Journal articles: 'Government partisanship'

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Rueda, David. "Left Government, Policy, and Corporatism: Explaining the Influence of Partisanship on Inequality." World Politics 60, no. 3 (April 2008): 349–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0043887100009035.

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The author argues that to understand the relationship between partisan government and equality two fundamental things need to be done: separate the effects of partisanship on policy and of policy on the economy; and assess the influence of government partisanship once the mediating role of corporatism is accounted for. The main goal of this article is to explore the relationship between government partisanship, policy, and inequality at the lower half of the wage distribution. The analysis is motivated by a puzzling finding in previous work: the absence of government partisanship effects on earnings inequality. The author focuses on the role of three different policies: government employment, the generosity of the welfare state, and minimum wages. The results show that government employment is a most significant determinant of inequality (although it is affected by left government only when corporatism is low). They also demonstrate that welfare state generosity does not affect inequality and, in turn, is not associated with left government. Finally, they reveal that the effect of government partisanship on minimum wages and of minimum wages on inequality is completely conditional on the levels of corporatism (these effects are only present when corporatism is low). The author explains why specific policies do or do not affect earnings inequality and also why corporatism mitigates or magnifies the influence of government partisanship. By explicitly exploring the determinants of policy and earnings inequality, the article represents an important contribution to our understanding of how governments can promote redistribution.

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이규정, 신재혁, and Lee Sung-woo. "Government Partisanship and Technological Disasters." Locality and Globality: Korean Journal of Social Sciences 41, no. 3 (December 2017): 271–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.33071/ssricb.41.3.201712.271.

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Walter, Aaron T. "Institutional partisanship." Slovak Journal of Political Sciences 16, no. 2 (April 1, 2016): 146–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/sjps-2016-0008.

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Abstract The balance of power between the legislative and executive branches of government in the United States has held firm despite the evolution of each branch. Moreover, as the primacy of one branch succumbed to the dominance of the other there remained a constant variable. Partisanship existed since the American founding, however, the importance of Congressional partisanship in the later half of the nineteenth century and rise of the imperial presidency in the twentieth century highlight the formidable challenges of divided government in the United States. The following paper utilizes rational choice theory in political science to explain decision making of American political leaders though inclusion of casual and descriptive examples highlight certain choices within

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Matsubayashi, Tetsuya, and Michiko Ueda. "Government Partisanship and Human Well-Being." Social Indicators Research 107, no. 1 (March 29, 2011): 127–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11205-011-9831-8.

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Kang, Michael. "Gerrymandering and the Constitutional Norm Against Government Partisanship." Michigan Law Review, no. 116.3 (2017): 351. http://dx.doi.org/10.36644/mlr.116.3.gerrymandering.

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This Article challenges the basic premise in the law of gerrymandering that partisanship is a constitutional government purpose at all. The central problem, Justice Scalia once explained in Vieth v. Jubilerer, is that partisan gerrymandering becomes unconstitutional only when it “has gone too far,” giving rise to the intractable inquiry into “how much is too much.” But the premise that partisanship is an ordinary and lawful purpose, articulated confidently as settled law and widely understood as such, is largely wrong as constitutional doctrine. The Article surveys constitutional law to demonstrate the vitality of an important, if implicit norm against government partisanship across a variety of settings. From political patronage, to government speech, to election administration and even in redistricting itself, Vieth is the exception in failing to bar tribal partisanship as a legitimate state interest in lawmaking. The puzzle therefore is why the Supreme Court in Vieth diverged from this overarching norm for legislative redistricting where the need for government nonpartisanship is most acute and so rarely met. The Article proposes a new approach focused on legitimate state interest and partisan purpose, building on a constitutional norm against government partisanship. The importance of consolidating and reifying this norm, in its most salient legal context, cannot be overstated at a time when hyperpolarization between the major parties dominates national politics and is at its most severe in our lifetime.

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Koch, Jeffrey W. "Partisanship and Non-Partisanship Among American Indians." American Politics Research 45, no. 4 (March 17, 2016): 673–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1532673x16637122.

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This research examines the partisan inclinations of American Indians, a minority population with a complicated history with the U.S. government and American society. The empirical analyses identify Native Americans as preferring the Democratic Party over the Republican Party. The impact of being Native American on identification with the Democratic Party is sizable, equivalent to the effect for being Hispanic, Asian, or female. In addition, American Indians demonstrate a pronounced tendency to not affiliate with a major American political party. The higher incidence of non-identification among Native Americans likely results from the importance of their claims for sovereignty and, relatedly, living separate from much of American society. Unlike other broad-based social groups in American politics, Native Americans disseminate cues that reduce the tendency of their members to affiliate with a major political party.

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Whiteley, Paul, and Ann-Kristin Kölln. "How do different sources of partisanship influence government accountability in Europe?" International Political Science Review 40, no. 4 (July 9, 2018): 502–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0192512118780445.

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The possibility of holding representatives to account through regular elections is one of the cornerstones of representative democracy. The precise role of partisanship in doing this has not been extensively examined. Using survey data from Europe (2002–2012), we show that partisanship can weaken or strengthen accountability, depending on its sources. If it is an affective-psychological attitude, as the Michigan school suggests, then it weakens accountability because it acts as a perceptual screen. If, however, it is a calculation of party performance which is constantly updated by citizens, then it strengthens accountability. The findings suggest that partisanship in Europe has been quite responsive to performance over the ten-year period. Instead of acting as a screen that inhibits accountability, partisanship appears rooted in calculations of party performance and so enhances accountability. However, the effects are asymmetric with left-leaning partisans more sensitive to the performance of their governments than right-leaning partisans.

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Alvarez, R. Michael, Geoffrey Garrett, and Peter Lange. "Government Partisanship, Labor Organization, and Macroeconomic Performance." American Political Science Review 85, no. 2 (June 1991): 539–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1963174.

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Governments of the Left and Right have distinct partisan economic policies and objectives that they would prefer to pursue. Their propensity to do so, however, is constrained by their desire for reelection. We argue that the ability of governments to further their partisan interests and preside over reelectable macroeconomic outcomes simultaneously is dependent on the organization of the domestic economy, particularly the labor movement. We hypothesize that there are two different paths to desirable macroeconomic performance. In countries with densely and centrally organized labor movements, leftist governments can promote economic growth and reduce inflation and unemployment. Conversely, in countries with weak labor movements, rightist governments can pursue their partisan-preferred macroeconomic strategies and achieve similarly beneficial macroeconomic outcomes. Performance will be poorer in other cases. These hypotheses are supported by analysis of pooled annual time series data for 16 advanced industrial democracies between 1967 and 1984.

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Kim, Heemin, and Richard C. Fording. "Government partisanship in Western democracies, 1945-1998." European Journal of Political Research 41, no. 2 (March 2002): 187–206. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.00009.

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Shin, Doh Chull, and Rollin F. Tusalem. "Partisanship and Democratization." Journal of East Asian Studies 7, no. 2 (August 2007): 323–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1598240800008766.

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How do attachments to political parties among the mass publics of East Asia affect the process of democratization in the region? Analyses of the East Asia Barometer surveys reveal that partisanship motivates East Asians to endorse the democratic performance of their political system and embrace democracy as the best possible system of government. These findings accord, by and large, with the socialization, cognitive dissonance, and rational choice theories of partisanship.

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Jakobsson, Niklas, and Staffan Kumlin. "Election campaign agendas, government partisanship, and the welfare state." European Political Science Review 9, no. 2 (October 6, 2015): 183–208. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s175577391500034x.

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Although theoretically contentious, most empirical studies contend that electoral-political factors structure the welfare state. In practice, most studies concentrate on ‘government partisanship’, that is the ideological character of the government. We agree that politics matters but also seek to expand our understanding of what ‘politics’ should be taken to mean. Drawing on recent comparative research on agenda-setting, we study the impact of whether welfare state issues were broadly salient in the public sphere during the election campaign that produced the government. We formulate hypotheses about how such systemic campaign salience and government partisanship (separately and interactively) affect welfare generosity. We also consider how such effects might have changed, taking into account challenges to standard assumptions of representative democracy coming from the ‘new politics of the welfare state’ framework. We combine well-known, but updated, data on welfare state generosity and government partisanship, with original contextual data on campaign salience from 16 West European countries for the years 1980–2008. We find that campaigns matter but also that their impact has changed. During the first half of the examined period (the 1980s and early 1990s), it mainly served to facilitate government partisanship effects on the welfare state. More recently, big-time campaign attention to welfare state issues results in some retrenchment (almost) regardless of who forms the postelection government. This raises concerns about the democratic status of the politics of welfare state reform in Europe.

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Huo, Jingjing. "Left Partisanship and Top Management Pay in Affluent Capitalist Democracies." Social Forces 98, no. 1 (October 26, 2018): 93–118. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/sf/soy101.

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Abstract Complementing the existing partisanship and income distribution literature that focuses on the earnings of all employees, this paper examines the effect of left government partisanship on top managers. Drawing on firm-level top executive compensation data across thirteen advanced industrialized countries, the paper shows that left government partisanship principally leads to lower CEO compensation, either through laws that enhance workers’ collective bargaining power vis-à-vis management or laws that allow shareholders to cast proxy votes on executive compensation (i.e., say-on-pay laws). Furthermore, I show that left government partisanship reduces CEO pay more heavily in those firms that more strongly favor labor’s competing stakeholders. In particular, left partisanship reduces executive compensation more heavily in firms that set aside more revenue for shareholders, managers, or creditors, that is, firms with higher asset return, stock return, or debt. These findings highlight how the macro-politics of rising top income inequality at the national level interacts with the micro-distributive conflicts at the firm level. In particular, financialization, such as the rise of the shareholder value revolution, may accentuate the impact of partisan politics against top income inequality.

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Switzer, David. "Citizen Partisanship, Local Government, and Environmental Policy Implementation." Urban Affairs Review 55, no. 3 (August 1, 2017): 675–702. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1078087417722863.

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Local governments play a large, if understudied, role in the implementation of environmental policy in the United States. The major environmental statutes outline explicit responsibilities for the federal and state governments in enforcement under a cooperative federalism framework, and a literature on environmental federalism has developed looking at how variables at the state level affect implementation. Largely ignored by this literature is the important part local governments play in implementation. This study explores one way local politics may influence implementation, investigating the effect of citizen preferences on municipal compliance with the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA). The findings show that utilities in Democratic leaning areas violate the SDWA less frequently than those in Republican leaning areas. The results suggest that just as politics influence environmental policy implementation at the federal and state levels, the local role in environmental policy is inherently tied to the political incentives facing municipalities.

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Sayers, Anthony M., and Jeremy Moon. "State Government Convergence and Partisanship: A Long-Run Analysis of Australian Ministerial Portfolios." Canadian Journal of Political Science 35, no. 3 (September 2002): 589–612. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008423902778360.

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This study makes use of ministerial portfolios to analyze the scope of government activity. It shows that in comparison with expenditure and employment measures, portfolios have a number of advantages in terms of stability, absoluteness, and in identifying when new activities attract sustained government attention. Portfolios are used to investigate whether there has been any convergence in the scope of government activity across state governments in Australia over the century since 1890, and, also, whether partisanship has had any consistent impact on government activity. Neither hypothesis is confirmed. Rather, long-term patterns of activity are complex and appear to be driven by a wide range of forces.

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15

Beck, Nathaniel, Jonathan N. Katz, R. Michael Alvarez, Geoffrey Garrett, and Peter Lange. "Government Partisanship, Labor Organization, and Macroeconomic Performance: A Corrigendum." American Political Science Review 87, no. 4 (December 1993): 945–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2938825.

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Alvarez, Garrett and Lange (1991) used cross-national panel data on the Organization for Economic Coordination and Development nations to show that countries with left governments and encompassing labor movements enjoyed superior economic performance. Here we show that the standard errors reported in that article are incorrect. Reestimation of the model using ordinary least squares and robust standard errors upholds the major finding of Alvarez, Garrett and Lange, regarding the political and institutional causes of economic growth but leaves the findings for unemployment and inflation open to question. We show that the model used by Alvarez, Garrett and Lange, feasible generalized least squares, cannot produce standard errors when the number of countries analyzed exceeds the length of the time period under analysis. Also, we argue that ordinary least squares with robust standard errors is superior to feasible generalized least squares for typical cross-national panel studies.

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Chen, Jia, and Seungbin Park. "Government Partisanship, Unionization and the Structure of Investment Liberalization." Canadian Journal of Political Science 52, no. 4 (September 16, 2019): 825–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008423919000295.

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AbstractGovernments in advanced industrial democracies generally regulate foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows with two types of policy measures: entry barriers and post-establishment restrictions. This article provides an integrated account for the two types of FDI restrictions, which is largely absent in the existing literature. We argue that the government's choice of FDI policies is shaped by a compound effect of the incumbent's ideological orientation and the political influence of unionized labour. Although inward FDI broadly benefits domestic workers, the entrance of multinational corporations (MNCs) adversely impacts the unionized interests of labour by transforming the labour market in ways detrimental to unions’ wage-bargaining leverage. Leftist governments, driven by the preferences of their labour constituency, tend to lift entry barriers to FDI in order to promote capital inflows. At the same time, leftist governments may also need to address unions’ concerns about inbound MNCs by tightening post-establishment restrictions on FDI, which impose constraints on the globalized business and operational model of MNCs. We argue that leftist incumbents generally liberalize entry barriers but tighten post-establishment restrictions when the level of labour unionization is high. We found evidence consistent with our argument from country-level and sector-level analysis of FDI restrictions, using a sample from the early 2000s to the mid-2010s of Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries.

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Krueger, Skip, and HyungGun Park. "Pathways to Citizen Participation: Participatory Budgeting Policy Choice by Local Governments." Chinese Public Administration Review 11, no. 1 (June 29, 2020): 46. http://dx.doi.org/10.22140/cpar.v11i1.249.

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The existing literature on participatory budgeting – as one means of citizen participation in local governance – tends to focus on how to stimulate citizen participation in the budget process, and primarily aims to descriptively explain the magnitude of participation or the adoption of specific policy approaches. We investigate participatory budgeting from an institutional perspective and empirically evaluate the choices that local governments make in adopting a specific set of rules for including citizens in the budget process. We suggest that the choice of the type of participatory budgeting policy is predicated on the partisanship of policymakers, the administrative capacity of local government, and citizen’s experience with other forms of direct democracy. To test these hypotheses, we collect information on 224 local governments in South Korea from 2004 to 2013. For each city, we identify the type of participatory budgeting policy they adopt and evaluate that choice in an empirical model. The results provide evidence that the partisanship of local policymakers and the administrative capacity of the local government are associated with different choices about the inclusion of citizens in the budget process.

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Jahan, Rounaq. "BANGLADESH IN 2003: Vibrant Democracy or Destructive Politics?" Asian Survey 44, no. 1 (January 2004): 56–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2004.44.1.56.

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Abstract The year 2003 saw a continuation of the confrontational politics that has plagued Bangladesh for decades. Partisanship continued to affect the functioning of government and civil society organizations. Controversy emerged over judicial appointments to the higher courts. The government's successes were marred by corruption and deteriorating law and order.

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Uche, Ada. "Analysis of Local Government Performance and Leadership in Nigeria." Africa’s Public Service Delivery and Performance Review 2, no. 4 (December 1, 2014): 130. http://dx.doi.org/10.4102/apsdpr.v2i4.70.

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This paper examines the quality of local government leaderships in Nigeria. It explores how local governments’ inefficiency and poor leadership have been a major challenge facing the development process in Nigeria. The paper has two objectives. The first is to identify the professionalism of a sample of Nigerian local government chairpersons. The second is to examine whether there are systematic correlations between local government chairpersons’ professionalism, political partisanship, local characteristics, and performance. The paper argues that the quality of local government chairpersons has significant policy implications because of their vital role in policy making and implementation. The concluding section provides some policy recommendations on how local government leaders could improve performance.

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Jung, Dong-Joon. "Does Partisanship Hurt Electoral Accountability? Individual-Level and Aggregate-Level Comparisons of Western and Postcommunist Democracies." East European Politics and Societies: and Cultures 32, no. 1 (October 31, 2017): 168–201. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0888325417728772.

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While the negative effect of partisanship on electoral accountability has been assumed in established Western democracies, its empirical test has been rare, especially for postcommunist democracies whose democratization processes are so distinct that their partisanship might deliver different political impacts from their Western counterparts. Through individual- and aggregate-level regressions, I find that partisanship, in general, does hurt electoral accountability at both levels. From a comparative perspective, the individual-level tests reveal that such a negative effect of partisanship has been more salient among the postcommunist voters with fewer electoral resources to rely on than among the Western voters whose abilities to hold the government accountable are stronger. At the aggregate level, however, this tendency becomes reversed as any increase in partisanship beyond its current relatively high level may induce the over-institutionalization of the Western party systems restricting electoral accountability, while it could rather help to stabilize the postcommunist party systems making it easier for voters to discern which political group is accountable for policy outcomes.

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Kwon, Hyeok Yong. "Government Partisanship and Electoral Accountability: The Effect of Perceived Employment Situation on Partisan Vote Switching." Political Research Quarterly 72, no. 3 (October 8, 2018): 727–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1065912918804897.

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What are the electoral impacts of perceptions of unemployment under different partisan persuasions of the government? Neither the literature on retrospective economic voting nor partisan voting has provided a compelling answer to this question. This paper addresses this puzzle by analyzing panel surveys and leveraging differences in government partisanship in two consecutive elections. I argue that negative evaluations of the employment situation induce voter transition to support a left-wing party under a right-wing government, but that such voter perceptions do not affect vote choice under a left-wing government. An analysis of a voter transition, using British Election Panel Study 1992–1997 and 1997–2001, reveals findings that support my argument. My argument suggests conditional partisan voting effects. Essentially, the effect of economic issues on vote choice is conditional on issue salience and which party “owns” the issue, namely, the varying levels of issue salience related to government partisanship.

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Klitgaard, Michael B., and Christian Elmelund-Præstekær. "The partisanship of systemic retrenchment: tax policy and welfare reform in Denmark 1975–2008." European Political Science Review 6, no. 1 (November 16, 2012): 1–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755773912000252.

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We hypothesize that decisions to constrain government revenue may constitute an attractive strategy, especially to right-wing governments, when pursuing a preference for welfare state retrenchment. Whereas programmatic retrenchment in social policy programs imposes concentrated losses in return for diffuse gains, the distributive profile of systemic retrenchment via tax cuts might entail concentrated benefits for specified groups financed by diffuse losses for larger groups in a distant future. Consequently, the electorate may accept or even desire tax cuts and associated initiatives to curb government income relative to retrenchment measures of services and benefits. Our empirical analysis supports such theoretical propositions. In an extensive comparative analysis of all tax laws adopted by four Danish governments, we find clear partisan differences. In an in-depth study of the tax policy of the latest right-wing government, we moreover empirically support the causality of the argument as the government did in fact try to curb specific taxes in order to constrain the spending side of the welfare state in an indirect manner.

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Shin, Mi Jeong. "Partisanship, Tax Policy, and Corporate Profit-Shifting in a Globalized World Economy." Comparative Political Studies 50, no. 14 (February 6, 2017): 1998–2026. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414016688007.

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Political science scholarship has found mixed evidence on the impact of partisanship on the taxation of firms. In this article, I show that although left-leaning governments set tax rates at higher levels than right-leaning governments, the difference in the effective tax rates paid by firms is much less dramatic between left and right governments. I argue that left-leaning governments maintain high tax rates, a visible policy their constituency supports, while allowing firms to transfer profits abroad to minimize their tax burden (transfer pricing). Constituency costs hinder them from cutting tax rates to avoid backlash from voters, but they impose fewer restrictions on profit-shifting to attract investment by multinational firms for economic growth. Data covering 19 advanced economies between 2006 and 2009 support my theoretical expectation. My analyses suggest that the effect of government partisanship on corporate tax policy can be ambiguous when political parties consider various policy tools.

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Evans, Geoffrey, and Anja Neundorf. "Core Political Values and the Long-Term Shaping of Partisanship." British Journal of Political Science 50, no. 4 (October 1, 2018): 1263–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123418000339.

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AbstractParty identification has been thought to provide the central organizing element for political belief systems. This article makes the contrasting case that core values concerning equality and government intervention versus individualism and free enterprise are fundamental orientations that can themselves shape partisanship. The authors evaluate these arguments in the British case using a validated multiple-item measure of core values, using ordered latent class models to estimate reciprocal effects with partisanship on panel data from the British Household Panel Study, 1991–2007. The findings demonstrate that core values are more stable than partisanship and have far stronger cross-lagged effects on partisanship than vice versa in both polarized and depolarized political contexts, for younger and older respondents, and for those with differing levels of educational attainment and income, thus demonstrating their general utility as decision-making heuristics.

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Avdagic, Sabina. "Partisanship, political constraints, and employment protection reforms in an era of austerity." European Political Science Review 5, no. 3 (October 2, 2012): 431–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755773912000197.

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Why do some governments adopt unpopular reforms entailing far-reaching liberalization of the labor market, while others opt only for marginal adjustments or even regulatory reforms? This paper explains the likelihood of different types of reforms as an effect of different constellations of government partisanship and veto players. Combining the ‘blame avoidance’ and ‘veto players’ logics of politics, I argue that veto players have either a constraining or enabling effect depending on the partisan orientation of government. Liberalization is most likely to be adopted either by right parties facing few veto players, or by left parties in contexts with a high degree of power sharing. Regulatory reforms are most likely when left governments enjoy strong power concentration, but marginal regulation may also be adopted under external pressure by right governments facing many veto players. An analysis of employment protection reforms in 24 European Union countries during 1990–2007 supports the argument that the effect of political constraints and opportunities on the choice of reforms is shaped by partisan differences.

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Aaskoven, Lasse. "Redistributing under fiscal constraint: partisanship, debt, inequality and labour market regulation." Journal of Public Policy 39, no. 3 (July 16, 2018): 423–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0143814x18000193.

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AbstractLabour market regulation varies significantly, both within and between developed democracies. While there has been extensive research and debate in economics on the consequences of labour market regulation, the political causes for levels and changes in labour market regulation have received less scholarly attention. This article investigates a political economy explanation for differences in labour market regulation building on a theoretical argument that labour regulation can be used as a nonfiscal redistribution tool. Consequently, partisanship, the demand for redistribution and government budget constraint jointly determine whether labour market regulation will increase or decrease. Consistent with this argument, panel analyses from 33 Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development countries reveal that labour market regulation increases under left-wing governments that face increased market inequality and high government debt.

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Chang, Chun-Ping, and Chien-Chiang Lee. "Partisanship and international trade: Some international evidence." Acta Oeconomica 62, no. 1 (March 1, 2012): 41–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1556/aoecon.62.2012.1.4.

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This paper investigates the attitudes of political parties to international trade in 23 OECD countries in the period 1972–2004. Employing different datasets and various measures of trade openness, we examine how government ideology affects trade policy preferences and whether this relationship depends on international and domestic factors by employing the panel data techniques. Our main findings are that an increase in the leftist orientation of the government leads to more restrictive or less open trade policies, while right-oriented parties are likely to express more favor to trade openness. Secondly, international factors such as globalization in political and social dimension as well as financial openness, have a strong positive influence on a given party’s trade policy preferences. Thirdly, we offer clear evidence that a political party will change its partisan positions due to the influence of the domestic economic and institutional environment.

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Faragó, Laura, Anna Kende, and Péter Krekó. "We Only Believe in News That We Doctored Ourselves." Social Psychology 51, no. 2 (March 2020): 77–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1027/1864-9335/a000391.

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Abstract. In this research we aimed to explore the importance of partisanship behind the belief in wish-fulfilling political fake news. We tested the role of political orientation, partisanship, and conspiracy mentality in the acceptance of pro- and anti-government pipedream fake news. Using a representative survey ( N = 1,000) and a student sample ( N = 382) in Hungary, we found that partisanship predicted belief in political fake news more strongly than conspiracy mentality, and these connections were mediated by the perceived credibility of source (independent journalism vs. political propaganda) and economic sentiment. Our findings suggest that political bias can be more important in predicting acceptance of pipedream political fake news than conspiracy mentality.

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de Benedictis-Kessner, Justin. "Strategic Partisans: Electoral Motivations and Partisanship in Local Government Communication." Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy 2, no. 2 (2021): 227–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/113.00000036.

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Beazer, Quintin H., and Byungwon Woo. "IMF Conditionality, Government Partisanship, and the Progress of Economic Reforms." American Journal of Political Science 60, no. 2 (July 30, 2015): 304–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12200.

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Weymouth, Stephen, and J. Lawrence Broz. "Government Partisanship and Property Rights: Cross-Country Firm-Level Evidence." Economics & Politics 25, no. 2 (June 6, 2013): 229–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12011.

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Bandau, Frank, and Leo Ahrens. "The impact of partisanship in the era of retrenchment: Insights from quantitative welfare state research." Journal of European Social Policy 30, no. 1 (October 3, 2019): 34–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0958928719868446.

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Does government partisanship still matter in the era of welfare retrenchment? The comprehensive quantitative research on this question offers contradicting answers. Our meta-analysis demonstrates that the results of published empirical studies depend on a number of the studies’ characteristics. Focusing on studies on retrenchment-prone ‘old social policies’, we show that the single most important factor affecting the results on partisanship is the choice of the dependent variable. In general, studies using entitlements are four times more likely to find partisan effects than studies based on social spending. Furthermore, partisan effects are more pronounced in class-related programmes like unemployment benefits and sick pay than in lifecourse-related welfare programmes such as pensions. Finally, we show a clear decline of partisanship over time. Some recent studies, however, indicate that innovations in terms of operationalisation and measurement of the independent variable may bring new life to the debate on the persistence of partisanship.

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Muirhead, Russell, and Nancy L. Rosenblum. "The Political Theory of Parties and Partisanship: Catching Up." Annual Review of Political Science 23, no. 1 (May 11, 2020): 95–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-041916-020727.

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Despite their centrality to modern democracy, until recently political parties were relegated to the margins of normative democratic theory, taking a back seat to social movements, civil society associations, deliberative experiments, spaces for local participatory government, and direct popular participation. Yet, in the past 15 years, a burgeoning literature has emerged in democratic theory focused directly on parties and partisanship; that is our focus in this review. We locate three main normative defenses of parties: one centered in the special role parties can play in political justification as agents of public reason, a second that looks to the way parties contribute to deliberation, and a third that focuses on the partisan commitment to regulated political rivalry and peaceful rotation in office. In this last connection, we survey work on the constitutional status of parties and reasons for banning parties. We then consider the relation of partisanship to citizenship, and in a fourth section we turn to the ethics of partisanship. Parties and partisanship are interwoven but separable: If partisans are necessary to realize the value of parties, the reverse holds as well, and parties are necessary to realize the value of partisanship.

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IVERSEN, TORBEN, and DAVID SOSKICE. "Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More Than Others." American Political Science Review 100, no. 2 (May 2006): 165–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055406062083.

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Standard political economy models of redistribution, notably that of Meltzer and Richard (1981), fail to account for the remarkable variance in government redistribution across democracies. We develop a general model of redistribution that explains why some democratic governments are more prone to redistribute than others. We show that the electoral system plays a key role because it shapes the nature of political parties and the composition of governing coalitions, hence redistribution. Our argument implies (1) that center-left governments dominate under PR systems, whereas center-right governments dominate under majoritarian systems; and (2) that PR systems redistribute more than majoritarian systems. We test our argument on panel data for redistribution, government partisanship, and electoral system in advanced democracies.

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Nollenberger, Karl, and James Simmons. "Municipal Government Structure in Wisconsin: Does Form Matter?" Journal of Public and Nonprofit Affairs 2, no. 2 (November 1, 2016): 82. http://dx.doi.org/10.20899/jpna.2.2.82-100.

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This article examines the forms of municipal governments in Wisconsin and their relationship to variables in the areas of socioeconomic, partisanship, election process, decision-making in the governance process, and internal municipal operations. Wisconsin has more mayor-council and mayoral forms with an appointed administrator rather than council-manager forms common in other states. We find that reform in Wisconsin has occurred in all government forms and that most municipalities desiring the managerial results of a professional administration have chosen an adaptation of the mayor-council form. Furthermore, we find that there are few clearly identifiable differences between cities with differing governmental forms.

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Aridi, Amalisha Sabie. "Understanding Government Leadership Styles and Approaches Through Smart and Adaptive Leadership Models." International Journal of Smart Education and Urban Society 13, no. 1 (January 1, 2022): 1–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/ijseus.312234.

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Mass shootings, COVID-19, political partisanship, and natural disasters have made government leadership more challenging and more complex. Unfortunately, the government's current leadership development approaches have been under resourced, ineffective, not comprehensive, and not fully infused with the concept of the public stewardship and public trust. This paper explores an understanding of leadership and its application to government through an exploration of leadership models from emerging research and the literature. The value of this approach is to take a plethora of dispersed complex models and combine them in a context suitable for a smart, needed, and relevant discussion.

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Smith, Michael G., and Johannes Urpelainen. "Windows of opportunity: legislative fragmentation conditions the effect of partisanship on product market deregulation." Journal of Public Policy 36, no. 1 (January 23, 2015): 51–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0143814x14000300.

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AbstractPrevious research on deregulation in industrialised countries emphasises differences between left-wing and right-wing parties, but data on product market regulation (PMR) indicate that these differences have been modest. If partisan preferences on the merits of deregulation differ sharply, why such modest differences? We argue that partisan differences only become pronounced when the government is strong and rules a relatively unified legislature. Thus, legislative fragmentation should reduce the left-right difference in PMR. We test this theory against PMR data in 29 industrialised countries, 1978–2007. We find that right-wing governments only have a strong negative effect on regulation if the legislature and the government are not fragmented.

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McJimsey, Robert. "Crisis Management: Parliament and Political Stability, 1692-1719." Albion 31, no. 4 (1999): 559–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0095139000063420.

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Ever since J. H. Plumb published his Ford Lectures, The Growth of Political Stability in England, 1679-1725 (1966), the topic of political stability has gripped the attention of England’s early modern historians. In particular Plumb’s characterization of the politics of 1679-1722 as “The Rage of Party” was refined by Geoffrey Holmes, whose British Politics in the Age of Anne ushered in a variety of studies of political warfare in what has come to be known as The First Age of Party. These and succeeding works have elaborated and confirmed the existence of deep and severe differences between Whig and Tory partisans, differences renewing animosities extending back to the Civil Wars and generating a self-perpetuating struggle for power. The consequences of this “rage of party” for the formation and execution of policy were daunting. In particular party rage placed three important restrictions on the executive’s room for maneuver. By rendering all political alliances unstable, partisanship limited the ability of the governments of William and Anne to operate as combinations of the parties. Partisanship also put all government servants under the constant threat of defending their conduct from year to year. And partisanship dictated certain policy options while frustrating others.

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Gandrud, Christopher, and Cassandra Grafström. "Inflated Expectations: How Government Partisanship Shapes Monetary Policy Bureaucrats’ Inflation Forecasts." Political Science Research and Methods 3, no. 2 (December 4, 2014): 353–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2014.34.

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Governments’ party identifications can indicate the types of economic policies they are likely to pursue. A common rule of thumb is that left-party governments are expected to pursue policies for lower unemployment, but which may cause inflation. Right-party governments are expected to pursue lower inflation policies. How do these expectations shape the inflation forecasts of monetary policy bureaucrats? If there is a mismatch between the policies, bureaucratsexpectgovernments to implement, and those that theyactuallydo, forecasts will be systematically biased. Using US Federal Reserve Staff’s forecasts we test for executive partisan biases. We find that irrespective of actual policy and economic conditions forecasters systematically overestimate future inflation during left-party presidencies and underestimate future inflation during right-party ones. Our findings suggest that partisan heuristics play an important part in monetary policy bureaucrats’ inflation expectations.

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Helgason, Agnar Freyr, and Vittorio Mérola. "Employment Insecurity, Incumbent Partisanship, and Voting Behavior in Comparative Perspective." Comparative Political Studies 50, no. 11 (December 14, 2016): 1489–523. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414016679176.

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We argue that occupational unemployment rates, by informing perceptions of economic insecurity, serve as a salient and powerful heuristic for aggregate economic performance. Consequently, high and rising occupational unemployment leads to negative evaluations of the economy and reduces the probability of supporting the incumbent government. Simultaneously, however, such changes shift support toward left-wing parties. Thus, economic insecurity serves as a valence issue, but is also inherently a positional issue, due to the distributional consequences of welfare policies. This brings about a potential conflict as under left-wing incumbent governments the economically insecure are cross-pressured, which increases their likelihood of exiting the electoral arena completely. We test our hypotheses using a Bayesian hierarchical multinomial model, with individual-level data from 43 elections in 21 countries. We find support for the hypothesized effects of employment insecurity on voting behavior, with a follow-up analysis supporting the posited informational mechanism.

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McElwain, Kenneth Mori, Shusei Eshima, and Christian G. Winkler. "The proposer or the proposal? An experimental analysis of constitutional beliefs." Japanese Journal of Political Science 22, no. 1 (March 2021): 15–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1468109921000025.

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AbstractIn many countries, constitutional amendments require the direct approval of voters, but the consequences of fundamental changes to the powers and operations of the state are difficult to anticipate. The referendums literature suggests that citizens weigh their prior beliefs about the merits of proposals against the heuristic provided by the partisanship of the proposer, but the relative salience of these factors across constitutional issue areas remains underexplored. This paper examines the determinants of citizen preferences on 12 diverse constitutional issues, based on a novel survey experiment in Japan. We show that support for amendments is greater when its proposer is described as non-partisan. However, constitutional ideology moderates this effect. Those who prefer idealistic constitutions that elevate national traditions tend to value proposals that expand government powers, compared to those who prefer pragmatic constitutions that constrain government authority. These results highlight the significance of constitutional beliefs that are independent of partisanship.

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Lee, Young-Im, and Farida Jalalzai. "President Park Geun-Hye of South Korea: A Woman President without Women?" Politics & Gender 13, no. 04 (October 23, 2017): 597–617. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1743923x17000204.

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This article explores the first female president of South Korea, Park Geun-Hye, and her substantive representation of women. Though Park is one of many women executives from Asia taking the family route to power, her presidency still may lead to the implementation of women-friendly policies once elected. Park's government has expanded women-related policy areas first developed by previous progressive governments, but not consistently. Though mixed, her performance shows improvement over the previous conservative president, who shares Park's party affiliation. Since we can control for partisanship, Park administration's efforts on behalf of women prove particularly compelling. While advantaged by her political lineage, her government offers important policy benefits to women.

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Garrett, Geoffrey, and Peter Lange. "Government Partisanship and Economic Performance: When and How does "Who Governs" Matter?" Journal of Politics 51, no. 3 (August 1989): 676–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2131501.

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KWONHYEOKYONG. "Does Who Governs Matter? Government Partisanship, Welfare States, and Varieties of Capitalism." Korean Political Science Review 44, no. 1 (March 2010): 85–105. http://dx.doi.org/10.18854/kpsr.2010.44.1.004.

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KATO, JUNKO, and BO ROTHSTEIN. "Government Partisanship and Managing the Economy: Japan and Sweden in Comparative Perspective." Governance 19, no. 1 (January 2006): 75–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0491.2006.00304.x.

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Stockton, Hans. "Partisanship, Ethnic Identification, and Citizen Attitudes toward Regime and Government on Taiwan." Journal of Contemporary China 15, no. 49 (November 2006): 705–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10670560600836754.

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Miller, W. L., S. Tagg, and K. Britto. "Partisanship and party preference in government and opposition: The mid-term perspective." Electoral Studies 5, no. 1 (April 1986): 31–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0261-3794(86)90027-2.

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Schumacher, Gijs. "Social democracy inside out: Government partisanship, insiders and outsiders in industrialized democracies." Acta Politica 44, no. 4 (November 3, 2009): 476–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/ap.2009.15.

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Shin, Mi Jeong. "Does Government Partisanship Influence Multinational Corporations’ Tax Payments in the United States?" Social Science Quarterly 101, no. 2 (March 2020): 759–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.12779.

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Miongsei Kang. "Democracy and the Welfare State: Government form, partisanship, and labor market institutions." National Strategy 20, no. 1 (February 2014): 95–127. http://dx.doi.org/10.35390/sejong.20.1.201403.004.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Government partisanship'

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