Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Hobbes'

Abstract     While Thomas Hobbes´ theory of absolutism is in general considered to be one of the most influential theories of political philosophy, it at the same time seems to be widely misunderstood. Hobbes´ most famous work on absolutism Leviathan, is frequently falsely accused of promoting the ideas of despotism, tyranny and similar. The purpose of this essay is not only, to prove otherwise by showing that although some passages can be found in his works, that can be interpreted as pointing to the direction of the above mentioned ideas (this is nonetheless not what Hobbes´ theory really is about), but to show, that there are more arguments of greater weight supporting his thesis than there are arguments to suggest otherwise. This is done by comparing Hobbes´ thesis and arguments for and against it with the theories of his fellow social contract theorists (John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau) and their advantages and disadvantages. The essay then is not pleased with just proving there to be more arguments for Hobbes´ absolutism than against it, but goes so far, as to suggest that it could be favored over Locke´s and Rousseau´s theories by meeting a number of conditions.

In presenting their correspondence, I highlight the means in which Hobbes is able to divorce nature and politics in his philosophy. This is done by bringing to light Hobbes’s agreement with Descartes’s deceiving God argument. First, I demonstrate Hobbes’s hidden agreement with it by analyzing his objection to Descartes’s first Meditation. Second, I show that Hobbes and Descartes both retreat into consciousness in order to deal with the possibility of deception on the behalf of God. Third, I trace Hobbes’s rational justification for entertaining that very possibility. Fourth, I bring forward Hobbes’s certain principle, that God is incomprehensible. Fifth, I demonstrate Hobbes’s rationalization for rendering nature incomprehensible in turn. From this key insight, the differences between the two philosophers stand out more. Whereas Descartes rids himself of the possibility of a deceiving God, Hobbes does not. Sixth, I show that Descartes needs to rid himself of that possibility in order to have a basis for science, Hobbes’s science is such that he does not need to rid himself of that possibility. My investigation ends by considering both Hobbes’s and Descartes’s stance on nature, in relation to politics. I find that Hobbes’s principle is much more practical that Descartes’s principle. Hobbes’s principle is shown to be much more instructive and sustainable for human life. In conclusion, this analysis of the origins, principles, and orientation of the two philosopher’s thought brings forward the overarching question, whether the recovery of value and meaning is to be brought about in nature, or in civilization.

This thesis provides a comprehensive analysis of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s engagement with the political thought of Thomas Hobbes and Hobbism. This involves tracing Hobbes’s French reception in the first half of the eighteenth century amongst authors with whom Rousseau was familiar, thereby elucidating the context in which he responded to Hobbesian ideas and arguments. When situated in this context, many of the difficulties in understanding Rousseau’s engagement with Hobbes are overcome, and the deeply polemical character of the engagement is revealed. In particular, Rousseau’s state of nature theory sought to collapse the prevalent bifurcation between Pufendorfian sociability and Hobbesian Epicureanism in order to show that Hobbes’s natural law critics were in fact no better than Hobbes; a line of argument that Rousseau also pursued in the Social Contract. In addition, Rousseau’s invocation of Hobbes was intended to support his republican critique of doux commerce theory, by revealing that the modern defenders of commercial society rested their theories on a Hobbesian picture of man’s natural condition. This picture closely resembled the neo-Augustinian account of man’s post-lapsarian state, and by rejecting this Augustinian-Hobbesian depiction of man Rousseau was able to offer a vision of a well-ordered republic for men who were yet to be corrupted by the onset of luxury and entrenched relations of inequality. In examining Rousseau’s engagement not just with Hobbes, but also with natural law, republican and Augustinian contexts, an original interpretation of his political thought is advanced throughout the thesis. This interpretation stresses the importance and interplay of three themes, the problematical relationship between which often leads to much confusion in the scholarly literature on Rousseau: first, nature understood as a normative standard; second, free will as an inalienable gift of nature; and, third and finally, the role of the passions in general and of amour-propre in particular.

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Para Thomas Hobbes, a Filosofia é um exercício voltado para a obtenção de conhecimento que permita mudar a vida das pessoas. Averiguar os rudimentos das relações do homem com o corpo natural e do homem com o corpo moral significa, nesta medida, para Hobbes, buscar um projeto cientificista confiável, tendo o homem e o Estado como objetos, identificando-se com o espírito galileano do século 17. Tal projeto, a soma das filosofias natural e moral, foca o movimento quantificável dos corpos, naturais ou políticos. Contudo, Hobbes admite propósitos ou fins como causa da organização da natureza. Esta dissertação trata da relação entre a fundamentação mecanicista e as concessões ao finalismo em Hobbes, com o intuito de compreender como o sistema filosófico do autor permanece coeso.
Salvador

The thesis examines the role of metaphor in political thought and, in particular, in the work of the British philosopher Thomas Hobbes. It is argued that, contrary to what many critics have suggested, Hobbes's use of images, metaphorical and otherwise, formed the basis for much of his political philosophy. Indeed, it is from a correct understanding of the use of the metaphoric image in political thought that varied Hobbesian concerns such as history, science, geometry, optics, poetry, and political philosophy can be united. Appropriately, chapter one narrates four distinct traditions of applying the subject of metaphor to philosophy. It is argued that, far from being marginal to political thought, metaphor partially forms the basis for much of the activity of political thinking. The second chapter develops a theory of the meaning of political metaphors. It is argued here that many twentieth century accounts of the meaning of metaphors are deficient for they fail to acknowledge how metaphorical images are used in political thought: namely, to unite the populace in a common political judgment. The remainder of the thesis is then devoted to the work of Thomas Hobbes. Based upon an understanding of political metaphor as outlined in the first two chapters, it is argued in chapter three that contempory theorists are wrong when they suggest that Hobbes contradicted himself when using metaphors to adorn his prose and yet, at the same time, condemning their very existence. On the contrary, it is argued that Hobbes's treatment and use of metaphors was highly consistent. More importantly, once Hobbes's alleged contradiction has been satisfactorily resolved, we soon find that the metaphoric image was to play a large role in almost all of his work, from his translation of Greek classics to his theory of rhetoric and of history. Chapter four then turns to Hobbes's optical theory of nowledge, for it is argued here that the starting point to Hobbes's understanding of science, geometry, and, ultimately, knowledge is primarily visual. Chapter five then analyzes the metaphorical imagery of Hobbes's most popular work, Leviathan. From a dose look at various aspects of this work we find that the metaphoric image is perhaps its most constitutive element. Finally, chapter six analyzes the double-edged sword to our political images. From looking at the role of metaphorical imagination in Hobbes's political philosophy, including a discussion of the poetic imagination of Michael Oakeshott and Martin Heidegger, it is argued that the act of imagination can be either politically creative or highly dangerous. This, indeed, is the consequence of the metaphoric image in political thought - it has the power either to save or enslave us.

O presente trabalho procura demonstrar a existência de quatro diferentes sentidos de liberdade no sistema filosófico de Hobbes: liberdade como ausência de impedimentos externos ao movimento, liberdade como direito natural de auto-preservação no estado de natureza, liberdade como esfera de ação delimitada pela lei civil e liberdade como direito legítimo de descumprir certas leis civis. Nesse sentido, os resultados da pesquisa contrariam a compreensão do conceito de liberdade em Hobbes a partir de sua apropriação pela tradição liberal, que considera apenas um desses quatro sentidos. As análises permitem ainda inferir que entre os diferentes sentidos de liberdade em Hobbes há relações de analogia e de pertencimento.
This research aims to demonstrate four different ways of understanding the concept of liberty in Hobbes\' philosophical system: liberty as an absent of external impediments to movement; liberty as the natural right of self-preservation in the state of nature; liberty as the field of action limited by the civil law; and liberty as the right to disobey some civil laws without injustice. The research\'s results contradict the liberal use of Hobbes\'s concept of liberty, due to this usage been restricted to only one of the four ways of the concept of liberty in Hobbes\' works.

Hobbes, considera al hombre como un ser malo por naturaleza, como el lobo del propio hombre, vive en un estado de naturaleza bajo una condición primitiva con la libertad natural de hacer cuanto quiera, pues carece de gobierno, no hay leyes, no existe alguien a quien obedecer y esto conduce a vivir en un estado de guerra de todos contra todos; Hobbes argumenta que el hombre tiene derecho a luchar solo por tres razones: por proteger lo propio, por desear las posesiones del otro y por obtener fama y reputación, trayendo como resultado el legítimo derecho a la guerra, al estar en disputa constante tiene el miedo latente de perder la vida, y para conservarla tiene que renunciar a su libertad natural y adquirir una libertad civil, esto se realiza mediante un pacto entre todos los individuos y se da paso a la creación de un nuevo estado. Dentro de éste hay leyes, normas y un dirigente que ha sido elegido mediante este contrato llamándolo soberano. El cuál los gobernará y traerá paz dentro del estado, permitiendo así la transición de un estado de natural a un estado civil. Una vez instaurado el soberano, podrá y deberá conservar por todos los medios posibles una armonía, para preservar esto tiene el derecho de usar el poder coercitivo siempre y cuando tenga como propósito preservar lo paz y el orden. Teniendo ya a los súbditos dentro de un estado civil la forma de gobierno que plantea Hobbes y que considera que es la indicada será un absolutismo total, nadie tiene más poder que el soberano, nadie puede castigarlo, culparlo; pues los súbditos han hecho pacto con él, más no el soberano con ellos.

Thomas Hobbes está preocupado com as consequências do desacordo moral que, segundo ele, impedem as sociedades de viverem em paz, a qual é condição necessária para a garantia uma vida confortável a todos. Para apresentar uma solução a esse problema, o autor começa estudando a condição natural dos humanos, que, sem um poder soberano, vivem em condição de guerra. Depois de alcançar essa conclusão, Hobbes nos mostra como é possível constituir corretamente uma república. Apesar de apresentar o argumento do estado de natureza como sendo o ponto de partida para a instituição da soberania, ele está focado principalmente no seu significado para a estabilidade da república. Hobbes afirma, assim, estar consciente de que as pessoas sempre desejam viver juntas e de que elas têm vivido assim desde sempre. Seu principal interesse está, na verdade, em demonstrar como as pessoas podem viver juntas em paz ao longo do tempo. Hobbes mostra aos seus leitores que a paz só é possível quando os cidadãos conhecem as leis de natureza e estão corretamente motivados a segui-las. Essa tese tem dois objetivos principais: (i) discutir como Hobbes desenvolve sua teoria moral, e como ele conecta essa teoria à lei civil, e (ii) debater sua teoria sobre a natureza humana e a possibilidade de ensinar os cidadãos sobre a necessidade de obedecer ao soberano. Os principais tópicos discutidos e as contribuições que essa tese pode proporcionar estão relacionados à questão da normatividade das leis de natureza e ao impacto que ela pode ter no restante da teoria política de Hobbes, com particular destaque à relação, em uma república, entre moralidade e educação, pois a segunda motiva os cidadãos a seguirem a primeira.
Thomas Hobbes is concerned with the consequences of moral disagreement as, according to him, they prevent societies from living in peace, which is a necessary condition to guarantee a comfortable life to everyone. In order to present a solution to this problem, Hobbes starts studying the natural condition of humans, who, in the absence of a sovereign power, live in a state of war. After reaching this conclusion, Hobbes shows us how it is possible to correctly institute a commonwealth. Despite presenting the argument concerning the state of nature as a starting point to the institution of the sovereignty, he is focused mainly on the state of nature’s meaning to the stability of the commonwealth. Hobbes hence asserts that he is aware that people always desire to live together and have always lived like that. His main interest is actually to demonstrate how people can live together in peace over time. Hobbes shows his readers that peace is only possible when citizens know the laws of nature and are correctly motivated to follow them. This paper has two main aims (i) to discuss how Hobbes advances his moral theory and how he connects it to the civil law, and (ii) to reflect his theory about human nature and the possibility of teaching citizens about the need of obeying the sovereign. The main topics discussed and the contributions this paper may make concern the normativity of the laws of nature and the impact it may have on the rest of Hobbes’s political theory, with particular emphasis on the relation, in a commonwealth, between morality and education, as the latter motivates citizens to follow the former.

CONSELHO NACIONAL DE DESENVOLVIMENTO CIENTÍFICO E TECNOLÓGICO
Le contract social dans Thomas Hobbes est l` object de cette dissertation. Le contract naît en milieu aux conflits économiques, politiques et religieux du siècle XVII, surtout an Anglaterre. Son objectif principal est convoquer les individus à l`obéissance au pouvoir souverain, au moyen du pacte de soumission. Les individus se transfèrent réciproquement leurs droits et instituent un troisième, une personne artificielle avec pouvoir de promulguer les lois, juger et exécuter. Ce pouvoir est absolu, indivisible et irrévocable, capable d` imposer la peur aux pactuants, faire désavantageux la inobservance du pacte, et éviter l`état naturel, c`est-à-dire, la guerre d` origine religieuse, politique et économique.
O contrato social em Thomas Hobbes é o objeto de análise desta dissertação. O contrato emerge em meio aos conflitos econômicos, políticos e religiosos do século XVII, em particular na Inglaterra. Seu objetivo principal é conclamar os indivíduos à obediência ao poder soberano por meio de um pacto de submissão, pelo qual os indivíduos transferem-se mutuamente direitos e instituem um terceiro, uma pessoa artificial com poder para promulgar as leis, julgar e executá-las; seu poder deve ser absoluto, indivisível e irrevogável, capaz de impor medo aos pactuantes e tornar desvantajoso o descumprimento do pacto, e evitar desse modo, o estado de natureza, isto é, a guerra de origem religiosa, política e econômica.

Orientador: Yara Adario Frateschi
Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas
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Resumo: O presente trabalho pretende analisar os conceitos de razão e reta razão em Hobbes com o objetivo de compreender melhor o estatuto das leis de natureza nessa Teoria. Pois ainda que Hobbes afirme que a razão é frágil perante as paixões, que é capaz de erro e engano, que não é uma faculdade infalível, ele também nos diz que o uso diligente e rigoroso da razão possibilita a ciência bem como a dedução das regras de comportamento que conduzem à paz e à preservação de si. Como as leis de natureza são deduzidas a partir da razão, consideramos que uma investigação dessa faculdade, aliada à consideração da natureza humana, nos permite compreender melhor a questão da obrigação em Hobbes. Para tanto, pretendemos resgatar o uso que Hobbes faz dos termos razão e reta razão e comparar com os conceitos de razão e reta razão na tradição. Também nos propomos a tratar brevemente da questão da obrigação em Hobbes e como ela foi é compreendida pelos comentadores.
Abstract: The present work intends to analyze the reason and right reason in Thomas Hobbes. In this manner we aim to understand the operation of natural laws on this theory. Hobbes recognizes the fragility of reason confronted to passions, he tells us reason is prone to mistakes and deceive and it is not an infallible faculty. But in the other hand he supports that the very use of reason allows the existence of science, and through reason we can obtain that conduct rules necessary to lead us to self-preservation and peace. Since natural laws are deduced from reason, inquiring into this faculty allow us a better comprehension of the obligation in Hobbes. To achieve this, we intend to analyze the Hobbes's use of terms reason and right reason and proceed with a confrontation on traditional conceiving of reason and right reason. We also propose to deal briefly about obligation in Hobbes and how this subject is understood by Taylor e Warrender.
Mestrado
Filosofia
Filosofia

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In the absence of external impediments the free action of men, what kind of society exist? Is it true that men get together in society as a pure gratuity? A strong and sovereign power, able to handle all the needs and passions in right? If men have always sought to be free, why an organized able to control them? Thomas Hobbes, on the basis of similar interjections, sought answers in context, fully imbued with innovative scientific ideas. This scientific process emerged in an attempt to legitimize the Copernican system of the universe, which was based on mathematically study the movements of physical bodies. As a result, there was a sharp break with traditional cosmofisica and the emphasis focused on the relation of cause and effect of physical phenomena. Hobbes applied this new methodology in political philosophy and said that the world is a joining of bodies in motion. This was a mechanical man, and also extended to the state, that as perfect machines can have their movements controlled and known by science that made them the object of his study. While the state was described as an artificial man, who mimics the natural man, the mechanics of man was drafted in a way analogous to a clock. However, Hobbes showed that men, when inserted in the natural state, they acted according to his own passions and always looking for its own sake: the principle of benefit. A sphere improper to preserve life. Because of right reason, men came to the conclusion that the institution of the Leviathan is the most effective output, so that the pleasant life and peace are guaranteed. Based on the scenario, the present paper, which is entitled Freedom and Movement in Thomas Hobbes , seeks to demonstrate the application of the movement a legacy of science the concept of freedom, understood and disseminated so far as freedom of the will and rational beings, and therefore, a metaphysical attribute. From Hobbes, liberty is merely applied to the whole body and body, rational or not, since it is moving. It is this sense that the hobbesian definition of freedom, the absence of external restraint to the movement, the truth wins and becomes incompatible with the natural order, which is to keep the peace. In order to preserve the vital movement and a comfortable life, men, therefore, limit the freedom and start living under civil law.
Na ausência de impedimento externo à ação livre dos homens, que tipo de sociedade existiria? Será verdade que os homens se reúnem em sociedade por pura gratuidade? Um poder forte e soberano, capaz de lidar com todas as necessidades e paixões é o mais adequado? Se os homens sempre procuraram ser livres, por que organizaram um meio capaz de controlá-los? Thomas Hobbes, em função de interjeições similares, procurou respostas no seu contexto, totalmente imbuído de inovadoras idéias científicas. Este processo científico surgiu na tentativa de legitimar o sistema copernicano do universo, que tinha por base estudar matematicamente os movimentos dos corpos físicos. Em decorrência disso, houve um brusco rompimento com a cosmofísica tradicional e a ênfase focou-se na relação de causa e de efeito dos fenômenos físicos. Hobbes aplicou essa nova metodologia na filosofia política e afirmou que o mundo é uma junção de corpos em movimento. Essa forma mecanicista foi estendida também ao homem e ao Estado, que como máquinas perfeitas podem ter seus movimentos conhecidos e controlados pela ciência que fez deles o seu objeto de estudo. Enquanto o Estado era descrito como um homem artificial, que imita o homem natural, a mecânica do homem era delineada de forma análoga a de um relógio. Contudo, Hobbes evidenciou que os homens, quando inseridos no estado natural, agiam de acordo com as próprias paixões e sempre buscando o próprio bem: o princípio do benefício próprio. Uma esfera imprópria à preservação da vida. Por conta da reta razão, os homens chegaram à conclusão de que a instituição do Leviatã é a saída mais eficaz, a fim de que a vida prazerosa e paz sejam garantidas. Com base neste cenário, a presente dissertação, que tem como título Liberdade e Movimento em Thomas Hobbes , pretende demonstrar a aplicação do movimento legado da ciência ao conceito de liberdade, até então compreendido e disseminado como a liberdade da vontade e dos seres racionais e, por isso, um atributo metafísico. A partir de Hobbes, a liberdade é puramente corpórea e aplicada a todo corpo, racional ou não, desde que esteja em movimento. É neste sentido que a definição de liberdade hobbesiana, ausência de impedimento externo ao movimento do corpo, ganha veracidade e se torna incompatível com a ordem natural, que é a de manter a paz. Visando a preservação do movimento vital e uma vida confortável, os homens, portanto, limitam a liberdade e passam a viver sob a lei civil.

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Para Thomas Hobbes, a única função do Estado é manter a paz entre os cidadãos. Cada homem, ao querer possuir o que entende ser necessário para si mesmo, pode entrar em conflito com outro que poderá querer a mesma coisa. Se não houver quem regule, quem organize a convivência humana, o que impera é a lei do mais forte, ou mais astuto. Sempre haverá alguém que poderá colocar em risco minha sobrevivência se eu não tiver como me proteger. O Estado surge como necessidade de construção da paz. Abrimos mão de nossas capacidades de autoconservação, de autodefesa e as delegamos ao Estado, constituído através de um contrato, para que cuide de nossa segurança, para que possamos viver civilizadamente, para que não vivamos em eterna guerra de todos contra todos. O Estado hobbesiano é soberano. Depois de constituído, de formalizado, tem poderes ilimitados de organizar a sociedade como melhor lhe aprouver. Sem Estado não há civilização, não há cidadania, não há paz.

L'œuvre politique hobbesienne s'exprime par la tension entre deux termes: l'un, l'exigence d'une souveraineté absolue: l'autre, l'individualisme extrême qui domine sa conception de l'homme et de la société, sous lequel nous pouvons trouver les fondements de ce que de nos jours nous appelons libéralisme. Le centre de sa théorie de l'obligation politique est la notion de contrat social. Avant même Locke et la déclaration des droits de 1789, Hobbes conçoit la république comme le résultat d'un pacte entre les individus qui consentent à limiter leur droit de nature: la société n’est que cette restriction. Le fondement de la théorie hobbesienne de l'obligation politique sont les individus. L'état hobbesien n'a pas d'autre sens que d'éviter la violence que produit un individualisme sans restriction. La fonction de l'État se réduit à la préservation et défense des sujets particuliers
In Hobbes political works two terms are opposed: the demand for and absolute sovereign and extreme individualism which dominates his conception of man and society, under which we find the foundation of what we call until our days liberalism. Just like later the liberalism, Hobbes makes the individuals the subject of politics. The heart of his theory of political obligation is the notion of the social contract. Even before Locke and the declaration of human rights in 1789, Hobbes regards the state as a result of a contract between the individuals who consent to limit their natural rights: society is but that restriction. The hobbesian state restricts the political right of civilians -the political expressions of the people - while warrants for the protection of the private, the individual

Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Centro de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas. Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia
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O problema em questão diz respeito ao contrato que funda e legitima o Estado em Thomas Hobbes. Tendo como escopo questionar a possibilidade e/ou impossibilidade de nulidade do contrato social e assim verificar as implicações disto para o conceito de soberania hobbesiana. A leitura que impera na tradição de estudiosos da obra política de Hobbes, em especial do Leviathan, é a de um Estado no qual a soberania é absoluta e irrevogável. A interpretação do contrato firmado entre e, somente, entre os homens, deixando, portanto, o soberano de fora, ofereceria legitimidade a este para agir de forma absoluta e obrigaria ao súdito a obedecer de forma irrestrita. A hipótese que se busca sustentar remete à possibilidade de rompimento, desobediência e mais centralmente da nulidade contratual a partir do vício e/ou desrespeito de determinadas cláusulas fundamentais do contrato, visto se oporem às condições de validade do contrato social. Se isso puder ser sustentado desse modo, isto é, se Hobbes compartilhar mesmo de uma teoria forte da nulidade contratual e pela razão, como declinado acima, que achamos ser a correta, então, tal formulação implicaria em sua teoria uma reconsideração do conceito de soberania e obediência, haja vista o estabelecimento de certos vínculos fortes que condicionam as possibilidades de exigência, autoridade e poder da soberania. Portanto, concentra-se em encontrar uma explicação e/ou teorização da nulidade do contrato social e da sua consequência para a teoria da soberania e obediência hobbesiana.

Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Centro de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia, Florianópolis, 2012
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Pretende-se investigar o surgimento da ideia de representação política nos primórdios da era moderna, no período de transformação gradativa dos reinos feudais em Estados nacionais. O estudo será realizado pelo confronto das teorias de Johannes Althusius e Thomas Hobbes. O primeiro é autor de Política e um defensor da soberania popular e da responsabilidade dos representantes ante os representados. Ele recorre à representação tanto como forma expressiva da vontade do povo quanto como meio de controle da atuação dos governantes. Concebe a sociedade com base em grupos, como reunião interativa de associações, que se iniciam no núcleo familiar estendido, característico do medievo, e progressivamente alcançam as relações complexas dos estamentos sociais sob um rei ou imperador. O tema em Hobbes será fundado no Leviatã, onde a representação é um instrumento de unificação pacificadora. Partindo da diversidade de vontades de indivíduos considerados como originalmente livres e iguais, os quais em função de seu próprio poder lutam por tudo que querem, Hobbes deseja demonstrar que só pela renúncia e transferência irrevogável destes direitos naturais ilimitados para um soberano absoluto é que os homens podem estabelecer um Estado. Ser representado é o caminho para construir uma vida boa numa sociedade em que todos devem submeter-se incondicionalmente a um representante onipotente. Na parte final, a leitura crítica e historicamente situada destas obras-primas será seguida de análise conceitual apoiada em Hanna Pitkin e seu The Concept of Representation.

Abstract : In this essay I intend to investigate the emerging of the idea of political representation in the early stages of modern era, during the period of gradual transformation of feudal kingdoms into national States. This study will be accomplished by confronting the theories of Johannes Althusius and Thomas Hobbes. The first is the author of the Politics, a defender of the popular sovereignty, and of the responsibility of the representatives in view of the represented. He resorts to representation as much as in a way to express people's will, as in a way to control the governor's actions. He conceives society as being group-based, as an interactive reunion of associations that start in the extended nuclear family, characteristic of the medieval, and progressively reaches the complex relations of the social estates under a king or an emperor. The same theme in Hobbes will be found in the Leviathan, where the representation is an instrument of pacifying unification. Starting from the diversity of the individuals' wills considered originally as being free and equals, whom because of their own power will fight for everything they want, Hobbes wishes to demonstrate that only through the irrevocable renounce and transference of these unlimited natural rights to an absolute sovereign is that men can establish a State. Being represented is the only path to construct a good life in a society where everyone must submit unconditionally to an omnipotent representative. In the final part of this essay the critical and historically situated reading of these two masterpieces will be followed by a conceptual analysis backed in Hanna Pitkin's book The Concept of Representation.

Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Centro de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia, Florianópolis, 2012
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Na presente tese, são investigadas as relações entre ética e política no pensamento de Thomas Hobbes. A motivação inicial da pesquisa se encontra nas interpretações que procuram estabelecer um fundamento moral e religioso para a obrigação política hobbesiana. Um dos objetivos fundamentais deste trabalho consistiu na demonstração de que a teoria da obrigação de Hobbes está fundada no contrato e não numa suposta obrigação moral incondicional diante das leis naturais. A argumentação, para demonstrar essa tese, é a de que a obrigação diante das leis naturais não pode ser concebida como uma obrigação genuína, tendo em vista que, de acordo com o filósofo inglês, uma obrigação é genuína apenas quando ocorre o cancelamento do direito de agir conforme a vontade. Desse modo, as tentativas de derivar a obrigação incondicional diante da lei natural a partir da obrigação in foro interno ou da obrigação diante de Deus revelam-se incoerentes com a definição hobbesiana de obrigação. Contudo, afirmar que não existe uma obrigação moral fundamentando a obrigação política não implica negar a importância da reflexão ética na filosofia de Hobbes. Ao contrário - este é outro argumento fundamental desta tese -, a reflexão ética se constitui como parte essencial do projeto político de Hobbes. Porém, para elucidar mais precisamente o papel da ética, é necessário investigar mais profundamente a própria definição estabelecida pelo filósofo de Malmesbury. Desse modo, o ponto de partida deste texto está justamente no esclarecimento da concepção hobbesiana de ética e da compreensão de sua relação com os argumentos políticos. Nesse sentido, a princípio, é indicado que a concepção de ética, conforme Hobbes, apresenta um duplo sentido. Num primeiro sentido, a ética é compreendida propriamente como a análise dos movimentos da mente, isto é, uma teoria das paixões. Trata-se, portanto, de uma ciência descritiva que, partindo da física, visa descrever uma realidade apresentada à imaginação. Nesse estágio, Hobbes descreve o aparecimento das noções de bem e mal, originadas diretamente das paixões. Esse não é, porém, o único sentido que Hobbes concede à ética. Há outro aspecto, que Hobbes nomeia de filosofia moral, isto é, a ciência do bem e o mal na convivência humana. Trata-se, nesse caso, não mais de uma mera ciência descritiva, uma vez que é na filosofia moral que se estabelecem as leis de natureza. Esta esfera, a filosofia moral, está mais próxima da matemática, já que é concebida como puro cálculo com nomes e, nesse sentido, não pretende descrever nenhuma realidade, tal como ocorre na teoria das paixões. É, por isso, um cálculo perfeito, pois, da mesma forma que ocorre na geometria, somos nós seus próprios criadores. O estabelecimento das leis de natureza ressalta a importância de outra distinção fundamental no pensamento de Hobbes, a saber, a distinção entre prudência e razão. Enquanto a primeira é apenas um cálculo com imagens, sendo, portanto, a esfera própria da imaginação e das paixões, a razão é a esfera do discurso verbal, dos cálculos com nomes. Apenas nessa esfera é possível atingir a universalidade e a necessidade dos cálculos, e é nessa esfera que Hobbes fundamenta a teoria da obrigação, visto que, fundamentalmente, para Hobbes, uma obrigação consiste em não contradizer o que foi significado na promessa. Entretanto, a análise da filosofia moral, isto é, das leis de natureza, aponta também para a insuficiência da própria razão no estabelecimento de relações pacíficas na esfera da natureza. Não somente as leis de natureza são insuficientes, na medida em que não obrigam por natureza, como também a própria razão parece apontar que, numa condição natural, a não cooperação e os ataques preventivos seriam os comportamentos mais razoáveis para a garantia da autopreservação. Vislumbra-se, assim, o aspecto mais fundamental de toda a argumentação hobbesiana: a necessidade do Estado. É somente no interior do Estado que o comportamento virtuoso torna-se razoável. Logo, é somente no interior do estado civil que a moralidade é estabelecida. O Estado também possui o papel de arbitrar os conflitos de opinião que, num hipotético estado de natureza, conduziriam à guerra de todos contra todos. Assim, se por natureza, em virtude da fluidez das paixões, não havia a possibilidade de um acordo moral, será tarefa do soberano estabelecer uma regra comum que elimina a possibilidade do conflito. Desse modo, a relação entre ética e política pode ser pensada de outro modo. Não como uma relação de fundação, conforme as interpretações de Taylor e Warrender advogaram, mas como uma relação indissociável, na qual se percebe que, para Hobbes, a reflexão ética (a teoria das paixões e o estabelecimento das leis de natureza) é parte essencial para o desenvolvimento de sua argumentação política.

Abstract : The present thesis investigates the relations between the ethics and the politics in the Tomas Hobbes# thoughts. The initial motivation of this study is found in the interpretations which tries to establish a moral and religious fundament to the hobbesian political obligation. One of the fundamental aims of this study consists in the demonstration that the obligation theory of Hobbes is founded in the contract e not in a supposed unconditional moral obligation before the natural laws. We argue, to demonstrate this thesis, that the obligation before the natural laws cannot be conceived as a genuine obligation, since then, according to the English philosopher, an obligation is genuine only when it occurs the canceling of the right of acting according to the will. This way, the attempts to derive the unconditional obligation up against the natural law from the obligation in foro interno or the obligation before God, reveal themselves inconsistent in the Hobbesian definition on obligation. However, to confirm that it does not exist a founded moral obligation founding the political obligation, it does not implies to deny the importance of the ethic reflection in the Hobbes ` philosophy. On the contrary, - this is another fundamental argument in this thesis -, the ethic reflection constitutes as an essential part of Hobbes` political project. Otherwise in order to clear the ethics role, it is necessary to investigate deeply the definition itself established by the philosopher of Malmesbury. This way, the starting point of our text is exactly in the clearness of the Hobbesian conception of ethics and in the comprehension of its relation with the political arguments. In this sense, we begin indicating that the ethics conception, according to Hobbes, shows double meaning.In the first meaning, the ethics is perceived as the analysis of the movements of the mind, that is, the passion theory. It is considered a descriptive science that, starting from Physics, aims to describe a reality presented to the imagination. On this stage Hobbes describes the beginning of the notions of good and bad, originated straight from passions. This is not the single meaning in which Hobbes gives to the ethics. There is another feature which Hobbes calls on moral philosophy, that is, the science of good and bad in the human relationship. In this case, it is not a simple descriptive science anymore given that, it is in the moral philosophy that establishes the nature of laws. In this area, the moral philosophy is closer to the mathematics, given that it is conceived as a pure calculus with names and, in this sense, it doesn´t intend to describe a reality as it happens in theory of passions. For that reason, a perfect calculus so, in the same way that occurs in geometry, we are their own generators. The establishment of the laws of the nature highlights the importance of another fundamental distinction in the Hobbes# thoughts, that is, the distinction between prudence and reason. While the first is only the calculus with images that way, being the sphere itself of the imagination and the passions, the reason is the sphere of the verbal discourse and from the calculus with names. Only in this extent it is possible to reach the universality and the necessity of the calculus, and it is in this sphere that Hobbes found the obligation theory, given that, fundamentally to Hobbes, the obligation consists in do not contradicting what was significant the promise. Otherwise, the analysis of the moral philosophy, that is, of the nature laws also points to the insufficiency of the proper reason in the establishment of the pacific relations in the human sphere. Not only the laws of nature are enough, in a sense that they do not obligate by nature, as well the own reason seems to point that, in a natural condition, the no cooperation and the preventive attacks would be the most reasonable behaviors to grant the self-preservation. On that view, the most fundamental feature of all hobbesian argumentation: the need of the State. The State also has the role to arbitrate the conflicts of opinion that, in a hypothetic nature state, conduct to the war of all against all. So, if by nature, due to the fluidity of the passions, there was no possibility for a moral agreement, it will be the task of the sovereign to establish a common rule that eliminates the possibility of conflict. This way, the relations between ethics and politics may be thought in another way. Not only as relationship foundation, according to the interpretations of Taylor and Warrender , but as an inseparable relationship in which it is noticed, to Hobbes, the reflection of ethics ( the theory of passions and the establishment of the natural laws) is part of the essential to the development of its political argumentation.

Les textes que Hobbes a consacrés à la théologie constituent une part importante, bien que trop souvent ignorée, de son oeuvre. Ces textes, qui se caractèrisent par la place prépondérante qu'ils accordent à l'attribut divin de l'omnipotence, n'appartiennent pas au courant principal de la théologie chrétienne de la toute-puissance, d'inspiration ockhamiste, mais à un courant mineur de cette théologie, souvent jugé hétérodoxe. De fait, lorsqu'il établit un lien entre toute-puissance et nécessité, Hobbes est plus proche d'Abelard que d'Ockham. L'objet de notre thèse est de montrer en quoi la réflexion sur la toute-puissance divine orienté de façon décisive la pensée morale et politique de Hobbes
Although they have been ignored for a long time, the texts devoted by Hobbes to theology are an important part of his work. Those texts, that give a predominant part to the divine attribute of omnipotency, don't belong however to the main ockhamist stream of the theology of almightiness. Indeed, when he links almightiness and neccessity, Hobbes is nearer to abelard than to Ockham. Hobbes'reflection on the almightiness of God conditions directly his moral and political philosophy

Ma thèse vise à établir une comparaison détaillée entre la pensée de G.W.F. Hegel et celle de Thomas Hobbes. L’hypothèse avancée par ce travail est la suivante : pour ce qui concerne l’explication de certains phénomènes de la vie pratique – le lien entre désir et conscience de soi, le rôle de la passion et de la félicité dans l’action, la genèse du droit et la nature de la souveraineté étatique – Hegel et Hobbes partagent un même lieu conceptuel de départ. Notamment, deux points fondamentaux de la critique de Hobbes à l’éthique ancienne ont des racines profondes dans la pensée de Hegel : la récusation de la question classique de la vie meilleure, et la supériorité de l’art sur la nature. Le désir est décrit par les deux penseurs en tant que mouvement d’auto-affirmation individuelle, non plus comme une tendance théologiquement orientée ; la volonté de l’homme devient, également, la source de toute normativité. L’enquête sur les affinités aura pourtant une fonction préparatoire à l’analyse des divergences théoriques essentielles entre les deux penseurs. Chez Hobbes, la limitation du désir est la condition de l’édification de l’ordre, tandis que la Bildung [éducation] hégélienne est le moyen de la rationalisation du désir. Finalement, le désir individuel n’est chez Hegel qu’une forme de manifestation du désir de la raison de se donner présence et durée dans la réalité
This thesis aspires to establish a detailed theoretical comparison between the thought of G. W. F. Hegel and that of Thomas Hobbes. It is my contention that the two thinkers have a common starting point on many fundamental problems of human practical life, such as the account of desire and self-consciousness, the role of passion and happiness in human agency, the phenomenon of right and the nature of the political sovereignty of the State. One of my central points will be the deep connection of Hegel’s practical thought with two points of the Hobbesian criticism of ancient ethics: namely, the refutation of the classical question of the good life as the basis of human conduct and association, and the superiority of art over nature. Hence, desire is described by both thinkers as a movement of individual self-affirmation and causality over the world, not as a teleological tension towards different kinds of goods; and the human will becomes, for both equally, the source of all practical, juridical and political normativity. Nonetheless, the account of these similarities will be preparatory to the analysis of the crucial differences between Hegel’s and Hobbes’ solutions. Whereas for Hobbes the limitation of the natural desire of man is the prerequisite for all order, Hegelian Bildung [education] is the mean of the rationalization of desire. In the last analysis, the desire of individuals is for Hegel a form of manifestation of the all-pervading impulse of reason to give itself presence and endurance in reality

Thesis advisor: Susan Shell
One of Hobbes’s most provocative claims is that he is the first to articulate a true civil science. I argue on the basis of internal and external textual evidence that De Cive sheds a unique light on this statement and deserves careful study in isolation from his other works. Hobbes argues there that Socrates initiated a sea change in politics in which a mode of governing by divine mystery falls before the withering philosophical critique of his dilettante heirs. Afterward, regimes are forced to defend their power with rational arguments, and neither statesmen nor philosophers have been able to replace the old consensus with a solid foundation. Hobbes means to be the first to do so. The new civil science Hobbes proposes, lacking any physics or psychology on which it could be based, turns out to be a science of power modeled closely on the metaphor of repairing an artifact. The craftsman must possess adequate, not complete, knowledge of the parts and their interactions to repair or improve an artifact; the civil scientist likewise can perform his craft with just a working knowledge of human beings and their interactions. Just as the artisan depends on a prior understanding of the purpose of his artifact in order to judge its quality, the civil scientist must also presuppose some goal to be achieved that is not supplied by the scientific method itself. Hobbes provides arguments that internal political stability ought to be the scientist’s goal, but these are not scientific arguments on his terms. Contrary to Hobbes’s reputation as advancing a vision of science as complete, I show that his science turns out to be progressive and open to future revision. It must nevertheless maintain the appearance of certainty, as post-Socratic political instability is above all a conflict of ideas, and that battle can only be won by science rendering the final verdict in every argument. Hobbes’s definitional method appears to yield certain conclusions, but actually admits of improved definitions and therefore improved conclusions. It preserves the appearance of certainty while accommodating change and progress in human knowledge. Civil science breaks down the commonwealth into individuals and arrives at an abstract understanding of them sufficient to achieve its goal. It then shapes those individuals so that they fit together well. Human beings need to be oriented away from problematic transcendent interests and taught to recognize cosmopolitan mutual humanity and to cease categorizing others according to prejudicial pre-scientific categories. All human interactions, down to basic familial bonds, have to be reinterpreted according to the only reliable model of human interaction: consent to dominion. Hobbes borrows the language of natural law in order to package this teaching, which he justifies primarily on grounds of narrow self-interest, but then also as moral principles and divine commands in order to satisfy different readers. So shaped, individuals can be reassembled without disturbing existing peaceful relations to produce the internally stable, rational commonwealth
Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2015
Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Discipline: Political Science

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Para Thomas Hobbes, a ?nica fun??o do Estado ? manter a paz entre os cidad?os. Cada homem, ao querer possuir o que entende ser necess?rio para si mesmo, pode entrar em conflito com outro que poder? querer a mesma coisa. Se n?o houver quem regule, quem organize a conviv?ncia humana, o que impera ? a lei do mais forte, ou mais astuto. Sempre haver? algu?m que poder? colocar em risco minha sobreviv?ncia se eu n?o tiver como me proteger. O Estado surge como necessidade de constru??o da paz. Abrimos m?o de nossas capacidades de autoconserva??o, de autodefesa e as delegamos ao Estado, constitu?do atrav?s de um contrato, para que cuide de nossa seguran?a, para que possamos viver civilizadamente, para que n?o vivamos em eterna guerra de todos contra todos. O Estado hobbesiano ? soberano. Depois de constitu?do, de formalizado, tem poderes ilimitados de organizar a sociedade como melhor lhe aprouver. Sem Estado n?o h? civiliza??o, n?o h? cidadania, n?o h? paz

This thesis focuses on the relationship between Thomas Hobbes and his one-time patron, Francis Bacon. It addresses the natural and civil histories and philosophies of the two thinkers. The study does not contain any extended treatment of Bacon and Hobbes' conception of rhetoric or theology, or their literary style. V The thesis comprises five chapters. Chapter 1 sets out the extant evidence for the personal relationship between the two thinkers. It also shows that Hobbes' knowledge of Bacon's works was extensive and that his interest in _ his texts was ongoing. Chapter 2 deals with Bacon and Hobbes' histories of learning. It argues that Hobbes consistently followed the contours of Bacon's history of knowledge. It also shows the way in which Hobbes assimilated details from the histories of other writers into this framework, and how he provided more naturalistic explanations of some of the central characters and motives in that history. The third chapter discusses Bacon and Hobbes' civil histories. This chapter explores the conception of history embodied in Hobbes' translation of Thucydides. It also addresses Hobbes' later church histories. In so doing it extends the analysis of the previous section in two ways. First, it traces Hobbes' conception of the history of philosophy back to Thucydides. Secondly, it shows how, especially in Hobbes' later church histmies, the factors that had led to the poverty of human science also posed dangers for the commonwealth. Chapter 4 deals with natural history and philosophy. Central to this chapter is the claim that Hobbes' assimilation of Euclid reflected a pre-existing commitment to a Baconian conception of the ends and justification of science. It also argues that Hobbes' two major discoveries of the 1630s and 1640s (as he saw them) were expressed in Baconian terms. Finally, the fifth chapter explores civil philosophy. I also explore Bacon and Hobbes' understanding of the passions and Hobbes' rejection of Bacon's doctrine of civil greatness. Throughout I have attempted to compare Bacon's mature position with Hobbes' philosophy at different stages of its development. The purpose of this thesis is not to claim that Hobbes' philosophy was essentially Baconian. Nor do I claim that Bacon, rather than Galileo, Harvey or Euclid, was Hobbes' pre-eminent interest. Rather, I argue that Bacon was one of a number of philosophers with whom Hobbes constructively and critically engaged. Consequently, I reject the thesis that Hobbes' thought was the antithesis of Bacon's, and the view that Hobbes soon forgot Bacon after reading Euclid and Galileo.

La historia de Occidente, con sus disímiles contextos, con sus logros y retrocesos (en la ciencia por ejemplo) animan, sin lugar a dudas, los pensamientos más elaborados, los sistemas más completos o las tesis más utópicas. En ese caldo de cultivo y bajo esas perspectivas es que realizo una investigación sobre las ideas políticas del filósofo inglés Thomas Hobbes. El contexto social del siglo XVII que vivió este filósofo motivó a alterar el sistema que él tenía pensado. Y dicho contexto fue el de la guerra civil vivida en su Inglaterra natal. Situación que Hobbes califica como la peor de las calamidades.
Tesis

La philosophie politique de Hobbes prend toute son importance avec la catégorie de la représentation qui apparaît dans le Léviathan en 1651. Plutôt qu’une forme de délégation de pouvoir, il faut y voir une condition ontologique pour qu’un peuple soit, pour que la pluralité des hommes puisse posséder son unité et échapper à la contradiction d’une nature qui s’autodétruirait. Hobbes reconfigure les conditions de possibilité de toute communauté en substituant la représentation au schème de l’incarnation qui prévalait jusqu’alors. Une telle refondation implique un travail de rupture avec un héritage à la fois théologique et juridique, et a notamment pour conséquences de disqualifier l’idée de corps politique et d’imposer une redéfinition du concept de personne
Hobbes’s political philosophy reshapes the ontological condition of a human community with the concept of representation. Far from being an other word for delegation, representation deals with the way men unite in one people and avoid the contradiction of the state of nature, where nature nature destroys itself. Hobbes substitutes representation for incarnation, as a model to bring men unto being together. This new foundations for politics split with a theological tradition as well as corporation law. They discredit the idea of a body politic, and opens on a new definition of the person

Cette étude cherche à interroger la signification des références à la vertu du citoyen dans la pensée politique de Machiavel, Montaigne et Hobbes. On trouve chez ces trois auteurs des discours sur la vertu qui oscillent de façon caractéristique entre la critique de ses représentations classiques et une volonté de la redéfinir à nouveaux frais. Dans une perspective comparative, nous cherchons à montrer que cette oscillation a constitué un ressort rhétorique fondamental à travers lequel s’est articulé un nouveau mode de justification des vertus étayé sur deux principes indissociables. D’une part, les dispositions civiques ne sont plus évaluées à partir d’une hiérarchisation ontologique des biens, mais sur la base d’une représentation du mal souverain qui prend différentes formes : la domination politique chez Machiavel, la cruauté et la tyrannie chez Montaigne, et la guerre civile chez Hobbes. En résulte que la vertu civique n’est plus encouragée du fait qu’elle constituerait l’expression privilégiée de la vie bonne, mais parce qu’elle est jugée nécessaire pour prémunir le bien commun contre ces maux. D’autre part, ces discours cherchent à articuler une conception de la vertu avec une nouvelle représentation de l’égalité fondée sur l’idée d’une commune vulnérabilité. Cette thèse a pour vocation de montrer que se dessinent à l’horizon du tournant machiavélien des figures originales et concurrentes de la vertu civique qui désignent désormais les capacités ordinaires disposant l’individu à obéir aux exigences de la justice, de la paix et de la civilité
This dissertation examines the meaning of the reference to the virtue of the citizen in the political thought of Machiavelli, Montaigne and Hobbes. In the work of these three authors, we find an array of discourses on virtue that vacillate between the critiques of its classical representations and calls to redefine it in relation with new requirements. Through a comparative approach, this study aims to show that those variations constitute a fundamental rhetorical device for delineating a new mode of justification for virtues that combines two related principles. On the one hand, this new approach no longer rests on an ontological hierarchy of ends, but instead on a representation of a sovereign evil that takes different forms: political domination for Machiavelli, cruelty and tyranny for Montaigne, and civil war for Hobbes. Thus, the civic virtues are no longer encouraged as an expression of the good life, but as an essential instrument for protecting the common good from those vices. On the other hand, these three discourses seek to articulate a conception of virtue with a new representation of equality based on the idea of a common vulnerability. This dissertation advocates that, at the wake of the Machiavellian turn, diverse and often conflicting attempts to present a new concept of virtue began to appear, which valued the ordinary attributes of individuals with an emphasis on peace, justice and civility

Deux modes de légitimations politiques différents s'opposent au XVIIème siècle : une légitimation rationnelle appuyée sur une redéfinition de la loi de nature comme théorème de la sécurité publique chez Hobbes et une légitimation dynastique transfigurée par l'idée d'une jurisprudence universelle chez Leibniz, c'est pourquoi cette analyse développe ce que Leibniz a appris de Hobbes pour élaborer cette nouvelle vision de la "cité de Dieu" aux dimensions qu'il avait de l'Europe contemporaine. Partant de leurs différentes conceptions de l'état de nature afin de fonder le politique et d'instaurer la société civile, il importait de montrer que la souveraineté contractuelle chez Hobbes fonde l'obéissance et la paix civile, alors que pour Leibniz, c'est en l'homme, assujetti au principe du meilleur, qu'il faut trouver une fraternité qui tend à l'universalité. Parallèlement à cette société civile où règne le Souverain s'établit une société métaphysique des Esprits dont Dieu, monarque, se fait également juge suprême. Ainsi, une justice singulière et terrestre se réfère à une justice transcendante et universelle. Il était donc nécessaire d'évoquer le rôle de la loi et la manière dont la justice s'instaure en vertu de l'institution et de Dieu. Aussi était-il intéressant d'observer que la pensée hobbesienne paraît investie de la réalisation d'une unité où tout concourt et qui passe par la constitution de l'Etat et que dans le système leibnizien est contenu en puissance la loi telle que Hobbes la définit dans le De Cive. Finalement, ces deux pensées s'affirment complémentaires et semblent à deux degrés distincts orientées par le principe du meilleur.

Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Centro de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia, Florianópolis, 2015.
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Thomas Hobbes apresenta em seu Leviatã a ética como um ramo da Filosofia Natural. Ela é concebida com uma investigação das ?consequências das paixões?. A classificação da investigação moral como uma ciência que é parte da física foi tomada por alguns comentadores como um sinal do caráter descritivo da teoria moral hobbesiana. Algumas interpretações que propuseram uma teoria moral com conteúdo prescritivo viram a necessidade de tomarem a moralidade como uma investigação independente da filosofia natural. Alguns intérpretes tentaram tomar a sério a ideia de que a ética está vinculada às ciências naturais e defenderam a teoria moral hobbesiana como sendo uma vertente do naturalismo moral. A presente tese parte da possibilidade de se afirmar a ética como uma investigação que segue um padrão científico na perspectiva hobbesiana, e ao mesmo tempo tenta mostrar que ela é uma teoria prescritiva com uma normatividade moral em sentido forte. A ética é tomada neste trabalho não como uma descrição das paixões e suas consequências como podem ser vistas na realidade e nas condutas particulares, mas como a construção de um modelo racional de ação que toma a natureza humana de um ponto de vista universal. Ciência é o trabalho da razão. A razão articula nomes e proposições em teorias. Nomes e proposições assim articulados podem causar em nossa mente um arranjo diferente de nossas ideias. A razão é capaz de corrigir nossas concepções de várias maneiras. Estas correções são feitas através da linguagem, concebida como ?signos? ou ?marcas sensíveis? de nossos pensamentos. Nomes e proposições articulados em uma teoria ética compõem o que podemos tomar como a forma racional de conceber a ação humana. Todas as ações ou paixões que aparecem sem uma organização racional ou não são racionalmente justificáveis não podem ser aceitas como ?boas? e nem ?corretas?. Assim, a ética não apenas uma tentativa de compreender quais são as paixões e quais são as ações que os homens empreendem normalmente, mas quais são as conexões necessárias de nossas crenças. O modelo racional da natureza humana e da ação humana não pode engendrar contradições. A investigação das consequências das paixões humanas é a investigação do modelo coerente da natureza humana, das paixões não contraditórias e das contradições que devem ser evitadas. Uma teoria coerentista daverdade é apresentada como a melhor interpretação do conceito de ciência verdadeira na teoria hobbesiana.

Abstract : Thomas Hobbes presents, in his Leviathan, Ethics as a branch of Natural Philosophy. It is conceived as an investigation of the ?consequences of the passions?. The classification of the moral investigation as a science that is part of physics was taken by some commentators as a sign of the descriptive character of Hobbes?s moral theory. Some interpretations that tried to defend a prescriptive content in Hobbes?s ethics saw the necessity of taking the morality as an independent investigation. There are others that tried to make sense of the relation between natural science and ethics and defended Hobbes?s moral theory as a kind of naturalism. The present thesis investigates the possibility of affirming ethics as an investigation that has a scientific pattern in Hobbes?s view, and at the same time tries to show that it is a prescriptive theory with a very strong sense of moral normativity. Ethics is taken in this work not as a description of the passions and the consequences as they are seen in reality, but as the construction of a rational model of action that takes human nature in a universal sense. Science is the work of reason. Reason articulates names and propositions in theories. Names and propositions so articulated are able to cause in our mind a different composition of ideas. Reason is able to correct our senses in many ways. These corrections are made through language, conceived as the ?signs? or ?sensible marks? of our thoughts. Names and propositions articulated in an ethical theory compound what we could take as the rational way of conceiving human action. All the actions or passions that arise without a rational organization or is not rational justifiable cannot be accepted as good or right. So, ethics is not just the attempt to understand what are the passions and what are the actions human beings currently perform, but what are the necessary rational connections of our believes. The rational model of human nature and of human action cannot bear contradictions. The investigation of the consequences of the human passions is the investigation of the coherent model of human nature, of the non contradictory passions and the contradictions that need to beavoided. A coherence theory of truth is presented as the best interpretation of the concept of true science in Hobbes?s theory.

L 'œuvre de Thomas Hobbes (l588-1679) est au carrefour de différentes traditions de recherche. Son originalité repose principalement sur la caractérisation des corps en général à partir de sa théorie du mouvement. Ce principe commun d'explication est à la fondation de sa prima philosophia. Pour y arriver, il faut commencer par le seul point de départ justifiable du point de vue philosophique à savoir l'analyse des phantasmes. Le hiatus existant entre ce qui nous apparaît et la constitution dernière du monde s'avère ainsi insurmontable, Les définitions génétiques auront pour tâche de nous présenter rationnellement les différentes manifestations des choses selon leurs causes nécessaires. La connaissance de la façon dont les accidents se produisent et se détruisent dans la nature ne peut être absolument accomplie qu'une fois saisis les différents mouvements responsables des différents types d'effets. Il apparaît ici le déterminisme universel et l'impossibilité des futurs contingents, question classique qui est au cœur du système hobbesien. Dans la mesure où l'être humain fini n'est pas capable de parcourir la série complète des causes qui ont concouru à la production d'un effet dans la matière, la science dans le domaine de la physique ne pourra être qu'hypothétique. C'est dans la géométrie, mais surtout dans l'éthique et la politique, que l'être humain aura la possibilité de bâtir une connaissance universelle et nécessaire de son objet dans la mesure où celui-ci est un artefect. On peut connaître absolument, et non de façon hypothétique, les propriètés géométriques des objets que nous avons construits, aussi bien que les causes de la guerre et de la paix.

Orientadora: Maria Isabel Limongi
Dissertaçao (mestrado) - Universidade Federal do Paraná, Setor de Ciencias Humanas, Letras e Artes, Programa de Pós-Graduaçao em Filosofia. Defesa: Curitiba, 2007
Inclui bibliografia
Área de concentraçao: História da filosofia moderna e contemporânea

Dentre os debates a respeito da filosofia política de Hobbes, as relações entre lei de natureza e lei civil são objeto de grande controvérsia. Principalmente dois pontos são discutidos em relação à lei de natureza. O primeiro corresponde à sua imperatividade: a lei de natureza tem força de comando no estado de natureza ou é mera recomendação? O segundo corresponde à sua relação com a lei civil: são ambas a mesma coisa, são contrárias, são complementares? Com vistas a responder a esses questionamentos, a presente dissertação investiga três utilizações do conceito de lei de natureza por Hobbes como preceito da razão, como comando de Deus e como lei moral , duas utilizações do conceito de lei civil como comando do soberano e como medida das ações dos súditos , bem como as relações que Hobbes estabelece entre os dois conceitos.
Among the discussions concerning Hobbes political philosophy, the relations between the law of nature and the civil law raise great controversy. Two points related to the law of nature remain unsolved. The first one deals with its imperative character: does the law of nature have the force of a true command in the state of nature or is it a mere recommendation? The second point deals with its relation with the civil law: are they the same, are they contradictory, are they complementary? Aiming to answer these questions, this work analyses three different uses of the law of nature concept as a rational precept, as a command of God and as moral law , two uses of the civil law concept as a command of the sovereign and as a rule for the subjects actions , as well as the relations that Hobbes states between those two concepts.

This is a complex argument about the history of transformations in value through the rise of modern liberalism. I argue that there are several contradictions that emerge from these transformations. I argue that these contradictions emerge as double effects of liberalism, in tension with the project of liberalism and thriving in spite of it. My data are the theories of Thomas Hobbes and the interpretations of his work. Hobbes is a good datum for the project because he is representative of several of these transformations in value due to the time when and concepts with which he writes. I conclude that these transformations have negatively affected the quality of our theory and negatively effected our ability to theorize.

This dissertation analyzes the unprecedented eruption of organized criminal violence in Mexico. To understand the dynamics of drug violence, this dissertation addresses three questions. What explains the onset of the war on drugs in Mexico? Once the conflict starts, why does drug violence escalate so rapidly? And lastly, why is there subnational variation in the concentration of violence?

Based on a game theoretic model, the central argument indicates that democratization erodes the peaceful configurations between the state and criminal organizations and motivates authorities to fight crime, thus triggering a wave of violence between the state and organized criminals and among rival criminal groups fighting to control strategic territories. In this account, state action is not neutral: law enforcement against a criminal group generates the opportunity for a rival criminal organization to invade its territory, thus leading to violent interactions among rival criminal groups. These dynamics of violence tend to concentrate in territories favorable for the reception, production and distribution of drugs. In this way, the disrupting effect of law enforcement unleashes a massive wave of violence of all-against-all resembling a Hobbesian state of war.

To test the observable implications of the theory, the empirical assessment relies on a novel database of geo-referenced daily event data at municipal level providing detailed information on who did what to whom, when and where in the Mexican war on drugs. This database covers all municipalities of the country between 2000 and 2010, thus comprising about 9.8 million observations. The creation of this fine-grained database required the development of Eventus ID, a novel software for automated coding of event data from text in Spanish. The statistical assessment relies on quasi-experimental identification strategies and time-series analysis to overcome problems of causal inference associated with analyzing the distinct - yet overlapping - processes of violence between government authorities and organized criminals and among rival criminal groups. In addition, the statistical analysis is complemented with insights from fieldwork and historical process tracing. Results provide strong support for the empirical implications derived from the theoretical model.

Orientador: Roberto Romano da Silva
Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas
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Resumo: A filosofia política de Thomas Hobbes é nosso ponto de partida para uma análise do conceito de soberania. Da forma como se encontra descrita nas obras políticas do autor, como o poder supremo e absoluto, a soberania tomou-se o cerne da concepção moderna de Estado. Por outro lado, a teoria da soberania de Hobbes continua, nos dias de hoje, a suscitar considerações de grande relevância política, e. g., reflexões sobre democracia, sobre legitimidade, e outros ternas. Buscamos neste trabalho, em primeiro lugar, assinalar alguns aspectos originais da teoria política de Hobbes e descrever, brevemente, o seu lugar na história do pensamento político. Em seguida, tendo por referência o De Cive, procuramos reconstituir os argumentos que o levaram a postular a necessidade de um poder absoluto como condição formal para a existência da própria comunidade política. Para tanto, retomamos os fundamentos de sua civil science, observando, também, como nela é engendrado o conceito de soberania. Os princípios da teoria política de Hobbes, de acordo com ele próprio, devem ser extraídos da natureza do homem. Pretendemos mostrar nesta dissertação, que esses fundamentos são, para o autor, a razão e o interesse próprio, e que o entendimento do significado desses fundamentos é essencial para a compreensão do conceito de Commonwealth. Outra questão que pretendemos abordar em profundidade concerne à noção de pacto, urna vez que a idéia de soberania está intimamente ligada em Hobbes à uma concepção peculiar dessa noção teórica. Em virtude disso, foi possível tecer algumas considerações sobre as presumidas tendências autoritárias do autor, e sobre a sua concepção secular da política. Tais questões são inevitáveis quando se examina em profundidade os fundamentos sobre os quais Hobbes edifica a sua teoria soberania
Abstract: Thomas Hobbes's Philosophy of Politics is our prior concern here since we intend to analyze the concept of sovereignty. Described in his political system as the absolute and supreme power within civil society, that concept became the core of the Modern State Theory. From another standpoint, Hobbes's view on sovereignty also contributes nowadays to discuss great issues on Politics such as democracy and legitimacy of power. Our aim here is, first, to present some considerations about Hobbes's remarkable political enterprise, showing some of its oddities to the politics of his own day and briefly describing its place in the History of Political Thought. Second, based on the theory presented in De Cive, we try to exhibit the arguments that lead the author to state an absolute power as a formal condition to any political community. Two things must be considered in order to accomplish our account of the theory: its basis, and how it begets the abstract idea of a sovereign power. According to Hobbes, the tenets of his political theory are to befound in man 's nature. As we try to show here, they are defined as reason and self-interest. lt is a fundamental task to comprehend the meaning of those principies, since we wish to understand what kind of Commonwealth Hobbes establishes in his political science. Another point to be stressed is Hobbes's notion of covenant. For his idea of Sovereignty strongly depends on this theoretic device. Furthermore, we draw from his particular conception of sovereignty some conc/usions about Hobbes's vigorously authoritarian position, and issues concern the secularism of his political theory, among several other topics
Mestrado
Mestre em Filosofia

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The present work aims to investigate the role of fear in the unfolding of the political theory of Thomas Hobbes. It is known that men are equal by nature. This equality is also an equal fear, since an individual can not be characterized as stronger than others and this makes them fearful. This fear is not any fear, but fear of losing his life, his greatest asset, so violent. Because they are equal, it may happen that men want the same thing at the same time and that leads to violent confrontation, as Hobbes called a state of war of all against all. From this perspective, men find themselves unprotected and insecure and seek the formation of the body politic the solution to the problem of insecurity. The goal here is to demonstrate that the fear of violent death is a major cause of the state institution, or a political passion motivating the state also has a very important role: to be an ally of the sovereign power in law enforcement and education of subjects.
O presente trabalho tem por objetivo investigar o papel do medo no desdobramento da teoria política de Thomas Hobbes. É sabido que os homens são iguais por natureza. Essa igualdade também é uma igualdade no medo, uma vez um indivíduo não pode ser caracterizado como mais forte do que os outros e isso os torna temerosos. Este medo, não é um medo qualquer, mas o medo de perder a vida, seu maior bem, de forma violenta. Por serem iguais, pode acontecer de os homens desejarem a mesma coisa ao mesmo tempo e isso os leva ao confronto violento, que Hobbes denomina como sendo um estado de guerra de todos contra todos. Sob essa perspectiva, os homens vêem-se desprotegidos e inseguros e buscam na formação do corpo político a solução para o seu problema de insegurança. O objetivo aqui é demonstrar que o medo da morte violenta é uma das principais causas da instituição do Estado, ou seja, uma paixão política motivadora que tem no Estado também um papel muito importante: ser uma aliada do poder soberano na aplicação das leis e educação dos súditos.

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A presente pesquisa propõe-se a analisar os pressupostos teóricos que servem de apoio para Hobbes fundamentar a sua ciência civil, a qual aparentemente denotaria certa contradição quanto ao fato de ele lançar mão da eloquência enquanto arte da retórica implicitamente nos Elementos da Lei e no Do cidadão ao alinhar parte da bíblia sagrada à obediência civil. Ao mesmo tempo em que claramente o autor nas obras citadas acima condena o referido aspecto da eloquência, paradoxalmente, nas suas duas obras políticas posteriores, Leviatã e Behemoth, Hobbes lança mão explicitamente desta, chegando à conclusão de que ela é necessária como força coadjuvante da razão para conformar as paixões humanas na obediência civil.
This study aims to examine the theoretical assumptions which underpin their support for Hobbes civil science, which apparently denotes some conflict as to whether he make use of eloquence as an art of rhetoric implicitly in the Elements of Law and Do citizen to align part of the holy bible to civil obedience. While clearly the author in the works cited above condemns such aspect of eloquence, paradoxically, in its two political works later, Leviathan and Behemoth, Hobbes explicitly makes use of this and concluded that it is needed as a force supporting the reason to conform the human passions in civil obedience.

Derrière les apparences d’une unité lexicale et sémantique, le concept de « puissance » nous invite à nous interroger sur la diversité des réalités auxquelles il renvoie. Les réflexions de Descartes, Hobbes et Spinoza peuvent constituer le cadre de l’étude de cette polysémie, manifeste dans la multiplicité des termes latins que traduit la « puissance » : « potestas », « potentia », « vis », « facultas », « posse ». La puissance est-elle un pouvoir absolu de faire ou de ne pas faire, ou une force actuelle, qui s’inscrit dans l’ordre de la nécessité sans le rompre ? L’étude de sa nature physique et de son enracinement métaphysique permet de poser le problème et d’esquisser les différentes réponses de nos auteurs. Mais, la puissance, en raison du lien étroit qu’elle entretient avec l’individualité, appelle aussi des analyses éthiques et politiques. L’expérience originelle de l’impuissance révèle à la fois la puissance créatrice d’illusions de celle-ci, et les moyens de son dépassement possible. Le devenir-puissant de l’individu implique une pratique de soi, qui met au jour la puissance des représentations, et notamment celle du vrai. Toutefois, le vrai ne peut être puissant face aux passions qui nous nuisent que s’il nous affecte aussi. Les régimes de la puissance révèlent la nécessaire articulation de la puissance décisionnaire (potestas) et de la puissance conçue comme une actualité (potentia), et oblige à nuancer l’opposition communément admise entre Descartes et Spinoza. La lecture croisée de Descartes, Hobbes et Spinoza offre ainsi l’occasion d’une recherche des fragments conceptuels cartésiens qui peuvent rendre compte des productions de Spinoza et Hobbes, et des analogies de structures qui éclairent le sens de la « puissance »
Behind the appearances of a lexical and semantic unity, the concept of “power” leads us to question the diversity of the realities to which it gives light. The reflections of Descartes, Hobbes et Spinoza could make-up the framework of a study of this polysemy, demonstrated by the multitude of Latin terms which translate “power”: « potestas », « potentia », « vis », « facultas », « posse ». Is power an absolute force to do or not to do, or an actual strength, inscribed in the order of necessity without rupturing it? The study of its physical nature and its metaphysical rooting allows this problem to be exposed and outlines the different responses of our authors. However due to the close ties linking power to individuality, this also calls for ethical and political analysis. The original experience of impotence reveals not only power creating illusions of powerlessness, but also means of exceeding it. To enable an individual to become powerful implies self-practice, which brings to light the power of representations, and in particular the power of truth. Nevertheless, the truth cannot be powerful in the face of passions which harm us, unless it also affects us. The rules of power reveal the necessary articulation of powerful decision-making and of power conceived as an actuality (potentia), and which obliges us to qualify the opposition commonly admitted between Descartes and Spinoza. The cross reading of the works of Descartes, Hobbes and Spinoza offers therefore the opportunity of research of Cartesian conceptual fragments which can explain the productions of Spinoza and Hobbes, and the structural analogies which enlighten the meaning of power

Cette these propose une addition au modele de programmation des applications reparties, qui offre a la fois la souplesse necessaire a la prise en compte fine des avantages et des problemes de la repartition, et la transparence. Il se base sur un mecanisme universel mais simple et efficace : un protocole de liaison flexible des references reparties qui permet le choix par un serveur des mandataires le representant chez son client. Notre protocole est ouvert, permettant l'encapsulation des politiques de l'utilisateur a l'aide de mecanismes systeme, assurant souplesse et versatilite ; il offre en meme temps une transparence maximale pour un programme client et des moyens permettant au fournisseur de service de gerer des aspects comme la tolerance aux pannes. Nous avons mis en oeuvre un systeme, hobbes, base sur ce modele. Ce systeme et ses applications en illustrent les possibilites et la souplesse. Il constitue un environnement de programmation complet qui permet de realiser des applications elaborees de maniere simple et efficace. Deux realisation successives ont permis de tirer des enseignements et de raffiner hobbes. La seconde realisation a permis la refonte et l'integration des chaines de paires souches-scions, un mecanisme de references reparties qui permet le ramassage de miettes en environnement reparti.