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Journal articles on the topic 'Greece History Peloponnesian War'

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Author: Grafiati

Published: 10 December 2022

Last updated: 28 January 2023

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1

Septianingrum, Anisa. "INVASI YUNANI KE PERSIA SEBAGAI BUKTI KEBANGKITAN KEBUDAYAAN HELLENIS." Diakronika 18, no. 1 (November 21, 2018): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.24036/diakronika/vol18-iss1/58.

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Persia and Greece have engaged in a complicated relationship with war in the expansion of the territory. Persia was superior first because it was able to form strong empires and conquer cities around Asia and several cities in Europe. Greece managed to get rid of Persia, but it did not last long. Greece in ancient times consisted of many policies that competed with each other. The most famous policies of that period were Athens and Sparta. Both have advantages compared to other policies scattered in Greece. However, Athens and Sparta are two policies that compete with their respective strengths, causing disputes. Persia at that time had established good relations with Athens and Sparta. Persia found great opportunities to control Greece in the event of a war between Athens and Sparta. Persian interference in Greece was unavoidable which led to the Peloponnesian War which resulted in the conquest of Persia over Greece. Greece's downfall under the conquest of Persia did not last long. A unifying figure emerged in Greece that was able to embrace all policies and become the greatest king in history who had a vast conquest, both in the West and East. Alexander The Great was a king from the Kingdom of Macedonia in Greece who was able to unite all policies. Alexander invaded Persia to spread Hellenic culture.

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2

Lanni, Adriaan. "The Laws of War in Ancient Greece." Law and History Review 26, no. 3 (2008): 469–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0738248000002534.

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One of the earliest and the most famous statements of realism in international law comes from ancient Greece: the Melian dialogue in history of the Peloponnesian War. In 416 B.C.E., the Athenians invaded Melos, a small island in the Aegean that sought to remain neutral and avoid joining the Athenian empire. Thucydides presents an account of the negotiation between the Athenians and the Melian leaders. The Athenians offer the Melians a choice: become a subject of Athens, or resist and be annihilated. The Melians argue, among other things, that justice is on their side. The Athenians dismiss arguments from justice as irrelevant and reply with a statement that many scholars believe represents view: “We both alike know that in human reckoning the question of justice only enters where there is equal power to enforce it, and that the powerful exact what they can, and the weak grant what they must.”

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Sojer, Thomas. "Eric Voegelin's and Simone Weil's return to Ancient Greece." Acta Antiqua Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 61, no. 1 (May 17, 2022): 87–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1556/068.2021.00009.

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Summary Two enigmatic figures of 20th-century political theory, Eric Voegelin and Simone Weil, stand out with idiosyncratic receptions of ancient Greek texts. Both thinkers diagnosed that, as political agents in late modernity, we have unlearned to read world-making ancient texts and their narratives in their cosmic dimension and thus lost what has rooted European culture and history. Against this backdrop, Voegelin and Weil share ‘antidotal’ practises of combining historically and generically distinct material. These practices aim at fathoming a primordial experience at work in European narratives. With this comparative analysis of Voegelin's and Weil's symbolic readings (exemplified in this paper by passages from the Iliad, the History of the Peloponnesian War, and the Symposium), I present some considerations how their combinatory imagination of ancient material could supply late modern political agents with a pathos, a meaningful self-world relationship that was thought to have gone missing.

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4

Willi, Andreas. "Old Persian in Athens Revisited (Ar. Ach. 100)." Mnemosyne 57, no. 6 (2004): 657–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1568525043083514.

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AbstractThe Old Persian line in Aristophanes' Acharnians (100) is commonly believed to contain nothing but comic gibberish. Against this view, it is argued here that a responsible reconstruction of an Old Persian original is possible if one takes into account what we nowadays know about late fifth-century Old Persian. Moreover, the result, whose central element is the Persian verb for 'writing',fits in with both general considerations on linguistic realism in drama and the historical reality of diplomatic interaction between Greece and Persia during the Peloponnesian War.

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Kokaz, Nancy. "Between anarchy and tyranny: excellence and the pursuit of power and peace in ancient Greece." Review of International Studies 27, no. 5 (December 2001): 91–118. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s026021050100804x.

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Ancient Greece is not unfamiliar to International Relations scholars. Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War has been especially influential in shaping our understanding of the ancient Greek international system, not only because it is the best historical source available, but also in light of the status it has achieved as the foremost classic of International Relations. Of particular interest to International Relations have been questions concerning the character of the system and the units within it, and how these have affected the dynamics of conflict and co-operation in the international arena. Many find the antecedents of the modern European states-system in the pattern of relations that emerged between the independent city-states of Hellas roughly between the eighth and fourth centuries BC. Like our contemporary international system, the ancient Greek international system was anarchic in the sense that it lacked an overarching common government.

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Politopoulos, Aris, Angus A. A. Mol, Krijn H. J. Boom, and Csilla E. Ariese. "“History Is Our Playground”: Action and Authenticity in Assassin's Creed: Odyssey." Advances in Archaeological Practice 7, no. 3 (August 2019): 317–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/aap.2019.30.

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OverviewUbisoft's Assassin's Creed series is one the entertainment industry's most popular titles set in the past. With a new game released on an annual basis—each full of distinct historical places, events, and people—the series has unfolded across post-classical history, from the Levant during the Third Crusade to Victorian-era London. The 2017 release of Assassin's Creed: Origins, which entailed a massive reconstruction of Hellenistic Egypt, pushed the series even further back in time. With it, Ubisoft also launched its Discovery Tour, allowing players to explore the game's setting at their leisure and without combat. These trends continued in 2018's Assassin's Creed: Odyssey, set in Greece during the Peloponnesian War. This review discusses the narrative, world, and gameplay of the latest Assassin's Creed within the series more broadly. We provide a critical appraisal of the experience that Odyssey offers and link it to this question: in the Assassin's Creed series, do we engage in meaningful play with the past, or are we simply assassinating our way through history?

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McKenzie, Nicholas J., and Patricia A. Hannah. "Thucydides’ Take on the Corinthian Navy. οἵ τε γὰρ Κορίνθιοι ἡγήσαντο κρατεῖν εἰ µὴ καὶ πολὺ ἐκρατοῦντο, ‘The Corinthians believed they were victors if they were only just defeated’." Mnemosyne 66, no. 2 (2013): 206–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156852511x584955.

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Abstract This paper closely examines Thucydides’ presentation of three naval battles fought in the Corinthian Gulf and the battle of Sybota off north-west Greece, in order to show how his version of the action does not just stress the pervasive impression of Athenian dominance and downplay the Peloponnesian performance, but extends to characterising the Corinthian fleet in a surprisingly negative way. In the first battle he claims that they were ignorant of the local weather patterns, in the second of the underwater hazards, and after the third that ‘The Corinthians believed they were victors if they were only just defeated’. His account of the earlier battle off Corcyra is similarly flawed, since by focussing on the participants’ treaty obligations he fails to bring out the significance of the Corinthian naval victory for the history of Greek warfare. The reader of The Peloponnesian War is encouraged not to question Thucydides’ disparaging record of the Corinthian navy, as it reinforces his focus on a bipartite contest between Athens and Sparta. However, a case is made here for a more positive assessment of Corinthian involvement in the modified design of the trireme and the revision of naval tactics in the late fifth century BC.

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French, A. "Economic Conditions in Fourth-Century Athens." Greece and Rome 38, no. 1 (April 1991): 24–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0017383500022968.

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The flute players who in 404 B.C. celebrated the demolition of the Athenian walls with a hymn of joy for the liberation of Greece were thought to be hailing the dawn of a new era. It was an era in which Athens herself could participate, for even in defeat she had been spared the worst fate: her citizen population had not been butchered or enslaved; her land was not divided among alien colonists. Nevertheless the future which she faced was expected to be hard, in accordance with her humbled status. Her treasure was spent, her empire at an end; her losses in manpower had been terrible; the farming land which had traditionally been the economic basis of her existence, had been deliberately and extensively damaged. Thucydides in retrospect described the war as the most destructive in history: and Athens had ended as the loser. No wonder that historians have regarded the Peloponnesian War as a turning point of European history; and many have terminated their studies at this point, as if to divert their eyes from the tragic sight of Athens' decline into a new era of poverty and humiliation.

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Kuminova, K. "IMAGES OF ANACHARSIS AND SCYLES IN THE ANCIENT LITERATURE." Bulletin of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv. History, no. 139 (2018): 41–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/1728-2640.2018.139.07.

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The article is dedicated to the images of Anacharsis and Scyles in ancient literature. It says in detail about the formation of the image of a noble barbarian in the ancient literature of the 4th century BC. It is analyzed written reports of ancient authors of the 5th cent. BC – 3rd cent. AD in the article. The author described in short, the political and economic situation in Greece and Rome of this period. The first mention of Anacharsis and Scyles we find in «The History» of Herodotus (5th century BC). Anacharsis became a popular literary character. Scyles was forgotten and was not mentioned after Herodotus. This is connected with the peculiarities of the historical process in the ancient Greece of the 4th cent. BC. The Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC) and the crisis of the post-war period made philosophers to think a place of a man in this world. The noble barbarian became the new ideal of ancient philosophy. It is shown that Anacharsis became the ideal image of a noble barbarian for the ancient world. He was a sample of wisdom and purity. Anacharsis became famous for the simplicity of his way of life and his acute observations on the institutions and customs of the Greeks. Scyles is a sample of excessive pleasures. In the following centuries Anacharsis is becoming increasingly popular. The image of a noble barbarian was used also roman authors. Conclusions are drawn that the popularity of Anacharsis and the wise barbarian is the reaction of ancient authors to crises in ancient times. As a conclusion it must be emphasized, that close study of the ancient sources confirmed an idea that had been expressed by Ch. Schubert about two stages of the formation of the image of Anacharsis.

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Kuminova, K. "THE «ATHENIAN PLOT» IN THE ANCIENT BIOGRAPHIES OF ANACHARSIS." Bulletin of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv. History, no. 145 (2020): 39–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/1728-2640.2020.145.7.

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The paper analyses the "Athenian plot" in the ancient biographies of Anacharsis. The main objective of the paper is to date the emergence of stories about Anacharsis’ meeting with Solon in Athens. It is analysing written reports of ancient authors of from the 8th century BC to 3rd century AD. The first mention of Anacharsis we find in "The History" of Herodotus (5th century BC). It is spoken in detail about Diogenes Laërtius and the primary source of his «Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers». The fact that Diogenes Laërtius uses the works of Sosicrates of Rhodes and Hermippus of Smyrna, who are the ancient authors of the 3rd and 2nd centuries BC, is stressed. This makes it possible to date the appearance of the «Athenian plot» in ancient biographies of Anacharsis precisely this period. The author described in short, the political and economic situation in Greece and Rome of this period. It is shown that Anacharsis became an ideal image of a noble barbarian for the ancient world. The Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC) and the crisis of the post-war period made philosophers to think a place of a man in this world. The noble barbarian became the new ideal of ancient philosophy. It is concluded that the popularity of Anacharsis and the wise barbarian is a reaction of ancient authors to crises in ancient times. He was a sample of wisdom and purity. Anacharsis became famous for the simplicity of his way of life and his acute observations on the institutions and customs of the Greeks. None of the works ascribed to him in ancient times, if indeed they were written by him, have survived.

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Marren, Marina. "The Ancient Knowledge of Sais or See Yourselves in the Xenoi: Plato’s Message to the Greeks." Akropolis: Journal of Hellenic Studies 3 (December 8, 2019): 130–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.35296/jhs.v3i0.28.

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It is easier to criticize others and their foreign way of life, than to turn the mirror of critical reflection upon one’s own customs and laws. I argue that Plato follows this basic premise in the Timaeus when he constructs a story about Atlantis, which Solon, the Athenian, learns during his travels to Egypt. The reason why Plato appeals to the distinction that his Greek audience makes between themselves and the ξένοι is pedagogical. On the example of the conflict between Atlantis—a mythical and, therefore, a foreign polis— and ancient Athens, Plato seeks to remind the Greeks what even a mighty polis stands to lose if it pursues expansionist war. On the example of the failure that befalls the mythical Atlantis, and on the basis of the religious similarity between ancient Athens and ancient Sais (21e), Plato bridges the distance between the Greeks and the Egyptians, who would have been seen as actual (as opposed to mythical) ξένοι. The next step that Plato encourages his contemporaries to take is this: look at the history of Egypt (8 – 7BC) and the internal conflicts that led to the demise of the last bastion of Egyptian power—Sais—and recognize in the internal political intrigues of the “Athens-loving” (21e) ξένοι the pattern of the destructive actions of the Greeks. Plato moves from the less to the more familiar—from the story about a mythic past and Atlantis, to ancient Athenians, to ancient Egyptians, to the Egyptians and Athenians of Solon’s time. The meeting between the ξένοι—the Egyptians at Sais—and the quintessentially Athenian Greek, Solon (7BC – 6BC), undeniably problematizes the customs, national identity, and political dealings of Plato’s contemporaries, the Greeks in the 5BC – 4BC. By the time that Plato writes the Timaeus, circa 360BC, in the aftermath of the Peloponnesian War, Athens is all but undone. However, the fate of Greece is not yet sealed. Why turn to Egypt? Toby Wilkinson’s (2013) description of the Egyptian kingdom offers a clue: “The monarchy had sunk to an all-time low. Devoid of respect and stripped of mystique, it was but a pale imitation of past pharaonic glories” (The Rise and Fall of Ancient Egypt 431). The Greeks face that same prospect, but how to make them see? Direct criticism (the Philippic addresses of Demosthenes, for example) fails. Plato devises a decoy—make Greeks reflect on the repercussions of their poor political decisions by seeing them reflected in the actions and the history of the Egyptians—the Greek-loving and, by Plato’s time, defeated ξένοι.

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12

Flory, Stewart, and Steven Lattimore. "Thucydides: The Peloponnesian War." Journal of Military History 63, no. 1 (January 1999): 169. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/120339.

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13

Holladay, A. J. "Sparta and the First Peloponnesian War." Journal of Hellenic Studies 105 (November 1985): 161–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/631531.

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In JHS xcvii (1977) 54–63 I argued against the view that the prevalent Spartan attitude towards Athens throughout the Pentekontaetia was aggressive and that in the First Peloponnesian War Sparta was eager to engage and crush her, being prevented only by the barrier of Mt. Geraneia with its Athenian garrisons. There seemed to me to be four main difficulties in this view:(a) The Corinthians succeeded in crossing Mt. Geraneia with their local allies early in the war, even though the Athenians were already present: so why not Sparta?(b) A full Peloponnesian army was able to reach central Greece by sea after the war had been in progress for some three years, and their reluctance on that occasion to cross the northern frontier of Attica even after they had defeated the Athenians seems inexplicable on this view.

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Bowden, Hugh. "A New History of the Peloponnesian War." International History Review 33, no. 2 (June 2011): 353–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2011.592293.

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Levene, David S. "Rome Redeems Athens? Livy, the Peloponnesian War, and the Conquest of Greece." Ktèma : civilisations de l'Orient, de la Grèce et de Rome antiques 42, no. 1 (2017): 73–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.3406/ktema.2017.1516.

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Flory, Stewart, David R. McCann, and Barry S. Strauss. "War and Democracy: A Comparative Study of the Korean War and the Peloponnesian War." Journal of Military History 66, no. 1 (January 2002): 262. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2677407.

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ROSIVACH, VINCENT. "State Pay as War Relief in Peloponnesian-War Athens." Greece and Rome 58, no. 2 (September 26, 2011): 176–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s001738351100012x.

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In the course of its history of the Athenian constitution, the Aristotelian Athēnaiōn Politeia describes Aristeides' leading role in organizing the Delian League, including his initial assessment of the contributions (phoros) paid by the League's members (Ath. Pol. 23.4–5). It then recounts his subsequent advice to the Athenians (24.1):Afterwards, as the polis was already growing bold and much money had been accumulated, his advice was to take over the leadership [of the League], and to come in from the fields and dwell in the urban centre [astu]; for there would be a living [trophē] for all – for those soldiering, for those standing guard, for those conducting public business – then in this way they would firmly hold onto their leadership.

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Araújo, Marcelo. "“They declared war and made their decision to prefer might to right”: Thucydides on the use of force among states." Revista Estudos Políticos 11, no. 21 (October 13, 2020): 71. http://dx.doi.org/10.22409/rep.v11i21.46519.

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When we think of the contributions made by the ancient Greek, the philosophy of Socrates and Plato, the plays by Sophocles, Euripides, and Aristophanes, or the historical thinking of Herodotus and Thucydides may come to or minds. Between the fifth and fourth centuries BCE, Athens set the stage for unprecedented cultural developments in the history of humankind. However, we sometimes forget that the historical period in which these authors lived and produced their masterpieces was also a time of war and plague. Some way or other, all these authors participated in the Peloponnesian War. And the Athenians, who were a major power at the beginning of the conflict, emerged as the defeated party in the end.The main source of information we have about the Peloponnesian War is Thucydides’ work known as the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides took an active part in the war as a general on the Athenian side. But after failing to protect a city, of strategic value for the Athenians, he lost his position as a general and was forced into exile. It is in the exile, then, that Thucydides writes the Peloponnesian War, seeking to take into consideration the accounts provided by all parties involved in the conflict. The text, though, remained unfinished. And it is unclear whether the order of chapters, as displayed in most modern editions, matches Thucydides’ original plan. It is not my intention here to examine the structure of the Peloponnesian War as a whole. My goal is far more modest: I intend to focus only on a few specific passages in which Thucydides discusses the causes of war and the reasons for violent conflict among human beings.

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Shengli, Ling, and Lv Huiyi. "Why Are China and the U.S. Not Destined to Fall into the “Thucydides’ Trap”?" China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies 04, no. 04 (January 2018): 495–514. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s2377740018500288.

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With the rise of China and relative decline of the United States, the question of whether both countries will fall into the so-called “Thucydides’ Trap” — an analogy to the Peloponnesian War in ancient Greece — has triggered heated debate within international academia. By discussing the misunderstanding about the concept and conducting a three-level analysis of modern Sino-U.S. relations, this article identifies a few major flaws in making a simple analogy between the Athens-Sparta confrontation in ancient Greece and the Sino-U.S. relationship today. It concludes that a war between China and the United States is unlikely to take place thanks to the confines of the international system, the different nature of alliance networks from the ancient Greek period, the economic interdependence among countries, and the changing public attitude toward war. It also suggests both countries expand their economic, political, security and cultural cooperation, so as to ultimately overcome the “Thucydides’ Trap.”

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Flory, Stewart, and Robert B. Strassler. "The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War." Journal of Military History 61, no. 2 (April 1997): 358. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2953974.

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Hart, Janet. "Cracking the Code: Narrative and Political Mobilization in the Greek Resistance." Social Science History 16, no. 4 (1992): 631–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0145553200016680.

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That narrative can be more than a mechanical recitation of events is epitomized in Thucydides’ challenge to historiographical paradigms current during the fifth century B.C. In his definitive history of the war between Athens and Sparta, the Athenian general in effect tells a “story” with a beginning, middle, and end. Thucydides’ history of the Peloponnesian War is anything but a neutral description of events. Instead, the collection interprets the conflict for the reader. The tale contains a discussion of the role of alternative military strategies and of the war’s wider political implications. According to Thucydides, the fractionization and polarization engendered by war as a mode of resolving political conflicts is too high a price to pay for victors and losers alike. Thucydides warns of psychic as well as material costs. Thus, the ancient political scientist tells the story of the Peloponnesian War to assert that the “sequences of real events be assessed as to their significance as elements of a moral drama” (White 1987: 21).

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Lang, Mabel B. "The Thucydidean Tetralogy (1.67–88)." Classical Quarterly 49, no. 1 (May 1999): 326–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cq/49.1.326.

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A new look at Thucydides’ account of the debate at Sparta motivating the Spartan declaration of war (1.67–88) may provide a footnote to valuable past discussion. Chief concerns about the debate have always been (1) the uniqueness of the four-speech set-up; (2) the oddity of an Athenian embassy in attendance at a Peloponnesian League meeting; and (3) the unlikelihood that any detailed report of speeches made to the Peloponnesian League or Spartan assembly came to Athens. Thucydides' judgement concerning the cause of the Peloponnesian War is far more likely to have been based on his knowledge of past and present relations between Athens and Sparta and members of the Peloponnesian League (Ξυμπ⋯σα γνώμη) than on any information about an actual debate (τ⋯ ⋯ληθ⋯ς λɛχθ⋯ντα). But for τ⋯ δ⋯oντα he needed a confrontation which would not only dramatize both opposition I and characters of Sparta and Athens but also put them in historical context, that is, in their Persian War roles as recorded by Herodotus. Only in this way is it possible to explain peculiarities of this confrontation which appear to duplicate characteristics of the Herodotean debate involving Athens and Sparta before the battle of Plataea. Thuc. 1.67–88 is like Hdt. 8.140–4 in comprising four speeches of which the first (A) 1 is answered by the third (Cl) and the second (B) is answered by the fourth (C2). In each case Cl and C2 are spoken by representatives of a single people: with the Athenians in Herodotus’ debate answering two different peoples, and with two different Spartans in Thucydides answering two different peoples.

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Kostuch, Lucyna. "CO TRAPIŁO GRECKICH ŻOŁNIERZY? ŻOŁNIERSKIE BOLĄCZKI W ŚWIETLE GRECKIEJ HISTORIOGRAFII OKRESU KLASYCZNEGO." Studia Europaea Gnesnensia, no. 15 (June 15, 2017): 75–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/seg.2017.15.4.

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The aim of the paper is to compile a list of typical complaints that a Greek soldier of the Classical period might have had. For that purpose, the author analyses the great war narratives of that time: Histories by Herodotus, History of the Peloponnesian War by Thucydides Xenophon’s Hellenica, Anabasis, and Agesilaus.

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Pettegrew, David. "D. Graham J. Shipley, The Early Hellenistic Peloponnese: Politics, Economies, and Networks 338-197 BC. pp. xxxii+355, 1 ill., 9 maps, 7 tables. 2018. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 2018978-0-521-87369-7, hardback $120." Journal of Greek Archaeology 5 (January 1, 2020): 610–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.32028/jga.v5i.464.

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The ‘decline’ of the polis in the late Classical and early Hellenistic periods numbers among the stock elements of historical narratives of ancient Greece. In the conventional rendition baked into old textbook descriptions of Greek civilization, the aftermath of the Peloponnesian War marked the end of a golden age as city-states devolved into a downward cycle of power play, hegemonic contest, and warfare that ended only with the conquests of Philip II and Alexander. The polis thereafter lost its autonomy, political directive, and ideological essence. As one popular textbook of western civilization put it recently: ‘With the advent of Macedonian control, once-independent poleis became subject cities whose proud political traditions were no longer relevant.’ This picture of decline, decay, and irrelevance remains common today despite a range of recent scholarship reappraising the early Hellenistic period in Greece.

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Spence, I. G. "Perikles and the defence of Attika during the Peloponnesian War." Journal of Hellenic Studies 110 (November 1990): 91–109. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/631734.

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Given the increasing interest in ancient military history it seems timely to set Perikles' Peloponnesian War policy of avoiding major land battles in the context of the military options available and how these worked in practice. I should, however, sound one note of caution from the start. My discussion (especially sections I and II) represents a modern assessment of the defence strategies and options available to Athens in 431. While Perikles and his successors undoubtedly considered how best to fight the war, it would be misleading to even imply that their thought processes involved conducting an analysis anywhere near as sophisticated as the one which follows. Quite simply they lacked the theoretical concepts and even the technical vocabulary to do so. There was no history or tradition of staff college appreciations in fifth century Athens and no body of technical or theoretical military literature, and it seems clear that even experienced and successful commanders did not look at war with the same sort of theoretical constructs which we take for granted today.

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Weiberg, Erika. "Pictures and people. Seals, figurines and Peloponnesian imagery." Opuscula. Annual of the Swedish Institutes at Athens and Rome 3 (November 2010): 185–218. http://dx.doi.org/10.30549/opathrom-03-09.

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The point of departure for this paper is the publication of two Early Helladic sealing fragments from the coastal settlement of Asine on the north-east Peloponnese in Greece. After an initial description and discussion they are set in the context of sealing custom established on the Greek mainland around 2500 BCE. In the first part of the paper focus is on the apparent qualitative differences between the available seals and the contemporary seal impressions, as well as between different sealing assemblages on northeastern Peloponnese. This geographical emphasis is carried into the second part of the paper which is a review and contextualisation of the representational art of the Aegean Early Bronze Age in general, and northeastern Peloponnese in particular. Seal motifs and figurines are the main media for Early Helladic representational art preserved until today, yet in many ways very dissimilar. These opposites are explored in order to begin to build a better understanding of Peloponnesian representational art, the choices of motifs, and their roles in the lives of the Early Helladic people.

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Rhodes, P. J., and Barry S. Strauss. "Athens after the Peloponnesian War: Class, Faction, and Policy, 403-386 B.C." American Historical Review 93, no. 2 (April 1988): 397. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1859937.

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Paradiso, Annalisa. "Lampito in Aristophanes’ Lysistrata and the Reasons of a Choice." Klio 104, no. 2 (November 17, 2022): 471–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/klio-2021-0043.

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Summary This paper argues that Lampito, the Spartan character who takes part in the pacifist plot of Aristophanes’ Lysistrata (411 BC), has been inspired by both parents of Agis II, the king of Sparta who led the war against Athens at the time of the Peloponnesian War and fortified Deceleia in 413 BC. Agis’ mother bore the quite rare name of Lampito as well; his father, the ‘pacifist’ King Archidamos II, voted against the war at the Spartan Assembly in 432. Aristophanes knew of Archidamos’ speech from oral tradition, possibly from the report of the Athenian ambassadors at Sparta or, alternatively and more probably, from public readings of Thucydides’ account of the pre-war debate that took place in the Spartan Assembly.

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Kallet-Marx, Lisa. "The Kallias Decree, Thucydides, and the Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War." Classical Quarterly 39, no. 1 (May 1989): 94–113. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0009838800040507.

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It has become necessary to enter any discussion of the date of the Kallias decrees,IGi3.52, armed with apologies and justifications merely for bringing up the matter again; such is the result not so much of the quantity of articles and chapters written on the subject as of the belief that the orthodox date, 434/3, has been proved, despite reliance on circumstantial evidence and some forceful objections levied against it.1 Indeed, that the case is considered closed can find no better reflection than the assignment of the date 434/3 inIGi3without even a question mark.

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Welch, David A. "Why International Relations theorists should stop reading Thucydides." Review of International Studies 29, no. 3 (June 26, 2003): 301–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0260210503003012.

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Many regard Thucydides as the first genuine International Relations theorist and a writer of continuing, even timeless importance. His history of the Peloponnesian War is certainly a remarkable work that obviously has had an enormous influence on the development of the field. Its influence, however, is largely pernicious. This article explores why.

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Zatta, Claudia. "Conflict, People, and City-Space: Some Exempla from Thucydides' History." Classical Antiquity 30, no. 2 (October 1, 2011): 318–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/ca.2011.30.2.318.

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This essay considers episodes in which phenomena like war and civil strife affected, changed, and revealed the identity of the polis. Even if framed by an understanding of the Peloponnesian War and the imperialistic logic and destiny of Athens, Thucydides' History still provides us with narratives that illuminate the particular history of “minor” poleis, each with its specific events, turning points, and dynamics. Through analysis of Thucydides' historical material, this essay focuses on Plataea, Corcyra, and Mytilene and discusses the notion of the polis in relation to space and in the context of time, thereby testing Aristotle's question—too soon dismissed—about the separation of a community from the space of its city (Pol. 3.1276b1–5).

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Mazower, Mark. "Historians at war: Greece 1940–1950." Historical Journal 38, no. 2 (June 1995): 499–506. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0018246x00019543.

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Hanson, Victor Davis, and Donald Kagan. "A New History of the Peloponnesian War. Vol. I: The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. Vol. II: The Archidamian War. Vol. III: The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition. Vol. IV: The Fall of the Athenian Empire." Journal of Military History 56, no. 1 (January 1992): 119. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1985714.

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DOLGERT, STEFAN. "Thucydides, amended: religion, narrative, and IR theory in the Peloponnesian Crisis." Review of International Studies 38, no. 3 (February 21, 2012): 661–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0260210511000738.

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AbstractMost of our knowledge of the Peloponnesian War comes from the text of Thucydides' History, yet IR scholars are strangely credulous when evaluating Thucydides' pronouncements. I explore what Thucydides does not tell us, and suggest that his text obscures important information regarding the outbreak of the war. Thucydides has a secular bias which leads him to discount the Spartan religious self-narrative, but by attending to this schema, in which Sparta sees itself in the role of the pious defender of moderation pitted against the corrupt Athenians, we gain a richer understanding of the chain of events that led to war. Contemporary scholars have too readily adopted Thucydides' perspective on this issue, but by assessing Thucydides' data using insights drawn from contemporary cognitive theories of narrative and image we see that misperceptions based in the conflicting Athenian and Spartan narratives played an important role in the escalation of the crisis.

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PLATIAS, ATHANASSIOS. "Grand Strategies Clashing: Athenian and Spartan Strategies in Thucydides’ “History of the Peloponnesian War”." Comparative Strategy 21, no. 5 (October 2002): 377–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01495930290043137.

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Plant, Ian M. "The influence of forensic oratory on Thucydides’ principles of method." Classical Quarterly 49, no. 1 (May 1999): 62–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cq/49.1.62.

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In recent years, there has been considerable debate about the reliability of Herodotus: the attack on his honesty led by Fehling, the defence by Pritchett. The debate, it seems, may have begun at least as far back as Thucydides, but now Thucydides himself may have joined the school of liars. Badian has produced a new reading of Thucydides’ description of the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, arguing that Thucydides deliberately set out to mislead the reader, misrepresenting the Spartans as the instigators of the War and carefully masking the Athenians’ own responsibility.

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Maniatis, Y., D. Malamidou, H. Koukouli-Chryssanthaki, and Y. Facorellis. "Radiocarbon Dating of the Amphipolis Bridge in Northern Greece, Maintained and Functioned for 2500 Years." Radiocarbon 52, no. 1 (2010): 41–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0033822200045021.

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The remains of a wooden construction, recovered in the 1970s at the northwest sector of the walls of the ancient city of Amphipolis (northern Greece), have been recognized as foundation remains of a wooden bridge described by Thucydides in his description of the events that took place at Amphipolis in 424–422 BC, during the Peloponnesian War. Frequent repairs in the Roman, Byzantine, and even Ottoman periods are very probable. In the last 10 yr, conservation has been done to enhance this unique monument. This work involves systematic investigation with radiocarbon dating of all the verified or suspected phases of this wooden bridge. The dating results reveal the beginning of construction most probably in the Archaic period and confirm beyond a doubt that the major construction phase took place in Classical times. Successive phases, related to repairs rather than to major reconstructions, have been detected during the Hellenistic, Roman, Early Christian, and Byzantine periods as well as the Ottoman era. The combined archaeometric and archaeological evidence leads to the remarkable conclusion that this bridge was functioning for about 2500 yr.

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Trevett, Jeremy. "History in [Demosthenes] 59." Classical Quarterly 40, no. 2 (December 1990): 407–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0009838800042981.

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It is well known that Athenian orators, when they made reference to the historical past, usually eschewed prolonged narrative in favour of brief allusions to familiar episodes from Athenian history. Perhaps the most striking exception to this custom is the long and detailed account of fifth-century Plataean history in the pseudo-Demosthenic speech Against Neaera (Dem. 59.94–103). The main interest of this passage, however, lies not in its divergence from contemporary rhetorical practice, but in its clear reliance on Thucydides for its account of the siege of Plataea during the Peloponnesian War. Indeed, it is unique in Attic oratory in the extent of its reliance on an identifiable historical work. Yet, considering its significance, this passage has received very little scholarly attention, and merits a closer reexamination.

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Stergiou, Andreas. "Greece during the Cold War." Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 8, no. 1 (March 2008): 67–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683850802012180.

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González García, Francisco Javier, and Pedro López Barja de Quiroga. "Neocon Greece: V. D. Hanson’s War on History." International Journal of the Classical Tradition 19, no. 3 (June 2012): 129–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12138-012-0313-4.

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Papanikos, Gregory T. "Thucydides and the Synchronous Pandemic." ATHENS JOURNAL OF HISTORY 7, no. 1 (December 10, 2020): 71–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.30958/ajhis.7-1-4.

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Thucydides survived the pestilence and gave a vivid portrayal of the Athenian Epidemic at the onset of the Peloponnesian War. He belongs to the rare group of historians who wrote history about events which had a personal experience. He was involved with the war (as an Athenian strategos) and with the epidemic (had survived an infection). His History of the Peloponnesian War is a textbook approach of how historical events and facts should be researched and described. His historical methodology is based on an orthological analysis of human behaviour. Such an approach enables the researcher to interpret existing stylized facts and personal involvements with reason and objectivity. Within this framework, this paper examines Thucydides exposition of the epidemic of 430 BCE by means of four hypotheses which underline his historical analysis of the pestilence. Then, I proceed with the verification of these hypotheses using the data generation process of the synchronous pandemic of 2020. My main conclusion is that despite technological progress made by human beings with the graceful assistance of Prometheus, human nature did not change as much as Thucydides so eloquently emphasized, prognosed and hoped. Evidence on synchronous pandemic supports Thucydides diagnosis of the human nature but does not vindicate him on the hypothesis (or may be his wish) that his history would be used by future generations to avoid making the same mistakes over and over again. So far, the same or similar faults seem unavoidable. It appears that these faults are embedded in human nature and cannot be avoided.

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Onians, John. "War, Mathematics, and Art in Ancient Greece." History of the Human Sciences 2, no. 1 (February 1989): 39–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/095269518900200103.

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Jun-Ho Chang. "Reconstruction of Thucydides' ''The History of the Peloponnesian War": diplomatic debates and its contemporary meaning." Journal of Korean Political and Diplomatic History 28, no. 2 (February 2007): 75–108. http://dx.doi.org/10.18206/kapdh.28.2.200702.75.

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44

Will, Wolfgang. "Aggelos Kapellos, Xenophon’s Peloponnesian War. (Trends in Classics, Supplementary Volumes, Vol. 82.) Berlin/Boston, De Gruyter 2019." Historische Zeitschrift 312, no. 1 (February 1, 2021): 158–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/hzhz-2021-1015.

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Milisavljevic, Vladimir. "Human nature and stasis: On the influence of Thucydides on Hobbes’s science of politics." Zbornik Matice srpske za drustvene nauke, no. 159-160 (2016): 689–707. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/zmsdn1660689m.

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This paper assesses the influence of Thucydides on Hobbes?s conception of man and, more generally, on his model of ?Civil Science?. This influence can be traced back to the time when Hobbes worked on his translation of Thucydides?s history of the Peloponnesian War. Already at that time, Hobbes characterized Thucydides as the ?the most politic historiographer that ever writ?, i.e. the historian whose work contributed the most to the true knowledge of politics. The main argument of the paper is that Hobbes?s admiration for the author of the History of the Peloponnesian War can be best explained by Thucydides?s ability to portray the essential conflictuality of politics. This thesis is confirmed by a comparative analysis of some important themes in Thucydides?s historical narrative and several major theoretical statements of Hobbes?s anthropology and political theory. There is an unmistakable similarity, which has often been commented on, between Hobbes?s account of the three principal causes of conflict between individuals in the state of nature - Competition, Diffidence and Glory - and the three main human instincts to which the Athenians appeal, in a speech that Thucydides conveys, to justify their striving for power. However, Thucydides influenced Hobbes mostly by his descriptions of internal war. The final part of the article examines in this light two topics from Thucydides?s famous description of the stasis which took place in Corcyra - the impossibility of justice and the perversion of language in time of sedition in the polis.

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Karathanasis. "A Game of Timber Monopoly: Atheno-Macedonian Relations on the Eve of the Peloponnesian War." Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens 88, no. 4 (2019): 707. http://dx.doi.org/10.2972/hesperia.88.4.0707.

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Schubert, Charlotte. "Das Datum des Phidias-Prozesses, die Aufstellung der Athena Parthenos und der Ausbruch des Peloponnesischen Krieges bei Philochoros." Mnemosyne 69, no. 6 (November 18, 2016): 909–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1568525x-12342047.

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The scholia on Aristophanes Pax 605-606 refer to Philochoros’ dating of Pheidias’ trial, the inauguration of the chryselephantine Athena Parthenos, the Megarian decree and the idea that Pericles started the Peloponnesian war to sidetrack the Athenians’ attention away from his own responsibilities concerning Pheidias’ fraud. In contrast to previous opinions this paper shows that the scholiasts believed Philochoros’ information to belong to the events of 432/1 bc.

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Eckstein, Arthur M. "Thucydides, the Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, and the Foundation of International Systems Theory." International History Review 25, no. 4 (December 2003): 757–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2003.9641012.

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Higham, Robin, and Jon V. Kofas. "Intervention and Underdevelopment: Greece During the Cold War." Journal of American History 77, no. 2 (September 1990): 727. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2079316.

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Terceiro Sanmartín, Nerea. "Corruption and Urban Landscape in Plato: The Story of Atlantis, the Chronicle of Thucydides and the Geometry of the Town Plan." Gerión. Revista de Historia Antigua 40, no. 2 (November 22, 2022): 575–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.5209/geri.81273.

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The aim of this paper is to study Plato's use of landscape to convey the historical-political meaning of the Atlantis story. As the crux of the argument, I will argue two interlinked hypotheses: first, that the descriptions of Atlantis and primaeval Athens provide the key to identifying these cities, respectively, as mirror images of fifth-century Athens and of an idealised Sparta, suggesting that the story conceals an evocation of the Peloponnesian War. Secondly, I will propose that Plato expresses the cause of this conflict also through the landscape and, specifically, through the symbolism of the corruption of the circular layout that initially defines Atlantis.

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