Academic literature on the topic 'Great Britain – Military relations – Germany'
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Journal articles on the topic "Great Britain – Military relations – Germany"
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Koybaev, Boris G. "The Allied Powers in Iran during World War II: the fight against German agents." Vestnik of North-Ossetian State University, no. 2(2021) (June 25, 2021): 44–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.29025/1994-7720-2021-2-44-49.
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On the eve of the Second World War, Iran’s relations with Germany in the field of political, trade, economic, military and cultural relations significantly increased. At the same time, Iran’s relations with the Soviet Union and Britain were deteriorating. Many attempts to enter Iran, especially to gain access to Iranian oil, have also been made by the United States. They were actively opposed by the USSR and Great Britain, and the latter acted more decisively and persistently, which caused the anger of Washington. All this prompted Tehran to search for a “third force” that could protect Iran from the encroachment of the USSR and Great Britain on its interests. And such a” third force “ Iran found in the person of Germany, which after Hitler came to power began to develop intensively in military and economic terms. Reza Shah was impressed by Hitler, who, in turn, expressed interest in cooperation with Iran, as a large state in the Middle East, which occupied an important place in the plans of Nazi Germany to conquer world domination. As you know, the fascist leadership after the implementation of the Barbarossa plan intended to defeat Great Britain, but first to capture its pearl-British India. Berlin hoped to implement these plans in alliance with Iran, using its territory for subversive and aggressive actions against India. It was also intended to seize the AIOC oil fields, because the Axis powers did not have their own sources of oil.
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ONEA, TUDOR A. "Between dominance and decline: status anxiety and great power rivalry." Review of International Studies 40, no. 1 (February 8, 2013): 125–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0260210512000563.
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AbstractThis article investigates the role of status considerations in the response of dominant powers to the rise of emergent states. Accordingly, the hypothesis explored is that dominant actors are prone to fear that they will lose their upper rank, and, due to this status anxiety, resist the efforts of emergent powers to match or surpass them. The article begins by explaining why political actors deem status important and puts forward a theory of status anxiety in world politics. The more pronounced is this anxiety across status dimensions (economic and military capabilities as well as prestige), the higher the likelihood of conflict. This argument is then tested against competing theories of dominant power behaviour in two cases: the relations between France and Britain from the 1740s to Napoleon and those between Britain and Germany from the 1880s to World War One.
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Gajownik, Tomasz. "Podpułkownik dyplomowany Andrzej Czerwiński i jego raport z 1933 roku o sytuacji polityczno-wojskowej w Czechosłowacji oraz warunkach i możliwościach pracy attachatu w Pradze." Studia Interkulturowe Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej 11 (November 6, 2018): 3–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0012.7228.
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In 1933 geopolitical situation in Europe had been changed. The leaders of four countries: Great Britain, France, Italy and Germany tried to make some agreement of ruling on the continent. For such countries like Poland and Czechoslovakia this agreement could be very dangerous. Both of them had a very difficult mutual relations. But potential threat could bring them closer. In a spirit of those thinking, polish military attache lt. Col. Andrzej Czerwiński had prepared a short report of political and military situation in Czechoslovakia, especially in the face of German’s pressures. He was writing about possibility of closing between two countries, chances of development of military forces and mutual cooperation.
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Pavlov, Nikolay. "Germany in the Middle East: from Bismarck to Hitler." ISTORIYA 12, no. 12-2 (110) (2021): 0. http://dx.doi.org/10.18254/s207987840019238-0.
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Germany has always been interested in expanding its influence in the Middle East where the strategic interests of the main imperialist powers competing among one another met. For a long time this region was for Germany a territory that provided access to sea, played the role of the military and political bridgehead, was a source of raw materials and a market for German goods. Having embarked on the path of colonial conquests much later than Great Britain and France, Germany was forced not to conquer but to win back its share of the “colonial pie”. Nevertheless, Germany managed to take a leading place in relations with the countries of the Middle East, which considered it as a central European power capable of becoming a conductor of their interests in Europe. However, Germany’s defeat in two world wars led to the fact that it lost its positions in the region and two new German states needed one decade to start a new dialogue with the countries of the region in the conditions of Cold war and bloc confrontation.
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Dudaiti, Аlbert K. "Problems of Iran’s relations with the leading world Powers in the initial period of the Second World War (1939–1941)." Vestnik of North-Ossetian State University, no. 3(2021) (September 25, 2021): 12–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.29025/1994-7720-2021-3-12-19.
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The article examines the complex relations between Iran and the leading world powers at the initial stage of the Second World War. The relevance of the study is due to the fact that Iran’s foreign policy is considered in the context of active diplomatic maneuvers of the Reza Shah government aimed at distancing itself from the belligerent powers and preserving Iran’s neutrality. The novelty of the research consists in studying the features of the foreign policy actions of the government of the Ira, which allow us to reveal the reasons for the formation of conflict relations with Great Britain and the USSR in the initial period of the war. It is established that despite the predominant military-political rivalry at the beginning of the war between Germany and Great Britain, the Iranian authorities were afraid of an invasion of the country by Anglo-Soviet troops. At the same time, it is emphasized that such a danger was real, given the active underground activities of Nazi agents in this country directed against the USSR, as well as the growth of pro-German sentiments in the Iranian government. These circumstances caused the desire of the USSR leadership to secure the southern borders of the country; In turn, the government of Great Britain set a goal to prevent Nazi Germany from implementing its long-term plans to invade the territories of the Near and Middle East controlled by the British, as well as British India. As a result of the conducted research, it is concluded that the entry of Anglo-Soviet troops into the territory of Iran was the logical consequence of the failed foreign policy actions of the Shah’s government aimed at further rapprochement with Nazi Germany, with the expectation that after its victory over the Soviet Union, Iran will be able to expand its borders at the expense of the border territories of the Soviet Transcaucasia.
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Fomin, A. M. "British Policy and Strategy in the Middle East in 1941: Three Wars ‘East of Suez’." Moscow University Bulletin of World Politics 12, no. 3 (November 20, 2020): 191–221. http://dx.doi.org/10.48015/2076-7404-2020-12-3-191-221.
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After the defeat of France in the summer of 1940, Great Britain was left face to face with the Nazi Germany. It managed to endure the first act of the ‘Battle of Britain’, but could not wage a full-scale war on the continent. Under these conditions, the defense of the British positions in the Mediterranean and in the Middle East became a top priority for W. Churchill’s cabinet. The author examines three episodes of Great Britain’s struggle for the Middle East in 1941 (Iraq, Syria, Iran), framing them into the general logic of the German-British confrontation during this period.The author emphasizes that potential assertion of German hegemony in the Middle East could have made the defense of Suez almost impossible, as well as the communication with India, and would have provided the Reich with an access to almost inexhaustible supplies of fuel. Widespread antiBritish sentiments on the part of the local political and military elites could contribute greatly to the realization of such, catastrophic for Britain, scenario. Under these circumstances, the British government decided to capture the initiative. The paper examines the British military operations in Iraq and Syria. Special attention is paid to the complex dynamics of relations of the British cabinet with the Vichy regime and the Free France movement. As the author notes, the sharpest disagreements aroused on the future of Syria and Lebanon, and the prospects of granting them independence. In the Iran’s case, the necessity of harmonizing policies with the Soviet Union came to the fore. The growing German influence in the region, as well as the need to establish a new route for Lend-Lease aid to the USSR, fostered mutual understanding. After the joint Anglo-Soviet military operation in August-September 1941, Iran was divided into occupation zones. Finally, the paper examines the UK position with regard to the neutrality of Turkey. The author concludes that all these military operations led to the creation of a ‘temporary regime’ of the British domination in the Middle East. However, the Anglo-French and Anglo-Soviet rivalries had not disappeared and, compounded by the growing US presence in the region, laid basis for new conflicts in the post-war period.
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Trunov, Philipp. "Germany’s security and defense policy : transformation in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic." Urgent Problems of Europe, no. 1 (2022): 254–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.31249/ape/2022.01.10.
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The COVID-19 pandemic has created significant obstacles to the implementation of national foreign policies, including the reduction of the resource base. This article analyzes the schemes and forms of government activities that can reduce the negative impact of the pandemic factor. The object of the study is the Federal Republic of Germany, which is currently at a turning point in its development: the end of A. Merkel’s «era» (autumn 2021) is accompanied by a large number of unresolved foreign policy tasks that prevent Germany from establishing itself as a world power. The article provides a detailed overview of these tasks and the ongoing efforts to solve them, presented on a problem-geographic principle. Issues related to the restart of relations between Germany and the United States under the Biden administration, the FRG’s involvement in building up the political and military potential of the EU, as well as the dynamics and nature of the FRG’s dialogue with the leading European NATO member states – Great Britain, Italy and especially France – are analyzed in the context of the ongoing pandemic crisis. Particular attention is paid to the problems associated with deepening cooperation within the framework of the German-French tandem. The paper also explores the difficulties that have appeared during the pandemic and new opportunities for expanding the political and military presence of Germany in Libya, «G5 Sahel» countries, Syria and Iraq. The consequences that a decision of the United States to carry out the «deal» with the Afghan Taliban may have for Germany are analyzed. The FRG’s attempts to strengthen its positions in the post-Soviet space and the Far East are presented in the context of deteriorating relations with the Russian Federation and China. In conclusion, an assessment of Germany’s activity in the sphere of security and defense during the first year of the pandemic is given.
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Tkachuk, T. "The United States Position on the Military Assistance to Great Britain at the Beginning of the World War II (1939 – 1941)." Problems of World History, no. 17 (January 27, 2022): 110–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.46869/2707-6776-2022-17-5.
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The article examines the problem of relations between the two leading countries of the world – Great Britain and the United States, which had a significant impact on the international political situation in the world in 1939–1941, and still have nowadays. As a vector of research, the author used the factor of American military aid to the British governments of N. Chamberlain and W. Churchill to fight against Nazi Germany. According to this, the author aimed to conduct a comprehensive analysis and his own assessment of the United States’ position on providing Britain with the necessary weapons and ammunition at the beginning of World War II.
During the research the author used a comparative-historical method to analyze various factors influencing the US position on military assistance to London, a problem-chronological method to present the material in chronological order, and a statistical – to analyze the attitude of ordinary Americans on important decisions of the Roosevelt administration. That allowed the author to analyze and rethink the evolution of the United States’ position on Britain in the problem of providing military aid regarding the current geopolitical situation.
The author works out that under the necessity of supporting London with various types of weapons, armament and ammunition to fight against Hitler’s regime the United States significantly changed the principles of its foreign policy – from “isolationism” in 1939 to its cancellation in the late 1941. At the same time, according to the author, this process was caused by a number of factors, including both the “isolationist” opposition in Congress and the Roosevelt administration’s gradual understanding of the Nazi regime threat to the security of the United States.
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Mirzekhanov, Velikhan. "The Batum Subsystem of International Relations: Problems of Formation and Inter-Imperial Competition, June-August 1918." Novaia i noveishaia istoriia, no. 4 (2022): 5. http://dx.doi.org/10.31857/s013038640021032-3.
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The implementation of the Treaty of Batum on 4 June 1918 signalled the hegemony of the Ottoman Empire in the macro-region between the Black and Caspian Seas. From the very first days it provoked opposition from other imperial actors, including Germany, an ally of Turkey. In June–July 1918, all the contenders for control of the post-imperial spaces of the former Ottoman Empire were forced to combine coercive and diplomatic means to strengthen their positions, recruiting allies and amassing forces. Due to a number of objective reasons, none of the great powers had the necessary resources to achieve their goals, facing a shortage of both military means and the necessary technical conditions. Their interest in the transformation of the region was extremely high: Germany and Soviet Russia sought to incorporate Transcaucasia into the space of the larger Brest system, while the Entente and the Central Powers were still engaged in a decisive campaign of the Great War, and the Young Turks saw their only chance of implementing their nationalist projects. The hostages of these aspirations were the newly emerged limitrophe states, which were in various stages of formation, on both sides of the Caucasus range. The German mission to Georgia, the Ottoman assistance to Azerbaijan and the Mountainous Republic, and Armenia's hopes for assistance from Britain, Soviet Russia or Austria-Hungary all played a decisive role in their fate. The policy of the great powers was complicated by problems of coalition interaction and systemic trends towards the formation of a coherent geopolitical space following the victory of the Central Powers over the disintegrating Russian Empire and Romania. The peace conference in Constantinople failed to resolve the problem, and the Entente's efforts to re-establish the Eastern Front in parts of the former Russian Empire were growing. Interaction and competition between various actors led to the active integration of the macro-region into the logic of the Great War, so that attempts to diplomatically formalise or revise the Batum subsystem were soon replaced by military confrontation between all the imperial claimants around Baku. The article draws on the diplomatic archives of the former Central Powers to reconstruct the formation of a new subsystem of international relations.
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Kharkovsky, Ruslan. "Mahdist State in the Colonial Struggle of France and Great Britain in Sudan (1880s — 1890s)." ISTORIYA 13, no. 2 (112) (2022): 0. http://dx.doi.org/10.18254/s207987840020471-7.
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The article analyzes the evolution of the “Sudanese question” in the system of international relations in the last third of the 19th century. The thesis is argued that for Great Britain control over the Sudanese territories was an important link in the struggle for the creation of the world’s largest colonial empire. The threat of war between Britain and France during this period was quite real. The military, primarily naval, weakness of France was one of the essential reasons for its retreat from Sudan. The settlement of the colonial differences between England and France in Northeast Africa later became one of the reasons for the emergence of the Entente as a counterbalance to the growing German Empire.
Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Great Britain – Military relations – Germany"
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Erlichman, Camilo. "Strategies of rule : cooperation and conflict in the British Zone of Germany, 1945-1949." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/25995.
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This thesis examines strategies of rule deployed during the British occupation of north-western Germany from 1945 to 1949 and explores instances of cooperation and conflict between the occupiers and the occupied population. While the literature has primarily looked at the occupation through the lens of big political projects, this study analyses the application of quotidian ruling strategies and the making of stability on the ground. Techniques for controlling the German population were devised during the war and transmitted to officials through extensive training. Lessons from previous occupations and imperial experiences also entered the Military Government’s ruling philosophy by way of the biographical composition of its top cadre. Once in Germany, the British instituted a system of ‘indirect rule’ which relied on focal points of visibility as embodied by their local officials charged with cooperating with German notables, and invisible instances of supervision in the form of mass surveillance of civilian communications. To illustrate the way the occupiers dealt with conflict, the thesis analyses the dispensation of punishment for breaking Military Government laws, demonstrating that the British often issued severe punishment when their monopoly of force was contested, thus belying the notion of a particularly docile occupation. During mass popular protests, however, they sought to use moderate German trade unionists as intermediaries tasked with diffusing popular unrest, who were co-opted in exchange for material and propagandistic support. The British also used German administrators at the local and regional level, many of whom had a distinctively technocratic and conservative profile and who were appointed for their administrative experience rather than for their political inclinations. Through lobbying by British ecclesiastical figures, the occupiers also cooperated extensively with the German Churches, who were seen as effective partners in the re-Christianisation of Germany and increasingly as an essential bulwark against Communism. The thesis concludes that the long-term legacies of the British occupation lay in the effects of ‘indirect rule’, which exacerbated social inequalities by strengthening the profile of certain social elites at the expense of mass politics. The occupation is finally placed within the comparative context of occupations in Western Europe during the mid-20th century, which had the common legacy of buttressing elites who were primarily concerned with the making of stability rather than with participatory democracy, thus giving the post-war era its conservative mould.
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Luce, Alexandra Isabella. "British intelligence in the Portuguese world, 1939-1945 : operations against German Intelligence and relations with the Polícia de Vigilância e Defesa do Estado (PVDE)." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2010. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.608984.
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Millman, Brock 1963. "The Anglo-Turkish alliance 1939-1940 : anatomy of a failure." Thesis, McGill University, 1992. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=39377.
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It is the contention of this thesis that the Tripartite Alliance came at the end of a period during which Britain and Turkey attempted to reconcile their often conflicting interests in order to ensure common security in the Near East. Between 1934-1939, contrary to the usual belief, the dynamics of Anglo-Turkish relations most often led Turkey to seek a formal relationship, which Britain, for reasons of its own, was reluctant to grant. Once conceded, in May 1939, with the proclamation of the Joint Guarantee, the fledgling Anglo-Turkish condominium promptly began to sicken, and by June 1940, had failed altogether. The primary reasons for this collapse were four. Firstly, the political under-pinnings of the alliance never seemed sufficient to permit either partner to consider advantageous the activation of the alliance once made. Secondly, the Alliance was afflicted by certain powerful dilemmas within Britain's global strategy which prevented British planners from coming to any lasting consensus regarding Turkey's role in imperial defence. Thirdly, if the alliance were to be made effective, sufficient and timely assistance--chiefly, material and economic assistance--would have to be provided the Turkish partner. During this early period, both Britain and France remained unable or unwilling to provide anything like the level of assistance required. Finally, the numerous inter-allied Staff conversations, which were a principle feature of the Alliance's early years, failed to produce a single viable option for the fruitful deployment of common forces against any possible enemy. Without such a plan, the entry of Turkey to the war would have been worse than ill-advised; it would have been pointless.Once the Alliance had definitely foundered on these rocks, in the infinitely more menacing conditions existing after June 1940, it was entirely unlikely that Turkey would permit the activation of an alliance no longer consistent, by any reading, with its essential interests. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)
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Vourkoutiotis, Vasilis. "The British government's reception of, and reaction to, information from intra-German opposition to Hitler and other sources, 1938-1939 /." Thesis, McGill University, 1993. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=68142.
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From 1938 to the outbreak of war in 1939, German opponents of Hitler made numerous contacts with the British government. While the information sent came from a variety of sources, most of the reports landed on the desk of Sir Robert Vansittart, the former Permanent Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office. His "internal-exile" to the position of Chief Diplomatic Advisor, as well as his personality conflicts with his successor, Sir Alexander Cadogan, and Lord Halifax, led to inefficient use of the information received from Germany. German warnings of Hitler's plans and ambitions, when listened to at all, were awkwardly and ineffectively incorporated into British foreign policy.
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Mason, Andrea 1976. "Opponents of Hitler in search of foreign support : the foreign contacts of Carl Goerdeler, Ludwig Beck, Ernst von Weizsäcker and Adam von Trott zu Solz, 1937-1940." Thesis, McGill University, 2002. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=29516.
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This thesis examines the attempts made by Carl Goerdeler, Ludwig Beck, Ernst von Weizsacker and Adam von Trott zu Solz to obtain the support of the British government in their effort to overthrow the Nazi regime between 1937 and 1940. The circumstances surrounding each mission are detailed, including the degree of readiness on the part of the German opposition for a coup d'etat and the particular form of support sought from the British to increase the chance of success in each case. Consideration is given to the factors which conditioned the British reaction to the resistance emissaries, including the British foreign policy imperatives of the moment, important events in European relations and the attitude and degree of influence wielded by the statesmen to whom the German resistance emissaries addressed themselves.
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Cozens, Joseph Thomas. "The experience of soldiering : civil-military relations and popular protest in England, 1790-1805." Thesis, University of Essex, 2016. http://repository.essex.ac.uk/16495/.
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Over the past three decades, historians of the long eighteenth century have emphasized both the stability of the British state and the progressive growth of national sentiment over the period. The enormous mobilization of manpower during the French Wars is often characterized as the culmination of this evolution. Arming to fight the French, it is argued, was a formative process, which encouraged greater social cohesion, and forged an overarching sense of national identity. This thesis will contend that the ‘Nation-in-Arms’ interpretation has been constructed at a considerable remove from the culture and lives of common people. Adopting a ‘history from below’ approach, it will re-evaluate the popular experience of mass arming, by focusing upon two relatively neglected branches of the armed forces, the army and militia. Three central themes have been selected for investigation: The recruitment process, the experience of soldiering in the home garrison, and the role of armed force in maintaining public order. It will be shown that, between 1790 and 1805, the government was faced by a mixture of popular ambivalence and hostility towards the raising of the army and militia. It will be demonstrated that economic privation was the preeminent cause of enlistment and that, once recruited, soldiers and militiamen retained their working-class attitudes, and viewed their service primarily as a contractual form of labour. The extent to which armed service was viewed as conditional and negotiable will be emphasized through an examination of the military crimes of mutiny and desertion. Finally, an analysis of military deployments during industrial protests and food riots will demonstrate that, during the French Wars, the state became much more reliant upon armed force for maintaining public order. By adopting a ‘history from below’ approach, the limits of social stability and social cohesion will be tested, and a richer, more variegated, understanding of the popular experience of mass-arming will be offered.
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Straw, Sean William. "Anglo Libyan relations and the British military facilities, 1964-1970." Thesis, University of Nottingham, 2011. http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/11983/.
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This study explores the role of the Anglo-Libyan relationship and the British military facilities in the Labour Government’s foreign and defence policy from 1964 to 1970. This relationship, built upon a “shared tradition” of strategic self interest, was given form in the 1953 treaty which permitted British deployments. The military presence enabled the British to maintain their wider strategic interests East of Suez as well as provide security for the Idris regime in Tripoli. As the Labour Government made cuts in Britain’s defence policy, Libya lost its strategic value but grew in importance for the trade opportunities it offered. In line with defence cuts and a Libyan withdrawal request in 1967, the facilities were scaled back. The remaining presence enabled the British to exploit the growing Libyan economy and maintain influence and defence interests in the country. Tripoli grew increasingly unnerved by the political and territorial ambitions of its Arab Nationalist neighbours, Egypt and Algeria, whilst London regarded Libya as vulnerable to economic and political penetration from the Soviet Union, placing the relationship within the context of the Cold War and Western security. As a consequence the Labour Government encouraged the Libyans to take greater responsibility for their defence, exporting arms to Tripoli and welcoming attempts by Prime Minister Al-Bakkoush to develop the country using oil revenue. After the 1969 Libyan revolution the Labour Government, concerned by the strategic implications of an Arab Nationalist regime in Tripoli, sought to secure Britain’s position and steer the regime away from participating in the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, Tripoli was no longer politically inclined towards the West and London’s attempt to forge a relationship, using existing arms contracts, was complicated by the contentious issue of the sale of Chieftain tanks negotiated with the previous regime. Negotiations floundered and British interests, including a residual presence were lost. Not until thirty years later did the relationship regain any of its former geniality as a strategic “shared tradition” re-emerged to bring the two nations together once more.
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Murray, Scott W. "The origins of an illusion: British policy and opinion, and the development of Prussian liberalism, 1848-1871." Thesis, University of British Columbia, 1990. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/28832.
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The massive historiography dealing with the problem of Germany's development in the first half of twentieth century has been strongly influenced by the notion that certain peculiar national characteristics led Germany down a Sonderweq, or "special path," which diverged from that of other Western European nations. However, by helping to focus scholarly attention on various political, social and intellectual developments which took place in Germany in the nineteenth century, the Sonderweq thesis has distracted scholars from examining more closely the possible impact which the interplay of international relations had on Germany's development during this pivotal period. The present study examines the extent to which British foreign policy affected the growth of authoritarianism and the decline of liberalism in Prussia during the period 1848-1871, and how certain Intellectual currents in England at the time affected both the formulation and the expression of British policy regarding Prussia.
By examining both the policies pursued by British statesmen at certain key points during the period 1848-1871, and the views expressed by a group of highly idealistic British liberal commentators who watched affairs in Prussia closely during this period, I have attempted to demonstrate the following: firstly, that existing interpretations of British policy regarding Prussia have overemphasized the role of liberal idealism in the calculations of British policy-makers, who appear instead to have consistently pursued pragmatic policies aimed at a Prussian-led unification of Germany; and secondly that it was this latter group of British commentators who provided policy-makers with a style of rhetoric which obfuscated the pragmatic considerations underlying British policy. Moreover, it was this same corpus of liberal, "Whig" commentary which laid the conceptual foundations for what was to become the standard interpretative approach to German history, particularly amongst Anglo-American historians writing since 1945 - the Sonderweq thesis. Thus, by separating the rhetoric from the actual practice of British policy, and by identifying the liberal biases which pervaded British liberal discourse on Prussia during this period, I have attempted to clarify Britain's role in the important developments taking place in Germany at this time, while broadening our appreciation of how and why subsequent scholarship on the German question has so readily embraced the notion that German history is "peculiar".Arts, Faculty of
History, Department of
Graduate
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Packard, Edward Frederick. "Whitehall, industrial mobilisation and the private manufacture of armaments : British state-industry relations, 1918-1936." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2009. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/46/.
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This thesis presents a comprehensive account of the complex relationship between the British government and the domestic military-naval arms industry from the armistice in 1918 until the period of rearmament in the 1930s. Challenging traditional 'declinist' assumptions, it offers a multifaceted interpretation of the industry's strengths and weaknesses and its place in national security. In this regard, British governments always prioritised national interests over the private armament manufacturers' particular concerns and never formulated a specific policy to help them adjust to peacetime conditions. Indeed, the wartime experience of industrial mobilisation – the mass production of war material by ordinary firms – made specialist arms producers appear less important in supply planning: a view that proved more important than disarmament and retrenchment in damaging state-industry relations and, together with Britain's liberal economic traditions, helped to foster an enduring but exaggerated sense of relative weakness. Faced with the government's apparent indifference, the overextended arms industry underwent comprehensive internal reorganisation, led by Vickers and supported hesitantly by the Bank of England. This reduced the overall number of manufacturers but it also brought modernisation and a comparatively efficient nucleus for emergency expansion. Internationally, British firms retained a large share of the global arms market despite rising competition. Policymakers rarely accepted widespread public criticism that private armaments manufacture and trading were immoral but believed that the League of Nations' ambition to enforce all-encompassing international controls posed a far greater risk to British security. Although the government imposed unilateral arms trade regulations to facilitate political objectives, and was forced to address outraged popular opinion, neither seriously damaged the manufacturers' fortunes as the country moved towards rearmament. Indeed, the arms industry was never simply a victim of government policy but instead pursued an independent and ultimately successful peacetime strategy, before rearmament led to a cautious renewal of state-industry relations.
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Farley, Robert M. "Transnational determinants of military doctrine /." Thesis, Connect to this title online; UW restricted, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/1773/10753.
Full textBooks on the topic "Great Britain – Military relations – Germany"
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Britain, Germany, and western nuclear strategy. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995.
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Dockrill, Saki. Britain's policy for West German rearmament, 1950-1955. Cambridge [England]: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
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Britain, Germany and the Cold War: The search for a European Detente, 1949-1967. New York, NY: Routledge, 2007.
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Cooperation under fire: Anglo-German restraint during World War II. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995.
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The Royal Navy and German naval disarmament, 1942-1947. London: F. Cass, 1998.
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Ralph, Uhlig, and Germany (Territory under Allied occupation, 1945-1955 : British zone). Zonal Advisory Council., eds. Confidential reports des Britischen Verbindungsstabes zum Zonenbeirat der britischen Besatzungszone in Hamburg, 1946-1948: Demokratisierung aus britischer Sicht. Frankfurt am Main: P. Lang, 1993.
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Britain's economic blockade of Germany, 1914-1919. London: Frank Cass, 2004.
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Peter, Neville. Appeasing Hitler: The diplomacy of Sir Nevile Henderson, 1937-39. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2000.
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M, Denham H. Inside the Nazi ring: A naval attaché in Sweden, 1940-1945. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1985.
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I, Handel Michael, and Maurer John H, eds. Churchill and strategic dilemmas before the World Wars: Essays in honor of Michael I. Handel. London: F. Cass, 2003.
Find full textBook chapters on the topic "Great Britain – Military relations – Germany"
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Kitchen, Martin. "Civil-Military Relations in Germany During the First World War." In The Great War, 1914–18, 39–68. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1990. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-11454-2_4.
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Greentree, Todd. "Civil-military relations in Great Britain and the “special relationship”." In The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations, 269–82. 2nd ed. London: Routledge, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003084228-24.
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Palmer, Jerry. "Nurses and the Military Medical Services in the Great War." In Nurse Memoirs from the Great War in Britain, France, and Germany, 47–71. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-82875-2_3.
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DiFilippo, Anthony. "Military Spending and Government High-Technology Policy: A Comparative Analysis of the US, West Germany, Japan and Great Britain." In Towards a Peace Economy in the United States, 3–28. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-12105-2_1.
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Pischedda, Costantino. "The Appeasement Puzzle and Competition Neglect." In Studi e saggi, 123–40. Florence: Firenze University Press, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.36253/978-88-5518-595-0.11.
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Recent studies indicate that British appeasement towards Hitler followed a buying-time logic, i.e., it tried to postpone confrontation until Great Britain improved its military position through rearmament. However, this chapter shows that Germany actually extended its military edge over the appeasement years. Drawing on the literature on judgment and decision-making, the chapter theorizes that competition neglect – the tendency to focus myopically on one’s own capabilities and pay insufficient attention to those of the competition – may explain the puzzling gap between British policymakers’ plans and actual trends in the balance of power. The competition neglect thesis and an alternative explanation, positing the occurrence of miscalculation, are tested with a case study of British foreign policy towards Germany in 1937-38.
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Zlobin, Alexander, Valeriy Inozemcev, Sergey Komissarenko, Igor Medveckiy, Igor Nelga, Sergey Tretyakov, and Artem Sherstyuk. "Main steps of developing chemical organophosphorus agents abroad." In ORGANOPHOSPHORUS NEUROTOXINS, 17–34. ru: Publishing Center RIOR, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.29039/11_017-034.
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Organophosphorus compounds (OPC) occupy a special place among chemical warfare agents (CWA). High level of toxicity, a wide range of physicochemical properties, polyapplication of action already in the 1930s attracted the close attention of foreign military experts. In 1936, the German chemist Gerhard Schrader for the first time synthesized O-ethyl-dimethylamidocyanophosphate, known today as a herd. By the beginning of the Second World War, the staff of his laboratory synthesized over two thousand new OPC. Some of these compounds were selected for further study as CW agents and subsequently were adopted as weapons by the German army. In 1938 the same Gerhard Schrader have synthesized the organophosphorus compound, closed to tabun, but more toxic: O-isopropyl methyl fluorophosphate, called sarin. In 1944 the German chemist, the 1938 Nobel laureate in chemistry Richard Kuhn synthesized soman and revealed the damaging effect of organophosphorus CWA’s. In 1941 the British chemist Bernard Saunders synthesized diisopropyl fluorophosphate. During World War II the industrial production of organophosphorus CWA’s was organized in Germany, Great Britain and in the USA. Germany produced tabun, sarin and soman, the western allies: diisopropyl fluorophosphate. Till the end of World War II the leadership in the sphere of the development of nerve agents belonged to Nazi Germany. After the end of the war the German scientists, many of whom were devoted Nazis, continued their work under the auspices of military departments of the USA and Great Britain. Subsequently phosphorylated thiocholine esters: V-series substances (VG, VM, VR, VX, EA 3148, EA3317 agents etc.) were synthesized with their participation. The wide range of organophosphorus compounds was tested on volunteers in Porton Down (Great Britain) and in the Edgewood arsenal (USA). But after the synthesis of V-series agents the work on organophosphorus CWA’s did not stop. In recent years there appeared the tendency of the transformation of real threats connected with the chemical weapons use, to propaganda sphere. In recent years, there has been a tendency toward the transformation of real threats associated with the use of chemical weapons into provocation and an advocacy field, but this does not mean that the search for new CWA in Western countries has been stopped.
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Zlobin, Alexander, Valeriy Inozemcev, Sergey Komissarenko, Igor Medveckiy, Igor Nelga, and Sergey Tretyakov. "Main steps of developing chemical organophosphorus agents abroad." In Organophosphorous Neurotoxins, 11–28. ru: Publishing Center RIOR, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.29039/chapter_5e4132b5e7e856.69190447.
Full textAbstract:
Organophosphorus compounds (OPC) occupy a special place among chemical warfare agents (CWA). High level of toxicity, a wide range of physicochemical properties, polyapplication of action already in the 1930s attracted the close attention of foreign military experts. In 1936, the German chemist Gerhard Schrader for the first time synthesized O-ethyl-dimethylamidocyanophosphate, known today as a herd. By the beginning of the Second World War, the staff of his laboratory synthesized over two thousand new OPC. Some of these compounds were selected for further study as CW agents and subsequently were adopted as weapons by the German army. In 1938 the same Gerhard Schrader have synthesized the organophosphorus compound, closed to tabun, but more toxic: O-isopropyl methyl fluorophosphate, called sarin. In 1944 the German chemist, the 1938 Nobel laureate in chemistry Richard Kuhn synthesized soman and revealed the damaging effect of organophosphorus CWA’s. In 1941 the British chemist Bernard Saunders synthesized diisopropyl fluorophosphate. During World War II the industrial production of organophosphorus CWA’s was organized in Germany, Great Britain and in the USA. Germany produced tabun, sarin and soman, the western allies: diisopropyl fluorophosphate. Till the end of world war ii the leadership in the sphere of the development of nerve agents belonged to Nazi Germany. After the end of the war the German scientists, many of whom were devoted Nazis, continued their work under the auspices of military departments of the USA and Great Britain. Sub consequently phosphorylated thiocholine esters: V-series substances (VG, VM, VR, VX, EA 3148, EA3317 agents etc.) were synthesized with their participation. The wide range of organophosphorus compounds was tested on volunteers in Porton Down (Great Britain) and in the Edgewood arsenal (USA). But after the synthesis of V-series agents the work on organophosphorus CWA’s did not stop. In recent years there appeared the tendency of the transformation of real threats connected with the chemical weapons use, to propaganda sphere. In recent years, there has been a tendency toward the transformation of real threats associated with the use of chemical weapons into provocation and an advocacy field, but this does not mean that the search for new CWA in Western countries has been stopped.
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Murray, Michelle. "Weltpolitik." In The Struggle for Recognition in International Relations, 87–112. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190878900.003.0004.
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This chapter considers the rise of Imperial Germany to world power status at the turn of the twentieth century. It argues that Germany’s bid for world power status—Weltpolitik—embodied the recognitive practices constitutive of world power status and was designed to secure recognition from Britain, the system’s preeminent world power. Specifically, in building a powerful fleet of battleships stationed in the North Sea, German leaders reasoned they could alter the political relationship with Britain by creating a display of military force so great that Britain would recognize Germany’s position among the world powers. At the same time, these recognitive practices insulted Germany from the social uncertainty associated with intersubjective identity formation by creating the illusion that its world power status was self-evident rather than dependent on British recognition. The precariousness of its social status was revealed during the First Moroccan Crisis, when in response to acts of misrecognition Germany initiated a serious international crisis that risked war, rousing suspicions among the European great powers that Germany was a revisionist power.
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Pugh, Martin. "The Great War and the Re-drawing of the Ottoman Empire." In Britain and Islam, 166–97. Yale University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.12987/yale/9780300234947.003.0008.
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This chapter details how, during the 14 years before the outbreak of the First World War, Britain comprehensively revised her diplomatic alignments, readjusted her military strategy, and rearranged her armed forces to meet the threat posed by the European powers. In the process, she signed an alliance with Japan and ententes with France and Russia, she concentrated her fleet in the North Sea and the Channel, and developed a plan to prevent Germany from imposing a quick defeat on France by mobilising a new British Expeditionary Force. However, there remained one flaw in all this: she had not really considered the Ottoman Empire or, indeed, the wider question of her relations with the Muslim societies in Turkey, Persia, Egypt, and especially India. This oversight was a by-product of her new strategy, which frankly made security in Europe the chief object and in effect downgraded the importance of the imperial world. As a result, Britain failed to take full account of changes in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa engendered by the Great War.
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Głogowski, Aleksander. "Początki konspiracji wojskowej i cywilnej na Wileńszczyźnie w latach 1939-1941." In Żołnierze Armii Krajowej na Kresach Wschodnich podczas II wojny światowej: Historia – polityka – pamięć, 213–39. Ksiegarnia Akademicka Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.12797/9788381384681.07.
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THE BEGINNINGS OF THE MILITARY AND CIVIL UNDERGROUND IN THE VILNIUS REGION IN 1939-1941 The first years of the occupation of the Vilnius Region were an unusual period in terms of the history of the Polish Underground State and the Polish armed resistance movement. This area was occupied after September 17, 1939 by the Soviet Union, but part of it was transferred to the Republic of Lithuania, along with which it was re-incorporated into the Soviet Union. The Lithuanian occupation was a considerable challenge both for the Polish authorities in exile and for the inhabitants of the Vilnius Region. Meeting such a challenge required certain diplomatic talents (not to worsen the situation of Poles living in this area) as well as knowledge of the relations in the area, which was a problem for the Polish authorities in France, and especially in Great Britain. The Polish inhabitants of the Vilnius Region considered the legal status of their land to be illegal occupation, while the Lithuanians claimed that thanks to a new agreement with the USSR, the period of occupation of these lands by Poles ended. These opinions, together with the mutual resentments and stereotypes flourishing for nearly 20 years, made the peaceful coexistence of two nations difficult, or even impossible. The government of the Republic of Poland tried to prevent the attempts to start an anti-Lithuanian uprising, not wanting to provoke the other two occupiers into military intervention. To this stage, it sought an intermediate solution between the abandonment of any conspiracy (which carried the threat of forming armed groups beyond the control of the legal Polish authorities) and its development on a scale known, for example, from the German or Soviet occupation. The Vilnius Region was to become the personnel and organisational base for the latter. The dilemma was resolved without Polish participation at the time of the annexation of the Republic of Lithuania by the Soviets. Then the second period of the Soviet occupation began, characterised by much greater brutality than the first one, with mass arrests, executions and deportations. The policy of repression primarily affected the pre-war military staff and their families, who were the natural base for the resistance movement of the intelligentsia. Fortunately, this process ended at the time of the German aggression against the USSR. Those that survived the period of the “second Soviet invasion” could in the new conditions continue their underground activities and prepare for an armed uprising in the circumstances and in the manner indicated by the Home Army Headquarters and the Polish Government in London.
Conference papers on the topic "Great Britain – Military relations – Germany"
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Ragulskaya, M., and E. Tekutskaya. "Solar-terrestrial relations: solar activity and the COVID-19 pandemic." In ASTRONOMY AT THE EPOCH OF MULTIMESSENGER STUDIES. Proceedings of the VAK-2021 conference, Aug 23–28, 2021. Crossref, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.51194/vak2021.2022.1.1.130.
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COVID-19 pandemic took the start at the lows of the 11-year and quasi-century solar cycle. The genogeographic character-istics of the population have become one of the significant factors determining the development of the local epidemics. Thelargest number of victims per 1 million inhabitants is recorded in the territories with a dominant haplogroup R1b: Italy,Spain, France, Belgium, Great Britain, and the United States. The R1a haplogroup is characterized by the rapid develop-ment of the COVID-19 pandemic with low mortality and a large number of asymptomatic patients (Russia, Germany, andIran). The level of herd immunity achieved through vaccination also depends on the genetic makeup of the population andsolar activity. Its value is highest for countries with a dominant haplogroup R1b (about 80% for haplogroup R1b versus40% for haplogroup N). The resulting effect can be associated with the generation of reactive oxygen species and affectedhuman adaptive capabilities.
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Chen, Zhenyi. "Study On The Situation Between France And The South China Sea From The Perspective Of Balance Of Power Theory." In 8th Peace and Conflict Resolution Conference [PCRC2021]. Tomorrow People Organization, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.52987/pcrc.2021.011.
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ABSTRACT With the rise of China and the escalation of tension between China and the United States, European countries led by Britain, France and Germany pay increasing attention to the regional situation in the Asia-Pacific (now known as "Indo-Pacific"). Among them, the South China Sea (SCS) is one of the main areas disputed by China, the United States, Southeast Asian countries and some European countries. Western countries are worried that the rise of China's military power will break the stability of the situation in SCS and alter the balance of power among major powers. Therefore, they tried to balance China's rise through alliance. In France's Indo-Pacific strategy, France aims to build a regional order with the alliance of France, India and Australia as the core, and regularly carry out military exercises targeting SCS with the United States, Japan and Southeast Asian countries. This paper aims to study the activities and motivation of France in the South China Sea, and put the situation in SCS under the perspective of Balance of Power Theory, focusing on China, America and France. It will be argued that great powers are carefully maintaining the balance of military power in SCS, and it is highly possible that this trend would still last in the middle and long term, particularly via military deployment and strategic alliances. KEYWORDS: South China Sea, France, China, Balance of Power theory, Indo-Pacific.
Reports on the topic "Great Britain – Military relations – Germany"
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Drury, J., S. Arias, T. Au-Yeung, D. Barr, L. Bell, T. Butler, H. Carter, et al. Public behaviour in response to perceived hostile threats: an evidence base and guide for practitioners and policymakers. University of Sussex, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.20919/vjvt7448.
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Background: Public behaviour and the new hostile threats • Civil contingencies planning and preparedness for hostile threats requires accurate and up to date knowledge about how the public might behave in relation to such incidents. Inaccurate understandings of public behaviour can lead to dangerous and counterproductive practices and policies. • There is consistent evidence across both hostile threats and other kinds of emergencies and disasters that significant numbers of those affected give each other support, cooperate, and otherwise interact socially within the incident itself. • In emergency incidents, competition among those affected occurs in only limited situations, and loss of behavioural control is rare. • Spontaneous cooperation among the public in emergency incidents, based on either social capital or emergent social identity, is a crucial part of civil contingencies planning. • There has been relatively little research on public behaviour in response to the new hostile threats of the past ten years, however. • The programme of work summarized in this briefing document came about in response to a wave of false alarm flight incidents in the 2010s, linked to the new hostile threats (i.e., marauding terrorist attacks). • By using a combination of archive data for incidents in Great Britain 2010-2019, interviews, video data analysis, and controlled experiments using virtual reality technology, we were able to examine experiences, measure behaviour, and test hypotheses about underlying psychological mechanisms in both false alarms and public interventions against a hostile threat. Re-visiting the relationship between false alarms and crowd disasters • The Bethnal Green tube disaster of 1943, in which 173 people died, has historically been used to suggest that (mis)perceived hostile threats can lead to uncontrolled ‘stampedes’. • Re-analysis of witness statements suggests that public fears of Germany bombs were realistic rather than unreasonable, and that flight behaviour was socially structured rather than uncontrolled. • Evidence for a causal link between the flight of the crowd and the fatal crowd collapse is weak at best. • Altogether, the analysis suggests the importance of examining people’s beliefs about context to understand when they might interpret ambiguous signals as a hostile threat, and that. Tthe concepts of norms and relationships offer better ways to explain such incidents than ‘mass panic’. Why false alarms occur • The wider context of terrorist threat provides a framing for the public’s perception of signals as evidence of hostile threats. In particular, the magnitude of recent psychologically relevant terrorist attacks predicts likelihood of false alarm flight incidents. • False alarms in Great Britain are more likely to occur in those towns and cities that have seen genuine terrorist incidents. • False alarms in Great Britain are more likely to occur in the types of location where terrorist attacks happen, such as shopping areass, transport hubs, and other crowded places. • The urgent or flight behaviour of other people (including the emergency services) influences public perceptions that there is a hostile threat, particularly in situations of greater ambiguity, and particularly when these other people are ingroup. • High profile tweets suggesting a hostile threat, including from the police, have been associated with the size and scale of false alarm responses. • In most cases, it is a combination of factors – context, others’ behaviour, communications – that leads people to flee. A false alarm tends not to be sudden or impulsive, and often follows an initial phase of discounting threat – as with many genuine emergencies. 2.4 How the public behave in false alarm flight incidents • Even in those false alarm incidents where there is urgent flight, there are also other behaviours than running, including ignoring the ‘threat’, and walking away. • Injuries occur but recorded injuries are relatively uncommon. • Hiding is a common behaviour. In our evidence, this was facilitated by orders from police and offers from people staff in shops and other premises. • Supportive behaviours are common, including informational and emotional support. • Members of the public often cooperate with the emergency services and comply with their orders but also question instructions when the rationale is unclear. • Pushing, trampling and other competitive behaviour can occur,s but only in restricted situations and briefly. • At the Oxford Street Black Friday 2017 false alarm, rather than an overall sense of unity across the crowd, camaraderie existed only in pockets. This was likely due to the lack of a sense of common fate or reference point across the incident; the fragmented experience would have hindered the development of a shared social identity across the crowd. • Large and high profile false alarm incidents may be associated with significant levels of distress and even humiliation among those members of the public affected, both at the time and in the aftermath, as the rest of society reflects and comments on the incident. Public behaviour in response to visible marauding attackers • Spontaneous, coordinated public responses to marauding bladed attacks have been observed on a number of occasions. • Close examination of marauding bladed attacks suggests that members of the public engage in a wide variety of behaviours, not just flight. • Members of the public responding to marauding bladed attacks adopt a variety of complementary roles. These, that may include defending, communicating, first aid, recruiting others, marshalling, negotiating, risk assessment, and evidence gathering. Recommendations for practitioners and policymakers • Embed the psychology of public behaviour in emergencies in your training and guidance. • Continue to inform the public and promote public awareness where there is an increased threat. • Build long-term relations with the public to achieve trust and influence in emergency preparedness. • Use a unifying language and supportive forms of communication to enhance unity both within the crowd and between the crowd and the authorities. • Authorities and responders should take a reflexive approach to their responses to possible hostile threats, by reflecting upon how their actions might be perceived by the public and impact (positively and negatively) upon public behaviour. • To give emotional support, prioritize informative and actionable risk and crisis communication over emotional reassurances. • Provide first aid kits in transport infrastructures to enable some members of the public more effectively to act as zero responders.