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1
Ruzhelnyk, Olga. "Annexed and displaced: Ukrainian football clubs in Crimea and Donbass since 2014." Football(s). Histoire, culture, économie, société, no. 1 (November 17, 2022): 125–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.58335/football-s.127.
Abstract:
L’espace footballistique ukrainien a connu de profonds changements si on le compare à son état d’avant 2014. Pour des raisons politiques, à savoir l’annexion de la Crimée et le début de la guerre du Donbass, nombre des principaux clubs de football ukrainiens ont bouleversé la physionomie de la ligue nationale de football. Certains l’ont quittée, à l’instar des clubs de football de la péninsule de Crimée ; d’autres ont changé d’emplacement, comme, par exemple, le FC « Shakhtar » Donetsk ou le FC « Zorya » Louhansk. Cet article vise à examiner les mutations du football professionnel en Ukraine, c’est-à-dire les incidences sur les clubs de football mentionnés des évolutions de la situation politique du pays de 2014 jusqu’au début de 2022.
2
Minakov, Mikhaïl. "Un siècle de système politique ukrainien : l’expérience de construction d’un État en Europe orientale aux XXe et XXIe siècles." Connexe : les espaces postcommunistes en question(s) 8 (December 30, 2022): 169–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.5077/journals/connexe.2022.e1029.
Abstract:
Avec l’aimable autorisation de la revue, nous présentons ci-après la traduction légèrement abrégée d'un article de Mikhaïl Minakov paru dans Neprikosnovennyj Zapas en 2020 (n° 129, pp. 161–179). Il nous semble important de faire connaître ce texte au lectorat francophone dans le contexte de l’invasion russe déclenchée le 24 février 2022. À l’époque, la défaite rapide de l’armée ukrainienne et l’effondrement de l’État ukrainien paraissaient l'hypothèse la plus probable non seulement pour le Kremlin, mais aussi pour de nombreux commentateurs. Pour expliquer l’étonnante résistance de l’Ukraine face à l’agression, on a souligné le rôle de la mobilisation civique, dans la lignée des recherches sociologiques menées depuis 2014 sur les « volontaires » du Maïdan puis dans la guerre qui s’en est suivie dans le Donbass. L’article de Mikhaïl Minakov s’intéresse quant à lui à l’État lui-même et prend plus de recul en envisageant un siècle d’histoire et pas seulement les huit dernières années. Il montre ainsi la continuité paradoxale dans la construction d’un système politique solide en Ukraine.
3
Gladii, Andrzej. "Konteksty oraz uwarunkowania ruchu separatystycznego we wschodnim regionie Ukrainy w 2014 roku." Refleksje. Pismo naukowe studentów i doktorantów WNPiD UAM, no. 13 (October 31, 2018): 21–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/r.2016.1.3.
Abstract:
In this paper was taken an attempt to research the causes of separatism in the Donbass based on a multi-faceted inquiry. Donbass has always been a key region in Ukraine. In many cases here were decided the political and economic destiny of the state. This region is the most socially and economically diversified. Donbass is a place of the most dangerous working conditions and the enormous social inequalities in Ukraine.In 2014 after the events at the Euromaidan Donbass was a field of fighting between the Ukrainian government and Russian-backed separatists. The issue of separatism in Ukraine remains unresolved.
4
Ryabinin, Yevgeny. "Russia’s Exogenous Factor in the Donbass Conflict." Przegląd Strategiczny, no. 13 (December 31, 2020): 97–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/ps.2020.1.6.
Abstract:
The hypothesis of this research is that Russia has been imposing its influence on Ukraine since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Before the political and military crisis in 2013, it was an indirect influence, whereas since 2014 it has been a direct impact in many spheres.
It is necessary to underline that Ukraine has always been split into two parts in terms of foreign policy priorities, language, religion, and culture. This fact was mentioned by Samuel Huntington, who predicted an intense crisis in bilateral relations between Russia and Ukraine in his work Clash of Civilizations. There were two parties in Ukraine that were widely supported in South-Eastern Ukraine, namely the Party of Regions and the Communist Party. The former never spoke about the integration of Ukraine as part of Russian integrational projects because its politicians were afraid of aggressive Russian capital. So they only used pro-Russian rhetoric to win elections. The Communist Party openly backed integration with Russia, but didn’t get enough support as for this idea. It is also demonstrated that there were no parties that were backed financially by Russia, because the parties that offered a kind of a union with Russia never got any seats in the parliament.
Since 2014, Russia has been imposing its influence on Ukraine in various spheres, such as economics, politics, diplomacy, the military sphere, etc. Having signed two cease-fire agreements, Russia and Ukraine have failed to apply them and the crisis continues to this day.
5
Enin, Maxim. "The change of the attitude of Ukrainians to Russia in the conditions of the anti-terrorism operation and humanitarian aid needs of population of Donbass region: the results of sociological researches." Świat Idei i Polityki 15, no. 1 (December 31, 2016): 139–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.15804/siip201608.
Abstract:
The article describes the specific features of the new terrorism in the Donbass which has the support of Russia in the struggle for influence on the policy of Ukraine. The terrorist organizations on Donbass are specific territorial units. Using the concept ‘state’, focusing on the Orthodox faith and idea of ‘Russian world’ this terrorism has purpose to capture a new territory, intimidation and demoralization of Ukraine and the world community. In the context of anti-terrorist operation in the Donbass region we studied also the dynamic of changing the attitude of Ukrainians to Russia. From December 6 to December 15, 2014 the Kiev International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) conducted All–Ukrainian poll of public opinion. Deterioration of attitudes towards Russia is observed in all regions. At the same time for studying attitude of Russians to Ukraine the Levada-center in Russia from 23 to 26 January, 2015 conducted a survey on a representative selection for Russian. The purpose of the second research is monitoring humanitarian aid needs of the residents of Donbass (Donetsk and Lugansk region). The research was conducted by the Kiev International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in December 2014 (the author of article is one of the organizers of this research). The humanitarian situation in Donbas has deteriorated during period from December 2014 to September 2015: increased number of respondents who estimate the situation of living conditions as unbearable in their localities. A significant share surveyed population (15%) would like to leave the localities of Lugansk and Donetsk region but they are not able. Despite a distress half of the residents of Donbass are optimistic and unite to help each other.
6
Semenov, M. Е. "The Approaches of Presidents P. Poroshenko and V. Zelensky to the Settlement of the Conflict in the Donbass: Comparative Analysis." Outlines of global transformations: politics, economics, law 14, no. 1 (January 28, 2021): 250–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.23932/2542-0240-2021-14-1-13.
Abstract:
The article is devoted to the analysis of the approaches of the presidents of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko and Volodymyr Zelensky to the issue of resolving the conflict in Donbass. The election of Vladimir Zelensky in 2019 as president of Ukraine gave rise to hope among some politicians and experts regarding the possibility of resolving the conflict that has been ongoing in 2014 in the Donbass. This was explained by the fact that, unlike his predecessor, he had no previous relation to politics, was not related to the outbreak of the conflict, and also that V. Zelensky actively used peace-loving rhetoric in his election campaign. In this regard, more than a year after V. Zelensky’s victory in the presidential election, the aim of the article was to compare his approach with P. Poroshenko’s approach to resolving the conflict in the Donbass. The study sequentially examines the approaches of the Ukrainian government in 2014-2019 to the conflict in the southeast of the country, the current Ukrainian political class approaches to the Donbass problem and directly the politician V. Zelensky himself regarding the settlement of the conflict. Taking into account Russia’s involvement in the events in Ukraine, Kiev’s policy towards Donbass is also considered in the context of Ukraine’s foreign policy towards Russia. As a result of the study, the conclusion is drawn about the significant continuity of the policy of V. Zelensky regarding his predecessor. At the same time, the material notes differences in the approaches of the two Ukrainian presidents and gives the forecast regarding the further development of Ukraine’s policy regarding the settlement of the conflict in the Donbass.
7
Nina S., Ishchenko, and Zaslavskaja Elena A. "The Image of the Other as a Structural Characteristic of the Cultural Border on the Example of Ukraine and Donbass." Humanitarian Vector 16, no. 2 (April 2021): 124–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.21209/1996-7853-2021-16-2-124-136.
Abstract:
The article is devoted to the specifics of the cultural frontier of Russian culture. The relevance of the article is due to the strengthening in the post-Soviet period of cultural conflicts on the border of Russian civilization. These conflicts on cultural grounds even lead to military action against the bearers of Russian culture, as has been the case in the Ukrainian war against Donbass since 2014. The article examines the borderland as a zone of intercultural interaction, carries out a cultural analysis of the border between cultures and identities, highlights the structural characteristic of the cultural border ‒ the image of the Other. Based on the conducted cultural analysis, the structure of the cultural space of Ukraine and the Donbass, including the wartime situation since 2014 is investigated. The study of the media content of Ukrainian information projects and similar projects in the LPR is carried out on the basis of an information-analytical methodology. Two permanent Ukrainian media projects of the Internews-Ukraine: Revision of History and Propagandarium, which work intensively in the Russian-speaking regions of Ukraine creating and broadcasting the image of the Russian as the Other by methods of aggressive anti-Russian propaganda are considered. We also analyze the activity of the Lugansk cultural site “Dandelion”, which has been operating in Lugansk since 2015 and reflects the cultural life of the city and the republic during this period. An analysis of the site’s materials shows that in the republic in wartime conditions, Russian and world culture is preserved and mastered, intensive work is underway to integrate the republics of Donbass into the cultural space of modern Russia, relying on the historical memory of these territories. The article substantiates that Ukrainian culture is currently a borderland culture, since the image of the Other as the Russian dominates its structure and is imposed on the Russians of Ukraine by propaganda methods. At the same time, the culture of modern Donbass is developing as Russian culture in which the image of the Other as a modern Ukrainian, a carrier of anti-Russian identity is formed. Keywords: Russia, Ukraine, Donbass, borderland culture, the image of the Other, anti-Russian propaganda
8
Åslund, Anders. "Die ökonomischen Kosten der fortbestehenden russischen Aggression gegen die Ukraine." SIRIUS – Zeitschrift für Strategische Analysen 2, no. 4 (December 19, 2018): 352–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/sirius-2018-4004.
Abstract:
Kurzfassung Die Ukraine hat massive wirtschaftliche Verluste infolge der russischen Annexion der Krim im März 2014 und der militärischen Aggression gegen die östlichen Regionen Luhansk und Donetsk erleiden müssen. Während Russland auf der Krim einigermaßen funktionierende staatliche Strukturen eingeführt hat, ist die besetzte Donbass Region ein gesetzloses Dreckloch, aus dem mittlerweile die Hälfte der Bevölkerung geflohen ist. Russische Staatsbürger haben die Region geplündert und Unternehmen, Gebäude und Infrastruktur zerstört. Russische Handelssanktionen haben etwa 80 Prozent des Handels zwischen beiden Staaten eliminiert. Die Donbass-Region trug mit etwa 10 Prozent zum Bruttoinlandsprodukt der Ukraine bei, die Krim mit etwa 3,7 %. Wenn man von der Faustformel ausgeht, dass der Wert einer Region ungefähr dem Vierfachen des jährlichen Bruttoinlandsprodukts entspricht, so kann man den materiellen Verlust, der der Ukraine durch die russischen Aggressionen entstanden ist, bei etwa 98,4 Milliarden US Dollar ansetzen.
9
Guo, Zhikang. "Why the War in Donbass Is Difficult to Reconcile: Based on the Comparison to the 2014 Crimean War." Lecture Notes in Education Psychology and Public Media 15, no. 1 (October 26, 2023): 264–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.54254/2753-7048/15/20231067.
Abstract:
After the Crimean crisis in 2014, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict re-emerged in the form of war in the Donbass. The two conflicts were handled in completely different ways, with the Crimean crisis ending in a short period, while the war in the Donbass lasted for more than a year. Using a case study and comparative politics approach, this paper examines the reasons for the intractability of this war by comparing the two Russia-Ukraine conflicts. The paper begins by setting the context of the two conflicts, aiming to show how the differences like the war, government strategy, the level of Western support, and the ethnic composition of the conflict areas have had an impact on the intractability of the war. The paper suggests that the war will be a long-term stalemate and that the key point of mediation will be Chinas involvement. This article fills a gap in the scholarship by comparing the two Russia-Ukraine conflicts.
10
Mitrofanova, Oksana. "Ukraine-Pologne : du partenariat stratégique à l’incertitude tactique." Questions internationales 107-108, no. 3 (June 22, 2021): 145–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/quin.107.0145.
Abstract:
La Pologne et l’Ukraine ont noué un partenariat stratégique fort à la fin du siècle dernier. Or, malgré leur proximité géographique et de nombreux intérêts communs, les deux pays connaissent des divergences socio-économiques et sécuritaires croissantes. Avec le conflit de basse intensité qui secoue le Donbass depuis 2014, l’Ukraine est en effet confrontée à des problèmes intérieurs majeurs qui participent à l’affaiblissement de ce partenariat. Sa pérennité dépend tant de la capacité des partenaires à surmonter les vicissitudes actuelles que des évolutions du contexte géopolitique régional .
11
Denisov, D. O. "Place and role of all-Ukrainian round tables of National Unity in the settlement of the Conflict in the donbass." Humanities and Social Sciences. Bulletin of the Financial University 13, no. 4 (October 8, 2023): 85–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.26794/2226-7867-2023-13-4-85-90.
Abstract:
Since the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine, various methods and methods of its settlement have been applied. One of such mechanisms was to be an inclusive dialogue within Ukrainian society. This format was supported by all parties involved in the conflict in the spring of 2014. In May 2014, after the start of the so-called anti-terrorist operation in the East of the country, the Kiev authorities, with the assistance of the OSCE, organized a series of All-Ukrainian round tables of national unity. In the public sphere, the organizers of the events pursued the main goal of finding a compromise between the parties to the conflict. In the course of the study, an attempt was made to identify the impact of the All- Ukrainian Round tables of National Unity on the conflict settlement process in the Donbass. The object of the study were three Round tables held in May 2014 in Kiev, Kharkiv and Nikolaev (Mykolaiv). The relevance of the research is due to the problem of insufficient elaboration and development of the topic related to dialogue platforms in Ukraine in the period from 2014 to 2022 and their impact on the course of the conflict in the Donbass. The novelty of the work lies in the fact that the topic of the All-Ukrainian round tables of National Unity has not been covered in the scientific literature.
12
Matveeva, A. "Donbass at limbo: self-proclaimed republics in the inter-war period (2014–2021)." Pathways to Peace and Security, no. 1 (2022): 92–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/2307-1494-2022-1-92-106.
Abstract:
In order to better understand the new phase of the war in and around Donbass that started in February 2022, the article suggests looking back at the “interwar” period in the region. This period is analyzed through the prism of a combination of three interpretations of the conflict – as an irredentist movement to join the “historical homeland” which the region had been “separated from”, as a civil conflict for a different (multiethnic, multilingual, more decentralized) Ukraine, better disposed towards the aspirations of the people of Donbass, and as an international geopolitical confrontation between Russia and the West. All three interpretations are seen as valid. In 2014–2022, self-proclaimed republics (the DNR and the LNR) went through the stages of their formation in the context of a historical cataclysm, early postconflict development when their economic and social life was still oriented towards Ukraine, the cut-off stage resulting from a strict economic blockade by Kiev, and the concluding period of creeping integration into Russia. The article specifically addresses the limbo phase that lasted from 2016 to early 2022. While this phase brought a greater level of security that allowed life in the DNR and the LNR to go on, security was brittle and prone to significant disruption. However, in both security and socio-political terms, the worst was the sense of a lack of clarity about the entities’ future, with three scenarios circulated by politicians at once: return to Ukraine on the basis of the Minsk agreements, joining Russia, and building up their own “statehood”. The Minsk Agreements that were initially viewed positively, as they reduced the level of hostilities, progressively lost their value. Special status was not what the war had been fought for and it remained an amorphous and abstract idea, which the years that passed since failed to fill with practical content. Balancing on the verge of renewal of hostilities necessitated the resources that the two republics did not have, which locked them into dependency on the Russian government. While the republics survived as self-governing entities with a political and cultural proximity to Russia and established proto-state institutions, they also experienced governance deficit and economic decline. By the early 2020s, any illusions of the two republics’ independent agency evaporated. What started as a people’s rebellion, when the region asserted its right to make choices and act upon them, came to the situation that their future was to be determined elsewhere. This future seemed to clear up since Russia’s formal recognition of the DNR and the LNR and the start of Russian military operation in Ukraine in 2022, but its contours lie beyond the article’s scope.
13
Marangé, Céline. "La posture internationale de la Russie depuis l’annexion de la Crimée." Questions internationales 101, no. 6 (January 15, 2020): 68–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/quin.101.0068.
Abstract:
L’annexion de la Crimée et la guerre dans le Donbass ont valu à la Russie d’être exclue du G8 en 2014. Aujourd’hui, la fracture avec les pays occidentaux apparaît moins irrémédiable. En août 2019, Emmanuel Macron a reçu son homologue russe au fort de Brégançon, quelques jours avant le sommet du G7 de Biarritz dont il était l’hôte. Le président français a jugé « pertinent qu’à terme la Russie puisse rejoindre le G8 », tout en soulignant l’importance de parvenir à des progrès tangibles dans la résolution du conflit ukrainien. Comment la Russie s’est-elle repositionnée sur la scène internationale au point de devenir un acteur indispensable ?
14
Levin, Oleh, and Oleh Poplavskiy. "The historical parallels between today's events in the Donbass and the pages of its past of hundred years ago, when this region was in the center of a fierce struggle between different political forces, social strata, and hostile groups are analyzed in this article. The main attention is focused on the investigation of attempts to create an anti-Ukrainian identity in the Donbass based on the use of prepared facts of events related to the history of the creation and short-term existence of the Donetsk-Kryvyi Rih Soviet Republic. It was determined that during almost the entire period of Ukraine’s independence in the Donbas, with the active participation of the Kremlin, Soviet and imperial interpretations of history were spread, ideas of a special regional identity were formed, and the ideological basis of anti-Ukrainian insinuations was created. At the same time, history was used as a kind of propaganda, and manipulation of the past. It was one of the main strategies of anti-Ukrainian forces in the Donbass. Stereotypes were instilled that this region is the territory of the formation of "novoros", "the people of Donbass", who have their own mentality and even traditions of statehood, unrelated to the history of Ukraine. All this became the ideological basis of the bloody events associated with the attempt to create in 2014 the so-called "people’s republics" in the territory of Donbass. Pseudo-referendums were held in this region, pseudo-independent republics headed by puppet governments, fully controlled by the Kremlin, were proclaimed like a hundred years ago, in order to restore imperial domination in Ukraine, according to the experience of the Bolsheviks. On the example of historical parallels of personal destinies of people who are forced one way or another to lead regional separatist movements or become puppets in the hands of external puppeteers by the revolutionary events of both a hundred years ago and today. It is reminded of the inadmissibility of ignoring the laws of historical development." Naukovyy Visnyk Dnipropetrovs'kogo Derzhavnogo Universytetu Vnutrishnikh Sprav 4, no. 4 (December 29, 2020): 89–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.31733/2078-3566-2020-4-89-95.
Abstract:
The historical parallels between today's events in the Donbass and the pages of its past of hundred years ago, when this region was in the center of a fierce struggle between different political forces, social strata, and hostile groups are analyzed in this article. The main attention is focused on the investigation of attempts to create an anti-Ukrainian identity in the Donbass based on the use of prepared facts of events related to the history of the creation and short-term existence of the Donetsk-Kryvyi Rih Soviet Republic. It was determined that during almost the entire period of Ukraine’s independence in the Donbas, with the active participation of the Kremlin, Soviet and imperial interpretations of history were spread, ideas of a special regional identity were formed, and the ideological basis of anti-Ukrainian insinuations was created. At the same time, history was used as a kind of propaganda, and manipulation of the past. It was one of the main strategies of anti-Ukrainian forces in the Donbass. Stereotypes were instilled that this region is the territory of the formation of "novoros", "the people of Donbass", who have their own mentality and even traditions of statehood, unrelated to the history of Ukraine. All this became the ideological basis of the bloody events associated with the attempt to create in 2014 the so-called "people’s republics" in the territory of Donbass. Pseudo-referendums were held in this region, pseudo-independent republics headed by puppet governments, fully controlled by the Kremlin, were proclaimed like a hundred years ago, in order to restore imperial domination in Ukraine, according to the experience of the Bolsheviks. On the example of historical parallels of personal destinies of people who are forced one way or another to lead regional separatist movements or become puppets in the hands of external puppeteers by the revolutionary events of both a hundred years ago and today. It is reminded of the inadmissibility of ignoring the laws of historical development.
15
Müür, Kristiina, Holger Mölder, Vladimir Sazonov, and Pille Pruulmann-Vengerfeldt. "Russian Information Operations Against the Ukrainian State and Defence Forces: April-December 2014 in Online News." Journal on Baltic Security 2, no. 1 (June 1, 2016): 28–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jobs-2016-0029.
Abstract:
Abstract The aim of the current article is to provide analysis of information operations of the Russian Federation performed against the Ukrainian state and defence forces from 1 April until 31 December 2014. Russia uses ideological, historical, political symbols and narratives for justifying and supporting their military, economic and political campaigns not only in Donbass but in the whole of Ukraine. The article concentrates on the various means of meaning-making carried out by Russian information operations regarding the Ukrainian state and military structures.
16
Driedger, Jonas J. "The Stopping Power of Sources." Analyse & Kritik 45, no. 1 (May 1, 2023): 137–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/auk-2023-2006.
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Abstract The article analyzes arguments, made by John J. Mearsheimer and others, that the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was largely caused by Western policy. It finds that these arguments rely on a partially false and incomplete reading of history. To do so, the article identifies a range of premises that are both foundational to Mearsheimer’s claims and based on implied or explicit historical interpretations. This includes the varying policies of Ukraine toward NATO and the EU as well as the changing Russian perceptions thereof; the political upheavals in Ukraine in early 2014 that were immediately succeeded by the annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbass; and the supposed absence of Russian ‘imperialism’ toward Ukraine prior to 2014. Finding that these interpretations do not hold up in light of relevant and available data, the article qualifies and contextualizes the validity of Mearsheimer’s arguments, points to superior ones, and highlights the need for case-specific expertise when using explanatory theory to make sense of politically salient ongoing events.
17
Chappedelaine, Bernard. "La guerre en Ukraine et l’unité allemande." Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains N° 294, no. 2 (June 3, 2024): 123–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/gmcc.294.0123.
Abstract:
La « victoire sur le fascisme » et le contrôle exercé sur la RDA ont été des éléments essentiels du statut international du régime soviétique après 1945. Très affaiblie, l’URSS donne son aval à la réunification de l’Allemagne, mais les conditions dans lesquelles la guerre froide prend fin vont créer dans l’opinion russe un traumatisme qui va être instrumentalisé par V. Poutine, témoin de ces événements à Dresde. La révolution pacifique de 1989 conforte les Allemands dans une vision des relations internationales fondée sur la loi et le marché et sur l’exclusion du recours à la force, conception dont ils auront du mal à s’extraire. Pour justifier l’annexion de la Crimée en 2014, puis l’invasion de l’Ukraine en février 2022, le Kremlin met en avant la nécessité de surmonter la « division de la nation russe », ainsi que les promesses qui auraient été faites par les Occidentaux sur le non-élargissement de l’OTAN lors des négociations (« 2+4 ») en 1990.
18
Davidenko, Alexandr. "29-ти летие начала гибридной агрессии РФ против Республики Молдова в Приднестровье (1992 год) в сравнении с началом аналогичной гибридной агрессии РФ против Украины в Крыму и на Донбассе (2014 год) / 29th anniversary of the beginning of the hybrid aggression of the Russian Federation against the Republic of Moldova in Transnistria (1992) in comparison with the beginning of a similar hybrid aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine in Crimea and Donbass (2014)." PLURAL. History, Culture, Society 9, no. 2 (November 20, 2021): 84–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.37710/plural.v9i2_7.
Abstract:
The hybrid aggression of the Russian Federation against the independent Republic of Moldova in the Transnistrian region in 1992 (Pridnestrov‘ye), and the Ukrainian point of view to that mentioned aggression. The year 2014, the beginning of the aggressive hybrid war of the Russian Federation against independent Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea, and the occupation of parts of the territory of Ukrainian Donetsk and Luhansk regions (Donbass). A common the problem for the World is the lack of a real-world counter mechanism similar to hybrid aggression, stopping such conflicts and resolving them.
19
Gruzdev, Vladislav V., Dmitriy A. Babichev, and Natal'ya A. Babicheva. "History of self-determination of the people of Donbass. experience of the Soviet Republic of Donetsk and Krivoy Rog." Vestnik of Kostroma State University, no. 3 (2019): 148–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.34216/1998-0817-2019-25-3-148-152.
Abstract:
The article is devoted to the burning problem that arose in 2014 in the Ukraine, in the regions of Lugansk and Donetsk, and that concerns the right of the people of Donbass to self-determination. This problem is not only of a local territorial nature, but it is also one of the most complex debatable problems of international law. Since the right to self-determination contradicts the principle of territorial integrity of the state, the consideration and solution of this issue is the most burning for the whole population living on the territory of the self-proclaimed people's republics of Lugansk and Donetsk. In the article, the authors analyse the concept of "self-determination of the people" and give a generalised characteristic of it, approving that it is the right of every nation to solve the issues of state structure, political status, economic, social and cultural development independently and at its own discretion. The author also examines the historical past of the people of Donbass, where, in terms of the Republic of Donetsk and Krivoy Rog and various documentary historical and legal materials, we come to the conclusion that the population of Donbass has the right to social, economic, cultural, spiritual and other development just as all the recognised countries of the world.
20
Yuskiv, Khrystyna. "Идентичность как причина появления сепаратистских тенденций (на примере Украины)." Studia Politologiczne, no. 62/2021 (December 18, 2021): 84–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.33896/spolit.2021.62.6.
Abstract:
The intensification of separatism in Ukraine in 2014 became possible due to profound changes in the worldview of a significant part of the population, which manifested in the changing of national self-identification. The purpose of the article is to clarify scientific ideas about the essence and relationship of separatism and identity on the example of Donbas. The article argues for the idea of the absence of an ethnic marker in the conflict in Donbass, where separatism is based on the specific regional identity, to which, through the efforts of Russian propaganda, the cultural, ideological, civilizational characteristics of the «Russian world» are added.
21
Rzepka, Marcin. "Badanie ukraińskich wspólnot ewngelikalnych poprzez misyjne narracje biograficzne." Textus et Studia, no. 1(29) (July 9, 2022): 13–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.15633/tes.08101.
Abstract:
By focusing on missionary narratives, the article offers a short description of the Ukrainian evangelical communities that have developed in Poland since 2014. Arguing that the outbreak of the war in Donbass was a decisive moment that shaped the waves of migrations from Ukraine, the article tries to analyze the strategy of reconstructing the biographies of Ukrainian evangelicals in the Polish cultural context. Using the categories of migrants and missionaries as biographical types, the article contextualizes the meaning of evangelicalism through its Ukrainian and Polish variations, and at the same time refers to the processes that are occur ring in evangelical Christianity globally.
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Sedakov, I. E., N. G. Semikoz, S. E. Zolotukhin, A. N. Zaika, A. V. Bondar, and D. S. Riazantseva. "Dedicated to the Memory of Academician Grigory Vasilievich Bondar and the 80th Anniversary of the Oncological Service of Donbass." Journal of oncology: diagnostic radiology and radiotherapy 6, no. 3 (October 16, 2023): 92–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.37174/2587-7593-2023-6-3-92-100.
Abstract:
The oncological service of Donbass has a rich history. The path of its formation began in 1943, when on September 9, 1943, Professor M.K. Afanasiev signed an order to restore the activities of the Stalin X-ray station and the oncological hospital.The first organizer of the radiological service in the Donbass is considered to be Ekaterina Vladimirovna Stelling, who was appointed in 1946 to the post of head of the oncological hospital in Stalino. The radiological service appeared in 1947, when the Regional Oncological Dispensary was organized. Soon the institution was renamed the Donetsk Regional Oncological Dispensary (DROD). Soon the institution was renamed the Donetsk Regional Oncological Dispensary. In 1955, DROD, in order to increase the number of beds, was transferred to the base of the Regional Clinical Hospital. M.I. Kalinin.Under the leadership of Grigory Vasilyevich Bondar, in September 1968, an oncology course was organized, the clinical base of which was DROD. August 19, 1975 Grigory Vasilyevich headed the Department of Oncology, established at the Donetsk State Medical Institute. M. Gorky. October 12, 1992 Donetsk Regional Oncology Center received the status of an antitumor center. Academician of the National Academy of Medical Sciences of Ukraine, Doctor of Medical Sciences, Professor Grigory Vasilyevich Bondar has been appointed its General Director.The center, which subsequently became the leading one in Ukraine, had the greatest experience in surgical and combined treatment of tumors of various localizations using the methods proposed in the clinic. In 2006, the first radiotherapy complex in Ukraine was installed in the Donetsk Regional Cancer Center.At the beginning of 2014, our teacher passed away. Students with dignity continue the work of Bondar Grigory Vasilyevich. At the end of 2014, on the basis of the Donetsk Regional Antitumor Center, the Republican Cancer Center of the Ministry of Health of the Donetsk People’s Republic was created, which was named after Professor Grigory Vasilyevich Bondar. The Center proudly bears the name of the great Teacher Grigory Vasilyevich Bondar! And in our present life, he is still a mentor and assistant!We are sure that the symbiosis of science and practice of a team of professionals who selflessly give their knowledge, experience and skills for the benefit of patients will give a powerful impetus to the further development of the oncological service of Donbass.
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Zambrzycka, Marta, and Paulina Olechowska. "Ukraina Wschodnia jako przestrzeń symboliczna w prozie Serhija Żadana – na podstawie powieści Woroszyłowgrad i Mezopotamia." Studia Ucrainica Varsoviensia, no. 8 (August 31, 2020): 233–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.31338/2299-7237suv.8.18.
Abstract:
The subject of the article is an analysis of the three aspects of depicting urban space of Eastern Ukraine, focusing specifi cally on the Donbass region and the city of Kharkov as depicted in the novels Voroshilovgrad (2010) and Mesopotamia (2014) by Serhiy Zhadan. The urban space of Eastern Ukraine overlaps with the most important values that shape a person’s personality and aff ect her or his self-identifi cation. The city space is also a “place of memory” and experiences of generations that infl uence current events. In addition to the historical and axiological dimension, the imaginative aspect of space is also important. This approach is used by the author to describe the urban space as a functioning imagination or stereotypes associated with it as opposed to its realistic depiction.
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Полішук, Ярослав. "Зобразити війну." Pomiędzy. Polonistyczno-Ukrainoznawcze Studia Naukowe 3, no. 1 (2017): 27–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.15804/ppusn.2017.03.03.
Abstract:
How to Represent War. The hybrid warfare going on in Donbass has had consequences on the informational and cultural spheres in Ukraine. It is a war for influence where Ukraine cannot adequately confront Russia because it does not have the necessary recourses and a developed media culture. The number of literary works about the war published in the last few years show that Ukrainian writers want to challenge the discourse on war. Between 2014 and 2016 numerous novels, stories, essays, reports, and poems were published by such writers as Halyna Vdovychenko, Yevhen Polozhiy, Sergei Lozko, and Vladyslav Ivchenko. These authors try to show all the horror of the war and the changing attitudes and consciousness of Ukrainians. The issue of forming a new Ukrainian collective identity is reflected in contemporary literature.
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Gruzdev, Vladislav V., and Aleksandr I. Levchenkov. "Republics of Donbass as an international political and legal precedent." Vestnik of Kostroma State University, no. 3 (2019): 143–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.34216/1998-0817-2019-25-3-143-147.
Abstract:
The article analyses the events taking place in Donbass from 2014 to 2019, to be exact, the very fact of the appearance of the peoples' republics of Lugansk and Donetsk, the way in which these republics appeared and the way of their possible international legalisation. The study was carried out not only at Russian, but also at the international level. The authors' vision of solving the problem is proposed, in particular, the idea is that the implementation of the fundamental (universal) principle of modern international law – the principle of universal respect for human rights and freedoms in conditions of the Ukraine military operation affecting the citizens of the republics in the sphere of influence of Russia – is impossible without implementing the principle of self-determination of peoples and nations. Only with such concrete conflict binding, the principle of self-determination of peoples and nations can predominate over the principles of territorial integrity and inviolability of borders.
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Bezrodnyi, B. G., S. O. Dykuha, and I. V. Kolosovich. "DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT OF COMBAT INJURIES OF THE HEART AND GREAT VESSELS. Review." Medical Science of Ukraine (MSU) 16, no. 2 (June 30, 2020): 69–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.32345/2664-4738.2.2020.12.
Abstract:
Relevance. According to the modern realities of hostilities in the East of Ukraine, the medical community has grown a request for information about the nature of the most dangerous defeats of the participants of the Joint Forces Operation (JFO) in Donbass.
Objective: analysis and generalization of the nature of heart injuries received during the hostilities in the East of Ukraine, the stages of medical support of such wounded.
Materials and methods. Analysis of scientific publications in scientific journals of Ukraine by keywords for the period 2014-2018.
Results. The nature of injuries among participants in the JFO has been analyzed. The first place is occupied by injuries of blood vessels with bleeding (60%), 2 - pneumothorax (34%), and 3 - airway obstruction (6%). All this can be combined and supplemented by damage to the nervous system and other organs. In the conditions of the modern war in Donbass, shrapnel injuries (50.5%), bullet wounds (25.3%), and closed injury (20.3%) are considered frequent types of injuries. The classification of heart injuries, clinical symptoms, the levels of support for such a wounded are described: first aid at the prehospital stage ("golden minutes") on the battlefield, qualified medical assistance ("golden hour"), specialized medical care in a hospital. Post-traumatic stress disorders have been described that last from one to 6 months and require complex treatment.
Conclusion. According to NATO's new military medical doctrine, "an effective and reliable medical support system contributes to maintaining the trust of the military and the general public in the army and its political leadership".
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Stolyarov, V. "State Regulation of Socio-Economic Recovery of Ukrainian Donbass (Memoir-Analytical Review of Alternative Government Decisions Taken in 1991-2020). Part 2. Strategic Social Planning of a Unitary State in the Implementation of Budget Federalism." Economic Herald of the Donbas, no. 1 (63) (2021): 197–219. http://dx.doi.org/10.12958/1817-3772-2021-1(63)-197-219.
Abstract:
The article reveals the possibilities of implementing the doctrine of three "S": social forecasting, social planning and social management in the formation of strategies for regional development of Luhansk and Donetsk regions and Ukraine as a whole. The main components of budgetary federalism of the unitary state with definition of coordinated borders of financial independence of Ukrainian Donbass and state regulation by reproduction of economic and vital activity of the population are considered. The results of the study, the subject of which were the leading components of scientific and methodological support of socio-economic recovery of Ukrainian Donbass, are presented in the form of a memoir-analytical review of fateful state and possible alternative solutions. The object of the study was the chronology, essence, content and validity of decisions. The working hypothesis of the review was to find out the origins of the civil-military conflict between the national authorities in 2014 and the population of Ukrainian Donbass, identifying the causes and factors of the tragedy of both sides 7 years ago in the context of "terror" and "terrorism". The features of state and international terrorism sanctified by Wikipedia are considered and their manifestation in the national economy in the processes of introduction of Anglo-Saxon model of open market economy is generalized. The reduction of the role of state influence on regional development in the development of long-term development strategies to achieve the 7th Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015 and 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) for the period up to 2030 is revealed. The absence of a "goal tree" in the hierarchy and in the time of its coordination with the MDG, SDG and human development indicators was revealed. The close connection of International Geopolitical Business with the holding of the First (2004) and Second (2014) Maidans in Kyiv, the launch of the "ATO" project was revealed. Author's versions of state decisions on the transition of unitary Ukraine to model of budget federalism to strengthen its independence and sovereignty as an alternative to the "ATO" project are revealed. In contrast to the deliberately falsified information on the rating of 2013 of regional human development in Luhansk and Donetsk regions according to the National Methods of 2001, 2012, it is possible to predict 33 indicators of the Regional Human Development Index: 22 growth stimulators and 11 development disincentives. Thanks to this, the strategic and operational goals of the socio-economic reconstruction of Luhansk and Donetsk regions of Ukrainian Donbass have been determined.
28
Goujon, Alexandra. "Ukraine : entre « dégagisme » prometteur et revanche politique." Questions internationales 101, no. 6 (January 15, 2020): 100–109. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/quin.101.0100.
Abstract:
Le 24 août 2019, l’Ukraine a fêté le 28 e anniversaire de son indépendance sous les auspices d’une nouvelle présidence. Le pays n’échappe pas au scénario du « dégagisme » observé ailleurs avec la victoire de l’acteur Volodymyr Zelensky. Ce choix est un nouveau soubresaut dans la vie politique ukrainienne. Il annonce des changements au niveau des élites destinés à mettre fin à la corruption tant dénoncée lors de la révolution de la Dignité (2013-2014) et trop faiblement combattue sous la présidence de Petro Porochenko (2014-2019). Le nouveau président peut-il relever ce défi en s’affranchissant des clans oligarchiques ? En aura-t-il les moyens sachant que le pays est en guerre et dans une situation économique fragile ?
29
Ishchenko, Nina S. "Donbass Hierotopy in Elena Zaslavskaja’s Poem “Novorossia of Thunderstorms. Novorossia of Dreams” (2020)." Almanac “Essays on Conservatism” 64 (June 30, 2021): 464–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.24030/24092517-2021-0-2-464-470.
Abstract:
The article is devoted to the analysis of the creation of the hierotopy of modern warring Donbass in the poem by Elena Zaslavskaja “Novorossia of Thunderstorms. Novorossia of Dreams” (2020). The article shows how the archetypes of cultural memory are actualized under the wartime circumstances and in the situation of extreme existential choice. One of the most ancient cultural archetypes of Russian culture is the image of Russia as a sacred space, which synthesizes the archaic image of the holy kingdom and Christian ideas of holiness as the feat of self-sacrifice. The author analyzes the mechanisms of creation in the poem of the image of Lugansk-Svyatograd included in the sacred Christian space due to the self-sacrifice of its inhabitants during the war with the Ukraine since 2014.
30
Zatyka, Marcin. "Material and Spiritual Aid from the Catholic Church of Poland to Ukraine in the Face of Russian Aggression that Began in 2014." Political Observer | Revista Portuguesa de Ciência Política (Portuguese Journal of Political Science), no. 20 (January 22, 2024): 27–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.59071/2795-4765.rpcp2023.20/pp-27-37.
Abstract:
This article presents the attitude of the Polish Catholic Church, also known as the Roman Catholic Church in Poland, towards Russian aggression against Ukraine and the forms of support it has given to the victims of the war. The Russian invasion, which began in 2014 through a hybrid war that resulted in the occupation of Crimea and began military actions in the Donbass, unleashed a wave of refugees that in 2022 became an unprecedented phenomenon in the history of European countries. After the conflict entered a phase of open warfare between Russia and Ukraine in February 2022, Ukraine’s neighbouring countries received a large number of refugees. A year later, Poland, which had become the main destination for refugees, received the largest group - more than 10 million people, among whom were predominantly Orthodox. 1 Significant help was given to them by the Catholic Church, strongly influenced by the teachings of Polish Pope John Paul II, who died in 2005. Support for the victims of the war in Ukraine is carried out by Polish Catholics on the territory of the Republic of Poland, as well as through aid sent by them to the war-affected areas on Ukrainian territory.
31
Voytyuk, Oksana. "Internal Migrations from Crimea and Donbass after 2014 as Conflict-Triggering Factors in the Regions of Ukraine." Athenaeum Polskie Studia Politologiczne 67, no. 3 (September 30, 2020): 154–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.15804/athena.2020.67.09.
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Vehesh, M., and R. Kopolovets. "Causes and prerequisites of the occupation of Luhansk and Donetsk regions: empirical analysis of territories (on the basis of indicators of the democratization index “Freedom in the World 2020”)." National Technical University of Ukraine Journal. Political science. Sociology. Law, no. 4(48) (January 29, 2021): 43–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.20535/2308-5053.2020.4(48).232690.
Abstract:
Summary. The article examines the main reasons and preconditions for the occupation of certain regions in eastern Ukraine. The influence and role of Russia in this military conflict are analyzed, and for the first time an empirical (applied) analysis of the democratization index in the temporarily occupied territories is carried out. Russia’s aggressive policy in eastern Ukraine is part of a “hybrid” war against Ukraine that began in early 2014 with the occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. With the support of Russia, the so-called “Donetsk and Luhansk” people’s republics were created in eastern Ukraine. In essence, these are occupation military administrations that number more than 30,000 people, including regular troops and instructors of the armed forces of the Russian Federation. These are well-armed military formations, the number and combat capabilities of which are not inferior to the armies of individual European countries. In the temporarily occupied territories there is a total political and ideological “Russification”, the purpose of which is the alienation and further isolation of these territories from official Kyiv. It should be noted that the hostilities, which have been going on for the sixth year, pose serious economic, political, legal, and geopolitical problems on Ukraine’s path to consolidating the democratic regime and integrating with the European community. The change of political regime in 2013 in Ukraine opened up prospects for the consolidation of national identity and the restoration of the course of Euro-Atlantic integration, which was usually not accepted by official Moscow and personally by President Putin. It should be clearly understood that the war in Donbass, provoked by Russia, is the result of a systematic and long-term policy of Russia towards Ukraine as a country with a favorable geopolitical location and a kind of bridge between Europe and Russia. The article pays special attention to the theoretical and applied analysis of democratic development in Donbass. It should be noted that from 2020 “Freedom House” will start monitoring the territory and accordingly provide quantitative data on the democratization index with the appropriate analytical base and forecasts.
33
Arbatova, N. "Were the Minsk Agreements doomed to failure? An alternative history." Pathways to Peace and Security, no. 1 (2022): 107–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/2307-1494-2022-1-107-120.
Abstract:
History does not allow for subjunctive mood but politics do allow. As Russia‟s special military operation is underway in Ukraine growing into a major, deadly conflict with unpredictable consequences, it is worthwhile to ask a question: could this conflict be prevented if the Minsk agreements were implemented? The 2014 and 2015 Minsk agreements were aimed at securing a ceasefire between the Ukrainian government and pro-Russian separatists in southeastern Ukraine (Donbass). The rebels from Donetsk and Lugansk drew their courage from the “Crimea precedent” – Moscow‟s incorporation of the Crimea “on the basis of voluntary self-determination and historical commonness”. The Minsk agreements were a product of the Normandy format – a platform for senior diplomats from France, Germany, Russia, and Ukraine, created in June 2014 with the aim of finding a peaceful resolution to the conflict. The agreements ended large-scale fighting, but not creeping violence that posed the main obstacle for the political settlement of the conflict. The article provides an analysis of the Minsk agreements, including their strengths and weaknesses. Special attention is paid to the EU‟s political goals and instruments for the peaceful settlement of the Ukrainian conflict. The article also seeks to explain why the Europeans have not been able to take on a more visible and effective role in the implementation of their proclaimed goals.
34
Renchka, Inna. "Language behavior and language firmness of Ukrainians under Russian-Ukrainian war (after the novel “Daughter” by Tamara Gorikha Zernia)." Ukrainska mova, no. 3 (2020): 75–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.15407/ukrmova2020.03.075.
Abstract:
The Russian-Ukrainian military conflict in Donbas region exacerbated and highlighted the problems of linguistic, national, cultural and civic identity, language behavior and language firmness during the war, when the Ukrainian language becomes not only a means of communication but also a means of preserving identity and resistance to the language of conquerors. An important source for studying these issues and some of their aspects are literature and art works dedicated to the events in Eastern Ukraine. The purpose of the article is to attempt to characterize the language behavior of Ukrainians under the Russian-Ukrainian war in Eastern Ukraine, to identify the examples of the language firmness and to determine the reasons that influence on the choice of language code under mentioned circumstances, based on the materials of a contemporary literary work. The article uses descriptive and contextual-interpretive methods to describe and analyze the material of the study as well as to summarize the results. The study is based on a novel by the writer and volunteer Tamara Gorikha Zernia (the real name of the author is Tamara Duda) “Daughter”, which reproduces the events of spring and summer 2014 – the beginning of the war and the occupation of a part of Donbass region. The plot is based on true stories that happened to real people, as well as the testimonies of eyewitnesses and participants in the events. The analysis of the novel “Daughter” by Tamara Gorikha Zernia made it possible to study the characteristic manifestations of the language behavior of Ukrainians under the Russian-Ukrainian war. The predominant Russian-speaking of Donbass is the result of a purposeful Russification policy of the region during the Soviet era, and it was the language factor that became one of the reasons for the success of the Russia’s information and propaganda campaign and armed aggression. The work reflects the perception by Donetsk residents of the Ukrainian language, Ukraine, Ukrainian national tradition, which is far from being unambiguous. At the same time, with the help of appropriate language strategies chosen by the author, it is emphasized that the war in Donbass region is primarily for Ukrainian identity. Language firmness is a characteristic feature of the communicative behavior of the main character of the work, who together with the like-minded people joined the struggle to defend their country. Language is presented as a means of preserving one’s own identity as well as the “friend-or-foe” marker, an internal factor that clearly identifies the position of the participants in the events described in the novel. Keywords: language behavior, language firmness, Donbass region, Russification, language and national identification, “friend-or-foe” opposition, information aggression.
35
Colin Lebedev, Anna. "Mobiliser en Ukraine et en Russie : pratique militaire, gestion politique et impact social." Revue Défense Nationale N° 867, no. 2 (February 12, 2024): 36–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/rdna.867.0036.
Abstract:
Si l’Ukraine avait déjà tiré des leçons du fiasco de 2014, la Russie a été confrontée à des difficultés en septembre 2022 avec une mobilisation partielle mal conduite. La question reste posée après deux ans de guerre avec des pratiques et des questionnements très différents entre les deux pays, entre gestion démocratique pour Kiev et gestion autoritaire pour Moscou.
36
Khilchevskyi, V. K. "WATER AND ARMED CONFLICTS – CLASSIFICATION FEATURES: IN THE WORLD AND IN UKRAINE." Hydrology, hydrochemistry and hydroecology, no. 1(63) (2022): 6–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/2306-5680.2022.1.1.
Abstract:
The purpose of this article is to study the concept of water conflicts, which can be unarmed and military (with the use of weapons), their classification features, to illustrate in practice the manifestations of water conflicts in the world and in Ukraine. The database of the Pacific Institute (USA), which monitors water conflicts, shows that water-related violence began several thousand years ago. Only for the period 2000-2022 this database contains about 900 cases of various water conflicts, of which about 15 are in Ukraine. Water conflicts are divided into types based on the use of water, the impact on water, or the role of water during the conflict. Water is a trigger or root cause of conflict when there is a dispute over control of a water body, resulting in violence. Water is a weapon in conflict when a water body (water resources) is used as a tool or weapon in a violent conflict. Water is a victim when it becomes the object of deliberate or accidental violence. During hostilities, water (water infrastructure) often becomes a victim. On the territory of Ukraine, one of the first water conflicts was recorded in 1941 – undermining the dam of the Dnieper hydroelectric power station by the Red Army, which retreated under the onslaught of German troops during the World War ІІ. The next wave of water conflicts on the territory of Ukraine is associated with the Russian-Ukrainian war, which began in 2014 – the Russian armed invasion of Crimea and its annexation in february-march 2014; war in eastern Ukraine (Donbass) since april 2014; full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine from february 24, 2022. According to the water conflicts recorded in the international database in Ukraine (mainly in the Donbas) during 2014-2022, the classification by type is as follows: 80% – water as a victim, 13 % – water as a weapon, 7% – water as a trigger. A number of water conflicts that have been taking place during the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine since February 24, 2022, have yet to be recorded in the international database (Mariupol, Mykolaiv, Vasylivka, etc.). A full assessment of the number and consequences of water conflicts on the territory of Ukraine, associated with the Russian-Ukrainian war, can be carried out after its completion.
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Shcherbak, Valeriia G. "INFLUENCE OF FORCED MIGRATION ON THE ECONOMY OF UKRAINE." Management 28, no. 2 (March 29, 2019): 33–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.30857/2415-3206.2018.2.3.
Abstract:
Introduction. Significant geopolitical transformations, the annexation of the Crimea, and the conflict in the Donbass affect the functioning of the Ukrainian economy. These processes provoked a profound and only political but also socio-economic crisis, intensification of labor migration, massive forced displacement of the population: the emergence of the category of forced migrants – internally displaced persons (IDP). IDPs are citizens of a country that does not cross borders and migrate within their own country for compelled reasons (similar to the case with refugees). In Ukraine, they are called forced migrants.The hypothesis of scientific research is to find out how the emergence of regional migration asymmetry, in particular the emergence of a significant number of IDP, affects the asymmetry of migration processes in Ukraine, the economy and welfare of the population, and the level of socio-economic development of the country.The aim is to diagnose the existing processes of domestic forced migration processes in Ukraine, including the asymmetry of migratory flows, the impact of the movement of internally displaced persons on the level of development of regional economies.The research methodology is fundamental and applied research in the field of forced internal migration, the demographic situation and the state of the labor market, UN materials, the ILO, UNESCO, the bodies of the state statistics service, materials from other official sources and Internet resources. During the study, methods of systematization, theoretical generalization, scientific classification, comparative analysis, statistical methods were used.Results: the main factors determining the conditions and nature of forced internal migration in Ukraine in 2014–2017 were determined. The main directions of forced internal migration since the beginning of hostilities in the Donbass were determined. The emergence of regional asymmetry of migration processes at the level of aggregate migratory flows is investigated.Conclusions: it is proved that all regions of Ukraine have a significant right-side asymmetry of balance in the direction of arrivals in the region, which manifests itself in the concentration of refugees in the presence of a relatively small number of most mass flows. HPE is perceived in their places of residence as an additional resource for the development of a regional economy: the emergence of new opportunities for increasing social activity by refugees; the opening of new businesses; a strong motivation to succeed; intensification of production and provision of services; filling jobs that were not in demand by the local population.
38
Park, Jee-Kwang. "National Identity in the Eastern and Southern Ukraine in 2022: a National Survey Analysis." East European and Balkan Institute 46, no. 3 (August 31, 2022): 179–209. http://dx.doi.org/10.19170/eebs.2022.46.3.179.
Abstract:
The Russia-Ukraine conflict over territory is rekindled by the Russia’s military invasion into Ukraine in February 2022. Russia takes it as the pretext of this invasion to protect the Russian-speaking population in Ukraine which accounts for about one-third of the Ukraine population. Russia has insisted that Ukraine does not have a separate and independent national identity distinct from Russia. Russia further insists that Ukraine was historic allyl a part of Russia and should be incorporated into the Russian civilization world. Radical Russian nationalists believe that it is their duty to reclaim the Eastern Ukraine which rightfully belongs to Russia but is mistakenly given to Ukraine. Ukrainian politicians and scholars deny any of these claims made by Russian nationalists.
This debate between Russia and Ukraine over Ukraine’s identity largely depends on the definition of national identity. national identity can be defined as ethnical or civic one. Ethnically, Ukraine has a national identity close to Russia’s. However, in terms of civic identity, Ukraine has a distinct identity from Russia’s. Ukrainian scholars emphasize that most residents in Ukraine have Ukraine civic identity and have fortified it in the wake of the Crimean Peninsula annexation and the Donbass war in 2014. On the other hand, Russian nationalists deny this argument.
To answer the questions, this article conducts a nationally representative telephone survey in Ukraine in February, 2022. The survey shows that about 70% of the respondents identify themselves as entirely Ukrainian citizen. Even in the East Ukraine, over 50% of the respondents do so. Thus, the Russian nationalists claim that the Russian-speaking people in the East feel Russian national identity is not empirically supported by our survey. However, the Ukrainization of Russian-speaking people in the East has not occurred as widely as some scholars assert although there is clear evidence for the phenomenon.
39
Lagerwall, Anne. "How does jus contra bellum apply to States in their Relations with the Self-proclaimed Republics in the Donbass?" Italian Yearbook of International Law Online 32, no. 1 (November 6, 2023): 159–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22116133-03201009.
Abstract:
Abstract The escalation in February 2022 of the conflict between Ukraine and Russia that first began in 2014 has not been the subject of particularly divergent opinions from an international legal perspective. The overwhelming majority of States and authors condemn the Russian military operations as a blatant act of aggression pursued in violation of the United Nations Charter. Yet, it might be useful to examine the reactions prompted by the main argument deployed by Russia as to the right of the Peoples’ Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk to benefit from military assistance by virtue of collective self-defence recognized in customary international law and codified in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This argument raises the question of the applicability of the jus contra bellum regime to relations between States and secessionist entities which has already been debated. This contribution argues that the war in Ukraine sets a precedent which confirms that self-defence is a justification exclusively available to States and that secession or territorial annexation secured through forceful means cannot be recognized, while addressing how one can understand, from an international legal perspective, that this has sometimes been the case in the past.
40
Lefèvre, Anna. "« Ireland’s sisters in the East » : l’Ukraine, la véritable sœur orientale de l’Irlande ? La mémoire des années 1840 à 1940 dans les relations ukraino-irlandaises." Matériaux pour l’histoire de notre temps N° 147-148, no. 1 (February 22, 2024): 112–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/mate.147.0112.
Abstract:
Les liens historiques entre la Pologne et l’Irlande depuis le xix e siècle, ainsi que leur sentiment réciproque d’une destinée commune, donnent lieu à une documentation de plus en plus riche. Mais la similitude entre les destins des Irlandais et des Ukrainiens entre les années 1840 et 1940, éclipsée en Irlande par le destin polonais, semblent attirer plus d’attention encore depuis le retour de la guerre en Ukraine dès 2014.
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Radchenko, Oleksandr, and Tomasz Michalski. "Charków – przeciwdziałanie dominującej komunistycznej toponimii miasta." Prace i Studia Geograficzne 68, no. 4 (2023): 27–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.48128/pisg/2023-68.4-02.
Abstract:
Kharkiv is the second largest city in Ukraine after Kiev in terms of importance and population. From 1919 to 1935, Kharkiv was the official capital of Soviet Ukraine, and therefore Lenin’s “Communist Propaganda Plan” was most often applied in it. Most streets, administrative districts, industrial plants, community centres, schools, etc. were named after communist activists or symbols of communism. In this context, the article aims to analyse a long-term process of removing the dominant communist toponymy of the city during de-communization in Kharkiv. After the declaration of independence, the Ukrainian authorities banned the Communist Party and the propagation of communist ideology, but despite this, for around thirty years Kharkiv’s toponymy continued to be dominated by names associated with the Soviet propaganda. It was only with the onset of the war in the Donbass in 2014 that real renaming of toponymic objects with communist origins began in Kharkiv. The first major change took place in May 2016, when seven city districts, five metro stations, 52 streets and a park were renamed. The process of change accelerated after the onset of a full-scale war in 2022.
42
Fylypenko, Artem. "The Transnistrian Conflict in 1992 and Russian Aggression Against Ukraine: Comparative Analysis." Історико-політичні проблеми сучасного світу, no. 37-38 (December 12, 2018): 62–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.31861/mhpi2018.37-38.62-70.
Abstract:
The article presents a comparative analysis of the Transnistrian conflict of 1990-1992 and the Ukrainian-Russian conflict in 2014-2018. The similarities and differences between the two conflicts are analyzed. It is proved that the scenario under which events in the Donbas are developing is very similar to the events in Transnistria in 1990-1992, in particular, through the use of linguistic issues for the emergence of confrontation, the provision of military and political support, including through the involvement of irregular formations , direct intervention of armed units of the regular Russian army in war.
Particular attention is paid to the methods of information warfare against Moldova in the early 90's. The similarity of these methods with those used by Russia in the information war against Ukraine is shown, in particular: 1) dehumanization of the enemy, dissemination of information about its cruelty and inhumanity; 2) manipulation of historical facts; 3) representation of the struggle against separatism as the aggression of one state against the other; 4) appeal. to the events of the Second World War; 5) the statement that foreign troops are fighting on the side of government forces; 6) attempts to present separatist movements as "popular".
The conclusions state that the Transnistrian conflict of 1990-1992, as well as the occupation of Crimea and the conflict in the East of Ukraine in 2014-2018, are part of Russia's overall strategy to preserve the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine in its sphere of influence. The ultimate goal of this strategy is the reintegration of separatist enclaves under conditions favorable to Russia, namely: the ability to influence foreign policy, change foreign policy priorities (rejection of the course on European and Euro-Atlantic integration), preservation of dependence on supplies of Russian energy carriers.
Key words: Ukraine, Republic of Moldova, Transnistria, Transnistria conflict, Ukrainian-Russian conflict, Donbass
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KOSTENKO, YULIA V. "LANGUAGE POLICY OF UKRAINE IN THE SOUTH AND EAST OF THE COUNTRY AS A METHOD OF ETHNOCRACY." CASPIAN REGION: Politics, Economics, Culture 65, no. 4 (2020): 58–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.21672/1818-510x-2020-65-4-058-065.
Abstract:
The author characterizes the language policy of post-Maidan Ukraine (2014-2020) in the South and East of the country as a method of consolidating ethnocracy in the process of nation-building. An assessment of the state and trends in the historiography of the problem is given. Ethnodemographic changes in the structure of the population, as well as public opinion in the South and East of Ukraine over the period from 1989 to 2020 were revealed. The intentions of the language policy of Ukraine are revealed. The ineffectiveness of international influence to ensure compliance with democratic norms of language policy is noted. Russian Russian language policy is defined as the destruction of institutions of Russian-language education and mass media in the Russian language, the weakening of Russian ethnic identity, carried out by the state authorities of Ukraine. An important factor in de-Russification is the armed conflict in the Donbas, which has become a catalyst for the transition to ethnocracy in Ukraine. At the same time, the unrecognized states in Donbass maintain the equality of languages on their territory. It is concluded that the dual (mixed) identity of residents of the South and East of the country is preserved at the regional and local levels. At the same time, the Russian-speaking community in the South and East of the country remains politically weak and disorganized, and is subject to targeted discrimination. The political consequences of forced ukrainization, as well as resistance to ethnocracy in public opinion and voting in elections, are determined.
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Korotayev, Andrey, Daniil Romanov, and Ilya Medvedev. "Echo of the Arab Spring in Eastern Europe: A Quantitative Analysis." Sotsiologicheskoe Obozrenie / Russian Sociological Review 18, no. 1 (March 2019): 56–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.17323/1728-192x-2019-1-56-106.
Abstract:
The article analyzes the impact of the Arab Spring on destabilization processes in Eastern Europe. The authors show how the success of the Arab revolutions influenced the rise of protest activity in Eastern Europe in 2011. The similarities of the protests in Eastern Europe with the protests of the Arab Spring period are demonstrated. We also analyze ways of borrowing patterns of destabilization. The wave of protest activity after 2011 is compared with the previous wave of protest activity initiated by the global financial-economic crises of 2008–2009. In addition to the external factor of the Arab Spring, the article examines the internal factors of the protest activity of the second wave of the economic crisis associated with the economic crises in Portugal, Italy, Spain, and Greece. The authors define the most typical forms of destabilization for Eastern Europe: anti-government demonstrations, riots, terrorist actions, and guerrilla warfare. The contribution of the Ukrainian Revolution in 2014 to the dynamics of the most violent forms of protest in Eastern Europe is also analyzed. In explaining the special case of Ukraine which breaks with the general trend of Eastern Europe, the authors show that Ukraine experienced a transition from less-violent forms of destabilization (anti-government demonstrations and riots) to more violent ones (guerrilla warfare and terrorist attacks) in 2013–2014. The reasons for the growth of terrorist activity and guerrilla warfare as well as the role of the war in Donbass are discussed. It is shown that though the case of Ukraine is unique for Eastern Europe in the period under study, it has many parallels on a global scale.
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Vavilov, A. "Current Political Manifestations of Regionalism in the Context of the Power Crisis in Ukraine." International Trends / Mezhdunarodnye protsessy 19, no. 2 (2021): 85–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.17994/it.2021.19.2.65.5.
Abstract:
This article analyzes the manifestations of regionalism in the context of a deep socio-political crisis in Ukraine. With the development of the political crisis that followed the coup d'etat in February 2014 in Ukraine, there was a noticeable actualization of issues and problems related to regionalism, society as a whole demonstrated a request for the redistribution of powers between the power center and the regions. This is reflected in numerous initiatives of regional authorities and public organizations aimed at expanding the financial base, functions and rights of local authorities and self-government, as well as in policy documents of political forces. At the same time, in some cases, the idea of establishing a contractual relationship between the Central government and the regions was put forward, which is typical for the Federal model of government. In response to this request, the Executive branch made another attempt to implement local government reform under the slogan of decentralizing the country's state structure. Since 2014, Ukraine has developed two multidirectional trends – centrifugal and centripetal, the ratio of which will determine the dynamics and severity of political manifestations of regionalism. Despite numerous autonomist statements, Ukrainian regionalism remains within the "rigid" model formed in the post-Soviet period. The conflict in the South-East of the country and the deep involvement of the leading powers – Russia, the United States and the European Union-are the determining factor that predetermined the "freezing" of regionalization processes in Ukraine after 2014. After the signing of the Minsk agreements, the implementation of which means for Ukraine to introduce elements of Federal relations into the system of state structure, the reform of the state structure and territorial administration has become inextricably linked with Kiev's strategy towards the self-proclaimed republics of Donbass. Manifestations of regionalism were perceived by Kiev to a large extent in the context of threats to the territorial integrity of the country, which significantly limited the possibility of implementing the policy of decentralization. In addition, Russia and the United States have demonstrated in practice different approaches to the interpretation and implementation of the Minsk agreements, which has had a negative impact on the regionalization processes in Ukraine. The nature of the processes of regionalization in Ukraine allows to draw Parallels with the situation in Transnistria and around him, and to talk about common Moldovan and Ukrainian models hard regionalism, the hallmark of which is the transformation of the regionalization processes in a tool to achieve political goals of Russia and the West in conflict with the nature of their interaction on post-Soviet space.
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Tokarev, A. A. "The Electoral History of the Post-Soviet Crimea: from UkSSR to Russia." MGIMO Review of International Relations, no. 5(44) (October 28, 2015): 32–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2015-5-44-32-41.
Abstract:
Abstract: One year ago, the referendum was held in the Ukrainian autonomous republic of Crimea which resulted in the peninsula becomino part of Russia. This article discusses all Crimean voting, including referendums and elections: from the first referendum in the history of the Soviet Union in January 1991, to the last election to the State Council of the Republic of Crimea within the Russian Federation in September 2014. For each vote, except for the regional elections, the average results of the main candidates are presented in the Crimea and in Ukraine. Sevastopol always has particular identity and special administrative status of the city, regardless of the sovereign center title (Moscow or Kyiv). That`s why we give the data for Sevastopol in addition to the Crimea for each vote. The author analyzes the voting results and compares them with those in other south-eastern regions of Ukraine. A special Crimean identity postulates in this case and changing of regional political trends in Ukraine in the mid-2000s are given. After 2002, Donetsk and Luhansk regions provided 70-100% of support to ”Party of Regions“ and its leader. While their main rivals always received minimum points from the Donbass. Crimea and Sevastopol were always in second position supporting the ruling party until the end of their Ukrainian history. For a visual comparison of the difference in votes of the Crimea, Sevastopol and the whole Ukraine, the author offers the original graph. In addition, the article focuses on the results and sociological basis of the last Crimean referendum held in March 2014. On the one hand its procedure creates many questions: the lack of equality in the agitation, the presence of paramilitaries, the vote in the absence of actual voter lists, etc. On the other hand, there are, at least, 4 researches of Ukrainian and American sociological services, according to which the sovereignty of Russia is a real value perceived by the majority of Crimea and Sevastopol citizens.
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Meyer zum Felde, Rainer. "Was ein Militärbündnis zwischen Russland und China für die NATO bedeuten würde." SIRIUS – Zeitschrift für Strategische Analysen 6, no. 2 (May 9, 2022): 165–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/sirius-2022-2004.
Abstract:
Kurzfassung Sind Russland und China ewige Rivalen oder Partner einer im Entstehen begriffenen Allianz? Und was würde letzteres für die NATO bedeuten? Die NATO reagierte im Jahr 2014 auf die russische hybride Aggression gegen die Ukraine, die aus verdeckter Destabilisierung des Donbass und völkerrechtswidriger Besetzung und Annexion der Krim bestand, mit einem Paradigmenwechsel, der sogenannten „NATO Adaptation.“ Auf dem Gipfeltreffen in Wales 2014 erhöhte sie ihre Reaktionsbereitschaft mit dem Readiness Action Plan, beim Gipfel in Warschau 2016 stärkte sie ihr Abschreckungs- und Verteidigungsdispositiv und richtete 2018 beim Gipfeltreffen in Brüssel ihre Führungsstruktur wieder auf kollektive Verteidigung aus. Obgleich eingebettet in einen „360-Grad-Ansatz“, zielen alle zentralen Verteidigungselemente der NATO-Anpassung seit 2014 in erster Linie auf Russland hin, das seither als potenzielle Bedrohung für die territoriale Integrität der osteuropäischen Mitgliedstaaten gilt. Aber dieser Paradigmenwechsel beruhte zur Gänze auf der Einschätzung, einzig Russland sei eine ernstzunehmende militärische Bedrohung für die Allianz und (abgesehen von Belarus) auf sich allein gestellt. Der Frage, was es bedeuten würde, wenn Russland von einer gleichgesinnten Großmacht wie China unterstützt würde, und ebenso der Frage, welche Folgen zwei gleichzeitige Aggressionen – eine durch Russland in Europa, eine weitere durch China im Indopazifik – für die NATO hätte, wurde bislang keine Beachtung geschenkt. Dabei haben diese beiden Problempunkte in den letzten Jahren rapide an Tragweite für die Anpassung der NATO an die neuen geopolitischen Realitäten gewonnen. Das gilt erst recht in einer abermals veränderten Sicherheitslage, in der Putins Russland aus revisionistischen und imperialen Großmachtmotiven einen unverblümten, brutalen Angriffskrieg gegen sein souveränes Nachbarland Ukraine führt, dabei die europäische Friedensordnung entgegen allen abgeschlossenen Verträgen grundsätzlich in Frage stellt und Unterstützung findet von Xi Jinpings China als „engem Freund und strategischen Partner“, der sich das russische Narrativ zu eigen macht und den USA und der NATO die Schuld für den Konflikt zuweist.
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Zhiltsov, S. S. "Western Policy toward Ukraine: Outcomes and Challenges for Russia." Post-Soviet Issues 9, no. 2 (September 3, 2022): 138–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.24975/2313-8920-2022-9-2-138-150.
Abstract:
The change in the balance of power in Ukraine in February 2014 not only changed Ukraine’s foreign policy course, but also marked the beginning of a new Western policy toward Kiev. Political support for the Ukrainian authorities was expanded. Ukraine’s involvement in the sphere of Western interests intensified. Western countries used multilateral mechanisms to form new interstate relations with Ukraine. The Ukrainian army was actively modernized. The West supplied Western equipment. The U.S. and the EU have been closely following the conflict in Donbass. While publicly supporting a peaceful solution to the conflict, the West did not take real steps to resolve it. Advocating a violent solution to the conflict, nationalist forces became actively involved in the country’s domestic politics. Kiev was encouraged to take steps to curtail trade and economic cooperation with Russia and to sever ties between businesses. The IMF was actively pursuing programs and consistently demanding reforms in the social and economic spheres. In the political sphere, the West supported Ukraine’s policy, which led to the aggravation of political relations between the countries. After Vladimir Zelensky came to power in 2019, the West intensified its support for Kiev. Western authorities bet on a forceful solution to the conflict and provoked conflict between Ukraine and Russia. In February 2022, anticipating Ukraine’s actions, Russia launched a special military operation. It called into question the further development of Ukraine and, at the same time, led to an adjustment of Western policy. The U.S. and EU stepped up military support for Kiev and significantly expanded financial aid. This policy of the West has created certain risks for Russia, which has entered the phase of acute geopolitical confrontation with the U.S. and the EU.
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Mukhin, Mikhail Yu. "CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION IN THE ADJACENT REGIONS OF RUSSIA AND UKRAINE. UNTAPPED POTENTIAL." RSUH/RGGU Bulletin. Series Eurasian Studies. History. Political Science. International Relations, no. 3 (2021): 91–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.28995/2686-7648-2021-3-91-103.
Abstract:
The article is devoted to the development of the cross-border coop- eration in the adjacent regions of Russia and Ukraine in the post-Soviet period. Analyzing the course, circumstances and results of those many-sided contacts, the author came to the conclusion that the cross-border cooperation between the two countries was influenced by an example of the effective work of the “Eurore- gions” created in the EU countries. The positive experience accumulated earlier in the countries of Western and Central Europe promised the transformation of the border regions of Russia and Ukraine into a kind of locomotives of the economic and socio-humanitarian cooperation between the countries. However, the creation of similar Euroregions on the Russian-Ukrainian border was delayed until the beginning of the 21st century. Only the stabilization of the economic situation in the post-Soviet space and overcoming the economic shock that fol- lowed the collapse of the Soviet Union created the necessary prerequisites for a large-scale intensification of the cross-border cooperation. The most dynamic de- velopment on the Russian-Ukrainian border in 2002–2013 was the development of the Euroregions “Donbass”, “Slobozhanshchina” and “Yaroslavna”. Unfortu- nately, the gradual increase in tension between Moscow and Kiev, characteristic of the 2000s, significantly slowed down the formation of those Euroregions. The political crisis that began in 2014 and continues up to the present day has finally made the development of the cross-border cooperation between Russian and Ukrainian regions unlikely.
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Zakharova, O. V. "PARTICIPATION OF UKRAINE IN THE FUNCTIONING OF EUROREGIONS." Proceedings of Scientific Works of Cherkasy State Technological University Series Economic Sciences, no. 64 (April 20, 2022): 75–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.24025/2306-4420.64.2022.255966.
Abstract:
Ukraine, as a European country, is a full-fledged and quite active participant in the globalization processes that are implemented within the EU on the basis of the Euroregion tool. During 1995-2012 ten Euroregions were created with the participation of Ukraine, since the state authorities and regional authorities of the border territories have been pursuing a fairly open, good-neighborly policy of constructive interaction throughout the entire period of the country's independence. That is why a certain euroregion was created with all countries that have common borders in essence and sea with Ukraine. However, in 2014, the Russian Federation committed illegal actions against the sovereignty of Ukrainian territory and borders due to the unexpected occupation of part of the territory of Ukraine and the annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, which automatically excluded the possibility of functioning of those euroregions where the aggressor country was one of the participants. Thus, eight years ago, for Ukraine, the bilateral Ukrainian-Russian euroregions Slobozhanshchina, Yaroslavna, Donbass and the multilateral ones - the Dnieper and the Black Sea - ceased to exist. In February 2022, the Russian Federation launched a full-scale military invasion of the territory of Ukraine, using for this, among other things, the territory of the Republic of Belarus, thereby drawing this neighboring country into military aggression against an independent European country, which Ukraine has been for more than thirty years. Therefore, the further functioning of Ukraine as part of the Euroregion Bug also became impossible. So, at the moment, out of ten euroregions, full participation in the creation of which Ukraine took at different times, only four euroregions remained active - the Lower Danube, the Carpathian, the Upper Prut and the Dniester. These three Euroregions should play a decisive role in bringing the Ukrainian economy out of crisis and rapid recovery in the post-war period. That is why further research should be devoted to a deeper study of the potential of the three euroregions that are relevant today for the economic recovery of Ukraine. At the same time, attention in cross-border cooperation should be simultaneously paid to all possible areas of cooperation from culture, tourism and education to innovation-investment and military spheres.