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Yelshibayev, R. K. "State regulation of the securities market of the Republic of Kazakhstan." BULLETIN OF THE KARAGANDA UNIVERSITY. ECONOMY SERIES 101, no. 1 (April 30, 2021): 152–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.31489/2021ec1/152-161.
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Object: The purpose is to identify promising directions for the development of the securities market of the Republic of Kazakhstan and reform the system of its government regulation. Methods: The study used methods of empirical, subject-object, system, deductive and comparative analysis. Each of these methods was used adequately to its functional capabilities and resolving abilities for solving the corresponding stage research tasks. Findings: As a result of the research by the author: features of the securities market as an object of government regulation are studied; infrastructure support of the system of government regulation of the securities market of the Republic of Kazakhstan was examined; assessment of the current state of the securities market of the Republic; system problems of government regulation and market development are investigated; promising areas of reforming the securities market of the Republic of Kazakhstan and its government regulation system are developed and scientifically substantiated. Conclusions: A shift of focus from problems of legal support of the system of government regulation of the securities market of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the problem of primary transparency and reliability of the market in terms of economic integration and global coronacrisis will allow achieving the following targets: share market capitalization to GDP will double if new IPOs are held by corporate issuers; RFCA will join the group of ten leading financial centers in Asia; access to financial services for a wide range of consumers will be provided; increase of financial literacy of the population, protection of interests of potential investors and safety of savings of market participants will be ensured.
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Galchynska, Ju. "IMPROVEMENT OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF BIOENERGY MARKET." Investytsiyi: praktyka ta dosvid, no. 7 (April 18, 2019): 64. http://dx.doi.org/10.32702/2306-6814.2019.7.64.
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Marichova, Aneta. "Efficiency of the construction market and need for government regulation." Ovidius University Annals of Constanta - Series Civil Engineering 19, no. 1 (December 20, 2017): 37–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/ouacsce-2017-0004.
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Abstract For a long time in economic theory and practice, regulation is only linked to the need for state intervention in monopolistic markets, by developing uniform, simple regulatory rules to limit and control the monopoly power, the monopoly price, mergers and acquisitions between companies in the same industry and others. In recent years the prevailing opinion that government regulation is particularly necessary in oligopolistic markets where there are several leading, dominant companies that can influence the price, quantity and quality of the product offered. However, this regulatory policy should not apply to common rules and taking into account the specifics of the market/industry, market structure (concentration level) of the various market segments and the relevant economic activity. The aim of the study: 1) Evaluation of the efficiency of the construction market, 2) Demonstrate the need for government intervention, 3) Guidelines for the implementation of the regulatory function of the government.
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Bedin, Boris. "Possible Focus Areas of Government Regulation of the Real Estate Market." Известия Байкальского государственного университета 28, no. 3 (September 3, 2018): 508–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.17150/2500-2759.2018.28(3).508-516.
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The housing problem is relevant for many countries, including Russia. The solution of this problem is impossible without active and meaningful participation by the state. The residential real estate market has specific characteristics that significantly distinguish it from other markets. The article highlights the features of the residential real estate market as an object of government regulation. The author describes specific features of the government as a subject of management of the residential real estate market, substantiates rationale for the active participation of the state in the management of the real estate market, and outlines possible directions of government regulation of the residential real estate market. The author also describes the Russian experience of implementing certain measures in the framework of direct and indirect forms of government regulation of the residential real estate market as well as the results of such events.
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Aaskoven, Lasse. "Redistributing under fiscal constraint: partisanship, debt, inequality and labour market regulation." Journal of Public Policy 39, no. 3 (July 16, 2018): 423–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0143814x18000193.
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AbstractLabour market regulation varies significantly, both within and between developed democracies. While there has been extensive research and debate in economics on the consequences of labour market regulation, the political causes for levels and changes in labour market regulation have received less scholarly attention. This article investigates a political economy explanation for differences in labour market regulation building on a theoretical argument that labour regulation can be used as a nonfiscal redistribution tool. Consequently, partisanship, the demand for redistribution and government budget constraint jointly determine whether labour market regulation will increase or decrease. Consistent with this argument, panel analyses from 33 Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development countries reveal that labour market regulation increases under left-wing governments that face increased market inequality and high government debt.
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D'Hollander, David, and Axel Marx. "Strengthening private certification systems through public regulation." Sustainability Accounting, Management and Policy Journal 5, no. 1 (February 11, 2014): 2–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/sampj-04-2013-0016.
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Purpose – Private certification systems (PCS) have emerged as governance tools for sustainable development, regulating social and environmental standards through global supply chains. PCS are seen as essentially private and market-driven, but governments have engaged with them in various ways. There are also substantial differences in the institutional design of PCS with regard to the standard-setting process, ex-ante conformity assessment and ex-post verification procedures. Consequently, what determines the institutional design of PCS has attracted growing attention. This article argues that governments, through public regulation, influence the design of PCS, which in turn affects their effectiveness. The paper aims to discuss these issues. Design/methodology/approach – First, a review of academic literature, policy and legal documents presents how PCS have become institutionalized in government policy, focusing on sustainable public procurement (SPP) regulation. Second, the authors explore the link between effectiveness and the institutional design of PCS by empirically assessing the variations between institutional parameters conducive to effectiveness. Data from the Ecolabel Index database were used to assess the presence or absence of four institutional design parameters related to the rule-making and monitoring mechanisms of PCS. Findings – Public procurement regulations are important drivers influencing the institutional design of PCS. The buying power and market share of government spending is a potential tool for policy-makers not only to stimulate the adoption of PCS, but also for shaping their design and effectiveness. However, the impact of such policies is highly dependent upon the market-share of public procurement within a given sector. In addition to public procurement frameworks, other factors drive the institutional evolution of PCS. Originality/value – The article connects two themes within the study of non-state market regulation; the growing interaction of governments with PCS, and the institutional variety and development of these systems.
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Awaga, A. L., W. Xu, L. Liu, and Y. Zhang. "Evolutionary game of green manufacturing mode of enterprises under the influence of government reward and punishment." Advances in Production Engineering & Management 15, no. 4 (December 24, 2020): 416–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.14743/apem2020.4.375.
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Green production mode is an advanced manufacturing mode. However, due to the environmental externality of green production, it is different for a pure market mechanism to promote the evolution of green operation mode of manufacturing enterprises. Government regulation is very important. This paper establishes an evolutionary game model of whether manufacturing enterprises choose to implement green production mode when the government implements two different mechanisms of reward and punishment. Considering the complexity of strategy selection of enterprises' green production behaviour under market competition, the method constructs the simulation analysis model of enterprises' green product production behaviour with multi-subject participation. We can simulate the influence of these factors on the strategic choice of both parties (enterprises and governments) by changing the different influence factors, and studying the evolutionary law of different government guidance and regulation strategies on the production behaviour of green products. These factors include government incentives, penalties, reputations, costs, differences in the cost of implementing green production on the corporate side, corporate reputation, and false rewards or penalties. By the computer implementation of multi-subject modelling, the results show that enterprises' green product production behaviour needs the government's guidance and regulation. When formulating relevant policies, the government should combine various guidance and regulation strategies and fully consider the influence of market competition.
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Fridman, A. A., and M. A. Verbetskaia. "Government regulation of the market for higher education." Journal of the New Economic Association 45, no. 1 (2020): 12–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.31737/2221-2264-2020-45-1-1.
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Shen, Liang, and Yu Yan Wang. "The Limit Price Strategy Analysis of Integrated Medicine Supply Chain Based on Government Regulation." Applied Mechanics and Materials 397-400 (September 2013): 2553–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.397-400.2553.
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Considering the integrated medicine supply chain, and introducing the government limit pricing and subsidy mechanism, the pricing strategy of integrated medicine supply chain was studied in this paper. And the optimal strategy in the face of market fluctuations caused by unconventional emergencies based on government regulation was given. The study shows that, under different subsidy levels, the optimal production volume, retail price and profit of the supply chain are related to production cost, market size, government regulation and government subsidy; governments limit price regulation on medicines is welfare for both consumers and retailers, and it is favorable for medicine supply chains normal development.
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Melnyk, Viktoriia. "Specific features of government regulation of Ukraine’s agriculture market." Herald of Ternopil National Economic University, no. 2(92) (March 3, 2019): 36–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.35774/visnyk2019.02.036.
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Introduction. The necessity of government regulation of Ukraine’s agriculture market is determined by the unique features of Ukrainian agricultural sector and its significance for the food safety. The structural transformations of the internal and external environments have had a major impact on the development of agriculture and the national economy as a whole. Since the current challenges are getting deeper in the conditions of globalization processes, the research of this issue is of relevance. Purpose. The purpose of the article is to provide a rationale for theoretical, methodological and strategic principles of government regulation of agriculture at this point of time. Methods. The theoretical and methodological framework of the study includes the dialectic method of thinking and a holistic integrated approach to the issue of government regulation of Ukraine’s agriculture market. The methods of deduction, analysis and synthesis are used to study the concepts of government regulation of agriculture market and its basic components, namely, market, government, regulation, agricultural products. Analysis and monographic method are used to identify specific features of government regulation of agricultural production with respect to international practices of government regulation. Logical grouping is applied for describing the key trends in the development and support of agricultural sector. Results. The article systematizes and describes specific features of government regulation of agriculture market with regard to its main components, namely, market, government, regulation, agricultural production. The author considers the factors that determine distinctive features of government regulation of agriculture in Ukraine, taking into account world experience in government regulation. Within the context of discussing government regulation of agriculture market, special attention is drawn to government investment and innovation policy. The strategic areas of government regulation of agribusiness operation and development are described. The paper suggests ways of improving government performance and increasing its efficiency in enhancing Ukraine’s agricultural production. It is determined that government regulation of agricultural production is implemented through a set of measures that are aimed at promoting better conditions for producing agricultural goods. At present, the main areas of development and support for the agricultural sector by the government and the key goals of government regulation of agriculture include: quality assurance and competitiveness of domestic agricultural production; conservation and restoration of natural resources; creation of an effective market and development of its infrastructure. Discussion. The article claims that further studies should be aimed at seeking innovative techniques of institutional transformations, which create a basis for effective agriculture market.
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Gede Dwiki Cahyadi, Anak Agung Sagung Laksmi Dewi, and I Wayan Arthanaya. "Implementasi Peraturan Daerah Kabupaten Klungkung Nomor 2 Tahun 2018 tentang Retribusi Pelayanan Pasar." Jurnal Preferensi Hukum 3, no. 2 (April 30, 2022): 437–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.55637/jph.3.2.4959.437-442.
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The traders who sell in the Public Market owned by the Klungkung Regency Government have an obligation to pay a market levy. The Regional Government together with the Klungkung Regency Cooperatives and UMKM Service are institutions in charge of retribution in accordance with statutory regulations. The purpose of this study is to discuss the implementation of the Klungkung Regency Regional Regulation No. 2 of 2018 on Levy Taxes and to examine the legal consequences of the Klungkung Regency Regional Regulation No. 2 of 2018 concerning Market Service Fees, Especially in the Semarapura Market. This study uses an empirical method using a sociological approach, a conceptual approach, and a factual approach. Market levies have an influence on local revenue (PAD) as a significant source of revenue for routine and development financing in an autonomous region. The continuation of the Covid-19 pandemic, namely realizing the abolition of fines if the market retribution arrears are more than two months and only required to pay the principal, referring to the policies issued by the cooperative and MSME services as government institutions that take shelter in managing user charges. Public markets in Klungkung Regency that are required to pay a levy are Semarapura Public Market, Galiran Public Market, Kusumba Public Market, Mentigi Public Market, and Senggol Public Market.
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Tkachuk, Vadym A., and Ivan V. Solonenchuk. "GROUNDS FOR SELECTION OF THE ENERGY MARKET GOVERNMENT REGULATION TOOL." Management 29, no. 1 (September 4, 2019): 76–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.30857/2415-3206.2019.1.6.
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Introduction. World experience has shown that the high energy intensity of the economy coupled with the scarcity of its own energy base causes many problems of low competitiveness of the country. The use of an effective model of state regulation of energy consumption allows us to form an effective energy saving strategy, to intensify the processes of updating the fixed assets with high-tech energy-saving equipment and technologies.Hypothesis: the lack of a universal approach to building a system of state regulation of the energy market requires focusing on individual methods and directions of implementing energy conservation policies.The purpose of the study is to substantiate and develop practical recommendations for implementing an effective policy of state regulation of the energy market.Methods of research: historical and logical – in the study of patterns of development of scientific thought about the role of the state in regulating the energy resources market; statistical and factor analysis – for revealing of macroeconomic factors of influence on the market of energy resources; economic and mathematical modeling – in developing the model of functioning of the energy market.Results: features of the use of modern instruments of state regulation of energy resources are analyzed. The model of functioning of the energy resources market, the introduction of which will contribute to the formation of a highly competitive environment of generating companies, transferring organizations, intermediaries, and a high level of competition, is proposed.Conclusions: state regulation of the energy resources market is an activity on the state functions in relation to the rational use of energy resources, reducing the energy intensity of the gross domestic product. Formation of effective instruments of state regulation of the energy resources market will improve the functioning of the energy sector of the Ukrainian economy.
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Antoni, David, and Freddy Leal. "The Ethics of Regulation." Deakin Papers on International Business Economics 3, no. 2 (December 1, 2010): 1–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.21153/dpibe2010vol3no2art184.
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Regulations are often imposed in order to correct any failures in the market, whether the failure is a result of the functioning of a market or the behaviour of a government. However, every regulatory intervention br ings up a question: How ethical is the regulation? Even if a regulatory intervention could achieve more effici ency or more equity, it may not mean that it is ethi cal. The concept of ethics is ne cessarily subjective, it is based on the morals and standards of a society. Yet even though a society may be concerned about ethics, the issues of equity and altrui sm matter as does the way in which firms produce and seek to rationally an d efficiently maximize profit. Defining ethics is a difficul t issue, and defining ethical regu lation is even more difficult. Any form of regulation is a tool for interv ention used to balanc e the trade-off between efficiency and equity to create harmony between a market or economy and the society it functions within. In an ideal world, any go vernment intervention implemented would be for the greater benefit of all. However, this does not always happen in the vicissitudes of the real world when governments regulate an d intervene in markets, which are, in turn, based on the principle of rational self-interest and efficiency. In this paper we discuss the role of society in market regu lation. The discussion will focus on the importance of society on ethics and therefore on what constitutes ethical regulations. In fact we argue that equity, effi ciency or even failures are not the main factors to consider when regulating. It is society that defines ethics and how society understands ethics influences the regulatory environment
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Nepp, Alexander. "Inefficiency of pension investment regulation: case of Russia." Investment Management and Financial Innovations 14, no. 3 (October 18, 2017): 148–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.21511/imfi.14(3).2017.14.
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Inflation risks are one of the major factors faced by funded pension systems. Investment risks affect such key parameters of pension systems as the amount of pension contributions and payments. In order to limit the exposure of pension systems to such risks, governments have introduced instrumental and geographical restrictions on pension investments. These measures are particularly popular in developing countries. This article discusses the efficiency of pension investment regulation in Russia and demonstrates the inadequacy of the current regulatory measures. Authors show that the negative investment results of pension market players were caused by inefficient government regulation. Authors also show that pension market players should be given more freedom in their investments and that instrumental and geographical restrictions should be removed. Was proposed to diversify investment portfolios into stocks traded on the leading stock markets, which would allow to increase investment returns and maintain the risk at the current level. Thus, it would be reasonable to invest 76% of funds into foreign assets, which will increase pension benefits and the replacement rate by 2.54 times. If we keep the geographical barriers but lift the restrictions on equity investments, the growth will be 1.34 times.
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Harti, Harti. "Implementation of Local Regulations Concerning Market Charges and Problems in Practice." Law Development Journal 2, no. 1 (September 19, 2020): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.30659/ldj.2.1.1-10.
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This research raises a problem regarding the Retribution for Markets, Wholesale Markets and Shops controlled by the Demak Regency Government in Bintoro Market, Demak Regency.This research was conducted with a qualitative approach. The research was conducted at the Demak Regency DPRD, Demak Regency Legislation Section, Demak Regency DPKKD Office. Office of the Department of Industry, Trade, Cooperatives, MSMEs, Regional Regional I Pasat UPTD Offices, Demak District Civil Service Police Unit and Bintoro market. Data collection methods used were interviews and documentation. The data analysis method is descriptive and the analysis used is qualitative.The results showed that the implementation was not going well. This can be seen in the many articles in Regional Regulation Number 2 of 1999 concerning Retribution for Markets, Wholesale Markets and Shops controlled by the Demak Regency Government which are not applied in the field besides that the collection of field contribution rates is not in accordance with the provisions stipulated in Regional Regulation Number 2 years 1999 concerning Retribution for Markets, Wholesale Markets and Shops controlled by the Demak Regency Government. In the implementation of Regional Regulation Number 2 of 1999 concerning Retribution for Markets, Wholesale Markets and Shops which are controlled by the Demak Regency Government, there are supporting and inhibiting factors.Keywords: Retribution; Market; Wholesale markets and shops
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Stern, Gary. "Credibility and Reform of Financial Institution Regulation." Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies 04, no. 03 (September 2001): 359–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219091501000504.
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There is heightened interest in reforming government regulation of financial institutions to make better use of market discipline and data. We strongly support such reforms, which are being implemented to some degree by the Federal Reserve System. However, market oriented reforms will not work unless government policies are credible in putting market participants, especially those at the largest financial institutions, at risk of loss. Establishing credible policies requires that governments address the time-consistency problem head-on. As a result, we recommend policies that establish credibility by directly reducing the incentive that policy-makers have to protect the creditors of financial institutions. Other policies, which do not address the fundamental reasons why policy-makers bail out creditors, are therefore likely to be circumvented when large banks get into trouble.
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Li, Xiang, and Yongjian Li. "On green market segmentation under subsidy regulation." Supply Chain Management: An International Journal 22, no. 3 (May 8, 2017): 284–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/scm-11-2015-0425.
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Purpose This study aims to provide a better understanding of the market balance between regular (high-carbon) and green (low-carbon) products. Further, this study analyses the role of government subsidy policy, based on the results of the government’s optimal green subsidy decision and its implication for green market segmentation and social welfare. Design/methodology/approach This study adopts a Stackelberg game framework to study the interaction between the government’s subsidy regulations and the firms’ marketing regimes. When considering government subsidy decision, we use multi-objective programming theory and turn the problem into weighted single-objective optimisation programming. Findings This study explores three marketing regimes and identifies the conditions under which each regime should be adopted by a firm. Further, investigating the optimal subsidy decision problem for the government reveals three subsidy regimes corresponding to the three marketing regimes. The government may be stuck in a regime of useless subsidy and the reason for this phenomenon is analysed as well. Research limitations/implications Developing the model into a more complex supply chain situation will enhance the applicability of the framework. Incorporating other environmental regulations, such as carbon tax, can be interesting research extensions of this study. Practical implications This study provides a quantitative framework, which can help the regulator gain a deeper understanding of green subsidy policies and assist focal companies in acquiring a better appreciation of green marketing segmentation. Originality/value The study is one of the first few works to explore the optimal design of green subsidy regulation for the government and its impact on market segmentations of high- and low-carbon products by using quantitative modelling approaches and deriving vital managerial insights.
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Berezovska, Lyudmyla, and Anastasiia Kyrychenko. "STATE REGULATION OF CAPITAL MARKET IN UKRAINE." Scientific Notes of Ostroh Academy National University, "Economics" Series 1, no. 21(49) (June 24, 2021): 4–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.25264/2311-5149-2021-21(49)-4-9.
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In modern conditions a developed stock market is a necessary element of the country's economy effective functioning as it establishes legal and economic relations between businesses that need financial resources and individuals who can provide them. The level of business activity in this sector determines the state of economic development of the country. Exchange activity in a market economy requires government regulation in order to ensure the efficiency, balance and stability of the exchange market. The purpose of the article is to analyze the state regulation of the stock market in Ukraine. The article analyzes the dynamics of trading on the stock market of Ukraine, identifies problems with its operation. The main models of state regulation of the financial services market are considered, namely: monoregulatory and polyregulatory. It is concluded that there is a multi-regulatory model of organized markets in Ukraine, as regulatory functions are assigned to the National Commission on Securities and Stock Market and the National Bank of Ukraine on domestic government bonds, money market derivative contracts, money market instruments. The state regulation of the stock market in Ukraine in accordance with the Law of Ukraine "On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine on Simplification of Attracting Investments and Introduction of New Financial Instruments" of June 19, 2020 is studied. which includes capital markets and commodity markets; improving the organization of the depository and clearing system; introduction of a trade repository and a liquidation of the netting mechanism; enshrining in law the differences between qualified and unqualified investors; introduction of green bonds as a new type of financial instruments. It is concluded that the adoption of the above law is an important step in the development of the stock market, as this law amends the law "On Securities and Stock Market" and establishes uniform rules for all exchange traders, defines the market regulator and circulation mechanism. financial instruments, radically changes the structure of the capital market and adapts Ukrainian legislation to the norms of the European Union in the field of financial services, bringing Ukraine closer to the global financial space.
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Ferrier, Peyton, and Russell Lamb. "Government regulation and quality in the US beef market." Food Policy 32, no. 1 (February 2007): 84–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2006.01.004.
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Jackson, Tim. "Pricing for pollution: Market pricing, government regulation, environmental policy." Energy Policy 20, no. 1 (January 1992): 84–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0301-4215(92)90153-s.
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Kusumawati, Berlianingsih, Muchtar Riva’i, and Ali Chaerudin. "Kebijakan Strategis Peningkatan Kapasitas Pasar Tradisional Dan Pedagang Kaki Lima Dengan Konsep Kemitraan Di Tangerang Selatan." Liquidity 2, no. 2 (July 2, 2018): 179–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.32546/lq.v2i2.120.
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Presidential Regulation No. 112/2007 and Regulation of the Minister of Trade No. 53/2008 concerning the Arrangement and Development of Traditional Markets in Modern Market has been established. So along with the implementation of these regulations, then the rules to increase the capabilities and bargaining power of traditional traders, street vendors and entrepreneurs of modern markets is a strategic policy. The purpose of this study is to examine the concept of "partnership" among small and large enterprises. The method used socio-legal which determine and analyze power behavior/ effectiveness of the regulations require a review of the philosophical, juridical, economic, sociological and political, and examine methods follow the theory of participation by conducting a survey of objects that match the theme of this research. The result informed us that the Local Government of Tangerang Selatan has been launched the local regulation which is legally very beneficial for retail trade arrangements between traditional markets, and the Modern Market. However, the regulation has not been tested in practice as an evident effectiveness of the regulation.
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Nakamura, Masao. "The security market and the changing government role in Japan." Asian Education and Development Studies 5, no. 4 (October 3, 2016): 388–407. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/aeds-09-2015-0044.
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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to explain how current security market regulations in Japan have evolved following Japan’s corporate governance reforms, which began in the 1990s after the bursting of a massive financial bubble. As part of the reform, Japan aimed to introduce US-style corporate governance mechanisms. Design/methodology/approach This paper first explains the process behind Japan’s corporate governance reforms using the theory of selective adaptation. By doing so, the various changes that have taken place in the regulations of security markets are also explained. The paper concludes with a discussion of the limitations of transplanting US-style corporate governance mechanisms in Japan and the implications for the functioning of Japan’s security markets. Findings While applying a selective adaptation framework to Japan’s efforts to transplant US-style corporate governance mechanisms to its own markets, the author found that certain Japan-specific business practices, such as its heavy reliance on keiretsu corporate groupings, may interfere with the market-based business practices and free competition which characterize the US system. This in turn places limitations on the functioning of US-style security markets in Japan. Originality/value This paper explains the limitations of government regulation on security markets in Japan, which may be of interest to both public and private sector analysts. This paper focusses on Japan’s experience of transplanting US-style corporate governance mechanisms to Japan. The author expect that Japan’s experience will be of much interest to China, South Korea and other countries in East Asia, where pyramidal and other types of business groups play important roles in their economies.
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DORON, ISRAEL, and ERNIE LIGHTMAN. "Assisted-living for older people in Israel: market control or government regulation?" Ageing and Society 23, no. 6 (October 29, 2003): 779–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0144686x03001417.
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In recent decades there has been a rapid expansion of assisted-living facilities for older people in many different countries. Much of this growth has occurred with only limited or no government regulation, but many problems have arisen, typically around the quality of care, which have led to demands that governments act to protect vulnerable residents. This paper examines whether formal legal regulation is the optimal policy to protect the needs and rights of frail residents, while respecting the legitimate interests of others, such as operators and owners. It presents the case for and against direct legal regulation (as in institutions), and suggests that no overall a priori assessment is possible. The analysis is based on the case of Israel, where proposed regulations for assisted-living have been introduced but not implemented. After a brief history of assisted-living in Israel – its recent dramatic growth and why this occurred – the paper concludes that formal direct regulation is not the best route to follow, but that the better course would be to develop totally new ‘combined’ regulatory legislation. This would define the rights of residents and encourage self-regulation alongside minimal and measured mechanisms of deterrence. Such an approach could promote the continued development of the assisted-living industry in Israel and elsewhere, while guaranteeing that the rights, needs and dignity of older residents are protected.
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Shao, Y., G. Chen, R. Li, and F. Liu. "Government regulation and consumer evaluation after dairy products scandal in China." Acta Alimentaria 49, no. 1 (March 2020): 111–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1556/066.2020.49.1.14.
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With the continuous expansion of the global dairy trade market, the quality and safety of the Chinese dairy market have a wide and far-reaching impact on the world. Based on the development of the dairy scandal in the past few years in China, this study illustrates the serious damage of melamine on human health and the negative impact on the dairy industry in China. This study shows that the lack of effective government regulations is a key reason for dairy market failure. Consumers are lacking confidence in the quality of Chinese dairy products and the government's market regulations. The Chinese dairy market will continue to rely on imported dairy products. By analyzing the typical cases of the dairy market in China, this study aims to provide a guide for dairy industries in other countries.
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Bruno, Brunella, Enrico Onali, and Klaus Schaeck. "Market Reaction to Bank Liquidity Regulation." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 53, no. 2 (March 4, 2018): 899–935. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022109017001089.
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We measure market reactions to announcements concerning liquidity regulation, a key innovation in the Basel framework. Our initial results show that liquidity regulation attracts negative abnormal returns. However, the price responses are less pronounced when coinciding announcements concerning capital regulation are backed out, suggesting that markets do not consider liquidity regulation to be binding. Bank- and country-specific characteristics also matter. Liquid balance sheets and high charter values increase abnormal returns whereas smaller long-term funding mismatches reduce abnormal returns. Banks located in countries with large government debt and tight interbank conditions or with prior domestic liquidity regulation display lower abnormal returns.
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Biswas, Amit K., and Marcel Thum. "Corruption, environmental regulation and market entry." Environment and Development Economics 22, no. 1 (August 30, 2016): 66–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1355770x16000218.
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AbstractThe authors develop a simple analytical framework to study the welfare-maximizing environmental standards when market entry is endogenous and firms can circumvent regulation by bribing corrupt officials. Corruption changes the tradeoff in environmental policy. Corruption leads more polluting firms to enter into the market, which requires tighter environmental regulation. However, corruption also makes trading in some environmental protection for a marginally higher market entry optimal for the government.
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Guy, Shannon. "Regulation of Private Equity in Brazil: Policy Questions Presented and Critique." Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review, no. 2.2 (2013): 309. http://dx.doi.org/10.36639/mbelr.2.2.regulation.
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In this note, I explore some of the policy questions affecting Brazil’s private equity industry that the country must tackle. In Part II, Section A, I begin by asking the threshold question of whether the Brazilian government should play an active role in encouraging the growth of the private equity industry. I resolve that Brazil should play an active role in encouraging the industry’s growth to encourage several possible benefits to the real economy. Private equity may benefit the economy by providing job growth and job preservation, improved access to credit for firms that would not otherwise have funds, and improved access to talented managers. Further, private equity may be an effective screening mechanisms for selecting good companies. In Part II, Section B, I ask whether Brazil has successfully encouraged the growth of the private equity industry, or has set policies that stifle its growth. By applying Ribeiro et al.’s “supply” and “demand” factors, which lead to private equity growth in the Brazilian context, I conclude that Brazil has done a commendable job creating a regulatory environment that bolsters the growth of the private equity industry, but that lowering interest rates and the costs associated with starting a business would help the industry to expand further. In Part III, Section C, I ask whether the Brazilian government should play an active role in regulating its nascent private equity industry, and conclude that Brazil should proactively regulate the industry, in certain areas, because the benefits of good governance outweigh the costs associated with added regulatory compliance. In Section D, I ask which actors are best suited to create and enforce private equity regulations—government agencies or self-regulating agencies. I conclude that the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission does not, at present, provide sufficient oversight of the private equity industry, and that the self-regulatory agencies, like ANBIMA, ABVCAP, and BM&FBOVESPA cannot adequately enforce their own regulations due to conflicts of interest. In Part III, I critique Brazil’s current regulatory policies. I ask which risks Brazilian regulators should focus on mitigating, and try to assess their effectiveness at regulating each risk. In eight sections, I explore different risks that a robust private equity industry could pose for Brazil: (1) increased leverage in the capital markets, (2) market abuse problems, (3) conflicts of interest, (4) transparency risks, (5) overall market efficiency risks, (6) market access risks, (7) systemic risk to capital markets, and (8) risks for qualified investors. I conclude that of these risks, Brazilian regulators should focus primarily on market-abuse risks, conflicts of interest, and transparency issues, and that, at present increased regulation for the other enumerated risks is either unnecessary or impractical. Part IV Concludes.
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Cai, Chengrong. "Research on the Policies and Means Changes of Macro Regulation and Control of Chinese and Foreign Governments." Journal of Finance Research 1, no. 1 (October 16, 2017): 5. http://dx.doi.org/10.26549/jfr.v1i1.379.
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In the process of economic development, government uses the "visible hand" to achieve macroeconomic regulation and control for "market failure", which has been common knowledge among people after World War II. Comparing policy and means adopted by Chinese and foreign governments in macro regulation and control, we can see that the choice is different in different historical periods and the change of emphasis in macro regulation and control policy and means has the convergence tendency. We can make the following conclusion from research of the change rules of macro regulation and control means in the market economic condition of Chinese and foreign governments: supply-side structural reform in China complies with the basic rules of development of market economy.
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Gilbert, Berdine. "Opioids: Government intervention and black markets." Southwest Respiratory and Critical Care Chronicles 6, no. 23 (April 18, 2018): 28–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.12746/swrccc.v6i23.460.
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The U.S. is in the midst of an opioid crisis. This crisis is partially responsible for declining life expectancy. The rising mortality in young people 25-44 is partially responsible and is being attributed to opioids. In this article, the formation of black markets in response to government regulation will be examined. We will also examine how the black market changes in character with subsidies. The subsidies available for Medicaid patients can be close to 100%. The subsidy makes it profitable for Medicaid patients to be recruited as a source of supply of opioids. The economics of opioids and their black markets will be explained on the basis of supply and demand. The conclusion is that the type of illicit behavior occurring in the U.S. was both rational and predictable based on the regulation of narcotics, monopoly pricing of certain opioids, and the availability of government subsidies to obtain these opioids.
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Meyer, Brett. "Learning to Love the Government." World Politics 68, no. 3 (May 18, 2016): 538–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0043887116000058.
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One counterintuitive variation in wage-setting regulation is that countries with the highest labor standards and strongest labor movements are among the least likely to set a statutory minimum wage. This, the author argues, is due largely to trade union opposition. Trade unions oppose the minimum wage when they face minimal low-wage competition, which is affected by the political institutions regulating industrial action, collective agreements, and employment, as well as by the skill and wage levels of their members. When political institutions effectively regulate low-wage competition, unions oppose the minimum wage. When political institutions are less favorable toward unions, there may be a cleavage between high- and low-wage unions in their minimum wage preferences. The argument is illustrated with case studies of the UK, Germany, and Sweden. The author demonstrates how the regulation of low-wage competition affects unions’ minimum wage preferences by exploiting the following labor market institutional shocks: the Conservatives’ labor law reforms in the UK, the Hartz labor market reforms in Germany, and the European Court of Justice's Laval ruling in Sweden. The importance of union preferences for minimum wage adoption is also shown by how trade union confederation preferences influenced the position of the Labour Party in the UK and the Social Democratic Party in Germany.
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Tini�, Seha M. "Derivatives and stock market volatility: Is additional government regulation necessary?" Journal of Financial Services Research 9, no. 3-4 (December 1995): 351–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01051754.
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Cortes, Bienvenido S. "Government regulation, productivity, and farm size in Japan's rice market." International Advances in Economic Research 1, no. 2 (May 1995): 104–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02295964.
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Whiteside, Noel. "State Policy and Employment Regulation in Britain: An Historical Perspective." International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 35, Issue 3 (September 1, 2019): 379–400. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/ijcl2019018.
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Waged work in Britain is being transformed: permanent full-time jobs decline as precarious irregular task-based employment increases. This development is actively supported by government policy (labour market deregulation, the promotion of ‘flexibility’), to promote work as the sole route out of poverty. Using historical evidence, this article argues that, on the contrary, irregular employment was for long understood as a primary cause of poverty, not its cure. It thus generates high levels of social dependency. The UK’s earliest labour market policies sought to eradicate casual work and to encourage permanent employment – policies promoted assiduously for most of the twentieth century. Current governments are recreating the labour markets of the late nineteenth century, the conditions that stimulated state intervention in the first place. Three salient points arise. First, irregular employment exacerbates widening social inequalities. Second, it damages public trust. Employers evade employment obligations for task-based workers while state regulations require job-seekers to take on this work. Third, multiple job-holding and unstable employment destroys labour market categories on which policy analysis and the law rely. Legal frameworks governing employment rights are weakened and public understanding of labour markets is undermined.
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Kaur, Simrit, and S. P. Jain. "Privatization and Public Regulation." Paradigm 1, no. 2 (January 1998): 109–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0971890719980217.
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In many developing and developed countries, privatization through transfer of ownership from public to the private hands is considered as a cure for most of the problems faced by the public sector enterprises (PSEs.) However, policy makers tend to forget that both the systems – private and public – are imperfect. If market failure necessitates the need for government intervention, then failures associated with the government require more market friendly policies. This implies that at any point of time both systems will coexist i.e. privatization will go hand in hand. The present article attempts to discuss the modalities of privatization options and public regulation adopted by India.
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Li, Jinghua, Shuyao Wan, and Li Gou. "Analysis of the role of government in the construction of cross-regional innovation system." E3S Web of Conferences 292 (2021): 02037. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/e3sconf/202129202037.
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The cross-regional innovation system is an innovation system formed on the basis of the integration of administrative regions and economic regions. Taking the collaborative innovation of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region as an example, the role that the government should play in the construction of cross-regional innovation system is analyzed, and draws the following conclusions: There is a link between the “visible hand” (government intervention) and the “invisible hand” (market regulation). The contribution of the government is the precondition for the market to play its role, and the market mechanism further promotes the promotion of government functions, thus forming a virtuous circle in which local governments and market competition are embedded. To be specific, governments play different roles in different development stages of the cross-regional innovation system. In the initial stage of the construction of the system, the government played a leading role as a planner; In its mature stage, the government will cooperate with other various innovation entities in the region as a participant to jointly promote the effective implementation of innovation policies.
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Waring, Peter, Azad Bali, and Chris Vas. "The fourth industrial revolution and labour market regulation in Singapore." Economic and Labour Relations Review 31, no. 3 (July 24, 2020): 347–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1035304620941272.
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The race to develop and implement autonomous systems and artificial intelligence has challenged the responsiveness of governments in many areas and none more so than in the domain of labour market policy. This article draws upon a large survey of Singaporean employees and managers (N = 332) conducted in 2019 to examine the extent and ways in which artificial intelligence and autonomous technologies have begun impacting workplaces in Singapore. Our conclusions reiterate the need for government intervention to facilitate broad-based participation in the productivity benefits of fourth industrial revolution technologies while also offering re-designed social safety nets and employment protections. JEL Codes: J88, K31, O38, M53
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Wellizar, Wellizar. "IMPLEMENTASI PERATURAN DAERAH NOMOR 3 TAHUN 2007 TENTANG PENGELOLAAN PASAR (STUDI KASUS DI PASAR RAYA SOLOK)." Ensiklopedia of Journal 4, no. 2 (January 21, 2022): 289–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.33559/eoj.v4i2.1076.
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Solok City Regional Regulation No. 3 of 2007 on the Market, aiming to provide guidance,regulation,structuring,control and supervision in order to empower small traders, medium, cooperatives and traditional markets to be resilient, advanced,independent and can improve well-being. The law is set before the enactment of Law No. 12 of 2011 on the Establishment oflegislation, and until now has not been implemented properly, because it does notinvolvethe publicin the preparation, andlack of socialization. The problems are: 1) How Implementation Regulation No. 3 of 2007? 2) What are the obstacles for Solok Government in implementing the Regulation on the Management of the Market? 3) What are the efforts made by the Government of Solok in Structuring Market? The method used in this research is a sociological juridical approach using secondary data and primary data through interviews, observation and document study. Market Research Location in Solok City.The Results of the study were 1) Implementing Regulation has not done well, the obstacles are a) The regulation has not been properly socialized, b) The Market Size is not proportional to the number of traders, limited human resources managers and traders Market c) The Worse drainage system. 3) Efforts have been made: a) Establishment of institutional, b) Management of Pasar Raya, c)Provision of support for market management.d) will revitalize the Pasar Raya Solok City which has been included in the 2021-2026 RPJM.
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Rynkov, Vadim M. "Labor market regulation in Eastern Russia in 1918–1922: Institutional factors, mechanisms, and outcomes." Russian Journal of Economics 7, no. 2 (July 9, 2021): 137–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.32609/j.ruje.7.56634.
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This article uses archival documents and periodical publications to analyze the impact of the Civil War on the labor market in the regions of Eastern Russia. It considers key labor market institutions such as legislation, infrastructure (labor exchanges, unemployment funds, and professional and entrepreneurship organizations), and labor contracts. It has been established that there was continuity in the regulatory framework and labor market management tools between the Provisional Government and the anti-Bolshevik governments. The study shows the challenges and shortcomings of managing hiring and dismissal processes by soft regulatory methods given the deep economic crisis. The labor supply was backed by extensive cohorts of prisoners of war, refugees, and foreign workers, which contributed to a drop in labor rates. The government sought to stabilize the situation by reinforcing transactional barriers to reduce employment. The labor market in Eastern Russia was subjected to regionalization and localization.
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Chen, Baike, Yuxia Rong, and Zhaoxia Jing. "Generation Revenue Regulation and Incentive Contract Design in Electricity Market." E3S Web of Conferences 252 (2021): 01009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/e3sconf/202125201009.
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In order to curb market power, encourage investment and redistribute welfare, revenue regulation should be carried out in electricity market. The incentive contract represented by the Contract for Difference is a kind of regulation. This paper proposes a Government Authorized Contract based on Revenue Estimation Method (REM) from the perspective of regulating generation revenue. First, the principle and design of the Vesting Contract in Singapore electricity market is employed, analyzing its limitations in regulation. Then, the incentive contract based on REM is presented in four steps. Finally, the IEEE30 node classic system is adopted to demonstrate the proposed model, showing that it can promote generators to bid rationally.
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Shen, Liang, Yuanyuan Chen, Runjie Fan, and Yuyan Wang. "Government Supervision on Explosive Enterprises’ Immoral Behaviors in E-Commerce Enterprises: An Evolutionary Game Analysis." Complexity 2021 (June 10, 2021): 1–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/6664544.
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Explosive enterprises’ immoral behaviors in the online shopping market are widespread and have not been effectively solved. Especially in developing countries, there is a direct relationship between massive immoral behaviors and the inefficiency of government supervision. Using an evolutionary game, this paper finds that immoral behavior is more likely to spread in online markets than in traditional markets. Only when government supervision and punishment are large enough and government’s punishment for the illegal enterprise exceeds extra supervision costs that government pays, explosive immoral behaviors can be curbed. Additionally, consumer support is an essential factor in improving the efficiency of government supervision. This study sorts out the interactions between e-commerce market participants and the government, obtains a path to achieve efficient government regulation, and offers management insights. The findings can serve as a reference for ensuring order in the emerging online shopping market and can also provide theoretical references for future related research.
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Slepak, V. Yu. "LEGAL REGULATION OF THE STATE AID SUPPORT FOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION." Lex Russica, no. 12 (January 4, 2020): 122–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.17803/1729-5920.2019.157.12.122-134.
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Taking into account the generally accepted view that competition in the market brings positive results in terms of pricing, production and resource use, it should be noted that government intervention is able to improve the functioning of markets and thus promote reasonable, sustainable and inclusive growth. For the R&D and innovation sphere is characterized by the inefficiency of the market mechanism, because usually market participants do not take into account the positive external effects of the use of this direction, considering it less significant in comparison with others. Similarly, R&D and innovation projects are hampered by funding or lack of coordination among market actors. Thus, government assistance in R&D and innovation can be compatible with the rules of the internal (common) market. It can be expected that government support reduces market failures in this area and will facilitate the implementation of an important project of common European interest, will promote the development of certain economic activities, where the subsequent distortions of competition and trade will not be contrary to the common interest.
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Sun, Limei, Jinyu Wang, Zhicheng Wang, and Leorey Marquez. "Mechanism of Carbon Finance’s Influence on Radical Low-Carbon Innovation with Evidence from China." Sustainability 12, no. 18 (September 18, 2020): 7708. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su12187708.
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Radical low-carbon innovations have considerable technological and revolutionary influences. These key technologies considerably reduce carbon dioxide emissions. This study examines the role of carbon finance development in China’s radical low-carbon innovations. The paper identifies the key entities involved, constructs a network model of the interaction between carbon finance and radical low-carbon innovation, and uses multi-agent simulation modeling to analyze the associated influence mechanism. The results demonstrate that the carbon market can promote radical low-carbon innovation by (1) regulating the number of enterprises participating subject to carbon emission regulations, (2) regulating the number of market intermediaries, (3) establishing the market regulation level, and (4) setting the carbon intensity reduction level. The paper concludes that the Chinese government can formulate novel carbon market-related policies and regulations that, in a timely manner, influence the relationship between the carbon market and participating entities to promote the development of radical low-carbon technologies.
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Smith, Michael G., and Johannes Urpelainen. "Windows of opportunity: legislative fragmentation conditions the effect of partisanship on product market deregulation." Journal of Public Policy 36, no. 1 (January 23, 2015): 51–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0143814x14000300.
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AbstractPrevious research on deregulation in industrialised countries emphasises differences between left-wing and right-wing parties, but data on product market regulation (PMR) indicate that these differences have been modest. If partisan preferences on the merits of deregulation differ sharply, why such modest differences? We argue that partisan differences only become pronounced when the government is strong and rules a relatively unified legislature. Thus, legislative fragmentation should reduce the left-right difference in PMR. We test this theory against PMR data in 29 industrialised countries, 1978–2007. We find that right-wing governments only have a strong negative effect on regulation if the legislature and the government are not fragmented.
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Chitra, M., and Nandan Kumar. "Pharmaceutical Market Structure in India & Competition Concerns." Shanlax International Journal of Arts, Science and Humanities 8, no. 1 (July 2, 2020): 233–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.34293/sijash.v8i1.3295.
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Health Status of any country depends upon its preventive, curative, and promotive measures. But to implement these measures with available skilled human resources, and infrastructure, the growth of the pharmaceutical market is an essential one. Health Status is a function of health professionals, health infrastructure, invention, and innovations in the health sector, and the nature of government programs and policies. The Government of India exposed ‘Pharma Vision 2020’ aimed at making India a global leader in end-to-end drug production. Permission time for new facilities has been reduced to boost investments. Further, the government introduced devices such as the Drug Price Control Order and the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority to deal with the issue of affordability and availability of medicines (www.idma.com). India’s cost of making is significantly lower than that of the US and almost half of that of Europe. It gives a competing edge to India over others. (Sectoral Report / Sep 2016). The competition in these markets is very crucial for making quality drugs at affordable prices to consumers. Competition law plays an essential role in dealing with anti-competitive issues in the sector and maintains competitive markets. Hence the researcher attempted to view the status of existing Indian pharmaceutical market structure, government regulations, an,d common anti-competitive concerns in the sector. Too much regulation reduces competition in the market. An equal act of management and maintaining competition is required to benefit human society in reducing theirs out of pocket expenditure for pharmaceutical products.
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Popov, N. V. "Evolution of Tariff Government Regulation in Energy and Communal Markets on the Basis of Smart Regulation System." Administrative Consulting, no. 6 (August 24, 2021): 148–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.22394/1726-1139-2021-6-148-157.
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The Aim. Analysis of effects according to digital pricing system advent in energy and communal sphere in Russia as a part of new industrial revolution.Purpose of a research. Review of a current world trends on energy markets, determination of ways and instruments for tariff regulation digital development on the energy and communal markets, definition of possible results from complex digitalization of tariff regulation system.Methodology of a research. During research of this article were widely applied instruments of complex theoretical analysis, cause-effect relations were tested between theoretical hypothesis and practical realization of digital tariff regulation models.Result of a research. By the author were written and systematic defined concept of pricing digitalization system on the Russian energy and communal markets according to analysis of main world trends in this economic sphere. The term of digital platform of tariff regulation was developed.Output. Digitalization of tariff regulation could develop premises for deregulation of energy and communal spheres in Russia enable the competence development and lower the entrance barriers for new market players what can lead to higher innovation and investment level recruited in these important markets.
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Zhu, Qi. "A Perspective of Evolution for Carbon Emissions Trading Market: The Dilemma between Market Scale and Government Regulation." Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 2017 (2017): 1–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2017/1432052.
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Which means are more effective for reducing carbon emission? Our paper argues the effect of the government regulation and the market trading on the carbon emission. Based on our model, we obtain three conclusions as follows. First, government strengthened regulation can encourage firms to participate in the trading market for carbon emission. Second, there is the negative relation of supervision cost to trading price. Third, there is an alternative relationship between the scale economy level of the supervisory authority and that of the carbon emissions market. Meanwhile, our numerical simulations also confirm our results for our model analyses.
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Chen, Kevin, and Jeevika Weerahewa. "Regulation, Market Power, and Advertising Effectiveness." Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 27, no. 2 (October 1998): 209–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1068280500006523.
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Using the case of Canadian dairy industry, this paper investigates the farm level effectiveness of generic advertising in two vertically related markets under government regulation and oligopolistic power. Comparative static analysis indicates that an increase in advertising may either increase or decrease the farm level profit when the processing industry is oligopolistic. When advertising leads to an increase in the farm level profit under the oligopolistic processing industry, the size of this effect may be more than, less than, or the same as that under perfect competition. Specifications of the retail demand function play an important role in determining both the direction and magnitude of the effect of advertising on the farm level profit under the oligopolistic processing industry. The simulation results of the Canadian butter industry illustrate that the magnitude of the bias caused by an erroneous assumption regarding the market structure could be significant.
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Lee, Yeonho. "Participatory Democracy and Chaebol Regulation in Korea: State-Market Relations under the MDP Governments, 1997––2003." Asian Survey 45, no. 2 (March 2005): 279–301. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2005.45.2.279.
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The government-chaebol nexus formed under Democratic Party governments reflects new state-market relations in Korea that are predicated on a democratic model emphasizing participation and equity. The participatory democratic logic of corporate reform assumes that civic organizations, functioning as a third sector, should act as watchdogs and whistle-blowers to correct any unequal market structures.
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Lin, Xuchen, Ting-Jie Lv, and Xia Chen. "The coevolutionary relationship of technology, market and government regulation in telecommunications." China Communications 15, no. 8 (August 2018): 152–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/cc.2018.8438281.
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Захарова, Galina Zakharova, Амирова, and Elmira Amirova. "GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE GRAIN MARKET IN THE TERMS OF IMPORT SUBSTITUTION." Vestnik of Kazan State Agrarian University 10, no. 3 (September 15, 2015): 15–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.12737/14746.
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