Academic literature on the topic 'Gettier, Edmund L Is justified true belief knowledge?'

In 1963, Edmund Gettier published a short paper in the journal Analysis. That paper, entitled “Is Justifi ed True Belief Knowledge?,” purported to demonstrate that even though a person is justified in believing a true proposition p, having that justified true belief (JTB) is not sufficient for the person knowing that p (Gettier, 1963). In particular, Gettier presented examples purporting to show that a person may have a justified true belief, but the belief is, in one way or another, a “lucky belief,” and so the person having the justified true belief that p does not know that p. In what follows, I argue that justified, but luckily true beliefs do count as knowledge. What is important is that there is a limited ability to generalize from such cases, suggesting that many, if not most of what we count as instances of knowledge are, to a greater or lesser extent, localized.

This work, “The Nothingness” of the Gettier Problem is an attempt to deconstruct the popularly held view that a fourth condition may be necessary for the Traditional Account of Knowledge otherwise known as JTB. Plato, it was who championed the traditional account of knowledge as justified Belief in response to the agitation of the skeptics notably Georgias and Protagoras. This tripartite account held sway until Edmund Gettier Challenged the position with his article “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” Since this challenge, scholars have tried to solve what has become known as the Gettier Problem by trying to fashion out a fourth condition to JTB. This work argues that the celebrated Gettier counter-examples in the challenge of the tripartite account is a "nothingness". The traditional account is rather fundamental in knowledge claim, hence any new vista in form of additional information on JTB should not invalidate it. The textual analysis was adopted as a method for this research.

Abstract Edmund Gettier (1963) argued that there can be justified true belief (JTB) that is not knowledge. The correctness of Gettier’s argument is questioned by showing that Smith of his famous examples does not earn justification for his incidentally true beliefs, while a doxastically more conscientious person S would come to hold justified but false beliefs. So, Gettier’s (and analogous) cases do not result in justified and true belief. This is due to a tension between deductive closure of justification and evidential support. For being justified, any believing, disbelieving, or withholding of deductively inferred propositions must be distributed proportionally to given evidential support. This proportionality principle has primacy over deductive closure in case of conflict. Although the author’s argument does not save the JTB-account, it explains why subjects in Gettier situations do not earn knowledge.

This paper attempts to provide an account of Gadamer’s conception of truth. Due to this, I attempt to venture in a path that has not been fully explored. I argue that Gadamer’s conception of truth has an anamnetic character for the following reasons: First, Gadamer views truth as an event – a disclosure or uncealment of what is hidden within the being- is part of the structure of understanding without such truth happening will not occur. Second, I will show that Gadamer’s view of truth is inseparable from his view of dialectic and understanding as these are necessary conditions of the possibility of conversation primarily characterized by his account on the hermeneutic experience, language, and tradition. Third, by looking at other salient Gadamerian concepts such as the four guiding concepts of humanism, language, understanding, and conversation, the link between truth and anamnesis is fully completed. These concepts are necessary to substantiate and support my view that indeed truth has an anamnetic character. However, I should be clear that my attempt to elucidate the anamnetic character of truth is not tantamount to trying to provide an account of the nature of truth for it is one thing to give an account of the nature of truth and another to simply provide a characterization of it. The paper will be divided into three sections. The first section will discuss Plato’s view of anamnesis and his influence to Gadamer’s thought. The second section will be on Gadamer’s conception of truth and lastly, the concluding remarks. References Ackrill, John L. Essays on Plato and Aristotle. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. Cooper, John M. (ed). Collected Works of Plato. Indianapolis, Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 1997. Gadamer, Hans-Georg. The Gadamer Reader: A Bouquet of the Later Writings. Edited by Richard E. Palmer. 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Gettiered beliefs are beliefs that fall short of knowledge in the way illustrated by Gettier cases: cases like those Edmund Gettier employed to show that justified true belief doesn’t suffice for knowledge. What has happened to a belief that falls short of knowledge in the way such cases illustrate? I focus initially on two leading substantive answers, what I call the Ease of Mistake Approach and the Lack of Credit Approach. After critically assessing and rejecting each of these approaches, I introduce and evaluate two less prominent approaches to gettiered belief. According to the view I settle on—a species of what I call the Risk of Misleading Justification Approach—a gettiered belief is one which is justified and true, yet held in such a way that the belief’s subject either actually is justified in believing many falsehoods similar to its propositional content or could well have been so justified.

‘The analysis of knowledge’ begins with Edmund Gettier who challenged the ‘classical analysis of knowledge’ that equates knowledge with justified true belief. His no-false-belief proposal had some flaws. Alvin Goldman then proposed the causal theory of knowledge: experience-based knowledge that requires the knower to be appropriately causally connected to a fact. Goldman went on to launch a fresh analysis of knowledge, focused on reliability. Reliabilism is when knowledge is true belief that is produced by a mechanism likely to produce true belief. But can knowing be analysed at all? The relationship between knowing and believing is considered in the knowledge-first and belief-first movements of epistemology.

After Edmund Gettier’s “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”, epistemology was dominated by attempts to explain what is needed in order to make justified true belief knowledge. The post-Gettier literature contained many views that tried to solve the Gettier problem by appealing to the notion of defeat. Unfortunately, all of these views are false. The failure of these views greatly contributed to a general distrust of reasons in epistemology. However, reasons are making a comeback in epistemology, both in general and in the context of the Gettier problem. There are two main aims of this chapter. First, I will argue against a natural defeat-based resolution of the Gettier problem. Second, I will defend my own defeat-based solution. This solution appeals to a modal anti-luck condition. I will argue that this condition captures anti-luck intuitions, and has virtues that rival modal anti-luck conditions lack.

This chapter considers accounts of identifying what has to be added to true belief in order to get knowledge. One tradition says that what is needed is something like an argument in defense of the belief, a justification to use the term of art. But the chapter looks further, by examining those arguments made after Edmund Gettier's influential 1963 article, which illustrated that justification on its own is not enough. Thus the chapter considers what has to be added to justified true belief in order to get knowledge. Many proposals attempting to address this assume that what needs to be added to true belief in order to get knowledge is something related to true belief but distinct from it. In contrast, this chapter suggests that whenever an individual S has a true belief P but does not know P, then S lacks important information.