Relevant bibliographies by topics / Haugeland

Academic literature on the topic 'Haugeland'

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Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 20 February 2023

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Journal articles on the topic "Haugeland"

1

Ainbinder, Bernardo. "John Haugeland: Dasein Disclosed: John Haugeland’s Heidegger. Edited by Joseph Rouse." Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14, no. 4 (April 16, 2014): 1171–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11097-014-9361-3.

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Kraatz, Karl. "John Haugeland: Dasein Disclosed." Zeitschrift für philosophische Literatur 2, no. 4 (October 16, 2014): 60–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.21827/zfphl.2.4.35346.

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Pedersen, Hans. "John Haugeland, Dasein Disclosed." Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual 4 (2014): 86–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/gatherings201445.

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Okrent, Mark. "HEIDEGGER AND DAVIDSON (AND HAUGELAND)." Southern Journal of Philosophy 28, S1 (March 1990): 75–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.1990.tb00566.x.

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Huemer, Wolfgang. "Husserl and Haugeland on Constitution." Synthese 137, no. 3 (December 2003): 345–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/b:synt.0000004902.07390.18.

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Kraatz, Karl. "Zed Adams und Jacob Browning (Hg.): Giving a Damn. Essays in Dialogue with John Haugeland." Zeitschrift für philosophische Literatur 5, no. 3 (July 10, 2017): 33–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.21827/zfphl.5.3.35403.

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Brandom, Robert B. "Responses to Pippin, Macbeth and Haugeland." European Journal of Philosophy 13, no. 3 (December 2005): 429–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0378.2005.00238.x.

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Bátori, Zsolt. "Review of Having Thought, by John Haugeland." Essays in Philosophy 3, no. 2 (2002): 308–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eip20023217.

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Carman, T. "Is Dasein People? Heidegger According to Haugeland." boundary 2 41, no. 2 (June 1, 2014): 197–212. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/01903659-2686142.

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Henschen, Tobias. "Dreyfus and Haugeland on Heidegger and Authenticity." Human Studies 35, no. 1 (February 2012): 95–113. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10746-012-9212-6.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Haugeland"

1

Tauber, Justin. "Reading Merleau-Ponty: Cognitive science, pathology and transcendental phenomenology." Thesis, The University of Sydney, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/1965.

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This thesis explores the evolution of the way the Phenomenology of Perception is read for the purpose of determining its relevance to cognitive science. It looks at the ways in which the descriptions of phenomena are taken to converge with connectionist and enactivist accounts (the "psychological" aspect of this reading) and the way Merleau-Ponty's criticisms of intellectualism end empiricism are treated as effective responses to the philosophical foundations of cognitivism. The analysis reveals a general assumption that Merleau-Ponty's thought is compatible with a broadly naturalistic approach to cognition. This assumption has its roots in the belief that Merleau-Ponty's proximity to the existential tradition is incompatible with a commitment to a genuine transcendental philosophical standpoint. I argue that this suspicion is unfounded, and that it neglects the internal structure of the Phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty's criticism of classical forms of transcendental philosophy is not a rejection of that tradition, but instead prompts his unorthodox use of pathological case-studies. For Merleau-Ponty, this engagement with pathology constitutes a kind of transcendental strategy, a strategy that is much closer to Husserl's later work than is commonly acknowledged. The thesis also demonstrates a different mode of engagement with cognitive science, through a critical encounter with John Haugeland's transcendental account of the perception of objects. Confronting his account with the phenomenon of anorexia, I challenge him to differentiate his notion of an existential commitment from the anorexic's pathological over-commitment to a particular body image. Merleau-Ponty's account does not suffer from the same problems as Haugeland's because transcendence is not construed in terms of independence, but in terms of the fecundity and inexhaustibility of the sensible. I attempt to articulate Merleau-Ponty's own notion of a pre-personal commitment through the metaphor of invitation and show how this commitment and the Husserlian notion of open intersubjectivity can shed light on the anorexic's predicament.
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Tauber, Justin. "Reading Merleau-Ponty: Cognitive science, pathology and transcendental phenomenology." Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/1965.

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Master of Philosophy (Dept. of Philosophy)
This thesis explores the evolution of the way the Phenomenology of Perception is read for the purpose of determining its relevance to cognitive science. It looks at the ways in which the descriptions of phenomena are taken to converge with connectionist and enactivist accounts (the "psychological" aspect of this reading) and the way Merleau-Ponty's criticisms of intellectualism end empiricism are treated as effective responses to the philosophical foundations of cognitivism. The analysis reveals a general assumption that Merleau-Ponty's thought is compatible with a broadly naturalistic approach to cognition. This assumption has its roots in the belief that Merleau-Ponty's proximity to the existential tradition is incompatible with a commitment to a genuine transcendental philosophical standpoint. I argue that this suspicion is unfounded, and that it neglects the internal structure of the Phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty's criticism of classical forms of transcendental philosophy is not a rejection of that tradition, but instead prompts his unorthodox use of pathological case-studies. For Merleau-Ponty, this engagement with pathology constitutes a kind of transcendental strategy, a strategy that is much closer to Husserl's later work than is commonly acknowledged. The thesis also demonstrates a different mode of engagement with cognitive science, through a critical encounter with John Haugeland's transcendental account of the perception of objects. Confronting his account with the phenomenon of anorexia, I challenge him to differentiate his notion of an existential commitment from the anorexic's pathological over-commitment to a particular body image. Merleau-Ponty's account does not suffer from the same problems as Haugeland's because transcendence is not construed in terms of independence, but in terms of the fecundity and inexhaustibility of the sensible. I attempt to articulate Merleau-Ponty's own notion of a pre-personal commitment through the metaphor of invitation and show how this commitment and the Husserlian notion of open intersubjectivity can shed light on the anorexic's predicament.
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Books on the topic "Haugeland"

1

Haugeland, JohnHG. Dasein Disclosed: John Haugeland's Heidegger. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013.

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2

McDowell, John, Zed Adams, Jacob Browning, and John Haugeland. Giving a Damn: Essays in Dialogue with John Haugeland. MIT Press, 2016.

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3

Blattner, William, Steven Crowell, Zed Adams, and Jacob Browning. Giving a Damn: Essays in Dialogue with John Haugeland. MIT Press, 2016.

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4

Adams, Zed, and Jacob Browning. Giving a Damn: Essays in Dialogue with John Haugeland. MIT Press, 2016.

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5

Giving a Damn: Essays in Dialogue with John Haugeland. MIT Press, 2016.

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Book chapters on the topic "Haugeland"

1

Kulvicki, John. "Recording and Representing, Analog and Digital." In Giving a Damn. The MIT Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262035248.003.0010.

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In “Representational Genera,” Haugeland built an account of representational kinds around the structures of their contents. Icons, which include pictures, images, graphs, and diagrams, differ from logical representations like linguistic expressions because iconic contents are essentially patterns of dependent and independent variables. Such structures are absent in language. Recording is a witless, replayable process that Haugeland deployed to calm worries about his content-wise account of representational genera. This paper elevates recording from the supporting role Haugeland gave it to star of the show. The main claim defended here is that some kinds of representation—pictures, images, graphs, diagrams—are modeled by recording processes, while others, like languages, are not. Extensionally, this distinction is close to Haugeland’s, but it is intensionally subtler, more plausible, and, as I hope to show, more useful. This approach abandons Haugeland’s goal of distinguishing representational kinds exclusively in terms of their contents, but there are many advantages to doing so.
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Lance, Mark. "“Two Dogmas of Rationalism”: A Second Encounter." In Giving a Damn. The MIT Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262035248.003.0013.

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I develop, at John’s request, some objections I raised to Haugeland’s “Two Dogmas” when Haugeland presented the paper at Georgetown University. First, I suggest that what he identifies as ‘positivism’ should be seen more as an epistemological rather than an ontological dogma; and second, I push to clarify what is important and unique about Haugeland’s account of alethic modality. The account seeks to explain modality by focusing on the pragmatics of modal discourse rather than its semantics. Haugeland concedes too much in giving this account, namely that it can only account for free-standing modal claims. I argue that this would be fatal to the account, were it true, but that it is not. I offer an outline of a way to provide a fuller account of modal discourse in Haugeland’s pragmatic terms, drawing analogy with similar “pragmatist semantics” accounts of negation and other idioms.
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Maher, Chauncey. "Constancy Mechanisms and the Normativity of Perception." In Giving a Damn, edited by Zed Adams. The MIT Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262035248.003.0009.

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In “Truth and Rule-Following,” John Haugeland criticizes a wide swath of competing accounts of perceptual representation on the grounds that they cannot make room for the possibility of perceptual states that are functionally right but factually wrong. In this paper, we spell out what we take Haugeland’s criticism to involve by showing how it applies equally well to an account of perceptual representation that was published after Haugeland’s death: namely, the account of perceptual representation offered in Tyler Burge’s Origins of Objectivity (2010).
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Cummins, Robert. "Haugeland on Representation and Intentionality." In The World in the Head, 135–51. Oxford University Press, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199548033.003.0009.

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Haugeland, John. "Two Dogmas of Rationalism." In Giving a Damn. The MIT Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262035248.003.0011.

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In this previously unpublished essay, Haugeland aims to “expose two covert ‘dogmas’—tendentious yet invisible assumptions—that underlie rationalist thought, both modern and contemporary.” The dogmas are “positivism,” the claim that the world is composed entirely of facts, and “cognitivism,” the claim that the mind is exhausted by the rational intellect. Haugeland argues that both of these dogmas force rationalism into a limited understanding of the mind and world. But the dogmas also prevent rationalism from recognizing the distinctively human capacities to disclose the truth in truly novel and unforeseen ways. Haugeland argues that the blinders of rationalism inevitably distort the profound importance of areas such as love, integrity, and commitment in the development of our social, romantic, and scientific practices. In addition to being a response to the work of the Pittsburgh School of Philosophy more broadly, it also offers a unique contribution to current debates concerning alethic modality.
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Rouse, Joseph. "Love and Death." In Giving a Damn. The MIT Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262035248.003.0005.

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This paper explicates and connects two of Haugeland’s most controversial philosophical claims: his puzzling claim that the characteristic form of intentionality and human understanding is love, and his revisionist interpretation of Heidegger’s account of “existential death” in Being and Time. The former claim responds to Haugeland’s implicit classification and telling criticisms of the predominant alternative conceptions of intentionality. Haugeland argues that these alternatives actually fit different phenomena (“ersatz” or “lapsed” intentionality) that fall short of even the most ordinary human comportments. The latter claim treats “death” as concerned not with human mortality, but with the objective accountability of entire domains of human activity and understanding. Heidegger thereby has a deeper, more adequate account of intentionality and understanding directly complementing Haugeland’s re-conception of intentionality as a form of love. This reading also brings Being and Time into closer critical engagement with Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. This juxtaposition further illuminates Heidegger’s Kantian emphasis upon the finitude of human understanding, and brings out the political significance of Being and Time in constructively revealing ways despite Heidegger’s own later disastrous political involvement.
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Haugeland, John. "Appendix: The Transcendental Deduction of the Categories." In Giving a Damn. The MIT Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262035248.003.0014.

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In this 16 page outline, Haugeland (with James Conant and John McDowell) offers a summary outline and interpretation of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction of the Categories from his (Kant’s) Critique of Pure Reason (B Edition). In addition to a careful exposition of a difficult text, this outline also provides helpful context for understanding the role of Kant in the contemporary philosophers of the Pittsburgh School.
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Kukla, Rebecca. "Ostension and Assertion." In Giving a Damn. The MIT Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262035248.003.0004.

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I draw on Haugeland and a Haugelandian reading of Heidegger to give an ostensive theory of assertion: to assert the truth of a claim is to engage in a kind of ostensive act. Crucially, ostensive acts are first and foremost social acts; hence truth-talk has its first and most natural home in communicative interactions. Telling myself that something is true makes sense only derivatively, if at all. Like other deflationists, I argue that truth-talk serves only a formal semantic function. But unlike traditional deflationists, I try to show that the pragmatics of truth-claiming is rich and multi-faceted, and that to understand it we need to explore the nature and variety of ostensive acts. I argue that the metaphysics and semantics of truth are deflationary, while the pragmatic structure of assertion is substantive and philosophically revealing. Understanding the pragmatics of truth-claims dissolves some of the worries that make more metaphysically and semantically robust truth theories tempting. Haugeland gives us most of the materials for an ostensive theory of assertion, but he is hampered by a thin understanding of the role of social interaction and communication.
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Helm, Bennett W. "Truth, Objectivity, and Emotional Caring: Filling In the Gaps of Haugeland’s Existentialist Ontology." In Giving a Damn. The MIT Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262035248.003.0008.

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In a remarkable series of papers, Haugeland lays out what is both a striking interpretation of Heidegger and a compelling account of objectivity and truth. Central to his account is a notion of existential commitment, which insists on the independence of the phenomena from our understanding. This requires the potential for us to change or give up on our understanding of the world in the face of apparently impossible phenomena. Although Haugeland never gives a clear account of existential commitment, he claims that it is fundamentally an individual matter. This, I argue, is a mistake that fails to make sense of the public, shared nature of the objective world. Instead, I offer an initial account of existential commitment as one we undertake jointly, and I analyze it (and the corresponding responsibility) in terms of interpersonal rational patterns of reactive attitudes: emotions like resentment, gratitude, indignation, approbation, guilt, and trust. The upshot is that our existential commitment is not only to a shared, objective world but also to each other such that our ability individually to take responsibility for our understanding of the world is intelligible only in terms of others' being able to hold us responsible for it.
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Blattner, William. "Anonymity, Mineness, and Agent Specificity: Pragmatic Normativity and the Authentic Situation in Heidegger’s Being and Time." In Giving a Damn. The MIT Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262035248.003.0002.

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“California Heideggerianism,” as developed in the 1980‘s by Dreyfus, Haugeland, and Guignon, interprets Heidegger’s notion of the Anyone in Being and Time as a pattern of social normativity that establishes the contours of Dasein’s self-understanding and world. Specifically, the Anyone maintains a reservoir of “anonymous” or “generic” social roles, and individual cases of Dasein understand themselves by throwing themselves into one or several such social roles. Thus, the content of Dasein’s self-understanding is circumscribed by those possibilities of living on offer from Anyone. I argue that this reconstruction of the role of the Anyone is neither phenomenologically plausible nor exegetically required. To develop an alternative approach, I analyze the pragmatic normativity of those situations in which Dasein is called upon to deviate from everyday social norms. I draw upon Haugeland’s reconstruction of the phenomenon of conscience in Being and Time, which I argue can lead us to a conception of authentic self-understanding in which the content of self-understanding is neither some utterly novel and unprecedented form of originality nor provided by anonymous social norms. Rather, this owned content is the product of specifying impersonal possibilities of self-understanding that reside in the background culture in which one lives.
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