Academic literature on the topic 'Heidegger's phenomenology of boredom'
Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles
Consult the lists of relevant articles, books, theses, conference reports, and other scholarly sources on the topic 'Heidegger's phenomenology of boredom.'
Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.
You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.
Journal articles on the topic "Heidegger's phenomenology of boredom"
1
Sodeika, Tomas. "Martin Heidegger’s Phenomenology of Boredom and Zen Practice." Dialogue and Universalism 30, no. 3 (2020): 205–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/du202030343.
Full textAbstract:
In this article, Martin Heidegger’s phenomenology of boredom is compared with some aspects of Zen practice. Heidegger is primarily interested in boredom as a “fundamental mood,” which takes us beyond the opposition of the subject and object. Thus, boredom reveals the existence more initially than those forms of cognition that are the basis of classical philosophy and special sciences. As an essential feature of the experience of boredom, Heidegger singles out that being in this state we feel that our attention is held by something in which we find nothing but emptiness. In the article, this emptiness is compared with the Buddhist concept of shunyata, and various forms of experiencing boredom are paralleled with the different types of concentration achieved in Zen practice (samadhi). Besides, the question is discussed how the Buddhist perception of emptiness corresponds to Heidegger’s “openness.”
2
Stafford, Sue P., and Wanda Torres Gregory. "Heidegger's phenomenology of boredom, and the scientific investigation of conscious experience." Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5, no. 2 (June 22, 2006): 155–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11097-005-9007-6.
Full text
3
FEIJOO, Ana Maria Lopez Calvo De, and Paulo Victor Rodrigues Da COSTA. "Daseinsanálise e a Tonalidade Afetiva do Tédio: Diálogos entre Psicologia e Filosofia." PHENOMENOLOGICAL STUDIES - Revista da Abordagem Gestáltica 26, no. 3 (2020): 317–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.18065/2020v26n3.7.
Full textAbstract:
The aim of this article is to think, especially from the phenomenological-hermeneutic perspective, the relationship between the attunement of boredom and the daseinsanalysis. Such a thought arises explicitly with the German philosopher Martin Heidegger, making essential the relation between phenomenology and hermeneutics. From this, the possibility of a repositioning of understanding in relation to boredom arises: a solipsist interpretation is avoided and appears an historical interpretation of certain existential disorders that in the contemporary world need renewed interpretations. Philosophy emerges as a fundamental element of the dialogue in this new understanding of the phenomenon of boredom, unfortunately not yet thematized by the main authors of Daseinsanalysis.
4
Paley, John. "Meaning, lived experience, empathy and boredom: Max van Manen on phenomenology and Heidegger." Nursing Philosophy 19, no. 3 (April 11, 2018): e12211. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/nup.12211.
Full text
5
van Manen, Max. "Phenomenology in Its Original Sense." Qualitative Health Research 27, no. 6 (April 2, 2017): 810–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1049732317699381.
Full textAbstract:
In this article, I try to think through the question, “What distinguishes phenomenology in its original sense?” My intent is to focus on the project and methodology of phenomenology in a manner that is not overly technical and that may help others to further elaborate on or question the singular features that make phenomenology into a unique qualitative form of inquiry. I pay special attention to the notion of “lived” in the phenomenological term “lived experience” to demonstrate its critical role and significance for understanding phenomenological reflection, meaning, analysis, and insights. I also attend to the kind of experiential material that is needed to focus on a genuine phenomenological question that should guide any specific research project. Heidegger, van den Berg, and Marion provide some poignant exemplars of the use of narrative “examples” in phenomenological explorations of the phenomena of “boredom,” “conversation,” and “the meaningful look in eye-contact.” Only what is given or what gives itself in lived experience (or conscious awareness) are proper phenomenological “data” or “givens,” but these givens are not to be confused with data material that can be coded, sorted, abstracted, and accordingly analyzed in some “systematic” manner. The latter approach to experiential research may be appropriate and worthwhile for various types of qualitative inquiry but not for phenomenology in its original sense. Finally, I use the mythical figure of Kairos to show that the famous phenomenological couplet of the epoché-reduction aims for phenomenological insights that require experiential analysis and attentive (but serendipitous) methodical inquiry practices.
6
Gordon, Rivca. "Questioning Martin Heidegger's Thinking on Boredom." Philosophical Inquiry 25, no. 1 (2003): 125–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philinquiry2003251/210.
Full text
7
Garza, Gilbert. "A clarification of Heidegger's phenomenology." American Psychologist 61, no. 3 (2006): 255–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0003-066x.61.3.255.
Full text
8
Gorner, Paul. "Heidegger's Phenomenology as Transcendental Philosophy." International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10, no. 1 (January 2002): 17–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09672550110103109.
Full text
9
Kovacs, George. "Heidegger's Way to Hermeneutic Phenomenology." Research in Phenomenology 19, no. 1 (1989): 304–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156916489x00182.
Full text
10
Quaranta, Chiara. "A Cinema of Boredom: Heidegger, Cinematic Time and Spectatorship." Film-Philosophy 24, no. 1 (February 2020): 1–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/film.2020.0126.
Full textAbstract:
Boredom, in cinema as well as in our everyday experience, is usually associated with a generalised loss of meaning or interest. Accordingly, boredom is often perceived as that which ought to be avoided. In Martin Heidegger's philosophical inquiry, however, boredom is posited as one of the fundamental existential dispositions that provide access to the possibility of philosophising. My contention is that boredom can be a tool for understanding spectatorship in cinema and, in contrast to the ordinary perception of boredom as something to escape, it can be a stimulus for reflecting on the images before us. To this end, I focus on Heidegger's tripartition of boredom – “becoming bored by something,” “being bored with something,” and “profound boredom” – and the ways in which these forms can be significant to cinema. I then consider boredom's potential for film spectatorship, differentiating between mainstream entertainment cinema as a means to evading boredom and less immersive forms of cinema which allow for boredom to remain present. On the one hand, “profound boredom” disrupts the potentially alienated relationship between spectators and spectacle-images by opening up a time which becomes long – something which Isidore Isou's On Venom and Eternity (Traité de Bave et d'Éternité, 1951) and, less manifestly, Michelangelo Antonioni's L'Eclisse (1962) and Ingmar Bergman's Cries and Whispers (Viskningar och rop, 1972) deliberately arouse. Thus, profound boredom can be a tool to criticise the spectacularised image in the cinema, promoting a pensive spectatorship. On the other hand, the escapism endorsed by mainstream narrative cinema can dialectically reveal the contemporary anxiety of horror vacui, therefore turning boredom into a means for investigating our relationship with time and the image. This article ultimately argues that boredom – that from which we daily try to shy away – has the potential to un-conceal the ways we understand and interact with moving images in the world we currently inhabit.
Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Heidegger's phenomenology of boredom"
1
Bellingham, Robin. "A phenomenological and thematic interpretation of the experience of creativity." Click here to access this resource online, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/10292/432.
Full textAbstract:
Creativity is a nebulous concept, lacking both clear articulations and common understandings of meaning. Due to a lack of clear alternatives the concept of creativity is increasingly becoming infused with economically driven vocabulary, associations, interests and ideologies. There is an immediate need to provide alternatives to the „creative economy‟ view of creativity, because of its insidious effect on educational institutions and practices and because it promotes a generally impoverished view of the meaning of creativity and of human potential. Reductionist thought; the tendency to understand concepts as separate and distinct from one another prevents us from easily conceptualising an experience such as creativity which involves the simultaneous experience of seemingly paradoxical elements such as individuality and unity, intellect and intuition and freedom and discipline. Democracy is a metaphor which can help to articulate and understand the paradoxical experience of creativity. Democracy stands for the potential to make meaning from the integrated exploration of individuality and of unity, which I argue is a fundamental dynamic of the creative experience. I further suggest that the essence of the creative experience is a democratic attunement to existence, in which subject and object, self and environment, intellect and intuition and freedom and discipline are experienced as in a democratic relationship with one another. This way of understanding creativity provides an alternative to the creative economy view. It implies some significant changes to traditional educational emphases, including a movement away from primarily individualistically oriented curricula and toward curricula and educational values which situate the individual within an integrated eco-system.
2
Plate, Blomberg Jennie. "Den levda tråkigheten : En fenomenologisk undersökning av hur tråkighet kommer till uttryck i lärarvardagen." Thesis, Södertörns högskola, Centrum för praktisk kunskap, 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:sh:diva-45723.
Full textAbstract:
Detta är ett essäistiskt försök att fånga den flyktiga tråkigheten. Med fenomenologin som grund undersöks lärarens levda erfarenhet av tråkighet och hur den kommer till uttryck i hennes yrkesvardag. I skärningspunkten mellan två gestaltningar ur min lärarvardag, i filosofen Martin Heideggers tre former av tråkighet – uttråkad av, uttråkad med och djupgående tråkighet – och kultur- och utbildningsteoretisk forskning växer tre beskrivningar av 2020-talets lärare fram. För det första består en del av lärarens yrkesvardag i att förhålla sig till en samtid där delar av hennes yrkespraktik digitaliserats och den administrativa bördan successivt ökat. Med utgångspunkt i litteraturvetaren Eran Dorfmans jämförelse mellan Heideggers uttråkad med och det Dorfman vill kalla för tråkighetsutmattning argumenterar jag för att tråkighetsutmattningen är en fjärde form av tråkighet. I det gestaltade mötet med kollegan Assar träder en lärarvardag fram som visar hur lärare dels verkar i ett tidsligt limbo där tiden är påträngande och ständigt beräknad, dels upplever en tomhet trots att vardagen hela tiden fylls med ett flöde av digital stimuli. För det andra. Enligt Heidegger tvingar tråkigheten, framför allt den djupgående, oss till ett avbrott i vardagen och det han kallar för ”Mannet”, ett slags diffust ”de andra”. Den djupgående tråkigheten tvingar oss att lyssna till vårt autentiska jag och den vi skulle kunna vara. Sett ur en yrkespraktikers vardag undersöker jag hur relationen mellan tråkighet, ett autentiskt mer kreativt praktikerliv och min läraridentitet ser ut. Min undersökning visar bland annat att även om Mannet är starkt finns möjligheter till kreativa mikromotstånd för att värna om yrkesidentiteten. Men frågan är om motståndet är tillräckligt för att kunna nå en verklig autenticitet? Mot bakgrund av det som beskrivs i föregående avsnitt och i mötet med elever, kollegor och den egna läraridentiteten gör lärare etiska ställningstaganden. I det tredje avsnittet ges en beskrivning av relationen mellan tråkighet och de etiska ställningstaganden som lärare gör. Den bild som träder fram är komplex. Lärare gör många etiska val som ibland är motsägelsefulla. Som tidigare nämnts är Mannet starkt och för att lärare ska kunna värna om sin läraridentitet och göra kloka överväganden i mötet med elever – gestaltat i exemplet med eleven Pricken – behöver de gå samman för att bland annat kunna stå emot de krafter som förorsakar tråkighetsutmattning.This is an essayistic attempt to capture the elusive boredom. With phenomenology as a basis, the teacher's lived experience of boredom and how it is expressed in her professional everyday life is examined. At the intersection of some compositions from my everyday life as a teacher, in the philosopher Martin Heidegger's three forms of boredom – bored by, bored with and profound boredom – and cultural and educational theoretical research, three descriptions of teachers of the 2020s emerged. Firstly, part of the teacher's professional everyday life consists of relating to a time where parts of her professional practice have been digitized and the administrative burden has gradually increased. Based on the literary scholar Eran Dorfman's reading of Heidegger's bored with and what Dorfman wants to call boredom-fatigue I argue that boredom-fatigue is a fourth form of boredom. In the described meeting with my colleague Assar, a teacher's everyday life emerges that shows how teachers work in a temporary limbo where time is intrusive and constantly calculated, and how they experience an emptiness even though everyday life is constantly filled with a flow of digital stimuli. Secondly. According to Heidegger, boredom, especially the profound one, forces us to take a break from everyday life and what he calls “the They”, a kind of diffuse "the others". The profound boredom forces us to listen to our authentic selves and who we could be. Seen from the everyday life of a professional practitioner, I examine what the relationship between boredom, an authentically more creative practitioner life, and my teacher identity looks like. My study shows that even though “the They” is strong, there are opportunities for creative micro-resistance to, among other things, protect the professional identity. But the question is whether the resistance is sufficient to achieve true authenticity? In the light of what is described in the previous sections and the encounters with students, colleagues, and one’s own teacher identity, teachers make ethical positions. The third section describes the relationship between boredom and the ethical positions that teachers make. The picture that emerges is complex. Teachers make many ethical choices that are sometimes contradictory. As previously mentioned, “the They” is strong and for teachers to be able to protect their teacher identity and make wise considerations in the encounters with students – for example with the student I call Pricken – they need to come together to be able to withstand the forces that cause boredom-fatigue.
3
Reynold's, Stephen. "Heidegger's introduction to the phenomenology of religion." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2009. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.530068.
Full text
4
Hadjioannou, Christos. "The emergence of mood in Heidegger's phenomenology." Thesis, University of Sussex, 2015. http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/58463/.
Full textAbstract:
This thesis offers a genealogical-exegetical account of Heidegger's phenomenology of mood (Stimmung), focusing on his Freiburg and Marburg lectures from 1919 to 1925. In Being and Time, moods manifest the transcendental factical ground of “thrownness” (Geworfenheit) in which an understanding of Being is constituted. However, throughout Heidegger's work, moods have operated as the ground for disclosure, the origin of authentic ontological understanding, the defining character of each historical epoch and as the enactmental urgency that will bring about an ‘other' beginning. This thesis contextualizes Heidegger's accounts of mood within the broader phenomenological project concerning the constitution and grounding of meaning. The first part of the thesis examines the neo-Kantian challenges to philosophy as well as Husserl's response. It further explores the problems Heidegger identifies in Husserl's phenomenology and shows how Heidegger offers a grounding of phenomenological understanding in lived experience, in order to provide a concrete account of a phenomenological “beginning” (Anfang). Heidegger's turn to affects constitutes a radicalization, rather than a repudiation, of Husserlian insights. The second part of the thesis explores Heidegger's earliest accounts of affective phenomena in his interpretations of St. Augustine and Aristotle, where the terminology of Being and Time is developed for the first time. This involves an analysis of Heidegger's accounts of love (Liebe) and joy (Freude) as they figure in the 1920 lecture course Phenomenology of Religious Experience, and analyses the emergence of Angst and other grounding moods (Grundstimmungen). The thesis then looks at Heidegger's early interpretation of Plato and Aristotle in the lecture courses immediately prior to Being and Time, where the technical notion of disposition (Befindlichkeit) emerges, as well as his first analysis of fear (Furcht).
5
Gibbs, Paul Thomas. "Time as a dimension in the consumption of financial services." Thesis, University of Southampton, 1995. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.295636.
Full text
6
Ruin, Hans. "Enigmatic origins : tracing the theme of historicity through Heidegger's works." Doctoral thesis, Stockholms universitet, Filosofiska institutionen, 1994. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-40008.
Full textAbstract:
The preoccupation with the "historicity" of thought and existence is central to thehermeneutic-phenomenological branch of modern philosophy. Its foremostrepresentative is Martin Heidegger, who in his main work Sein und Zeit (1927)developed a theory of historicity, according to which human beings not only exist inhistory, but are themselves historical. In subsequent writings Heidegger argued thatnot only man, but also truth and being, must be understood "historically" in aparticular sense. The meaning and the impHcations of Heidegger's "historicization" ofphilosophy are here analyzed along two parallel tracks: as a theory of the conditions ofphilosophical understanding; second, as an incentive to new ways of respondingphilosophically to these conditions. The study focuses on the sense of belongingwhich Heidegger assigns to historicity, as a dialogical relation to an enigmatic originthat cannot be exhaustively articulated, but to which understanding must neverthelessrespond in repetition and critique. The idea of the "hermeneutic situation," and what itmeans to occupy such a situation, is shown to be central in this regard. Heidegger's"historicization" of the philosophical territory is inte reted as an exemplary attempt topreserve philosophy as a quest for "origins" in the explicit recognition of theinterminable historical mediation of thinking. His approach leads to a criticalquestioning of fundamental philosophical distinctions, such as the temporal and theeternal, the absolute and the relative, subject and object, and of truth as correspondence.Eventually he is led to question the ability of language to express thehistoricity of thought and of being, which can only be indicated by means of conceptssuch as "moment" (Augenblick) and "event" (Ereignis). In seven chapters the themeof historicity is explored from different angles, which together provide a guide toHeidegger's path from a philosophy of life to a thinking of being in the "otherbeginning." The study covers the full range of his writings, but it emphasizes thedevelopment from the earliest lectures, over Sein und Zeit, to the second major work,Beiträge zur Philosophie (1938, published posthumously in 1989).
7
Amoah, Vida Maame Kissiwaa. "Heidegger's Hermeneutic Phenomenology and the Application to Ghanaian Women's Experiences of Unsuccessful Invitro Fertilisation (IVF) Treatment." Doctoral thesis, Faculty of Health Sciences, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/11427/32192.
Full textAbstract:
Ghanaian women experiencing infertility problem, have been seeking invitro fertilisation treatment in the quest for motherhood, however there is a dearth in the nursing studies researching this phenomenon. It appears that the concept and meanings of infertility is inadequately explored from the perspective of women experiences following unsuccessful invitro fertilisation treatment. In particular, it is vital to be knowledgeable about the challenges women encounter when undergoing IVF treatment and following unsuccessful procedure. The study sought to gain a deeper knowledge and to understand the meanings women struggling with infertility and its treatment experience and how invitro fertilisation treatment failure affects women in their everyday life. To unearth the women perception and meaning attributed to their experiences of unsuccessful infertility treatment, Heidegger's philosophy of phenomenology underpinned this study. A semistructured opening question and further probing questions were used to gather information which was reduced to sub-themes and main themes which captured the participant's lived experiences of unsuccessful invitro fertilisation treatment. I adopted van Manen's (1990) six steps of research activities as a structure to unravel the participants' phenomenological conversations. Applying Heidegger's concept of the three modes of existence (Existenze): authenticity, inauthenticity and undifferentiatedness, four major themes were identified: 1. Seeking wholistic and authentic care- authenticity 2. Facing up to the Angst- inauthenticity 3. The vulnerable self - inauthenticity 4. Living with infertility (being-in-the-world-of-motherless) - undifferentiatedness The participants' phenomenological conversations and their stories have revealed a range of challenges Ghanaian women who seek invitro fertilisation treatment go through. The study contribute significantly by giving insight to the painful experiences Ghanaian women go through when seeking invitro fertilisation treatment and has given a voice to how assisted reproductive technologies are currently experienced in the Ghanaian context. From the women's narrative, it appeared that their emotional and informational needs were not being met and were not being cared for as expected. The findings provide some direction regarding the needs of women experiencing infertility for information, support and advocacy in their pursuit of assisted reproductive technology services in Ghana. There is a critical need to simplify invitro fertilisation treatment and provision of safe, affordable procedure so that the average Ghanaian women can access it.
8
Weigelt, Charlotta. "The logic of life : Heidegger's retrieval of Aristotle's concept of Logos." Doctoral thesis, Stockholms universitet, Filosofiska institutionen, 2002. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-22358.
Full text
9
Atkins, Zohar. "Unframing existence : an ethical and theological appropriation of Heidegger's critique of modernity." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2014. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:4ddc46cd-b7be-46ad-beb4-5b51db89aaa1.
Full textAbstract:
This thesis argues that Heidegger’s thought offers crucial insights into the structural challenges that modernity poses to being an ethical and religious person. I argue that these difficulties come down to an instrumentalist conception of truth, a denial or repression of finitude as the condition of meaningfulness, and a philosophical anthropology that is both too subjectivistic and too objectivistic. Yet while Heidegger was good on the diagnosis, he was reluctant to give more than digressive and opaque prescriptions to these problems. My thesis seeks to respond to this lacuna by putting Heidegger’s critical observations in the service of articulating a positive religious ethics. To that end, it seeks to locate—as well as redefine from an ontological perspective—the human dispositions and practices that expose truth in a non-instrumental light, that show finitude as a positive condition of meaningfulness, and that reveal the essence of the human being in non-subjectivist and non- objectivist terms. I argue that these include listening and gratitude—dispositions and practices I claim should form the backbone of any religious ethics, and yet which I also claim should not be limited to those who believe in a personal, theistic God. My thesis contributes to the fields of modern theology and Heidegger Studies in four ways. First, it shows that Heidegger’s critics (such as Levinas and Adorno) are wrong to oppose ontology to ethics. Second, it shows that Heidegger’s critics (such as Marion and Jonas) are wrong to oppose ontology to theology. Third, it shows that Heidegger’s own ambivalence about the ethical and theological relevance of his thought allows for the development of a deeply ethical and theological posture. And fourth, it offers a unique, post-Heideggerian interpretation of gratitude, one in which it is understood as a structure of Dasein that is both “always already” and “not yet” operative.
10
Arvanitopoulos, Michael. "The Statue that Houses the Temple: A Phenomenological Investigation of Western Embodiment Towards the Making of Heidegger's Missing Connection with the Greeks." Scholar Commons, 2016. http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/6170.
Full textAbstract:
Much of the criticism Heidegger has drawn from realism, from postmodernism and even existentialism, as well from the anti-Nazi protests on his philosophy, could be diluted if a defaulted connection was made between Heidegger's metaphysics and the Greeks. Being and Time drafted the blueprint of the origin of predication and world-disclosure from the primordial intuition of the limitations of action in the face of human finitude. This existential reprioritization forced a radical reversal of primacy from nature to culture, having assumed the absolute objectivity of some original world determinacy, the phenomenological structure of which, nevertheless, was never produced in Heidegger’s seminal work or thereafter.
Existentialism has thus been downplayed as a counterintuitive, fanciful hypothesis, and will remain so for as long as horizontal temporality has not made itself available to itself as a negated object of perception in the horizon of disclosure. The objectified subjectivity of Dasein’s cultural bias should be demonstrable, if there is indeed a determinant even firmer and “causally prior” to the object of perception in reified nature. And the theory of freedom that is existentialism will remain a “theory” with a private definition of the term, if both the phenomenological structures of the “objectification” of subjectivity have not appeared: first as the objectivity of freedom that is absolute and universal, but no less than as the object that frees made up from nothing other than the absolute and universal objectivity of freedom.
Heidegger must have felt this most pressing shortcoming in his metaphysics, because in a later monumental work, The Origin of the Work of Art, he avowed of such an object that is both the programmatic manifesto of freedom, and frees, pointing to the Greek Doric temple. He must have realized that the highest objectification of Dasein’s volatile subjectivity was somehow of “Greek” origin, and as I will argue, in this assumption alone he was right. But his proof was premised therein in an incomplete, trivial and self-contradictory way that left exposed to counter-entrenchment his arguments over both the attribution of the origin of reality, and consequently also its subjective constitution. From this point on, existentialism has remained doggedly problematic, if not inconsequential, in being unconnected to its bloodline, that is, phenomenology, and inasmuch as Heidegger’s incomplete metaphysics has remained unconnected to his miscued art theory.
My hermeneutic method seeks this elusive, twofold objectification of subjectivity, in order to justify existentialism by simultaneously making the missing connections between Heidegger and the Greeks, and between Being and Time and The Origin of the Work of Art. The connections I am suggesting are both necessary and possible, provided that Heidegger’s theory of art is modified to grant monumental statuary its due hermeneutic primacy.
Heidegger attributed the disclosure of world in truth-as-untruth to poetry and architecture, while Gadamer, who advanced Heidegger’s phenomenology to the currently predominant hermeneutic theory, also gave primacy to poetry and architecture. Their mistake is critical, because, as I will argue, Greek statuary is the patent twofold objectification of Dasein’s existential analytic, it is the convergence point of evidence to infer Heidegger’s missing theory of embodiment, and it is the ultimate origin of Western metaphysics.
Current theories of embodiment, including Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological case from where a missing dialogue has been attempted to derive Heidegger's theory of embodiment, typically confine themselves to Dasein’s ontological and ontic corporeality. I suggest that such theories should have addressed the necessity of the structures of Reason to incarnate themselves as the fundamental ontological prescriptions of perception. To address the necessity of this incarnation in monumental art as a primordial world disclosure, is to explore in this work a previously untapped tripartite hermeneutic conjecture, where theory of art and theory of embodiment are already theories of perception.
My hermeneutic hypothesis adheres to, corroborates and advances basic phenomenological principles, to show how Dasein’s embodied structures in the exclusivity of Greek statuary have so far been misunderstood, decontextualized, and begged the question, accordingly as a “mystery” (Hegel), as “godly” (von Humboldt), as a “misunderstanding” (Buschor), or as “Greek naturalism” (art historians).
Special attention will be paid to works such as the Laokoön Group, the Ptoan Apollo, the Blond Youth, the Zeus of Artemision and the Gigantomachy. I argue that these cultural fossils provide the most reliable grounds for a thorough commentary to Heidegger’s implied theory of embodiment, because they manifest as the art which relates most intimately to the instrumental modality through which the being-towards-death makes itself phenomenologically available to itself as the negation of the negation to live. Additionally, and in a postmodern world of academic wars that have claimed every aspect of Greek culture as stolen from other great civilizations, such solely uncontested cultural fossils are arguably the unsolicited proof classicists have been unable to produce regarding the exclusively Greek origin of Western metaphysics.
The most consequential thrust of this work seeks to revitalize Heidegger’s claim regarding the origin and the chronology of world against competing alternatives such as Christian metaphysics, science’s Big Bang Theory, or the emasculated feminist case regarding the metaphysical primacy of the womb. The ultimate contribution this work aspires to, is the empowering of a presently stalled paradigm shift from the scientific to an existential-phenomenological world view. This shift would be akin to the one which procured with the advent of the Enlightenment between science and religion - a clash still raging in education – where further progress now demands that humanity leaves behind the disguised alienation which Heidegger himself coined as “the dictatorship of science.”
Books on the topic "Heidegger's phenomenology of boredom"
1
The question of God in Heidegger's phenomenology. Evanston, Ill: Northwestern University Press, 1990.
Find full text
2
A companion to Heidegger's Phenomenology of religious life. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2010.
Find full text
3
Crowe, Benjamin D. Heidegger's phenomenology of religion: Realism and cultural criticism. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007.
Find full text
4
Heidegger's early philosophy: The phenomenology of ecstatic temporality. London: Continuum, 2008.
Find full text
5
Gibbs, Paul. Heidegger's contribution to the understanding of work-based studies. Dordrecht: Springer Science+Business Media, 2011.
Find full text
6
Heidegger's atheism: The refusal of a theological voice. Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002.
Find full text
7
McNeill, William. The Fate of Phenomenology: Heidegger's Legacy. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Incorporated, 2020.
Find full text
8
Fate of Phenomenology: Heidegger's Legacy. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Incorporated, 2020.
Find full text
9
McMullin, Irene, and Matthew Burch. Transcending Reason: Heidegger's Transformation of Phenomenology. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Incorporated, 2020.
Find full text
10
Heidegger's Phenomenology of Perception: An Introduction. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Incorporated, 2019.
Find full textBook chapters on the topic "Heidegger's phenomenology of boredom"
1
Kaelin, Eugene F. "Between Boredom and Anxiety." In American Phenomenology, 227–32. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1989. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2575-5_24.
Full text
2
Freeman, Lauren, and Andreas Elpidorou. "Fear, anxiety and boredom." In The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Emotion, 392–402. Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY : Routledge, 2020. | Series: Routledge handbooks in philosophy: Routledge, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315180786-38.
Full text
3
"Metaphysics and the Mood of Deep Boredom: Heidegger’s Phenomenology of Mood." In Essays on Boredom and Modernity, 85–107. Brill | Rodopi, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/9789042032125_005.
Full text
4
Cykowski, Beth. "A Journey through Boredom." In Heidegger's Metaphysical Abyss, 77–96. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198865407.003.0005.
Full textAbstract:
This chapter continues to examine Heidegger’s discussion of boredom and his demand that we ‘open ourselves up’ to this attunement. The chapter analyses Heidegger’s conviction that, if we manage to endure this demand, we discover something about our own contemporary metaphysics and about ourselves as contemporary Dasein. This journey also begins to unveil something of the three titular fundamental concepts of metaphysics—world, finitude, and solitude—so the chapter brings these concepts into greater focus, showing how the ‘forms’ of boredom that Heidegger traces each correspond to one of these concepts, reinforcing our understanding of their conspicuousness in the contemporary epoch. Heidegger hopes, by the end of Part One of the lecture course, to have justified the idea that profound boredom is our fundamental attunement, that it infiltrates the way in which we encounter beings qua contemporary Dasein.
5
"Heidegger's project." In Phenomenology and Existentialism, 161–74. Routledge, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203762837-19.
Full text
6
Cykowski, Beth. "The Role of ‘Fundamental Attunement’ in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics." In Heidegger's Metaphysical Abyss, 60–76. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198865407.003.0004.
Full textAbstract:
This chapter proceeds chronologically through the lectures and examines Heidegger’s analysis in Part One of The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics of the ‘fundamental attunement’ of ‘profound boredom’, which he regards as the contemporary optic through which all metaphysics occurs, including that of the human/animal distinction. The chapter introduces Heidegger’s argument that the concept of a metaphysical abyss between human and animal is the expression of a deep-seated inherited prejudice concerning a division between ‘life’ and ‘spirit’. This division is crystallised in the work of contemporary philosophers of culture, including Oswald Spengler, Ludwig Klages, Max Scheler, and Leopold Ziegler, all of whom Heidegger regards as ‘spokespeople’ of the contemporary epoch. The chapter examines Heidegger’s engagement with these thinkers, followed by his conclusion that their work signals a profound boredom gripping the age.
7
"Introduction. Ontology, Phenomenology, and Temporality." In Heidegger's Temporal Idealism, 1–30. Cambridge University Press, 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139173155.001.
Full text
8
Judith, Wolfe. "Eschatological Affliction as the Centre of a Phenomenology of Religion, 1916–21." In Heidegger's Eschatology, 40–65. Oxford University Press, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199680511.003.0004.
Full text
9
Cykowski, Beth. "The Outcome, Criticisms and Legacy of Heidegger’s Comparative Examination." In Heidegger's Metaphysical Abyss, 159–76. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198865407.003.0008.
Full textAbstract:
This chapter explores how, in the final stages of The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, Heidegger demonstrates the manner in which we can travel upstream from the metaphysical quagmire of our situation in order to access deeper and more essential knowledge of the human, metaphysics, and physis. To facilitate this move, Heidegger considers it necessary to review what has been garnered from the study of our contemporary situation and its expression through the media of Kulturphilosophie and biology. The chapter argues that Heidegger’s hope throughout the lecture course has been that, by coming to know the essential distinctions that arise in these fields in all their superficiality, we will enable ourselves to go deeper into the attunement of profound boredom, and eventually to replace the contemporary opposition between life and spirit with a more primordial understanding of the human and its status within physis.
10
Dastur, Françoise, and Robert Vallier. "Phenomenology and History." In Questions of Phenomenology. Fordham University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.5422/fordham/9780823233731.003.0011.
Full textAbstract:
This chapter examines the philosophical reflections of Wilhelm Dilthey, Edmund Husserl, and Martin Heidegger regarding the link between phenomenology and history. The philosophies of historicity developed in the climate of relativism that marked the failure of Hegelianism announce a new confrontation with G. W. F. Hegel and a new perspective on the relation of truth and history, which must not be confused with mere anthropocentrism. It is this new perspective on history that we see unfolding in the horizon opened by Husserl's phenomenology and prepared by certain aspects of “life- philosophy.” The chapter first considers Dilthey's concept of “historicity” before discussing the similarities of the Hegelian and Husserlian manners of thinking the subject of history. It also analyzes Heidegger's claim that finitude and historicity are essentially interconnected, with mortality constituting the hidden ground of the historicity of existence.