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1
Lainé, Julien. "Empirisme et conceptualisme en droit constitutionnel." Electronic Thesis or Diss., Lille 2, 2011. http://www.theses.fr/2011LIL20014.
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Connu en droit administratif, le thème de l’empirisme et du conceptualisme interroge la possibilité pour la doctrine, d’induire de la jurisprudence des catégories plus générales et abstraites, facilitant la connaissance d’une discipline essentiellement jurisprudentielle. L’idée de confronter cette problématique au droit constitutionnel est d’abord liée aux mutations de la discipline depuis la création du Conseil constitutionnel en 1958. Précisément, le développement de la jurisprudence constitutionnelle pouvait laisser présumer une facette empirique en droit constitutionnel, susceptible d’interroger la nécessité pour la doctrine, de procéder a posteriori à une mise en ordre synthétique des décisions du Conseil constitutionnel. En réalité, l’alternance entre l’empirisme et le conceptualisme en droit constitutionnel dépasse le seul rapport de la doctrine et la jurisprudence. La présente étude s’efforce alors de saisir dans tous les stades de la discipline, et quelles que soient les sources, le travail de systématisation du droit. Néanmoins, il ne s’agit pas de se contenter de suivre, conformément à une démarche chronologique, l’évolution de la pensée en droit constitutionnel, mais de procéder à l’identification de périodes. Le conceptualisme ancien, hérité des premiers manuels de droit constitutionnel à la fin du XIXe siècle, a permis d’élaborer les grands principes du droit constitutionnel français. Partant, l’évolution des méthodes doctrinales tout au long du XXe et au début du XXIe siècle, en lien avec l’évolution du droit lui-même, soumet ces principes à des démarches plus empiriques. Il s’agit d’abord, d’un premier courant doctrinal apparu à la suite de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, qualifié dans le cadre de la présente étude de « empirisme politique », puis, aux alentours des années 1970, d’un second courant, défendant un « empirisme juridique ». Enfin et cette dernière période demeure en cours, le développement de la jurisprudence du Conseil constitutionnel, caractérisée par son empirisme, ouvre la voie à un « empirisme jurisprudentiel », dont les enjeux sont plus largement abordés dans la présente étudeThe issue of empiricism and conceptualism has been studied in administrative law. It refers to the possibility for academics to infer general and abstract categories from case law. Such reasoning by induction aims to facilitate the knowledge of administrative law, which essentially consists of case law. Studying this issue in constitutional law is justified by the changes which have occurred in the discipline since the birth of the Conseil Constitutionnel in 1958. Specifically, the development of constitutional case law has led to the assumption that constitutional law has a more empirical dimension and that new relations are being established between academics and judges. In practice, the alternation between empiricism and conceptualism in constitutional law goes beyond the relation between legal scholars and case law. Thus, this study attempts to capture the systematization of law in all stages of the discipline and whatever the sources. The analysis is not only following the changes in the mode of thinking concerning constitutional law by respecting a chronological sequence, it also aims at identifying periods. The conceptualism of the past, inherited from the first treatises on constitutional law at the end of the nineteenth century, has developed the main principles of French constitutional law. Since then, the evolution of doctrinal methods, throughout the twentieth and the early twenty-first century, in conjunction with the development of law itself, subjects these principles to more empirical approaches, bringing them closer to the reality of constitutional law. More precisely, three empirical periods can be identified. The first period emerged after World War II and is described as “political empiricism” in this study. The second time appeared in the 1970’s and advocates a “legal empiricism”. Finally, the development of the jurisprudence of the Conseil constitutionnel opens the way for “case law empiricism”, widely discussed in this analysis
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Lainé, Julien. "Empirisme et conceptualisme en droit constitutionnel." Thesis, Lille 2, 2011. http://www.theses.fr/2011LIL20014/document.
Full textAbstract:
Connu en droit administratif, le thème de l’empirisme et du conceptualisme interroge la possibilité pour la doctrine, d’induire de la jurisprudence des catégories plus générales et abstraites, facilitant la connaissance d’une discipline essentiellement jurisprudentielle. L’idée de confronter cette problématique au droit constitutionnel est d’abord liée aux mutations de la discipline depuis la création du Conseil constitutionnel en 1958. Précisément, le développement de la jurisprudence constitutionnelle pouvait laisser présumer une facette empirique en droit constitutionnel, susceptible d’interroger la nécessité pour la doctrine, de procéder a posteriori à une mise en ordre synthétique des décisions du Conseil constitutionnel. En réalité, l’alternance entre l’empirisme et le conceptualisme en droit constitutionnel dépasse le seul rapport de la doctrine et la jurisprudence. La présente étude s’efforce alors de saisir dans tous les stades de la discipline, et quelles que soient les sources, le travail de systématisation du droit. Néanmoins, il ne s’agit pas de se contenter de suivre, conformément à une démarche chronologique, l’évolution de la pensée en droit constitutionnel, mais de procéder à l’identification de périodes. Le conceptualisme ancien, hérité des premiers manuels de droit constitutionnel à la fin du XIXe siècle, a permis d’élaborer les grands principes du droit constitutionnel français. Partant, l’évolution des méthodes doctrinales tout au long du XXe et au début du XXIe siècle, en lien avec l’évolution du droit lui-même, soumet ces principes à des démarches plus empiriques. Il s’agit d’abord, d’un premier courant doctrinal apparu à la suite de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, qualifié dans le cadre de la présente étude de « empirisme politique », puis, aux alentours des années 1970, d’un second courant, défendant un « empirisme juridique ». Enfin et cette dernière période demeure en cours, le développement de la jurisprudence du Conseil constitutionnel, caractérisée par son empirisme, ouvre la voie à un « empirisme jurisprudentiel », dont les enjeux sont plus largement abordés dans la présente étudeThe issue of empiricism and conceptualism has been studied in administrative law. It refers to the possibility for academics to infer general and abstract categories from case law. Such reasoning by induction aims to facilitate the knowledge of administrative law, which essentially consists of case law. Studying this issue in constitutional law is justified by the changes which have occurred in the discipline since the birth of the Conseil Constitutionnel in 1958. Specifically, the development of constitutional case law has led to the assumption that constitutional law has a more empirical dimension and that new relations are being established between academics and judges. In practice, the alternation between empiricism and conceptualism in constitutional law goes beyond the relation between legal scholars and case law. Thus, this study attempts to capture the systematization of law in all stages of the discipline and whatever the sources. The analysis is not only following the changes in the mode of thinking concerning constitutional law by respecting a chronological sequence, it also aims at identifying periods.The conceptualism of the past, inherited from the first treatises on constitutional law at the end of the nineteenth century, has developed the main principles of French constitutional law. Since then, the evolution of doctrinal methods, throughout the twentieth and the early twenty-first century, in conjunction with the development of law itself, subjects these principles to more empirical approaches, bringing them closer to the reality of constitutional law. More precisely, three empirical periods can be identified. The first period emerged after Word War II and is described as “political empiricism” in this study. The second time appeared in the 1970’s and advocates a “legal empiricism”. Finally, the development of the jurisprudence of the Conseil constitutionnel opens the way for “case law empiricism”, widely discussed in this analysis
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Maniscalco, Lorenzo. "The concept of equity in early-modern European legal scholarship." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2019. https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/288545.
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In modern scholarship, the concept of equity is often assimilated with that of Aristotelian epieikeia, a process which serves to correct rules when, though their wording undoubtedly applies to a case, yet the outcome would be unjust, or the legislator would have never wanted the rule to be applied to such a case. My thesis deals with the early-modern origins of the association of equity and epieikeia in legal scholarship, and of its consequences for the doctrinal development of equity in the sixteenth and seventeenth century. I begin by showing that medieval legal writings on equity were almost completely unconcerned with epieikeia, and that the latter was only developed by philosophers and theologians. Legists and canonists developed a concept of equity that was unrelated - indeed mostly incompatible - with judicial discretion or the emendation of written rules. Thus, throughout the Middle Ages, there was almost no interaction between the writings of civil and canon lawyers on equity, and those of theologians on epieikeia. In the second chapter of my thesis, I show that the introduction of epieikeia in legal scholarship was the result of the influence of humanistic philology over the writings of humanist jurists, and argue that it caused the majority of early-modern authors to depart from medieval scholarship on equity, re-modelling instead equity as a doctrine of interpretation of the law beyond its letter in accordance with the intentions of the legislator. The final part of my thesis argues that the development of equity as epieikeia in legal scholarship broke down the barrier that had hitherto divided theological and legal writings on equity. Indeed, from the late sixteenth century onwards, legal and theological writings on equity were connected to such an extent that many later authors treated these two branches of scholarship as belonging to one, equally authoritative body of learning on the same topic.
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Kwon, Chan Doo. "Reassessing Korean legal culture and the rule of law : legal history, constitutional review and negotiations." Phd thesis, Faculty of Law, 1996. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/5994.
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Saccone, Giuseppe Mario. "The role of A Dialogue in Hobbes's conception of law and legal history." Thesis, University of Exeter, 1994. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.240761.
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Kelly, Margaret Rose Louise Leckie. "King and Crown an examination of the legal foundation of the British king /." Phd thesis, Australia : Macquarie University, 1999. http://hdl.handle.net/1959.14/71499.
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"27 October 1998"Thesis (PhD)--Macquarie University, School of Law, 1999.
Bibliography: p. 509-550.
Thesis -- Appendices.
'The Crown' has been described as a 'term of art' in constitutional law. This is more than misleading, obscuring the pivotal legal position of the king, which in modern times has been conveniently ignored by lawyers and politicians alike. -- This work examines the legal processes by which a king is made, tracing those processes from the earliest times to the present day. It concludes that the king is made by the selection and recognition by the people, his taking of the Oath of Governance, and his subsequent anointing. (The religious aspects of the making of the king, though of considerable legal significance, are not examined herein, because of space constraints.) -- The Oath of Governance is conventionally called the 'Coronation Oath'-which terminology, while correctly categorising the Oath by reference to the occasion on which it is usually taken, has led by subliminal implication to an erroneous conclusion by many modern commentators that the Oath is merely ceremonial. -- This work highlights the legal implications of the king's Oath of Governance throughout history, particularly in times of political unrest, and concludes that the Oath legally :- conveys power from the people to the person about to become king (the willingness of the people so to confer the power having been evidenced in their collective recognition of that person); - bestows all the prerogatives of the office of king upon that person; - enshrines the manner in which those prerogatives are to be exercised by the king in his people(s)' governance; and that therefore the Oath of Governance is the foundation of the British Constitution. -- All power and prerogative lie with the king, who as a result of his Oath of Governance is sworn to maintain the peace and protection of his people(s), and the king can not, in conscience or law, either do, or allow, anything that is in opposition to the terms of that Oath.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
xxvii, 818 p
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Callum, Douglas R. "Soviet society and law : the history of the legal campaign to enforce the constitutional duty to work." Thesis, University of Glasgow, 1995. http://theses.gla.ac.uk/6553/.
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In both the 1936 and 1977 USSR Constitutions conscientious labour in socially useful activity was decreed to be a "duty and matter of honour" for every Soviet citizen. This study examines the various approaches adopted by successive Soviet leaderships in their determined efforts to reinforce that ethos. It focuses, in particular, on the so-called "anti-parasite" laws dating back to 1957, when as a part of Khrushchev's attempt to revive popular justice, several smaller republics experimented with enactments that permitted peer justice institutions in the form of amorphous social assemblies to exile "parasites" via a procedure which bypassed the existing court system. Special attention is devoted to the criticism lodged against the laws (during their adoption and spread to the other union republics in 1961) by members of the legal profession, who complained that the wide punitive given to the extra-judicial bodies and the attitudes and behaviour encouraged in them would erode the respect for "socialist legality" which they had been charged with enhancing in the minds of the mass public. Although as a result of such criticism, the Khrushchev regime modified the peer justice institutions in the early 1960's, and even though his populism was absorbed by or subordinated to the normative sector of social control in Brezhnev's legal policy, the study highlights the fact that complaints of abuses and inconsistencies in anti-parasite proceedings continued to be levelled against the prosecution process. This, it is contended, was due in large part to the extreme vagueness of the notion of social parasitism itself, although the lack of a precise and consistent definition of this peculiar offence (and of the key elements which were deemed to constitute it) was actually seen as necessary and even desirable since it allowed the authorities to use the anti-parasite legislation as a weapon of suppression against a broad spectrum of socially, politically, and economically inconvenient groups within Soviet society.
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Stephens, Otis H. Jr, John M. II Scheb, and Colin Glennon. "American Constitutional Law, Volume I and II: Civil Rights and Liberties." Digital Commons @ East Tennessee State University, 2015. http://amzn.com/1285736923.
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AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, Volumes I and II, combines cases, decisions, and authorial commentary to maximize your learning and understanding in this course. These comprehensive volumes cover the entire range of topics in constitutional law. Volume I examines the institutional aspects of constitutional law; Volume II deals with civil rights and liberties. Each of the chapters includes an introductory essay providing the legal, historical, political, and cultural context of Supreme Court jurisprudence in a particular area of constitutional interpretation. Each chapter also contains several boxed features (labeled "Case in Point" and "Sidebar") to provide additional perspective and context for the set of edited decisions from the United States Supreme Court cases that follow. In selecting, editing, and updating the materials, the authors emphasize recent trends in major areas of constitutional interpretation, as well as many landmark decisions, some of which retain importance as precedents while others illustrate the transient nature of constitutional interpretation. Because the book provides a good balance of decisions and authorial commentary, this text appeals to instructors of law as well as instructors of political science.https://dc.etsu.edu/etsu_books/1021/thumbnail.jpg
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Spagnolo, Benjamin James. "Kelsen and Raz on the continuity of legal systems : applying the accounts in an Australian context." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2013. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:a9025e33-e70e-49e9-994f-52f8daa311fd.
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This thesis has three objectives. Its primary objective is to examine, and critically evaluate, the theoretical accounts offered by Hans Kelsen and Joseph Raz to explain the temporal continuity and discontinuity of legal systems. In particular, it evaluates the explanatory power of those accounts by combining an abstract analysis of the accounts in principle and an evaluation based on systematically applying them to one concrete, historically circumstanced instance: the legal systems of British derivation in Australia between 1788 and 2001. The thesis thus tests each account’s factual fit: how adequately it corresponds to, accords with, and persuasively makes sense of, the facts – including complex social facts, attitudes and normative standards – for which it purports to offer an account. Second, the thesis aims to demonstrate, more generally, the utility of applying theoretical accounts to a particular historical instance to complement abstract analysis. Third, the thesis aims to advance the understanding of the evolution of Australian legal systems between 1788 and 2001. These three objectives are achieved through the critical exposition and reconstruction of the accounts, their development and enrichment where refinement is appropriate, their application to the specific context of Australia and their evaluation, individually and in comparison.
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Highkin, Emily. "Delegate Voting at the 1787 Constitutional Convention: The Entanglement of Economic Interests and the Great Compromise." Oberlin College Honors Theses / OhioLINK, 2019. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=oberlin1582396815051673.
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Kleiner, Samuel. "Declaring war no more : the use of international legal frameworks and the expansion of the presidential war power : US presidential utilization of international legal frameworks to expand the president's constitutional power to use military force." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2012. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:a8ce8bc9-3efd-40e1-b2f8-a669aa21276d.
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The struggle between the President and the Congress over the power to control the use of military force is an enduring dimension of U.S. foreign policy. In the 20th century Arthur Schlesinger labeled the growth of Presidential war power the “Imperial Presidency.” While some scholars have attempted to explain the expansion of Presidential power based on the Cold War or nuclear weapons, there has been little work studying the link between America’s ascending role in international legal frameworks and this domestic legal transformation. In this dissertation, I argue that America’s participation in international legal frameworks, such as the United Nations and NATO, has been a central factor in enabling the growth of Presidential war power. These international frameworks allow the President to circumvent Congress and to assert that the use of military force was something other than a ‘war’ that would need Congressional authorization. In case studies of pre-WWII aid to Great Britain, the Korean War, the Vietnam War and the Gulf War, I demonstrate how the rise of executive war power relied on America’s growing participation in international legal frameworks. The dissertation contributes to the nexus of International Relations and Constitutional scholarship. It offers a unique interpretation of Presidential war power while also offering new insights on the nature of the United States’ relationship with international legal frameworks. I argue that participation in international legal frameworks has been ‘democracy-undermining’ as the President utilizes those frameworks to circumvent the Constitution’s restrictions on Presidential war power.
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Cazzetta, Claudia. "The national and the international influences on the drafting of the South African Bill of Rights : A study on the South African transitional legal culture." Thesis, Högskolan Dalarna, Afrikanska studier, 2020. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:du-34517.
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The South African democratic transition in the 1990s represents one of the clearest cases of practical implementation of constitutional engineering. The process was aimed to the creation of the principle of national unity in the fundamental text first, hoping it would be mirrored consequently by a popular sentiment. Within this context, the Bill of Rights, included in the second chapter of the final text, affirmed itself as the most relevant document that emerged from the country's nation-building process. This thesis aims to compare the influences that the national and international components of the South African transitional legal culture had on the drafting of the Bill of Rights, through the investigation of their historical and political dynamics. The analysis highlights that the liberal component characterizes the majority of the text, while being, however, declined on the neo-liberal international doctrine, while the African customary law is recognized within the cultural rights but remains subjected to the requirement of conformity with the liberal provisions.
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Huapaya, Tapia Ramón Alberto, and Povis Lucio Andrés Sánchez. "The legal regime of forced expropiation in the peruvian administrative system. Normative evolution and current perspectives." THĒMIS-Revista de Derecho, 2017. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/109619.
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The forced expropriation has been, since the origins of the Peruvian Republic, a useful mechanism for the Government to meet its objectives, at the expense of the lawful damage inflicted to the private actors, conferring a fair compensation in return.In this article the current Peruvian legal regime of forced expropriation is studied, for which purpose both authors compare it with the regulation in the earliest Peruvian constitutions and laws, discovering that the concept has not always been designed in the same way by the constituent or the legislator.La expropiación forzosa ha sido, desde los orígenes de la República, un mecanismo que ha servido al Estado para cumplir con sus objetivos, a costa del daño lícito causado al privado, y a cambio de un justiprecio. En el presente artículo se estudia el actual régimen jurídico de la expropiación forzosa en el Perú, para lo cual los autores lo comparan con lo regulado en las primeras constituciones y leyes peruanas, descubriendo que la figura no siempre fue pensada de la misma manera por el constituyente o el legislador.
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Spencer, Daniela. "The Confrontation Clause: Maryland v. Craig and the Judicial Philosophies of Scalia and O'Connor." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2012. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/434.
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This thesis looks at the Confrontation Clause from the Sixth Amendment in light of the decision made in Maryland v. Craig. It examines the opinions of Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Antonin Scalia, and determines if their judicial philosophies were consistent with their opinion. It does so by examining the history of the Confrontation Clause from ancient history to the present, and by enumerating the judicial philosophies of O'Connor and Scalia. In conclusion, while O'Connor's majority opinion is consistent with her pragmatic philosophy, Scalia's dissent is not consistent with his originalist views.
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Fargeaud, Benjamin. "La doctrine constitutionnelle sous la IVe République : Naissance d'une nouvelle génération de constitutionnalistes." Thesis, Paris 2, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018PA020054.
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En 1945, la période de la Libération devait également être un moment de rénovation pour le droit constitutionnel. Au moment même où la France se dotait d’une nouvelle Constitution, une nouvelle génération de constitutionnalistes accède au devant de la scène. A la génération des « disciples », qui elle-même avait succédé à la génération des fondateurs, succède celle que Marcel Prélot avait baptisée la « troisième génération de constitutionnalistes » et qui devait être la génération des « novateurs ». La rénovation du droit constitutionnel s’avéra toutefois un programme difficile à mettre en œuvre. La IVe République, malgré l’adoption d’une Constitution nouvelle, est rapidement revenue aux pratiques et usages de la IIIe République antérieure, décevant ainsi les espoirs de la doctrine constitutionnelle et les tentatives de façonner un droit constitutionnel propre au nouveau régime. Constatant l’échec du droit constitutionnel à encadrer la vie parlementaire, les constitutionnalistes ont alors délaissé le terrain de la technique constitutionnelle et se sont tournés vers la science politique afin de refonder leur discipline. Si cette voie politiste a permis à la « jeune école de droit public » d’aborder des champs de recherches nouveaux, tels que les partis politiques ou l’histoire des idées politiques, elle l’a toutefois détournée du terrain de la technique constitutionnelle sur lequel allait finalement se jouer la révision constitutionnelle de 1958, qui a consacré la Constitution de la Ve RépubliqueIn 1945, the Liberation era was supposed to be a time when constitutional law would be renovated. At the very moment where France was adopting a new Constitution, a new generation of constitutional law Professors emerged. From the « disciple » generation which succeeded to « the founders » generation itself, the « Third generation of constitutional law Professors », as Marcel Prélot named them, emerged. It was meant to be the « creative » generation. But renewing constitutional law was not an easy task. Notwithstanding the adoption of a new Constitution, the IVth Republic rapidly came back to the uses and habits of the IIIrd Republic. It therefore disappointed the hopes of the constitutional legal doctrine and its attempts to reshape a specific constitutional law suiting the new regime. Taking note of the failure of constitutional law to frame the parliamentary daily life, constitutional law Professors reoriented their efforts to renew their academic discipline in a way that would get closer to political sciences. This new orientation allowed the « Third generation » to tackle new fields of research, such as political parties or the history of political ideas, but diverted them from a more technical approach. However, it was on the latter that the constitutional revision of 1958 that set out the Constitution of the Vth Republic settled
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Arlettaz, Jordane, Attila Badó, Kitti Bakos-Kovács, Szilvia Bató, János Bóka, Laureline Congnard, Erzsébet Csatlós, et al. "Internationale Konferenz zum zehnjährigen Bestehen des Instituts für Rechtsvergleichung der Universität Szeged = Conférence internationale au 10ème anniversaire de l‘Institut de droit comparé de l‘Université de Szeged." Universität Potsdam, 2014. http://opus.kobv.de/ubp/volltexte/2014/7203/.
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Die Konferenz „International Conference for the 10th Anniversary of the Institute of Comparative Law” hat am 24. Mai 2013 in Szeged stattgefunden. Im Rahmen der viersprachigen Konferenz haben mehr als dreißig Teilnehmer ihre Forschungsergebnisse präsentiert.
Der Essay von Zoltán Péteri blickt auf die Disziplin aus der Perspektive der Wissenschaftsgeschichte. Katalin Kelemen und Balázs Fekete gehen in ihrem Aufsatz der Frage nach, welchen Weg die Versuche der Klassifikation der Rechtssysteme von Osteuropa in der späten Phase der Umbrüche der 1980/90er Jahren genommen haben. Die historische Betrachtungsweise mit Bezug auf Rechtsgeschichte und Rechtsvergleichung spiegelt sich auch in anderen Essays wider, vor allem in den Aufsätzen von Szilvia Bató, Magdolna Gedeon und Béla Szabó P. sowie auch in den Aufsätzen von Péter Mezei und Tünde Szűcs. Attila Badó analysiert die Rechtsvergleichung aus der Sicht des Rechts, der Soziologie und der Politikwissenschaft anhand von Untersuchungen über das Sanktionsystem der Richter in den USA. Diese politikwissenschaftliche Seite wird auch in den Aufsätzen über die aktuellen Fragen der europäischen Integration von Carine Guemar und Laureline Congnard betont. Eine Reihe von Aufsätzen behandeln die konventionelle normative Komparatistik auf dem Gebiet des Verfassungsrechts (Jordane Arlettaz und Péter Kruzslicz), Gesellschaftsrechts (Kitti Bakos-Kovács), Urheberrechts (Dóra Hajdú) und Steuerrechts (Judit Jacsó). Daneben bilden eine weitere Gruppe die Aufsätze von János Bóka und Erzsébet Csatlós, die die Verwendung der vergleichenden Methode in der Praxis der Rechtsprechung untersuchen.
Die Rechtsvergleichung ist eine sich dynamisch entwickelnde Disziplin. Die Konferenz und dieser Band dienen nicht nur der Würdigung der bisherigen Arbeit des Instituts für Rechtsvergleichung, sondern zeigen gleichzeitig neue Ziele auf. Die wichtigsten Grundsätze bleiben aber fest verankert auch in einem sich stets verändernden rechtlichen und geistigen Umfeld. Das Motto des Instituts lautet „instruere et docere omnes qui edoceri desiderant“ – „alle lehren, die lernen wollen.“ Auch in den folgenden Jahrzehnten werden uns der Wille des Lernens und Lehrens, die Freiheit der Forschung sowie die Übertragung und Weiterentwicklung der ungarischen wie globalen Rechtskultur leiten.
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Jones, Benjamin Nicholas Farror. "British politics and the post-war development of human rights." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2013. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:e680adc1-a3e9-4c7a-be6d-0f3b374fb209.
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In this thesis I explore the attitudes, arguments, and actions of British political elites in connection with the development of human rights law in Europe and the UK. I do this by examining British input into five key episodes for the development of European supranational rights and their incorporation into domestic legal orders (namely the drafting of the European Convention on Human Rights 1950, the drafting of the European Social Charter 1961, the acceptance of individual petition in 1966, the failed 1970s Bill of Rights debate, the passing of the Human Rights Act 1998, and recent developments such as the UK ‘opt-out’ to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and the emergence of a new ‘British Bill of Rights’ debate). Casting light on British involvement in less examined periods in European rights development, I challenge existing, isolated, explanations for the more focal episodes (such as Simpson’s rational-choice post-colonial thesis for individual petition acceptance, and ideological accounts for New Labour’s post-1997 constitutional reform). Responding to the most recent literature in the area, central to my analysis is the question of how rights progress relates to inter-party conflict. By considering continuities and discontinuities in elite political discussion of rights I argue that while conflict is a significant underlying feature of every major episode of rights progress during the last sixty years, and is less evident in less progressive periods, other factors have had a greater influence over the form, timing, and extent of rights progress. Most significant amongst these is the constitutional ideological development of the Labour party and the critical connection between Labour’s elevation of the Convention within the UK constitutional space and revisionist shifts in party thinking.
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Numata, Yuki. "Why Foreign Policy Principles Persist: Understanding the Reinterpretations of Japan’s Article 9 and Switzerland’s Neutrality." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2016. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/pomona_theses/157.
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This study examines why Japan and Switzerland have chosen to keep the vocabulary of Article 9 and neutrality, respectively, and to reinterpret their definitions to suit their needs (policy reinterpretation), instead of simply abandoning the original policy and replacing it with a new, more suitably worded policy that clarifies the changing policy position of the government (policy abandonment). By analyzing the legal history of the overseas capabilities of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces and the Swiss Armed Forces, as well as the actions and influences of the government, political parties, and the public, this study finds the following trends. First, the government tends to refrain from policy abandonment either due to perceived public opposition or benefits in international negotiations. Second, party resistance is not an significantly influential factor in the choice of policy abandonment over policy reinterpretation. Finally, public opinion is influential, but self-contradictory; often supporting the change in policy (increased overseas capabilities of armed forces) but opposing the concept of policy abandonment due to high attachment to the respective policies of Article 9 and neutrality.
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Fahlbusch, Markus. "European integration in the field of human rights protection: the interaction on the basis of different constitutional cultures." Doctoral thesis, Universite Libre de Bruxelles, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/2013/ULB-DIPOT:oai:dipot.ulb.ac.be:2013/209162.
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The present thesis suggests that judicial interaction can benefit constructive solutions of concrete human rights problems as a specific way of integrating European human rights protection. This affirmation is substantiated by case studies examining the interaction of the European Court of Human Rights with the UK House of Lords and Supreme Court on the one hand and with the German Federal Constitutional Court on the other. Yet, the manner in which the courts proceed in their interaction, notably in view of their potentially conflictual stances, can deflect from the concentration on constructively solving the substantive human rights problem with which the courts are confronted. Accordingly, the courts might be inclined to preserve the status quo of their initial positions and to resort to a mere compromise between the different interests involved.This thesis identifies two major factors in the courts’ reasoning that inhibit the fruitful discussion of the substantive human rights questions brought up by the cases: the reference to “culture” and the focus on their institutional relationship with the balancing of possibly conflicting interests. By way of analysing practical cases against a legal- and political-theoretical backdrop, this work develops how these two factors contribute to the obstruction of a constructive interaction between the courts and to the shielding of controversial views from being discussed and challenged. In response, also by reference to the concrete practice of the courts, this thesis puts forward an approach to the interaction which avoids this inhibiting effect and therefore allows for a comprehensive, deep and critical discussion on how to solve the specific human rights problems raised by the cases./La présente thèse soutient que l’interaction judiciaire peut bénéficier à des solutions constructives des problèmes concrets de droits de l’homme comme une forme spécifique d’intégration de la protection européenne des droits de l’homme. Cette affirmation est corroborée par des études de cas qui examinent l’interaction de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme avec la House of Lords et la Cour suprême du Royaume-Uni d’un côté et avec la Cour constitutionnelle fédérale de l’Allemagne de l’autre. Pourtant, la manière dont les cours procèdent dans leur interaction, notamment au vu de leurs points de vue potentiellement conflictuels, peut détourner l’attention de la solution constructive des problèmes substantiels des droits de l’homme auxquels les cours font face. En conséquence, il se peut que les cours soient susceptibles de préserver le statu quo de leurs positions initiales et d’avoir recours à un simple compromis entre les différents intérêts en cause.
Cette thèse identifie deux facteurs majeurs dans le raisonnement des cours qui entravent la discussion fructueuse des questions substantielles soulevées par les cas :la référence à la « culture » et la concentration sur leur relation institutionnelle avec le balancement des intérêts possiblement conflictuels. Au moyen de l’analyse des cas pratiques sur le fond de la théorie juridique et politique, ce travail fait ressortir comment ces deux facteurs contribuent à l’obstruction d’une interaction constructive entre les cours et à la protection des opinions controversées contre leur discussion et défi. En réponse, également en se fondant sur la pratique concrète des cours, cette thèse avance une approche quant à l’interaction qui évite cet effet inhibant et, par conséquent, permet une discussion complète, profonde et critique de comment résoudre les problèmes spécifiques de droits de l’homme posés par les cas.
Doctorat en Sciences juridiques
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Picchia, Lucia Barbosa Del. "Estado, democracia e direitos na crise do constitucionalismo liberal: uma comparação entre o pensamento jurídico francês e o brasileiro." Universidade de São Paulo, 2012. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/2/2133/tde-22042013-141125/.
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A tese tem como objeto compreender, no campo da história das ideias jurídicas, a forma pela qual se equacionou a relação entre democracia e direitos sociais na Constituição brasileira de 1934, utilizando como perspectiva de análise e como baliza comparativa o constitucionalismo francês dos anos 1920 e 1930. Trata-se de um período de particular interesse para o estudo constitucional, tendo em vista a crise das premissas liberais, premissas que, por certo, haviam permitido a expansão democrática, mas que, até mesmo em função disso, se viram insuficientes como resposta única diante da irrupção da questão social. Na França, não há alteração constitucional, e é a doutrina do direito público que absorve a tarefa de responder à nova realidade, o que faz de diferentes modos. No Brasil, se por um lado as premissas liberais não são postas em prática, afastando a massificação democrática nos anos 1930, por outro lado a revolução que leva Getúlio Vargas ao poder e a necessidade de uma nova Constituição obrigam a Assembleia Constituinte a lidar com novas e velhas questões, isto é, tanto com a democracia liberal ainda por se concretizar quanto com os novos direitos sociais que marcam as Constituições modernas. O objetivo da tese é descrever de que forma se travou esse debate no processo constituinte brasileiro, por meio sobretudo dos registros da época, buscando identificar tanto influências quanto semelhanças e divergências com o caso francês, reposicionando a matéria na história das ideias jurídicas.This work examines, from the standpoint of the history of legal ideas, the way in which the relation between democracy and social rights was dealt with in the Brazilian Constitution of 1934, using the French constitutionalism of the 1920s and 1930s both as an analytical perspective and as a point of comparison. This historical period has great interest to constitutional studies due to the crisis of liberal propositions that was taking place; propositions which, of course, had allowed a democratic expansion, but, and even because of that, had proved themselves insufficient as a unique response to the outburst of the so-called social question. In France, there is no change in the Constitutional regime, and it is the legal doctrine that assumes the task of responding in various ways to the new reality. In Brazil, on the one hand, the liberal propositions had not been fully materialized, something that restrained any significant democratic expansion during the 1930s. On the other hand, the revolution that had led Getúlio Vargas into power and the claim for a new Constitution forced the Constitutional Assembly to deal with both old and new problems, in other words, with both the liberal democracy yet to be materialized and the new social rights that characterized modern Constitutions. The aim of this work is to describe the way this debate developed during the Brazilian constitutional process, specially by analyzing the historical sources, and searching to identify influences from, as well as similarities and differences with the French case, repositioning the subject in the history of ideas.
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Noriega, Christina R. "Rawlsian Foundations for Justification and Toleration of Civil Disobedience." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2013. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/scripps_theses/232.
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Though ultimately seeking more just law, civil disobedience still entails the breaching of a law. For this reason, most theories hold that people who practice civil disobedience must be willing to accept the legal consequences of their actions. On the other hand, a nation that is truly committed to justice will recognize that its constitution and legal order may in some ways fall short of perfect justice. In this thesis, I defend Rawls’s theory of civil disobedience as unique in its capacity for justification and even government toleration. Appealing to a shared conception of justice, Rawlsian civil disobedients are able to ground their actions in the same principles to which the state is committed. I argue that Rawls’s shared conception of justice is further substantiated when read in the light of his later theory of the overlapping consensus of comprehensive doctrines. I ultimately conclude that civil disobedience construed in the Rawlsian sense ought to receive some degree of toleration by the state, and particularly by constitutional states which maintain a formal commitment to justice in the protection of rights and intentional design of government institutions.
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Rodriguez, Villabona Andrés Abel. "La circulation de modèles juridiques : les origines de l’État providence en Colombie pendant les années trente et l’influence du constitutionalisme français du début du XXe siècle." Thesis, Université Grenoble Alpes (ComUE), 2015. http://www.theses.fr/2015GREAD006/document.
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À la différence d'autres phénomènes juridiques, le déplacement du droit d'un lieu à l'autre s'inscrit dans une analyse beaucoup plus ample que celle de droit comparé. Les États sont mis en concurrence dans de nombreux domaines : politiques économiques et fiscales, protection sociale, systèmes éducatifs, innovation, etc. Les systèmes juridiques se retrouvent également en compétition. Avec la mondialisation les échanges entre les systèmes juridiques se sont multipliés, ouvrant la voie à un recours plus fréquent à la démarche comparative. Par conséquent, la circulation du droit est un sujet qui a intéressé à la pensée juridique depuis toujours, mais qui ne commence à être traité que récemment. Pour le comprendre il convient de se rapporter à un cas spécifique, qui étant donné son caractère paradigmatique est celui de la réception du droit, de la doctrine et du régime constitutionnel français pendant les années trente en Colombie. Son examen servira comme support empirique d'un modèle explicatif du phénomène de la diffusion, d'un État à un autre, d'un droit formalisé et systématiséUnlike other legal phenomena, law's moving one place to another is part of a much broader analysis than that of comparative law. States are in competition in many areas: economic and fiscal policies, social protection, education systems, innovation, etc. Legal systems are also in competition. With globalization, exchanges between legal systems have proliferated, opening the way to more frequent use of comparative approach. Therefore, the circulation of law is a subject that always interested to legal thought, but it begins to be treated recently. To understand it should relate to a specific case, which given its paradigmatic character is that of reception of the law, the doctrine and the constitutional French regime during the thirties in Colombia. This review will serve as empirical support for a model explaining the phenomenon of diffusion from one state to another, of a formalized and systematized law
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Millman, Eric. "Substantive Due Process and the Politicization of the Supreme Court." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2018. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1905.
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Substantive due process is one of the most cherished and elusive doctrines in American constitutional jurisprudence. The understanding that the Constitution of the United States protects not only specifically enumerated rights, but also broad concepts such as “liberty,” “property,” and “privacy,” forms the foundation for some of the Supreme Court’s most impactful—and controversial—decisions.
This thesis explores the constitutional merits and politicizing history of natural rights jurisprudence from its application in Dred Scott v. Sandford to its recent evocation in Obergefell v. Hodges. Indeed, from slavery to same-same sex marriage, substantive due process has played a pivotal role in shaping our nation’s laws and destiny: But was it ever intended to?
This paper first examines the legal arguments in favor of substantive due process to determine whether the judiciary was designed to be the “bulwark” of natural as well as clearly scribed law. Then, employing a novel framework to measuring judicial politicization, the thesis tracks the doctrine’s application throughout its most prominent case studies. Often arriving at nuanced conclusions, we observe that the truth is more often painted in some gradation of grey than in black or white.
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Blattner, John S. "Render Unto Caesar: How Misunderstanding a Century of Free Exercise Jurisprudence Forged and Then Fractured the RFRA Coalition." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2017. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1575.
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This thesis provides a comprehensive history of Supreme Court Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence from 1879 until the present day. It describes how a jurisdictional approach to free exercise dominated the Court’s rulings from its first Free Exercise Clause case in 1879 until Sherbert v. Verner in 1963, and how Sherbert introduced an accommodationist precedent which was ineffectively, incompletely, and inconsistently defined by the Court. This thesis shows how proponents of accommodationism furthered a false narrative overstating the scope and consistency of Sherbert’s precedent following the Court’s repudiation of accommodationism and return to full jurisdictionalism with Employment Division v. Smith (1990). It then shows how this narrative inspired a massive bipartisan coalition in favor of codifying accommodationism, and how this coalition succeeded in passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in 1993. The RFRA coalition eventually fractured, as RFRA’s implications began to conflict with principles and objectives of liberal interest groups and the Democratic Party. This thesis posits that the fracture of the RFRA coalition can be traced back directly to confusions over Sherbert’s precedent.
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Weber, Ruth. "Der Begründungsstil von Conseil constitutionnel und Bundesverfassungsgericht : eine vergleichende Analyse der Spruchpraxis." Thesis, Paris 2, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018PA020096.
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Le style, c’est la Cour ! – Cette thèse examine la manière dont le Conseil constitutionnel français et la Cour constitutionnelle fédérale allemande motivent leurs décisions, et ce que ces motivations nous disent sur la façon dont chaque Cour se perçoit. Le Conseil constitutionnel peut-il être qualifié de bouche de la Constitution ? et la Cour constitutionnelle fédérale allemande est-elle l’incarnation différenciée de l’état de droit constitutionnel ? Telles sont les questions qui sous-tendent la thèse.La thèse montre que les styles de motivation façonnent l’identité de chaque Cour nationale. Depuis la création de la Cour constitutionnelle fédérale allemande, son style de motivation a contribué à garantir l’acceptation de ses décisions, notamment en ce qui concerne son rôle d’autorité constitutionnelle suprême du pays. En revanche, le style de motivation du Conseil constitutionnel français a traditionnellement servi à mettre en évidence sa subordination au législatif. Toutefois, les réformes de 2016 suggèrent que le Conseil constitutionnel commence lui aussi à s’affirmer en tant que gardien de la Constitution. L’une des raisons probables de ces changements réside dans la manière dont la jurisprudence française est reçue par les autres juridictions nationales et supranationales en Europe. Les réformes facilitant une communication inter-juridictionnelle européenne sont en effet souhaitables. Et bien qu’il soit trop tôt pour le dire, on pourrait faire valoir qu’elles représentent un premier pas important vers un style de motivation européenThe style is the Court! – This thesis explores both how the French Constitutional Council and the German Federal Constitutional Court justify their decisions, and what those justifications tell us about how each Court sees itself. Can the Constitutional Council be characterized as an authoritative voice, the "bouche de la Constitution"?, and is the German Federal Constitutional Court the sophisticated embodiment of a constitutionalized state?, are the questions that underpin the dissertation.The thesis finds that the reasoning styles shape the identity of each national Court. Since the founding of the German Federal Constitutional Court, its reasoning style has helped guarantee the acceptance of its decisions, particularly as it concerns its role as the country’s foremost constitutional authority. By contrast, the reasoning style of the French Constitutional Council traditionally served to highlight its subordination to the legislative. Reforms from 2016, however, suggest that the Constitutional Council, too, is beginning to assert itself as the guardian of the constitution. One probable reason for the changes lies in how French case law is received by other national and supranational courts in Europe, with the reforms facilitating desirable European inter-jurisdictional communication. And although it is too early to tell, it could be argued that they represent a significant first step towards a European reasoning style
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Doyle, Daniel S. "A Discourse-Proceduralist Case for Election and Media Reform after Citizens United." Ohio University / OhioLINK, 2012. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ohiou1339711190.
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Roynier, Céline. "Le problème de la liberté dans le constitutionnalisme britannique." Thesis, Paris 2, 2011. http://www.theses.fr/2011PA020090.
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Le relatif échec que fut le Human Rights Act 1998 et les condamnations régulières du Royaume-Uni par la CEDH peuvent être considérés comme les symptômes, parmi d’autres, d’un problème de la liberté dans le constitutionnalisme britannique. Comment expliquer que cet Etat, membre fondateur du Conseil de l’Europe, résiste si fortement à l’application de cette déclaration de droits qu’est la Convention Européenne de Sauvegarde des droits de l’Homme et des libertés fondamentales ? Nous proposons dans ce travail une solution appuyée sur une étude de la culture classique de la common law, c'est-à-dire, essentiellement mais pas seulement, de la grande doctrine parlementaire anglaise du dix-septième siècle. Il nous semble en effet que cette doctrine a fixé la conception anglaise de la liberté et l’a définitivement envisagée comme devant relever de la common law. Nous suggérons que c’est par une redéfinition permanente de la common law que la liberté a été pensée en droit public anglais et que ce travail de redéfinition est encore à l’oeuvre aujourd’hui. Tout d’abord le problème de la liberté – qui s’est aussi posé en France et en Amérique par exemple – a pris une forme particulière en Angleterre : plutôt que de penser la source de légitimité du pouvoir, les juristes anglais ont réfléchi à ce que pouvait être les « marques » d’un droit acceptable pour tous. Cette réflexion a engendré des vagues de politisation du droit mais elle a rendu l’apparition d’un peuple sujet de droit beaucoup plus difficile. La première vague de politisation fait de la common law, le droit de la communauté, c'est-à-dire le droit commun à tous (Partie 1). La seconde vague de politisation de la common law correspond à un approfondissement de la première et fait de la common law un droit de la liberté en articulant le langage de la common law à l’individu par le biais d’une morale constitutionnelle (Partie 2)Many are the signs revealing a certain difficulty with liberty or freedom in british constitutionalism. The relative failure of the Human Rights Act 1998 in terms of efficiency , the never-ending debate about the enactment of a british declaration of rights and the numerous sanctions taken by the ECHR against the UK, can be considered as symptoms of this problem. How, then, is it possible to explain the overwhelming role of the UK in the adoption of the ECHR in the 1950’s and this resistance of the UK towards the European Convention ? Our aim, in this work, is to provide an explanation which would be based on the study of the early modern common law tradition that is mainly (but not exclusively) the parliamentary Doctrine of the Seventeenth Century. We think that this doctrine or discourse established the english conception of liberty and considered this latter as originating in the common law. We suggest that liberty was and is thought as a permanent redefinition of the law itself (the common law) and that this idea gave birth to Public Law exactly at the same time. First of all, the above-mentioned problem of liberty – which appeared in America and France as well – arose in a particular way in England. Rather than focusing on power and its legitimacy, english state lawyers concentrated their work on the marks of a law which could be acceptable for all. This reflexion led to successive waves of politisation of the law itself but did not enable the apparition of a people which would be the source of both law and power. The first wave of politisation established that common law was the law common to all (Part 1). The second wave deepened the first one and enabled the common law to be « the law of liberty » by linking the language of the common law with the individual, through constitutional morality (Part 2)
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Déchaux, Raphaël. "Les normes à constitutionalité renforcée : recherches sur la production du droit constitutionnel." Thesis, Aix-Marseille 3, 2011. http://www.theses.fr/2011AIX32074.
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Le contrôle de constitutionnalité des révisions n’est pas encore accepté en France. Il s’agit d’une position qui fait consensus en doctrine depuis les débuts de la IIIème République. Dans sa décision du 26 mars 2003, le Conseil constitutionnel a également rejeté sa compétence en matière de lois constitutionnelles. Pour autant, la situation française reste, à l’aune du droit comparé, si ce n’est exceptionnelle, du moins isolée par rapport à ses proches voisins allemands et italiens. En outre, il existe dans le texte de la Constitution de 1958 une disposition formellement non-révisable. L’article 89 alinéa 5 dispose ainsi : « La forme républicaine du Gouvernement ne peut faire l’objet d’une révision ». Loin des débats sur la supraconstitutionnalité, il est donc possible d’envisager un contentieux spécifique des lois de révision constitutionnelles sur le fondement même de la Constitution. On désigne ces normes comme des normes à constitutionnalité renforcée. Il s’agit d’envisager d’abord s’il existe en théorie une hiérarchie entre les normes à constitutionnalité renforcée et les normes à constitutionnalité simple. Cette recherche ne peut se fonder que dans le cadre d’une analyse positiviste et kelsénienne du droit. Elle montre bien que le pouvoir constituant pose des normes spécifiques lors de la production de la constitution que le pouvoir de révision, mais aussi tous les autres pouvoirs constitués de l’État, doit respecter. Ensuite, il convient de vérifier que cette théorie est effective dans la pratique. L’étude des « changements de constitution », lors de transitions constitutionnelles ou des révisions totales conforte cette posture théorique. L’analyse de la jurisprudence constitutionnelle comparée démontre enfin que, loin d’être la prémisse d’un « Gouvernement des juges », le contrôle des révisions constitutionnelles permet le parachèvement de l’État de droitJudicial review of constitutional amendments is not yet accepted in France. The legal community quasi-unanimously agreed on that solution since the early days of the III Republic. In its decision dated from march 26th, 2003, the Constitutional Council has explicitly denied its power concerning constitutional amendments. In view of the situation in neighboring countries Germany and Italy, the French situation remains singular, if not exceptional.The Constitution contains a provision which cannot be amended. Article 89 para 5 thus states: The republican form of government shall not be the object of any amendment.” Far from the debate on supraconstitutionaliy, it is therefore possible to envisage a specific action of constitutional amendment, based on the Constitution itself. These norms are called constitutionally enforced. The idea is to determine whether a hierarchy exists between “enforced constitutionally norms” and “simple constitutionally norms”. This research must be conducted under a positivist and kelsenian approach. It demonstrates that the constituent power creates specific norms that the amending power, along with all delegated power must respect. It should then be assessed if this theory is effective. The analysis of “constitutions changes” during constitutional transition reinforces the theoretical analysis. Comparative constitutional law studies demonstrate that judicial review of constitutional amendments is not a “Government by judiciary”; it further advances the rule of Law
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Hallengren, Anders. "The code of Concord : Emerson's search for universal laws." Doctoral thesis, Stockholms universitet, Institutionen för litteraturvetenskap och idéhistoria, 1994. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-14223.
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The purpose of this work is to detect a pattern: the concordance of Ethics and Aesthetics, Poetics and Politics in the most influential American thinker of the nineteenth century. It is an attempt to trace a basic concept of the Emersonian transcendentalist doctrine, its development, its philosophical meaning and practical implications. Emerson’s thought is analyzed genetically in search of the generating paradigm, or the set of axioms from which his aesthetic ideas as well as his political reasoning are derived. Such a basic structure, or point of convergence, is sought in the emergence of Emerson’s idea of universal laws that repeat themselves on all levels of reality. A general introduction is given in Part One, where the crisis in Emerson’s life is seen as representing and foreshadowing the deeper existential crisis of modern man. In Part 2 we follow the increasingly skeptical theologian’s turn to science, where he tries to secure a safe secular foundation for ethical good and right and to solve the problem of evil. Part 3 shows how Emerson’s conception of the laws of nature and ethics is applied in his political philosophy. In Part 4, Emerson’s ideas of the arts are seen as corresponding to his views of nature, morality, and individuality. Finally, in Part 5, the ancient and classical nature of Concord philosophy is brought into focus. The book concludes with a short summary.
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Garcia, Maria E. "Governing Gambling in the United States." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2010. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/3.
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The role risk taking has played in American history has helped shape current legislation concerning gambling. This thesis attempts to explain the discrepancies in legislation regarding distinct forms of gambling. While casinos are heavily regulated by state and federal laws, most statutes dealing with lotteries strive to regulate the activities of other parties instead of those of the lottery institutions. Incidentally, lotteries are the only form of gambling completely managed by the government. It can be inferred that the United States government is more concerned with people exploiting gambling than with the actual practice of wagering.
In an effort to more fully understand the gambling debate, whether it should be allowed or banned, I examined different types of sources. Historical sources demonstrate how ingrained in American culture risk taking, the core of gambling, has been since the formation of this nation. Sources dealing with the economic implications of gambling were also studied. Additionally, sources dealings with the political and legal aspects of gambling were essential for this thesis. Legislature has tried to reconcile distinct problems associated with gambling, including corruption. For this reason sports gambling scandals and Mafia connections to gambling have also been examined.
The American government has created much needed legislature to address different concerns relating to gambling. It is apparent that statutes will continue to be passed to help regulate the gambling industry. A possible consideration is the legalization of sports wagering to better regulate that sector of the industry.
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Feloniuk, Wagner Silveira. "A criação do Supremo Tribunal Federal em 1890." reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/149544.
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La création du Supremo Tribunal Federal est recherché par de facteurs qui ont influencé la chute de la monarchie, l'oeuvre du Gouvernement Provisoire, les discussions à l'Assemblée constituante et les normes de la nouvelle Constitution. L'environnement politique et juridique qui commence à se développer en 1870 explique la force des groupes, des idées politiques et comment les États-Unis sont devenus le modèle de référence pour le Brésilien. Il est le rôle des positivistes, des militaires, des propriétaires fonciers, des intellectuels urbains et la naissante opinion publique des villes qui composent l'environnement pour le remplacement de l'ancien système politique. Ces éléments sont présentés afin de vérifier comment était la division de la pensée politique au Brésil et les effets de cette division dans les normes constitutionnelles républicaines. Même qui bien documenté l'histoire de la cour suprême après leur activité, ces moments de création aident a donner un aperçu des origines de la cour et les raisons de sa conception institutionnelle. La compréhension de ces moments permettent d'expliquer les conflits qui pourraient surgir lorsqu'un tribunal avec de telles compétences ont agi pendant décennies dans un contexte peu enclins à accepter les interventions et les limites aux décisions politiques.A criação do Supremo Tribunal Federal é pesquisada por meio dos fatores que influíram na queda da coroa, implantação do Governo Provisório, discussões na Assembleia Constituinte e as normas da nova Constituição. O ambiente político e jurídico que começa a se desenvolver em 1870 explica a força dos grupos e ideias políticas e como os Estados Unidos da América passaram a ser o modelo de referência para os brasileiros. É o papel dos positivistas, militares, proprietários rurais, intelectuais urbanos e a nascente opinião pública das cidades que formam o ambiente para a substituição do antigo sistema político. Esses elementos são apresentados para verificar como se dividiam as correntes de pensamento político no Brasil e os efeitos dessa divisão nas normas constitucionais republicanas. Apesar de estar bem documentada a trajetória do Supremo Tribunal Federal após a sua atividade, esses momentos de criação ajudam a dar uma perspectiva das origens da corte e os motivos de seu desenho institucional. Compreender esses momentos ajuda a explicar os conflitos que seriam gerados quando uma corte com tais competências fosse atuar por décadas em um contexto pouco propenso a aceitar intervenções e limitações de decisões políticas.
The creation of the Supremo Tribunal Federal is researched considering the factors that influenced the fall of the monarchy, beginning of the Interim Government, discussions in the Constituent Assembly and the norms of the new Constitution. The political and legal environment that begins to develop in 1870 explains the role of groups, political ideas and how the United States became the reference model for the Brazilian. It is the role of the positivists, military, landowners, urban intellectuals and the rising public opinion in the cities that make up the environment for the replacement of the old political system. These elements are presented to verify how divided the currents of political thought were in Brazil and the effects of this division in the Republican constitutional norms. Although the history of the supreme court after its activity is well documented, these moments of creation help to give a fuller perspective of the court origins and the reasons for its institutional design. Understanding these moments helps to explain the conflicts that would arise when a court with such ample legal attributions were operating for decades in a context disinclined to accept interventions and limitations of policy decisions.
La creación de lo Supremo Tribunal Federal es investigada por medio de los factores que influyeron en la caída de la corona, la implementación del Gobierno Provisional, los debates en la Asamblea Constituyente y las reglas de la nueva Constitución. El entorno político y legal que comienza a desarrollarse en 1870 explica la fuerza de los grupos, las ideas políticas y cómo el Estados Unidos se convirtió en el modelo de referencia para los brasileños. Es el papel de los positivistas, militares, propietarios de tierras, intelectuales urbanos y la naciente opinión pública en las ciudades que conforman el entorno para la sustitución del antiguo sistema político. Estos elementos se presentan para se verificar cómo eran divididas las corrientes del pensamiento político en Brasil y los efectos de esta división en las normas constitucionales republicanas. Aunque bien documentada la historia de lo Supremo Tribunal Federal después de su actividad, estos momentos de la creación ayudan a dar una visión de los orígenes de la corte y las razones de su diseño institucional. La comprensión de estos momentos ayuda a explicar los conflictos que surgen cuando un tribunal con tales habilidades estuviera actuando por décadas en un contexto poco dispuesto a aceptar las intervenciones y las limitaciones en las decisiones políticas.
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Salters, Gregory A. "A Phenomenological Exploration of Black Male Law Enforcement Officers' Perspectives of Racial Profiling and Their Law Enforcement Career Exploration and Commitment." FIU Digital Commons, 2013. http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd/877.
Full textAbstract:
This phenomenological study explored Black male law enforcement officers’ perspectives of how racial profiling shaped their decisions to explore and commit to a law enforcement career. Criterion and snow ball sampling was used to obtain the 17 participants for this study. Super’s (1990) archway model was used as the theoretical framework. The archway model “is designed to bring out the segmented but unified and developmental nature of career development, to highlight the segments, and to make their origin clear” (Super, 1990, p. 201).
Interview data were analyzed using inductive, deductive, and comparative analyses. Three themes emerged from the inductive analysis of the data: (a) color and/or race does matter, (b) putting on the badge, and (c) too black to be blue and too blue to be black.
The deductive analysis used a priori coding that was based on Super’s (1990) archway model. The deductive analysis revealed the participants’ career exploration was influenced by their knowledge of racial profiling and how others view them. The comparative analysis between the inductive themes and deductive findings found the theme “color and/or race does matter” was present in the relationships between and within all segments of Super’s (1990) model. The comparative analysis also revealed an expanded notion of self-concept for Black males – marginalized and/or oppressed individuals.
Self-concepts, “such as self-efficacy, self-esteem, and role self-concepts, being combinations of traits ascribed to oneself” (Super, 1990, p. 202) do not completely address the self-concept of marginalized and/or oppressed individuals. The self-concept of marginalized and/or oppressed individuals is self-efficacy, self-esteem, traits ascribed to oneself expanded by their awareness of how others view them. (DuBois, 1995; Freire, 1970; Sheared, 1990; Super, 1990; Young, 1990). Ultimately, self-concept is utilized to make career and life decisions.
Current human resource policies and practices do not take into consideration that negative police contact could be the result of racial profiling. Current human resource hiring guidelines penalize individuals who have had negative police contact. Therefore, racial profiling is a discriminatory act that can effectively circumvent U.S. Equal Employment Opportunities Commission laws and serve as a boundary mechanism to employment (Rocco & Gallagher, 2004).
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Adams, Eric Michael. "The Idea of Constitutional Rights and the Transformation of Canadian Constitutional Law, 1930-1960." Thesis, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/1807/19019.
Full textAbstract:
This dissertation argues that the idea of constitutional rights transformed Canadian constitutional law well before the entrenchment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Specifically, it locates the origins of Canada’s twentieth-century rights revolution in the constitutional thinking of scholars, lawyers, judges, and politicians at mid-century (1930-1960). Drawing on archival documents, personal papers, government reports, parliamentary debates, case law, and legal scholarship, this work traces the constitutional thought and culture that first propelled human rights and fundamental freedoms to the forefront of the Canadian legal imagination. As a work of legal history, it also seeks to revive the dormant spirit of constitutional history that once pervaded the discipline of Canadian constitutional law.
The Introduction situates the chapters that follow within the emerging Canadian historiography of rights. Chapter Two traces the origins of Frank Scott’s advocacy for constitutional rights to the newer constitutional law, an approach to constitutional scholarship sparked by the social and political upheavals of the Depression, and the influence of Roscoe Pound’s sociological jurisprudence. Chapter Three explores the varied dimensions of the Second World War’s influence on the nascent idea of Canadian constitutional rights. In particular, the rapid rise of the wartime administrative state produced a rights discourse that tended to reflect the interests of property while ignoring the civil liberties of unpopular minorities. Chapter Four examines the rise of a politics and scholarship of rights in the years immediately following the war. In response to international rights ideals and continuing domestic rights controversies, scholars and lawyers sought to produce a theory of Canadian constitutional law that could accommodate the addition of judicially-enforced individual rights. If not entirely successful, their efforts nonetheless further reoriented the fundamental tenets of Canadian constitutional law. Chapter Five reveals the influence of Canada’s emerging constitutional culture of rights on the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada, particularly Justice Ivan Rand and his conception of an implied bill of rights. Together, these chapters demonstrate the confluence of ideology, circumstance, and personality – the constitutional history – that altered the future of Canadian constitutional law.
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Kwon, Chan Doo. "Reassessing Korean legal culture and the rule of law legal history, constitutional review and negotiations /." 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/5994.
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Knapp, Aaron Tristan. "Law's revolutions: coercion and constitutional change in the American founding." Thesis, 2016. https://hdl.handle.net/2144/14538.
Full textAbstract:
This study in constitutional history argues that the American framers created the Constitution of 1787 to address the problem of coercion in American society. It demonstrates that the framers’ antecedent commitment to a conception of the law that made coercion its sine qua non best explains why they sought fundamental reconstitution rather than amendment in 1787, and why they made certain choices and not others in establishing and administering the first federal government in the decade after ratification. The research revolves around two central questions.
First, why did coercion concern the framers? Certainly a number of concrete policy-related failures coming to a head in 1787 starkly illuminated both the Continental Congress’s want of enforcement powers and the foundering magistracies in the states. Part I, however, situates the coercion problem in a deeper historico-intellectual context. The American Revolution produced a constitutional discourse that made the consent of the governed its essential ingredient and government by coercion ipso facto illegitimate and unrepublican. At the same time, the Revolution unleashed egalitarian social thinking predicated on the belief in an absolute equality of mind, ability, and opportunity among individuals. Part I shows that the principles of popular consent and individual equality had real legal consequences in the decade after Independence that scholars have overlooked. Specifically, the principle of consent produced a revolution against independent judicial power and the principle of equality produced a revolution against professional lawyers and the common law. Both insurgencies posed special threats to legal professionalism as such and both advanced upon a single shared legal ideal: law without force. Fearing anarchy and seeking to secure their own place within the constitutional order, American lawyers calling themselves Federalists waged a counterrevolution against this conception of law in 1787.
But how? Those few historians who have acknowledged the Federalists’ stated commitment to the principle of coercion in 1787 have downplayed its practical significance in the early republic. They have suggested that Federalist legislators and administrators ultimately bowed to the strong anti-statist currents in American society and avoided coercive enforcement measures in the 1790s. Part II shows otherwise. The analysis recovers an originally understood constitutional structure of coercion that included military, magisterial, and judicial sanctions, to operate in accordance with a priority scheme that partially accommodated the inherited republican aversion to the deployment of military force in domestic affairs. It further demonstrates that in the decade after ratification the Federalists brought the constitutional structure of coercion to bear on individuals and states within the union in every area that concerned the framers and nothing in either the Jeffersonian ascendancy or the Revolution of 1800 immediately compromised the Federalists’ achievements in this regard. The constitutional structure of coercion’s effective implementation in the 1790s best explains why the first federal government succeeded where the Continental Congress had failed.
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Tvrdy, Linda Ann. "Constitutional Rights in a Common Law World: The Reconstruction of North Carolina Legal Culture, 1865-1874." Thesis, 2013. https://doi.org/10.7916/D8VX0PQS.
Full textAbstract:
The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, which were ratified in the aftermath of the Civil War, abolished slavery, established national citizenship and made equality before the law a constitutional requirement. These national constitutional amendments brought revolutionary change to America's foundational law, but it was up to state and local legal actors to incorporate this change into the law that governed the everyday lives of Americans. The literature of Reconstruction legal history tends to place federal law, federal courts and federal legal actors at the center of the story. But in the nineteenth century, the federal judicial system was limited in its institutional capacity and its jurisdictional authority. State courts, on the other hand, were ubiquitous and possessed of expansive jurisdictional authority to hear cases arising under both state and federal law. Before the end of the nineteenth century, most Americans could spend their entire lives without encountering the federal legal system. On the other hand, county courts and the common law legal culture in which they existed were an integral part of their daily lives. This dissertation focuses on the state of North Carolina, examining how the state's legal actors articulated the meaning of freedom and incorporated it into their common law legal culture during Reconstruction. Engaging with recent literature that reconsiders the importance of the common as an ideology and mode of governance, this dissertation argues that the common law conceptualization of rights stood in contrast to the abstract, individual rights embodied in the U.S. Constitution. Common law rights were contextual, relational, and hierarchical. Further, common law principles centered around creating and maintaining good social order rather than protecting individual rights. Because the common law dominated nineteenth century legal culture, North Carolina legal actors could not simply impose the principles of the newly amended U.S. Constitution onto the existing legal order. Rather, to ensure their lasting legitimacy they had to integrate those principles into the existing common law legal culture. The process of integration began even before North Carolina ratified the Thirteenth Amendment. At the end of the war, Union army General John M. Schofield oversaw the administration of justice and the implementation of freedom in North Carolina through military commission proceedings over civilians. Even in these military tribunals the common law provided a common language and ideology through which northern military officials, North Carolinian citizens and North Carolina lawyers could contest the precise meaning of freedom. Once civilian courts resumed their authority, North Carolinians continued throughout Reconstruction to refine the meaning of freedom and to incorporate the new constitutional values in the language of the common law. By focusing on the local implementation of constitutional change, this dissertation sheds light on how Americans experienced emancipation and freedom in their everyday lives. However, uncovering the common law context in which it developed aids our understanding of nineteenth century constitutional doctrine as well.
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Deklin, Anthony Paul Wano. "Legal control of the executive under the Papua New Guinea Constitution." Phd thesis, 1985. http://hdl.handle.net/1885/129611.
Full textAbstract:
The Papua New Guinea Constitution came into force at midnight on
16 September 1975 when the country became an independent, sovereign
State. This thesis is a study of a single aspect of this
Constitution, namely the legal control of the Executive. The task of
controlling the Executive is a major aim of the Constitution in that
it reflects what was perhaps the central concern of the Constitutional
Planning Committee (CPC) on whose recommendations much of the present
Constitution is based.
After an account of the factors which gave rise to the concern to
control the Executive is given, attention is directed to the main part
of the thesis, viz., the constitutional scheme of control the
constitution-makers devised for the purpose. The concluding chapter
provides some assessment of the operation of this scheme in practice,
focuäing, in particular, on the problems that have been experienced
since Independence. The chapter goes on to present some suggestions
as to the reforms that need to be made to the scheme, if the Executive
is to be adequately and effectively controlled in the future.
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Cordova, Flores Alvaro Rodrigo. "The Right of Indigenous Self-Determination and the Right to Consultation in the Peruvian Constitutional Tribunal Jurisprudence (2005-2011)." Thesis, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/1828/4980.
Full textAbstract:
The main argument of this study is that the right of Indigenous peoples in Peru to consultation has little practical force and effect, since the Peruvian Constitutional Tribunal is not prepared to base it on a broader right of self-determination. I centre my investigation on the 2005-2011 decisions of the Constitutional Tribunal of Peru regarding the right to consultation. In these decisions, the application of the right to consultation is divorced from a perspective informed by the right of Indigenous self-determination. The main consequence of this divorce is that it obscures the pragmatic and symbolic dimension of the right to Indigenous self-determination, debilitating the practical and symbolic potential of the right to consultation. The lack of correspondence between the right to consultation and the right of indigenous self-determination is built into the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Tribunal and reflects the bias of its judges. This bias is actually a continuation and accommodation of old prejudices of the dominant society against Indigenous peoples in Peru; it is part of the pervasive cultural discrimination that is embedded in Peruvian society and that has been translated into jurisprudential terms and language. This bias is also a symptom of the invisibility of the cultural manifestations of Indigenous peoples and the resultant obscuring of cultural differences in general. This situation illustrates that the racism that existed in the colony, and continued during the republican era in Peru, has not died, but has merely been transformed into a more subtle form of legal and constitutional colonialism.Graduate
0326
alvaro.cordova@mail.mcgill.ca
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Beaton, Ryan. "Positivist and pluralist trends in Canadian Aboriginal Law: the judicial imagination and performance of sovereignty in Indigenous-state relations." Thesis, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/1828/13391.
Full textAbstract:
This dissertation identifies institutional positivism and historically grounded pluralism as interpretive trends in the Canadian case law on Indigenous-state relations, and explores tensions between these trends. These are tensions between practices of judicial interpretation, not between theories of interpretation or legal concepts. They are practices developed case- by-case, with interpretive trends emerging over time through series of cases addressing similar issues in related contexts. Institutional positivist approaches insist that judicial recognition of Indigenous legal orders and accommodation of Indigenous interests must take place within established constitutional forms founded on state sovereignty. Historically grounded pluralist approaches show greater willingness to balance principles of state sovereignty against principles of popular sovereignty and of Indigenous priority in Canadian territory. While the two approaches overlap significantly, their differences sometimes lead to contrasting legal conclusions on key issues of, e.g., treaty interpretation, the relationship between Indigenous legal orders and the state legal system, and the jurisdictional dimension of Aboriginal title.
This dissertation examines these positivist-pluralist tensions in the context of the current period of ideological transition and rapidly evolving imaginaries of Indigenous-state relations. Chapters 1 and 2 explore the case law to highlight concrete ways in which this ideological transition finds doctrinal expression in both positivist and pluralist modes. Chapters 3 and 4 offer broader reflections on philosophical debates relating to legal positivism and the role of popular sovereignty in constitutional interpretation by Canadian courts. The final chapter then considers the implementation of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) in Canadian law, with a focus on implementing legislation recently adopted by British Columbia and on two recent judgments that split the Supreme Court of Canada on the proper role of the Canadian judiciary in coordinating Canadian state law with non-state legal orders (Indigenous in one case and international in the other). This concluding chapter explains how the ongoing interplay of positivist and pluralist concerns will inevitably shape the reception of UNDRIP in Canadian law and the ongoing elaboration of Canadian Aboriginal law more generally.Graduate
2022-08-26
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Joubert, Leonardus Kolbe. "The mandate of political representatives with special reference to floor crossing: a legal historical study." Thesis, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/10500/903.
Full textAbstract:
South Africa has had a free mandate theory of representation up to 1994. From 1994 to 2002 an imperative theory applied and in 2003 a limited hybrid free mandate was introduced. The origin of parliament, the development of representation as a concept in Public Law and the birth of political parties are studied. It is shown that parliament and representation were natural developments that occurred at the same time, not by grand design, but by chance.
It is also shown that political parties appeared first as informal intra-parliamentary groupings that developed into extra-parliamentary organisations, organised to achieve and exercise power in the political system as the franchise became more liberal.
The factors that influence a member's mandate and floor-crossing as such are discussed.
Finally it is concluded that from a legal historical perspective, a free mandate of representation is the preferred theory of representation in public law.Jurisprudence
LL.M. (Public Law)
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Thompson, Henriette, Koning Jan de, Roseanne Lopers Sweetman, and Bernard Zylstra. "Perspective vol. 15 no. 3 (Jun 1981)." 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10756/251298.
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Sweetman, Roseanne Lopers, Ginkel Aileen Van, Kathy Vanderkloet, and Robert E. VanderVennen. "Perspective vol. 16 no. 4 (Aug 1982)." 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10756/251290.
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Van, Ginkel Aileen, Brian J. Walsh, Don Posterski, Gary Duim, and Nicholas Terpstra. "Perspective vol. 17 no. 3 (Jun 1983)." 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10756/251284.
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Elton, Judith. "Comrades or competition? : union relations with Aboriginal workers in the South Australian and Northern Territory pastoral industries, 1878-1957." 2007. http://arrow.unisa.edu.au:8081/1959.8/45143.
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This thesis examines internal union and external factors affecting union relations with Aboriginal workers in the wool and cattle sectors of the South Australian and Northern Territory pastoral industries, from union formation in the nineteenth century to the cold war period in the 1950s.PhD Doctorate
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Hollingsworth, Marcia, Bernard Zylstra, and Albert M. Wolters. "Perspective vol. 14 no. 4 (Aug 1980)." 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10756/251303.
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Sweetman, Roseanne Lopers, and Jonathan Chaplin. "Perspective vol. 16 no. 5 (Oct 1982)." 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10756/251289.
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Seerveld, Calvin, Bernard Zylstra, Robert E. VanderVennen, Ginkel Aileen Van, Justin Cooper, and C. T. McIntire. "Perspective vol. 17 no. 5 (Dec 1983)." 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10756/251282.
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VanderVennen, Robert E., Roseanne Lopers Sweetman, Bernard Zylstra, and Kathy Vanderkloet. "Perspective vol. 17 no. 1 (Feb 1983)." 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10756/251287.
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Valois, Martine. "Évolution du droit et de la fonction de juger dans la tradition juridique occidentale : une étude sociohistorique de l’indépendance judiciaire." Thèse, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/1866/4372.
Full textAbstract:
Dans sa thèse, l’auteure analyse la fonction du système judiciaire dans le système juridique selon une double perspective historique et sociologique. Cette approche possède un potentiel euristique important, car elle révèle que la place réservée à la production judiciaire du droit se modifie au gré de la conception que se fait la société de l’origine et de la légitimité du droit.
Grâce à la méthodologie proposée par la théorie des systèmes, il est possible d’analyser le phénomène de la montée en puissance des juges dans sa dimension scientifique, en substituant une interprétation sociologique à celle, traditionnelle, formulée par la science politique. Grâce à une réappropriation de la justice par la science juridique, la production judiciaire du droit peut être étudiée dans une perspective systémique. Celle-ci démontre la situation névralgique occupée par la fonction de juger dans le système juridique.
Par le biais d’un retour aux sources de la fonction de juger, l’auteur identifie les stratégies empruntées par les titulaires de cette fonction pour maintenir et légitimer leur position dans l’organisation du système juridique. La thèse démontre que le discours judiciaire de la Cour suprême du Canada sur la norme d’indépendance judiciaire homologue la théorie de la place centrale du système judiciaire dans le système juridique.
La thèse conclut enfin que des conditions sociologiques sont nécessaires pour assurer l’indépendance judiciaire et garantir la primauté du droit. Ces conditions sont la différenciation sociale, une structure de programme juridique conditionnelle et la limitation de la responsabilité des juges pour l’impact de leurs décisions dans le système social.This thesis examines the function of the judiciary in the legal system in a historical and sociological perspective. Through the lens of history and sociology, the author reviews and considers the changes in the role of the judge in the development of law. The heuristic benefit of this approach borrowed from history and systemic theory, is invaluable. Firstly, it demonstrates that the place reserved for the judicial creation of law in the legal system is tributary to what is considered as the source and legitimacy of law. Secondly, it sets in an evolutionary perspective the significant changes that occurred in the development of law and the judicial function. The characterization of the judicial function evolves from a political science’s viewpoint to a legal perspective. Through this reappropriation by the legal science, the judicial production of law can now be examined in its systemic function. As well, exploration of the sources of the function of justice renders possible and understanding of the rationale used by judges throughout history to legitimize their position in the legal system. The thesis supports the proposition that, along with legal conditions relating to the status of judges, a set of sociological conditions must exist in order for judicial independence to be fully protected and the rule of law upheld. These conditions are social differentiation, a structure of conditional programs for law, and limitation in the social system of the responsibility and accountability of judges following the fulfillment of their judicial function. Finally, in the final stage of her socio-historical research, the author demonstrates how the current judicial interpretation of the conditions for judicial independence enhances the theoretical foundations that situate the judicial function at the centre of the legal system.
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Sweetman, Roseanne Lopers, Henriette Thompson, Bernard Zylstra, and Robert E. VanderVennen. "Perspective vol. 15 no. 1 (Feb 1981)." 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10756/251300.
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