Academic literature on the topic 'Greece History Spartan and Theban Supremacies'

According to some sources, the friendship between the Athenians and the Phokians dates back at least to the time of the First Sacred War and proved resilient enough to withstand, and adapt to, the different balances and constellations of alliances that took shape in the classical period. The bipolar Greece of the fifth century meant the Phokians had to choose between the Athenians and the Spartans. For both the Athenians and Spartans, friendship with the Phokians was important for extending their influence in central Greece and in the Delphic Amphictyony, although the Boiotian factor should not be overlooked. The years of Spartan hegemony saw the Phokians allied with the Spartans, also in an anti-Theban key, but when Spartan hegemony was on the wane, the Phokians had no choice but to allow themselves to be drawn into the Theban orbit. This represented a significant turning point: once Spartan power had diminished, Athens no longer needed to form an alliance with the Thebans against Sparta, and the new Spartan-Athenian axis offered the Phokians a fresh range of prospects. The Athenian-Phokian axis lasted also during the delicate phase of negotiations for the conclusion of the Peace of Philokrates and influenced memories of the archaic War of Krisa.

AbstractSoon after their victory over the Spartans at the Battle of Leuctra in 371 BCE, the Thebans asserted their claim to Panhellenic leadership, but that hegemonic experiment turned out to be a brief affair in classical Greek history. It is the purpose of this paper to explain this failure by comparing the Theban approach to interstate relations with that of the earlier and more successful Athenian and Spartan models. The first section reexamines those hegemonic precedents and their supporting alliances (συμμαχίαι) which served both military and social functions. The next section looks closely at the attempt of the Thebans, under the leadership of Epaminondas and Pelopidas, to extend their own political and military power through the construction of seven alliances or groups of alliances from 370 to 364 BCE. Although the Thebans’ alliance treaties were designed according to conventional principles and provisions, their alliance network proved incapable of sustaining their Panhellenic aspirations. The final section seeks out answers to why the Thebans failed where others had previously succeeded. Whereas modern scholarship points to institutional and structural deficiencies or personal hatreds, this paper adds a further reason: that the Thebans neglected to cultivate interpersonal ties with their new allies that could transcend the temporary objectives and inspire the parties to continue their relationship in the long term. Consequently, the alliances, and thus the whole Theban hegemonic experiment, collapsed within only a short time of their inception.