Academic literature on the topic 'Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus'

Imperator contra praedones Some Remarks on the Illegality of the lex GabiniaSummaryIn 67 BC Aulus Gabinius, a tribunus plebis, proposed a law appointing an imperator to deal with the pirates of the Mediterranean area. The law was passed as lex Gabinia de uno imperatore contra praedones constituendo and the senate was asked to choose the right candidate. The only possible choice was Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus, the most talented and famous general of the time. The senators opposed so violently that Gabinius was almost killed. Thus, another assembly was called which appointed Pompey to the task. His campaign against the pirates was amazingly fast and successful.There are several reasons for treating this case as a deviation from the republican constitution. Firstly, the imperium was given for a period of three years which was unusually long time for an extraordinary command. Secondly, the general was given power on the whole Mediterranean area, equal to this of the provincial governors. Thirdly, he could choose his own legati which was a case unknown to the republican system. Moreover, it was the first time when an extraordinary command was given by the concilia plebis regardless the senatorial opposition.The case of lex Gabinia was one of Pompey’s numerous victories over the republic. Notwithstanding, he managed to persuade everyone to picture himself as a hero and defender o f the republic.

The introduction begins with some historiographical problems encountered in the study of provincial governance in the Roman republic, and of the two key protagonists, Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus and Marcus Porcius Cato. Discussions of what ‘good government’ meant in Roman terms and of the relevance of moral philosophy set up the parameters of the study. Next, Pompey and Cato’s activities are placed in historical context by outlining previous attempts at provincial reform. A brief discussion of sources and an outline of the book’s argument follow.

This book examines attempts to improve provincial governance from 70–50, particularly the contributions of Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus and the younger Marcus Porcius Cato. It contends that Romans of the late republic were more concerned about the problems of their empire than is generally recognized, and were taking steps to address them. These efforts ranged well beyond the sanctions of the extortion law to encompass show trials, exemplary governance, and ideas drawn from moral philosophy, culminating in 52–50 in a reform programme which combined what Cicero called ‘Cato’s policy’ of ethical governance with Pompey’s lex de provinciis, a law which transformed the very nature of provincial command. The book also demonstrates that Pompey and Cato, two figures usually seen as combatants, were capable of collaborating in the cause of reform. The opening chapters examine Pompey’s engagement with problems of imperial governance in his first consulship and in his eastern campaigns, and Cato’s Stoic view of empire. Next, attention turns to the extortion law passed by Julius Caesar in 59 and subsequent attempts by Pompey and Cato to extend its penalties to equestrian officials. The final chapters detail the aims, context, legislative framework, and implementation of the reform programme pursued by Pompey, Cato, and others in 52–50, from the catalyzing effect of Marcus Crassus’ defeat in Parthia to Cato and Cicero’s efforts to promote a new ethos of provincial governance. This programme was cut short by civil war, but provided an important model for Augustus’ reforms.