Journal articles on the topic 'Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770-1831'

O presente artigo investigará a concepção de Estado do filósofo alemão Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (Stuttgart, 27 de agosto de 1770 – Berlim, 14 de novembro de 1831) a partir da obra “Filosofia do Direito” (1821), em especial, a sua terceira seção, que será a base para a análise da temática, por ser nela que Hegel discute, a miúde, os elementos constitutivos do Estado. A análise feita a partir desta discussão definirá a ideia de Estado hegeliano respeitando três estruturas básicas adotadas pelo filósofo naquela seção, que comporta: 1º) a natureza do Estado; 2º) a fundamentação da organização interna do Estado e 3º) o poder do príncipe. O objetivo da investigação proposta neste artigo é apresentar os elementos centrais e constitutivos do Estado à estrutura do direito interno que fundamenta sua política.

Este artigo visa apresentar e analisar a concepção de progresso histórico elaborada pelo filósofo alemão Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) em sua obra Lições sobre a Filosofia da História, publicada postumamente em 1837. Para isso, a exposição do artigo seguirá, principalmente, o terceiro capítulo da obra mencionada – denominado “O Curso da História Universal” –, acompanhando, detalhadamente, a argumentação do filósofo. A conclusão do artigo destaca o progresso histórico hegeliano compreendido enquanto um fim infinito, baseando-se, principalmente, na obra Does History Make Sense? (2017), de Terry Pinkard. Além disso, compara-se a compreensão hegeliana do progresso histórico com as compreensões linear e cíclica da história.

Este artigo analisa o papel da História na vida humana segundo dois dos mais importantes filósofos alemães do século XIX: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) e Karl Heinrich Marx (1818-1883). A Filosofia Hegeliana dá muita importância à Razão: a História seria apenas mais uma forma de manifestação dela. A Dialética seria a estrutura da História e tudo estaria integrado para contribuir para a consumação do ser, tendendo ao Absoluto. Por outro lado, Marx deu outro sentido à dialética e até mesmo à História, enfatizando o papel do homem na construção de seu futuro e sua chance de mudar seu próprio destino. Segundo Marx, a luta de classes é responsável por fazer a estrutura social mudar ao longo do tempo. Os conflitos sociais equivalem, para a filosofia de Marx, ao papel que a Razão tem nas obras hegelianas.

AbstractA close reading of Friedrich Hölderlin’s poems “Brod und Wein” and “Mnemosyne” demonstrates that Hölderlin intended to create a new religion as he and Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel had projected in their manifesto “Ältestes Systemprogramm.” This venture must be seen as part of the fight against monotheism and as an attempt to establish a counter-religion, characteristic for the threshold period between 1770 and 1800 in Western Europe. This attempt failed, as Hölderlin’s final desperation about the ambiguity of nature shows.

This contribution addresses the anthropocenic challenge from a dialectical perspective, combining a diagnostics of the present with a prognostic of the emerging future. It builds on the oeuvres of two prominent dialectical thinkers, namely Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (1881–1955). Hegel himself was a pre-anthropocenic thinker who did not yet thematise the anthropocenic challenge as such, but whose work allows us to emphasise the unprecedented newness of the current crisis. I will especially focus on his views on Earth as a planetary process, emphasising that (in the current situation) the “spirit” of technoscience is basically monitoring the impacts of its own activities on geochemistry and evolution. Subsequently, I will turn attention to Teilhard de Chardin, a palaeontologist and philosopher rightfully acknowledged as one of the first thinkers of the Anthropocene whose oeuvre provides a mediating middle term between Hegel’s conceptual groundwork and the anthropocenic present. Notably, I will discuss his views on self-directed evolution, on the on-going absorption of the biosphere by the noosphere, and on emerging options for “sublating” the current crisis into a synthetic convergence towards (what Teilhard refers to as) the Omega point. I will conclude that (a), after disclosing the biomolecular essence of life, biotechnology must now take a radical biomimetic turn (a shift from domesticating nature to the domestication of domestication, i.e., of technology); that (b) reflection itself must become distributed and collective; and (c), that the anthropocenic crisis must be sublated into the noocene.

Diversos estudos ligados à sociologia e às ciências políticas percebem o Estado como um importante mecanismo de coerção social. Analisando o desenvolvimento social da humanidade, depreende-se que o Estado tem se adaptado às diferentes demandas da elite burguesa, a qual detém o poder nos mais diversos contextos sociais e políticos. Com essa transformação capitalista da sociedade, ocorre, também, a subordinação da organização social às exigências do capital. Esse é o momento onde ocorre a construção de um Estado e das instituições políticas, ambos adequados ao domínio da burguesia. Diante desse contexto, o presente artigo tem como objetivo realizar uma discussão sobre a linha conceitual que considera o empreendedorismo como uma alternativa para a saída de uma crise social e econômica. Trata-se de uma pesquisa qualitativa e bibliográfica. Para a coleta dos dados foi realizado um levantamento teórico em estudos de Max Weber (1864-1920), Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) e Thomas Hobbes (1588-1651) em relação à teoria geral do Estado; de Karl Marx (1818-1883) em relação à intervenção do Estado nos aspectos econômicos e sociais; e de Schumpeter (1997), por se tratar de uma importante referência no estudo do empreendedorismo. Os resultados contribuem para a discussão sobre os conceitos de empreendedorismo e as características dos empreendedores e empreendedoras, além de abordar sobre o processo de empreender em um Estado marcado pela sua subordinação histórica ao capital. Dessa forma, espera-se que o presente estudo colabore com a construção do referencial teórico sobre empreendedorismo e inovação, em uma vertente mais crítica e contextualizada.

The debate herein exposed is aimed towards a confrontation between the autonomy of human will and its heteronomy, or between liberty and law. This crucial problem is also the most discussed within contemporary moral reflection. Is it possible to behave freely and morally by obeying law and to remain in full exercise of liberty? For his reflection, Hegel strongly criticizes Jewish religion and further concentrates on the passage of the New Testament that takes place at the home of Simon the Pharisee, analyzing the behavior of four characters: Mary Magdalene: love and need; Simon: the power to judge; the disciples: moral interest and Jesus: the voice of beauty and love. Hegel’s approach is summed up in seeking what man must do (morality) as a condition to access religion considered to be man’s happiness. How to open, therefore, the path of morality towards a religion that restores life and beauty, a religion as a living union between God and man? In conclusion, some arguments will be presented to demonstrate the insufficiency of Hegel’s criticism to religion in the Old Testament. Obedience appears as a human response to God’s nomination rather than as a response to law.

The phrase Idealism is not new for the students and readers of Philosophy, however, when the prefix German is added before it, it acquires a different meaning, mood, taste and inclination. German Idealism is distinguished from all other forms of European Idealisms. It concentrated on mind as an active and self-conscious entity. German Idealists suppressed the traditional ontologies based on substances and their accidents. The most prominent German Idealists include I - Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), II- Johann Gottelib Fichte (1762-1814), III-Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Von Schelling (1775-1854) and IV- George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831). Kant, though an empirical rationalist, could not deny the supremacy of mind over matter and of human beings over the external world. For him space, time and causality were the categories of mind, which it imposed on the outer world. However, he did believe in the dichotomy of mind and matter though he combined rationalism and empiricism in his Transcendental Idealism, which is an unconscious move towards unity despite the belief in noumena and phenomena. Later thinkers, however, gradually moved closer and closer to the Idealism and especially Monism. Some salient features of German Idealism which give it a distinct identity separate from the rest of Western Philosophy include: i- Idea of the Absolute, ii- Beginning of the world in the Absolute, iii- Stages and phases of Self- consciousness, iv- Unity of the Subject and Object, v-First traces of Philosophical Anthropology (What man is in itself beyond all physical things and the universe?), vi- Intellectual intuition as a source of knowledge and a tendency towards esotericism, vii – Enthusiastic interest in Dialectics, viii- Freedom and Determinism, ix- Self as an entity free of external and causal determinants , x- Ideas of Ego and Spirit, xi- World Spirit and xii- Existence as a whole or a Unity. These eternal, perennial, deep, highbrow, captivating, serious, scholarly, cherished, enthralling and fascinating ideas were presented and discussed at length by Muhammad Iqbal too in his Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam. Only one glance at the salient features of German Idealism brings into mind the familiar philosophical topics on which Muhammad Iqbal has written extensively. Besides his Urdu and Persian poetry, his political ideas bear profound stamps of these ideas. Therefore, this comparative study is academically justified, intellectually stimulating and scholastically enriching.

The paper addresses the journal Jahrbücher für speculative Philosophie, published between 1846 and 1848 in Darmstadt. The paper focuses on the forewords of the journal written by the sole editor Ludwig Noack (1819–1885). In these forewords, Noack elaborates the current situation of philosophy. He outlines his vision for the future philosophy. It would be meaningful not only for professional philosophers but also for the general audience. Moreover, it would be closely associated with other sciences. Noack’s vision was inspired by August Cieszkowski’s (1814–1894) so-called “Philosophie der Tat” (the philosophy of action), which resonated with the entire generation of German Hegelians from the late 1830s. Noack realized his journal in co-operation with the “Philosophische Gesellschaft zu Berlin”, founded by Cieszkowski and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s (1770–1831) former student Carl Ludwig Michelet (1801–1893) in 1843.

Abstract Since the early 2000s, in a development since mirrored throughout much of the Anglophone world, social work across UK jurisdictions has been subject to external regulation. Whilst a key justification for regulation was to enhance professional identity, there is little evidence that it has done so. Indeed, a growing literature points out conflictual and unproductive relationships between the social work profession and its regulators, within which a marked power imbalance in favour of the regulator is apparent. In this article, we illustrate the nature of this imbalance theoretically by drawing upon the classic philosophical narrative, developed by Georg Willhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831), of the ‘lord and bondsman’. We seek to demonstrate the utility of the Hegelian narrative using data from a study into the views of social workers on how they understand their professional identities, focusing specifically on those aspects of the study that address the place of regulation in this process. Whilst exposing some fundamental problems in the regulatory relationship, the lord and bondsman narrative may also offer some possibility of a way forward through identifying these dialectics as a step towards a more self-conscious professional maturity.

Segue abaixo a tradução do alemão da seção dedicada ao cinismo presente nas Lições Sobre a História da Filosofia de Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831). Na seção em questão, o filósofo alemão aborda não somente a história da escola cínica, mas também seus princípios, suas influências e a importância que esse movimento teve para o pensamento filosófico posterior – sobretudo para o estoicismo.

Acompanharemos o homem ridículo, protagonista do conto O sonho de um homem ridículo (1877), de Fiódor Dostoiévski (1821-1881), do (anti) clímax de seu niilismo à beira do suicídio até a retomada de sua vinculação histórico-espiritual com a vida. A trajetória redentora do homem ridículo será analisadaem diálogo com o filósofo alemão Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), a partir de sua Filosofia da História (1837), e com o educador francês Hippolyte Léon Denizard Rivail, mais conhecido como Allan Kardec (1804-1869), o codificador da doutrina espírita. Assim, a reconciliação utópica em Dostoiévski – a redenção do choro e do ranger de dentes dos humilhados e ofendidos que permeiam a obra do escritor russo – será iluminada pela noção de eternidade como caminho para a cicatrização do espírito.We will follow the ridiculous man, protagonist of Fyodor Dostoevsky’s (1821-1881) short story The Dream of a Ridiculous Man (1877), from the (anti)climax of his nihilism towards suicide to his historical and spiritual reconnection with life. The ridiculous man’s redeeming trajectory will be analyzed in dialogue with German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), from his Philosophy of History (1837), and with French educator Hippolyte Léon Denizard Rivail, better known as Allan Kardec (1804-1869), the encoder of Spiritism. Thus, utopian reconciliation in Dostoevsky – the redemption of the weeping and gnashing of teeth which permeates the Russian author’s works – will be illuminated by the notion of eternity as the path towards the healing of the spirit.

Bu çalışma, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’in (1770-1831) siyasal düşüncesine yönelik devletçilik-totaliterlik gibi eleştirilerin Hegel felsefesinin genel mantığını takip etmediğini iddia etmektedir. Bu nedenle ilk bölümde, Hegel’in bütün felsefesinde ya da sisteminin her alanında aynı hareket biçimini siyaset konusunda da sürdürdüğünü göstermek için bazı temel kavramların nasıl ele alındığı aktarılmıştır. İkinci bölümde, bu zemin üzerinde siyasal temaların nasıl işlendiğine liberal düşünüş biçiminin (sivil toplumun – ekonominin mutlak özerkliği) eleştirileri üzerinden değerlendirilmiştir. Hegel’in devlet (sivil toplum – devlet ilişkisi) kavrayışına yönelik liberal eleştirinin göz ardı ettiği noktaları belirtik kılmak adına Carl Schmitt’in Hegel okumasındaki bazı pasajlar öne çıkarılmıştır. Schmitt’in Hegel okumasına başvurulması stratejik açıdan bize şu çifte imkânı vermektedir: Hegel’in felsefi sisteminin siyasallaşmasının (Hegel’in siyasal düşüncelerinin değil) sonuçlarını göstermek ve liberal bakış açısından Hegel’de zemin bulan iki “totaliter rejim” düşüncesinin neyi hedef aldığını açığa çıkarmak.

Karl Christian Friedrich Krause (1781-1832) and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) are two representatives of German Idealism, both of whom developed impressing category systems. At the core of both systems is the question of the relation of the Absolute to its determinations and the determinations of finite beings. Both idealists try to deduce their respective category systems from the immediacy of the Absolute. Both use combinatorial methods to get from known to new categories or constellations in the system, which then unfold in the world (in creation, in world history etc.). Krause is thereby considered the eponym of so-called panentheism, the doctrine that “Everything is in God.” Hegel is also often referred to as a panentheist. Through a (necessarily superficial) comparison of the two systems of categories, in this essay the thesis will be advocated that Hegel was in no sense a panentheist. Krause is and remains the gold standard of panentheism.

OPSOMMING Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), een van die belangrikste figure in die ontwikkeling van Duitse idealisme, se filosofie staan as "absolute idealisme" bekend, aangesien hy die idee, of gees (verstand) as die eintlike werklikheid beskou - in teenstelling met 'n materialistiese denker soos Karl Marx, wat materie (stof) as primêre werklikheid aanwys. Hegel was die eerste Westerse denker wat die geskiedenis ernstig opgeneem het; volgens hom is alles, spesifiek menslike kulturele aktiwiteite, onderworpe aan historiese ontwikkeling, en beskryf hy hierdie ontwikkeling op verskeie vlakke, insluitende dié wat hy "absolute gees" noem. Op hierdie vlak word wêreldgeskiedenis aan die hand van 'n "dialektiese" ontwikkeling vanaf "subjektiewe" gees (individuele menslike passies en bedoelinge) via "objektiewe" gees (staatstrukture en wette) tot "absolute gees" voorgestel. In hierdie artikel word daar aandag gegee aan wat volgens Hegel op laasgenoemde vlak gebeur, spesifiek met betrekking tot sy raaiselagtige stelling, dat die kuns as "hoogste uitdrukking" van die gees "moet sterf", om plek te maak vir religie en filosofie as manifestasies daarvan op meer gevorderde vlakke. 'n Mens kan tereg wonder wat Hegel daarmee bedoel het in die lig van die voortdurende beoefening van kuns tot vandag toe. Die antwoord is geleë in die frase, "hoogste uitdrukking", wat daarop dui dat hy aan kuns in historiese ontwikkelingsterme dink - met ander woorde, kuns is die draer van die absolute gees tot op 'n bepaalde tydstip, waarna dit plek moet maak vir ander sodanige uitdrukkingsvorme, te wete godsdiens en filosofie. Bowendien is kuns self ook onderworpe aan interne ontwikkeling; vir Hegel is die vroegste kuns simbolies van aard, (met Egiptiese kuns as voorbeeld), gevolg deur klassieke kuns (onder die antieke Grieke) en laastens romantiese kuns (in sy eie tyd). Die verskille tussen hierdie drie kunsvorms word bepaal deur die verhouding tussen idee en materie; in simboliese kuns domineer materie oor die idee in kunswerke, sodat die betekenis daarvan slegs vaagweg gepeil kan word (dink maar aan die Sfinks, as die "simbool van die simboliese"), terwyl daar 'n volmaakte balans tussen idee en materie bestaan in klassieke Griekse kuns, sodat geeneen van die twee dominant is nie (soos in die geval van beeldhouwerke wat die god Apollo voorstel). In romantiese kuns (byvoorbeeld die romantiese skilderkuns van Gericault) vind 'n mens die teenoorgestelde van simboliese kuns, met die idee wat dermate oor die materie heers dat dit byna daarin slaag om in denkbeeldige vorm daarvan los te breek. Hierdie is volgens Hegel die "hoogste" ontwikkelingspunt wat kuns as draer van die gees kan bereik, voordat dit plek maak vir religie as "beelddenke" en uiteindelik filosofie, waar die gees as idee suiwer, sonder enige stoflike oorblyfsel, tot uitdrukking kom. Hier voltooi die absolute gees die ontwikkelingstrajek daarvan, wat by die objektiewe vergestalting daarvan begin en via subjektiewe beliggaming uiteindelik in absolute "selfkennis" kulmineer. Vir die doeleindes van hierdie artikel is dit egter tematies betekenisvol dat Hegel ook melding maak van die voortbestaan van kuns ná die punt waar dit afstand doen van die titel van "hoogste" manifestasie van die gees of idee, naamlik in die gewaad van "kritiese", polemiese kuns, wat vry geword het van spesifieke wêreldbeskouings. 'n Mens kan in die moderne kunsbewegings van die vroeë 20ste eeu - insluitende kubisme, abstrakte ekspressionisme, konseptualisme en futurisme - die beliggaming van hierdie verwagting by Hegel bespeur, waar hierdie soort kuns telkens die ontologiese aanspraak maak dat dit die ware werklikheid blootlê. As besonder treffende tydgenootlike uitdrukking van sodanige (radikale) kritiese kuns word Andy Goldsworthy se ekologiese kuns ten slotte onder die loep geplaas. Trefwoorde: dood van kuns, kritiese kuns, ekologiese kuns, dialekties, Hegel, geskiedenis, kapitalisme, Goldsworthy ABSTRACT Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), one of the major figures in the history of philosophy, played a significant role in the development of German idealism from Immanuel Kant in the 18th century via figures such as Schelling and Fichte, with the movement culminating in Hegel's "absolute idealism". In ontological terms idealism means that "the idea" is regarded as the true reality, instead of material things. Karl Marx, who learned a lot from Hegel as far as his dialectical method goes, famously remarked that Hegel had turned the world on its head, and he, Marx (a materialist thinker), would put it back on its feet again. Hegel made a substantial contribution to the philosophy of art - his multi-volume work, Lectures on Aesthetics, is justly famous - but instead of discussing it here in general terms, I shall focus on Hegel's puzzling statement that art had reached the highest point of its development as bearer of "the idea" in his own time (the first half of the 19th century), and would have to make way for religion and philosophy as expressions of the idea, or spirit/mind. This is known as Hegel's thesis of "the death of art". One might wonder what this means, because anyone can see that, if he meant the end of art as a cultural practice, he was simply wrong, given the ubiquitous signs of ongoing artistic activities. This may be the case, but recall that Hegel saw art as having reached the highest point of its development as bearer of "the idea" at that time, suggesting that there would still be a role for art after this point. This is precisely what is the case. For Hegel, the idea, or spirit (mind) as ultimate reality, unfolds itself in the history of the world at various levels. At the niveau of social and political development, which Hegel writes about in his Philosophy of History, he understands history from the ancient Chinese, Indians and Persians, through the Greeks and Romans until his own time as the history of the increasing "consciousness of freedom", with every new era displaying a step forward, approximating the ideal of political freedom. In this, his most accessible work, as well as in his magnum opus, The Phenomenology of spirit/mind, Hegel displays what is probably his most lasting philosophical legacy - a keen awareness, more than any philosopher before him, of history, and the fact that everything human is subject to historical development, which he believed to have meaning and direction. Moreover, instead of a simple-minded, linear conception of history, he thinks of historical change dialectically - that is, developing from one state of affairs through its negation by its dialectical opposite, or antithesis, to another, higher state, which comprises a synthesis of the two preceding stages. This new stage is again negated by its opposite, and so on. Importantly, however, Hegel claims that, with every dialectical movement from one historical condition to another, the previous, negated stage is preserved, uplifted, and cancelled simultaneously (a tripartite process called sublation in English, and Aufhebung in German). This means that every earlier stage of development is still present in every later stage, but in a transformed fashion. Hegel also calls this "the negation of the negation" - incorporating something of the other into oneself. To reach the level of what he calls absolute spirit, it develops through subjective spirit (sense perception, consciousness, self-consciousness) and objective spirit (the family, the state, law) to the point where it manifests itself in art, followed by religion, and eventually the highest level, namely, philosophy, where absolute spirit or mind "knows itself" in clear conceptual terms. In the development of art he distinguishes three stages, namely symbolic art, classical art and the art of his own time, namely romantic art. Certain kinds of art correspond to these stages, with architecture being the exemplary symbolic art, sculpture the epitome of classical art, and painting, music and dramatic poetry the clearest expressions of romantic art. Moreover, in every stage, and kind of art there is a typical relationship between the idea and the material within which it is enveloped (for that is what art is, for Hegel: the sensuous, or material, embodiment of the idea). In the case of symbolic art the idea does not appear clearly, but is only dimly suggested because the sensuous envelope predominates over it. The art of the ancient Egyptians serves as an example of symbolic art, with the Sphinx as "the symbol of the symbolic". Classical art is exemplified by ancient Greek sculpture, which is in a sense the "highest" that art is capable of as far as the relationship between idea and matter goes: in the sculptures depicting the Greek gods, such as Apollo, we see the perfect equilibrium, Hegel claims, between idea and matter, with neither dominating the other. However, when romantic art replaces classical art we find a preponderance that is the opposite of that found in symbolic art, insofar as the idea becomes too strong for the material to contain, so that it threatens to break its material bonds. Hegel sees this happening in the painting, music and poetry or drama of his time. Think of romantic paintings such as those of Eugene Delacroix or Theodore Gericault, for example, the latter's painting of The Raft of the Medusa, which commemorates the sinking of a ship by that name and shows survivors on a raft, in various stages of exhaustion and desperation. It is as if the painting is striving to surpass itself as artistic medium in an attempt to express the suffering of these people. The same is true of some of the music of Hegel's time. He would probably have been familiar with Beethoven's opera, Fidelio - with its valorisation of love, courage, sacrifice and freedom - although he does not refer to it. But it is particularly poetry and drama, where the poetic expressions of joy and suffering come close to philosophy (except that here they are instances of imaginative, instead of conceptual articulations), that testify to romantic art signalling the finale of art's capacity to embody the idea. Art passes the baton to religion, which Hegel thinks of as "pictorial thinking", and which expresses the subjectivity of humans and of God better than art could. Eventually religion has to make way for philosophy, though, because it is there that spirit or mind knows itself self-reflectively and clearly. As far as art is concerned there is an important corollary, however. Hegel writes about a "free art" that continues to exist after art has relinquished its "highest vocation", and attributes to this art a critical, polemical function, given that the artist has become free from the constraints of a specific worldview. In this respect Hegel seems to have been prescient; even in his own time he noticed that people had become less interested in merely looking at art, for instance, and more interested in what art meant - hence Hegel's anticipation of a "science of art". Beyond Hegel's lifetime art developed in a manner that bears out his expectations. Particularly in the early 20th century one notices a plethora of new art movements - abstract expressionism, cubism, fauvism, conceptualism, suprematism, futurism, metaphysical art - all of which bear overtly theoretical names, claiming to reflect the true nature of reality. In contemporary ecological art, such as that of Andy Goldsworthy, one may perceive a particularly powerful instance of the "critical" role of art that Hegel anticipated. It is here discussed to demonstrate what is meant by claiming that it embodies a "radically critical" art in the face of the ecological crisis facing humanity. Keywords: death of art, critical art, ecological art, dialectical, Hegel, history, capitalism, Goldsworthy