Journal articles on the topic 'Greenhouse gas mitigation – Economic aspects – Australia'

AbstractThis paper deals with the assessment of cultivation of bread wheat (Triticum aestivum L.) and oat (Avena sativa) grown in Central Europe within the conventional and organic farming systems in terms of greenhouse gas emissions and economic profitability. Organic farming may be one of the tools for mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions from agricultural production. In the context of crop production, cereals rank among the most commonly grown crops and therefore bread wheat and oat were chosen. The Climate change impact category was assessed within the simplified LCA method and the production of greenhouse gas emissions expressed in CO2e per the production unit was calculated. Economic balance of the cultivation of monitored cereals was compiled based on the yields, farm gate prices and costs. On its basis, the cultivation of wheat within the organic farming system appears to be the most profitable. From an environmental point of view, the emission load of the organic farming system is reduced by 8.04 % within the wheat production and by 15.46 % within the oat cultivation. Therefore, the organic farming system in the Czech Republic appears to be more environmentally friendly and economically efficient within the cereals production.

Adoption of mitigation measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions may affect other members of the society, producing a situation of trade-offs. In this study, such a trade-off is has been analyzed using three aspects of the Canadian society: producers (farm level adopter), environment (through reduction in the GHG emissions),; and regional economy (including rest of the society through lost / gained economic activities). The nutrient management strategy involving the switching nitrogen fertilizer application from a combination of fall and spring application to a 100 percent spring application. Results suggest that the adoption of such a measure creates a 'win-win' situation, being both environmentally and economically desirable. Under the scenario, fertilizer expenditures decreased by $43 million (giving rise to an equivalent increase in farm income), GHG emissions (in CO2E) by 2.15 percent of the 2000 level of emissions, Canadian economy as a whole showed improvements, although on a regional basis the results were mixed.Key words: Canadian prairie agriculture; Greenhouse gases; Mitigation; Nitrogen fertilizer Use; Trade-off analysisThe Journal of AGRICULTURE AND ENVIRONMENT Vol. 11, 2010Page: 70-82Uploaded date: 15 Septembre, 2010

Keynote paper presented at the International Leucaena Conference, 1‒3 November 2018, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia.The perennial legume leucaena (Leucaena leucocephala) is grown across the subtropics for a variety of purposes including livestock fodder. Livestock in Australia emit a significant proportion of the methane produced by the agriculture sector and there is increasing pressure to decrease emissions from beef cattle production systems. In addition to direct productivity gains for livestock, leucaena has been shown to lower enteric methane production, suggesting an opportunity for emissions mitigation and Commonwealth Emissions Reduction Fund (ERF) methodology development, where leucaena browse is adopted for high value beef production. Determining the proportion of leucaena in the diet may be one of the more challenging aspects in attributing mitigation. Current enteric emission relationships for cattle consuming mixed grass-leucaena diets are based on intensive respiration chamber work. Herd-scale methane flux has also been determined using open path laser methodologies and may be used to validate an on-farm herd-scale methodology for leucaena feeding systems. The methodology should also address increased potential for soil organic carbon storage by leucaena grazing systems, and changes in nitrous oxide production. This paper outlines the background, justification, eligibility requirements and potential gaps in research for an emissions quantification protocol that will lead to the adoption of a leucaena methodology by the Australian beef industry. Development of a methodology would be supported by research conducted in Australia.

Extensive grazing of beef cattle is the principal use of the northern Australia land area. While north Australian beef production has traditionally utilised a low-input, low-output system of land management, recent innovations have increased the efficiency with which beef is produced. Investment to raise efficiency of cattle production by improving herd genetics, property infrastructure, the seasonal feed-base and its utilisation, as well as promoting feedlot finishing can all be expected to reduce the number of unproductive animals and reduce age-at-slaughter. Consequently, these innovations can all be expected to contribute to a reduction in the emissions intensity of greenhouse gases (GHG; t GHG/t liveweight gain). The North Australian Pastoral Company (NAPCO) has adopted these technologies to enhance reproductive and growth efficiency of the herd and has coupled them with changes in other aspects of property operation, such as use of solar energy systems, establishment of introduced perennial pastures and minimum tillage, to achieve production and operational gains, which also reduce the emissions intensity of their pastoral properties. Investments to improve production efficiency have been consistent with both financial and, in principle, environmental objectives of NAPCO. While NAPCO supports the development and implementation of new mitigation strategies, the company requires greater knowledge on pastoral emission levels and clarity on the future position of agriculture in a carbon economy. This information would enable confirmation of current emission levels, modelling of mitigation options and evaluation of the efficacy of potential on-farm carbon sinks. This paper presents NAPCO’s perspective on GHG emissions in the context of its pastoral enterprise, including current and future research and mitigation objectives.

Greenhouse gas (GHG) inventory assessment, monitoring and auditing is becoming increasingly routine in oil and gas project evaluations. Already, some companies carry an ‘internal’ carbon cost reflected in projected capital and operational expenditure. Early evaluation allows for optimal planning of GHG mitigation and economic analysis inclusive of carbon costs, allaying concerns of investors and lenders. The challenge in evaluating pre-development, however, is the lack of real data and thus, uncertainties in field production. In this paper, we demonstrate the use of a Monte Carlo probabilistic method to better account for uncertainties in production, gas-oil ratio (GOR) and operation loads in a case study of a prospective oil field in offshore Western Australia. We compared the results to the scenario-based deterministic GHG emissions evaluation of the same field and found the deterministic estimates to be extreme representatives of the range of possible emission quantities, due to GOR and production uncertainties. From a breakdown of annual emissions, we also identified the emissions from flaring of excess natural gas to be one of the most significant mitigatable sources of emissions, due to the unexpectedly large production of gas over the project lifetime. Avoiding the flaring of excess gases alone could reduce the project’s emissions by ~44%. Through identifying these key sources and uncertainties, we are able to flag such unexpected, mitigatable sources of emissions at an early stage and provide a representative range of projected emissions, thus assisting the operator to make informed decisions in the field development.

Abstract. Parties to the Paris Agreement (PA, 2015) outline their planned contributions towards achieving the PA temperature goal to “hold […] the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 ∘C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 ∘C” (Article 2.1.a, PA) in their nationally determined contributions (NDCs). Most NDCs include targets to mitigate national greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, which need quantifications to assess i.a. whether the current NDCs collectively put us on track to reach the PA temperature goals or the gap in ambition to do so. We implemented the new open-source tool “NDCmitiQ” to quantify GHG mitigation targets defined in the NDCs for all countries with quantifiable targets on a disaggregated level and to create corresponding national and global emissions pathways. In light of the 5-year update cycle of NDCs and the global stocktake, the quantification of NDCs is an ongoing task for which NDCmitiQ can be used, as calculations can easily be updated upon submission of new NDCs. In this paper, we describe the methodologies behind NDCmitiQ and quantification challenges we encountered by addressing a wide range of aspects, including target types and the input data from within NDCs; external time series of national emissions, population, and GDP; uniform approach vs. country specifics; share of national emissions covered by NDCs; how to deal with the Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) component and the conditionality of pledges; and establishing pathways from single-year targets. For use in NDCmitiQ, we furthermore construct an emissions data set from the baseline emissions provided in the NDCs. Example use cases show how the tool can help to analyse targets on a national, regional, or global scale and to quantify uncertainties caused by a lack of clarity in the NDCs. Results confirm that the conditionality of targets and assumptions about economic growth dominate uncertainty in mitigated emissions on a global scale, which are estimated as 48.9–56.1 Gt CO2 eq. AR4 for 2030 (10th/90th percentiles, median: 51.8 Gt CO2 eq. AR4; excluding LULUCF and bunker fuels; submissions until 17 April 2020 and excluding the USA). We estimate that 77 % of global 2017 emissions were emitted from sectors and gases covered by these NDCs. Addressing all updated NDCs submitted by 31 December 2020 results in an estimated 45.6–54.1 Gt CO2 eq. AR4 (median: 49.6 Gt CO2 eq. AR4, now including the USA again) and increased coverage.

In Australia, agriculture is responsible for ~17% of total greenhouse gas emissions with ruminants being the largest single source. However, agriculture is likely to be shielded from the full impact of any future price on carbon. In this review, strategies for reducing ruminant methane output are considered in relation to rumen ecology and biochemistry, animal breeding and management options at an animal, farm, or national level. Nutritional management strategies have the greatest short-term impact. Methanogenic microorganisms remove H2 produced during fermentation of organic matter in the rumen and hind gut. Cost-effective ways to change the microbial ecology to reduce H2 production, to re-partition H2 into products other than methane, or to promote methanotrophic microbes with the ability to oxidise methane still need to be found. Methods of inhibiting methanogens include: use of antibiotics; promoting viruses/bacteriophages; use of feed additives such as fats and oils, or nitrate salts, or dicarboxylic acids; defaunation; and vaccination against methanogens. Methods of enhancing alternative H2 using microbial species include: inoculating with acetogenic species; feeding highly digestible feed components favouring ‘propionate fermentations’; and modifying rumen conditions. Conditions that sustain acetogen populations in kangaroos and termites, for example, are poorly understood but might be extended to ruminants. Mitigation strategies are not in common use in extensive grazing systems but dietary management or use of growth promotants can reduce methane output per unit of product. New, natural compounds that reduce rumen methane output may yet be found. Smaller but more permanent benefits are possible using genetic approaches. The indirect selection criterion, residual feed intake, when measured on ad libitum grain diets, has limited relevance for grazing cattle. There are few published estimates of genetic parameters for feed intake and methane production. Methane-related single nucleotide polymorphisms have yet to be used commercially. As a breeding objective, the use of methane/kg product rather than methane/head is recommended. Indirect selection via feed intake may be more cost-effective than via direct measurement of methane emissions. Life cycle analyses indicate that intensification is likely to reduce total greenhouse gas output but emissions and sequestration from vegetation and soil need to be addressed. Bio-economic modelling suggests most mitigation options are currently not cost-effective.

The lands held by Aboriginal people are mostly located in the Australian desert, aside from pastoral country purchased under the Indigenous Land Corporation, they are among the least amenable to agricultural production. Social expectations regarding land use are undergoing a multifunctional transition with a move away from a focus on production, to increased amenity and conservation uses. This change means that Aboriginal people with cultural connections to country enjoy an absolute advantage in managing country through their application of land care involving Indigenous ecological knowledge. An integrated multidisciplinary economic welfare approach, based on data from northern Australia and the central Australian desert, is used to demonstrate the role Aboriginal people can play in caring for country. Such engagement can be to the advantage of Aboriginal people through a multiplicity of private and public good benefits, such as improving Aboriginal health, maintaining biodiversity, and the mitigation of climate change impacts through possible greenhouse gas biosequestration and the reduction of dust storms – which are an important vector of disease.

Renewable energy production is gaining importance in the context of global climate changes. However, in some countries other aspects increasing the role of renewable energy production are also present. Such a country is Ukraine, which is not self-sufficient in energy supply and whose dependency on poorly diversified import of energy carriers regularly leads to political tensions and has socio-economic implications. Production of agricultural biogas seems to be a way to both slow down climatic changes and increase energy self-sufficiency by replacing or complementing conventional sources of energy. One of the most substantial barriers to agricultural biogas production is the low level of agricultural concentration and significant economies of scale in constructing biogas plants. The aim of the paper was thus to assess the potential of agricultural biogas production in Ukraine, including its impact on energy self-sufficiency, mitigation of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and the economic performance of biogas plants. The results show that due to the prevailing fragmentation of farms, most manure cannot be processed in an economically viable way. However, in some regions utilization of technically available manure for agricultural biogas production could cover up to 11% of natural gas or up to 19% of electricity demand. While the theoretical potential for reducing greenhouse gas emissions could reach 5% to 6.14%, the achievable technical potential varies between 2.3% and 2.8% of total emissions. The economic performance of agricultural biogas plants correlates closely with their size and bioenergy generation potential.

Global wind resources greatly exceed current electricity demand and the levelized cost of energy from wind turbines has shown precipitous declines. Accordingly, the installed capacity of wind turbines grew at an annualized rate of about 14% during the last two decades and wind turbines now provide ~6–7% of the global electricity supply. This renewable electricity generation source is thus already playing a role in reducing greenhouse gas emissions from the energy sector. Here we document trends within the industry, examine projections of future installed capacity increases and compute the associated climate change mitigation potential at the global and regional levels. Key countries (the USA, UK and China) and regions (e.g., EU27) have developed ambitious plans to expand wind energy penetration as core aspects of their net-zero emissions strategies. The projected climate change mitigation from wind energy by 2100 ranges from 0.3–0.8 °C depending on the precise socio-economic pathway and wind energy expansion scenario followed. The rapid expansion of annual increments to wind energy installed capacity by approximately two times current rates can greatly delay the passing of the 2 °C warming threshold relative to pre-industrial levels. To achieve the required expansion of this cost-effective, low-carbon energy source, there is a need for electrification of the energy system and for expansion of manufacturing and installation capacity.

Large-scale deployment of both biochemical and thermochemical routes for advanced biofuels production is seen as a key climate change mitigation option. This study addresses techno-economic and environmental aspects of advanced liquid biofuels production alternatives via biomass gasification and Fischer–Tropsch synthesis integrated to a typical sugarcane distillery. The thermochemical route comprises the conversion of the residual lignocellulosic fraction of conventional sugarcane (bagasse and straw), together with eucalyptus and energy-cane as emerging lignocellulosic biomass options. This work promotes an integrated framework to simulate the mass and energy balances of process alternatives and incorporates techno-economic analyses and sustainability assessment methods based on a life-cycle perspective. Results show that integrated biorefineries provide greenhouse gas emission reduction between 85–95% compared to the fossil equivalent, higher than that expected from a typical sugarcane biorefinery. When considering avoided emissions by cultivated area, biorefinery scenarios processing energy-cane are favored, however at lower economic performance. Thermochemical processes may take advantage of the integration with the typical sugarcane mills and novel biofuels policies (e.g., RenovaBio) to mitigate some of the risks linked to the implementation of new biofuel technologies.

Dairy cows are able to convert fibrous materials, such as grass, roughage, and by-products from the food industry, into milk and meat, which justifies their role in food production. However, modern dairy farming is associated with major sustainability challenges, including greenhouse gas emissions. In order to develop sustainable future production, it is important to implement existing knowledge and fill knowledge gaps. The aim of this study was to systematically map the scientific literature on environmental, economic, and social sustainability at farm level in dairy farming. Literature published between January 2000 and March 2020 and with the geographical focus on Europe, North America, and Australia–New Zealand was included. In total, the literature search resulted in 169 hits, but after removing duplicates and papers outside the study scope only 35 papers remained. Of these, only 11 dealt with the three dimensions of sustainability, and several of these only mentioned one or two of the dimensions or set them in relation to that/those actually studied. Overall, the selected literature did not clearly explain how aspects of sustainability are interlinked, so possible negative or positive interactions between different aspects of sustainability dimensions remain unidentified.

Limited alternative fuels for a CO2-neutral aviation sector have already been ASTM certified; synthetic paraffinic kerosene from hydrotreated esters and fatty acids (HEFA-SPK) is one of these—a sustainable aviation fuel. With the hypothesis to improve the greenhouse gas (GHG) balance of a HEFA plant by realizing the required hydrogen supply via electrolysis—power to gas (PTG)—an exemplary SynBioPTx approach is investigated in a comprehensive feasibility study, which is, regarding this comparatively new approach, a novelty in its extent. About 10 scenarios are analysed by technical, environmental, and economic aspects. Within the alternative scenarios on feedstocks, electricity supply, necessary hydrogen supply, and different main products are analysed. For different plant designs of the hybrid refinery, mass and energy balances are elaborated, along with the results of the technical assessment. As a result of this environmental assessment, the attainment of at least 50% GHG mitigation might be possible. GHG highly depends on the renewability grade of the hydrogen provision as well as on the used feedstock. One important conclusion of this economic assessment is that total fuel production costs of 1295 to 1800 EUR t−1 are much higher than current market prices for jet fuel. The scenario in which hydrogen is produced by steam reforming of internally produced naphtha proves to be the best combination of highly reduced GHG emissions and low HEFA-SPK production costs.

Solar irrigation is a climate mitigation technology to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in agricultural production. Despite its potential, small-scale farmers are unable to afford photovoltaic (PV) systems and resort to using the traditional diesel-powered pumps for irrigation. This study aims to analyze the social, economic, and environmental aspects of introducing solar irrigation systems from the perspective of small-scale farmers in developing countries. Applying socio-economic and environmental analyses to the case of the Philippines, the study found the environmental benefits of solar irrigation in terms of the reduction in GHG emissions of up to 26.5 tons CO2eq/ha/year and the avoidance of emissions of air pollutants such as carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, sulfur oxides, and particulate matter. The energy savings between 11.36 and 378.54 L/ha of diesel per year resulted in a range of −USD 1255/ha to USD 68,582/ha net present value, 30% to 2958% with an average of 315% returns on investment, and 0.3 to 30 years payback period with an average of 2.88 years. Regardless of the low awareness of environmental sustainability, most farmers were interested to invest in solar irrigation systems with 69% social acceptance, while the 26% were not interested as they consume a minimal amount of fuel and cannot recover the high investment from the cost savings. This study provided policy recommendations to make solar irrigation accessible to small-scale farmers as well as broader implications to make the agricultural sector more sustainable.

Environmental pollution and depletion of non-renewable resources are major problems at the international, national, regional, and local levels that endanger biological diversity, human health, and the further development of the economy. The economic and financial impact of climate change can lead to considerable future losses for banking financial institutions and environmental degradation is becoming a crucial dilemma globally. Climate change has become a threat to sustainable development. Mitigation and adaptation should be a priority of national policy. The increasing tendency of excessive consumption of natural resources due to intensive economic activity of corporations has led to a significant increase in greenhouse gas emissions, leading to global warming and, ultimately, to global climate change. These issues present the scientific community with the dilemma of finding a compromise between economic development and its impact on climate change. The main aim of the research is to emphasize the importance of responsible lending by promoting green banking products as green and eco loans, identify the potential environmental impact of negligent financing under the conditions of climate change, give definitions of this topic, consider current trends in the banking sector and prospects of development. Also, based on international experience, the authors tried to identify the main aspects of the environmental management policy of ProCredit Group and examine the share of the green loan portfolio at the group level, determine the environmental impact and subtract the improvement strategies and methods for implementing green lending in the Republic of Moldova.

Dependence of damage estimates upon assumptions of economic growth and technological development Greater economic growth could, by increasing emissions, lead to greater damages from climate change. On the other hand, by increasing wealth and advancing technological development and human capital, economic growth would also increase a society's adaptive capacity and reduce those damages. Although analyses of the impacts (or damages) of climate change generally incorporate economic growth into the emissions and climate change scenarios that they use as inputs, these analyses do not adequately account for the increase in adaptive capacity resulting from that very growth. Because of this inconsistency, these analyses generally tend to overstate impacts. For instance, the average GDP per capita for developing countries in 2100 is projected to be $11,000 (in 1990 US$, at market exchange rates) under A2, the slowest economic growth scenario, and $66,500 under A1, the scenario with both the greatest economic growth and largest climate change. By comparison, in 1990 the GDP per capita for Greece, for example, was $8,300 while Switzerland, the country with the highest income level at that time, had a GDP per capita of $34,000. Based on historical experience, one should expect that at the high levels of GDP per capita projected by the IPCC scenarios in 2100, wealth-driven increases in adaptive capacity alone should virtually eliminate damages from many climate-sensitive hazards, e.g., malaria and hunger, whether or not these damages are caused by climate change. Current damage estimates are inflated further because they usually do not adequately account for secular (time-dependent) improvements in technology that, if history is any guide, ought to occur in the future unrelated to economic development. A compelling argument for reducing greenhouse gases is that it would help developing countries cope with climate change. It is asserted that they need this help because their adaptive capacity is weak. Although often true today, this assertion becomes increasingly invalid in the future if developing countries become wealthier and more technologically advanced, per the IPCC's scenarios. Damage assessments frequently overlook this. Are scenario storylines internally consistent in light of historical experience? Regardless of whether the economic growth assumptions used in the IPCC scenarios are justified, their specifications regarding the relationship between wealth and technological ability are, in general, inconsistent with the lessons of economic history. They assume that the less wealthy societies depicted by the B1 and B2 scenarios would have greater environmental protection and employ cleaner and more efficient technologies than the wealthier society characterized by the A1F1 scenario. This contradicts general experience in the real world, where richer countries usually have cleaner technologies. Under the IPCC scenarios, the richer A1 world has the same population as the poorer B1 world, but in fact total fertility rates — a key determinant of population growth rates — are, by and large, lower for richer nations and, over time, have dropped for any given level of GDP per capita (Goklany 2001a). Merits of reallocating expenditures from mitigation to international development Halting climate change at its 1990 level would annually cost substantially more than the $165 billion estimated for the minimally-effective Kyoto Protocol. According to DEFRA-sponsored studies, in 2085, which is at the limit of the foreseeable future, such a halt would reduce the total global population at risk (PAR) due to both climate change and non-climate-change-related causes by 3 percent for malaria, 21 percent for hunger, and 86 percent for coastal flooding, although the total PAR for water shortage might well increase. The benefits associated with halting climate change — and more — can be obtained more economically through “focused adaptation”, i.e., activities focused on reducing vulnerabilities to the above noted climate-sensitive hazards, or through broadly advancing sustainable development in developing countries by meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015. In fact, such efforts, which together could annually cost donor countries $150 billion according to UN Millennium Project and World Health Organization studies, should reduce global malaria, hunger, poverty, and lack of access to safe water and sanitation by 50 percent (each); reduce child and maternal mortality by at least 66 percent; provide universal primary education; and reverse growth in AIDS/HIV, and other major diseases. These numbers also indicate that no matter how important climate change might be in this century, for the next several decades it would be far more beneficial for human well-being, especially in developing countries, to deal with non-climate change related factors. Not only would either focused adaptation or adherence to the MDGs provide greater benefits at lesser costs through the foreseeable future than would any emission reduction scheme, they would help solve today's urgent problems sooner and more certainly. Equally important, they would also increase the ability to deal with tomorrow's problems, whether they are caused by climate change or other factors. None of these claims can be reasonably made on behalf of any mitigation scheme today. Accordingly, over the next few decades the focus of climate policy should be to: (a) broadly advance sustainable development, particularly in developing countries since that would generally enhance their adaptive capacity to cope with the many urgent problems they currently face, including many that are climate-sensitive, (b) specifically reduce vulnerabilities to climate-sensitive problems that are urgent today and might be exacerbated by future climate change, and (c) implement “no-regret” emission reduction measures, while (d) concurrently striving to expand the universe of no-regret options through research and development to increase the variety and cost-effectiveness of available mitigation options. Ancillary benefits associated with greenhouse gas (GHG) reductions Some GHG emission control options might provide substantial co-benefits by concurrently reducing problems not directly caused by climate change (e.g., air pollution or lack of sustained economic growth, especially in developing countries). However, in both these instances, the same, or greater, level of co-benefits can be obtained more economically by directly attacking the specific (non-climate change related) problems rather than indirectly through greenhouse gas control. On the other hand, a direct assault on the numerous climate-sensitive hurdles to sustainable development (e.g., hunger, malaria, and many natural disasters) would, as indicated, provide greater benefits more cost-effectively than would efforts to mitigate climate change.

The purpose of this article is to analyze and compare the benefits of and barriers to the implementation of Environmental Management Systems (EMS)—International Standard ISO 14001 and Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS)—by organizations. This paper attempts to answer the following research questions: 1. Does the implementation of either ISO 14001 or EMAS bring the same benefits and barriers to organizations? 2. Does the system functioning duration in the company influence internal and external benefits resulting from EMS implementation? 3. Are economic aspects of EMS adoption as important for entrepreneurs as the ecological aspects? This topic is important due to the large disproportions appearing in recent years between the number of companies registered in ISO 14001 and in EMAS, and due to relatively frequent cases of non-renewal of EMAS certifications in recent years. It is crucial because each EMS certified institution has implemented procedures which contribute to better protection of the natural environment. The study was conducted in the form of a survey; questions and answers were specified based on the literature review and the authors’ research. Results indicate that the knowledge-based and organizational problems, as well as the time invested in preparing the documentation, are much more significant than financial problems associated with EMS implementation. Even organizations that previously introduced ISO 14001 still have difficulties with EMAS implementation. The perception of benefits resulting from EMS introduction is related to the system functioning duration in the company. The analysis shows that it is necessary to strengthen economic incentives in order to enable the widest possible dissemination of EMS among companies. Research results can contribute to further simplification and increases in EMS implementation, which may lead to more sustainable development and climate change mitigation, inter alia, due to the improvement in energy efficiency, increased use of renewable energy, and reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.

Akin to a public good, emissions reduction suffers from the ‘free rider’ syndrome. Although many countries claim that they are meeting their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction commitments, the average global temperature and GHG emissions continue to rise. This has led to growing speculation that some countries may be taking advantage of the system by effectively exploiting a range of loopholes in global agreements. Using a case study approach, we critically review the evidence from Australia, exploring how Australia has participated in global climate change negotiations and the way in which this emissions intensive country’s national emissions reduction obligations have been met. The findings suggest that: (1) successful negotiation to include Article 3.7 (‘Adjusting the 1990 Baseline’ or ‘the Australia Clause’) in the Kyoto Protocol significantly favored Australia’s ability to meet its First Kyoto Commitment (2008–2012); and (2) successful bargaining for the accounting rule that allowed carbon credits from the first commitment period to be carried over to the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol benefitted Australia by 128 MtCO2e. At the national level, a lack of bipartisan political support for an effective mechanism to drive emissions reduction has also been problematic. While the introduction of the Carbon Pricing Mechanism (CPM) in 2012 reduced emissions from electricity production from about 199.1 MtCO2e to 180.8 MtCO2e in 2014, a change of government led to the abolition of the CPM in 2014 and emissions from electricity production subsequently rose to 187 MtCO2e in 2015 and 189 MtCO2e in 2016 with adverse impacts in many sectors as well as Australia’s overall emissions. The current Australian government continues to undermine its commitment to mitigation and the integrity and credibility of its own emissions reductions policy, introducing a softer ‘calculated baseline’ for its own Safeguard Mechanism, which allows companies to upwardly adjust their calculated baselines on the basis of their highest expected emissions, permitting emissions in excess of their historical emissions. While disappointing in the context of the global emissions reduction project, Australia’s actions are sadly not unique and we also provide examples of loopholes exploited by countries participating in a range of other negotiations and emissions reduction projects. Such strategies undoubtedly serve the short-term political and economic interests of these countries; however, it is increasingly apparent that the cumulative impact of such tactics will ultimately impact the entire global community.

Governments, organisations and individuals have recognised the need to reduce their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. To identify where savings can be made, and to monitor progress in reducing emissions, we need methodologies to quantify GHG emissions and sequestration. Through the Australian Government’s Carbon Farming Initiative (CFI) landholders may generate credits for reducing emissions and/or sequestering carbon (C). National GHG inventories for the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, and accounting under the Kyoto Protocol use a sectoral approach. For example, fuel use in agriculture is reported in the transport component of the energy sector; energy use in producing herbicide and fertiliser is included in the manufacturing section of the energy sector; sequestration in farm forestry is reported in the land use, land-use change and forestry sector, while emissions reported in the agriculture sector include methane (CH4) from ruminant livestock, nitrous oxide (N2O) from soils, and non-carbon dioxide (CO2) GHG from stubble and savannah burning. In contrast, project-level accounting for CFI includes land-use change, forestry and agricultural sector emissions, and significant direct inputs such as diesel and electricity. A C footprint calculation uses a life cycle approach, including all the emissions associated with an organisation, activity or product. The C footprint of a food product includes the upstream emissions from manufacturing fertiliser and other inputs, fuel use in farming operations, transport, processing and packaging, distribution to consumers, electricity use in refrigeration and food preparation, and waste disposal. Methods used to estimate emissions range from simple empirical emissions factors, to complex process-based models. Methods developed for inventory and emissions trading must balance the need for sufficient accuracy to give confidence to the market, with practical aspects such as ease and expense of data collection. Requirements for frequent on-ground monitoring and third party verification of soil C or livestock CH4 estimates, for example, may incur costs that would negate the financial benefit of credits earned, and could also generate additional GHG emissions. Research is required to develop practical on-farm measures of CH4 and N2O, and methods to quantify C in environmental plantings, agricultural soils and rangeland ecosystems, to improve models for estimation and prediction of GHG emissions, and enable baseline assessment. There is a need for whole-farm level estimation tools that accommodate regional and management differences in emissions and sequestration to support landholders in managing net emissions from their farming enterprises. These on-farm ‘bottom-up’ accounting tools must align with the ‘top-down’ national account. To facilitate assessment of C footprints for food and fibre products, Australia also needs a comprehensive life cycle inventory database. This paper reviews current methods and approaches used for quantifying GHG emissions for the land-based sectors in the context of emissions reporting, emissions trading and C footprinting, and proposes possible improvements. We emphasise that cost-effective yet credible GHG estimation methods are needed to encourage participation in voluntary offset schemes such as the CFI, and thereby achieve maximum mitigation in the land-based sector.

In Australia in 2011 the Federal government introduced a voluntary offset scheme called the Carbon Farming Initiative, which allows farmers to receive carbon credits when they reduce or sequester greenhouse gas emissions. Various mitigation options have since been explored for their potential to reduce on-farm greenhouse gas emissions. Among these is the use of alternative pastures that lower methane (CH4) production of grazing animals such as Lotus corniculatus, a legume that contains condensed tannins that inhibit the formation of CH4 in the rumen. Lotus has other benefits for sheep production such as increased wool growth, liveweight gain and fecundity. This study modelled the potential emission, production and economic outcomes for wool and lamb enterprises that incorporate lotus in their pastures, evaluating the impact of existing farm productivity, lotus intake and carbon price. Depending on the amount of lotus consumed and the CH4 reduction rate, CH4 emissions fell by 0.02–0.38 t carbon dioxide equivalents (CO2e)/ha and 0.05–0.48 t CO2e/ha on wool and prime lamb enterprises, respectively. At a price of $6/t CO2e potential offset income attributable to use of lotus across all enterprises was $0.12–2.91/ha. Increases in income from increased productivity were 15–30 times greater than from potential carbon offset income. Income was driven by the amount of lotus dry matter intake and the subsequent production benefits. Over a 10-year period prime lamb enterprises generated up to $50/ha in profit by using lotus, due to increased liveweight gain and fecundity. In most modelled scenarios wool enterprises would not cover the cost of lotus pasture establishment. This research demonstrated that 18–23% and 37–46% of lotus intake within the diet was required to generate production enough to cover pasture establishment costs on prime lamb and wool enterprises, respectively. Potential carbon offset income would not be sufficient for farmers to establish lotus without the productivity benefits. While extra profit may be gained on prime lamb enterprises through the use of lotus, problems with persistence must first be overcome for lotus to be adopted on farms.

Maritime transportation has been a cost-effective option among other transport modes. Meanwhile, this demand has been increasing day by day because of the expanding global economy. The ships are one of the most important transport and trade vehicles in the world; 90% of the world trade is carried out by maritime transport, and this sector plays a crucial role in climate change and global warming because it is one of the key sectors leading to emissions of carbon dioxide, the main greenhouse gas (GHG). In other sectors that lead to CO2 emissions, i.e., energy production, manufacturing industry, and heating in residences, energy efficiency has been improved and emissions have been reduced significantly. However, there has been no net reduction in the transport sector; total CO2 emissions have also increased because of the continuous increase in freight and passenger traffic, although efficiency has increased. Increasing the energy efficiency of a ship allows for fuel consumption reduction and GHG emissions. In this study, the energy system of a chemical tanker ship was analyzed and then modeled by using the long-range energy alternatives planning system, a widely used platform for energy policy analysis and climate change mitigation assessment, including a comprehensive energy flow diagram, namely, reference energy system. A base scenario was developed, and the ship’s energy system was convenient to be analyzed and evaluated in terms of technical, economic, and environmental aspects, including low-emission development strategies, to comply with marine engine regulations of the International Maritime Organization.

One of the greatest challenges we face in the twenty-first century is to sustainably feed nine to ten billion people by 2050 while at the same time reducing environmental impact (e.g. greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, biodiversity loss, land use change and loss of ecosystem services). To this end, food security must be delivered. According to the United Nations definition, ‘food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life’. At the same time as delivering food security, we must also reduce the environmental impact of food production. Future climate change will make an impact upon food production. On the other hand, agriculture contributes up to about 30% of the anthropogenic GHG emissions that drive climate change. The aim of this review is to outline some of the likely impacts of climate change on agriculture, the mitigation measures available within agriculture to reduce GHG emissions and outlines the very significant challenge of feeding nine to ten billion people sustainably under a future climate, with reduced emissions of GHG. Each challenge is in itself enormous, requiring solutions that co-deliver on all aspects. We conclude that the status quo is not an option, and tinkering with the current production systems is unlikely to deliver the food and ecosystems services we need in the future; radical changes in production and consumption are likely to be required over the coming decades.

Five decades after the United Nation's first conference on the environment in 1972, the IPCC warned that ‘any further delay in concerted anticipatory global action on adaptation and mitigation will miss a brief and rapidly closing window of opportunity to secure a liveable and sustainable future for all’. Faced with steeply rising greenhouse gas emissions, accelerating biodiversity loss and continued degradation of oceans, forests and soil, the situation appears increasingly baffling. Why do we not see effective measures to turn these developments around? As the situation grows dire, it becomes more mysterious: what exactly is this crisis and why has it proven so difficult to solve? If the problem persists, is it because it is not properly understood? Yet, the environmental question has been studied for decades and diagnoses are legion: capitalism, colonialism, overpopulation, economic growth, humanity's inherent short-sightedness, patriarchy, the private property system – or the tragedy of the commons, the disconnect from nature in Western culture, corporate anti-environmental campaigns, the Neolithic adoption of agriculture – or its more recent industrialisation, the miscommunication of environmentalists and scientists, Christianity and neoliberalism have all been proposed as fundamental causes of the crisis. Despite this long and rich history of debate, it may be, as Pierre Charbonnier argues, that we need a more precise understanding of the ‘ecological question’ to find a way out of the present impasse. In line with Katrina Forrester and Sophie Smith's argument, we are convinced that such rethinking of the environmental must be historical, but also that it must pay special attention to economic aspects. Since the end of the Second World War, economics has risen to prominence as a form of expertise in governance at the expense of other kinds of knowledge, and the environment has become closely intertwined with the economic in the ways it has been governed. In that light, it is not surprising that current discussions among scholars, climate scientists, politicians and social movements hold that the environmental crisis calls for a reevaluation of the economic. History is central to this endeavour and can be ‘usable’ in the current crisis, as it, in Deborah Coen's words, can ‘reveal the contingent and often contradictory traces of the past in the present – and to provide clarity for the future’. In this introduction we discuss three partially overlapping ways in which historical perspectives can be helpful to the effort of constructing an ecologically stable society. In contrast to the general tendency in the twenty-first century academy to divide into ever more specialised fields, we call for a broader conversation among historians of the economic and of the environmental to reveal the paths that brought us here – and the ones not taken. We need new histories of thought, institutions, movements and governance that combine the economic and the environmental to reach a better understanding of the present crisis, decode the specific mechanisms of inaction in the face of looming catastrophe, and strive towards more apt formulations of the environmental. We wish to contribute to an emerging conversation located at the intersection of history of economic thought, intellectual history and political history more generally by pointing to strands of research that could be drawn together and that this special issue is meant to engage in dialogue.

Many cities have encountered challenges associated with rapid urban development, population growth and aging, in which urban renewal has become a promising option. Different renewal strategies, such as redevelopment, refurbishment and conservation, not only contributes to quality improvement and energy consumption reduction of dilapidated urban area, but also to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions mitigation. Such integrated benefits are often termed as co-benefits. However, choosing the most co-benefits strategy to adopt requires a holistic understanding of social-economic and environmental aspects, which has been less reported in the existing literature. Under such circumstance, this article aims to shed light on the co-benefits of different renewal strategies by adopting the Emergy-Life cycle assessment method. Then, the method is applied to one case study of the refurbishment of an educational building located in Chongqing, China. Resource allocation, CO2 emissions and emergy-based indicators are calculated to assess the co-benefits during a 60-year research period, to compare the impacts of the complete demolition followed by a new one (rebuilding strategy) and the refurbishing of the existing building (refurbishment strategy). The case study shows that the annual emergy in the O&M phase of rebuilding strategy and refurbishment strategy were lower than existing building. Rebuilding and refurbishment strategies released approximately 59.1% and 80.6%, respectively, of the total CO2 emissions that would be produced by the existing building. The results reveal that substantial environmental benefits can be obtained in both the refurbishment and rebuilding strategies. On the other hand, it can be concluded that the emergy yield ratio (EYR) for the rebuilding strategy is higher than refurbishment strategy, which demonstrate the better performance of refurbishment considering that less resources are required to generate greater benefits. In addition, the value of environmental loading ratio (ELR) and emergy sustainability index (ESI) also suggests that the refurbishment strategy performs better from the perspective of the environment. Thereby, the refurbishment strategy is more suitable than the rebuilding strategy. Findings from this study can be useful to urban planners and decision-makers in choosing the most suitable strategy to improve the quality of existing buildings.

Presented on Thursday 19 May: Session 24 Greenhouse gas (GHG) inventory assessment, monitoring and auditing is becoming increasingly routine in oil and gas project evaluations. Already, some companies carry an ‘internal’ carbon cost reflected in projected capital and operational expenditure. Early evaluation allows for optimal planning of GHG mitigation and economic analysis inclusive of carbon costs, allaying concerns of investors and lenders. The challenge in evaluating pre-development, however, is the lack of real data and thus, uncertainties in field production. In this paper, we demonstrate the use of a Monte Carlo probabilistic method to better account for uncertainties in production, gas-oil ratio (GOR) and operation loads in a case study of a prospective oil field in offshore Western Australia. We compared the results to the scenario-based deterministic GHG emissions evaluation of the same field and found the deterministic estimates to be extreme representatives of the range of possible emission quantities, due to GOR and production uncertainties. From a breakdown of annual emissions, we also identified the emissions from flaring of excess natural gas to be one of the most significant mitigatable sources of emissions, due to the unexpectedly large production of gas over the project lifetime. Avoiding the flaring of excess gases alone could reduce the project’s emissions by ~44%. Through identifying these key sources and uncertainties, we are able to flag such unexpected, mitigatable sources of emissions at an early stage and provide a representative range of projected emissions, thus assisting the operator to make informed decisions in the field development. To access the presentation click the link on the right. To read the full paper click here

AbstractWhile concerns about human-induced effects on the Earth’s climate have mainly concentrated on carbon dioxide (CO2) and methane (CH4), reducing anthropogenic nitrous oxide (N2O) flux, mainly of agricultural origin, also represents an opportunity for substantial mitigation. To develop a solution that induces neither the transfer of nitrogen pollution nor decreases agricultural production, we specifically investigated the last step of the denitrification pathway, the N2O reduction path, in soils. We first observed that this path is mainly driven by soil pH and is progressively inhibited when pH is lower than 6.8. During field experiments, we observed that liming acidic soils to neutrality made N2O reduction more efficient and decreased soil N2O emissions. As we estimated acidic fertilized soils to represent 37% [27–50%] of French soils, we calculated that liming could potentially decrease France’s total N2O emissions by 15.7% [8.3–21.2%]. Nevertheless, due to the different possible other impacts of liming, we currently recommend that the deployment of this solution to mitigate N2O emission should be based on local studies that take into account agronomic, environmental and economic aspects.

Abstract Background The availability of underexploited agricultural residues in Thailand opens up the opportunity to supply second-generation bioethanol production. The national implementation of residues-to-biofuel can potentially boost the bioeconomy and greenhouse gas mitigation but requires the involvement of multiple stakeholders in the development of effective policy recommendations. This study aims to optimize the implementation of the national strategy through the use of a multi-criteria approach that involves participatory prioritization by current stakeholders in order to evaluate certain aspects and important indicators for second-generation bioethanol development. Methods The Delphi-AHP technique was used to analyze the degree of importance of different criteria. The evaluation process was conducted with various stakeholders and used a pairwise comparison of 4 dimensions (main criteria) and 12 indicators (sub-criteria). Participants were asked to rate factors related to technical feasibility, environmental impacts, economic feasibility and social impacts in terms of importance. Results Bioethanol stakeholders in Thailand from five different sectors (industry/business, NPO/NGOs, the governmental sector, academic/research institutes and financial institutions/banks) participated in the Delphi survey. The 20 experts’ evaluation of the four dimensions ranked economic feasibility (32.7%) highest in terms of level of importance, followed by environmental impacts (25.1%), technical feasibility (24.9%) and social impacts (17.3%). When assessing the sub-criteria, the participants selected ‘final price per liter’, ‘added value of input materials’ and ‘net energy balance’ as the top three most important indicators among the 12 sub-criteria. In terms of a link between the preferred criteria and the participants’ expertise, the results encouraged taking different backgrounds and affiliations into account in the policy planning phase. Conclusions The stakeholder survey indicated the importance of economic aspects, highlighting the need to take governmental driven policy into consideration. However, implementation scenarios have to be embedded in a broader range of aspects because all the dimensions were rated as being highly impactful. For future sustainable bioenergy, the inclusion of stakeholders’ opinions can result in multifaceted scenarios that can be linked to social acceptance and benefits for all relevant players when developing policy recommendations for advanced bioenergy.

Land-use control is local and highly varied. State agencies struggle to assess plan contents. Similarly, advocacy groups and planning researchers wrestle with the length of planning documents and ability to compare across plans. The goal of this research is to (1) introduce Natural Language Processing techniques that can automate qualitative coding in planning research and (2) provide policy-relevant exploratory findings. We assembled a database of 461 California city-level General Plans, extracted the text, and used topic modeling to identify areas of emphasis (clusters of co-occurring words). We find that California city general plans address more than sixty topics, including greenhouse gas mitigation and Climate Action Planning. Through spatializing results, we find that a quarter of the topics in plans are regionally specific. We also quantify the rift and convergence of planning topics. The topics focused on housing have very little overlap with other planning topics. This is likely a factor of state requirements to update and evolve the Housing Elements every five years, but not other aspects of General Plans. This finding has policy implications as housing topics evolve away from other emphasis areas such as transportation and economic development. Furthermore, the topic modeling approach reveals that many cities have had a focus on environmental justice through Health and Wellness Elements well before the state mandate in 2019. Our searchable state-level database of general plans is the first for California—and nationally. We provide a model for others that wish to comprehensively assess and compare plan contents using machine learning.

Abstract Many years passed since the adoption of the Paris Agreement, which invites countries to determine their own contributions to climate change mitigation efforts. The Agreement does not offer a standard to measure progress but relies on a process of periodic stocktakes to inform ambition-raising cycles. To contribute to this process, we compare 2021 greenhouse gas emission projections up to 2030 against equivalent projections prepared back in 2015. Both sets of projections were prepared using the same bottom-up modelling approach that accounts for adopted policies at the time. We find that 2021 projections for the G20 as a group are almost 15% lower (approximately 6 GtCO2eq) in 2030 than projected in 2015. Annual emissions grow 1% slower in the coming decade than projected in 2015. This slower growth mostly stems from the adoption of new policies and updated expectations on technology uptake and economic growth. However, around one-quarter of these changes are explained by the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on short-term emissions and economic forecasts. These factors combined result in substantially lower emission projections for India, the European Union plus the UK (EU27 + UK), the Unites States, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa. We observe a remarkable change in South African projections that changed from a substantial increase to now a decline, driven in part by the planned phase-out of most of its coal-based power. Emissions in India are projected to grow slower than in 2015 and in Indonesia faster, but emissions per capita in both countries remain below 5 tCO2eq in 2030, while those in the EU27 + UK decline faster than expected in 2015 and probably cross the 5 tCO2eq threshold before 2030. Projected emissions per capita in Australia, Canada, Saudi Arabia, and the United States are now lower than projected in 2015 but remain above 15 tCO2eq in 2030. Although emission projections for the G20 improved since 2015, collectively they still slightly increase until 2030 and remain insufficient to meet the Paris Agreement temperature goals. The G20 must urgently and drastically improve adopted policies and actions to limit the end-of-century warming to 1.5 °C.

Obscured in contemporary climate change discourse is the fact that under even the most serious mitigation scenarios being envisaged it will be virtually impossible to avoid runaway ecosystem collapse; so great is the momentum of global greenhouse build-up (Anderson and Bows). And under even the best-case scenario, two-degree warming, the ecological, social, and economic costs are proving to be much deeper than first thought. The greenhouse genie is out of the bottle, but the best that appears to be on offer is a gradual transition to the pro-growth, pro-consumption discourse of “ecological modernisation” (EM); anything more seems politically unpalatable (Barry, Ecological Modernisation; Adger et al.). Here, I aim to account for how cheaply EM has managed to allay ecology. To do so, I detail the operations of the co-optive, definitional strategy which I call the “high-ground” strategy, waged by a historic bloc of actors, discourses, and institutions with a common interest in resisting radical social and ecological critique. This is not an argument about climate laggards like the United States and Australia where sceptic views remain near the centre of public debate. It is a critique of climate leaders such as the United Kingdom, Germany, and the Netherlands—nations at the forefront of the adoption of EM policies and discourses. With its antecedent in sustainable development discourse, by emphasising technological innovation, eco-efficiency, and markets, EM purports to transcend the familiar dichotomy between the economy and the environment (Hajer; Barry, ‘Towards’). It rebuts the 1970s “limits to growth” perspective and affirms that “the only possible way out of the ecological crisis is by going further into the process of modernisation” (Mol qtd. in York and Rosa 272, emphasis in original). Its narrative is one in which the “dirty and ugly industrial caterpillar transforms into an ecological butterfly” (Huber, qtd. in Spaargaren and Mol). How is it that a discourse notoriously quiet on endless growth, consumer culture, and the offshoring of dirty production could become the cutting edge of environmental policy? To answer this question we need to examine the discursive and ideological effects of EM discourse. In particular, we must analyse the strategies that work to continually naturalise dominant institutions and create the appearance that they are fit to respond to climate change. Co-opting Environmental Discourse Two features characterise state environmental discourse in EM nations: an almost universal recognition of the problem, and the reassurance that present institutions are capable of addressing it. The key organs of neoliberal capitalism—markets and states—have “gone green”. In boardrooms, in advertising and public relations, in governments, and in international fora, climate change is near the top of the agenda. While EM is the latest form of this discourse, early hints can be seen in President Nixon’s embrace of the environment and Margaret Thatcher’s late-1980s green rhetoric. More recently, David Cameron led a successful Conservative Party “detoxification” program with an ostentatious rhetorical strategy featuring the electoral slogan, “Vote blue, go green” (Carter). We can explain this transformation with reference to a key shift in the discursive history of environmental politics. The birth of the modern environmental movement in the 1960s and 70s brought a new symbolic field, a new discourse, into the public sphere. Yet by the 1990s the movement was no longer the sole proprietor of its discourse (Eder 203). It had lost control of its symbols. Politicians, corporations, and media outlets had assumed a dominant role in efforts to define “what climate change was and what it meant for the world” (Carvalho and Burgess 1464). I contend that the dramatic rise to prominence of environmental issues in party-political discourse is not purely due to short-term tactical vote-winning strategy. Nor is it the case that governments are finally, reluctantly waking up to the scientific reality of ecological degradation. Instead, they are engaged in a proactive attempt to redefine the contours of green critique so as to take the discourse onto territory in which established interests already control the high ground. The result is the defusing of the oppositional element of political ecology (Dryzek et al. 665–6), as well as social critique in general: what I term the gentrification of climate change. If we view environmentalism as, at least partially, a cultural politics in which contested definitions of problem is the key political battleground, we can trace how dominant interests have redefined the contours of climate change discourse. We can reveal the extent to which environmentalism, rather than being integrated into capitalism, has been co-opted. The key feature of this strategy is to present climate change as a mere aberration against a background of business-as-usual. The solutions that are presented are overwhelmingly extensions of existing institutions: bringing CO2 into the market, the optimistic development of new techno-scientific solutions to climate problems, extending regulatory regimes into hitherto overlooked domains. The agent of this co-optive strategy is not the state, industry, capital, or any other manifest actor, but a “historic bloc” cutting across divisions between society, politics, and economy (Laclau and Mouffe 42). The agent is an abstract coalition that is definable only to the extent that its strategic interests momentarily intersect at one point or another. The state acts as a locus, but the bloc is itself not reducible to the state. We might also think of the agent as an assemblage of conditions of social reproduction, in which dominant social, political, and economic interests have a stake. The bloc has learned the lesson that to be a player in a definitional battle one must recognise what is being fought over. Thus, exhortations to address climate change and build a green economy represent the first stage of the definitional battle for climate change: an attempt to enter the contest. In practical terms, this has manifest as the marking out of a self-serving division between action and inaction. Articulated through a binary modality climate change becomes something we either address/act on/tackle—or not. Under such a grammar even the most meagre efforts can be presented as “tackling climate change.” Thus Kevin Rudd was elected in 2007 on a platform of “action on climate change”, and he frequently implored that Australia would “do its bit” on climate change during his term. Tony Blair is able to declare that “tackling climate change… need not limit greater economic opportunity” and mean it in all sincerity (Barry, ‘Towards’ 112). So deployed, this binary logic minimises climate change to a level at which existing institutions are validated as capable of addressing the “problem,” and the government legitimised for its moral, green stand. The Hegemonic Articulation of Climate Change The historic bloc’s main task in the high-ground strategy is to re-articulate the threat in terms of its own hegemonic discourse: market economics. The widely publicised and highly influential Stern Review, commissioned by the British Government, is the standard-bearer of how to think about climate change from an economic perspective. It follows a supremely EM logic: economy and ecology have been reconciled. The Review presents climate change, famously, as “the greatest market failure the world has ever seen” (Stern et al. viii). The structuring horizon of the Stern Review is the correction of this failure, the overcoming of what is perceived to be not a systemic problem requiring a reappraisal of social institutions, but an issue of carbon pricing, technology policy, and measures aimed at “reducing barriers to behavioural change”. Stern insists that “we can be ‘green’ and grow. Indeed, if we are not ‘green’, we will eventually undermine growth, however measured” (iv). He reassures us that “tackling climate change is the pro-growth strategy for the longer term, and it can be done in a way that does not cap the aspirations for growth of rich or poor countries” (viii). Yet Stern’s seemingly miraculous reconciliation of growth with climate change mitigation in fact implies a severe degree of warming. The Stern Review aims to stabilise carbon dioxide equivalent concentrations at 550ppm, which would correspond to an increase of global temperature of 3-4 degrees Celsius. As Foster et al. note, this scenario, from an orthodox economist who is perceived as being pro-environment, is ecologically unsustainable and is viewed as catastrophic by many scientists (Foster, Clark, and York 1087–88). The reason Stern gives for not attempting deeper cuts is that they “are unlikely to be economically viable” (Stern et al. 231). In other words, the economy-ecology articulation is not a meeting of equals. Central to the policy prescriptions of EM is the marketising of environmental “bads” like carbon emissions. Carbon trading schemes, held in high esteem by moderate environmentalists and market economists alike, are the favoured instruments for such a task. Yet, in practice, these schemes can do more harm than good. When Prime Minister Kevin Rudd tried to legislate the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme as a way of addressing the “greatest moral challenge of our generation” it represented Australia’s “initial foray into ecological modernisation” (Curran 211). Denounced for its weak targets and massive polluter provisions, the Scheme was opposed by environmental groups, the CSIRO, and even the government’s own climate change advisor (Taylor; Wilkinson). While the Scheme’s defenders claimed it was as a step in the right direction, these opponents believed it would hurt more than help the environment. A key strategy in enshrining a particular hegemonic articulation is the repetition and reinforcement of key articulations in a way which is not overtly ideological. As Spash notes of the Stern Review, while it does connect to climate change such issues as distributive justice, value and ethical conflicts, intergenerational issues, this amounts to nothing but lip service given the analysis comes pre-formed in an orthodox economics mould. The complex of interconnected issues raised by climate change is reduced to the impact of carbon control on consumption growth (see also Swyngedouw and While, Jonas, and Gibbs). It is as if the system of relations we call global capitalism—relations between state and industry, science and technology, society and nature, labour and capital, North and South—are irrelevant to climate change, which is nothing but an unfortunate over-concentration of certain gases. In redrawing the discursive boundaries in this way it appears that climate change is a temporary blip on the path to a greener prosperity—as if markets and capitalism merely required minor tinkering to put them on the green-growth path. Markets are constituted as legitimate tools for managing climate change, in concert with regulation internalised within neoliberal state competition (While, Jonas, and Gibbs 81). The ecology-economy articulation both marketises “green,” and “greens” markets. Consonant with the capitalism-environment articulation is the prominence of the sovereign individual. Both the state and the media work to reproduce subjects largely as consumers (of products and politics) rather than citizens, framing environmental responsibility as the responsibility to consume “wisely” (Carvalho). Of course, what is obscured in this “self-greening” discourse is the culpability of consumption itself, and of a capitalist economy based on endless consumption growth, exploitation of resources, and the pursuit of new markets. Greening Technology EM also “greens” technology. Central to its pro-growth ethos is the tapering off of ecosystem impacts through green technologies like solar, wind, tidal, and geothermal. While green technologies are preferable to dependence upon resource-intensive technologies of oil and coal, that they may actually deliver on such promises has been shown to be contingent upon efficiency outstripping economic growth, a prospect that is dubious at best, especially considering the EM settlement is one in which any change to consumption practices is off the agenda. As Barry and Paterson put it, “all current experience suggests that, in most areas, efficiency gains per unit of consumption are usually outstripped by overall increases in consumption” (770). The characteristic ideological manoeuvre of foregrounding non-representative examples is evident here: green technologies comprise a tiny fraction of all large-scale deployed technologies, yet command the bulk of attention and work to cast technology generally in a green light. It is also false to assume that green technologies do not put their own demands on material resources. Deploying renewables on the scale that is required to address climate change demands enormous quantities of concrete, steel, glass and rare earth minerals, and vast programs of land-clearing to house solar and wind plants (Charlton 40). Further, claims that economic growth can become detached from ecological disturbance are premised on a limited basket of ecological indicators. Corporate marketing strategies are driving this green-technology articulation. While a single advertisement represents an appeal to consume an individual commodity, taken collectively advertising institutes a culture of consumption. Individually, “greenwash” is the effort to spin one company’s environmental programs out of proportion while minimising the systemic degradation that production entails. But as a burgeoning social institution, greenwash constitutes an ideological apparatus constructing industry as fundamentally working in the interests of ecology. In turn, each corporate image of pristine blue skies, flourishing ecosystems, wind farms, and solar panels constitutes a harmonious fantasy of green industry. As David Mackay, chief scientific advisor to the UK Government has pointed out, the political rhetoric of green technology lulls people into a false sense of security (qtd. in Charlton 38). Again, a binary logic works to portray greener technologies—such as gas, “clean coal”, and biomass combustion—as green. Rescuing Legitimacy There are essentially two critical forces that are defused in the high-ground strategy’s definitional project. The first is the scientific discourse which maintains that the measures proposed by leading governments are well below what is required to reign in dangerous climate change. This seems to be invisible not so much because it is radical but because it is obscured by the uncertainties in which climate science is couched, and by EM’s noble-sounding rhetoric. The second is the radical critique which argues that climate change is a classic symptom of an internal contradiction of a capitalist economy seeking endless growth in a finite world. The historic bloc’s successful redefinition strategy appears to jam the frequency of serious, scientifically credible climate discourse, yet at the level of hegemonic struggle its effects range wider. In redefining climate change and other key signifiers of green critique – “environment”, “ecology”, “green”, “planet”—it expropriates key properties of its antagonist. Were it not that climate change is now defined on the cheery, reassuring ground of EM discourse, the gravity of the alarming—rather than alarmist (Risbey)—scientific discourse may just have offered radical critique the ammunition it needed to provoke society into serious deliberations over its socioeconomic path. Radical green critique is not in itself the chief enemy of the historic bloc. But it is a privileged element within antagonistic discourse and reinforces the critical element of the feminist, civil rights, and student movements of the 1960s and 1970s. In this way ecology has tended to act as a nodal point binding general social critique: all of the other demands began to be inscribed with the green critique, just as the green critique became a metaphor for all of the others (Laclau). The metaphorical value of the green critique not only relates to the size and vibrancy of the movement—the immediate visibility of ecological destruction stood as a powerful symbol of the kernel of antagonistic politics: a sense that society had fundamentally gone awry. While green critique demands that progress should be conditional upon ecology, EM professes that progress is already green (Eder 217n). Thus the great win achieved by the high-ground strategy is not over radical green critique per se but over the shifting coalition that threatens its legitimacy. As Stavrakakis observes, what is novel about green discourse is nothing essential to the signifiers it deploys, but the way that a common signifier comes to stand in and structure the field as a whole – to serve as a nodal point. It has a number of signifiers: environmental sustainability, social justice, grassroots democracy, and peace and non-violence, all of which are “quilted” around the master-signifiers of “ecology”, “green”, or “planet”. While these master-signifiers are not unique to green ideology, what is unique is that they stand at the centre. But the crucial point to note about the green signifier at the heart of political ecology is that its value is accorded, in large part, through its negation of the dominant ideology. That is to say, it is not that green ideology stands as merely another way of mapping the social; rather, the master-signifier "green" contains an implicit refutation of the dominant social order. That “green” is now almost wholly evacuated of its radical connotations speaks to the effectiveness of the redefinitional effort.The historic bloc is aided in its efforts by the complexity of climate change. Such opacity is characteristic of contemporary risks, whose threats are mostly “a type of virtual reality, real virtuality” (Beck 213). The political struggle then takes place at the level of meaning, and power is played out in a contest to fix the definitions of key risks such as climate change. When relations of (risk) definition replace relations of production as the site of the effects of power, a double mystification ensues and shifts in the ground on which the struggle takes place may go unnoticed. Conclusion By articulating ecology with markets and technology, EM transforms the threat of climate change into an opportunity, a new motor of neoliberal legitimacy. The historic bloc has co-opted environmentalist discourse to promote a gentrified climate change which present institutions are capable of managing: “We are at the fork in the road between order and catastrophe. Stick with us. We will get you through the crisis.” The sudden embrace of the environment by Nixon and by Thatcher, the greening of Cameron’s Conservatives, the Garnaut and Stern reports, and the Australian Government’s foray into carbon trading all have their more immediate policy and political aims. Yet they are all consistent with the high-ground definitional strategy, professing no contraction between sustainability and the present socioeconomic order. Undoubtedly, EM is vastly preferable to denial and inaction. It may yet open the doors to real ecological reform. But in its present form, its preoccupation is the legitimation crisis threatening dominant interests, rather than the ecological crisis facing us all. References Adger, W. Neil, Tor A. Benjaminsen, Katrina Brown, and Hanne Svarstad. ‘Advancing a Political Ecology of Global Environmental Discourses.’ Development and Change 32.4 (2001): 681–715. 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