places humanity into another precarious “arms race” with weeds and pests, in addition to the pressure of maintaining current dependencies of petrochemicals, fertilizers, and continued observations of ecological homeostasis.

Le contexte historique et épistémologique de l’émergence de la génétique des comportements en tant que discipline trouve ses racines dans différentes disciplines biologiques :la génétique, la biologie de l’évolution et la biologie moléculaire. Ces dernières font partie du paradigme néodarwinien moléculaire. De cette origine, elle a hérité deux grands domaines de recherche, la génétique quantitative et la génétique moléculaire. Ils ont chacun des objectifs et des méthodologies différents. Les études concernant l’intelligence, les comportements agressifs, les comportements addictifs et l’orientation sexuelle permettent notamment d’illustrer ces différences. Elles permettent également de faire un état des lieux des recherches menées dans ce domaine parfois hautement polémique. En fait, la génétique des comportements est marquée par deux ères épistémologiques, l’ère génomique qui a débuté dans les années 1980 et l’ère post-génomique, qui comme son nom l’indique, lui succède dès le début des années 2000. Les résultats apportés par l’ensemble de ces recherches imposent une conclusion, les approches théoriques et techniques phares de l’ère génomique sont insuffisantes à rendre compte de la complexité des phénomènes développementaux liés aux comportements. L’ère post-génomique tente donc de combler les faiblesses de l’ère précédente. Ainsi, la biologie développementale revient au premier plan et ce retour est souhaité depuis longtemps par un courant philosophique majeur né dans les années 1990, la Developmental Systems Theory. L’ère post-génomique est également caractérisée par un pluralisme pragmatique, à la fois théorique et expérimental. La nécessité de multiplier les modes d’appréhension des comportements s’impose car leur complexité intrinsèque est reconnue et tend à être assumée. Les résultats plus récents apportés par les recherches sur l’intelligence, les comportements agressifs, addictifs et l’orientation sexuelle illustrent cette évolution épistémologique. L’opposition entre inné et acquis échoue à rendre compte de la complexité et du dynamisme développemental des phénotypes comportementaux./ The historical and epistemological context of the birth of behavioral genetics as a discipline has its roots in different biological domains: genetics, evolutionary biology and molecular biology. They are parts of the molecular neo-Darwinian paradigm. From this multiple outset, behavioral genetics has inherited two major areas of research, quantitative genetics and molecular genetics. They each have different purposes and methodologies. The study of researches on IQ, aggressive behaviors, addictive behaviors and sexual orientation illustrate these differences. It also permits to make an overview of results provided in this field that is sometimes highly controversial. In fact, behavioral genetics is marked by two epistemological eras, the genomic era that began in the 1980s and the postgenomic era that began by the early 2000s. The results provided by all these researches lead to one conclusion, the theoretical and technical approaches of the genomic era is insufficient to show the complexity of developmental phenomena associated with behaviors. The postgenomic era attempts to correct the weaknesses of the previous era. Thus, developmental biology comes back in the foreground and the necessity of this return has been defended by a major philosophical theory born in 1990, the Developmental Systems Theory. The postgenomic era is also characterized by a theoretical and experimental pragmatic pluralism. The complexity of the developmental patterns of behaviors is recognized and tends to be assumed. The latest results produce by researches on IQ, aggressive behaviors, addiction and sexual orientation illustrate these epistemological changes. The opposition between nature and nurture fails to properly apprehend the developmental dynamism of behavioral phenotypes.
Doctorat en Philosophie
info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

This thesis addresses questions relating to perceptions of abilities and abnormalities found in everyday life. Abilities in this paper range from a total lack of ability to function in extreme disability to a level of ability expected by society to enhanced and radically enhanced abilities and their place in the realm of abnormality. We begin by establishing the differences between abilities and enhancements. Following this is a discussion regarding the ethical concerns of human enhancement. After this we turn to a discussion of abnormality and the social experience of abnormality. These discussions lead into establishing a basis for how many abilities are considered abnormal. This is then followed by a discussion that specifically addresses whether or not individuals who voluntarily undergo non-therapeutic enhancement may be subject to oppressive measures.

Human cognitive development is a matter of interest for different disciplines among which are philosophical epistemology and cognitive psychology. Shi razi (Mulla Sadra), a Muslim philosopher, deals, among other issues, with the problem of human cognitive development through his 'Irfani -philosophical methodology on the basis of the principles of his philosophy. These principles are the principality and gradation, tashki k, of existence and substantial motion through which Shi razi relates cognitive development to the existential progress of the human being. Piaget from the Western tradition of cognitive psychology focuses his work on the problem of human cognitive development, investigating the issue through a semi-experimental methodology and interpreting his findings on the basis of the principles of genetic epistemology, namely, the analogy between cognitive and physical organisms in terms of assimilation, accommodation and equilibrium. These two perspectives are studied and compared in this thesis with respect to their underlying principles, their scopes and methodologies. Finally, a multi-disciplinary approach is proposed for the study of human cognitive development.

Orientador: Laymert Garcia dos Santos
Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas
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Resumo: A tese central deste trabalho é que a aceitação pública despertada pelo Projeto Genoma Humano só se explica pelo uso político e retórico de um determinismo genético crescentemente irreconciliável com os resultados empíricos da pesquisa genômica atual. A complexidade verificada no genoma humano e em suas interações com o meio desautoriza a manutenção de uma noção simples e unidirecional de causalidade, contrariamente ao pressuposto na idéia de gene como único portador de informação, esteio da doutrina do determinismo genético. Um complexo de metáforas informacionais e/ou lingüísticas continuo vivo nos textos publicados por biólogos moleculares na literatura científica, notadamente nos artigos veiculados nos periódicos de alto impacto Nature e Science de 15 e 16 fevereiro de 2001, respectivamente. Tais metáforas inspiram um tipo de discurso ambíguo que modula nuances variadas de retórica determinista, conforme se dirija aos próprios pares ou ao público leigo" O campo da genômica ainda está longe de rejeitar a conjunção problemática das noções de gene pré-formacionista e de gene como recurso desenvo/vimenta/ na base da metáfora do gene como informação. Essa fusão inspirada pela terminologia cibernética propicia uma versão asséptica de gene, distanciada da natureza, puramente sintática, móvel e virtual o bastante para circular desimpedida nos circuitos de produção de valor como recurso genético passível de garimpagem e de patenteamento. Críticos dã tecnociência devem desafiar o campo da genômica a reformular drasticamente as metáforas que dão suporte a seu programa hegemônico de pesquisa
Abstract: The central thesis of this work is that the public support generated for the Human Genome Project and the hype surrounding it can be explained only by the political and rhetorical uses of genetic determinism, a notion which increasingly cannot be reconciled with the empirical results of on-going genomic research. The complexity that has been uncovered in the human genome and in its interactions with the environment implies that a simple and unidirectional notion of causality cannot be maintained, contrary to a presupposition of the idea of the gene as the sole carrier of iliformation, an idea that contributes to sustain the doctrine of genetic determinism. A complex of informational and/or linguistic metaphors lives on in the texts published by molecular biologists in the scientific press, most notably in the issues published February 15thand 16thof 2001 ofthe high impact journals Nature and Science, respectively. These metaphors generate an ambiguous type of discourse that modulates various nuances of deterministic rhetoric, depending on whether it addresses peers or the lay publico The field of genomics is still a long way ITom rejecting the questionable conflation of the notions of gene as preformation and gene as developmental resource which underpins the metaphor of gene as information. This conflation inspired by cybernetics terminology enables an aseptic version of the gene, separated ITom nature, portable and virtual enough to flow unimpeded through the channels ofvalue production as genetic resource suitable for mining and patenting. Critics of technoscience should challenge the field of genomics to drastically reshape the metaphors which have supported its hegemonic research agenda
Doutorado
Doutor em Ciências Sociais

Il presente lavoro, incominciato nel novembre del 2017, è partito con l'ambizione di ricostruire la risposta che il sistema giuridico fornisce innanzi alle nuove tecniche di ingegneria genetica che, a fronte della loro applicabilità sugli esseri umani, hanno prodotto, negli ultimi anni, il sorgere di nuovi stakeholders e, ancor prima, di nuovi interessi meritevoli di tutela. Se fino a qualche anno fa pareva impensabile modificare il genoma umano e, men che meno, farlo in maniera precisa, efficiente ed economica, oggi grazie al sistema di modificazione genetica CRISPR/Cas9 è possibile, intervenendo sulla linea germinale degli embrioni umani, prevenire la contrazione di odiose malattie genetiche e, addirittura, a medio termine sradicarle dalla nostra società. Le enormi potenzialità terapeutiche di questa tecnica hanno addirittura attirato l’attenzione dell’Accademia Reale Svedese delle Scienze che, proprio mentre si stanno scrivendo queste righe, ha attribuito alle sue inventrici, Jennifer Doudna ed Emmanuelle Charpentier, il Premio Nobel per la Chimica 2020, definendo CRISPR/Cas9 come “un rivoluzionario metodo di editing genetico che contribuisce allo sviluppo di nuove terapie contro il cancro e può realizzare il sogno di curare malattie ereditarie” (The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences 2020a). Al fianco di queste prospettive, che dal 2017 ad oggi si sono fatte sempre più evidenti, si annidano però rischi e pericoli derivanti dall’uso delle tecniche d’ingegneria genetica che il diritto deve tenere in adeguata considerazione al momento della loro regolamentazione. Nei primi mesi di lavoro, dedicati proprio alla ricostruzione delle fonti giuridiche applicabili, ci ha subito colpito che nonostante le tecniche in parola costituiscano, ancora oggi, un’assoluta novità in continuo cambiamento, le norme giuridiche, sia sovranazionali che nazionali, siano relativamente risalenti nel tempo: la legge 40 che, in Italia, si propone di regolare la procreazione medicalmente assistita e alla lett. b) del co. 3 del suo art. 13 si occupa delle manipolazioni genetiche è del 2004, mentre la norma più rilevante sul punto a livello internazionale, l’art. 13 della Convenzione di Oviedo, è addirittura datata aprile 1997. Insomma, in questo campo il diritto anziché presentarsi in fisiologico ritardo, ha enucleato delle regolamentazioni in sospetto anticipo. Questa constatazione, combinata con gli esiti della ricostruzione del dibattito dottrinale, dove anche autorevolissimi autori combinano continuamente argomentazioni etiche ed argomentazioni giuridiche, spesso senza neppure differenziarle, ci ha condotto ad appurare come prima di affrontare il tema della regolamentazione specifica del genome editing fosse necessario riflettere su come il diritto s’interfacci innanzi al bios come oggetto normativo e, soprattutto, in quale relazione si ponga con la bioetica nell’espletare siffatta funzione. Pertanto, abbiamo deciso di dedicare la Parte Prima dell’opera proprio ad un’indagine sulla relazione tra la bioetica ed il biodiritto, che costituiscono la proiezione applicativa di etica e diritto al bios, finalizzata a dotare di un adeguato fondamento epistemologico l’intuizione della deriva di de-differenziazione tra essi. Per raggiungere tale obiettivo abbiamo ritenuto necessario partire, nel Capitolo I, da una breve genealogia della bioetica in cui ci siamo interrogati sulla nascita di questa disciplina e sulle sue successive svolte metodologiche. Il Capitolo II, invece, è stato dedicato alle origini di quello specifico ambito della comunicazione giuridica, comunemente identificato ormai come biodiritto, mettendo in evidenza i contributi interni che la scienza giuridica ha fornito per lo sviluppo dello stesso e riflettendo, in particolare, sul ruolo che ha giocato in tal senso l’istituzione giuridica dei diritti umani. Al contrario, il Capitolo III parte dai contributi esterni alla nascita del biodiritto e specificatamente quelli forniti dalla bioetica per proseguire, poi, con una riflessione sul rapporto tra questi. Mediante una ricostruzione delle posizioni dominanti in dottrina e soprattutto attraverso uno sguardo fisso alla prassi, si è posto in evidenza come, ad oggi, via sia un problema di de-differenziazione tra bioetica e biodiritto che ha portato quest’ultimo a trasformarsi in una scienza ancillare alla prima al punto da essere definito come “diritto della bioetica”. Lungi dal fermarci su posizioni unicamente critiche, abbiamo dotato l’ultima parte del Capitolo di una pars construens in cui abbiamo evidenziato i vantaggi di una relazione funzionalmente differenziata tra bioetica e biodiritto, senza però trascurare anche i problemi ad essa sottesi. Con il chiaro intento di testare i nostri approdi teorici nell’esperienza empirica e, allo stesso tempo, per assolvere all’intento originario della nostra opera, abbiamo deciso di dedicare la Parte II interamente alle implicazioni etiche, sociologiche e giuridiche derivanti dalle tecniche di manipolazione genetica germinale. Per farlo si è reso necessario, anzi tutto, dedicare il Capitolo IV a comprendere, tecnicamente, cosa sia una modificazione genetica germinale e quali siano le posizioni rinvenibili all’interno della comunità scientifica. Il Capitolo V, invece, è stato dedicato ad affrontare i problemi, i rischi, le promesse e le speranze che si annidano intorno alla nostra tecnica: dal timore per una deriva eugenetica alla compatibilità delle modificazioni con l’autocomprensione e la dignità del genere umano, passando per le preoccupazioni delle comunità delle persone diversamente abili e dei genitori, che rischiano di restare schiacciati dalle pressioni sociali, giungendo a prendere in seria considerazione però anche le possibilità di sradicare odiose malattie genetiche una volta per tutte, liberando l’umanità di alcune atroci sofferenze. Con un quadro chiaro dei diversi valori che mette in gioco ed in potenziale conflitto tra loro la tecnica germinale, abbiamo finalmente affrontato il problema della regolamentazione delle nostre tecniche. Abbiamo cercato di farlo non con l’animo di produrre una mera attività compilativa sulle regolamentazioni esistenti e neanche con il solo intento di mostrare lacune e paradossi che in esse si annidano, ma con la finalità più ambiziosa di verificare se le nostre conclusioni teoriche della Parte Prima fossero fondate: se effettivamente il diritto si propone come un mero trasformatore permanente di principi bioetici in precetti coercitivi e se l’approccio regolativo vigente sia adeguato per cogliere i benefici che una tecnica premiata con il Nobel per la Chimica può dare alla società, senza rinunciare a tutelare i diritti fondamentali delle persone.

Il s’agit de montrer que les technosciences, rencontrant l’humanitude comme leur condition de possibilité et leur moteur propulsif, risquent d’actualiser une potentialité aporétique associée à une enclave organique perméable et à une maintenance identitaire inscrite dans le devenir - associée à une intériorité se dépliant en extériorité et à un monisme substantiel s’exprimant dans la dualité (en soi, comme soi et hors de soi). Pour ce faire, nous observons et confrontons :les techniques (des PMA aux manipulations d’embryons, des diagnostics génétiques aux thérapies géniques, du clonage à la transgenèse) à l’individu, l’individu à ses latitudes (en ce compris par la voie d’une «consultation» des personnes souffrantes, des scientifiques et de la population dite «générale») et celles-ci à l’humanitude.

Par ailleurs, nous définissons l’individu d’une indéfinition :où l’homme est point de convergence (entre divers états, plans et déterminants) et force d’émergence (hors ses donnés) - équilibre en construction incessante et incessible. Où sa spécificité tient à l’occupation corporelle et pensée d’un espace et d’un temps :équilibre en soutenance entre stase et métabolisme, non-soi et soi, subordinations et libérations, centralisations identitaires et extériorisations identifiantes. Par suite, toute intervention pesant en déséquilibre sur ces articulations devrait être évitée – en principe. En principe car, du fait de la multiplicité et de la diversité des intervenants, du fait même de leur liberté et des incertitudes plurielles, il y aura toujours pression ou déséquilibre. Néanmoins, il importe de mesurer l’acte aux conditions de la liberté et de l’humanité :conscience, autonomie, libre disposition de soi, sensibilité, émotivité, souci, malléabilité principielle (contre une assignation à demeure spécielle ou existentielle) et réappropriation essentielle (contre un déterminisme global – une appropriation par tiers). Et il convient de préserver le lien du corps et de l’esprit :où l’esprit transcende le corps qui le forme et l’informe – selon une mise à distance au sein d’une unité (et d’une unicité).

Or, nous constatons que l’humanitude, prise en charge par les techniques qu’elle produit, édifie un domaine existentiel caractérisé par une biographie de l’arrachement ou du désinvestissement. Et que l’homme, être de l’entre-deux défini par la négation de tout Etat advenu, produit un processus technique propre à l’extraire de cet «entre-deux». Déjà, l’individu libère ses tendances dispersives et ses tendances confusionnelles :mise à distance de l’entité corporelle (en sa force référentielle ou définitoire), identité décisionnelle et puissance volitive plus dispersive que centralisatrice. Où donc néoténie, imparfaite assignation, distanciation et in-essentialité ouvrent à la liberté tout en autorisant l’incorporation du non-soi, l’opérativité de la volonté et l’évanescence des états de l’organisme et de la psyché (de la personnalité comme tout identitaire). Cependant, si les techniques font exploser ces équilibres, reste la dissipation :où le «soi serait amené à se reconnaître comme pure et simple concept construit. Dans ce contexte, tout s’abandonne aux modifications. Et l’homme de jouer avec le donné et le donné en lui - donné qui est lui mais se décompose dorénavant en fonds «sacral» de puissances, en substrats géniques, mnésiques et morphologiques modelables et en constituants interchangeables. Semblable attitude recouvre une fuite hors de la condition humaine :tantôt vers «autre chose», tantôt vers un alignement démissionnaire sur un Décideur Transcendant. Et pour la première fois aussi globalement et intensément, instinct et volonté de survivre se soumettent à leur propre négation :pour qu’il subsiste «quelque chose plutôt que rien» dans le futur lointain, l’espèce conspire à sa propre fin. Pour la première fois (première fois aussi proche d’une réalisation), l’individu aspire à une dispersion de conscience, à une évanescence personnale et à une fin de l’Histoire sous couvert d’une histoire sans fin et d’un devenir incessant – gardant du devenir la seule processualité mécanique. Le danger est alors considérable car l’homme sort de l’animalité dans le champ où s’entrechoquent libre arbitre et déterminisme, références identitaires et décentrages, appartenances et abstractions. Car cet animal-là exprime sa spécificité à l’extérieur de l’enceinte biologique mais à partir d’une densité individuale :dans l’élaboration sociale et culturelle. Dès lors, quand l’existence précède l’essence et face aux possibles technoscientifiques, il importe de préserver l’homme d’une existenciation illusoire et d’une personnalisation évanescente. Et de pondérer la totalité individuale de ses dimensions temporelles :où l’individu est un être perpétuellement devenant ;où l’existence crée, investit et signifie une durée ;où l’identité est continuité d’unicité en devenir ;où l’humanité est construction d’Histoire et invention de sens. Cela oblige l’individu à se soutenir eu égard à des doubles nœuds référentiels :anthropique et autobiographique, culturel et familial, spirituel ou décisionnel et charnel ou factuel, symbolique et opératoire, autoréférentiel et relationnel. Mais aussi, en matière éthique, entre principe et casuistique, idéal et exception, collectif et individuel.

Doubles nœuds contestés par les techniques. Aussi, face à l’opérativité croissante de celles-ci, nous nous interrogeons sur ce qu’il pourrait advenir de la condition humaine et des conditions de possibilité de l’homme - considéré ici comme individu (spécimen défini en ses spécificités) au milieu du monde, conscience (sensible et émotionnelle) en situation d’interrelation, et subjectivité (volitive) face à ses semblables.

Doctorat en philosophie et lettres, Orientation bioéthique
info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Defence date: 6 March 2006
Examining board: Prof. Wojciech Sadurski (Supervisor, European University Institute) ; Prof. Olivier De Schutter (Co-supervisor, Université Catholique de Louvain) ; Dr. Thomas Lemke (Bergische Universität Wuppertal) ; Prof. Francesco Francioni (European University Institute)
PDF of thesis uploaded from the Library digitised archive of EUI PhD theses completed between 2013 and 2017

The bacterium Helicobacter pylori is a human pathogen that infects a large proportion of the world's population and is associated with serious diseases such as gastric ulcers and adenocarcinoma. The motility of this organism, by virtue of sheathed polar flagella is essential to colonisation and persistence in the human host. The sequencing of the H. pylori genome in 1996 identified homologues of the majority of the flagellar genes found in S. enterica serovai typhimurium. These included genes encoding the flagellum ATPase, FliI and FliH a presumptive inhibitor, the primary focus of this study. Sequencing did not originally identify an H. pylori homologue of the flagellar chaperone FliJ, and this is also considered in this study. Bioinformatic analysis and modeling suggests a structural and functional relationship between FliI and homologues such as F1-ATPase α- and β-subunit. In particular, residues 2-91 of FliI resemble the N-terminal domain of the F1-ATPase α- and β-subunits. Biochemical analyses reported in this thesis showed that a truncated FliI-(2- 91) protein was folded, although the N-terminal 18 residues were likely unstructured. Furthermore, deletion mutagenesis showed that this disordered segment of the protein mediates interaction with FliH and very likely forms an amphipathic α-helix upon forming of the FliI-FliH complex. The scanning mutagenesis of this interaction segment of FliI identified a cluster of conserved hydrophobic residues that was critical for the interaction with FliH. Thus, the interaction between FliI and FliH has similarities to the interaction between the N-terminal α-helix of the α-subunit and the globular domain of the δ-subunit of the F1-ATPase. This similarity suggests that FliH, by analogy with the δ-subunit of the F1-ATPase, may function as a molecular stator of the flagellum. The findings presented above have been published (96). The function of a putative H. pylori FliJ homologue, HP0256, was also investigated by knock-out mutagenesis. Disruption of this gene does not abolish flagellar assembly, however further research continued beyond this thesis showed that the knock-out mutant results in impaired motility.

Electromagnetic fields (EMFs) have been associated with increased incidences of cancer as suggested by epidemiological studies. The in vitro sister chromatid exchange (SCE) technique, radiation-induced micronucleus assay (MN assay), COMET assay, and fluorescence in situ hybridization (FISH) were used in the present study to test the carcinogenic potentiality of extremely low frequency (ELF) EMFs on human peripheral blood lymphocytes. All experiments were performed single blind and used lymphocytes taken from 6 age-matched donors. The SCE experiments were conducted twice: round 1 (R1) and round 2 (R2), in order to determine whether or not the results obtained could be duplicated. Detailed analysis of the SCE results showed that there was a significant increase in the number of SCEs/cell in the grouped experimental conditions compared to the controls in both rounds. Similarly, in the MN assay, a significant increase of mean number of micronucleated CB cells/100 CB cells (Ma) and mean number of micronuclei/100 CB cells (Mb) was observed in the grouped experimental conditions compared to the controls. Moreover, the highest SCE frequency in R1 was 10.03 for a square continuous field, and the SCE frequency of 10.39 for a square continuous field in R2 (albeit a different strength) was the second highest in this latter round. But in the MN assay a square pulsed field with increasing EMF strength showed the greatest effect on the DNA repair system. The COMET assay also showed that both a l m T square field (continuous or pulsed) resulted in significant fragmentation of the DNA. On the other hand, a FISH analysis failed to show any translocations. In the field of EMF research, perhaps the most outstanding question that remains to be answered with certainty is how weak EMFs exert their effects at the molecular level. Various mechanisms are reviewed and evaluated in this thesis. From the results of the research performed in the current study which concentrated on testing and discovering genetic effects, a model is postulated that weak EMFs stimulate the production of free radicals which result in genetic damage. Further extensive research should be conducted to test this hypothesis.

Origins and dispersal of the sweet potato and bottle gourd in Oceania :|bimplications for prehistoric human mobility : a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Plant Biology at Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand

The current debate concerning genetically modified (GM) crops is primarily focused on the negative consequences that the production and consumption of GM foods could have on people and the environment. Adding to the list of concerns is the multinational agrochemical corporations' plan to implement GURTs (Genetic Use Restriction Technologies) to prohibit the unauthorized use of certain genetically modified plant varieties. Several activist groups perceive the potential implementation of GURTs to be a threat to resource-poor farmers since this technology (which the activists call Terminator Technology) may be used to wrongfully exploit resource-poor farmers in the name of economic gain. In this thesis, I argue that multinational agrochemical corporations will not necessarily be infringing upon the rights of resource-poor farmers nor with they be wrongfully exploiting such farmers through the implementation of GURTs. Given that the primary targets for implementing GURTs are currently modified plant varieties, and most resource-poor farmers are unable to afford GM seeds, multinational agrochemical corporations will not have the opportunity to form a relation with these farmers and therefore would not be able to use them as a mere means to maximizing seed industry profits. I conclude that the implementation of GURTs may be construed as immoral on some grounds, but it is not wrongfully exploitative.

Bibliography: leaves 193-234.
xiv, 235, [147] leaves, [1] leaf of plates : ill. ; 30 cm.
Focusses on the elucidation of the regulatory mechanisms that control heme biosynthesis in eukaryotic cells.
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Adelaide, Dept. of Biochemistry, 1998?