Journal articles on the topic 'Heidegger'
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Rostovskytė, Aneta. "HEIDEGGERIO PRASMĖS SAMPRATA ARISTOTELIO FILOSOFINĖS MINTIES KONTEKSTE." Problemos 85 (January 1, 2013): 67–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.15388/problemos.2014.0.2921.
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Prasmės sąvoka yra sietina su XX a. susiformavusia vadinamąja egzistencializmo kryptimi, kurios pagrindinis svarstymų objektas yra gyvenimo prasmės klausimas. Šio straipsnio tikslas yra pateikti Heideggerio prasmės sampratos analitiką Aristotelio filosofijos kontekste. „Būtyje ir laike“ Heideggeris nurodo, kad jo pagrindinis tikslas yra naujai kelti būties prasmės klausimą tradicinės ontologijos kritikos kontekste. Teigiama, kad svarbiausias ir tradicinės ontologijos turinį geriausiai reprezentuojantis mąstytojas Heideggeriui yra Aristotelis, o Heideggerio egzistencinė prasmės interpretacija yra reakcija bei Aristotelio teleologijos ir etikos kritika.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: Heideggeris, Aristotelis, prasmė, būtis, teleologija, egzistencija. Heidegger’s Conception of Meaning in the Context of Aristotle’s Philosophical ThoughtAneta Rostovskytė AbstractThe aim of this paper is to analyse Martin Heidegger’s conception of the meaning of Being against the background of Aristotle’s philosophical thought. In Being and Time Heidegger shows how this question of the meaning of Being should be thoroughly worked out in the light of the critique of the traditional ontology. The paper argues that for Heidegger the key thinker exemplifying the content of traditional ontology is Aristotle. Thus Heidegger’s philosophical interpretation of the meaning of the temporality of human existence is both reaction to and critique of Aristotelian teleology and ethics.Keywords: Heidegger, Aristotle, meaning, Being, teleology, existence.
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Mickevičius, Tomas Nemunas. "HEIDEGGERIS IR PLATONAS: TIESOS SAMPRATA." Problemos 83 (January 1, 2013): 62–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.15388/problemos.2013.0.833.
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Šiuo straipsniu įsiterpiama į diskusiją Heideggerio ir Platono filosofijų santykio nustatymo klausimu. Straipsnyje trimis pagrindiniais argumentais parodoma, kad Platono dialogų korpuse galima aptikti tokią tiesos sampratą, kuri atitinka heidegeriškąją. Parodoma, pirma, kad tiek Platonas, tiek Heideggeris panašiai aptarė klaidingos kalbos genezę bei tokios kalbos reikšmę ne-tiesai; antra, kad tiek Platonas, tiek Heideggeris tiesą supranta kaip – Heideggerio terminu tariant – nepaslėptį su jai priklausančia paslėptimi; ir, trečia, kad Platono tekstuose galima aptikti vėlyvojo Heideggerio apmąstomų tiesos kaip nepaslėpties „galimybės sąlygų“ struktūrinius atitikmenis.Heidegger and Plato: The Concept of TruthTomas Nemunas Mickevičius SummaryThis article interferes into the discussion regarding the relationship between the philosophies of Heidegger and Plato. It argues for the thesis that in the corpus of Platonic dialogues it is possible to find a concept of truth which corresponds to the Heideggerian one. First, it is shown, that both Plato and Heidegger similarly describe the genesis of false language and it’s connectedness with un-truth. Secondly, it is shown that both Plato and Heidegger understand truth – to use a Heideggerian concept – as unconcealedness with concealednessbelonging to it. And finally, it is shown that in the works of Plato one can find structural equivalents of later Heidegger’s attempt to think over the “conditions of possibility” of truth as unconcealedness.
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Rehman, Rashad. "Josef Pieper on Medieval Truth and Martin Heidegger’s Wahrheitsbegriff." Conatus 7, no. 1 (June 29, 2022): 103–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.12681/cjp.25177.
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Josef Pieper’s critique of Martin Heidegger’s Wahrheitsbegriff (concept of truth) has been virtually ignored in both Pieper and Heidegger scholarship; however, Pieper’s critique of Heidegger is both lethal and affirmative. On the one hand, Pieper makes a strong case against Heidegger’s Wahrheitsbegriff in “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit” and yet on the other he affirms his thesis that “the essence of truth is freedom.” This paper attempts to mend this gap in the literature by first presenting Heidegger’s “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit,” the essay in which Heidegger explicates his concept of truth. Second, I exegete the critique of Josef Pieper found in his “Heideggers Wahrheitsbegriff.” Third, I conclude the paper by contextualizing Pieper’s critique within Pieper’s Werke, and make a note of the philosophical insights derivative from Pieper’s less than simple relationship to Heidegger.
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Raffoul, François. "Tout contre Heidegger." Oxford Literary Review 43, no. 1 (July 2021): 82–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/olr.2021.0352.
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Derrida's relation to Heidegger can fairly be described as ‘complicated,’ and marked by a deep ambivalence. Although he has always recognized his debt towards Heidegger, Derrida has also insisted on his profound allergy towards some aspects of Heidegger’s thought. The reader is thus often faced with this ambivalence in Derrida's writings, which offer, on the one hand, uncannily precise and insightful readings of Heidegger's texts, with on the other hand less than generous interpretations. We find a Derrida tout contre Heidegger, at once entirely against Heidegger, but also right up close to Heidegger. I will explore this debate between Derrida and Heidegger by focusing on the motifs of deconstruction, presence, the proper and the inappropriable.
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Bastek, Adam. "Heidegger poza dobrem i złem." Humanistyka i Przyrodoznawstwo, no. 1 (August 12, 2018): 9–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.31648/hip.341.
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Aksjologia jest w filozofii Heideggera opozycją ontologii. Artykuł rozważa ten antagonizm, określa status wartości w fenomenologicznej redukcji do bycia i – za Heideggerem – demistyfikuje aksjologiczny język współczesności. Stanowi jednocześnie próbę wyodrębnienia porządku etycznego – i z tej persperktywy – traktuje o różnorako rozpoznawanym kryzysie teraźniejszości. Fenomenologia Heideggera jest odpowiedzią na dualizm podmiotowy, przedmiotowy, wyrażony w nowożytnym stosunku do myśli bytu. To “rozdwojenie bycia” jest dla filozofa największym zagrożeniem przyszłości. Antropocentryzm w czasie “światoobrazu” przybrał bowiem postać technicznej dominacji nad przyrodą. Odnalezienie i zrozumienie zapomnianych podstaw to droga jaką proponuje Heidegger. Droga do anihilacji dualizmu i do równoprawnego wspołistnienia.
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Scharff, Robert C. "American Heideggers … and Heidegger." Human Studies 35, no. 4 (June 21, 2012): 607–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10746-012-9230-4.
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Wang, Hongjian. "Tradition, φρόνησις und Praktische Philosophie." Synthesis philosophica 34, no. 1 (2019): 191–206. http://dx.doi.org/10.21464/sp34113.
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Im Unterschied zum starken ontologischen Interesse Heideggers entwickelt Gadamer die Konzeption der Hermeneutik als praktischer Philosophie. Mit Heidegger schenkt Gadamer dem Begriff φρόνησις bei Aristoteles und dessen Unterschied zu τέχνη große Beachtung, gleichwohl entfernt er sich insofern von seinem Lehrer, als die Momente von σύνεσις und ἦθος, die von Heidegger vernachlässigt werden, wieder einmal freigelegt und betont werden. Darin ist die Vorantreibung der Methodologie charakteristisch, durch die der formale Ansatz bei Heidegger zum geschichtlichen Ansatz transformiert wird. Damit kann Gadamer einen anderen Weg der praktischen Philosophie als Heidegger gehen, wodurch jedoch gerade der von Heidegger beanspruchte vortheoretische Charakter der Philosophie garantiert wird. Auf diese Weise kommt Gadamers kritische Aneignung von Heidegger zustande, die aber eben die Bedeutung des ontologischen Ansatzes Heideggers in unserem Zeitalter bekundet.
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Samarina, Tatiana S. "Religious Problematics in M. Heidegger’s Works and the Phenomenology of Religion: Linkage and Parallels." Voprosy Filosofii, no. 9 (2021): 173–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.21146/0042-8744-2021-9-173-183.
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The article analyzes Martin Heidegger’s idea of creating a special phenomenology of religion at an early stage of his work, which was obviously inspired by the fashion for the study of religion, which was also caused by R. Otto’s The Holy. It is proved that some of the philosophical ideas of early M. Heidegger, especially in his The Phenomenology of Religious Life, are in tune with Otto’s thought and are close to the phenomenological tradition of religious studies. But late M. Heidegger departs from these ideas, using the category of Holy as applied to the study of artistic and poetic creativity. Further, the article analyzes the existential of horror, which plays a significant role in the second stage of M. Heidegger's work, which is also in many ways similar to the description of the characteristics of numinous feeling by R. Otto. The article separately analyzes the specifics of the two concepts Angst and Furcht, for this purpose parallels are drawn with the works of S. Kierkegaard, S. Freud, G. van der Leeuw. It is suggested that the proximity of R. Otto’s and M. Heidegger’s approaches to this issue is more due to the cultural context than to direct influence, and it does not provide sufficient ground for a serious convergence of the phenomenology of religion and the ideas of M. Heidegger’s philosophy of the period of Being and Time. Although this does not deny the fact that some phenomenologists later turned to the philosophy of M. Heidegger, seeing it as a support for the construction of their theories.
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Kuchinov, Eugene. "From Heidegger to Pantechnical Anarchy." Revista Perspectiva Filosófica - ISSN: 2357-9986 49, no. 3 (August 11, 2022): 121. http://dx.doi.org/10.51359/2357-9986.2022.254746.
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Why after Heidegger (?)What does it mean to raise the question concerning technology after Heidegger? The average form of the answer could be summed up in one key point: today we must, literally following the way of Heidegger, entrust the question of technology to the matter of thought, by default sharing the belief that this question has no technical solution.Along the way, we must accept the reference point of Heidegger’s thinking, which is a variation of the ontological difference (being is essentially different from a being, from beings) and which is that “the essence of technology is by no means anything technological.”1 This reference point implies the rejection of the instrumental and anthropological definition of technology and is a condition for the release of thought into the open, where only one can get the growth of the saving power (whichwill also, probably, not be anything technical).In other words, to be ‘after Heidegger,’ on average, means to follow his way, moving along it further into the free openness of the ontological relationship (of thought) to technology.However, the extreme form of the answer, to which Heidegger himself pushes us, would suggest something different.He begins manuscripts of the 1940s dealing with modern technology by asking: “[w]hy should the non-intermittent statements of opinion about ‘technology’ be increased by one more?”2 This question marks the task of talking about technology in a way that no one has ever talked about before.It is obvious that today the drama of this question is complicated precisely by the situation that has developed ‘after Heidegger,’ that is, in the conditions when ‘the non-intermittent statements of opinion’ about technologyare produced exactly in the order of following Heidegger’s way.In order to dramatically repeat and put this ‘why,’ today it would be necessary to rather go against Heidegger and talk about technology in a way that no one else, including Heidegger himself, has ever said.So there are two forms of how to be ‘after Heidegger.’The average form: to be on the side of Heidegger, to speak with his voice, to be possessed by Heidegger3; and the extreme form: to be against Heidegger, to force him to speak with a voice other than his own, to make him possessed. The averaged form opens up a space of safety (there is nothing safer for ‘after Heidegger’ thinking than to rant about the dangers of technology). The extreme form opens up a space in which exactly what Heidegger warned about happened.We will take the way of extreme form.This does not mean that we will not listen to and hear what Heidegger says about technology, it means that we will take what he says to the extreme.Pushing to the extreme is possible in two ways: criticism and anomalous encounters.Critically, we will ask how far Heidegger goes in rejecting anthropologism and instrumentalism, in rejection, on the implementation of which the credibility of his main theses depends.If Heidegger does not bring it to the end, then as a result of a chain reaction, two of his key theses come into question: that the essence of technology is by no means anything technological, and that the question of technology is resolved by means of thought, not technically.Critical pushing to the extreme makes Heidegger flammable and explosive, open to encounters and abnormal rapprochements; criticism releases demonic Heidegger doubles who stand on the other side of the question of technology, putting it from the point of view of technics itself.As anomalous counterparts of Heidegger, we will have the pananarchistGordin Brothers, whose texts, if Heidegger had addressed them, would have forced him to feel them as embodiments of the demonry of technology (which Heidegger, as we know, refused to recognize4).They ask a question similar to Heidegger’s question, but arrive at diametrically opposite conclusions.
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Lambeth, Morganna. "The Role of Receptivity in Heidegger’s Kant Interpretation." Heidegger Circle Proceedings 55 (2021): 247–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/heideggercircle20215518.
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Commentators on Heidegger’s late-1920s interpretation of Kant often argue that Heidegger reveals himself in this work to be a philosopher of receptivity: Heidegger gives pride of place to the passive aspects of human cognition, our “openness to the world,” over against activity, spontaneity, and understanding (Gordon, 2010, p.7). On this view, Heidegger’s contribution to the transcendental tradition is offering an “affective transcendentalism” (Engelland, 2017, p.223): in response to the central question of transcendental philosophy – What are the prior conditions that enable and structure our experience? – Heidegger emphasizes the prior affectivity that preconditions our experience. While Heidegger’s position, so construed, may appear an exciting strain of transcendental philosophy, it likewise seems to be a considerable departure from Kant. After all, Kant insisted that both spontaneity and receptivity are required for human cognition; this is often referred to as Kant’s “discursivity thesis”. In Kant’s well-known formulation connecting our passively receiving intuitions and actively organizing concepts, “thoughts without content are empty, and intuitions without concepts are blind” (A51/B75). Therefore, the idea that Heidegger defends a philosophy of receptivity in his interpretive works on Kant contributes to the common view that Heidegger is a bad interpreter of Kant. I challenge the claim that Heidegger defends a philosophy of receptivity in his interpretive works on Kant. This claim derives its plausibility from Heidegger’s opening discussion of intuition, where Heidegger does insist that “thinking is in the service of intuition.” While this discussion grants a kind of primacy to sensibility – in particular, our faculty of sensibility explains why human cognition is finite – I suggest that it does not compromise Kant’s discursivity thesis. Heidegger affirms, with Kant, that understanding and sensibility, two distinct capacities or faculties, are required for cognition. Further, I argue that Heidegger’s claim that sensibility plays a “leading role” in cognition is merely the beginning of Heidegger’s argument; it is not his main intervention. For Heidegger is concerned not with cognition, but with the source of cognition: the very constitution of the human being. And this source, Heidegger insists, is both receptive and spontaneous. Heidegger’s central thesis – that we must consider the imagination to be the fundamental cognitive faculty in Kant – rests crucially on the claim that the imagination is both receptive and spontaneous. Under the consensus reading of Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant, Heidegger is supposed to be a perfect foil to the Neo-Kantian interpretation of Kant: where the Neo-Kantians privilege spontaneity, Heidegger privileges receptivity. While Heidegger is certainly critical of the Neo-Kantian prioritization of spontaneity, I argue that we must rethink Heidegger’s relationship to the Neo-Kantian view. Heidegger’s main thesis in the Kant interpretation – that the imagination, a faculty that is both spontaneous or receptive, is the “common root” of sensibility and understanding – answers a question that Heidegger takes up from the Marburg Neo-Kantians: what is the origin that unifies the faculties of sensibility and understanding? While the Neo-Kantians insist on an origin in the spontaneous faculty of understanding, Heidegger suggests instead that the origin is the receptive and spontaneous faculty of imagination. Where the Neo-Kantians overemphasize spontaneity, Heidegger restores balance. Ultimately, Heidegger does not prioritize receptivity in his reading of Kant; rather, Heidegger offers a transcendental philosophy that inquires more deeply into the unified receptivity and spontaneity that characterizes the human being.
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SALEM-WISEMAN, JONATHAN. "Heidegger, Wagner, and the History of Aesthetics." PhaenEx 7, no. 1 (May 26, 2012): 162. http://dx.doi.org/10.22329/p.v7i1.3361.
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This article explores Heidegger’s ambivalent philosophical relationship with Richard Wagner. After showing how Heidegger situates Wagner within his larger critique of aesthetics, I will explain why Heidegger believes that Wagner’s operas, due to the dominance of music, could not attain the status of “great art.” Because music can do no more than stimulate or intensify feelings, it becomes, for Heidegger, the paradigm of what art has become under the influence of aesthetics. Heidegger’s views on music even motivate him to contest Nietzsche’s thesis that music was the origin of Greek tragedy. Heidegger dismisses Nietzsche’s developmental account and argues instead that poetry is the essence of tragic drama. To conclude, I will show that Heidegger’s exclusive focus on Wagner’s theoretical work is too narrow, for his music reveals ontological concerns that cannot be easily assimilated into Heidegger’s history of aesthetics, and in fact suggest possible affinities with Heidegger’s own philosophical insights.
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Kalli, Pekka. "Heidegger, pelastaja?" Aikuiskasvatus 18, no. 1 (February 15, 1998): 72–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.33336/aik.92489.
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Drianus, Oktarizal. "Manusia di Era Kebudayaan Digital." MAWA'IZH: JURNAL DAKWAH DAN PENGEMBANGAN SOSIAL KEMANUSIAAN 9, no. 2 (December 20, 2018): 178–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.32923/maw.v9i2.784.
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The aims of paper is digging beneath the ontological relations between human and technology. It is handled by drawing a inspiration from Martin Heidegger's thought, specifically the period of Heidegger II. This library research discusses two key of Heidegger’s texts against technology, namely: “Questions concerning Technology” and “Discourse about Thinking”. The paper provides some findings: 1) The Dasein reconstruction transforms toward Digi-sein as the only and one Questioner of Being that exist within a heart of digital culture; 2) Heideggerian destruction of gestell as a framed way of thinking that makes humans and technology relations become non-free relations. Heidegger calls calculative thinking as actually "flight from thinking". Gestell shackles us in exploitative ways of thinking that oppose disclosure the veil of human openness to the Being; 3) Heidegger employs gelassenheit as a simple and relaxed attitude, as releasement, that was not impermeable to nuances of metaphysics and religion. Gelassenheit was living an attitude that kept a tension between saying "yes" and "no", simultaneously and ambiguously. Technology is addressed by “let it be” attitude, and release the technology as it is.
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Krell, David Farrell. "Three Timely Untimelies: Heidegger and Derrida on Nietzsche's Second Untimely Meditation." Oxford Literary Review 43, no. 1 (July 2021): 131–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/olr.2021.0354.
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The essay reflects on Nietzsche's second Untimely Meditation, ‘On the Use and Disadvantage of the Study of History for Life’, especially as Heidegger reads it in section 76 of Being and Time and as Derrida reads Heidegger's reading of it. Derrida's concludes his first seminar on Heidegger, Heidegger: la question de l’Être et l'Histoire; Cours de l'ENS-Ulm 1964–1965, by reflecting on Heidegger as a Nietzschean antiquarian.
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Herskowitz, Daniel M. "Variations on a Theme: Heidegger and Judaism." Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy 32, no. 1 (April 3, 2024): 8–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1477285x-12341353.
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Abstract This essay surveys a number of prominent, recurring, and new directions in the growing scholarly discourse on the theme “Heidegger and Judaism” arranged under three headings. The first, the contrastive framing, encompasses cases in which the relationship between Heidegger and Judaism is perceived as antithetical. The second, the conjunctive framing, encompasses views claiming the existence of affinities and parallels between Heidegger and Judaism, grouped under three subheadings: “Heidegger and biblical thinking,” “Heidegger and Kabbalah,” and “Heidegger and the Jewish nation.” The third, historical perspectives, uses the approach of intellectual history to explore visions of Judaism that are developed as part of engagements with Heidegger’s philosophy.
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Knudsen, Nicolai Krejberg. "Fænomenologi og antropocentrisme." Religionsvidenskabeligt Tidsskrift, no. 71 (August 18, 2021): 38–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.7146/rt.v0i71.128087.
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SUMMARY: This article poses the question: Is phenomenology anthropocentric? In the first half, I show that both Husserl’s and Heidegger’s philosophy take their point departure in the relation between the human being and the world, but that they both also argue that their respective analysis transcends the horizon of anthropology by inquiring into meaning or being as such. I then distinguish between ontological, epistemological, and ethical anthropocentrism and argue that these forms of anthropocentrism do not necessarily imply each other. In the next half, I focus on Heidegger’s analysis of the animal. I argue that Heidegger’s philosophy is ontologically anthropocentric but neither epistemologically nor ethically anthropocentric. In opposition to posthumanism, my thesis is that the particular kind of ontological anthropocentrism that characterise Heidegger and phenomenology is a presupposition rather than an obstacle for the capacity for understanding and caring for other creatures. I call this position anthropoeccentrism.
RESUME: Denne artikel stiller spørgsmålet: Er fænomenologien antropocentrisk? I den første halvdel viser jeg, at både Husserls og Heideggers filosofi ganske vist tager udgangspunkt i menneskets forhold til verden, men at de begge mener, at deres respektive analyser overskrider antropologiens spørgehorisont ved at spørge om mening eller væren som sådan. Dernæst skelner jeg mellem ontologisk, epistemologisk, og etisk antropocentrisme og argumenterer for, at disse former for antropocentrisme ikke nødvendigvis følger af hinanden. I den næste halvdel fokuserer jeg på Heideggers analyse af dyret. Jeg argumenterer for, at Heideggers filosofi er ontologisk antropocentrisk, men hverken epistemologisk eller etisk antropocentrisk. I modsætning til posthumanismen er min tese, at den særlige form for ontologisk antropocentrisme, der kendetegner Heidegger og fænomenologien, er en forudsætning snarere end en forhindring for evnen til at kunne forstå og drage omsorg for andre væsner. Denne position kalder jeg for antropoexcentrisme.
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Richardson, William J., Richard Capobianco, and Ian Alexander Moore. "From the Archives: William Richardson’s Questions for Martin Heidegger’s “Preface”." Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual 9 (2019): 1–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/gatherings201992.
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Martin Heidegger wrote one and only one preface for a scholarly work on his thinking, and it was for William J. Richardson’s study Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, first published in 1963. Ever since, both Heidegger’s Preface and Richardson’s groundbreaking book have played an important role in Heidegger scholarship. Much has been discussed about these texts over the decades, but what has not been available to students and scholars up to this point is Richardson’s original comments and questions to Heidegger that led to the famous Preface. These are published here for the first time both in the German original and in our English translation. In our commentary we 1) discuss how Heidegger’s Preface came about, 2) explain the source and status of the materials published here, and 3) pair selected passages from Richardson’s text with Heidegger’s reply in his Preface to highlight the consonance of their thinking.
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Demir Güneş, Cevriye. "Levinas’ın “Azizlik Etiği”nde Heidegger’i Bağışlama Olanağı." Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi / Cilicia Journal of Philosophy 7, no. 1 (2020): 1–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/kilikya2020711.
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Avrupa’da Nazi Almanyası ve II. Dünya savaşı sonrasında “Alman Suçluluğu” kavramı temelinde tartışılan bağışlama sorunu, Levinas tarafından Mişna’da geçtiği şekliyle ele alınır. Yoma Risalesi, “İnsanın Tanrı’ya karşı kabahatleri Kefaret Günü’yle bağışlanır; insanın başkasına karşı kabahatleri Kefaret günüyle bağışlanmaz, meğerki öncelikle o kişinin gönlünü almamış olsun...” (Yoma Risalesi, 85a-85b) der. Makalede Levinas’ın bağışlama fikri ve Heidegger ile olan ilişkisi Mişna’da dile getirildiği ve Levinas’ın “azizlik etiği”nde konumlandığı şekilde irdelenmektedir. İnsanın Tanrı’ya ve Başkası’na karşı işlediği suç ve bağışlama koşullarını içeren makalede, Levinas’ın Dört Talmud Okuması adlı eserinde bağışlama sorununu Heidegger’i anarak tartışmış olmasının anlamı ve bu tartışmanın Heidegger’i bağışlama olanağı taşıyıp taşımadığının sorgulanması ele alınmaktadır. Levinas bağışlama fikrini, bağışlamayı olanaklı kılan “mağdurun iyi niyeti” ve “suçlunun tam bilinçliliği” koşullarını açığa vuran Talmud hikâyelerinden yola çıkarak ortaya koyar. Bağışlamanın diyalektiğine işaret eden hikâyelerden ikincisi, Nazi dehşetinin açığa çıkardığı “nafile acı”yı anımsatacak bir şekilde Heidegger anılarak ortaya konur. Hikâyede hocası Rabi Hanina’ya karşı suç işleyen ve hocasından on üç yıl boyunca Kefaret Günü’nde bağışlanma dileyen öğrenci Rabi’nin “bağışlanmasının çok zor olduğu” yorumu Levinas tarafından Nazi zulmüyle ilişkisi bağlamında Heidegger’e uyarlanır: “Çoğu Alman’ı bağışlayabiliriz, ama bağışlamanın zor olacağı Almanlar da vardır. Heidegger’i bağışlamak zordur. Hanina hakkaniyet ve insaniyet sahibi Rabi’yi aynı zamanda son derece parlak birisi olduğu için bağışlayamadıysa Heidegger’i bağışlamak daha da zordur”. Levinas’ın Heidegger’i diğer Almanlardan ayrıcalıklı görerek öğrenci Rabi’nin durumuyla benzerliği içinde ele alması ve Nazi Politikasıyla/dehşetiyle ilişkisi içerisinde bağışlanmasının olanağı ve olanaksızlığı üzerine düşünmesi, özellikle bunu bir azizlik ilişkisi çerçevesinde tartışmaya açması, Heidegger’e atfettiği değerin ve onunla hesaplaşmasının büyüklüğünü gösterir. Makalede Başkası’nın hatalarını da üstlenen sonsuz sorumlulukla şekillenmiş, varlığın ötesindeki iyi’yi açığa çıkaran Levinas’ın “azizlik etiği”nin Heidegger’i bağışlama olanağı taşıdığı ileri sürülmektedir
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Frayne, Craig. "An Ecosemiotic Critique of Heidegger’s Concept of Enframing." Environmental Philosophy 15, no. 2 (2018): 213–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/envirophil201892678.
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This essay presents ecosemiotics as an approach to interpreting Heidegger in environmental philosophy. Comparisons between Heidegger’s philosophy and ecosemiotics have often focused on the 1929–1930 lecture course where Heidegger discusses Jakob von Uexküll’s notion of Umwelt. These and other ecological interpretations reach an impasse with the sharp ontological boundary Heidegger places between Dasein and more-than-human lifeforms. This essay revisits the theme by focusing on a central concept from Heidegger’s later work: enframing [Gestell]. Enframing, it is argued, can be understood as a rupture between human (cultural) and natural signs, which is a consequence of technological modernity. Although this interpretation diverges from Heidegger’s philosophy, such critical readings may be necessary if Heidegger’s work is to speak to today’s technologies and ecological issues.
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Sigrist, Michael, and Michael Steinman. "Is Heidegger a Phenomenologist?" Heidegger Circle Proceedings 53 (2019): 169–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/heideggercircle20195314.
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This panel explores Heidegger’s complicated relationship with phenomenology. One question is whether Heidegger was a phenomenologist at all. For Husserl, phenomenology was the study of essential structures of consciousness, and since Heidegger rejects both the ontological and methodological priority of consciousness, it might seem like he rejects phenomenology as well. On the other hand, the defining motto of phenomenology is ‘to the things themselves,’ and this seems to capture the persistent aim of Heidegger’s thinking, be it the work of art, technology, language, animality, or Dasein itself. Yet even if there is some way that Heidegger is ‘doing phenomenology,’ it’s not at all clear how he is doing it. He abandons Husserl’s reliance on the epoche, self-reflection, eidetic variation, and so on, and yet, while clearly not employing such a method, Heidegger does frequently write about a way of thinking proper to philosophy—can this way be described as phenomenological? In some ways our question is intractable—there are just too many ways to define phenomenology and too many ways to read Heidegger such that no single, broad consensus on both is likely to emerge—and yet, the question seems crucial for the understanding of Heidegger’s philosophy as a whole. Phenomenology, one can argue, holds the double promise that we can still think with Heidegger, instead of thinking about him as historical figure, and that there is something in his thought that is revealed, and not just postulated or construed.
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Tódor, Csaba. "Heidegger Pál apostol olvasata." Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai Theologia Reformata Transylvanica 68, no. 1 (June 30, 2023): 75–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.24193/subbtref.68.1.05.
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Heidegger’s Reading of Apostle Paul. From 1915 to 1923, Heidegger taught in Freiburg. This was a delicate biographical and important philosophical phase for Heidegger, in which it became increasingly urgent to distance himself definitively from Husserl’s
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Bancalari, Stefano. "“The Great Burden” of Religion." Philosophy Today 64, no. 1 (2020): 173–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtoday202049326.
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This article aims to reread Jonas’s famous lecture on “Heidegger and Theology” linking it with a still unpublished lecture course on Being and Time Jonas held in 1967 at the New School for Social Research. From the reading of Heidegger’s masterwork, Jonas takes the idea of the “burdensome” character of the existence, which he interprets in terms of a “polarity” between man and his “other” (other men, God, world). Such a polarity is for Jonas the very essence of “religion” (as religamen) and of responsibility. From this vantage point, “Heidegger and Theology,” with its sharp criticism of the theological appropriation of Heidegger’s post-turn philosophy, appears to be a strong defense of the burden of “polarity,” as developed in Being and Time, against its removal by the thought of Being: a Being which is nothing but a mirror image of Dasein. Partially reconsidering his views on Heidegger’s Gnosticism, Jonas turns (the earlier) Heidegger against (the later) Heidegger himself.
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Jaima, Amir. "(Re)Situating Geschlecht 3: The Political Stakes of Jacques Derrida’s Reading of Martin Heidegger’s Reading of Georg Trakl." Derrida Today 17, no. 1 (February 2024): 40–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/drt.2024.0325.
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In his 1985 lecture, Geschlecht III, Derrida sought to ‘situate Geschlecht within Heidegger’s path of thought’. Having identified a political disclosure of sorts in Heidegger’s discussion of the significance of Trakl’s poetic invocation of the polysemic, German word ‘Geschlecht’, Derrida intimates that Heidegger betrays ideas and presumptions concerning the ‘problematic of philosophical nationalism’. Given the contentious political context of Heideggerian thought, some scholars might hope that Derrida’s intervention here would bear upon the divisive scholarly concern referred to as the ‘Heidegger Question’. While Geschlecht III does not provide a resolution, a close reading betrays productive political implications to his manner of engagement. In this brief study, I will survey the political stakes of various methodological approaches to reading Heidegger, with Derrida’s manner of reading Heidegger’s ‘Language in the Poem’ at the centre. Ultimately, I argue that Derrida and Heidegger both appeal to a particular sense of the political that must be respected, though not necessarily accepted.
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Mitchell, Andrew. "Heidegger and Terrorism." Research in Phenomenology 35, no. 1 (2005): 181–218. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1569164054905528.
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AbstractTerrorism is a metaphysical problem that concerns the presence of beings today. Heidegger's own thinking of being makes possible a confrontation with terrorism on four fronts: 1) Heidegger's conception of war in the age of technological replacement goes beyond the Clausewitzian model of war and all its modernist-subjectivist presuppositions, 2) Heidegger thinks "terror" (Erschrecken) as the fundamental mood of our time, 3) Heideggerian thinking is attuned to the nature of the terrorist "threat" and the "danger" that we face today, 4) Heidegger rethinks the notion of "security" in a manner that alerts us to the oxymoronic character of "homeland security." The epoch of terrorism is likewise the era of political transformation that Heidegger identifies with "Americanism." In this essay an effort is made to think terrorism qua metaphysical problem and to inquire into the perhaps privileged role of America for the thinking of terrorism today.
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Höfele, Philipp. "Zwischen Selbsttätigkeit und Passivität. Ein Beitrag zur Rolle der Einbildungskraft und des Bildes bei Fichte und Heidegger." Fichte-Studien 48 (2020): 67–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/fichte2020487.
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This paper outlines a systematic relation between Fichte and Heidegger concerning their interpretations of imagination (Einbildungskraft) and image, drawing on their early and in particular their later writings. In 1929, Heidegger deems it necessary to develop his interpretation of the concept of imagination as referring to the temporality of Dasein in opposition to its interpretation as a subjective faculty in idealism, particularly in Fichte. At the same time, however, an affirmative use of the concept of imagination (Einbildung), in analogy to Fichte, can also be observed in Heidegger’s writings, as, in the 1930s, he uses it to describe the unavailable ‘event’ of Being. Moreover, in spite of his pronounced criticism of the modern understanding of the ‘world as image’, Heidegger is also aware of a positive concept of the image, that he claims for art: understood that way, the image, according to Heidegger, is able to disclose the ‘happening of truth’ (das Geschehen der Wahrheit) in the ‘shape’ (Ge-bild) of art. Conversely, in his early writings Fichte already interprets the imagination as a structure generating time and preceding the I. Yet it is only after 1800 that Fichte’s interpretation shows some analogies to Heidegger’s concept of the image, when he argues for the pictorial character of all apparent reality. Fichte conceptualises this specific character of reality both as a generating principle and as something that both originates from and is related to a concept that is situated behind reality and cannot be visualised.Der Beitrag zeigt mit Blick auf die frühen und insbesondere spateren Schriften Fichtes und Heideggers eine Nahe zwischen beiden Denkern hinsichtlich ihrer Deutungen der Einbildungskraft und des Bildes auf. Zwar meint Heidegger 1929 zunächst, seine auf die Zeitlichkeit des Daseins bezogene Interpretation der Einbildungskraft in einen Gegensatz zu der vermögenstheoretischen Auslegung derselben im Idealismus und insbesondere bei Fichte rücken zu müssen. Doch lässt sich bei ihm zugleich auch ein affirmatives Heranziehen des Einbildungsbegriffes analog zu Fichte beobachten, insofern er ihn in den dreißiger Jahren sogar zur Beschreibung des unverfügbaren ‚Ereignissesʻ des Seins heranzieht. Trotz seiner vehementen Kritik des neuzeitlichen Begreifens der ‚Welt als Bildʻ kennt überdies auch Heidegger einen positiven Bildbegriff, den er für die Kunst einklagt, die im ‚Ge-bildʻ das ‚Geschehen der Wahrheitʻ offenzulegen vermöge. Umgekehrt lässt sich auch schon beim frühen Fichte eine Interpretation der Einbildungskraft nachweisen, die diese als eine Zeit generierende und dem Ich vorgelagerte Struktur herausstellt. Doch erst nach 1800 betont Fichte ähnlich wie Heidegger die bildliche Verfasstheit aller erscheinenden Wirklichkeit, welche er in ihrem Werdecharakter sowie in ihrer Verwiesenheit auf und Abkünftigkeit von etwas dahinter noch zu Situierendem und nicht zu Verbildlichendem herauszustellen sucht.
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Sampath, Rajesh. "Ecstatic Temporality and Transcendence in Section 65 of Chapter III and Section 69 of Chapter IV in Relation to Ontological Movement in Section 74 of Chapter V in Division Two of Heidegger’s Being and Time (1927), Part I." Symposion 11, no. 1 (2024): 49–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/symposion20241115.
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This first article is part of a two-article series labeled Parts I and II. In Part I, we will attempt a close reading of Division Two of Heidegger’s greatest work, Being and Time (1927). We will execute a granular analysis of a few lines and phrases in section 65 in Chapter III, section 69 in Chapter IV, and sections 72 and 74 in Chapter V; those sections cover ‘primordial ecstatic, finite, unified, authentic temporality’ (Heidegger 1962, 380) and the ‘equiprimordiality of the unity of the ecstases’ (Heidegger 1962, 378), ‘the whitherings and horizontal schemas,’ (Heidegger 1962, 416), and the ontological distinction of movement/Bewegtheit and the Western metaphysical tradition on spatialized motion/Bewegung (Heidegger 1962, 427) respectively. Attempting to show the connectedness of these problems in a manner different from Being and Time, itself, requires a bracketing of how we renew our engagement with Plato, Aristotle, and Hegel even after Heidegger’s attempted ‘destruction’ (Heidegger 1962, 41) of the ontological and metaphysical traditions of the West. We want to set up the possibility of reengaging Heidegger on a cryptic moment in the 1962 English translators’ footnote on the ‘swoon’ and ‘clairvoyance’ (Heidegger 1962, 436) that immediately precedes Heidegger’s great articulation of the ‘moment of vision for its time’ and the possibility of an ‘authentic understanding of fate, which is historicality’ (Heidegger 1962, 437). In Part I, we will resume the possibility of an abstract metaphysical undertaking about a four-dimensional temporality that Heidegger could not and did not articulate in Being and Time. This first article constitutes Part I, which then sets up Part II to appear in a second article. In the second article, we will attempt a direct appropriation of Hegel’s The Science of Logic (1813-1816), particularly on his enigmatic introduction of the term ‘quadruplicity’ (Hegel 2010, 746), which comes at the very end of his greatest and most complex work.
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Levan, Varrel, and Alvin Hadiwono. "KONSEP EKSISTENSI-OTENTIK HEIDEGGER DALAM ARSITEKTUR: SEBUAH RUANG UNTUK MEMAHAMI KEHIDUPAN MELALUI KEMATIAN." Jurnal Sains, Teknologi, Urban, Perancangan, Arsitektur (Stupa) 5, no. 2 (October 31, 2023): 889–900. http://dx.doi.org/10.24912/stupa.v5i2.24241.
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This research is based on an architectural design that focuses on empathy towards humans who lose themselves in daily life. The design aims to provide a reflection experience on human existence through programs based on Heidegger's concepts. The purpose of this study is to investigate how to create space for visitors to contemplate and realize their own existence through different experiences and carefully designed spatial arrangements. The research is conducted by studying Heidegger's concepts and how architecture can assist humans in reflecting on their existence. The use of architectural design methods based on Heidegger's concepts and visitors' experiences is employed to achieve the objective, based on spatial perception methods. In daily life, humans often forget their existence and attachment to the surrounding environment. This research aims to result in an architecture project that is able to give a deep reflective experience for the visitors to contemplate and realize their existence based on Heidegger’s concept. Keywords: authentic-existence; being; routinity Abstrak Penelitian ini didasarkan pada sebuah rancangan arsitektur yang berfokus pada empati terhadap manusia yang kehilangan dirinya dalam keseharian. Rancangan ini berusaha memberikan pengalaman refleksi terhadap diri dan eksistensi manusia melalui program-program yang didasarkan pada konsep-konsep Heidegger. Tujuan dari penelitian ini adalah untuk mempelajari bagaimana cara memberikan ruang bagi pengunjung untuk merenungkan dan menyadari eksistensi mereka sendiri melalui pengalaman yang berbeda dan pengaturan ruang yang dirancang. Penelitian dilakukan dengan mengkaji konsep-konsep Heidegger dan bagaimana arsitektur dapat membantu manusia merenungkan eksistensinya. Penggunaan metode desain arsitektur yang berbasis pada konsep-konsep Heidegger dan pengalaman pengunjung dilakukan untuk mencapai tujuan tersebut, didasarkan dengan metode persepsi spasial. Dalam kehidupan sehari-hari, manusia seringkali lupa untuk memperhatikan eksistensi dan keterikatan mereka dengan lingkungan sekitar. Penelitian ini bertujuan memberikan hasil berupa rancangan arsitektur yang dapat memberikan pengalaman refleksi yang mendalam bagi pengunjung untuk merenungkan dan menyadari eksistensi mereka berdasarkan konsep Heidegger. Diharapkan bahwa rancangan ini dapat memperluas pemahaman manusia tentang keterikatan mereka dengan lingkungan sekitar dan memberikan kesadaran yang lebih dalam tentang eksistensi mereka.
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Dea, Shannon. "Heidegger and Galileo’s Slippery Slope." Dialogue 48, no. 1 (March 2009): 59–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217309090040.
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ABSTRACT: In Die Frage nach dem Ding, Martin Heidegger characterizes Galileo as an important transitional figure in the struggle to replace the Aristotelian conception of nature with that of Newton. However, Heidegger only attends to Galileo’s modernity and not to those Aristotelian elements still discernible in Galileo’s work. This article fleshes out both aspects in Galileo in light of Heidegger’s discussion. It concludes by arguing that the lacuna in Heidegger’s account of Galileo is the consequence of Heidegger’s own self-conscious modernity − a modernity that he slyly hints at in a remark he makes in FD concerning Galileo and Democritus.
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Remhof, Justin. "Sartre’s Challenge to Idealism in Heidegger." Heidegger Circle Proceedings 53 (2019): 343–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/heideggercircle20195330.
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In the Introduction to Being and Nothingness, Sartre provides what he calls an “ontological proof” that purports to undermine Heidegger’s idealist view that the existence of objects is constitutively dependent on our characteristically human mode of existence. In this paper, I introduce an interpretation of Heidegger’s idealism, develop Sartre’s criticism of Heidegger, and explore a promising way Heidegger might respond. It will emerge that Heidegger’s idealism, if understood correctly as embracing a modal commitment central to Kantian idealism, survives Sartre’s ontological proof.
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Kaufmann, Sebastian. "Der Wille zur Macht, die ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen und das Sein des Seienden. Heideggers „Aus-einander-setzung“ mit Nietzsche." Nietzsche-Studien 47, no. 1 (November 1, 2018): 272–313. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/nietzstu-2018-0011.
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Abstract Will to Power, Eternal Recurrence, and the Being of Entities. Heidegger’s “Aus-einander-setzung” with Nietzsche. The article examines the internal dynamics of Heidegger’s influential interpretation of Nietzsche, focusing on his lectures written between 1936 and 1942, which form the basis for Heidegger’s two-volume book Nietzsche, first published in 1961. Speaking of Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche is potentially misleading, however, since Heidegger gave a series of different interpretations that contradict one another in some essential points. In the first two lectures from 1936/37, we can still observe a far-reaching identification with Nietzsche as the mastermind of a ‘new beginning’ in the ‘history of being’. Nevertheless, shortly afterwards, Heidegger makes Nietzsche’s metaphysics responsible for the domination of modern technology and thus for the last stage of the ‘forgetting of being’. As such, Heidegger no longer views Nietzsche as a thinker of ‘transition’, but merely as the philosophical founder of a hopeless ‘end time’. Against this backdrop, and after the Second World War, Heidegger declared that this particular critique of Nietzsche entailed an “intellectual resistance” against National Socialism. This assertion is discussed at the end of the article together with Heidegger’s rapprochement with Nietzsche during the early 1950s.
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Ireland, Julia A. "Heidegger and the Critics." Heidegger Circle Proceedings 55 (2021): 188–210. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/heideggercircle20215513.
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This paper uses the unpublished correspondence between Heidegger and Eduard Lachmann to contextualize Heidegger’s 1939 talk “‘Wie wenn am Feiertage…,’” which has been the focus of an excoriating critical response to Heidegger’s Hölderlinrezeption. Contra the protestations of critics like Paul de Man, the paper shows that Heidegger was fully aware of the intricacies of the hymn’s final manuscript page, using the correspondence with Lachmann to offer a reading of Heidegger’s inclusion of the variant referring to Semele’s ashes. It argues that Heidegger’s characterization of Semele’s incineration as a “Gegenspiel,” or counter-play, orients the possibility of a reception “without danger” that collapses the event of the hymn’s language into the treatment of the poem as an objective text. The paper’s central claim is that “danger” orients the mortal finitude of the hymn’s reception, whose excess as text becomes readable only against the testimony of Semele’s ashes.
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Gordon, Peter Eli. "Between Logic and Politics: Three Recent Books on Heidegger." German Politics and Society 19, no. 4 (December 1, 2001): 96–114. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/104503001782486263.
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Julian Young, Heidegger, philosophy, Nazism (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997)Herman Philipse, Heidegger’s Philosophy of Being: A Critical Interpretation. (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1998)Michael Friedman, A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger (Chicago: Open Court, 2000)
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Patkul, Andrei B. "Vasily Sesemann’s Review of “Being and Time” of Martin Heidegger: analytical commentary." RUDN Journal of Philosophy 27, no. 1 (March 30, 2023): 7–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.22363/2313-2302-2023-27-1-7-18.
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In my paper, I give an analytical commentary on Vasily Sesemann’s review of Martin Heidegger's treatise Being and Time (1927) published in the journal entitled The Way in 1928. The aim of this commentary is to evaluate the adequacy of Sesemann’s perception of Heidegger’s thought and the acceptability of his review for today’s reception of the Heideggerian ontological project. In my text, I state that Sesemann accurately fixes the transcendent essence of Heidegger’s ontological investigation, its basic theme and the main stages of its explication. In this regard, the Sesemann’s evaluation of the project of fundamental ontology in Heidegger is much closer to the very idea of this project in comparison to the evaluations of it given by both Edmund Husserl and Nicolai Hartmann. Sesemann also offered several successful or - at least - original translations of Heideggerian terms into Russian. Since he understands the incompleteness of the project, the results of which were presented in the initial divisions of Being and Time, Sesemann remains very far from being able to provide a final judgement about it. And yet, he points out the key achievements of Heidegger: the special significance of the differentiation of the ways of being of Dasein and the inner-worldly entities, emphasis of care-structure, which allows to grasp Dasein in its integrity and systemic essence of Heidegger’s work. I also acknowledge that although the interpretation proposed by Sesemann contains some weaknesses, f.i., the interpretation of Dasein as being-awareness and the neo-Kantian understanding of the systematic essence of the ontology of Heidegger, the review written by Vasily Sesemann is highly keen and may be valid for reception of Heideggerian philosophy up to nowadays.
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Xia, Yu. "What Is Metaphysics? Heidegger’s Evolving Account of Metaphysics." Symposion 10, no. 2 (2023): 275–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/symposion202310216.
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In this paper, I deal with Heidegger’s evolving account of metaphysics, since Heidegger’s persistent concern, the question of being, is a basic metaphysical question. To date, most Heidegger scholars have focused only on a particular stage of Heidegger’s philosophy: either his early attempt to deconstruct metaphysics, or his efforts to overcome metaphysics in the 1930s, or his late embrace of ‘releasement’ from metaphysics. However, these limited approaches fail to address Heidegger’s different understandings of metaphysics, which lie at the root of his changing approaches to the question of being. They also fail to explain whether there is any inner connection between the various approaches. Further, given Heidegger’s unremittingly negative attitude towards metaphysics, some scholars have even maintained that Heidegger thought it both possible and desirable to leave metaphysics behind altogether. I address these issues first by arguing that metaphysics for Heidegger has three interconnected meanings: initially it is the representation of the totality of things that are present-at-hand, a view subsequently developed into subjective representational thinking, and finally radicalized into an expression of the will to power. At each stage, Heidegger critiques the metaphysical tradition but never claims that it can be fully eliminated, since it is a mode of Dasein’s being and ultimately possiblized by being itself. For this reason, Heidegger’s own philosophy of being remains inseparable from metaphysics.
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Bahoh, James. "Heidegger’s “produktive Logik”." Heidegger Circle Proceedings 50 (2016): 156–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/heideggercircle20165013.
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Beginning especially in the 1930s, Heidegger’s ontology famously and frequently used a great deal of obscure technical terminology. His use of this terminology has contributed to confusion in Heidegger scholarship and has been a target for many analytically minded philosophers. In this paper, I have two correlated goals. First, I hope to establish certain elements of a reconceived methodology for interpreting Heidegger, such that a consistent reconstruction of many of his seemingly bizarre concepts becomes possible. Rather than the dominant chronological approach according to which Heidegger’s various renditions of the ontological problematic are understood in relation to their position on the timeline of his career, I argue that these renditions should be arrayed along an axis of ground or what I call a “diagenic axis.” Making good sense of Heidegger’s obscure concepts requires reconstructing them in terms of their position in the methodological evolution of his project along a diagenic axis. Second, I hope to show why on the basis of this methodology a particularly obstinate line of critique of Heidegger goes wrong – the Carnapian critique, which captures the spirit of many who dismiss Heidegger on the basis of his difficult terminology. Accomplishing both of these goals, I argue, is dependent upon clarifying the methodological operation by which Heidegger’s ontology evolves and the role of the concept of ground in this evolution. In his early work, Heidegger provides a way of making sense of this evolution in terms of a “produktive Logik” characterizing his ontology.
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Ireland, Julia A. "Naming Φύσις and the “Inner Truth of National Socialism”: A New Archival Discovery." Research in Phenomenology 44, no. 3 (October 9, 2014): 315–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15691640-12341291.
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This article offers an interpretive reconstruction of Heidegger’s first reference to the “inner truth of National Socialism” in the 1934/35 lecture course, Hölderlin’s Hymns “Germania” and “The Rhine” (Gesamtausgabe 39), which has remained unknown due to an editorial error. Focusing on the distinction Heidegger draws between Greek φύσις and natural science, it examines the way Heidegger conceives politics more originally through Hölderlin and the naming force of Nature. It then contextualizes Heidegger’s specific reference to National Socialism in terms of the then contemporary debate between liberalism and the racially determined “new science,” arguing that Heidegger thinks the “inner truth of National Socialism” as a φύσις-event.
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Leng, Xin. "Martin Heidegger on Primordial Christian Life Experience: A Phenomenological Theological Perspective." Religions 13, no. 11 (November 10, 2022): 1082. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel13111082.
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Through his phenomenological interpretation of Paul’s letters, Martin Heidegger developed the Lutheran idea about Christian life experience as an experience of conversion, and argues that the Christian religiosity is rooted in the temporality of primordial Christian life experience as the expectation towards the Parousia. Heidegger also suggests that the Hellenic metaphysics are alien to primordial Christianity, therefore he is devoted to erasing Hellenic metaphysics from Christianity. Through his phenomenological interpretation of Saint Augustine, Heidegger deconstructs the value system and theology originated from Hellenic metaphysics by illustrating the existence of Dasein. In this article we will inspect Heidegger’s religious phenomenon and propose our own views about the essence of Heidegger’s primordial Christianity.
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Shah, Syed Alam. "HEIDEGGER’S READINGS OF KANT: APPROPRIATION OF TIME AND SPACE THROUGH UNDERSTANDING THE HISTORICITY OF DA-SEIN AS BEING-IN-THE-WORLD." Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities 54, no. 2 (December 31, 2015): 81–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.46568/jssh.v54i2.121.
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Heidegger’s reading of Kant is deciphered to have illuminated his own project concerning the basic question of Ontology, Time, Space and History [Temporality, Spatiality and Historicity] embodying the novel description of Human reality in terms of Mit-Dasein and Mit-welt [Subjectivity with the public face]. Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason led Heidegger develop his own project of Existential Phenomenology contrary to Husserilian Phenomenology. We will discuss the Kantian Heidegger following the two main issues: one, Heidegger appreciates Kant on his identifying and exploring the difference of ontic/ontological. Two, Kant prioritizes time over space. Heidegger would explore the subject of ontic/ontological difference in the sense that ontic knowledge is the knowledge of particular beings, whereas ontological knowledge is described as the a priori condition inferring the ontic knowledge. In this sense ontological knowledge pertains to question of being rather than beings. This is how Heidegger’s Kant interpretation would differ from the Neo-Kantianism of Marburg School which argued that Critique of Pure Reason is a work of epistemology. In contrast to this position, Heidegger held that Critique is a unique work of transcendental philosophy; it is theory of ontological knowledge but not ontic knowledge. Ontic knowledge of beings must conform to Being of beings [ontological foundation]. Heidegger holds that this should be Kant’s “Copernican Revolution”. However, Heidegger would appropriate the Kantian notion of time in the form of temporality of Dasein. Being manifests itself on beings through Being-there [Human reality] who purely understands Being. For Heidegger, temporality of Dasein is the foundation of ontological knowledge indeed.
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Jani, Anna. "God as “The Highest and Most Elevated Thing”: Contributions to the Theological, Phenomenological Interpretations of God-Experiences in Heidegger, Conrad-Martius, and Stein." Religions 14, no. 8 (August 19, 2023): 1064. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel14081064.
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Maybe the most divisive topic of the Heideggerian reception is whether the question of God is part of the disclosure of being in Heidegger’s thinking, or if Heidegger rather obscures the phenomenological inquiry on God by way of his questions on being and his reinterpretation of the meaning of being as historical beyng. It is not accidental that Hedwig Conrad-Martius, the contemporary of Heidegger, writes in her critique on Being and Time that it is “like when, with tremendous force of wise prudence and unflagging tenacity, a door that has been closed for a long time and is almost impossible to open is blown open and then immediately slammed shut again, locked, and barricaded so tightly that it seems impossible to open it again.” (Cf. Heideggers ‘Sein und Zeit’). Unfortunately, the different stages of Heidegger’s thinking do not help further clarify the question of whether it is a conscious program of Heideggerian thinking to involve theological questions into the fundamental ontological analysis of being, if it follows from his theological background and from the relation to theology (as a positivistic science in Heidegger’s sense), or if that he includes theological knowledges into his thinking and shows a critical turn against the theological statements. Heidegger’s reflections on his own thinking in relation to theological questions and his influence on the Munich–Göttingen Phenomenology raises the present argumentation for the common phenomenological interpretation of God-Experiences.
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Therezo, Rodrigo. "Doublings." Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 24, no. 1 (2019): 239–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/epoche20191119153.
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This article attempts to read the very concept of reading as articulated and problematized by Derrida’s newly discovered Geschlecht III. I argue that Derrida enacts a reading of Heidegger in Geschlecht III in ways that help us understand the strong sense Derrida gives this word. In the article’s first part, I dwell on Derrida’s—and Heidegger’s—(quasi)methodological precautions that problematize the traditional concept of reading so as to open the way for a reading of Heidegger that does not bank on the metaphysical presuppositions the very same Heidegger warns us against time and again. In the second part, I turn to Derrida’s topotypological examples that show us what traditional methodology problematically presupposes when “reading” Heidegger. The article ends by turning to the Derridean notion of “overprinting”—and the uncanny effects of doubling it implies—as a way to think about what it means to read and countersign Heidegger’s text.
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Congdon, David W. "Is Bultmann a Heideggerian theologian?" Scottish Journal of Theology 70, no. 1 (February 2017): 19–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0036930616000454.
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AbstractEver since the 1920s, Rudolf Bultmann has been charged with confining theology to philosophy, owing to his naïve adoption of Martin Heidegger's existentialist ontology. Bultmann's personal friendship with Heidegger is well-known, and the presence of Heideggerian concepts throughout his work is impossible to miss. But there is a great deal of confusion over the details of this relationship, and scholars differ widely over what conclusions we ought to draw regarding the nature of Bultmann's work. This article reassesses the Bultmann–Heidegger relationship from three angles. First, I show that the essential elements of Bultmann's theology were already in place before he met or learnt from Heidegger. Second, I argue that Bultmann circumscribes Heidegger's philosophy within a theology of revelation. Third, I demonstrate that his theological programme is, in principle, open to other conceptualities. Since nothing material rests on the appropriation of Heidegger, one cannot accurately call Bultmann a Heideggerian theologian.
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Béland, Martine. "Heidegger en dialogue: par-delà Ernst Jünger, un retour à Nietzsche." Dialogue 45, no. 2 (2006): 285–305. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300000573.
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ABSTRACTThis article investigates Martin Heidegger's intellectual relation to Ernst Jünger. In order to show that Heidegger's appraisal of Jünger is directly related to his understanding of Nietzsche's pre-eminent standing in the history of Western philosophy, I situate Jünger in the Heideggerian reconstruction of the history of metaphysics. It is because Jünger belongs to the Nietzschean paradigm that Heidegger believes he is worth reading—but also worth criticizing. Indeed, Jünger did not overtake the philosophical project that Nietzsche made possible by accomplishing the end of metaphysics. This is the very project adopted by Heidegger, first by thinking beyond metaphysics, and second by hoping Germany would turn towards a spiritual renewal of its civilization. Thus, since Nietzsche is the central figure who stands between Heidegger and Jünger, this article wishes to show that through his critical reading of Jünger, Heidegger in fact fosters a fundamental and uninterrupted dialogue with Nietzsche.
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Yáñez, Ángel Xolocotzi. "Intentional ontology. Heidegger and the transformation of Husserlian phenomenology." Phainomenon 24, no. 1 (April 1, 2012): 27–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/phainomenon-2012-0003.
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Abstract lntentional ontology. Heidegger and the transformation of Husserlian phenomenology. The article will look inside in what Heidegger said in his first course in Marburgo about the issue of intentionality as the basis for a “fundamental ontological investigation.” Through the first Heidegger’s lessons, especially Freiburg, aspects of the Husserl’s idea of intentionality who suffered a hermeneutic appropriation by Heidegger, will be deployed. The text will focus on the relationship between Husserl’s intentionality and categorial intuition in order to interpret them through the light of hermeneutic and understanding intuition that Heidegger speaks in his 1919’s Kriegsnotsemester.
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Capobianco, Richard. "Bill Richardson’s (Future) Legacy." Heidegger Circle Proceedings 50 (2016): 1–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/heideggercircle2016501.
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Bill Richardson’s masterwork Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought was first published in 1963. What follows is fully informed by his guiding and enduring insight: the “turn” (die Kehre) in Heidegger’s thinking, which, Bill referred to—in his memorable heuristic expression—as “Heidegger I” and “Heidegger II.” From his book: “For the shift of focus from There-being to Being…was demanded…as soon as it became clear [to Heidegger] that the primacy of the Being-process belongs to Being itself” (HTPT, 624). Let us see how Bill’s basic reading is further borne out and underscored in the recently published Black Notebooks.
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Lacoste, Jean-Yves. "Heidegger among the Theologians." Journal for Continental Philosophy of Religion 2, no. 2 (December 10, 2020): 159–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/25889613-00202002.
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Abstract In this article, Jean-Yves Lacoste lays out the central moments of Heidegger’s complicated relationship to Christian thinking, from his earliest studies under Carl Braig up to his death in 1976. With careful attention to personal letters, scholarly reviews, conferences, as well as major texts, Lacoste shows that this influence was mostly in one direction: despite the eagerness of theology to engage with Heidegger, Heidegger continually demonstrated reticence to approach theology except strictly on his own terms. The article closes with a retrospective evaluation of the central themes of the original Heidegger et la Question de Dieu volume, which took up this investigation in France in 1979. Despite the fact that its publication predated many of Heidegger’s essential texts on this theme, these essays, in Lacoste’s estimation, remain a “perfectly timeless” resource for those seeking to understand the place of God within phenomenology.
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Hilt, Annette, Ralf Becker, Pascal Delhom, Thomas Franz, and Patrick Baur. "Buchbesprechungen." Phänomenologische Forschungen 2006, no. 1 (2006): 223–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.28937/1000107932.
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Ina Schmidt: Vom Leben zum Sein. Der frühe Martin Heidegger und die Lebensphilosophie; Julia Jonas: Der phänomenologische Text. Eine Studie zu Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger und Franz Kafka; Rudi Visker: The inhuman condition. Looking for difference after Levinas and Heidegger; Anselm Böhmer (Hg.): Eugen Fink. Sozialphilosophie – Anthropologie – Kosmologie– Pädagogik – Methodik; Frank Schalow: The incarnality of being. The earth, animals, and the body in Heidegger’s thought; Lambert Wiesing: Artifizielle Präsenz. Studien zur Philosophie des Bildes
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Czepiel, Anna. "Heidegger’s Manichaeism. Comments on Peter Trawny’s Heidegger and the Myth of a Jewish World Conspiracy." Argument: Biannual Philosophical Journal 7, no. 2 (December 1, 2017): 333–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.24917/20841043.7.2.10.
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Heidegger’s Manichaeism: Comments on Peter Trawny’s Heidegger and the myth of a Jewish world conspiracy. In the book Heidegger and the myth of a Jewish world conspiracy, Peter Trawny convincingly shows that anti-Semitism in Heidegger’s thought does not have the shape of the Nazi call for racial discrimination, but rather is a stereotypical and unfortunate element of Heidegger’s call for a transformation of thinking so that philosophy and the human attitude to life would be focused on Being itself (Seyn selbst) instead of beings (Seiendes). Despite the advantages of Trawny’s book, I think that Trawny unlawfully tries to demonstrate that anti-Semitism is the main ethical and political problem of Heideggerian philosophy, while in my opinion the main problem is Heidegger’s “being-historical Manichaeism” — a phenomenon which is only marginally evoked by Trawny. This Manichaeism brings Heidegger to criticize the values of human subjectivity, personality and social and economic self-security as the en-emies of Being. These views not only can have severe political collectivist implications, but — to put it in the terminology of Sein und Zeit — they also make Heidegger speak in the manner of the conservative variant of “idle talk” (Gerede) of “the they” (das Man).
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Risser, James. "Heidegger’s Ethics of History (with reference to Agamben)." Heidegger Circle Proceedings 48 (2014): 140–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/heideggercircle20144813.
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Does Heidegger have an ethics of history? The very idea of an ethics of history, especially in regards to Heidegger’s work, appears to make little sense. For Heidegger, history is always the history of being, and, as we learn from the “Letter on Humanism,” the nature of ethics has yet to be fully determined. And yet, if we follow Heidegger is his way of determining the ethical in relation to *thos, we can in fact begin to speak of Heidegger’s ethics of history. Towards this end, I want to further interpret his characterization of *thos, especially as it is presented through the saying of Heraclitus, and extend the interpretation through the work of Giorgio Agamben.
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McManus, Denis. "Error, Hallucination and the Concept of ‘Ontology’ in the Early Work of Heidegger." Philosophy 71, no. 278 (October 1996): 553–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s003181910005347x.
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Recently the attempt has been made to demonstrate Heidegger's relevance to the concerns of analytic philosophers. A focus for this effort has been the criticism in his early work of Cartesian ontology. While a number of important works have mapped out this area of Heidegger's thought, a crucial task has not been carried out, namely that of assessing how Heidegger can accommodate those phenomena which motivate the Cartesian to adopt his highly counter-intuitive ontology. As long as we fail to examine how Heidegger's early ontology copes with the possibilities of error and of hallucination, the suspicion will remain that Heidegger is simply insensitive to those phenomena on which the Cartesian focuses. Neither Heidegger nor the Cartesian have been done any favours by commentators showing little inclination to bring the opponents into closer combat. This paper attempts to correct that omission.
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Gyllenhammer, Paul. "Heidegger’s Epicureanism." Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual 9 (2019): 60–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/gatherings201994.
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Heidegger and Epicurus seem to be separated by a great divide. Where Epicurus seeks ataraxia by minimizing anxiety and our concern with death, Heidegger describes how anxiety and death are factored into authentic living. But looks can be deceiving. A close study of Heidegger’s critique of das Man reveals a distinctly Epicurean line of thinking. His account of curiosity, in particular, parallels Epicurus’s own criticism of normal life as being mired in unnatural/empty desires due to an unconscious fear of death. Despite this similarity, Heidegger’s interest in ontological anxiety, i.e., homelessness, contrasts deeply with Epicurus’s goal of mental tranquility. Yet this difference is overcome, in part, in Heidegger’s turn to peaceful dwelling as an expression of authentic Being-in-the-world. Indeed, Heidegger’s account of the fourfold as the essence of dwelling can be seen as an Epicurean four-part cure to suffering (tetrapharmakos), bringing Heidegger into dialogue with the tradition of philosophical therapy.