Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Human embryo research'

This doctoral research explores the ways in which UK law engages with embryonic processes, namely under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (as amended). The research offers a fuller understanding of these elusive and evolving biological processes, and in particular, how they can, in turn, allow us to understand legal process and legal regulation more deeply. To do so, the thesis employs an anthropological concept - liminality - coined by Arnold van Gennep, which is itself concerned with revealing the dynamics of process. Liminality may be described as being concerned with the spaces in between distinct stages of human experience or with the process of transition between such stages. With this framing of liminality in mind - which is often characterised as a three-stage process of human experience - the research is divided into three parts, broadly reflecting the three parts of van Gennep's liminal schema: into, through, and out of liminality. It is argued herein that in regulating the embryo - that is, a processual liminal entity in itself - the law is regulating for uncertainty. Tracing the legal governance of the early stages of human life, from its inception to today's regulatory frameworks, the research diagnoses a 'legal gap' between the conceptual basis for regulation, and practical 'realities' of the 1990 Act (as amended). In particular, this 'gap' is typified by uncertainty surrounding embryos in vitro, and what this thesis diagnoses as 'legal stasis'. In order to situate this novel liminal analysis within existing paradigms, however, the thesis first frames embryos in vitro as 'gothic', building upon emergent analytical responses to postmodern forms of categorisation. This framing helps to articulate the nature of, and the reasons for, the above-mentioned 'legal gap'. This framing is nonetheless incomplete without a liminal lens, as it draws our attention to the dynamics of the processes occurring within this 'gap'. It is argued that considering the 'problem' in this manner enables us to move beyond conceptualisation, towards realisation. The gothic, and the liminal are thus used to critically assess legal representations of the embryo, and suggests that there are ways in which the law might better embrace the multiplicity of environments through which the embryo in vitro can travel, that is, either towards reproductive or research ends. It is argued that full recognition of these variable, relational liminal states of the embryo is important for the future of artificial reproduction and embryo research, and that this does not currently happen. In order for the law to reflect better the uncertain nature of embryonic processes, and the technologies that create them, the thesis posits a nuanced, contextual reframing of the embryo that captures the multiplicity of embryonic 'pathways' available within the 1990 Act (as amended). The overarching objective of this work is to consider a more coherent and robust intellectual defence of the ways in which we justify different treatments of in vitro embryos. It thus proposes a 'context-based approach' that embraces the variable, relational pathways already facilitated by the 1990 Act (as amended) in order to lead the embryo (and itself) into, through and out of liminality.

Over the past few years, embryo research has been a widely discussed topic. New techniques such as embryo stem cell research or therapeutic cloning are considered by scientists to be very promising. Nevertheless, opponents of these experimentations warn against the commodification of human life forms and argue that the moral status of embryos should protect them from being destroyed purely for research.
Legislations on this topic have been enacted in most Western countries, though they are still much criticised. Is there an adequate way of regulating embryo research? Our argument suggests that consensus can only be procedurally obtained. That is, we believe that only legislative assemblies should have authority to take a position on this controversial topic, which is subject to moral disagreement, and as such, judges should only have a minor role.

The development of artificially assisted reproduction has challenged some of the fundamental values which underlie the legal systems of the Western world. This thesis attempts first to put in context the continuing debate over the use of early human embryos in scientific research by considering the nature of the medical technology involved. In the second section, several aspects of the controversy over embryo research are then examined. Attempts to classify the human embryo and endow it with a particular moral or legal status are considered with a view to recommending an approach which legislators could adopt in regulating research on embryonic life. Thirdly the nature and scope of some of the attempts to regulate embryo research which have already been made are examined to test the approach suggested in the second section.
This thesis covers material up to and including September 1983. No account has been taken of any developments in policy or legislation which have occurred since then.

This thesis contributes to a theoretical understanding of change in governance of natural scientific research in the UK. The time period studied in detail is the years of the New Labour Governments, 1997 to 2010. Two case studies were chosen to explore the issues: research using human tissue and research using human embryos. Investigation was guided by these two questions: To what extent and in what way do governance regimes incorporate proposals and approaches developed by social scientists, Science and Technology Studies and Sociology of Scientific Knowledge theorists in particular, and taken up by a range of actors in response to the perceived failures of older regimes? What are the impacts of contemporary governance regimes on natural scientific research? A reflexive theme and approach runs through the thesis. Aspects of SSK and social science theory are drawn upon, as a means to explore governance and as a means to critically explore social science itself. Beyond SSK, a novel reading and combination of Erving Goffman and (more critically) John Rawls is used to interrogate the many dimensions of the performative work of natural and social scientists who were drawn into public engagement and deliberative exercises. The thesis finds that in some areas there has been significant change to the ways in which governance is organised and conducted, and that STS and SSK themes and approaches have contributed to this. The thesis outlines what has been lost: professional discretion; clarity about social science analysis and goals; and clarity about issues of public interest and issues associated with scientific research and knowledge. A typical outcome is greater complexity and greater bureaucrats' and managers' influence. That campaigners and STS / SSK theorists did not aim for this is largely true. That they have some responsibility for the outcome is also true.

Stem cell research offers hope to many people suffering from incurable diseases such as Alzheimer's disease, diabetes, heart disease and spinal back injuries. However this poses a moral dilemma because embryos are destroyed during embryonic stem cell research. To determine whether embryonic stem cell research is morally justifiable, two views in respect of a human being were considered: i. a human has a dualistic nature in which his body and soul are two separate entities or ii. his body and soul forms a unity which can not be separated. If a human has a dualistic nature, it means that the embryo is not a human, it does not have a soul because the soul is added later to form a human. The implication of this is that it will be morally justifiable to kill an embryo during embryonic stem cell research. However if body and soul forms a unity which can not be separated, the embryo is a human which is already developing into a full grown human with several stages of development. It will thus not be morally justifiable to kill an embryo as this will violate the sixth commandment, i.e. “Thou shalt not kill.” To determine whether a human’s body and soul is an inseparable unity or whether they are two separate entities, the Pauline letters' view on the human being was investigated. The research method employed was to do a comparative literary study to highlight the different aspects of stem cell research and then exegesis was done in respect of body (σoμα / sōma); soul (ψυχὴ / psychē) and spirit (πνεῦμα / pneuma) in the Pauline letters according to the grammatical-historical method. An electronic Bible Concordance was used to determine the texts in which the above concepts appear. A semantic word analysis was also done to analyse these concepts. Then authoritative commentaries were used to check the findings. The analysis indicated that Paul refers to a human as unity in which body and soul can not be separated. The implication of this finding is that embryonic stem cell research should be dismissed because it will result in the destruction of embryos. Humans will thus be killed in violation of the sixth commandment. On the other hand adult stem cell research should be encouraged because it has the potential to cure diseases which has up to now been incurable.
Thesis (MTh (Ethics))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2013.

The dissertation aims at identifying and analyzing the scientific, legal, and ethical issues raised by the perspective of intentional modification of human germline by the potential future use of gene editing techniques in the context of human reproduction. Such a study makes it possible to formulate some critical considerations about human germline gene editing governance. The dissertation claims that the best option to regulate the use of this biotechnological innovation for reproductive purposes consists of a regulation on a state-by-state-basis, which should however be developed within an international governance framework. Several arguments are suggested to underpin this thesis, and some recent initiatives adhering to such governance pattern are examined. The research is organized in three chapters. The first chapter, which is introductive to the real research, focuses on the scientific and technical aspects of the thesis topic. More specifically, this chapter aims at laying the foundations for the subsequent discussion, by defining and explaining the notions of i) DNA, gene, chromosome; ii) genetic mutation and genetic disease; and iii) gene therapy and gene editing. Special attention is paid to this latter technology and especially to its potential use on the human germline. Such use is highly controversial, mainly – but not exclusively – since, unlike modifications made by somatic gene editing, those affecting germinal cells – namely, gametes and zygotes – are transmitted to descendants, and thus to next generations. The second chapter is divided into two sections. The first section reconstructs and analyses the existing regulations in the field of human germline gene editing at international, supranational and national level, stressing their vagueness, fragmentation and lack of specificity. Given the impossibility of extensively examining all relevant domestic laws, guidelines and policies, those of four countries only – the USA, the UK, China and Italy – have been considered in detail. This choice is motivated by the geographical and cultural representativeness of their respective regulations, as well as by the fact that, except for Italy, those countries conducted nearly all the experiments carried out so far in the field of human germline gene editing. The second section of the chapter precisely focuses on these experiments – both for research and reproductive purposes. Jiankui He’s experiment – which resulted in the birth of the world’s first gene-edited babies in 2018 – and Denis Rebrikov’s germline gene editing clinical trial project are thoroughly described and analyzed. The third and last chapter deals with the ethical issues raised by the perspective of the potential future implementation of germline gene editing interventions in the context of human reproduction. This chapter too is articulated into two sections. The first section provides the theoretical bases for the subsequent ethical analysis, by dividing the possible future uses of germline gene editing techniques into three categories: i) therapeutic interventions; ii) medical enhancement interventions; and iii) non-medical enhancement interventions. Such categorization is paramount, since the various ethical issues related to human germline gene editing do not always involve all three of these categories, and, even when they do, they tend to carry different connotations according to each category. This becomes clear in the second section of the chapter, which critically explores six main ethically problematic areas related to this biotechnological innovation and their numerous articulations. Finally, the dissertation argues that the scientific, legal and ethical issues identified and examined throughout the research must be taken into account by proper germline gene editing governance mechanisms, which should be the result of parallel and complementary regulatory initiatives promoted both at national and international level.

Thesis (PhD)--University of Stellenbosch, 2005.
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Problem statement For utilitarians, human beings have intrinsic moral significance based on only two acquired characteristics: sentience, or the ability to suffer, and psychological personhood. Sentience is the entrance-requirement for moral significance, but does not justify a "right to life" claim; at most a "right" not to suffer. Personhood, described as some sort of self-conscious awareness with a concept of the future, may justify a "right to life" claim. However, since personhood is absent in prenatal beings, and only develops some time after birth, the implication is that such beings have little moral significance and may, for instance, be killed "at will". The moral problem that I address in this dissertation is to investigate, assess and evaluate the utilitarian position on the moral status or value of prenatal life. Methodology and results I firstly, on the basis of an extensive literature study, make a detailed analysis of the utilitarian position with reference to a number of themes that I have identified in their argument. This is followed by a critical philosophical evaluation of the utilitarian position, based on six particular arguments: • Utilitarianism is philosophically incoherent. It over-simplifies the moral argument in claiming that consequences are all that matter morally. Its underlying moral theory is at odds with moral claims contained in contemporary notions of human rights and individual justice. It ignores the moral significance of special obligations to special groups. • Utilitarianism potentially has unacceptable consequences. It IS inherently discriminatory and may lead to legitimate "slippery slope" fears. • Utilitarianism clashes with our fundamental moral intuitions on the value of prenatal life. These intuitions are cherished in most world religions. • Contrary to the utilitarian position, speciesism is inevitable to the human condition, especially argued from a position of existential phenomenology. Self- constitution, simultaneous constitution of the world as we know it, and the very possibility of morality are possible only within a particular notion of speciesism. • The potentiality of pre-persons to develop into persons cannot be as convincingly ignored as is done by the utilitarian. • There is a basic and underlying need and intuition to protect vulnerable human beings, of which pre-persons are exemplars. These notions clash with utilitarian theory. As an alternative, I introduce, set out and evaluate a two-phased position on the moral significance of pre-personal human life, a position of respectfulness of prenatal and pre-personal human life based upon its humanity, potentiality and separation-viability. This leads, firstly, to the conclusion of a graded, sliding scale conception of human prepersonal moral significance in line with the level of development and with the actuation of potentiality. Secondly, it leads to the conclusion that the advent of separationsurvivability (viability) is a morally significant cut-off point beyond which the human fetus may "normally" have a justifiable right to the continuation of its life. In as far as the application of my argument is concerned, I develop a "moderate" position with reference to the abortion debate. Whilst I recognize that all human prenatal beings of which it can be argued that they have a reasonable chance to develop their intrinsic potentiality, i.e., to become full-fledged persons, should have the opportunity to do so, I also recognize that neither this position, nor the complexities of life make it possible to hold "absolute" positions on the justifiability of abortion. I explore this extremely problematic notion in the text. That having been said, the advent of separation-survivability may imply a "moral cut-off point", beyond which termination is only rarely justified. I argue that I find no moral hindrance to wellmotivated research on human pre-embryos and stem cells.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Probleemstelling Utilitariste huldig sterk omlynde standpunte oor die waarde van lewe. Hulle redeneer dat menslike (inderwaarheid, alle lewende) wesens slegs op grond van twee eienskappe intrinsieke morele waarde kan verwerf: sentiëntisme, d.i. die vermoë om lyding te ervaar, en persoonstatus. Sentiëntisme is 'n bepalende vereiste vir morele status, maar regverdig nie 'n "reg op lewe"-aanspraak nie. Persoonsyn, verstaan as 'n vorm van selfbewustheid tesame met 'n bewuste belang by die voortsetting van eie bestaan, mag wel so 'n aanspraak regverdig. Voorgeboortelike (en "voorpersoonlike") wesens is egter nie persone nie; hulle word eers (aansienlik) ná geboorte volwaardige persone. Die implikasie is dat sulke wesens weinig morele status het, en byvoorbeeld, na willekeur gedood mag word. Die morele probleem wat ek in hierdie dissertasie aanspreek is om die utilitaristiese beskouing ten opsigte van die morale status of waarde van voorgeboortelike lewe krities-filosofies te ondersoek en te evalueer. Metodologie en gevolgtrekkings Eerstens maak ek na aanleiding van 'n gedetaileerde literatuurstudie 'n in-diepte analise van van die utilitaristiese posisie aan die hand van 'n aantal temas wat ek in hul argument geïdentifiseer het. Daarna volg 'n krities-filosofiese evaluasie van die utilitaristiese posisie, aan die hand van ses argumente: • Utilitarisme is filosofies onsamehangend. Dit oorvereenvoudig die morele argument deur voor te gee dat gevolge al is wat moreel saakmaak. Die onderliggende utilitaristiese teorie bots met die morele eise vervat in kontemporêre sienings van menseregte en geregtigheid. Dit negeer die morele belangrikheid van spesiale verpligtinge teenoor spesiale belangegroepe. • Utilitarisme het potensieelonaanvaarbare gevolge. Dit IS inherent diskriminerend en kan lei tot onkeerbare glybaan ("slippery slope")-argumente. Utilitarisme bots met ons fundamentele morele intuïsies betreffende die waarde van voorgeboortelike lewe. Hierdie intuïsies word onder meer ondersteun deur die meeste hoofstroom godsdienste. • Spesiësisme is, in kontras met die utilitaristiese beskouing, onafwendbaar vir ons selfverstaan as mense, soos aangetoon kan word met 'n beroep op die eksistensiële fenomenologie. Self-konstituering, gelyktydige konstituering van die wêreld van die mens, en selfs die moontlikheid van moraliteit is slegs moontlik vanuit' n bepaalde spesiësistiese beskouing. • Die potensialiteit van "pre-persone" om tot volwaardige persone te ontwikkel kan nie, soos die utilitaris doen, sonder meer geïgnoreer word nie. • Daar is 'n basiese en onderliggende morele eis om swak en weerlose menslike wesens te beskerm. Hierdie idees bots lynreg met utilitaristiese teorie. As 'n alternatief tot die utilitaristiese beskouing, ontwikkel ek 'n twee-fase posisie betreffende die morele waarde van voorgeboortelike menslike lewe. Ek noem hierdie posisie agting vir voorgeboortelike en voor-persoonlike menslike lewe gebaseer op die menslikheid, potensialiteit en oorleefbaarheid van prenatale mense. Dit lei, eerstens, tot die gevolgtrekking van 'n gegradeerde glyskaal konsepsie van voor-persoonlike menslike morele waarde, min of meer parallel aan die vlak van ontwikkeling en die ontwikkeling van potensialiteit. Tweedens lei dit tot die gevolgtrekking dat die ontwikkeling van lewensvatbaarheid 'n moreel-beduidende afsnypunt is waarna die menslike fetus "normaalweg" aanspraak kan maak op 'n reg dat sy lewe voortgesit moet word. In soverre dit die toepassing van my argument betref, ontwikkel ek 'n "gematigde" posisie vis-á-vis aborsie. Ek redeneer dat alle menslike voorgeboortelike wesens wat 'n redelike kans het dat hul intrinsieke potensialiteit verder sal ontwikkel, die geleentheid daartoe gegun behoort te word. Ek aanvaar ook dat nog hierdie beskouing, nog die kompleksiteit van die menslike bestaan "absolute" posisies moreel regverdig. Die problematiek en inherente spanning tussen hierdie oënskynlik-opponerende posisies word in die teks bespreek. Nogtans beskou ek die ontwikkeling van lewensvatbaarheid as 'n moreel insiggewende afsnypunt waarna terminasie net in buitengewone omstandighede moreel regverdigbaar is.

碩士
國立中央大學
哲學研究所碩士在職專班
97
The important ethical issues of the life right to life and morals status of the embryo are trickered by the fast progress of human embryonic stem cells research. These ethical disputes must be analyzed in greater details in order to make a proper judgment of the practice of embryonic stem cell research. Therefore, this thesis first gives an analysis of the terms and concepts involved in the debate. It presents Peter Singer’s argument against the thesis of sanctity of life and Mary Anne Warren’s criteria of personhood. Both are single criterion for moral status and criticized by the latter Warren as inadequate to cover the diverse field of moral status. Warren proposes a multi-criteria account of moral status, but offers insufficient status to embryos in accordance with our moral experience. A Confucian proposal is put forward to mitigate some of its pitfalls. According to Confucianism we are endowed with a natural concern of the sufferings of others. Thus, a person is a moral agent and must act morally according to her feeling towards the suffering of others. The moral status of embryo can thus be established by the moral expression of humanity from the moral agency so that it becomes sufficient and reasonable to place proper moral judgment in embryonic stem cells research. We express the hope that laws and regulations could be adjusted in time while new technology is innovated in embryonic stem cells research. At the same time, we also seek alterative methods for the development of stem cell lines to avoid the destruction of embryos in the process. Then the research of embryonic stem cells could promote the value and quality of human life.

This thesis analyses the nature, rationale, and implementation of United Kingdom and Australian regulation of research involving human embryos and cloning using legal materials, other documents and qualitative interviews with researchers, practitioners and regulators. It considers how law-makers have decided upon what to regulate and where to draw the line between permissible and prohibited activities, and the type of regulatory design strategies and enforcement approaches adopted in each jurisdiction (the ‘how to regulate’ question). It is argued that both jurisdictions have effectively decided upon permissible and prohibited activities as a result of thorough public consultation, research, reviews and the parliamentary process, and have appropriately balanced competing rationales for regulation. However, the type of regulation used in relation to those who are licensed to research in this area is unsuitable due to an over-emphasis on deterrence and the authoritarian approach taken by the regulatory bureaucracies. The central thesis is that a responsive regulatory system for licence-holders should be adopted. It is proposed that such a system would maintain the top level ‘command and control’ design strategies and deterrence approaches present in the current regulatory systems for breaches of legislation by non-licence holders and serious breaches by licence holders. However, greater use of co-regulatory design strategies and cooperative, educative and persuasive enforcement approaches should be used for regulating licensed research activities.