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1
Lakishyk, Dmytro. "German Question in the Foreign Policy Strategy of the USA in the Second Half of the 1940s – 1980s." European Historical Studies, no. 16 (2020): 73–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/2524-048x.2020.16.6.
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The article examines US policy towards West Germany after World War II, covering a historical span from the second half of the 1940s to the 1980s. It was US policy in Europe, and in West Germany in particular, that determined the dynamics and nature of US-German relations that arose on a long-term basis after the formation of Germany in September 1949. One of the peculiarities of US-German relations was the fact that both partners found themselves embroiled in a rapidly escalating international situation after 1945. The Cold War, which broke out after the seemingly inviolable Potsdam Accords, forced the United States and Germany to be on one side of the conflict. Despite the fact that both states were yesterday’s opponents and came out of the war with completely different, at that time, incomparable, statuses. A characteristic feature of US policy on the German question in the postwar years was its controversial evolution. The American leadership had neither a conceptual plan for development, nor a clear idea of Germany’s place in the world, nor an idea of how to plan the country’s future. However, the deterioration of relations between the USA and the USSR and the birth of the two blocs forced the US government to resort to economic revival (the Marshall Plan) and military-political consolidation of Western Europe and Germany (NATO creation). US policy toward Germany has been at the heart of its wider European policy. The United States favored a strong and united Western Europe over American hegemony, trying to prevent the spread of Soviet influence. Joint participation in the suppression of communism, however, could not prevent the periodic exacerbation of relations between the United States and Germany, and at the same time did not lead to an unconditional follow-up of the West Germans in the fairway of American foreign policy.
2
Kokeev, A. "Trans-Atlantic Relations in Germany's Foreign Policy." World Economy and International Relations 59, no. 11 (2015): 38–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2015-59-11-38-46.
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Relations between Germany, the US and NATO today are the core of transatlantic links. After the Cold War and the reunification of Germany, NATO has lost its former importance to Germany which was not a "frontline state" anymore. The EU acquired a greater importance for German politicians applying both for certain political independence and for establishing of a broad partnership with Russia and China. The task of the European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) development has been regarded by Berlin as a necessary component of the NATO's transformation into a “balanced Euro-American alliance”, and the realization of this project as the most important prerequisite for a more independent foreign policy. Germany’s refusal to support the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 led to the first serious crisis in US Germany relations. At the same time, there was no radical break of the deeply rooted Atlanticism tradition in German policy. It was Angela Merkel as a new head of the German government (2005) who managed to smooth largely disagreements in relations with the United States. Atlanticism remains one of the fundamental foreign policy elements for any German government, mostly because Berlin’s hope for deepening of the European integration and transition to the EU CFSP seems unrealistic in the foreseeable future. However, there is still a fundamental basis of disagreements emerged in the transatlantic relationship (reduction of a military threat weakening Berlin’s dependence from Washington, and the growing influence of Germany in the European Union). According to the federal government's opinion, Germany's contribution to the NATO military component should not be in increasing, but in optimizing of military expenses. However, taking into account the incipient signs of the crisis overcoming in the EU, and still a tough situation around Ukraine, it seems that in the medium-term perspective one should expect further enhancing of Germany’s participation in NATO military activities and, therefore, a growth in its military expenses. In Berlin, there is a wide support for the idea of the European army. However, most experts agree that it can be implemented only when the EU develops the Common Foreign and Defense Policy to a certain extent. The US Germany espionage scandals following one after another since 2013 have seriously undermined the traditional German trust to the United States as a reliable partner. However, under the impact of the Ukrainian conflict, the value of military-political dimension of Germany’s transatlantic relations and its dependence on the US and NATO security guarantees increased. At the same time, Washington expects from Berlin as a recognized European leader a more active policy toward Russia and in respect of some other international issues. In the current international political situation, the desire to expand political influence in the world and achieve a greater autonomy claimed by German leaders seems to Berlin only possible in the context of transatlantic relations strengthening and solidarity within the NATO the only military-political organization of the West which is able to ensure the collective defense for its members against the external threats. However, it is important to take into consideration that not only the value of the United States and NATO for Germany, but also the role of Germany in the North Atlantic Alliance as a “representative of European interests” has increased. The role of Germany as a mediator in establishing the West–Russia relations remains equally important.
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Gärditz, Klaus Ferdinand. "Shepherd v. Germany." American Journal of International Law 109, no. 3 (July 2015): 623–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.5305/amerjintelaw.109.3.0623.
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In Shepherd v. Germany, the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) issued a preliminary ruling requested by a German administrative court in an asylum case brought by a United States Army service member. Applying the relevant asylum law of the European Union (EU), the ECJ held that, under certain circumstances, a conscientious objector who has deserted from his military unit may claim international refugee protection. It also clarified the conditions under which the basically legitimate prosecution of military deserters must be qualified as illegitimate persecution under international refugee law.
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Trunov, Philipp. "Germany’s security and defense policy : transformation in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic." Urgent Problems of Europe, no. 1 (2022): 254–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.31249/ape/2022.01.10.
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The COVID-19 pandemic has created significant obstacles to the implementation of national foreign policies, including the reduction of the resource base. This article analyzes the schemes and forms of government activities that can reduce the negative impact of the pandemic factor. The object of the study is the Federal Republic of Germany, which is currently at a turning point in its development: the end of A. Merkel’s «era» (autumn 2021) is accompanied by a large number of unresolved foreign policy tasks that prevent Germany from establishing itself as a world power. The article provides a detailed overview of these tasks and the ongoing efforts to solve them, presented on a problem-geographic principle. Issues related to the restart of relations between Germany and the United States under the Biden administration, the FRG’s involvement in building up the political and military potential of the EU, as well as the dynamics and nature of the FRG’s dialogue with the leading European NATO member states – Great Britain, Italy and especially France – are analyzed in the context of the ongoing pandemic crisis. Particular attention is paid to the problems associated with deepening cooperation within the framework of the German-French tandem. The paper also explores the difficulties that have appeared during the pandemic and new opportunities for expanding the political and military presence of Germany in Libya, «G5 Sahel» countries, Syria and Iraq. The consequences that a decision of the United States to carry out the «deal» with the Afghan Taliban may have for Germany are analyzed. The FRG’s attempts to strengthen its positions in the post-Soviet space and the Far East are presented in the context of deteriorating relations with the Russian Federation and China. In conclusion, an assessment of Germany’s activity in the sphere of security and defense during the first year of the pandemic is given.
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Trunov, Philipp. "The key directions of German-Dutch and German-French cooperation in defence strengthening." Urgent Problems of Europe, no. 4 (2020): 203–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.31249/ape/2020.04.09.
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Since the former Cold War, the Federal Republic of Germany has had the closest, the most full-scale and different in the spectrum of tracks relations in the sphere of common strengthening of the defence capabilities with the continental Western European countries. First, these ones are France and the Netherlands. The article tries to explore German relations with these two countries in the military sphere during the modern period. The key research methods are event-analysis and comparative analysis. The paper covers the experience of the creation of the first bilateral and multilateral military groups of NATO member states` armed forces which consist of staffs and military forces of the mixed troop system. The article notes that first military groups of this kind were created on the territory of the united Germany and examines the reasons of this tendency. Special attention is paid to the development of German-Dutch Corpspotential. This one, the 1 st tank division and the division of rapid reaction forces (each of those divisions has one Dutch brigade) of the Bundeswehr are explored as military mechanisms of deep integration between the two countries. The article also identifies the features of military-technical German-Dutch cooperation, including their common efforts in the frames of Permanent Structured Cooperation platform. The article compares the scales and quality of German-Dutch and German-French cooperation. In this regard the paper rises the question about real military importance of German-French brigade and cooperation between two countries in military-technical field, including the creation of robotized technics. The paper shows the limits of German-French cooperation potential until the early 2020's.
6
Betts, Richard K. "Striking First: A History of Thankfully Lost Opportunities." Ethics & International Affairs 17, no. 1 (March 2003): 17–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7093.2003.tb00414.x.
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It is unlikely that George W. Bush feels constrained by international law when deciding whether to use military force abroad. Nevertheless, many of the United States' allies are reluctant to cooperate with and participate in military actions that cannot reasonably be justified under international law. And supportive allies, while perhaps not strictly necessary to the United States in its recent and foreseeable military campaigns, do make the military option easier to pursue. A war against Iraq would be difficult without access to bases and airspace in countries as diverse as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Germany, and Canada. For this reason, at least, it would seem to be worth the president's while to adhere to international law where possible and, where this is not possible, to seek to change the rules.
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Byers, Michael. "Letting the Exception Prove the Rule." Ethics & International Affairs 17, no. 1 (March 2003): 9–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7093.2003.tb00413.x.
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It is unlikely that George W. Bush feels constrained by international law when deciding whether to use military force abroad. Nevertheless, many of the United States' allies are reluctant to cooperate with and participate in military actions that cannot reasonably be justified under international law. And supportive allies, while perhaps not strictly necessary to the United States in its recent and foreseeable military campaigns, do make the military option easier to pursue. A war against Iraq would be difficult without access to bases and airspace in countries as diverse as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Germany, and Canada. For this reason, at least, it would seem to be worth the president's while to adhere to international law where possible and, where this is not possible, to seek to change the rules.International lawyers in the Department of State, together with lawyers in other parts of the U.S. government, have excelled in shaping the law to accommodate the interests of the United States. One example, though by no means the only one, concerns the response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.
8
Leonov, E. S. "The Origin of German-American Relations as a Partnership of Unequal Parties." MGIMO Review of International Relations, no. 6(45) (December 28, 2015): 15–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2015-6-45-15-22.
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Abstract: Despite the high technological effectiveness of today’s German economy which serves as the «engine» of Europe and the core of the European integration processes, Germany, however, possesses a limited foreign policy leverage in the modern international relations. Gradual restriction of the sovereignty of Germany began during the post-war period due to the strengthening of the European track of U.S. foreign policy. For instance, at this stage Washington takes the responsibility on restoration of the German economic welfare, filling of legal vacuum in West Germany and also initiates cultural and ideological expansion. In the latter case it was an important role played by the American course on the formation of the renewed German nation by means of work with the German youth and the control over the sphere of education. In fact, at the end of the war US authorities started in West Germany experimental project from scratch, since there were no state institutions in postwar Germany in principle. At the same time, German foreign policy takes shape in the 1950s in the spirit of «Atlantic solidarity» as a result of falling into the trap of Euro-Atlantic partnership. Hopes of attainment of foreign policy independence as a result of German reunification did not come true - the United States haven’t yet set Germany free from the sphere of its geopolitical influence. American military forces with nuclear component continue to be based within the territory of Germany. In addition, in the 1990s. Germany finds itself in even deeper trade, investment and financial bondage. The article analyzes the origin of German full-scale dependence on U.S. foreign policy.
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Gerzhoy, Gene. "Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint: How the United States Thwarted West Germany's Nuclear Ambitions." International Security 39, no. 4 (April 2015): 91–129. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00198.
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When does a nuclear-armed state's provision of security guarantees to a militarily threatened ally inhibit the ally's nuclear weapons ambitions? Although the established security model of nuclear proliferation posits that clients will prefer to depend on a patron's extended nuclear deterrent, this proposition overlooks how military threats and doubts about the patron's intentions encourage clients to seek nuclear weapons of their own. To resolve this indeterminacy in the security model's explanation of nuclear restraint, it is necessary to account for the patron's use of alliance coercion, a strategy consisting of conditional threats of military abandonment to obtain compliance with the patron's demands. This strategy succeeds when the client is militarily dependent on the patron and when the patron provides assurances that threats of abandonment are conditional on the client's nuclear choices. Historical evidence from West Germany's nuclear decisionmaking provides a test of this logic. Contrary to the common belief among nonproliferation scholars, German leaders persistently doubted the credibility and durability of U.S. security guarantees and sought to acquire an independent nuclear deterrent. Rather than preferring to renounce nuclear armament, Germany was compelled to do so by U.S. threats of military abandonment, contradicting the established logic of the security model and affirming the logic of alliance coercion.
10
Istomin, I., and A. Sokolov. "American Forces in Germany: Security Symbol, Loyalty Warrant or Excessive Luxury?" World Economy and International Relations 65, no. 3 (2021): 60–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2021-65-3-60-72.
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The article discusses the dynamics of the US military presence in Germany through the evolution of American foreign policy. The article presents data on the quantitative presence of the American army in Germany and assesses the impact of various incentives to change the size of the American contingent and their comparison. The presence of the US armed forces in Germany is one of the most striking examples of the long-term deployment of foreign troops on the territory of a major power. In terms of the duration and size of the contingent, it is comparable only to the deployment of American troops in Japan. In both countries, foreign troops played an occupying role after the end of World War II. In the future, the American contingent remained in them already as an ally. At the same time, in the case of Germany, the presence of foreign military personnel was combined with the creation of an efficient and relatively large army. For a long time, Tokyo was limited only by compact self-defense forces. The presence of independent capabilities to ensure security is often a prerequisite for pursuing an independent policy and encourages the refusal to deploy a contingent of another state on its territory. It is all the more surprising that in the FRG the question of the withdrawal of US forces was never seriously raised. On the contrary, the German leadership has repeatedly expressed concern about the possibility of reducing the American presence. In this it was very different from the Japanese establishment, in which the expediency of maintaining allied relations with the United States was sometimes critically assessed. The authors conclude that ensuring the loyalty of the German leadership was not associated with the size of Washington’s military presence on the territory of Germany. The buildup of the American contingent in the Federal Republic of Germany was influenced by fears around external threats, the correlation of conventional and nuclear deterrence in the US strategy and the desire to reduce military costs. Acknowledgements. The research was carried out at the expense of a grant from the Russian Science Foundation (project No. 17-78-20170 “Typology of Modern Military-Political Alliances and Model of Russia’s Relations with Allies”).
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Borhi, László. "Secret Peace Overtures, the Holocaust, and Allied Strategy vis-à-vis Germany: Hungary in the Vortex of World War II." Journal of Cold War Studies 14, no. 2 (April 2012): 29–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_00220.
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This article explores how the U.S. and British governments' wartime strategy against Germany affected their policies toward Hungary, a country that had allied itself with Germany when World War II began. U.S. and British leaders wanted to facilitate an Allied landing on the French coast by diverting German troops to other theaters, thinning them out as much as possible. To this end, the United States and Britain were cool toward Hungary's peace overtures in 1943 and were willing to brook Germany's military incursions into Hungary and Romania in 1944 because German troops operating there could not be quickly redeployed to the west. Germany's occupation of those two countries led to the destruction of what remained of the once-large Jewish communities there, a tragic price that Allied leaders were ultimately willing to risk. The failure of Hungary's secret peace overtures also contributed to the later Soviet occupation of Hungary and the grim fate that befell the country after the war.
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Vagts, Detlev F. "Military Commissions: A Concise History." American Journal of International Law 101, no. 1 (January 2007): 35–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0002930000029511.
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As military commissions have been revived in the wake of the attacks of September 11,2001, interest has grown in the history of the institution. The United States Supreme Court, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, sketched out some historical notes and set forth a tripartite division between law-of-war commissions, martial law commissions, and occupation tribunals. Various authors have advanced insights on this history, though most have focused on the prominent episodes, particularly the handful of Supreme Court cases. Even the most comprehensive article gives short shrift to the massive employment of commissions in the Reconstruction era and in postwar Germany. This essay attempts to advance the cause by sketching out the entire scope of the institution’s history and indicating what further research would have to be done to arrive at a truly comprehensive treatment. A basic difficulty is that the work product of military commissions is not encompassed in a series of trial reports like the Federal Supplement or the military’s own Court-Martial Reports. A handful of cases wound up in the Supreme Court and another half dozen stood out enough to attract historians’ interest. Otherwise, commission proceedings are memorialized, if at all, only in military general orders and records of trials that were maintained in the Office of the Judge Advocate General. I have explored the records pertaining to commissions in the Reconstruction period following the Civil War in anticipation of writing a comprehensive article. It is a difficult and time-consuming task. To complete the picture, similar pick-and-shovel work would have to be done on such extensive use of the commission as occurred in Germany after World War II. Both the Civil War-Reconstruction period and the German occupation produced thousands of trials.
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Paul, T. V. "Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy." International Security 30, no. 1 (July 2005): 46–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/0162288054894652.
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Analysts have argued that balance of power theory has become irrelevant to understanding state behavior in the post-Cold War international system dominated by the United States. Second-tier major powers (such as China, France, and Russia) and emerging powers (such as Germany and India) have refrained from undertaking traditional hard balancing through the formation of alliances or arms buildups. None of these states fears a loss of its sovereign existence as a result of increasing U.S. power. Nevertheless, some of these same states have engaged in soft-balancing strategies, including the formation of temporary coalitions and institutional bargaining, mainly within the United Nations, to constrain the power as well as the threatening behavior of the United States. Actions taken by others in response to U.S. military intervention in the Kosovo confiict of 1999 and the Iraq war of 2003 offer examples of soft balancing against the United States.
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Mitrofanova, O. "Experience and Peculiarities of Reconciliation of Contradictions between Germany and France." Problems of World History, no. 15 (September 14, 2021): 106–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.46869/2707-6776-2021-15-5.
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The article is devoted to the study of the experience and peculiarities of reconciliation of contradictions between Germany and France. The positions of the Presidents of France and Chancellors of the Federal Republic of Germany regarding the theoretical foundations and practical steps of the implementation of French-German reconciliation are studied. This paper deals with the problem of Alsace-Lorraine, a region with a border identity, which repeatedly became the cause of Franco-German disputes and passed from one state to another. The role of the individual in overcoming the contradictions between Germany and France is highlighted. The factor of European integration is considered, which not only contributed to the reconciliation of contradictions between Germany and France, but also turned the two states into leaders of a united Europe.
The Elysee Treaty and its implementation were analyzed. The military cooperation between France and Germany is investigated. The problem of historical memory and the desire to reconcile the contradictions between Germany and France are revealed.
It is proved that the experience and peculiarities of reconciliation of contradictions between Germany and France testify to the fact that the real reconciliation of the two leading states directed their efforts towards a more global goal – the creation of a common Europe. It was concluded that the mechanisms for achieving Franco-German reconciliation are interesting for studying and borrowing, taking into account national characteristics in the reconciliation of other European countries, and regions with borderline identities. The French-German experience may be useful for application in Polish-Ukrainian relations.
The main conclusion from the analysis of the experience and the peculiarities of reconciling the contradictions between Germany and France is that their implementation led to unexpected and far-reaching consequences that once seemed just a dream. At the beginning of European integration in the 50s of the twentieth century, it was difficult to imagine the contemporary EU with its common currency, the Schengen area, developed economy, social programs. Franco-German reconciliation was transformed into the fruitful work of the Franco-German tandem, on the success of which depends not only the future of France and Germany, but the evolution of the entire united Europe.
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Tkachuk, T. "The United States Position on the Military Assistance to Great Britain at the Beginning of the World War II (1939 – 1941)." Problems of World History, no. 17 (January 27, 2022): 110–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.46869/2707-6776-2022-17-5.
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The article examines the problem of relations between the two leading countries of the world – Great Britain and the United States, which had a significant impact on the international political situation in the world in 1939–1941, and still have nowadays. As a vector of research, the author used the factor of American military aid to the British governments of N. Chamberlain and W. Churchill to fight against Nazi Germany. According to this, the author aimed to conduct a comprehensive analysis and his own assessment of the United States’ position on providing Britain with the necessary weapons and ammunition at the beginning of World War II.
During the research the author used a comparative-historical method to analyze various factors influencing the US position on military assistance to London, a problem-chronological method to present the material in chronological order, and a statistical – to analyze the attitude of ordinary Americans on important decisions of the Roosevelt administration. That allowed the author to analyze and rethink the evolution of the United States’ position on Britain in the problem of providing military aid regarding the current geopolitical situation.
The author works out that under the necessity of supporting London with various types of weapons, armament and ammunition to fight against Hitler’s regime the United States significantly changed the principles of its foreign policy – from “isolationism” in 1939 to its cancellation in the late 1941. At the same time, according to the author, this process was caused by a number of factors, including both the “isolationist” opposition in Congress and the Roosevelt administration’s gradual understanding of the Nazi regime threat to the security of the United States.
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Koybaev, Boris G. "The Allied Powers in Iran during World War II: the fight against German agents." Vestnik of North-Ossetian State University, no. 2(2021) (June 25, 2021): 44–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.29025/1994-7720-2021-2-44-49.
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On the eve of the Second World War, Iran’s relations with Germany in the field of political, trade, economic, military and cultural relations significantly increased. At the same time, Iran’s relations with the Soviet Union and Britain were deteriorating. Many attempts to enter Iran, especially to gain access to Iranian oil, have also been made by the United States. They were actively opposed by the USSR and Great Britain, and the latter acted more decisively and persistently, which caused the anger of Washington. All this prompted Tehran to search for a “third force” that could protect Iran from the encroachment of the USSR and Great Britain on its interests. And such a” third force “ Iran found in the person of Germany, which after Hitler came to power began to develop intensively in military and economic terms. Reza Shah was impressed by Hitler, who, in turn, expressed interest in cooperation with Iran, as a large state in the Middle East, which occupied an important place in the plans of Nazi Germany to conquer world domination. As you know, the fascist leadership after the implementation of the Barbarossa plan intended to defeat Great Britain, but first to capture its pearl-British India. Berlin hoped to implement these plans in alliance with Iran, using its territory for subversive and aggressive actions against India. It was also intended to seize the AIOC oil fields, because the Axis powers did not have their own sources of oil.
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Bîlbîie, Răduţ. "The Professionalization of Public Relations in the Romanian Army." International conference KNOWLEDGE-BASED ORGANIZATION 22, no. 2 (June 1, 2016): 401–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/kbo-2016-0069.
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Abstract The communication structures of the Ministry of National Defense have a considerable seniority and have played an important role both in different historical, critical periods for the country (wars, political crises) or institutional building (the forming of the Romanian army, of the modern command structures, etc.) as well as during the transition period after 1989. The first military publication, Observatorul Militar, (Military Observer), was released in 1859, being followed by a few thousands of magazines, newsletters, specialized directories, or during the war years of information and opinion journals such as Romania, organ of the General Headquarters, in the years of World War I, or Soldatul (The Soldier), Santinela (The Sentry), during the years of World War II. One after another, others followed such as: since 1916 Studioul Cinematografic al Armatei (Army Cinema Studio), originally, a photo-cinema structure, then specialized in the documentary film: history, presentation or training, and, since 1940, on public radio frequencies Ora Ostaşului (Ora Armatei), (Soldier’s Hour, Army’s Hour), then since 1968, a television broadcast on public television station broadcasting frequencies, since 1996 the web products (the first web site of an army in Eastern Europe, the first site of a ministry within the Government of Romania). The force and the role of the structures varied from period to period Studioul cinematografic (The Cinematographic Studio) had in 1989, 217 employed people, military and civilians, today there are less than 15), according to the budgets and the importance of what they were given by the management structures. The revolution of December 1989 marked the depoliticization of the communication act and the switch to the professionalization of the specialized structures, transforming their propaganda tools into products and means of Public Relations. The years 1990-1995 have marked this process through: (a) the establishment of structures, (b), staff training (in France, Switzerland, Germany, but especially in the United States), (c) the completion of the first guides, instructions, procedures for the field, (d) the opening of the first course for specialists, (e) the initiation of a quarterly specialized magazine Panoramic militar, (Military Panorama), (f) a code of ethics for practitioners.
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Wenger, Andreas. "Crisis and Opportunity: NATO's Transformation and the Multilateralization of Détente, 1966–1968." Journal of Cold War Studies 6, no. 1 (January 2004): 22–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/152039704772741588.
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This article discusses how the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) overcame the challenged posed by France in the mid to late 1960s. French President Charles de Gaulle's decision to withdraw France's remaining forces from NATO's integrated military commands, and his visit to Moscow shortly thereafter, exposed the alliance to unprecedented tension. Yet as NATO moved toward a crisis, opportunities arose to define a new vision for the alliance in a time of détente. Trilateral talks among the United States, Britain, and the Federal Republic of Germany forged a consensus on strategy, force levels, burden sharing, and nuclear consultation a consensus that was endorsed by the other member-states. The Harmel exercise in 1967 restored NATO's political purpose, expanding its political role as an instrument of peace. By 1968 NATO had evolved into a less hierarchical military alliance of fourteen and a more political and participatory alliance offifteen (including France). This successful transformation of NATO moved the process of détente from the bilateral superpower accommodation of 1963 to the multilateral European rapprochement of the 1970s.
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Lakishyk, Dmytro. "U.S. European foreign policy vector (50-60s of the XX century)." American History & Politics Scientific edition, no. 7 (2019): 16–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/2521-1706.2019.07.16-27.
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The article argues that the United States entered the post-war world in a completely new role for the state, surpassed all other countries in the main indicators of strength – military, economic, technological and cultural. World wars turned them into the center of Western civilization, which opposed Soviet power, which secured significant spheres of influence in Eastern Europe and the Far East as a result of World War II. It is argued that the main areas of geopolitical rivalry between the two centers of power are the regions that are on the periphery of Eurasia: the clash line in Europe, the Middle and the Far East. Throughout the entire period of rivalry, the United States has transformed from an episodic into a constant factor in European politics, institutionalizing its presence in the Old World and building relations with Western European allies on the basis of “Atlantism”, “interdependence” and “burden sharing”. It was proved that the main task of the US administrations in the post-war period was the creation of a “power perimeter” around the zone of Soviet control, maintaining its functioning and further strengthening. First, its line ran in Europe, then in East Asia, and later was expanded to the Middle East, having adequate support with American military bases and military-political blocs. It is noted that the confrontation between the two superpowers took place including the alternation of conflict and cooperation, reflected the desire of the victors to consolidate the subordinate position of the defeated – mainly Germany and Japan – in the new system of international relations. Carrying out “containment” of the USSR, the USA actually implemented a policy of “double containment”, directed both against the potential strengthening of Germany and in order to maintain control over Western Europe as a whole. In this regard, the consolidation of “spheres of influence” of each of the parties preserved the results of the war, providing “silent cooperation” on issues of principle.
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Zimmermann, Hubert. "The Improbable Permanence of a Commitment: America's Troop Presence in Europe during the Cold War." Journal of Cold War Studies 11, no. 1 (January 2009): 3–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws.2009.11.1.3.
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This article elucidates a fundamental feature of transatlantic relations during the Cold War: the presence of more than 250,000 U.S. troops in Europe, mainly in West Germany, from 1952 through 1990. The article explains why this unprecedented commitment was extended for such a long time, despite intense domestic debates in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s. Opposition to the troop commitment was particularly strong in Congress. The article shows that the long-term stationing of U.S. troops in Europe was more precarious than often assumed. The article also shows that the debates in the 1960s and 1970s were instrumental in establishing the acceptance of long-term military commitments abroad as a feature of U.S. global policy.
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Ambos, Kai. "“Freiburg Lawyers’ Declaration” of 10 February 2003 – On German Participation In A War Against Iraq." German Law Journal 4, no. 3 (March 1, 2003): 247–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s2071832200015923.
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[Editors’ Comment: As is well known, opposition to a possible war against Iraq has been, within the Western world, among the strongest in Germany. Accurately sensing an overwhelming rejection of any armed intervention in Iraq among the German populace, the Social-Democrat / Green coalition government led by Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer began to take a stance against the forcible disarmament of Iraq and the toppling of the regime of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein during their reelection campaign in the fall of 2002. Since then, and in the face of an ever more undisguised intention on part of the Bush administration to go ahead with a war under all circumstances, Schröder and Fischer have reiterated and reinforced their position, going as far as to rule out any active German participation in an armed intervention even if such was eventually called for by the Security Council. The German government's position has been complicated by the fact that Germany is currently an elected member of the Security Council, and held its rotating presidency in the month of February. Its relations with the United States have been strained on account of the incompatibility of views on how to resolve the Iraq crisis, and Germany has increasingly found itself in an isolated position on the international plane, though it has recently been joined by France and Russia in its attempts to yet avoid a war. The Christian-Democratic and Liberal opposition have alleged that the Schröder government has internationally isolated the country, and, worse, alienated it from its traditionally strongest ally, the United States, in order to distract from its current domestic unpopularity. Be this as it may, it is probably true to say that the great majority of Germans across all sections of society are genuinely strongly opposed to a war. Such pacifist sentiments link back to the peace movement of the late 1970s and 1980s which saw an equally broad cross-section of society march side by side to protest against the military build-up of the Cold War, and which, among others, brought about the Green party itself. Critics have alleged then and now that such radical pacifism is both naive and the wrong lesson to be learned from Germany's omnipresent Nazi-past. Interestingly, the non UN-sanctioned intervention in Kosovo had the strong support of both this just re-elected government, as well as the general public, although the more mainstream adherents of a German ‘no’ to an Iraq intervention point to the very different circumstances in that case.
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Gill, Amandeep Singh. "Artificial Intelligence and International Security: The Long View." Ethics & International Affairs 33, no. 02 (2019): 169–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0892679419000145.
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AbstractHow will emerging autonomous and intelligent systems affect the international landscape of power and coercion two decades from now? Will the world see a new set of artificial intelligence (AI) hegemons just as it saw a handful of nuclear powers for most of the twentieth century? Will autonomous weapon systems make conflict more likely or will states find ways to control proliferation and build deterrence, as they have done (fitfully) with nuclear weapons? And importantly, will multilateral forums find ways to engage the technology holders, states as well as industry, in norm setting and other forms of controlling the competition? The answers to these questions lie not only in the scope and spread of military applications of AI technologies but also in how pervasive their civilian applications will be. Just as civil nuclear energy and peaceful uses of outer space have cut into and often shaped discussions on nuclear weapons and missiles, the burgeoning uses of AI in consumer products and services, health, education, and public infrastructure will shape views on norm setting and arms control. New mechanisms for trust and confidence-building measures might be needed not only between China and the United States—the top competitors in comprehensive national strength today—but also among a larger group of AI players, including Canada, France, Germany, India, Israel, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the United Kingdom.
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Byun, Joshua. "Regional security cooperation against hegemonic threats: Theory and evidence from France and West Germany (1945–65)." European Journal of International Security 7, no. 2 (December 2, 2021): 143–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/eis.2021.32.
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AbstractWhy do some regional powers collectively threatened by a potential hegemon eagerly cooperate to ensure their security, while others appear reluctant to do so? I argue that robust security cooperation at the regional level is less likely when an unbalanced distribution of power exists between the prospective security partners. In such situations, regional security cooperation tends to be stunted by foot-dragging and obstructionism on the part of materially inferior states wary of facilitating the strategic expansion of neighbours with larger endowments of power resources, anticipating that much of the coalition's gains in military capabilities are likely to be achieved through an expansion of the materially superior neighbour's force levels and strategic flexibility. Evidence drawn from primary material and the latest historiography of France's postwar foreign policy towards West Germany provides considerable support for this argument. My findings offer important correctives to standard accounts of the origins of Western European security cooperation and suggest the need to rethink the difficulties the United States has encountered in promoting cooperation among local allies in key global regions.
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Kiknadze, V. G. "History of the Second World War: Countering Attempts to Falsify and Distort to the Detriment of International Security." MGIMO Review of International Relations, no. 4(43) (August 28, 2015): 74–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2015-4-43-74-83.
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One of the negative phenomena of the modern world are attempts to falsify history and the results of the Second World War, 1939-1945., is an important component of the ideological confrontation in the information space of neoliberal forces of Russian society with patriotic and non-violent, is a tool for achieving geopolitical goals of a number of states. United States, European Union and Ukraine tend to distort the results of the Second World War to remove the history of the Great Patriotic War, the feat of the Soviet people, who saved the world from fascism, and the Soviet Union (Russian Federation), together with Nazi Germany put in the dock of history, accusing all the troubles of the XX century. At the same time attempts to rehabilitate fascism and substitution postwar realities lead to the destruction of the entire system of contemporary international relations and, as a consequence, to the intensification of the struggle for the redivision of the world, including military measures. China is actively implementing the historiography of the statement that World War II began June 7, 1937 and is linked to an open aggression of Japan against China. Given these circumstances, the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation noted that the trend of displacement of military dangers and military threats in the information space and the inner sphere of the Russian Federation. The main internal risks attributable activity information impact on the population, especially young citizens of the country, which has the aim of undermining the historical, spiritual and patriotic traditions in the field of defense of the Fatherland.
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Tkachuk, Taras. "JAPANESE INFLUENCE ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF BRITISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS BEFORE AND AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WORLD WAR II (1931 – 1940)." American History & Politics: Scientific edition, no. 13 (2022): 64–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/2521-1706.2022.13.6.
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The article examines the relationship between two leading countries – Great Britain and the United States, which had a significant impact on international political situation in the world in 1930s and still have nowadays. As a vector of research, the author takes the factor of the Japanese militaristic regime because of the rather similar current geopolitical situation due to the aggressive actions of Russian Federation. According to this, the author aimed to conduct a comprehensive analysis and his own assessment of the impact of Japan’s behavior in the international arena on the development of British-American relations in various fields. The chronological boundaries of the study are the period from the Mukden incident ‒ the beginning of Japanese invasion in the north-eastern part of China (September, 1931) to the conclusion of Berlin (Tripartite) Pact between Japan, Italy and Germany (September, 1940). Methodology: the article uses a comparative-historical method to compare and analyze the influence of Japan and Germany on the foreign policy of London and Washington, as well as descriptive method ‒ to identify the essence and features of British-American relations during 1931–1940. The use primarily of a wide base of diplomatic documents, archival sources from the F. D. Roosevelt Digital Library, cabinet papers of the British government allowed the author to apply the systematic approach and the principle of objectivity working with only verified facts and their comprehensive assessment. Scientific novelty: for the first time in Ukrainian historiography the author analyzed and rethought the process of how did Japan’s aggressive actions influence on US-British relations on the eve and beginning of World War II regarding the current geopolitical situation. The author concludes that the leadership of the United States and Great Britain did not realize the threat from Japan in time, that their inconsistent actions only contributed to the rapprochement of Tokyo with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, culminating in the formation of a tripartite military alliance («axis»). According to the author, the ambiguity of the position of London and Washington caused primarily by the struggle for spheres of influence in the Pacific area and trade conflicts between them in general. In view of this, the article emphasizes the need for modern leading states, especially Great Britain and the USA, to take into account the mistakes of the past in order to prevent a repeat of the Japanese scenario in the international arena in future.
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Krause, Joachim. "Die transatlantischen Beziehungen nach den US-Wahlen vom November 2020: Perspektiven der Wiederannäherung." Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 52, no. 2 (2021): 338–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.5771/0340-1758-2021-2-338.
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After Joseph R. Biden became President of the United States, transatlantic relations have a good chance to improve considerably. This article asks how much this relationship will develop over the coming years, both in its security and its economic dimension. The transatlantic partnership has always been held together by the common interest of all sides in sticking to and in reforming a rules-based international order. Until 1990, this mainly meant the US security guarantee against Russia and the leading role of the US (together with other G7 nations) in maintaining a global trade and financial system. After the end of the Cold War, the degree of cohesion has become less, but with the re-emergence of a Russian military threat and the rise of China, transatlantic cooperation is more relevant than ever. However, there are two trends working against deeper cooperation: nationalism and the “Make America Great” ideology in the US, and the tendencies of European states - notably Germany - to avoid taking sides in great power competition and to pursue an independent and rather mercantilist policy.
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YEŞILBURSA BEHÇET, KEMAL. "FROM FRIENDSHIP TO ENMITY SOVIET-IRANIAN RELATIONS (1945-1965)." History and Modern Perspectives 2, no. 1 (March 30, 2020): 92–105. http://dx.doi.org/10.33693/2658-4654-2020-2-1-92-105.
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On 26 February 1921, the Soviet Union signed a «Treaty of Friendship» with Iran which was to pave the way for future relations between the two states. Although the Russians renounced various commercial and territorial concessions which the Tsarist government had exacted from Iran, they secured the insertion of two articles which prohibited the formation or residence in either country of individuals, groups, military forces which were hostile to the other party, and gave the Soviet Union the right to send forces into Iran in the event that a third party should attempt to carry out a policy of usurpation there, use Iran as a base for operations against Russia, or otherwise threaten Soviet frontiers. Furthermore, in 1927, the Soviet Union signed a «Treaty of Guarantee and Neutrality» with Iran which required the contracting parties to refrain from aggression against each other and not to join blocs or alliances directed against each other’s sovereignty. However, the treaty was violated by the Soviet Union’s wartime occupation of Iran, together with Britain and the United States. The violation was subsequently condoned by the conclusion of the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance of 29 January 1942, which permitted the Soviet Union to maintain troops in Iran for a limited period. Requiring restraint from propaganda, subversion and hostile political groups, the treaty would also appear to have been persistently violated by the Soviet Union: for example, the various radio campaigns of «Radio Moscow» and the «National Voice of Iran»; the financing and control of the Tudeh party; and espionage and rumour-mongering by Soviet officials in Iran. Whatever the Soviet’s original conception of this treaty may have been, they had since used it one-sidedly as a treaty in which both countries would be neutral, with one being «more neutral than the other». In effect, both the 1921 and 1927 treaties had been used as «a stick to beat the Iranians» whenever it suited the Soviets to do so, in propaganda and in inter-governmental dealings. During the Second World War, the treaty between the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and Iran, dated 29 January 1942 - and concluded some 5 months after the occupation of parts of Iran by allied forces, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union were entitled to maintain troops in Iran, but the presence of such troops was not to constitute a military occupation. Nonetheless, Soviet forces in the Northern provinces used their authority to prevent both the entry of officials of the Iranian Government and the export of agricultural products to other provinces. The treaty also required military forces to be withdrawn not later than six months after «all hostilities between the Allied Powers and Germany and her associates have been suspended by the conclusion of an armistice or on the conclusion of peace, whichever is the earlier». This entailed that the Soviet Union should have withdrawn its forces by March 1946, six months after the defeat of Japan. Meanwhile, however, there emerged in Iranian Azerbaijan, under Soviet tutelage, a movement for advanced provincial autonomy which developed into a separatist movement under a Communist-led «National Government of Azerbaijan». In 1945, Soviet forces prevented the Iranian army from moving troops into Azerbaijan, and also confined the Iranian garrison to barracks while the dissidents took forcible possession of key points. At the same time, Soviet troops prevented the entry of Iranian troops into the Kurdistan area, where, under Soviet protection, a Kurdish Republic had been set up by Qazi Mohammad. In 1946, after Iran had appealed to the Security Council, the Russians secured from the Iranian Prime Minister, Qavam es Saltaneh, a promise to introduce a bill providing for the formation of a Soviet-Iranian Oil Company to exploit the Northern oil reserves. In return, the Soviet Union agreed to negotiate over Azerbaijan: the Iranians thereupon withdrew their complaint to the Security Council, and Soviet forces left Azerbaijan by 9 May 1946. In 1955, when Iran was considering joining a regional defensive pact, which was later to manifest itself as the Baghdad Pact, the Soviet Government threatened that such a move would oblige the Soviet Union to act in accordance with Article 6 of the 1921 treaty. This was the «big stick» aspect of Soviet attempts to waylay Iranian membership of such a pact; the «carrot» being the conclusion in 1955 of a Soviet-Iranian «Financial and Frontier Agreement» by which the Soviets agreed to a mutually beneficial re-alignment of the frontier and to pay debts arising from their wartime occupation of Northern Iran. The Soviets continued their war of nerves against Iranian accession to the Pact by breaking off trade negotiations in October 1955 and by a series of minor affronts, such as the cancellation of cultural visits and minimal attendance at the Iranian National Day celebrations in Moscow. In a memorandum dated November 26, the Iranian Government openly rejected Soviet criticisms. Soviet displeasure was expressed officially, in the press and to private individuals. In the ensuing period, Soviet and Soviet-controlled radio stations continued to bombard their listeners with criticism of the Baghdad Pact, or CENTO as it later became. In early 1959, with the breakdown of the negotiations for a non-aggression pact, Iran-Soviet relations entered into a phase of propaganda warfare which intensified with the signature of the bilateral military agreement between Iran and the United States. The Soviet Union insisted that Iran should not permit the establishment of foreign military bases on its soil, and continued to threaten Iran despite the Shah’s assurance on this issue. Consequently, the Iranians denounced Articles 5 and 6 of the 1921 treaty, on the basis of which the Soviet Union was making its demands. Attempts by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to improve relations met with little success until September 1959, when Russia offered massive economic support on condition that Iran renounced its military agreements with the United States. This offer was rejected, and, as relations continued to become strained, the Soviets changed their demand to one neither for a written agreement that Iran would not allow its terrain to be used as a base of aggression nor for the establishment of foreign missile bases. The publication by the Soviet Union of the so-called «CENTO documents» did nothing to relieve the strain: the Soviet Union continued to stand out for a bilateral agreement with Iran, and the Shah, in consultation with Britain and the United States, continued to offer no more than a unilateral assurance. In July 1962, with a policy of endeavouring once more to improve relations, the Shah maintained his insistence on a unilateral statement, and the Soviet Government finally agreed to this. The Iranian undertaking was accordingly given and acknowledged on 15 September. The Instruments of ratification of the 1957 Agreements on Transit and Frontier Demarcation were exchanged in Moscow on 26 October 1962 and in Tehran on 20 December, respectively.
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Motaghi, Samira, Afshin Mottaghi, Dmitry Pletnev, Ekaterina Nikolaeva, and Iuner Kapkaev. "National power measurement (case study: Oceania, Europa and North America)." E3S Web of Conferences 175 (2020): 14020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/e3sconf/202017514020.
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There is co-relation between national endowment and acceding to the health industry. The national power of each country reflects the level of influence at different levels of political, economic, and so on in order to advance a country’s major goals. National power is not a mere abstraction, but the national power of a country is the result of a set of variables that all lead to the formation of a nation’s national power. This article focuses on the national strength of the Western European Union (EU) countries of the United States, Canada, Mexico, Australia and New Zealand. As the national power of states determines the extent of their interactions and levels, it is necessary to investigate and measure this issue. In this paper, using the descriptive-analytical and mathematical methods of SAV and TOPSIS and finally averaging these two methods to measure the factors affecting the national power of countries based on the nine components of national power (political, economic, social, cultural, Educational, transboundary, space, territorial and military science).The results show that the United States, Canada, Germany, France, Australia, Luxembourg, Sweden, and Denmark ranksfirst.
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Middeke, Michael. "Anglo-American Nuclear Weapons Cooperation After the Nassau Conference: The British Policy of Interdependence." Journal of Cold War Studies 2, no. 2 (May 2000): 69–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/15203970051032318.
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The Anglo-American summit at Nassau in December 1962 did not strictly separate Britain's deterrent from the proposed Multilateral Force (MLF). As a result, Conservative governments in the 1960s tried to safeguard maximum British independence in nuclear relations with the United States. The British tried to thwart American initiatives on the mixed-manned MLF; some British officials even hoped to preserve an “independent British deterrent” through nuclear cooperation with France. For the United States, the British deterrent had political value in an intra-alliance or East-West context, but no military or political significance in itself. The MLF idea of bilateral nuclear cooperation with Britain and France was a means to contain French and German nuclear ambitions and to settle Cold War disputes with the Soviet Union. In London, however, leading officials believed that Britain's future as a great power was inextricably linked to the possession of an independent nuclear deterrent. When nuclear independence was lost, the appearance of independence became more important.
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Gilli, Andrea, and Mauro Gilli. "Why China Has Not Caught Up Yet: Military-Technological Superiority and the Limits of Imitation, Reverse Engineering, and Cyber Espionage." International Security 43, no. 3 (February 2019): 141–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00337.
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Can countries easily imitate the United States' advanced weapon systems and thus erode its military-technological superiority? Scholarship in international relations theory generally assumes that rising states benefit from the “advantage of backwardness.” That is, by free riding on the research and technology of the most advanced countries, less developed states can allegedly close the military-technological gap with their rivals relatively easily and quickly. More recent works maintain that globalization, the emergence of dual-use components, and advances in communications have facilitated this process. This literature is built on shaky theoretical foundations, however, and its claims lack empirical support. In particular, it largely ignores one of the most important changes to have occurred in the realm of weapons development since the second industrial revolution: the exponential increase in the complexity of military technology. This increase in complexity has promoted a change in the system of production that has made the imitation and replication of the performance of state-of-the-art weapon systems harder—so much so as to offset the diffusing effects of globalization and advances in communications. An examination of the British-German naval rivalry (1890–1915) and China's efforts to imitate U.S. stealth fighters supports these findings.
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Bantekas, Ilias. "The Contemporary Law of Superior Responsibility." American Journal of International Law 93, no. 3 (July 1999): 573–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2555261.
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In the bloody aftermath of World War I it became apparent that those in military or civilian authority provided a cornerstone for the good conduct of those under their command, and hence should carry some liability for their actions. A Commission established by the allies after World War I to assess the responsibility of German officers rightly assumed that a combination of power to intervene, knowledge of crimes and subsequent failure to act should render those concerned liable for the crimes of their subordinates. Despite United States and Japanese dissent, die latter arguing that highranking officials could not be held personally accountable under international law in accordance with the abstention theory of responsibility, trials instituted at the German Supreme Court in Leipzig recognized the existence of concrete duties pertaining to military commanders. Undoubtedly, two precursors to the Leipzig proceedings, the Hague Conventions IV (1907) and X (1907) created affirmative command duties in relation to the conduct of subordinate persons, establishing the doctrine of “command responsibility.”
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Mero, Theodor. "The Martens Clause, Principles of Humanity, and Dictates of Public Conscience." American Journal of International Law 94, no. 1 (January 2000): 78–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2555232.
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Together with the principle prohibiting weapons “of a nature to cause superfluous injury” or “calculated to cause unnecessary suffering,” the Martens clause, in the Preamble to the Hague Conventions on the Laws and Customs of War on Land, is an enduring legacy of those instruments. In the years since its formulation, the Martens clause has been relied upon in die Nurembergjurisprudence, addressed by the International Court of Justice and human rights bodies, and reiterated in many humanitarian law treaties that regulate the means and methods of warfare. It was restated in die 1949 Geneva Conventions for the Protection of Victims of War, the 1977 Additional Protocols to those Conventions, and the Preamble to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, albeit in slightly different versions. The Martens clause was paraphrased in Resolution XXIII of the Tehran Conference on Human Rights of 1968, and is cited or otherwise referred to in several national military manuals, including those of the United States, die United Kingdom, and Germany. Moreover, attempts have recently been made, including by parties before die International Court of Jusdce, to invoke the clause, in the absence of specific norms of customary and conventional law, to oudaw the use of nuclear weapons.
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Parkhitko, N. P. "NUCLEAR STRIKE AGAINST HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI. WARCRIME, THAT COULD BE AVOIDED." MGIMO Review of International Relations, no. 4(49) (August 28, 2016): 79–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2016-4-49-79-87.
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The article focuses on the research of the consequences of the US nuclear bombings of Japanese cities in August 6th and 9th 1945. Military, political and psychological aspects, that were crucial for American military planning at the latest stage of the Second World War are taken into consideration. Also the problems of the new reality in the global policy of that period, which made it possible to demonstrate the military power in such a destructive way, are investigated. The author offers some logical alternatives to the real circumstances of the 6thAugust 1945, including both implementing and non-implementing of the nuclear weapons. The author also offers some new conception of the bipolarity considering the «A-bomb factor» in the international relations, which was critical since August 1945 till August 1949. The very fact of the using the most destructive and powerful weapon, developed after the Germans' capitulation but before the capitulation of Japan, corresponds with the political concept, offered by K. Clausevitz in early 19th century. The approach to the problem, advocated by the German military theorist was in details researched in the article. Using some historical and political methodology, the author criticizes the realization of this concept in August 1945th and offers some alternatives in the historical retrospective. Acknowledging, on the whole, the necessity of demonstration of the newest weapon by the United States in global political aspect, the author reveals a number of targets, which seem more optimal for this goal. Bombing of peaceful cities, which caused inadmissible civil losses, is characterized by the author as military crime.
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Skorospelov, Petr P. "“A Special Form of Making Foreign Policy by the Threat of War to Imperialists”. A Case Study of Military-Political Activity of Central Committee Presidium under N.S. Khrushchev, 1953–1964. Part 2." Vostok. Afro-aziatskie obshchestva: istoriia i sovremennost, no. 3 (2022): 6. http://dx.doi.org/10.31857/s086919080020574-8.
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The results of Khrushchev's foreign policy can be considered, albeit not in everything and even more modest than planned, on the whole quite successful. To resolve the 2nd Berlin crisis (1958–1963), Khrushchev in 1960 reduced the Soviet ground forces by a third, thereby trying to encourage the United States to reduce its military presence in Europe. However, at the Paris Summit of the heads of the 4 powers (1960), due to the active opposition of France and Germany, he failed to push through an agreement on West Berlin on Soviet terms. Mao Zedong, who himself dreamed of leadership among socialist countries after Stalin's death, took advantage of the convenient situation to start a conflict with Moscow. In such an environment, Khrushchev escalated the Berlin crisis by threatening to conclude a peace treaty with the GDR and block Western powers' access to West Berlin (at the same time he conducts command and staff exercises “Storm”, 5–15.10.1961, together with the armies of the ATS countries). He hoped that the United States would not dare to start a war because of West Berlin, and this, in turn, would help to break off Western European states from NATO, showing them that the United States is not a reliable defender for them. His plan partially succeeded: in 1966, France will withdraw from NATO. In order to divert the attention and forces of the United States from West Berlin, the USSR has been actively creating distracting situations around the world since 1961. One of these situations was the Caribbean crisis, which almost led to a nuclear war (1962) and was a heavy defeat for the USSR, which had to fulfill all the conditions of the United States, but in return received Kennedy's promise to remove missile bases from Turkey. It will be possible to remove them only in 1963 in exchange for Turkey's support in its war with Greece over Cyprus. From Iran, due to the harsh Anglo-American pressure on the Shah, the USSR was able to achieve only an obligation not to deploy foreign missiles on its territory, but not to withdraw from the Baghdad Pact, nevertheless, the latter's activities were paralyzed. Under Brezhnev, despite the rejection of Khrushchev's tactics of nuclear bluff, the main directions and strategic goals of foreign policy remained the same as under Khrushchev: ensuring security on the western and southern borders of the USSR by splitting the opposing military blocs and establishing ties with Western European countries, especially France, improving relations with Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, linking them economically. The program of naval construction and the permanent presence of the Soviet Navy in all oceans, begun in 1959, continued.
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Sinichenko, Vladimir V., and Sergey M. Belozertsev. "Affaire of the American Consul Moser (1915) in Light of Previously Unpublished Documents from the Fonds of the State Archive of the Irkutsk Region." Herald of an archivist, no. 4 (2022): 1212–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.28995/2073-0101-2022-4-1212-1221.
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The history of Russian-American relations is full of various dramatic moments. There were periods of strategic partnership and alliance, but also those of aggravation of diplomatic and trade relations during the so-called Cold War. One thing persists from the moment the United States was formed in the 18th century to early 21st century: Russia and the United States have been allies in all military conflicts or maintained mutual neutrality. At the same time, as history shows, among political and bureaucratic elites of the United States, there have always been opponents of Russia as a geopolitical entity who provided direct assistance to its military opponents. One of these episodes occurred in 1915, when Moser, the American consul in the city of Harbin located on the territory of the Chinese Eastern Railway — a highway that ran along Manchuria and connected Chita with Vladivostok — found himself an object of cultivation of the Irkutsk Gubernia Gendarmerie Directorate. The article introduces into scientific use a document which permits to assess the degree of involvement of the American diplomat in the release of German prisoners of war, which caused a diplomatic demarche of Russia, expulsion of the consul, and, accordingly, a diplomatic scandal in Russian-American relations in 1915. This document is court opinion of November 6, 1915 of the investigator for especially important cases of the Irkutsk District Court M.S. Strazov based on secret survey of the captain of a separate corps of border guards, assistant to the head of the department at the gendarmerie-police directorate of the Chinese Eastern Railway A. M. Bokastov who had carried out the surveyance; on protocol of interrogation of non-commissioned officer Karl Schultz who fled the Russian camp in Western Siberia (in the city of Tara, Tobolsk gubernia) and was supported by the American diplomat; and on protocol of interrogation of J. E. Mandelstam accused of organizing this escape. Through the agency of their employees insinuated in groups of German officers who fled from the Russian camps in Siberia to China territories, the heads of gendarmerie directorate learned that the American diplomat not only supplied prisoners of war with money for escape, but also recommended them to makers of falsified documents and guides transporting runaways. Cultivation undertaken in 1915 by the Irkutsk Gubernia Gendarmerie Directorate resulted in arrest of Russian subjects of German and Jewish origin who, for various reasons, participated in organization of escapes of German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war from concentration camps located in Siberia and in the Far East.
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Shacillo, Vyacheslav. "The First (1895) and the Second (1903) Venezuelan Crises: a Comparative Analysis of Geopolitical Consequences." ISTORIYA 12, no. 12-1 (110) (2021): 0. http://dx.doi.org/10.18254/s207987840018150-4.
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The article presents a comparative analysis of the geopolitical consequences of two international crises in Latin America in the end of 19th — the beginning of the 20th century. The first Venezuelan crisis caused by a territorial dispute between Venezuela and the British Empire, worsened also relations between Washington and London. The government of the USA considered that the territorial claims of Great Britain to one of the Latin American countries threatened the vital interests of the United States and were in contradiction with the principles of the Monroe doctrine. Based on such considerations, the White House demanded the convening of an international tribunal to resolve this territorial dispute. The British government originally refused to accept the American proposal, and then, under the pressure of international circumstances, agreed to arbitration and actually recognized the Monroe doctrine. Afterwards, the process of rapprochement between the two countries began. During the Second Venezuelan crisis, caused by the financial demands of a number of European countries to the Venezuelan government, the main opponent of the United States was the German Empire, which also did not recognize the Monroe doctrine and tried to strengthen its financial and military positions in Latin America. The German-American confrontation in Venezuela seriously worsened relations between Washington and Berlin and led to a closer Anglo-American cooperation. Thus, both crises changed the geopolitical situation not only in Latin America, but also worldwide.
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Borisov, A. Yu. "The Anti-Hitler Coalition: From Enmity to Military Alliance — A Formula for Success." Moscow University Bulletin of World Politics 12, no. 3 (November 20, 2020): 7–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.48015/2076-7404-2020-12-3-7-44.
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It is unfortunate to note again today that World War II did not end, it continues in the form of the war of memory. Politicians and scholars who stand as ideological successors of collaborators are trying to rewrite the history of those tragic days, to downplay the role of the Soviet Union in the victory over fascism. They try to revive certain political myths, which have been debunked long ago, that the Soviet Union and the Nazi Germany bear equal responsibility for the outbreak of World War II, that the Red Army did not liberate Eastern Europe but ‘occupied’ it. In order to combat these attempts it is necessary to examine once again a turbulent history of the inter-war period and, particularly, the reasons why all attempts to form a united antifascist front had failed in the 1930s, but eventually led to the formation of the anti-Hitler coalition.The paper focuses on a complex set of political considerations, including cooperation and confrontation, mutual suspicions and a fervent desire to find an ally in the face of growing international tensions, which all together determined the dynamics of relations within a strategic triangle of the Soviet Union — the United States — Great Britain in the late 1930s and early 1940s. The paper shows how all attempts to establish a collective security system during the prewar period had shattered faced with the policy of appeasement, which allowed the Nazi Germany to occupy much of Europe. Only the Soviet Union’s entry into the war changed the course of the conflict and made a decisive contribution to the victory over fascist aggressors. The author emphasizes that at such crucial moment of history I.V. Stalin, F.D. Roosevelt and W. Churchill raised to that challenge, demonstrating realism, common sense and willingness to cooperate. Although within the anti-Hitler coalition there was a number of pending issues, which triggered tensions between the Allies, their leaders managed to move beyond old grievances, ideological differences and short-term political interests, to realize that they have a common strategic goal in the struggle against Nazism. According to the author, this is the foundation for success of the anti-Hitler coalition and, at the same time, the key lesson for contemporary politicians. The very emergence of the anti-Hitler coalition represented a watershed in the history of the 20th century, which has determined a way forward for the whole humanity and laid the foundations for the world order for the next fifty years.
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Blaich, Roland. "A Tale of Two Leaders: German Methodists and the Nazi State." Church History 70, no. 2 (June 2001): 199–225. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3654450.
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Nazi foreign policy was hampered from the start by a hostile foreign press that carried alarming reports, not only of atrocities and persecution of the political opposition and of Jews, but also of a persecution of Christians in Germany. Protestant Christians abroad were increasingly outraged by the so-called “German Christians” who, with the support of the government, gained control of the administration of the Evangelical state churches and set about to fashion a centralized Nazi church based on principles of race, blood, and soil. The militant attack by “German Christians” on Christian, as opposed to Germanic, traditions and values led to the birth of a Confessing Church, whose leaders fought to remain true to the Gospel, often at the risk of imprisonment. Such persecution resulted in calls from abroad for boycott and intervention, particularly in Britain and the United States, and threatened to complicate foreign relations for the Nazi regime at a time when Hitler was still highly vulnerable. In order to win the support of the German people and to consolidate the Nazi grip on German society, Hitler needed accomplishments in foreign policy and solutions to the German economic crisis. Both were possible only with the indulgence of foreign powers.
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Galina S., Mel’nik, and Misonzhnikov Boris Ya. "Linguistic Methods of Anti-Russian Propaganda ‒ a New Trend in the German Mass Media." Humanitarian Vector 15, no. 5 (May 2020): 99–109. http://dx.doi.org/10.21209/1996-7853-2020-15-5-99-109.
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The article reveals the specifics of constructing the image of Russia in the German mass media. Based on the study of media discourse, the positions of Russia in the context of the global information and psychological confrontation are determined. We identify markers that determine the information policy of Germany in relation to Russia, as well as linguistic means of forming the image of the country and methods of information aggression against Russian society. On the basis of headline complexes and article leads, priority topics (buzz-topics) in the media, informational reasons for referring to them, sentiment (expressive-evaluative vocabulary), directional vector were determined. The research object are German media, such as Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), Die Welt, Bild, Der Spiegel. The lexemes ″Russia″, ″Moscow″, ″Putin″, ″Kremlin″ (and synonyms) were used as the units of analysis. Relations with Syria, the United States and NATO, Ukraine, Belarus and Turkey were popular topics in the German media during the study period (2020). The analysis of the texts showed that the mostly negative media image of Russia is represented. In foreign policy, the country is presented as an invader, a military aggressor, a murderer, an enemy, and its leader, in the interpretation of the media, is an insidious, cunning schemer, a dishonest player on the geopolitical chessboard. The portrayal of leading German newspapers portrays Russia as a peripheral state, a third world country that claims to be a world power (with nuclear weapons) and a semi-dictatorial regime. In the course of the study, we used general scientific methods of cognitive and interpretive linguistic discourse analysis. In publications, even high-quality ones, metonymy, metaphors, comparisons, epithets, hyperboles are used as components of anti-Russian rhetoric. Conclusion: there is practically no positive news about Russia, the country itself is seen as the main threat to the security of the world. This requires an adequate response, a new information policy and a correction of the country’s reputation. Keywords: information attacks, media image, , enemy image, Russia, ogenda, stylistic means, semantic, discourse
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Sun, Degang, and Yahia H. Zoubir. "The Eagle's Nest in the Horn of Africa: US Military Strategic Deployment in Djibouti." Africa Spectrum 51, no. 1 (April 2016): 111–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/000203971605100107.
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Djibouti is the only country in the world in which US, French, German, Italian, Spanish, and Japanese military forces are stationed simultaneously; China will soon have a presence there as well. The US military deployment in Djibouti has shifted from a soft military presence to an arrangement of significant strategic import, and from a small outpost to a large garrison in the past two decades. The internal dynamics of the US deployment are geopolitical, as the US presence facilitates the carrying out of its strategies regarding antiterrorism, anti-proliferation, the protection of energy investments, and anti-piracy. The external dynamics of the US deployment are geo-economic: the government of Djibouti, as the host nation, reaps economic windfalls from the US presence in this strategically located country. Given that the United States has failed since 2008 to persuade any country on the continent to host AFRICOM, the base in Djibouti is likely to remain the only one in East Africa. Djibouti may be part of a pattern whereby some small African nations, such as São Tomé and Príncipe, collect revenue through the provision of military bases to big powers.
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Zhilina, Ludmila Nikolaevna. "Systemic Nationalism — the Baltics states on the way from pseudo-democracy to a new fascism." Diplomaticheskaja sluzhba (Diplomatic Service), no. 3 (June 7, 2022): 196–203. http://dx.doi.org/10.33920/vne-01-2203-03.
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The article shows that today all the Baltic countries are united in their views on the outcome of the Second World War and relations with Russia. Official propaganda, the elite and the ruling circles of the Baltic States constantly position Russia as the main threat to stability in the region and the world and constantly replicate the thesis of the USSR's fault in the current problems of the development of their state. It is emphasized that Latvia, like Lithuania and Estonia, evokes associations of a consistent anti-Russian irritant in the domestic and international public consciousness. The author shows that in the Baltic countries the phenomenon of collaboration during the Second World War had a specific national peculiarity and was associated with the hope of local elites that the military presence of Germany would allow them to recreate the nation-states in the former, pre-war format. The author notes that attempts to compensate for the inability to conduct a creative policy with Russophobia and revanchism will end, unfortunately, not tomorrow. The author examines the main reasons why the authorities of the Baltic countries are so tolerant of neo-Nazis. However, at the same time, Russia stands for balancing and leveling relations with the Baltic States and maintaining them at a level that allows for a fairly effective political dialogue and developing economic ties. Moreover, as the author notes, the situation can change quite quickly and radically with the appearance of real independent personalities in this political environment who are able to resolutely defend the truly national interests of the population of their countries, which, ultimately, will restore the regional and international authority of the Baltic countries and increase their attractiveness both politically and economically.
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Vylegzhanin, A. N., Tim Potier, and E. A. Torkunova. "Towards Cementing International Law through Renaissance of the United Nations Charter." Moscow Journal of International Law, no. 1 (July 25, 2020): 6–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/0869-0049-2020-1-6-25.
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INTRODUCTION. This year is the 75-th anniversary of the Great Victory of the Allies – Britain, the Soviet Union and the USA – over Nazi Germany. The most important legal result of this victory has become the Charter of the United Nations – the universal treaty initiated by Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the USA (and later – by China and France) aiming to save succeeding generations from the new world war by establishing United Nations mechanisms to maintain international peace and global security. The UN Charter has since become the foundation of modern international law, respected by States across continents and generations. That seems, however, to begin changing after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, when its former-members «socialist» European countries (including Bulgaria and Poland) became a part of the Western military bloc – North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO seems to demonstrate now a new attitude to fundamental principles of the UN Charter, first of all, to the principle relating to the use of armed force only according to the UN Charter. NATO States-members launched in 1999 an air campaign against Serbia without authorization by the Security Council; then an ad hoc western coalition, led by the United States, resorted to armed force in 2003 against Iraq and organized in the occupied territory of Iraq the death penalty of the President Saddam Hussein. Even some western European States, France and Germany, first of all opposed such military action of the USA for ignoring the UN Charter. The apparent involvement of the USA in the unconstitutional removal of the Ukrainian President Yanukovich from power in Kiev in 2014 and the subsequent local war between those who recognize such a discharge as legitimate and those who do not (both referring to the right of self-defense) – these facts make the problem of international peace especially urgent. In this political environment, the risks of World War III seem to be increasing. This paper addresses such challenges to modern international law.MATERIALS AND METHODS. Th background of this research is represented by the teachings of distinguished scholars and other specialists in international law, as well as international materials including documents of the international conferences relevant to the topic. Some of such materials are alarming, noting that the international legal system is in danger of collapse and it is doubtful whether an international legal order will be possible in the coming decades at all. Others are not so pessimistic. The analytical framework includes also suggested interpretations of the UN Charter and other international treaties regulating interstate relations in the area of global security. The research is based on a number of methods such as comparative law and history of international law, formal logic, including synthesis of relevant facts and analogy.RESEARCH RESULTS. It is acknowledged that there is a need for a more coherent international legal order, with the system of international law being at its heart. Within the context of applicable principles and norms of international law, this article specifically provides the results of analysis of the following issues:1) centrifugal interpretations of international law as they are reflected in its sources; 2) the need for increasing the role of the UN Charter in the global international legal framework; 3) modern values of the UN Charter as an anti-confusion instrument; 4) the contemporary meaning of the Principles embedded in the UN Charter; 5) comparison of the main principles of international law and general principles of law; 6) jus cogens and the UN Charter.DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS. After discussing the issues noted above, this paper concludes that it is in the interest of the community of states as a whole to clarify the normative structure and hierarchy of modern international law. Greater discipline will need to be demonstrated in the use and classification of principles of international law and general principles of law in the meaning of Article 38 of the ICJ Statute. The content of jus cogens norms most probably will be gradually identified, after diffi lt discussions across the international community, both at interstate level and among academics. At the heart of such discussions may be the conclusion suggested in this paper on the peremptoriness of the principles of the United Nations Charter – Articles 1 and 2. Such an approach will further promote international law at the advanced quality of regulation of international relations and, for the good of all mankind, assist in the establishment of an international environment much more dependent on the rule of law.
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Kyrychenko, O. "Latvia – NATO: Integration and Cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region." Problems of World History, no. 16 (December 16, 2021): 74–101. http://dx.doi.org/10.46869/2707-6776-2021-16-3.
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The article uses the methodology of geopolitics analysis to identify the basic characteristics of NATO’s current policy towards Latvia and the rest of the Baltic Sea countries. This region with the collapse of the former Soviet Union seemed to be one of the most stable in terms of military security. However, at present, especially after the Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine and the subsequent Russian aggression against our country, there is a noticeable increase in general tensions in the Baltics between NATO states and the Russian Federation and its allies. A study on the example of Latvia, devoted to the development of the military-political situation in the region, gives grounds to conclude that the current increase in the military presence in the Baltics is due to the need to strengthen the protection of the Baltic States from the Russian threat. The latter does not rule out the possibility of further NATO expansion not only to the East but also to the North at the expense of Sweden and Finland. Modern events in the Baltic region can be characterized as part of the next stage of the positional game on the world “chessboard”, where today the winning situation for the Anglo-Saxon strategy is obvious. At the same time, Russia’s geopolitical interests in the Baltic area, including Latvia, have remained virtually unchanged. The western vector of the republic’s development only strengthened Moscow’s attention through deeper and timely monitoring and analysis of the situation in its western neighbors in order to prevent the final and irreversible exit of the Baltic countries from the sphere of Russian influence.
The article is intended to help Ukraine to understand and study the unique experience of the transition of a certain post-Soviet country from one political state to another, which is needed not so much for history, but for the purpose of developing modern political and diplomatic methods of cooperation with the leadership of Latvia, as well as the practical application of its experience in its activities on the path of Euro-Atlantic integration. The focus of NATO and, first of all, the United States, on strengthening its presence in the Baltic Sea region is capable of influencing the relations between the Baltic countries that have developed as a result of many years of cooperation. The emphasis on the military component clearly outlines the differences in approaches between NATO member states (Denmark, Poland, Germany, the Baltic countries and Norway), neutral states (Sweden, Finland) and the CSTO allies (Russia and Belarus).
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Roberts, Geoffrey. "Litvinov's Lost Peace, 1941–1946." Journal of Cold War Studies 4, no. 2 (April 2002): 23–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/152039702753649638.
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The German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 and the ensuing conflict witnessed the political rehabilitation of the former People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Maksim Litvinov. After serving as ambassador to the United States from 1941 to 1943, Litvinov returned to the Soviet Union and played a key role in charting Moscow's wartime Grand Alliance strategy. He urged So-viet leaders to convene a joint Anglo-Soviet-American commission to discuss military-political questions, and he helped organize the October 1943 foreign ministers'conference in Moscow. As the war drew to a close, Litvinov argued for a postwar settlement dividing the world into security zones. His realist conception of foreign policy suggested a more moderate alternative o Josif Stalin's reliance on confrontation with the West. Although Litvinov faded again from public view after his retirement in 1946, his belief that the Grand Alliance could continue suggests that the rapid, postwar descent into the Cold War might have been averted had it not been for Stalin.
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Kuznetsov, Aleksei. "VARIETY OF POSSIBLE CENTERS OF FORCE IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER." Political Science (RU), no. 4 (2022): 107–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.31249/poln/2022.04.05.
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The article is devoted to the typology of potential centers of power of the new world order. It is shown that it is too early to write off classical political-geographical and geopolitical concepts into the archive - in particular, the population, the size of the territory (with its saturation with natural resources), the volume of GDP (including when calculating the purchasing power parities of currencies) still determine the weight of countries on the world stage. Despite the development of institutions of multilateral regulation of international relations and certain successes of some regional integration projects, the place of states in the transforming world order is largely determined by their veto power in the UN Security Council, the arsenal of nuclear weapons, proliferation in the world and the general status of their state language. We have identified a little more than two dozen possible centers of power, grouped into four types: (1) Superpowers of disappeared bipolar world (USA and Russia are the two developed countries with sufficient military and political tools and large-scale population, territory and national economies to demonstrate the obvious claim to the promotion of a new global cultural and ideological project); (2) Giants of the East (China and India in some respects are surpassing the United States and Russia, but yet related to economically developing countries and inferior to the first two, especially India, for foreign weight); (3) Major advanced countries (Japan, Germany, France, UK, Italy, Spain); (4) Rising regional powers (Indonesia, Brazil, Turkey and others). The composition of the types, especially the most numerous fourth, is quite controversial, which is shown in detail in the article. In particular, an explanation is given why states such as Canada, Australia, the Republic of Korea or Bangladesh cannot be considered as possible centers of power of the new world order, even conditionally “second echelon”.
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Bohomolets, Olha. "Geopolitical Discrimination of Some Countries as Exemplified by Ukraine: Difficulties and Perspectives." Diplomatic Ukraine, no. XIX (2018): 666–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.37837/2707-7683-2018-40.
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The article studies the history and the current stage of Russia’s aggression to-wards countries with lower military potential. The collapse of the post-war system of international relations and collective security has become apparent: the aggression of Russia against Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine has testified to the fact that there are no longer any tools to protect countries subjected to discrimination from super powers. Today discrimination affects not only people or social groups, but also some countries. Such countries are not capable of pursuing an independent policy as to major centres of international power they have to deal with. Peculiar to these countries are uncompetitive economy, low quality of life and undeveloped civil society, they hence become a target for “vital interests”, namely bidding by so-called super powers. “Giants” are attracted by the geographical location of a possible “victim”, access to the sea, transit facilities, natural resources, especially energy, low-cost labour, etc. It is often that “discriminated” countries become grounds for ignition of burning or frozen conflicts provoked by powerful neighbours’ influence, or are exposed to open aggression and become subject to occupation or hybrid war. This has all started after the Second World War, when super powers of the USSR and China, on the one hand, and the United States, Great Britain, Australia, and others, on the other, have made Korea fall into two states. In addition, there was subsequently a division of Germany, the Caribbean crisis…However, such conflicts then were not that wide-ranging, since the post-war collective security system was quite effective. Things, though, have changed dramatically in recent decades. One of the largest global players − Russia – has decisively begun to create around itself a buffer zone formed of countries, where it fuels frozen conflicts and in such a way keeps them under the radar and hinders their integration into the Western world. Initially, Russia ignited a conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, supporting Armenia and assisting it to invade a considerable part of the territory in Azerbaijan, and then initiated the war in Transnistria by virtually occupying part of Moldova’s territory and asserting itself there on the pretext of deploying a peacekeeping mission. Later, there was a war in Abkhazia and then − in South Ossetia aiming to detach part of Georgia’s territory. And lastly, the turn of Ukraine has come… Regrettably, Ukraine is a typical and another example of a country that has fallen victim of multifaceted interests of the leading global players − Russia, the United States and the EU, and has faced all possible forms of discrimination. Keywords: war in eastern Ukraine, military aggression, geopolitics, conflicts, buffer zones.
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Dudaiti, Albert K. "The problem of Middle East settlement in the policy of the leading member states of the European Union in the context of the Iraq and Lebanon crises (2003-2008)." Vestnik Tomskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta, no. 474 (2022): 178–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.17223/15617793/474/20.
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The article analyzes the Middle East policy of the leading EU member states in the period of the Iraqi and Lebanese crises. The author notes that the war in Iraq caused disagreements between France and Germany and the United States, but in general it did not affect the high level of relations between these countries. The Iraqi crisis contributed to increased tensions in the Middle East. In order to resume Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, a Quartet of international mediators (the United States, the UN, the EU, and Russia) was created, which introduced a “road map” for settlement. But soon there emerged differences in the Quartet on its separate points. They increased because of the actions of Israel on the implementation of the “unilateral disengagement” plan. During the war in Lebanon, the EU member states called for the introduction of UN peacekeepers into the country. The US authorities did not agree with this and proposed to introduce a NATO peacekeeping contingent in Lebanon. In turn, France did not support the American plan, considering it unproductive. The Lebanese crisis revealed differences between France and the United States, preserved since the beginning of the war in Iraq. Within the framework of the EU Middle East strategy, the principles of European policy were developed, among which priority was given to assistance in the establishment of a Palestinian state and assistance to Palestinians in the transition period. The EU launched a plan for the reconstruction and development of the Palestinian state, the Future for Palestine, which would provide financial assistance to the Palestinian government, upbringing and educational measures for Palestinian youth, psychological assistance to victims of the Second Palestinian Intifada, etc. After the victory in the presidential election, the new US administration appealed to the conflicting parties to resume negotiations. New moments in the US approach to the Middle East settlement were met with approval in the European Union. Aware at the same time that the initiative right to the Middle East settlement still belongs to the United States, the leading EU member states had difficulty in putting forward their settlement plan, so they were limited to supporting the American program. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in New York and Washington, the influence of political Islam in the Arab world increased markedly, to which the US authorities did not react properly. On the contrary, they sought to thoroughly reconstruct the “Greater Middle East” on the basis of Western democracy. The complex and contradictory nature of the processes developing in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the threat of the US military force against Iran, testified to this. In this difficult situation, issues related to the promotion of the Middle East peace process became even more urgent. The article concludes that the Quartet of international mediators should have made efforts to reach a comprehensive agreement as soon as possible, opening the way to peace in the Middle East.
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Arbatov, A. "The Nuclear Agreement with Iran: Exception or Precedent?" World Economy and International Relations 60, no. 3 (2016): 5–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2016-60-3-5-15.
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The article deals with the Agreement concluded in July of 2015 by the group of states “5+1” (the United States, Russia, Britain, France, China and Germany, and special envoy of the European Union) with Iran on its nuclear energy program (called Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – JCPOA). It is argued, that despite some controversial points the Agreement as a whole is tangibly limiting, reducing and restructuring Iranian nuclear-technical assets, its development program, stockpile and quality of nuclear materials, and is prohibiting potentially military activities. Of special value is the broad and deep regime of transparency, safeguards and control by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which goes much further than the existing safeguards associated with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It is underlined that objectively (regardless of Iranian intentions) manufacturing of nuclear weapon or some secret military activity of significant scale is practically out of question in Iran during the term of various provisions of the Agreement (10–25 years). As proved by the article, a crucial factor in reaching the JCPOA were the U.S. and European Union economic and financial sanctions, adopted against Iran in 2012. They led to the profound economic crisis, which brought the change of government at presidential elections of 2013, and eventually facilitated Iranian concessions (foremost, on the scale of uranium enrichment, deep underground enrichment complex, plutonium-producing reactor, and the scale of transparency). On the other hand, in contrast to American and Russian official statements, the unprecedented tensions between Russia and the West around the Ukrainian crisis since the early 2014 seriously weakened the unity and diplomatic dominance of the “5+1” group of states. Hence, it turned impossible to achieve still more far-reaching agreements on some principle issues (in particular, on the necessity for Iran to receive the approval of the “5+1” and IAEA for the parameters of its nuclear energy program justifiable by peaceful needs – as suggested by the Interim Agreement of November 2013). This has created a precedent for other states to claim the right for developing nuclear energy programs with dual purpose or suspicious elements without obligatory and plausible peaceful justification. It is also underlined, that the future impact of the Agreement on the global system and regimes of nuclear non-proliferation is unclear. The positive side is the JCPOA role in preventing the new war in the Gulf. The dubious aspect is that universalization of the limitations and transparency norms of the Agreement for the purpose of the Non-Proliferation Treaty enhancement is rejected by a number of states, foremost by Russia. It keeps to a tough position that the Agreement is exceptionally Iranian case, which is not applicable to other states, and in fact this point is legally fixed in JCPOA and IAEA documents. This Russian position is in line with its general stance against more restrictive interpretation of the NPT norms and against more intrusive IAEA safeguards. No doubt, in the foreseeable future, these issues will be a matter of serious controversies among states regarding the enhancement of the NPT and overall non-proliferation system and regimes.
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Seregina, Antonina A. "ON THE ISSUE OF INTERACTION BETWEEN DEFENSE INDUSTRY ENTERPRISES AND ORGANIZATIONS OF THE FUEL AND ENERGY COMPLEX IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION." RSUH/RGGU Bulletin. Series Economics. Management. Law, no. 3 (2021): 222–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.28995/2073-6304-2021-3-222-237.
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The process of diversification in the defense industry enterprises, besides ensuring the loading of high-tech equipment, first of all, calls for the technological independence of the country, capable of developing under conditions of instability in international relations. The aim of the study is to identify a successful large-scale experience of diversification in the international arena (using the example of the United States, China and Germany), and to formulate specific packages of measures and formats for overcoming stagnation in cooperation between the defense industry and the fuel and energy complex in the Russian Federation. The methodological basis of the study assumes using a systemic and synergetic approach, which in general approximation boils down to enhancing the mutual beneficial effect of its elements. Also, when writing the article, the author applied a quantitative analysis of statistical data, historical and descriptive methods, a comparative method. As the main result, he proposed the formats of interaction between the military and industrial complex and fuel and energy complex, aimed at more efficient use of the potential of the defense industry to meet the needs of organizations in the fuel and energy complex, increasing the volume of output of products at the defense industry enterprises and expanding its range. More active interaction of the defense industry works with organizations of the fuel and energy complex will allow them in the near future to set up producing the new types of civilian products and technologies, and fuel and energy companies to obtain competitive high-tech products.
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Goncharenko, A. V., and T. O. Safonova. "Great Britain and the tvolution of the colonial system (end 19th – beginning 20th centuries)." SUMY HISTORICAL AND ARCHIVAL JOURNAL, no. 35 (2020): 60–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.21272/shaj.2020.i35.p.60.
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The article investigates the impact of Great Britain on the evolution of colonialism in the late ХІХ and early ХХ centuries. It is analyzed the sources and scientific literature on the policy of the United Kingdom in the colonial question in the late ХІХ – early ХХ century. The reasons, course and consequences of the intensification of British policy in the colonial problem are described. The process of formation and implementation of London’s initiatives in the colonial question during the period under study is studied. It is considered the position of Great Britain on the transformation of the colonial system in the late XIX – early XX centuries. The resettlement activity of the British and the peculiarities of their mentality, based on the idea of racial superiority and the new national messianism, led to the formation of developed resettlement colonies. The war for the independence of the North American colonies led to the formation of a new state on their territory, and the rest of the “white” colonies of Great Britain had at the turn of the XIX-XX centuries had to build a new policy of relations, taking into account the influence of the United States on them, and the general decline of economic and military-strategic influence of Britain in the world, and the militarization of other leading countries. As a result, a commonwealth is formed instead of an empire. With regard to other dependent territories, there is also a change in policy towards the liberalization of colonial rule and concessions to local elites. In the late ХІХ – early ХІХ centuries the newly industrialized powers (Germany, Italy, and Japan) sought to seize the colonies to reaffirm their new status in the world, the great colonial powers of the past (Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands) sought to retain what remained to preserve their international prestige, and Russia sought to expand. The largest colonial empires, Great Britain and France, were interested in maintaining the status quo. In the colonial policy of the United Kingdom, it is possible to trace a certain line related to attempts to preserve the situation in their remote possessions and not to get involved in conflicts and costly measures where this can be avoided. In this sense, the British government showed some flexibility and foresight – the relative weakening of the military and economic power of the empire due to the emergence of new states, as well as the achievement of certain self-sufficiency, made it necessary to reconsider traditional foreign policy. Colonies are increasingly no longer seen as personal acquisitions of states, and policy toward these territories is increasingly seen as a common deal of the international community and even its moral duty. The key role here was to be played by Great Britain, which was one of the first to form the foundations of a “neocolonial” system that presupposes a solidarity policy of Western countries towards the rest of the world under the auspices of London. Colonial system in the late ХІХ – early ХІХ century underwent a major transformation, which was associated with a set of factors, the main of which were – the emergence of new industrial powers on the world stage, the internal evolution of the British Empire, changes in world trade, the emergence of new weapons, general growth of national and religious identity and related with this contradiction. The fact that the First World War did not solve many problems, such as Japanese expansionism or British marinism, and caused new ones, primarily such as the Bolshevik coup in Russia and the coming to power of the National Socialists in Germany, the implementation of the above trends stretched to later moments.