Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Hegel'

This is a study concerning Hegel’s critic of Rousseau’s common will and shows how Hegel’s concept of freedom should be understood from this criticism. This is done first of all through a study of Rousseau’s social contract and Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. The different state theories which Rousseau and Hegel represent, are evaluated separately, first Rousseau’s then Hegel’s to see how Hegel’s philosophy is a continuation of Rousseau’s philosophy. The most important concepts of this essay are Rousseau’s ”moral freedom” and Hegel’s concept of the ethical system.

Detta är en studie om Hegels kritik av Rousseaus allmänvilja och visar hur Hegels frihetsbegrepp ska förstås utifrån denna kritik. Detta görs först och främst genom en studie av Rousseaus verk samhällsfördraget och Hegels verk Rättsfilosofin. De olika statsteorierna som Rousseau och Hegel representerar behandlas var och en för sig, först Rousseaus sedan Hegels för att se hur Hegel bygger vidare sin filosofi utifrån Rousseau. Huvudbegrepp i uppsatsen är moralisk frihet eller moralitet och sedlighet.

Le moment de l'islam a une grande importance dans la philosophie hegelienne de l'histoire universelle. Ce moment trouve sa necessite fondamentale dans la dialectique interne du processus de la quatrieme formation universelle a savoir le monde germanique. C'est le moment de l'antithese absolue dans cette dialectique : un moment exterieur donc negatif. De plus, la conscience islamique se presente comme une conscience negative : son contenu est fonde sur l'abstraction et la separation absolue entre l'objectif et le subjectif. Cependant, bien qu'essentiellement philosophique, la conception hegelienne de l'islam a ses origines dans la theologie chretienne et dans la tradition intellectuelle occidentale, hostile a l'islam
The islam's moment has a great importance in hegel's philosophy of the universal history. This moment finds its fondamental necessity in the inner dialectic of the forth universal formation of the process that is to say the germanic world. It's the moment of absolute antithesis in this dialectic. : an extern moment, it mean negativ. However the islamic consciousness presents itself as a negativ one. Its contain is based on the abstraction and the absolut separation of the objectiv and the subjectiv. Though it's essentially philosophic, hegel's islam conception has its backgraund in the christian theology and in occidental intellectual customs hostil to islam

Hegel est souvent considere comme un penseur abstrait, dissolvant tout dans la fluidite du concept, sans respecter le singulier en lui-meme. Sous cet aspect, il ne reserverait aucune place a l'homme, apprehende dans l'epaisseur pure de sa subjectivite. Contre cette vue, la pensee de hegel ne permet-elle pas, au contraire, d'honorer l'homme, de le saisir comme cet etre qui ne s'ouvre a sa propre plenitude que dans l'acte paradoxal par lequel il se dessaisit de sa singularite pour en faire sacrifice a l'absolu? hegel nous offre une pensee du sejourner. Le proces infini de la negativite, sursumant sans cesse les figures et moments ne l'accomplissant pas comme totalite, ne vient-il pas liberer le mouvement de la vie, traduisant ainsi la volonte de lier le substantiel a la necessite d'un sejour qui lui fasse pleinement droit? pensee du sejourner, la philosophie de hegel n'est telle que parce qu'elle est, au fond, une philosophie destinale, essentiellement attentive a cette epaisseur sans epaisseur nouant l'esprit et le temps pour faire du present une croix. Il nous parait finalement que l'abstraction hegelienne est toujours une abstraction concrete, ce en quoi consiste la nature meme du speculatif. Le fondement de toute ethique, de l'homme en tant qu'etre en obligation, ne se trouve-t-il pas dans la nuit de la reflexion de l'essence, laquelle, comme lieu de sauvegarde de l'intimite, est le lieu d'ou seulement peut provenir une intimation?
Hegel is generally considered as a philosopher dissolving any reality in the fluididy of the concept: he doesn't have the mere respect for singular being, in itself. So no attention is paid to man in the intrinsical depth of his subjectivity. In the contrary, we do think hegel raises man to a place where he comes to be honoured as a being who gets to his own plenitude if only he sacrifices his singularity for the absolute. Hegel develops a "staying thought". The infinite process of negativity, while "sursuming" all the forms and moments unable to accomplish it as totality, liberates the movement of life, and expresses the necessity to find a substantial stay where rationality comes to coincide with itself in depth. Hegel's philosophy is a destinal one, paying attention to this infinite depthe where spirit and time become knotted like a cross of the present. Finally, hegelian abstraction can be said a concrete abstraction. Ethics and man as an obliged being do only have their fundation in the night of the essence as reflexion. Because it comes to save intimity, the reflexion of the essence is the ground from which can proceed an intimation

Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Centro de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia, Florianópolis, 2013.
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Esta tese visa analisar e investigar o conceito de Reconhecimento e Alteridade nas obras da Fenomenologia do Espírito e Princípios da Filosofia do Direito de Hegel. Demonstraremos inicialmente como esses conceitos se constituem num movimento e desenvolvimento da consciência em direção à autoconsciência, precisamente, nas figuras do senhor e servo da Fenomenologia do Espírito. Num segundo momento, mostraremos como Hegel, partindo da autoconsciência, chega ao Espírito Objetivo na sua Filosofia do Direito, com ênfase na família, sociedade civil e Estado, numa perspectiva do mútuo reconhecimento. Num terceiro momento, nosso intuito é comparar o reconhecimento em Hegel e a leitura de Axel Honneth. Apresentaremos as bases do conceito de reconhecimento em Honneth, pautadas no amor, no direito e na solidariedade. Mostraremos como Honneth se utiliza do conceito de reconhecimento em Hegel e quais são as diferenças entre esses dois pensadores. Nesse sentido o nosso propósito é também expor como e porque Honneth faz a passagem do reconhecimento para a reificação, numa tentativa de superar o próprio reconhecimento.

Abstract : This thesis aims to analyse and investigate the concept of Recognition and Alterity in Hegel´s Spirit Phenomenology and the Principles of the Philosophy of Right. Firstly it will be demonstrated how these concepts constitute a movement and a development from conscience into selfconscience precisely in the steps of master and slave in the Phenomenology of the Spirit. In a second moment we will show how Hegel, from the selfconscience arrives to the Objective Spirit in his Philosophy of Right, with emphasis in the family, civil society and State in a perspective of mutual recognition. In a third moment, our intention is to compare the recognition in Hegel and the reading of Axel Honneth. We will present the basis of the recognition concept in Honneth, guided in love, right and in solidarity. We will show how Honneth uses the Concept of recognition in Hegel and what are the differences between these two philosophers. In this sense our purpose is also to show how and why Honneth makes the passage from recognition to reification, as an attempt to overcome the recognition itself.

This thesis takes up the challenge of Jacques Derrida's Glas from an Hegelian perspective and addresses the central question of Derrida's book: "quoi du reste [ ••• ] d'un Hegel?" - "what remain(s) of a Hegel?". Glas construes a Hegel whose system is 'reappropriative' of all alterity and Derrida's efforts are devoted to disclosing the elements of Hegel's system that are not only incapable of reappropriation but which are, for that reason, the system's condition of possibility. Each chapter of the thesis addresses the construction of these 'remain(s), with regard to Hegel's text. The essay considers Derrida's reconstruction of Hegel's conception of Sophocles' Antigone, of the absolute religion and the construal of the Jews, whilst it also addresses the 'general fetishism' that is the method of Glas and is paricularly evident in the portion of the text devoted to Genet. In response, the thesis examines the Hegel of deconstruction and counters this construal with a rereading of the Hegel texts from which the 'remain(s), are collected. The fundamental argument of the thesis is that Glas presupposes and confronts the Hegel-reading of Alexandre Kojeve: a 'reappropriative' Hegel whose system concludes with the selftransparency of the bourgeois subject as citizen of the modern state. The 'remain(s)' represent all that refuses to be subsumed by the law or 'concept' of this state. In parallel, the argument focuses upon Derrida's construal of Hegel's thought as the 'metaphysics of the proper' and the essay thereby conceives of 'differance' as the alienation that constitutes formal identity or 'propriety'. Thus, the inadmissable 'remain(s), supply the formally-universal state and citizen of Kojeve with the moment of 'difference' that it must suppress: the 'remain(s)' collude with the sphere of production and exchange, with civil society and the proprietor. In contrast to the Kojevean Hegel of Glas, the thesis shows that Hegel's thought is not the narrative justification of modern, positive, property law but the determination of the latter's fixed and abstract oppositions. The response to Glas considers the 'remain(s)' to be the moment of alienation that is constitutive of the modern, universal right of private appropriation. Derrida, incapable of thinking otherwise than according to abstract law renders that moment transcendental. Thus, the thesis depicts Hegel as confronting the one-sided conceptuality of Kojevean 'right' and the one-sided emphasis upon non-identity and intuition in Derridean differance. The thesis asserts that Hegel's 'absolute' and the notion of 'ethical life', far from being the justification of positive law, adumbrate the possibility of cognizing this law without imposing the abstract concept anew. In the name of precluding the domination of the concept, however, the 'remain(s), will simultaneously reassert positive law as 'unknowable' whilst maintaining the violence of the law's imposition and its undeterminable oppositions.

On a longtemps tenu les textes hégéliens consacrés à l’Afrique pour secondaires, voire sans importance. Or, leur lecture attentive montre qu'il n'en est rien. Ils frappent par leur richesse étonnante et leur composition hétéroclite. Hegel, remarquons le, n'en est pas l'auteur. Au demeurant, il n'a jamais rien rédigé sur l’Afrique. Les textes en présence appartiennent à ses disciples qui, en la matière, ne lui ont pas été fidèles. Tissus de paradoxes, de contresens et de contradictions, ils ne laissent apparaitre ni les tensions auxquelles Hegel fut soumis durant ses recherches africanistes, ni ses hésitations (Egypte, Ethiopie) et ses refus (Saint-Domingue). Au reste, on y dénombre au moins trois conceptions de l’Afrique, ce qui jusqu'ici n'a jamais été mis en évidence. Nous avons tenté de reconstituer, période après période, l'itinéraire africain de Hegel qui participe intimement de son évolution, de Stuttgart à Berlin. Entre 1822 et 1826, ses études critiques le conduisent à réintégrer l’Afrique au sein de l'histoire. En 1831, à la veille de sa mort, Hegel s'apprêtait à remanier sa conception de l’Afrique. Son parcours de l'esprit africain mérite d'être entièrement repensé et refait
During along time, hegelian's texts about Africa have been considered subordinate, indeed without importance. Yet, their thorough reading shows they were not. They strike by their surprising richness and their heterogeneous composition. Hegel, we observe it, isn't the author. They belonged to his disciples who, on the subject, were unreliables. Tissues of paradox, misinterpretations and contradictions, these texts do not show the tensions which occupied Hegel during his africanists researches, neither his hesitations (Egypt, Ethiopia) nor his denials (Saint-Domingue). Besides, we count within three conceptions of Africa never been in evidence. Therefore, we have tried to reconstitute, period after period, the hegel's African itinary which takes intimately part in his evolution, from Stuttgart to Berlin. Between 1822 and 1826, his critical studies induce him to restore africa in the history. In 1831, just before his death, hegel got ready to adapt his conception of Africa. His run of african spirit is worth beeing completely thought over and done again

Il s'agit dans cette these d'une etude comparative de deux systemes philosophiques, celui d'al-farabi et de hegel. Les deux systemes chacun dans son epoque, sont consideres d'une part, comme synthese vivante de la pensee subjectivante et de la pensee objectivante et, d'autre part, comme le rationnel en soi et pour soi. La premiere partie, intitulee l'historique", traite des origines communes aux deux systemes, notamment religieuse et philosophiques : l'islam, en tant que reforme des deux religions monotheistes qui l'ont precede, dans le cas d'alfarabi; la reforme lutherienne dans le cas de hegel, et la philosophie grecque dans sa forme neoplatonicienne dans le cas d'al-farabi comme de hegel. La deuxieme partie traite du systeme lui-meme, en tant que le rationnel en soi et pour soi, suivant la division du systeme hegelien : science de la logique, philosophie de la nature, philosophie de l'esprit. La troisieme partie est consacree a la continuite historique du systeme a travers des auteurs comme ibn sina (avicenne), al-ghazali, ibn tufayl et spinoza. Dans le cas d'al-farabi comme de hegel, la religion vraie est comprise comme une religion de la liberte interieure, d'une relation libre et infinie a soi, par opposition a toute religion d'autorite. Quant a la philosophie, elle n'est, selon nos philosophes, que la forme rationnelle et objective de cette liberte interieure. D'ou le terme de "soufisme philosophique" qui, a notre avis, convient le mieux a cette maniere de philosophe

In this study, I will discuss Hegel’s words on the death of God as they are stated in his Phenomenology of Spirit and Faith and Knowledge. I will present a reading of what I consider to be the two different usages of these words, and relate their meanings to each other. Focus lies on what Hegel refers to as the “unhappy consciousness” and its experience of a disenchantment of the world, and on Christianity as the answer to this position. The discussion will be grounded on Hegel’s dialectical understanding of the concept of God. The divine and the human nature, must, according to him, be grasped as one and the same. The abstraction of the Christian deity must die, so that the notion of the unity of God and man, that actually constitutes the heart of Christianity, may be revealed beyond its spatial and temporal representations. I conclude that this for Hegel is the only way of escaping the situation of the unhappy consciousness.

Dans les Principes de la philosophie du droit , Hegel s'intéresse au problème de la pauvreté. Nous verrons dans cette thèse que le philosophe analyse le développement de la paupérisation comme un phénomène inhérent à la société civile. Nous nous intéresserons aussi aux effets que la pauvreté a sur la personne et également à ceux qu'elle a sur la société civile elle-même. Nous constaterons que Hegel ne semble pas offrir de remède à la pauvreté et nous nous interrogerons pour savoir si la raison de cette irrésolution n'est pas due à une conception capitaliste de la propriété privée, qui l'empêcherait de remettre en question la société civile. Pour cela, nous nous attacherons aux interprétations divergentes de Marcuse, de Harris et de Rose. Nous prendrons enfin position vis-à-vis de cette question pour montrer que Hegel n'est pas un défenseur acharné de la propriété dans sa forme bourgeoise et que ses développements sur la corporation dans les Principes de la philosophie du droit laissent entrevoir une solution au problème de la pauvreté par un changement d'esprit au coeur même de la société civile.

O presente trabalho é uma dissertação que tem como objetivo investigar de que modo podemos compreender o conceito de experiência estética na filosofia hegeliana, tomando como ponto de partida o modo como Hegel trabalha o conceito de experiência na Fenomenologia do espírito. A partir desta primeira etapa da nossa investigação, procuramos também entender de que modo o conceito de experiência pode ser entendido na Enciclopédia das ciências filosóficas, para somente então encaminharmos nossa análise para os Cursos de estética, onde podemos encontrar de fato um trabalho voltado prioritariamente para o tema da arte e, desse modo, é onde encontraremos uma forma de pensarmos o conceito de experiência observado nas duas obras supracitadas no contexto específico da estética, isto é, da filosofia da bela arte. Assim sendo, o presente trabalho busca analisar, ao longo dos segundo e terceiro capítulos, os diversos aspectos presentes nos Cursos de estética que apresentam-se com maior relevância à luz do nosso objetivo, a investigação do tema da experiência estética, mantendo-nos em referência ao conceito de experiência apresentado de início, no primeiro capítulo.
The present work is a dissertation that aims to investigate how we can understand the concept of aesthetic experience in Hegelian philosophy, taking as the starting point the way Hegel works the concept of experience in the Phenomenology of the spirit. From this first stage of our research, we also seek to understand how the concept of experience can be understood in the Encyclopedia of philosophical sciences, to only then progress our analysis to the Hegels aesthetics: lectures on fine art, where we can find indeed a work focused primarily on the theme of art and thus is where we will find a way to think of the concept of experience observed in the two works mentioned above in the specific context of aesthetics, i.e. the philosophy of art. That being said, the present work seeks to analyse, throughout the second and third chapters, the various aspects present in Hegels aesthetics: lectures on fine art which have greater relevance in light of our objective, the investigation of the theme of aesthetic experience, keeping us in reference to the concept of experience presented at the beginning, in the first chapter.

Hegel es uno de los primeros filósofos podemos que toma distancia frente al sentimiento triunfalista de su época, pero sin desconocer la originalidad de las nuevas formas de pensamiento e innovación política. A su filosofía debemos una caracterización conceptual de la modernidad en su conjunto gracias a la conciencia histórica con que ésta es juzgada. Lo propio y esencial de los tiempos modernos es, para Hegel, el principio de la subjetividad. El trabajo se divide en dos partes: primeramente, la concepción de Hegel es interpretada como una toma de posición ante el debate contemporáneo representado por la querelle des antens el des modernes. A continuación, se intenta mostrar que esta actitud teórica ante modernidad constituye el hilo conductor toda la obra de Hegel.

On connaît bien la référence au scepticisme de Hume qui aurait permis à Kant de rebondir vers le rationalisme critique. La référence au scepticisme par rapport à Hegel est moins connue mais tout aussi essentielle. Paradoxalement, c'est la formation théologique de Hegel au Stift de Tübingen qui l'a d'abord rendu sensible à des analyses sceptiques remettant en question la portée ontologique de tout discours. L'article hégélien de 1802 sur le scepticisme apparaît ensuite comme un moment-charnière dans la gestation de l'hégélianisme. Enfin, le scepticisme va jouer dans le système hégélien le rôle d'antidote contre un rationalisme dogmatique absolu, puisque l'hégélianisme reconnaît la nécessité de la contingence comme contingence.

Les Cours d'esthétique prononcés par Hegel entre 1820 et 1829 sont une tentative de compréhension de l'univers artistique à partir de la pensée systématique de Hegel lui-même, et de sa philosophie de l'absolu, déjà exposée par ailleurs. Ils constituent donc une tentative originale de penser la création artistique, soumise à des catégories déjà établies, et qui sont censées donner un sens achevé ou encore une retranscription généalogique de toutes les formes artistiques qui se sont succédé, de la civilisation égyptienne jusqu'à la période dite moderne. Parmi cette diversité des formes artistiques élues par Hegel, c'est l'analyse de la peinture qui mobilise notre travail de recherche doctoral. La fonction que Hegel assigne à la peinture ne se démarque jamais de cet impératif ontologisant qui innerve toute sa spéculation sur l'art - tâche que la peinture partage, certes, avec les autres arts - mais selon une spécificité qui lui est propre. L'aspect fortement contigu de la conception hégélienne de la peinture et de son système fait néanmoins l'objet d'un problème de taille. Car il traduit peut-être l'infortune d'une pensée qui tend à enrouler la peinture dans la philosophie, le visible dans le lisible, en mésestimant la puissance d'ébranlement de la peinture. C'est pourquoi, à ce besoin de clarifier et d'approfondir la pensée de Hegel en matière d'art pictural, en répond un second plus spéculatif et qui consiste à rendre compte d'une résistance ou d'une épreuve, celle qu'endure ou non, le système hégélien qui fait de la peinture un de ses moments nécessaires. Autrement dit, la peinture n'est elle pas ce qui fondamentalement, vient troubler la sérénité d'une philosophie trop assoiffée d'absolu ?

Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Centro de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas. Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia
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A presente dissertação é uma análise do conceito de reconhecimento na filosofia hegeliana, essencialmente nas duas obras do jovem Hegel, o Sistema da eticidade (1802-1803) e a Realphilosophie (1805-1806) e na obra da maturidade, Princípios da Filosofia do direito (1821). Contrariando uma leitura inicialmente feita pelo filósofo contemporâneo Axel Honneth em seu livro Luta por Reconhecimento (1996), que aponta a Fenomenologia do Espírito como a última obra em que Hegel teria tratado do tema do reconhecimento, defendo que este conceito permanece na Filosofia do direito, através das três esferas do espírito objetivo, isto é, o direito abstrato, a moralidade e a eticidade. Para tanto apresento o tema do reconhecimento nas obras do período de juventude retirando elementos necessários a compreensão de sua presença no movimento da última obra hegeliana da maturidade.
The following essay is an analysis of the concept of recognition in Hegel's philosophy, focused on Hegel's two early works, the System of ethicity (1802-1803) and the Realphilosophie (1805-1806), as well as on his later work, Principles of the philosophy of Right (1821). It aims at countering an initial reading by Axel Honneth in his Struggle for Recognition (1996), who point to the Phenomenology of the Spirit as being the last work in which Hegel supposedly tackled the theme of recognition. It makes the point that, on the contrary, the concept of recognition is still present in the Philosophy of Right, through the three spheres of the objective spirit, that is, abstract right, morality and ethicity. Therefore, I introduce the theme of recognition in the works from the time of Hegel's youth, sorting out the elements necessary to an understanding of its presence in the last work from Hegel's mature period.

Is alienation a process of self-discovery or is it a loss of reality? The subject of this thesis is how alienation is discussed in Hegel and Marx&rsquo
s philosophies in terms of this question. In Hegel&rsquo
s philosophy, alienation is part of the process of self-creativity and self-discovery. For Marx, it is the result of the capitalist mode of production. While Hegel explains the existence of the human being through focusing on its ontological dimension, Marx evaluates the term alienation in terms of the economic dimension which he claims that Hegel ignores. The understanding of these philosophers about how they make understandable the process, circumstances and results of alienation is significant for the subject of this thesis. The thesis concludes that, Marx, in spite of his criticisms of Hegel is closer to Hegel than is thought. An additional claim is that Marx&rsquo
s criticisms of Hegel complement Hegel&rsquo
s philosophy rather than overcoming it. The supporting analysis of the thesis is the discussion of whether Marx&rsquo
s criticisms related to Hegel&rsquo
s understanding of alienation as abstract, mystifying, and nonsense are right or wrong. Hegel&rsquo
s conception of alienation has thus been examined by way of Marx&rsquo
s criticisms.

This thesis argues that new readings of Hegel’s philosophical system generate a post-secular, philosophical political theology. This political theology is able to engage with the apocalyptic elements of the Christian tradition in order to understand the dual function of religion: the cultivation of social solidarity and the annihilation of the present world. After an initial discussion of Hegel’s role in the development of political theology and the current divisions in Hegel scholarship, this study turns to the significance of Hegel’s understanding of religion as representation. In particular it focuses on the implications of the ‘non-metaphysical’ reading of Hegel. In this reading, religion is not concerned with an external, transcendent deity, but represents the emergence of a self-conscious, self-determining community. While drawing on this shift in the nature of religion, this thesis argues that the ‘non-metaphysical’ reading subordinates religion to the state, diminishing religion’s role in social critique. This subordination to the state can be corrected by introducing apocalypticism as a representation of the negative moment of Hegel’s philosophical system, resulting in a greater emphasis on contingency and contradiction. This expanded understanding of religion is the basis of an apocalyptic, Hegelian political theology. Precedent for this form political theology is found in the work of Jacob Taubes. In addition to analysing Taubes’s explicit discussions of Hegel, this study argues that Hegel’s philosophy of religion draws out the methodology behind Taubes’s intervention. Having drawn out these underlying Hegelian aspects, affinities between Taubes and contemporary work on Hegel becomes apparent. In particular, Catherine Malabou’s understanding of plasticity is shown to closely parallel Taubes’s understanding of apocalypse. Reading Malabou and Taubes together results in a political theology of plastic apocalypticism. This political theology is a model of a post-secular theology operating, beyond the contradiction between philosophy and theology.

Notre travail porte sur l'absolu et l'histoire selon hegel, philosophe allemand. Il s'agit de resoudre l'antinomie et d'expliciter les rapports de l'absolu et de l'histoire. Pour ce faire, nous sommes partis de certains courants de pensee et d'auteurs; des critiques formulees par hegel contre ces conceptions philosophiques et religieuses et ses propres arguments essentiels. Nous nous sommes alors interroges sur les consequences de la presence effective de l'absolu dans l'histoire. Il a ete demontre que la manifestation de l'absolu et son incarnation dans le monde sensible donnaient a l'histoire son sens logique. Aussi, morale et politique trouvent-elles leur justification par l'esprit divin qui les fonde et qui garantit leur etre dans le monde, dans la vie sociale organisee. De plus, tout savoir n'est reel et rationnel que par et dans la lumiere divine qui eclaire le sujet connaissant, lequel par reconversion dialectique, n'est plus separe arbitrairement par l'objet naturel, et moins encore par l'etre de l'esprit absolu en lequel ils retournent par la reconciliation divine. Point de connaissance sans revelation divine, mais aussi point de revelation sans exteriorisation, sans incarnation dans l'histoire. Sans l'histoire, l'absolu n'est pas l'absolu, donc l'absolu est histoire. Enfin, nous soulignons que hegel n'est pas athee, mais forcement un philosophe religieux.

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) et Friedrich Carl von Savigny (1779-1861) ont été des contemporains, des compatriotes et des collègues à l'Université de Berlin, le premier y enseignant la philosophie du droit, le second y enseignant le droit romain. Mais ils ont aussi été des adversaires. C'est leur affrontement qui constitue le thème de la présente thèse. Un affrontement opposant le rationalisme de Hegel à l'historicisme de Savigny. Entre l'École spéculative du droit de Hegel et l'École historique du droit de Savigny, ce fut la guerre. En surface, c'est sur le front juridique que les deux adversaires ont livré bataille. À preuve, ces trois conflits: la Querelle de la réception, la Querelle de la possession, puis la Querelle de la codification. Toutefois, l'objectif de cette thèse est de montrer que la guerre entre Hegel et Savigny a été menée, d'abord et avant tout, sur le front politique. Face aux événements de leur temps - la Révolution française, l'Empire napoléonien, les Guerres de libération de 1813-1814, la Restauration, l'émergence du nationalisme allemand -, Hegel et Savigny ont adopté des positions complètement différentes. Face au contexte culturel de leur temps, - la diffusion d'une pensée contre-révolutionnaire héritée d'Edmund Burke (1729-1797) et la naissance d'un romantisme politique -, ils ont emprunté des voies complètement opposées. Leurs visions respectives de l'Allemagne en ce début du XIXe siècle étaient si divergentes que toute réconciliation entre le philosophe et le juriste fut impossible.
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) and Friedrich Carl von Savigny (1779-1861) were contemporaries, fellow-countrymen and Berlin University colleagues, with Hegel teaching philosophy of law and Savigny teaching Roman law. However, they were adversaries. Their confrontation, setting Hegel's rationalism up against Savigny's historicism, constitutes the subject of the present thesis. Hegel's school of thought, speculative in its approach, and Savigny's Historical School of Law were at war. This state of strife was most manifest in the feuds pertaining to judiciary issues, as attested by the three disputes - Rezeptionsstreit, Besitzstreit and Kodificationsstreit - bearing respectively on reception (of Roman law), possession (of property) and codification (of law). However, the goal here is to show that this conflict's most significant theatre was the political front. Before the events of their time - the French Revolution, the Napoleonic Empire, the Wars of Liberation, the Restoration, emerging German nationalism -, Hegel and Savigny each adopted completely different positions. Indeed, in responding to the cultural context of the day - the dissemination of counter-revolutionary thought, whose source could be traced to Edmund Burke (1729-1797), and the political Romanticism which was then taking shape - each one followed an entirely opposite path. Their respective visions of early 19th-century Germany were so divergent as to render any reconciliation between the philosopher and the jurist inconceivable.

MACEDO, Rodrygo Rocha. Guerra e estado em Hegel. 2016. 104f. – Dissertação (Mestrado) – Universidade Federal do Ceará, Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia, Fortaleza (CE), 2016.
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This work aims to understand, from dynamic between Nation-States introduced by Hegel ideas (which is nowadays understood, en bloc, as “International Relations”), the role of war within the Hegelian Theory of State as proposal for conflict related to sovereignty issues among States. In a particular level, this handwork attempts to explain, using Hegel’s dialectical method, how violence (and its related contingences) joins the realization of the freedom in the material world, and how this same violence, which belongs together to the free will, is used by States as tool of political management. The dialectical thinking of Hegelian (found in Phenomonology of Spirit and mainly in Philosophy of Right) indicates that State appears to be the major maker of human freedom, since it is the mediator tool of resolution of conflicts between individual wills, always based on ethical values and on what is better for a community. This work, using the exegesis of the Hegelian handworks, finds passages and text parts that point to the issue of war is not just a matter of State policy, but takes into account the ontological key when the definitions “freedom” and “will” are suggested to clarify the conflict causes. This statement is based on the comprehension, within External State Law, of what is the distinction between States, assumption of the juridical and existential individuality of a nation which would provoke inevitably tensions as well. However, the present work approaches the possibility of statements “Morality”, “Religion” and the concept of “Constitution”, which are found in Hegel’s method, by the sense of community and perception of right and wrong, regardless of juridico-political institutions, may indicate the elucidation about the impasse of the coexistence between war and freedom.
O presente trabalho objetiva compreender, a partir da dinâmica entre Estados-Nação apresentada por Hegel (entendida hoje, em conjunto, por relações internacionais), como pode ser entendida a guerra na teoria hegeliana de Estado como proposta para resolução de impasses relacionados a questões que envolvam a soberania das nações. Em nível mais específico, empreende-se a tentativa de explicar, no método dialético de Hegel, como a violência (e suas contingências correlatas) segue acompanhada da efetivação da liberdade no mundo, e como esta mesma violência, associada à vontade livre, é utilizada pelos Estados como ferramenta de gerenciamento político. O texto hegeliano (na Fenomenologia do Espírito e, sobretudo, na Filosofia do Direito) demonstra que o Estado aparece como realizador pleno da liberdade humana, uma vez que se torna instrumento mediador de resolução de tensões entre as vontades individuais, sempre pautado no ético, no que seja melhor para a coletividade. Apesar de o ente estatal ocupar-se de questões que dizem respeito à sua conservação, ele partilha o mundo com outros Estados, relacionando-se com eles. O presente trabalho, a partir de uma exegese do texto hegeliano, encontra passagens que indicam que a questão da guerra não apenas reside somente no agir político do Estado, mas também consideram a chave ontológica ao tomar o recorte dos conceitos “liberdade” e “vontade” para elucidar as causas do conflito. Tal assertiva ser referenda na compreensão, dentro do Direito Estatal Externo, do que seja diferenciação entre Estados, pressuposto da individualidade jurídica e existencial de uma nação que, ontologicamente necessária, também provocaria inevitavelmente as tensões. Outrossim, o presente trabalho aborda a possibilidade de as esferas “Moralidade” e “Religião”, associados ao conceito de “Constituição”, presentes nas descrições políticas e antropológico-metafísicas de Hegel e nas quais um senso de comunidade e união, bem como o discernimento do certo e do errado, independentemente de instituições, pode indicar uma resolução sobre o impasse da coexistência entre guerra e liberdade.

Abstract In the recent political theory it is ever more common to point out that the liberal theory has had in the modern world a respectable rival called republican theory. This study tries to support the thesis that however fundamentally their distinction be defined it has as its most important element different concepts of freedom. The liberals have so called negative concept of freedom almost without exception as the basis of their political theory whereas the republicans tend to have a different concept of freedom as that. In this study this is called autonomic freedom in its more developed version. The above thesis has been argued by comparing two central modern republicans, Rousseau and Hegel. The arguments of this study firstly show that they both have the autonomic freedom as a basis of their political theories in a much more developed and richer form than anyone else before. The arguments secondly show that their theories of the modern society on the one hand and those of political community on the other hand are very similar. The very same thing can thirdly be said of their accounts of the relationship of these conceptions. Their political theories showed a considerable amount of common features which are different from or contrary to those of liberal theories. Many of them could be connected to Rousseau’s and Hegel’s near-kindred concepts of autonomic freedom. Their characteristic differences can in many cases be accounted for to their historically different perspectives into the development of the modern society. The case in point is Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations (1776). It is very unlikely that Rousseau even knew about it whereas studying it was very important for Hegel’s understanding of the modern society. The argumentation for the theses of the study has been based on close and detailed interpretation of the relevant texts of Rousseau and Hegel
Tiivistelmä Viime aikoina on poliittisessa teoriassa yleistynyt käsitys, jonka mukaan liberalistisella poliittisella teoriassa on modernissa maailmassa varteenotettava kilpailija, nimittäin republikanistinen teoria. Tutkimuksessa pyritään esittämään tukea teesille, jonka mukaan liberalismin ja republikanismin eron keskeinen fundamentti tai ainakin yksi aivan keskeisimmistä on niiden erilainen vapauden käsite. Liberalistisella poliittisella teorialla on melkein poikkeuksetta nk. negatiivinen vapauden käsite perusteenaan, kun taas republikanisteilla on yleensä perusteena toisenlainen vapauskäsite, jonka kehittynyttä muotoa nimitetään tässä tutkimuksessa autonomiseksi vapaudeksi. Juuri mainittua teesiä perustellaan tutkimalla kahta keskeistä modernia republikanistia, Rousseauta ja Hegeliä. Ensin osoitetaan, että heillä on autonominen vapaus poliittisen teoriansa perusteena kehittyneemmässä ja rikkaammassa muodossa kuin kenelläkään heitä ennen. Toiseksi osoitetaan heidän poliittisia teorioitaan tutkimalla, että heidän käsityksensä modernista yhteiskunnasta ja poliittisesta yhteisöstä ovat varsin yhteneväiset. Kolmanneksi osoitetaan, että heillä on hyvin yhteneväinen käsitys myös niiden suhteesta. Heidän poliittisissa teorioissaan esiintyi runsaasti liberalistisesta teoriasta poikkeavia tai sille vastakkaisia yhteisiä piirteitä. Monet näistä voitiin asettaa tiiviiseen yhteyteen edellä mainitun heille pitkälti yhteisen vapauskäsitteen kanssa. Heidän luonteenomaiset eronsa voidaan usein yhdistää heidän historiallisesti erilaiseen perspektiiviinsä modernin yhteiskunnan kehitykseen. On esimerkiksi erittäin epätodennäköistä, että Rousseau olisi edes kuullut Adam Smithin Kansojen varallisuudesta, kun taas Hegelin teoria modernista yhteiskunnasta perustuu huomattavassa määrin tämän teoksen tutkimiseen. Tutkimuksen teesien perustelu nojaa Rousseaun ja Hegelin relevanttien tekstien yksityiskohtaiseen lähitulkintaan

The thesis critically analyses the dominant foundationalist tendency of modern philosophy, with special reference to the sophisticated antifoundationalist critiques of foundationalism formulated by G.W.F. Hegel and Gilles Deleuze. It begins by outlining a general methodological aspect of foundationalism, regarding the necessity of radical self-critique in philosophy, which directly connects contemporary thought with Cartesianism, via classical German philosophy. In the philosophies of Kant, Fichte and Schelling, this self-critical project is transformed: they undertake to show that reason can, by examining itself, give an account of experience that is systematic, or consistent with itself. However, each of these thinkers fails to accomplish this, and indeed, the commitment to a priori foundations is itself undermined in Schelling's work; where a philosophical crisis of meaning (a 'trauma of reason', philosophical nihilism) emerges. Deleuze and Hegel's contrasting critiques of foundationalism, and their positive reconstructions of the standpoint of philosophy, are then interpreted as non-foundationalist attempts to overcome this internal crisis of foundationalist thought as inadvertently exposed by Schelling. Both criticise certain subjective presuppositions common to foundationalist philosophies, which they consider constitute a dogmatic 'image' of philosophy, a kind of transcendental illusion that is the guiding force behind foundationalism. Both also aim to replace this with a genuinely philosophical image. The thesis provides an original historical contextualisation of Deleuze's thought in relation to German Idealism, and Schelling in particular, with whom, it is argued, Deleuze has much in common. Deleuze's conception of pure difference is treated in this regard as a kind of 'absolute knowledge'. This contextualisation also allows the sometimes crudely understood antipathy between Hegel and Deleuze to be addressed in a more penetrating fashion, which shows that they have more in common in terms of their critical orientation than is usually supposed. The thesis concludes with a critical comparison of these thinkers, which argues that, although both succeed in their own terms, in relation to a criterion of self-consistency, Hegel's philosophy offers a more satisfactory treatment of the ontological and historical conditions of philosophical activity.

Thesis advisor: John Sallis
This dissertation attempts to give an account of philosophical language in Hegel, with particular emphasis on his claim that a philosophical exposition must be living and self-moving. Since Hegel did not provide an extended, thematized account of philosophical language, my primary approach is to take the resources of his thought in general and attempt to construct an account which is consistent with his philosophy as a whole. Thus, a large portion of this dissertation is not directly about philosophical language, but about other determinations such as becoming, indifference, contradiction, life, the understanding, reason, etc., which lay the groundwork for discussing philosophical language in the final chapter. As a preface to all of this, however, I devote Part I of the dissertation to an investigation of Hegel's view of how one should go about comprehending philosophical determinations, i.e., those things which are the subject matter of philosophy (e.g., the determination 'plant' but not 'poison ivy'; the determination 'art' but not 'Flemish Baroque painting'). Chapter 1 deals with his critique of the formalistic approach which attempts to comprehend things by 'applying' categories to them (e.g., applying 'thinking' and 'animal' to comprehend 'human being'). In Chapter 2 I discuss Hegel's alternate view of comprehension, describing this view in terms of the idea of 'expression': later categories in his encyclopedia are comprehended not by applying earlier ones to them, but by grasping the later ones as developmental expressions of the earlier ones. Thus, expression is not only a linguistic but also an ontological category, a point which is investigated in more concrete detail in Chapter 3 through a close reading of the statement "being and nothing are one and the same." As it turns out, this linguistic expression of being plays an essential role in being's ontological expression and development. In Part II, I explore the logical determinations of 'mechanism' and 'life' in the Science of Logic. To set the stage for this, Chapter 4 gives an account of the relation of 'indifference' (present between the 'parts' of a whole) and the relation of 'reciprocity' (present between the 'moments' of a whole). These two kinds of relations allow us in Chapter 5 to see more clearly why Hegel views the logical determination of mechanism as involving a movement of thought whose source is external to it, and the logical determination of life as involving self-movement and self-determination. To further clarify what Hegel means by calling philosophical thought 'living,' I discuss what he might mean by the word 'movement' in the Logic, along with his view of the relation between becoming, contradiction, and self-movement. In Part III I argue that, regarding the logical determinations of mechanism and life, the former finds particularly vivid expression in the operations of the understanding and its 'ordinary language' (Chapter 6), while the latter finds such expression in the operations of reason and its 'philosophical language' (Chapter 7). The faculty of the understanding, whose nature it is to have objects standing over against it (Gegenstände) and to operate according to the category of formal identity, is characterized by finitude and abstract thinking. As such, the ordinary language which it produces is characterized by these same qualities. This entails a.) that this language is incapable of expressing the interdependence of identity and difference, b.) that it thus views the copula ('is') as containing merely formal identity, and c.) that it tends to define its words in abstraction from each other. Another result of ordinary language being produced by the understanding is that it is incapable of providing a genuinely philosophical account of anything, insofar as such an account requires a level of self-reflexivity which the faculty of the understanding, in isolation, renders impossible. The faculty of reason, on the other hand, both includes the understanding (with its abstracting powers) and goes beyond it, particularly in its rejection of identity as merely formal (i.e., identity as independent of difference). Crucially, it is this rejection which allows reason to comprehend the dissolutions of the contradictory logical determinations which move thinking forward. Directed not toward 'objects' but toward its own self, the goal of reason is self-knowledge via the concrete experience of thinking through its own thinking, a 'thinking through' which is necessary and self-moving insofar as its internal contradictions propel it down one (and only one) logical path. The language of reason - philosophical language - is an essential part of this process. Philosophical language, qua language, possesses a contingent dimension, e.g., the way the words sound and the letters are shaped. But this contingency, I argue, does not compromise philosophical language's ability to mediate the non-contingent nature of philosophical thought; for, the nature of logic is that it can reach its full expression only through the determinations of spirit, and all such determinations (with the exception of philosophy itself) necessarily contain contingencies. Philosophical language belongs not to the logical sphere (i.e., the sphere which is wholly 'within itself' and thus wholly necessary), but rather to the spiritual one (i.e., the human realm). As a result, this language must possess contingent dimensions, for it is precisely its 'not-being-within-itself' which allows it to be other to the realm of logic, and thus to be its expression. In contrast to ordinary language, philosophical language is able to give expression to the interdependence of identity and difference, and to create the meaning of its words not as isolated 'parts' but rather as 'moments' which depend on the meanings of all the other words which it has generated. Because of this, philosophical language engages in a continual diaeresis (division) and synagoge (collection) of its meanings, splitting the meaning of a term into an opposed meaning which contradicts the previous one and leads to a new word with a new meaning, containing the remnants of the previous ones. This dialectical process is a living one insofar as the oppositions and contradictions which move the exposition forward are immanent to the exposition itself. Operating throughout the entire encyclopedia (Science of Logic, Philosophy of Nature, Philosophy of Spirit), the self-moving linguistic diaeresis and synagoge reaches its conclusion in the final definition, that of the term 'philosophy,' thereby bringing together in one word the living remains of the meanings of all prior determinations. Because philosophy and philosophical language constitutively determine one another, neither can be, or be comprehended, apart from the other. In Hegel's view, although one is doing philosophy from the very first words of the Science of Logic, one can only account for philosophy at the 1,500-page encyclopedia's very end; my claim is that, in the same way, although one is using philosophical language from the very beginning, one can only account for this language at the very end. Philosophical language receives its determinateness from philosophy, and vice versa. As a result, only at the encyclopedia's end can one fully comprehend what one has been doing and saying for the last 1,500 pages
Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2011
Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Discipline: Philosophy

This work results from an attempted synthesis of our study on the discussions held by Hegel on the formation of conscience in the transition period between youth and maturity, particularly between the years 1802 and 1807, years in which they were published, respectively, Faith and Knowledge and Phenomenology of Spirit. Apparently, this period wins in Hegel emphasis the importance of the concept of abstraction for knowledge. Attempt to show how the author works this concept from the process of formation of conscience to the apex of knowledge when the limit imposed by abstraction with the conquest of knowledge of the absolute is expired. Now retrace some of the main aspects of training process led us to some reflections on the positive role of abstraction, ie, that it is not just a cognitive loss, but is also the only way to move gradually from the particular to the whole.
O presente trabalho resulta de uma tentativa de síntese do nosso estudo acerca das discussões realizadas por Hegel sobre a formação da consciência no período de transição entre juventude e maturidade, particularmente entre os anos de 1802 e 1807, anos em que foram publicados, respectivamente, Fé e Saber e Fenomenologia do Espírito. Aparentemente, nesse período ganha em Hegel ênfase a importância do conceito de abstração para o conhecimento. Como tentaremos mostrar, o autor trabalha esse conceito desde o processo de formação da consciência até o ápice do conhecimento, quando é vencido o limite imposto pela abstração com a conquista do conhecimento do absoluto. Ora, reconstituir alguns dos aspectos principais desse processo de formação nos conduziu a algumas reflexões sobre o papel positivo da abstração, ou seja, de que ela representa não apenas uma perda cognitiva, mas que também é o único meio de passar paulatinamente do particular ao todo.

Orientador: Hermas Gonçalvez Arana
Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Faculdade de Educação
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Résumé: L'axe central de ce travail est le Prod_s Dialéctique de Ia Construction du Concepet Concret chez Hegel. TI ságit d'lUle analyse textuelle de Ia Science de Ia Logique ou sont recherchées les speccifications du concept hégelien qui, en passand par les Doctrine: de l'Être, de IEssence ed du Concept accomplit les moments suivants: L'Être est le concept seulemente en soi, l'Éssence est le concept en tant que concept posé et, finelemente, le Concept ec,.t l'Absolumente concreto Ce nouyau constitue Ia Premiére Partie de Ia Thése. Pour une Édude sur Ia Concretisation du Concept chez Hegel - premiere partie du texte - a traité le theme en ayant comme référence les suivantes oeuvres de Hegel: La Fhénoménologie de I'Esprit, La Philosophie de l'histoire et I'lntroduction à I'Histoire de Ia Philosophie. Toujours dans cette partie nous avons cherché des interpretes de Hegel aves le but de cemer les interlocuteurs internes à I' oeuvre de Hegel: Kant, Fichte et Schelling. Une telle étude constitue lUle verticalization chez le prope Hegel, pour que quelques suggestions de nouvelles études, présentes dans les remarques finales, sur l'Ontologie de l' Être Social puissent être developées prochainemente avec rigueur dans Ia logique dialectique et dans lUle fimdamentacion philosophique
Resumo: O eixo central da tese é o Processo Dialético na Construção do Conceito Concreto em Hegel. Trata-se de uma análise textual da Ciência da Lógica, que busca apreender as especificações do conceito hegeliano, o qual, passando pelas Doutrinas do Ser, da Essência e do Conceito, realiza os seguintes momentos: o Ser é o conceito somente em si; a Essência é o conceito enquanto conceito posto; e, finalmente, o conceito é o absolutamente concreto. Constitui-se tal núcleo na Parte Segunda. A Parte Primeira, Estudo sobre a Concretização do Conceito em Hegel, tematiza as seguintes obras de Hegel: A Fenomenologia do Espiríto, A Filosofia da História e a Introdução à História da Filosofia. Ainda nesta parte, no segundo capítulo, procura-se examinar o diálogo de Hegel com os interlocutores internos à sua obra: Kant, Fichte e Schelling. a presente estudo, ao realizar uma verticalização em Hegel, pretende abrir caminhos para que algumas propostas de novos estudos sobre a antologia do Ser Social, constantes nas considerações finais, possam ser posteriormente desenvolvidas com mais rigor na lógica dialética e na fundamentação filosófica
Doutorado
Filosofia
Doutor em Educação

Orientador: Marcos Lutz Muller
Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas
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Resumo: Essa dissertação tem como tema a questão do princípio da ciência filosófica na obra hegeliana. O intuito da dissertação é mostrar que esse problema é uma preocupação perene na obra madura de Regel, desde o período em que o autor ministrava aulas na Universidade de Iena, nos inícios do século dezenove, até as últimas formulações do sistema, trinta anos depois. Esse problema é retomado nas interpretações do sistema hegeliano, tanto nas mais recentes como naquelas de seus discípulos e adversários, durante todo o século dezenove. Para mostrar como esse problema é tratado no período ienense, analisa-se um texto de 1801, A Diferença entre os sistemas de filosofia de Fichte e de Schelling, procurando por um lado relacioná-lo com as questões pós-kantianas da época, bem como com suas relações com o resto do sistema hegeliano posterior
Abstract: This dissertation focuses the problem of the begining of Science, considered from a hegelianpoint of view, that means, from a logic-speculative point of view. The intention is to show that this question is a long-term preocupation in Reger' s work. From his Iena-period until the last formulationsof his sistem, the question of how to make the begining of the philosophie appear. The critics and disciples contemporary to him and his modern commentators debate this theme of Regel' s work, as well. The problem has two main sides, one is to know how one counscience an approach that speeulative (philosophieal) point of view, and the other to know how do the speculative Science must beginn. To present this aspects of the so called Iena-period of Regel, is our intention to analyse the Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems der Philosophie (The diference between the systems of philosophy of Fichte and of Schelling) and to conect it with the pos-kantian discussion of the begining of the XIXth century, as with the rest of Regel' s philosophical Sistem
Mestrado
Mestre em Filosofia

nÃo hÃ
A presente dissertaÃÃo à uma leitura das trÃs principais obras de juventude do filÃsofo alemÃo G.W.F.Hegel (1770-1831): A Vida de Jesus (1795), A Positividade da ReligiÃo Cristà (1797) e O EspÃrito do Cristianismo e seu destino (1799), tendo como tema central a relaÃÃo entre Cristianismo e a Positividade. Hegel, partindo da obra do perÃodo bernÃs A Vida de Jesus, chega a compreender o cristianismo a partir dos conceitos opostos de ReligiÃo Moral e ReligiÃo Positiva, o primeiro conceito, sob influÃncia de Kant, leva-o ao cerne do ensinamento de Jesus, enquanto mestre de virtude, jà o segundo conceito surge como perda de liberdade e despotismo a ser superado atravÃs da moralidade entendida como autonomia da razÃo. Jà em Positividade da religiÃo cristà e O EspÃrito do cristianismo e seu destino, esta Ãltima do perÃodo de Frankfurt, Hegel chega à compreensÃo do carÃter histÃrico do desenvolvimento do cristianismo enquanto religiÃo positiva, trata-se entÃo, para ele, de superar esta positividade da religiÃo cristà atravÃs dos conceitos de amor e destino. Tal perspectiva leva o filÃsofo a entender a religiÃo cristà enquanto intrisecamente positiva, o que o fez compreender por trÃs desta aparÃncia algo mais profundo, isto Ã, o desenvolvimento e a manifestaÃÃo do espÃrito de um povo e de uma religiÃo que apresenta atravÃs de seu destino. Estas conclusÃes serÃo os elementos fundamentais que permitirÃo ao filÃsofo de Stuttgart desenvolver a idÃia de processo dialÃtico e de manifestaÃÃo do EspÃrito na HistÃria.

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Diese Arbeit handelt von Hegels politischer Philosophie und versucht seine Staatstheorie zu begreifen. Die Hauptwerk unserer Forschung war Hegels berÃhmte Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. Wir haben versucht, Hegels begriffliche Deduktion des Staates zu verfolgen und sie im Rahmen seines ganzen System zu klÃren. Wir versuchen zu zeigen, dass Hegels Staatstheorie die WidersprÃche und Zweiteilungen der politischen Philosophie der Moderne Ãber die Bedeutung und Rechtfertigung des Staates Ãberwinden wollte. Diese WidersprÃche, wie zum Beispiel die hypothetische und subjektive BegrÃndung des Staates, haben dazu gebracht, dass die Entgegensetzung zwischen Individuum und Staat immer grosser wurde, so dass der Staat in der Moderne keineswegs die sittliche Gesamtheit einer Gemeinschaft, den Volksgeist, darstelle, aber nur die Interessen der besonderen Willen. Um diese Entegegensetzung zu lÃschen, bedient sich Hegel von den wichtigen begrifflichen Paar bÃrgerliche Gesellschaft und Staat. FÃr ihn, ist der Staat durch das vernÃnftige Recht begrÃndet und muss betrachtet werden als die einzige gesellschaftliche Institution, die die gesellschaftliche WidersprÃchen aufheben kann. Es ist deswegen Aufgabe des Staates die ganze Allgemeinheit und Wirklichkeit des Mensches zu fÃrdern und die Freiheit konkret zu verwirklichen. Dies ist das oberste Prinzip des hegelschen Systems.
Este trabalho tem por tema a filosofia polÃtica de Hegel, mais especificamente sua teoria do Estado. Com tal objetivo servimos-nos, como obra principal em nossos estudos, dos PrincÃpios da Filosofia do Direito. Com eles tentamos reconstruir a argumentaÃÃo de Hegel sobre o conceito de Estado, contextualizando tal concepÃÃo no Ãmbito prÃprio do sistema hegeliano assim como em seus fundamentos principais. Como resultado de nossa pesquisa, constatamos que a teoria de Estado hegeliana pretendia superar as contradiÃÃes e dicotomias das filosofias polÃticas modernas sobre o significado e a legitimaÃÃo do Estado. Estas contradiÃÃes, como, por exemplo, a fundamentaÃÃo hipotÃtica e subjetiva do Estado, aprofundavam a oposiÃÃo entre indivÃduo e Estado, em que o Ãltimo representava somente os interesses de vontades particulares e nÃo o conjunto Ãtico de uma coletividade, o espÃrito de um povo. Em busca da sÃntese e soluÃÃo destas questÃes, Hegel elabora teoricamente a distinÃÃo conceitual entre sociedade civil e Estado. Para ele, o Estado se fundamenta racionalmente no direito e à aquela instÃncia social capaz de suprassumir as contradiÃÃes sociais, tornado-se, assim, capaz de promover a universalizaÃÃo e realizaÃÃo plena do homem, isto Ã, capaz de realizar concretamente o princÃpio Ãltimo de toda a sua filosofia e de toda a humanidade, a liberdade.

Not being a mere epigonenor disprover ofHegel, Heidegger started a dialogue with Hegel's thought since his Habilitation thesis in 1915 until his last reference to Hegel in 1969. This brief paper intends to point out Heidegger' s ambivalent relationship to Hegel in three fundamental issues in which his agreementis as important as his disagreement: the relationship between being and thought, the identity of being and nothingness, the conception of history. Light is thus shed upon the oppositions between the speculative sentence and the phenomenological tautology, between the oppositional logic and the ontological difference, and between the dialectics of history and the meditation on the history of being and Ereignis.
No siendo epígono ni refutador de Hegel, Heidegger inició muy pronto (desde su Tesis de habilitación en 1915) y continuó hasta muy tarde (la última referencia a Hegel es de 1969) un diálogo con el pensamiento de Hegel. En este breve artículo, se trata de mostrar la relación ambivalente que guarda Heidegger con Hegel a partir de tres temas fundamentales sobre los que su acuerdo es tan grande como su desacuerdo: la relación del seral pensamiento, la identidad del ser yla nada, la concepción de la historia. Por esta vía podrán aclararse las oposiciones entre la proposición especulativay la tautología fenomenológica, entre la lógica oposicional y la temáticade la diferencia ontológica, y entre la concepción dialéctica de la historia y la meditación sobre la historia del ser y el Ereignis.

L'œuvre de Hegel traite systématiquement de tout, et même précisément du tout, et l'encyclopédie des sciences philosophiques est la présentation de ce système du savoir en son universalité. Ainsi y est-il traité de l'animal, du corps ou des maladies. Mais en quoi peut consister une considération philosophique des maladies ? Au sein du système, l'organisme animal est l'être capable de supporter sa contradiction entre l'universel et le singulier. La maladie, comme crise - nécessaire - de cette capacité, mérite toute l'attention que requiert un point crucial où se manifeste l'esprit du système hégélien. Là en effet, le syllogisme se présente dans son accomplissement. Dans la philosophie de la nature, Hegel, après avoir défini la maladie et critique le « parler-essence » comme les « considérations extérieures », commence par présenter les genres différents de la maladie, puis son développement, et enfin la guérison et les remèdes. Nous avons choisi de suivre cet ordre. Dans un premier moment, partant de la définition conceptuelle de la maladie, nous étudions la nosologie hégélienne, où comment il réduit le nombre des maladies à trois grands types : la nocivité comme déterminité universelle, les nocivités particulières, et les maladies de l'âme. Deuxièmement, dans le corps, le concept se développe temporellement en différents stades de la maladie. Enfin, le dernier stade de la maladie est sa guérison. Hegel y envisage aussi les différentes manières dont le médecin peut aider cette guérison : comment aider l'organisme à surmonter la maladie comme contradiction. Nous croyons avoir cerné la maladie dans le corps et que sa considération est contenue par la philosophie de la nature. Mais nous la voyons alors réapparaitre dans la langue, dans le culte et dans l'état où elle semble s'être transportée. Nous tentons donc, dans un troisième moment, d'éclairer l'usage « métaphorique » du terme de maladie, en logique, en religion et en politique.

Généralement considérée comme un moment mineur de la méthode hégélienne, l'analyse occupe pourtant une place étrange dans l'ensemble du système spéculatif. Cette activité qui décompose des représentations, des objets ou des concepts est à l'origine des faux départs et des faux mouvements de la réflexion ; mais elle permet également de condenser logiquement les acquis de l'anthropologie, dévoilant l'appropriation du monde extérieur par un sujet vivant et connaissant. Enfin, elle offre une vue originale sur la dialectique elle-même. La présente étude tente de mettre au clair la relation entre plusieurs couples célèbres (analyse et synthèse bien sûr, mais aussi analyse représentative et analyse empirique, jugement et méthode analytique, analyse finie et infinie) en laissant une large place au dialogue entre Hegel et d'autres penseurs (principalement Locke, Leibniz, Kant et Bergson). Elle accorde une attention particulière a deux paradoxes : premièrement l'analyse est d'une telle immanence qu'elle rend compte de son objet par une suite de propositions identiques, et n'explique donc rien. Deuxièmement, elle est si formelle qu'elle semble valable pour tout type d'objets, mais dénature la singularité de chacun. En articulant logique et méthode, on voit comment Hegel fonde ces paradoxes sur la genèse réelle de la connaissance, les justifie au nom de la lutte contre les totalités indécomposables et les déjoue : il montre en effet que l'analyse infinie ne dégage pas des caractéristiques abstraites, mais sélectionne les moments ou les œuvres rendent compte de leurs auteurs, les points où s'expriment des décisions individuelles, libres et nécessaires
Analysis is generally considered to be a minor moment in the hegelian method. It assumes, however, a strange role in the overall hegelian system. This activity, which decomposes any representation, object or concept, initiates the false starts and false movements of reflexion, but it also helps the logical condensation of anthropological achievements, thus revealing the appropriation of the external world by a living subject, able to reach knowledge. It offers finally a specific view on dialectics itself. This study tries to make clear the relationships between several well known couples (analysis and synthesis of course, but also representative and empirical analysis, analytical judgment and analytical method, finite and infinite analysis) emphasizing various dialogues between hegel and other philosophers (especially Locke, Leibniz, Kant and Bergson). Two paradoxes are accorded particular attention. First, analysis is so immanent that it accounts for its objects by a series of identical propositions, and so explains nothing. Secondly, it is so formal that it seems to be valuable for any kind of object, even if it denatures the singularity of each. One can see how hegel, by articulating logic and method, grounds these paradoxes on the real genesis of knowledge, how he justifies them as useful in the fight against unsplittable totalities, and finally how he gets around them both by showing that rather than bringing out abstract characteristics, infinite analysis selects moments when works account for their authors, or points where individual, free and necessary decisions are expressed

Pragmatisme et individualisme voudraient nous persuader aujourd'hui de l'obsolescence de toute pensée se satisfaisant de réfléchir sur ce qui est. Le hégélianisme, qui avoue que pour ce qui est d'enseigner " comme le monde doit être, la philosophie, de toute façon, vient toujours trop tard n, réduirait ainsi la philosophie à n'être que philosophie de l'histoire ou histoire de la philosophie. Pourtant Hegel ne cesse de démontrer l'identité de la pensée et de l'action susceptible d'accomplir les droits d'un sujet qui n'est pas le seul individu, et ceux d'un monde, irréductible à un musée des institutions humaines. C'est pourquoi l'esprit objectif développe sa normativité et sa vitalité; c'est pourquoi la subjectivité déploie dans sa vie absolue son action de trouver un monde, de le produire, de s'y libérer. Une telle confiance en la force de la pensée nous engage, à l'instar de certains philosophes contemporains, à chercher à tirer tout le profit du hégélianisme.

L'ensemble des travaux presentes comprend: 1. Trois volumes publies:a)deux traductions :hegel, recension des oeuvres de jacobi (paris, vrin,1976) et hegel,la posivite de la religion chretienne (paris, puf,1983); b) un recueil de textes de hegel, avec des traductions nouvelles, des notes et des remarques ;"hegel, le droit,la morale et la politique" (paris,puf,1977) 2. Un revueil de textes pulbies photocopies intitule :"etudes sur hegel, suivi d'un hommage a v. Jankelevitch"; il s7agit d'etudes d'histoire de la philosophie consacrees principalement a la philosophie de hegel, mais egalement a la philosophie d'auteurs appartenant a la periode contemporaine (nietzche, jankelevitch). 3. Un manuscrit dactylographie intitule : "le probleme moral dans la philosophie de hegel". La position de hegel sur la morale est analysee a partir des principaux ecrits de l'auteur, depuis les manuscrits anterieurs a la periode de iena jusqu' aux dernieres oeuvres publiees, hegel refuse la distinction kantienne entre la moralite et la legalite; il lui substitue la distinction entre la moralite abstraite (moralitat) et la vie ethique concrete ou ethicite (sittlichkeit); pour lui, l'autonomie de la volonte constitue bien "la base et le point de depart" d'une conception moderne de la morale, mais la morale doit s'effectuer dans des institutions; la reflexion sur la morale fait partie de la philosophie du droit; la morale occupe ainsi une place a la fois essentielle et subordonnee : l'esprit objectif ne trouve son accomplissement que dans l'esprit absolu
Following studies are presented: 1. A)translations of hegel's uber f. H. Jacobis werke (paris,vrin,1976) and hegel's positivitat der christlichen religion (paris,puf,1983); b)an anthology of translated hegel's texts, with notes and remarks, entited : "hegel,le droit,la morale et la politique" (paris,puf,1977) 2. A volume containing published studies entitled: "etudes sur hegel, suivi d'un hommage a v. Lankelevith"; studies in history of philosophy, principally dedicated to the philosophy of hegel, but also to contemporary authors (nietzsche,nankelevitch) 3. A typerwritten manuscript entitled : "le probleme moral dans la philosophie de hegel. " hegel's conception of ethics is analysed in the most important works of the author, from the early writings to the last published works. Hegel does not admit kant's distinction between morality and legality; he distinguishes between abstract morality (moralitat) and concrete ethical life (sittlicjkeit); according to hegel, autonomy fo the will constitutes the "foundation an starting-point" of a modern conception of ethichs ; but ethics must be realised in institutions; philosophical ethics is a part of philosophy of right; ethics thus appears at once as essential and subordinated : objective spirit only accomplished in absolute spirit

En intégrant les concepts de réflexion de l'"Amphibolie" au mouvement des déterminations de l'essence de la "Logique objective", Hegel développe différents aspects - logique, mathématique, physique ou phénoménologique, pratique, téléologique - de la réflexion, déjà explorés par Kant d'un point de vue transcendantal. Chez les deux philosophes, la réflexion s'affranchit de la psychologie du sujet, de l'égologie, du formalisme de la réflexivité et du dogmatisme de la fondation, pour conduire l'entendement vers le savoir de lui-même qu'il prend en tant que raison. Le kantisme cesse d'être accusé du dualisme d'entendement des "philosophies de la réflexion". Toutefois, une philosophie de l'êre raisonnable fini s'oppose à une philosophie de l'esprit à propos du principe de la réflexion ; le fait de la réflexion entre en conflit avec l'effectivité de l'activité réflexive ; enfin, les deux réflexions s'opposent sous l'aspect des fins de la raison pratique et de la vérité de l'Histoire.

Cette these elucide la confrontation de heidegger avec hegel. Donnant un acces particulierement riche a la deconstruction heideggerienne de l'histoire de la philosophie, cette confrontation se divise, dans notre travail, en : i) le dialogue (gesprach) commande par le pas-en-arriere (schritt zuruck}, 2) la dissociation {verdeutlichung) et, 3) l'explication (auseinandersetzung) ouvrant l'espace de la traduction. Nous analysons la necessite interne de chacune de ces approches en i) le dialogue entre hegel et heidegger sur l'etre, 2) la dissociation entre le dasein et la conscience de soi et, 3) leur explication concernant l'histoire et la communaute. Par la, notre travail acquiert le sens d'une << double deconstruction >> : la << deconstruction >> de la philosophie hegelienne par la question heideggerienne de l'etre et, la << deconstruction >> de la pensee heideggerienne par ta theorie hegelienne de la reconnaissance. Ce parcours nous permet de formuler un antagonisme constitutif de la philosophie entre, d'une part, l'amour de la verite comme condition transcendantale de la philosophie et, d'autre part. L'amitie des philosophes comme sa condition existentiale. Nous montrons comment hegel et heidegger ouvrent, de la << meme >> maniere, cet antagonisme comme situation la plus propre de la pensee, depuis la negativite ou le polemos qu'ils decouvrent au cur de la philio. Leur confrontation - sur le sens de la confrontation - permet d'interroger la condition meme de la pensee finie.