Journal articles: 'German military intelligence'

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Nowacki, Krzysztof, and Adam Szymanowicz. "German preparations for the war in the light of documents of the Polish military intelligence (1933-1939) – selected aspects." Scientific Journal of the Military University of Land Forces 192, no. 2 (April 1, 2019): 253–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0013.2597.

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As a result of the Treaty of Versailles the provisions concerning the issue of limitation of the armed forces were imposed on Germany. These provisions were unilaterally terminated by Germany two years after Adolf Hitler had come to power. There was introduced general and compulsory military service. On 21st May 1935, Hitler – as the Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor – signed the secret Reich Defence Law, which gave the Wehrmacht command wide powers to expand the army. Thus, the intensive development of the German army was initiated. After the Nazi Party came to power in Germany, gaining new information by the Polish military intelligence became increasingly difficult. It was connected with the expansion of the German counter-intelligence services, especially the Gestapo, as well as the police supervision over the German society. Through good operational work of the Polish intelligence the Polish side already before the outbreak of the war was relatively well familiarized with the particular phases of the overall German army’s armaments, as well as the German operational doctrine and methods of warfare.

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Nogaj, Adam. "Evaluation of the correctness of the German military intelligence’s findings concerning armament and equipment of the Polish Army in 1939. Part II. Aviation, Navy, radio communication, means of transport and logistics of the Polish Army." Scientific Journal of the Military University of Land Forces 197, no. 3 (September 11, 2020): 600–619. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0014.3955.

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The presented article constitutes the second part of the publication and is devoted to the current knowledge of the German military intelligence concerning the armament and equipment of land forces, Navy, radio communication, means of transport and logistics of the Polish Army in 1939. The article also attempts to assess the correctness of these findings. The presented article is one of several articles written by the author to present the knowledge of German military intelligence about the Polish Army in 1939, together with the assessment of the correctness of these findings. The article is based on archival materials of the 12th Foreign Armies East Intelligence Section of the General Staff of the High Command of the Land Forces of 1939, which developed synthetic elaborations for the top military commanders of the German army, based on the analysis and collective materials from the individual Abwehstelle. For years, the documents analysed were classified and delivered exclusively to the top commanders of the German army and Hitler’s Chancellery. At present, they are entirely non-confidential and available to researchers at the Bundesarchiv-Militaerarchiv in Freiburg. Copies of parts of these documents, in the form of microfilms, can be found, among others, in the Archive of New Files in Warsaw. According to the author, working out both – the Polish aviation and fleet – was carried out at a high and correct level. Nevertheless, it does not mean that no mistakes were made, even very serious – for example as regards the assessment of the number of submarines. The greatest negligence of the German Military Intelligence’s findings on armament and equipment of the Polish Army concerns the equipment of signal corps. As the German Intelligence overlooked modernisation of communication equipment which took place in the years 1937-1939, there was no knowledge of, among the other things, the “N” type radio stations, which were used in almost every regiment. Scarcity of the Polish Army equipment as regards mechanical means of transport was well known. The shortages in the above scope were enormous. What is interesting, is the fact that logistics of the Polish Army was completely overlooked by the German Intelligence. It should be assumed that the German Military Intelligence’s figuring out of armament and equipment of the Polish Army was carried out on a high and correct level. Nevertheless, it does not mean that all the findings were appropriate and true. The accuracy of the correctness of the German Military Intelligence’s findings concerning figuring out of organisation and composition of the Polish Army, and dislocation of the Polish units in time of peace, should also be highly assessed. Nevertheless, the Intelligence’s findings, as regards signal mobilization process, figuring out the mobilization and operational plans of the Polish Army and organisation and the composition of the Polish Army during war should be evaluated differently. It results from the fact that the German Intelligence was not aware of, among the other things: number of divisions Poland would engage at war, names and composition of the Polish military units, very strong reserve of the High Commander, as well as it was not able to localize the Polish divisions developed over the borders just before the outbreak of war. Knowledge of the Polish economy was also on a very basic level. Therefore, the aforementioned negligence in the German Military Intelligence’s findings on the Polish Army and Poland itself during the period directly preceding the war, should be regarded as major. Taking the above into consideration, the conclusion is that the German agency did not exist among the people holding high positions in the Polish Army; in the Central Staff, General Inspector of Training, Corps District Commands. Nevertheless, the overall view of the Polish Army recorded by the German Military Intelligence was correct. It was noticed that the army is weak, poorly equipped and badly managed and it would not be able to fight the enemy. It was a correct assessment.

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BOCHACZEK-TRĄBSKA, Joanna. "ACTIVITY OF BRANCH 3 IN BYDGOSZCZ IN THE 1930s. OPERATION “WÓZEK”." Scientific Journal of the Military University of Land Forces 162, no. 4 (October 1, 2011): 200–208. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0002.3221.

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From the moment Poland regained independence, national security was threatened by Germany. This article shows the activity of Branch 3 of Unit II of the General Staff of the Polish Army in Bydgoszcz in the face of the war threat. Branch 3 conducted both military intelligence and counterintelligence activities. Operation “Wózek” carried out by the branch is worth attention. Its objective was to check German parcels, especially military ones, transported from Germany to East Prussia and the Free City of Gdańsk [Polish: Wolne Miasto Gdańsk]. Such a way of obtaining valuable intelligence material was not only important but also inexpensive. Operation “Wózek” contributed to the identification of German preparations for their aggression against Poland in September 1939.

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Landmann, Tomasz. "THE GERMAN-SOVIET RAPPROCHEMENT DURING THE YEARS 1921–1930, AND THE SECURITY OF THE POLISH STATE IN THE EVALUATION OF DIVISION II OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE POLISH ARMYT." Kyiv Historical Studies, no. 1 (2019): 6–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.28925/2524-0757.2019.1.1.

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This article attempts to look at practical examples approximation of political, economic and military Germany and Soviet Russia, then the Soviet Union in 1921–1930. It is adopted the thesis according to which the German-Soviet political, economic and military rapprochement during the years 1921–1930 significantly endangers the safety of the Second Republic of Poland.To prove this thesis it was decided to rely on both the literature and source materials, including first of all materials in the Central Military Archives in Warsaw-Rembertów. The key is turned out to be the materials collected in teams of Division II of the Supreme Command of the Polish Army and the Russian Collection Act. The collected archival documents pinpoint various areas of cooperation with the Germans and the Soviets during the given period, as well as determine to what extent the Polish military intelligence assessed the feasibility and effects of the approximation to a direct threat to the security of the Polish state.The content allows concluding that the Polish military intelligence had good diagnosis examples of German-Soviet cooperation, often with a strong anti-Polish shape and character. This cooperation in the years 1921–1930 was particularly intense, threatening the security interests of the Second Republic of Poland and leading to the negation established after the Treaty of Versailles and the Treaty of Riga Polish borders on both the west and the east.

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Żurawski, Damian. "Implementation of intelligence and diplomatic tasks by the military attache office of the legation of the republic of poland in berlin in 1928-1932." Scientific Journal of the Military University of Land Forces 189, no. 4 (October 1, 2018): 70–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0013.0724.

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The article presents the origins and functioning of the Military Attaché Office in Berlin in the years 1928-1932 led by Lieutenant Colonel Witold Dzierżykraj-Morawski, who carried out the intelligence activities under the guise of a military diplomat. Within the scope of his operational activities, Lieutenant Colonel Morawski established contacts with other military attachés and gathered and transmitted information on the country of residence in order to identify its military potential as well as internal and external political situation in the Weimar Republic. In his work, Lieutenant Colonel Morawski did not conduct intelligence activity of a purely operational nature, however, he managed to obtain a wide range of contacts for intelligence work, in which he used the meetings with military attachés of foreign countries, people from various circles from German pacifists and the Union of Poles in Germany as well as the environments related to the armaments industry. From 1929 to 1932 he expanded his activity to include open sources, i.e. the official press and announcements of the Ministry of the Reichswehr that gave him knowledge about the dates of the next maneuvers and detailed information about their course, which he received in a wider range from Japanese or Spanish military attachés. Moreover, he obtained information about the cooperation between Germany and the USSR, which was to serve to devalue contacts between the military attaché of Great Britain and the German military authorities. One of such information was obtained in 1931 from the military attaché of Sweden through the Finnish military attaché office. In spite of quite secretive action, in November 1931 he was accused of espionage and was expelled in March 1932. He also gave a lecture at the Center for Higher Military Studies in Warsaw (February 1932) where he presented the possible directions of attack of the German Army and the entire doctrine of combat activity of the Reichswehr.

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Buse, Dieter K. "Domestic intelligence and German military leaders, 1914–18." Intelligence and National Security 15, no. 4 (December 2000): 42–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520008432627.

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LANDMANN, Tomasz, and Piotr BASTKOWSKI. "MANIFESTATIONS OF CLOSER GERMAN-SOVIET POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY RELATIONS, IN THE YEARS 1921-1926, FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE STATE SECURITY, AS ASSESSED BY THE SECOND DEPARTMENT OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE POLISH ARMED FORCES." Journal of Science of the Gen. Tadeusz Kosciuszko Military Academy of Land Forces 184, no. 2 (April 2, 2017): 16–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0010.4895.

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The article attempts to analyse the practical examples of closer political, economic and military relations between Germany and Soviet Russia, and then the Soviet Union, in the years 1921-1926. The paper lays out the thesis that the closer German-Soviet political, economic and military relations, in the years 1921-1926, posed a significant threat to the security of the Second Polish Republic. To justify the above thesis both the literature and source materials were examined, including first of all the materials held in the Central Military Archives (Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe) in Warszawa-Rembertów. The materials gathered in the groups of records of the Second Department of the Polish Army High Command and the Collections of Russian records were found out to be of key importance. The collected archival materials made it possible to identify different planes of cooperation between the Germans and the Soviets in the discussed period and to establish to what extent the Polish military intelligence was aware of the feasibility and effects of such closer relations, resulting in a direct threat to the security of the Polish state. On the basis of the presented information it can be stated that the Polish military intelligence provided an accurate diagnosis of the examples of German-Soviet cooperation, often anti-Polish in its form and character. In the years 1921-1926, this cooperation was particularly intensified, posing a threat to the security of the Second Polish Republic and leading to negotiations regarding both the western and the eastern borders of Poland established after the Treaty of Versailles and the Treaty of Riga.

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Shpiro, S. "Intelligence Services and Foreign Policy: German-Israeli Intelligence and Military Co-operation." German Politics 11, no. 1 (April 2002): 23–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/714001230.

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9

Burdick, Charles B., and David Kahn. "Hitler's Spies: German Military Intelligence in World War II." Military Affairs 50, no. 4 (October 1986): 218. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1988029.

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Homze, Edward L., and Lauran Paine. "German Military Intelligence in World War II: The Abwehr." Military Affairs 52, no. 2 (April 1988): 103. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1988054.

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Olsson, Simon. "Beyond Diplomacy: German Military Intelligence in Sweden 1939-1945." International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 24, no. 2 (June 2011): 338–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2011.519251.

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Rydel, Jan. "Generał Reinhard Gehlen i jego raport o polskim podziemiu." Studia Środkowoeuropejskie i Bałkanistyczne 30 (2021): 53–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.4467/2543733xssb.21.005.13798.

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General Reinhard Gehlen and his report on the Polish underground The article presents the brilliant military career of Wehrmacht officer Reinhard Gehlen, who led the intelligence of the German land forces on the eastern front from 1942 to 1945. He developed this intelligence and became Germany’s best expert in the Soviet Army, which made it easier for him to establish close cooperation with the CIA after the war and become head of West German Intelligence (BND ). During the war, General Gehlen’s intelligence was, among other things, involved in the development of the Polish resistance movement. For this reason, when in the last weeks of the war, the German leadership considered the creation of a major Nazi resistance movement after the Third Reich’s capitulation, Gehlen presented an extensive one in April 1945, The final report under the title Militärische und nachrichtendienstliche Kräfte im Gesamtrahmen der Polnischen Widerstandsbewegung [Military and Intelligence Forces within the overall framework of the Polish Resistance], because he considered the Polish underground to be the best resistance movement in Europe. The report contains, among others, positive opinions about the will to survive and the resistance of the Polish society, high professional evaluations of the Polish underground army and even words of admiration for the activities of Polish military intelligence.

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Pechatnov, V. O. "The Battle of Stalingrad and the Second Front Problem." MGIMO Review of International Relations, no. 2(29) (April 28, 2013): 86–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2013-2-29-86-94.

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Using less-known documents from American and British archives the article examines the impact of developments on Soviet-German front in late 1942 on military-political planning in U.S. and U.K. with a special emphasis on the second front problem. It is demonstrated how deeply the German defeat at Stalingrad affected Anglo-American military and intelligence estimates of situation at Soviet- German front and prospects of the war in general.

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Rauch, Stefanie. "Good Bets, Bad Bets and Dark Horses: Allied Intelligence Officers’ Encounters with German Civilians, 1944–1945." Central European History 53, no. 1 (March 2020): 120–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008938919001006.

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AbstractThis article explores Allied intelligence officers’ encounters with and interrogations of German civilians from autumn 1944 onwards, psychological warfare operations directed at civilians, and their wider ramifications. Focusing especially on the officers serving with the Psychological Warfare Division (PWD), I will demonstrate that field intelligence officers’ stance towards German civilians was fluid and often ambiguous, with the encounter causing considerable distress to some of them. Their reports and correspondence further suggest that in this period, Germans readily professed knowledge of atrocities. But contrary to intelligence officers’ expectations, they failed to accept any guilt or responsibility. Finally, I will argue that the very foundations and techniques of Western Allied psychological warfare may have reinforced and legitimised justification strategies that separated between “real” Nazis and everyone else. This was at odds with one of the central aims of Military Government, i.e. to inculcate a sense of culpability in Germans.

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Chen, Chern. "Deutsche militärische Ausbildungshilfe im Kalten Krieg: Nationalchinas Offiziere in der Bundeswehr 1964–1973." Militaergeschichtliche Zeitschrift 72, no. 1 (June 1, 2013): 51–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/mgzs-2013-0003.

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Abstract During the Cold War the Bonn government always insisted on the »principle of non-involvement« in its China policy, in order to maintain strict neutrality in the continuous conflicts in the Far East. For strategic and intelligence considerations, however, the Federal Intelligence Service and the Federal Ministry of Defense had tried to intensify the relations with National China. The contacts between Bonn and Taipei developed to a military training aid, which the Federal Ministry of Defense granted National Chinese officers for training purposes into the Federal Republic. In the period 1964 to 1973, a total of 27 National Chinese army officers were trained in the German Armed Forces schools and the Führungsakademie. The German military training aid was considered not only as a starting point of a diplomatic break-through, but also as a means to break the political ice age which resulted from the lack of diplomatic relations between West Germany and National China in the post-war period.

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Gajownik, Tomasz. "Polityka państw bałtyckich wobec Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i III Rzeszy na przełomie marca i kwietnia 1939 roku w ocenie wileńskiej ekspozytury oddziału II Sztabu Głównego Wojska Polskiego." Przegląd Wschodnioeuropejski 9, no. 1 (June 1, 2018): 359–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.31648/pw.3450.

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Polish military intelligence had prepared a lot of analysis about political and military situations in the countries around the Republic of Poland. It was a kind of belaying towards potential Polish-German conflict. The issues of the Baltic States were interested a military intelligence’s field station in Vilnius. A few months before the Second World War has begun, Vilnius’s station prepared some analysis of domestic and foreign policy of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. One of them had discussed most important consequences of occupation of Klaipeda by German’s Wehrmacht. Additionally, in these documents, one can be read about multilateral policy of the Baltic Entente.

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Nogaj, Adam. "Evaluation of the correctness of the German military intelligence’s findings concerning armament and equipment of the Polish Army in 1939. Part I. Land forces." Scientific Journal of the Military University of Land Forces 196, no. 2 (June 26, 2020): 366–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0014.2540.

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The presented publication is one of several that the author wrote on to the presentation of the knowledge of German military intelligence about the Polish Army in 1939. These publications also attempted to assess the correctness of the findings of the afore-mentioned intelligence. The article is based on archival materials of the 12th Foreign Armies East Intelligence Section of the General Staff of the High Command of the Land Forces of 1939, which developed synthetic elaborations for the top military commanders of the German army, based on the analysis and collective materials from the individual Abwehstelle. For years, the documents analysed were secret and delivered exclusively to the top commanders of the German army and Hitler’s Chancellery. At present, they are entirely non-confidential and available to researchers at the Bundesarchiv-Militaerarchiv in Freiburg. Copies of parts of these documents, in the form of microfilms, can be found, among others, in the Archive of New Files in Warsaw. Due to the considerable volume of the publication, it has been divided into two parts. The presented article constitutes the first part and is devoted to the knowledge of the German military intelligence on the armament and equipment of land forces. The article presents not only the knowledge of the German military intelligence, but also basic analyses concerning the evaluation of the correctness of its findings. The analyses carried out and the generalised records presented in the article show that the German military intelligence did not make gross errors in the presented assessments concerning the armament and equipment of infantry and cavalry. That is, the most important and numerous components of the Polish Army (WP). However, many mistakes were made in the presentation of the armament of the artillery, assuming, among other things, the presence of cannons from the Polish-Soviet war of 1920 in the equipment, which the WP did no longer have in 1939. Perhaps in 1939 the Abwehr, having no current data, used data from earlier years, from the first half of the 1930s, when the WP still had cannons in its equipment. Models of the heaviest artillery weapons were also unknown. On the other hand, the Polish armoured weapons were worked out very well. The article constitutes yet another contribution to the work of learning about the so-far unexplored recesses of our recent history.

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Shubin, Aleksander. "Soviet-German Military and Economic Supplies in 1939–1941 and the Motives of the Soviet Leadership." Novaia i noveishaia istoriia, no. 4 (2021): 122. http://dx.doi.org/10.31857/s013038640016184-0.

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The article examines the Soviet-German economic and military cooperation in 1939–1941 and the motives behind the position adopted by the Soviet leadership at that time. The author believes that the Soviet leaders' choice of military supplies was determined by both the experience of the war in Spain and their ideas about the potential theatre of military operations in Eastern Europe. The defeat of France, the territorial changes of 1940, and the growing threat of a military clash with Germany were among significant influences on the adjustment of the Soviet position. The Soviet leadership's ideas about the beginning of the war turned out to be largely erroneous, which led to a different contribution of German military supplies to the Soviet victory. The role of the Navy in the coming war was overestimated. A bid to overcome the technical backlog of Soviet aviation, demonstrated during the war in Spain, was successful. The role of tanks was underestimated. The author traces the course of negotiations on supplies and demonstrates the role of Soviet intelligence in reaching an agreement. Germany invested in the current needs of the population's consumption and supplying industry, primarily military. The USSR invested mainly in the future, which in the conditions of the Second World War, the Soviet leadership linked to the development of weapons production. German supplies played a role in the further general technical modernization of Soviet industry, which was a valuable contribution to the victory and contributed to the post-war development of Soviet industry.

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JACKSON, PETER. "FRENCH INTELLIGENCE AND HITLER'S RISE TO POWER." Historical Journal 41, no. 3 (September 1998): 795–824. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0018246x98008000.

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This article examines the French response to the rise to power of Adolf Hitler and the Nazi party in Germany in January of 1933. It argues that French intelligence warned civilian and military leaders that the priorities of the new regime were rearmament and the militarization of German society in preparation for a war of conquest. This essentially accurate appreciation of the situation inside Germany had little impact on the course of French foreign policy. At this juncture French society was preoccupied with worsening economic crisis and pacifist sentiment had reached its inter-war zenith. The national focus was inward and domestic concerns took priority over the external threat from Germany. Finally, France was in a position of relative isolation and could garner no support for a policy of firmness from its erstwhile allies, Great Britain and the United States. This combination of national introspection and diplomatic isolation deterred a succession of governments from taking determined steps to meet the Nazi challenge in 1933.

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Mallett, Derek R. "Western Allied Intelligence and the German Military Document Section, 1945-6." Journal of Contemporary History 46, no. 2 (April 2011): 383–406. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022009410392408.

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Thomas, David. "Foreign Armies East and German Military Intelligence in Russia 1941-45." Journal of Contemporary History 22, no. 2 (April 1987): 261–301. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002200948702200204.

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Young, Robert J. "French Military Intelligence and the Franco-Italian Alliance, 1933–1939." Historical Journal 28, no. 1 (March 1985): 143–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0018246x00002259.

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‘Watersheds’ and ‘turning points’ are two standard literary devices for addressing the question of direction in history. Once that direction is determined, one is able to survey the roads not taken, sorting out the possible and the probable from the unavoidable. This paper forswears the vocabulary of turning points, but it owes something to the idea such language expresses. Put cryptically, our discussions of the origins of the Second World War could afford to pay closer attention to Franco-Italian relations in the 1930s. Next to the Manchurian, Rhenish, Spanish, Austrian, Czech and Polish crises of that decade, the crisis within the ephemeral alliance between Paris and Rome has been given short shrift. Even within the context of the Ethiopian crisis there is a tendency to measure the implications against Anglo-French, Anglo-Italian and Italo-German relations. The net effect is to downplay the importance of relations between France and Italy. And from that, to choose but one example, comes an exaggerated sense of the ease with which the French fell into line with British policy in the Mediterranean, and with which the Italians subsequently received German overtures respecting Austria and Central Europe.

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Sribnyak, Ihor. "ATTEMPTS TO USE CAPTIVE UKRAINIANS AT THE RASTATT CAMP (GERMANY) TO UNDERMINE THE RUSSIAN ARMY IN UKRAINE DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR." Kyiv Historical Studies, no. 1 (2020): 26–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.28925/2524-0757.2020.1.4.

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The article discloses attempts by the German authorities to use certain captive Ukrainians from the Russian army to destabilize its arson during World War I. Due to the lack of relevant archival sources, it is not possible to determine the degree of informative nature of agent messages recruited by the German Ukrainian activists, as well as the extent of their importance in planning strategic or tactical military operations at the front by the German command. The author of the article assumes that the most successful Ukrainian “turns” from captivity acted in the cause of revolutionizing Ukrainian provinces of the Russian Empire. It should also be noted that by agreeing to cooperate with the German military authorities, not all captive Ukrainians were guided by ideological motives. Some of them were driven by the desire to use this opportunity to accelerate their return home, and they were not a priori planning to collect and transmit intelligence to the Germans and to carry out the work of revolutionary content. Finally, a small proportion of Ukrainians who were sent home by the efforts of the Union of Liberation of Ukraine and the German authorities, joined the disintegration of imperial institutes at Ukrainian lands, and also took an active part in the Ukrainian state-building in 1917–1920.

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Harris, J. P. "British military intelligence and the rise of German mechanized forces, 1929–40." Intelligence and National Security 6, no. 2 (April 1991): 395–417. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529108432108.

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Gross, Stephen. "Confidence and Gold: German War Finance 1914–1918." Central European History 42, no. 2 (May 15, 2009): 223–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008938909000296.

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In January 1915, Sir William Grenfell Max-Müller, an intelligence officer in the British Foreign Office, recorded the following remark from a German trade journal.As long as the confidence in military and political victory continues, we need not fear our paper system and its consequences. But one sees immediately what would be bound to threaten us in the contrary case—a ruin to avoid which we are compelled to sacrifice the last man and the last penny.1

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Woźny, Aleksander. "Bezpieczeństwo II Rzeczpospolitej – oceny. 1 wrzesień 1939 r. – „niespodziewana” wojna z III Rzeszą i „zaskoczenie” agresją (17) Związku Sowieckiego." Annales Collegii Nobilium Opolienses 1, no. 10 (December 31, 2021): 27–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.15804/acno2020102.

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The Wehrmacht (German armed forces) attacked Poland without declaration of war on 1 September 1939, on the orders of the leader of the III Reich. Then, on 17 September, the Red Army forced the borders of the Polish II Republic. The title of the article reflects what Polish historiography will forever struggle with – whether the aggression by its western neighbour was “unexpected” and whether we can consider the invasion from its eastern neighbour a “surprise”. Above all, the question is whether the military (General Staff; military intelligence) and political leadership (Foreign Ministry) of the state foresaw beforehand the possibility of rift in Polish-German relations and the renewal of a German-Soviet alliance/pact (cooperation), which in consequence brought about undeclared war with Poland’s eastern neighbour. The presented article is in sections and presented in chronological order.

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Carlson, Cody. "Hitler’s Fremde Heere Ost: German military intelligence on the eastern front 1942–45." Intelligence and National Security 33, no. 4 (January 25, 2018): 626–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2018.1430671.

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Willems, Dr Bastiaan. "Hitler’s Fremde Heere Ost: German Military Intelligence on the Eastern Front 1942–45." Journal of Slavic Military Studies 31, no. 3 (July 3, 2018): 403–4. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2018.1488344.

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Altenhöner, Florian. "Total War—Total Control? German Military Intelligence on the Home Front, 1914–1918." Journal of Intelligence History 5, no. 2 (December 2005): 55–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2005.10555117.

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Cook, Alan. "Reginald Victor Jones, C.H., C.B., C.B.E. 29 September 1911 — 17 December 1997." Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society 45 (January 1999): 239–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsbm.1999.0016.

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R.V. Jones came to Churchill's notice in 1940 when he identified navigational beams for German bombers, and thereafter developed scientific intelligence throughout World War II. Dissatisfied with postwar plans for military intelligence, he became Professor of Natural Philosophy at Aberdeen and from 1946 pursued very precise measurements in physics. He became unsympathetic to academic developments that followed the Robbins Report. The Royal Air Force (RAF), the US Air Force, and intelligence circles in the USA always held him in very high repute. Many thought he never received adequate recognition for his wartime work; his Companionship of Honour came almost too late.

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Jeppsson, Anders. "How East Germany Fabricated the Myth of HIV Being Man-Made." Journal of the International Association of Providers of AIDS Care (JIAPAC) 16, no. 6 (August 17, 2017): 519–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2325957417724203.

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Despite the fact that the origin of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) being a contamination and a mutation originating from primates is well-documented alternative narratives are often being heard ofespecially in sub-Saharan Africa. One such narrative is about HIV being man-made in a military laboratory in the United States. In this article, it is shown how this narrative was fabricated by the intelligence services in East Germany (German Democratic Republic – GDR) as part of the ideological warfare during the Cold War. The purpose of this article is to put an end to a long-lasting conspiracy theory, which is still alive and may create diversion from serious research on the topic.

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FEDOROWICH, KENT. "GERMAN ESPIONAGE AND BRITISH COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA AND MOZAMBIQUE, 1939–1944." Historical Journal 48, no. 1 (March 2005): 209–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0018246x04004273.

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For most of the Second World War, German and Italian agents were actively engaged in a variety of intelligence gathering exercises in southern Africa. The hub of this activity was Lourenço Marques, the colonial capital of Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique). One of the key tasks of Axis agents was to make links with Nazi sympathizers and the radical right in South Africa, promote dissent, and destabilize the imperial war effort in the dominion. Using British, American, and South African archival sources, this article outlines German espionage activities and British counter-intelligence operations orchestrated by MI5, MI6, and the Special Operations Executive between 1939 and 1944. The article, which is part of a larger study, examines three broad themes. First, it explores Pretoria's creation of a humble military intelligence apparatus in wartime South Africa. Secondly, it examines the establishment of several British liaison and intelligence-gathering agencies that operated in southern Africa for most of the war. Finally, it assesses the working relationship between the South African and British agencies, the tensions that arose, and the competing interests that emerged between the two allies as they sought to contain the Axis-inspired threat from within.

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Krasnozhenova, E. E., and S. V. Kulinok. "On the Question of Using the Civilian Population of the USSR by German Intelligence in 1941–1944." Modern History of Russia 10, no. 3 (2020): 609–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu24.2020.304.

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During 1941–1944 the German occupation and intelligence services created an extensive network of training centers (schools and courses) in the occupied territories of the USSR. Mostly Soviet prisoners of war were involved in reconnaissance and sabotage work, although a significant number of agents were recruited from the civilian (non-military) population. First, people who were in active or passive opposition to the Soviet regime were attracted: former emigrants, those repressed or dispossessed, ideological opponents, criminals, and others. At the same time, a significant number of agents were recruited from the civilian population who remained in the occupied territories, especially from its most vulnerable categories (women and children). The recruited agents were used to carry out reconnaissance and sabotage missions, both in the rear of the USSR and in parts of the Red Army, and against the resistance movement. On the territory of the BSSR occupied by the Germans, sixteen training centers were opened where saboteur children were trained, and more than twenty were opened to train “agents in skirts”. Similar schools and courses were opened in Russia, Ukraine, and the Baltic states. The Soviet secret services and partisan counterintelligence bodies were well informed about such work of the German secret organs. The performance of agents trained from among the civilian population was low. There were some tactical successes and actions by enemy agents (especially on the eve and during the period of punitive operations), but strategically this work by the Germans actually failed.

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Ristanović, Rade. "NEMAČKI ČOVEK: ULOGA PUKOVNIKA TANASIJA DINIĆA TOKOM DRUGOG SVETSKOG RATA." Istorija 20. veka 40, no. 2/2022 (August 1, 2022): 361–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.29362/ist20veka.2022.2.ris.361-382.

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Tanasije Dinić was a hero from the Balkans and the First World War, a military intelligence officer, a man for special tasks of King Alexander Karadjordjević and a Member of Parliament during the interwar period. Apparently, before the Second World War, he also became an informant of the German intelligence service. In this paper, the author analyzes his career during the Second World War. During this period, he was a man of great trust of the occupiers. He was given special tasks such as investigating the March 27 coup, re-establishing the state administration and police formations. He was also the Minister of the Interior and Social Policy and Public Health. In privately he wrote reports for the occupier in which he analyzed various topics. He was one of the main people in charge of removing officials who were assessed as ideologically, politically and racially “unreliable”. He did not enjoy the trust of Prime Minister Milan Nedić, who considered Dinić to be a strict exponent of the Germans. This caused delays and tensions during his appointments, as well as numerous difficulties in his work. Dinić remained a German man until the end of the Second World War. In a situation where it was clear that Germans had lost the war, he met in Berlin with key people from the police and security sector, Ernst Kaltenbruner and Heinrich Miller. After the end of the war, he was arrested by the authorities in Yugoslavia and sentenced to death.

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Jackson, Peter. "French Military Intelligence responds to the German Remilitarisation of the Rhineland, 1936 - A look at French intelligence machinery in 1936." Intelligence and National Security 22, no. 4 (August 2007): 546–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520701640514.

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Kostyuchenko I.V, Nelga I. A. "Chemical Weapons: History of the Study of Organophosphorus Toxic Agents Abroad." Journal of NBC Protection Corps 3, no. 2 (2019): 175–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.35825/2587-5728-2019-3-2-175-193.

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Organophosphorus compounds occupy a unique positon among all chemical warfare agents (CWA's). Since the 1930-s their high toxicity, wide range of physical-chemical properties and complex action attracted close attention of foreign military experts. In 1936 a German chemist, Dr. Gerhard Schrader, synthesized O-ethyl-dimethyl amidocyanophosphate, known as tabun, for the first time. By the beginning of World War II, more than two thousand new organophosphorus and phosphorus containing compounds were synthesized by his laboratory's stuff. Some of these compounds were selected for further study as CW agents and subsequently were adopted as weapons by the German army. In 1938 the same Gerhard Schrader have synthesized the organophosphorus compound, closed to tabun, but more toxic: О-isopropyl methyl fluorophosphate, called sarin. In 1944 the German chemist, the 1938 Nobel laureate in chemistry Richard Kuhn synthesized soman and revealed the damaging effect of organophosphorus CWA's. In 1941 the British chemist Bernard Saunders synthesized diisopropyl fluorophosphate. During World War II the industrial production of organophosphorus CWA's was organized in Germany, Great Britain and in the USA. Germany produced tabun, sarin and soman, the western allies: diisopropyl fluorophosphate. Till the end of World War II the leadership in the sphere of the development of nerve agents belonged to Nazi Germany. After the end of the war the German scientists, many of whom were devoted Nazis, continued their work under the auspices of military departments of the USA and Great Britain. Subsequently phosphorylated thiocholine esters: V-series substances (VG, VM, VR, VX, EA 3148, EA3317 agents etc.) were synthesized with their participation. The wide range of organophosphorus compounds was tested on volunteers in Porton Down (Great Britain) and in the Edgewood arsenal (USA). But after the synthesis of V-series agents the work on organophosphorus CWA's did not stop. In recent years there appeared the tendency of the transformation of real threats connected with the chemical weapons use, to propaganda sphere. The provocation which the «Novichok» agent, arranged primitively by the British intelligence, is the perfect example of such a transformation. But it does not mean that the research in the sphere of new organophosphorus CWA's in the West is stopped

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Graczyk, Konrad. "Analysis of Major Jerzy Sosnowski’s letters to his father against the background of the criminal trial before the Military District Court No. I in Warsaw." Scientific Journal of the Military University of Land Forces 199, no. 1 (March 18, 2021): 21–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0014.8107.

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The study presents the contents of the letters from the private archive of Major Jerzy Sosnowski, a Polish military intelligence officer operating in Berlin in 1926-1934. The letters are addressed to his father and come from 1937 and 1938. The text presents Major Sosnowski’s profile. Then the circumstances in which the letters were written and their meaning are discussed. Their content was analyzed against the background of the criminal trial before the Military District Court No. I in Warsaw and regarding the current state of knowledge about Major Sosnowski’s fate from crossing the German-Polish border in April 1936 until the sentence in June 1939. The content of the letters proves their author’s personal harm and violations of the law preceding criminal proceedings before the Polish military court, and to some extent, also provide insight into the trial for which the primary sources (court records) have not been preserved.

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Alexander, Martin S. "French Military Intelligence responds to the German Remilitarisation of the Rhineland, 1936 - The military consequences for France of the end of Locarno." Intelligence and National Security 22, no. 4 (August 2007): 563–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520701640548.

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Zverev, V. O., and O. G. Polovnikov. "Secret Agents of the Russian Gendarmerie in the Fight against Espionage at the Beginning of the First World War." Modern History of Russia 10, no. 4 (2020): 892–901. http://dx.doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu24.2020.405.

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The article discusses the limited intelligence capabilities of the gendarmerie departments of the Warsaw Governor General (Lomzinska, Warsaw, Kielce, Lublin, and Radom provinces) in the fight against German and Austrian spies in the second half of 1914 and the first half of 1915. One reason for the secret police’s lack of readiness is the reluctance of the gendarmerie-police authorities to organize counter-response work on an appropriate basis. The rare, fragmentary, and not always valuable information received by agents of the investigating authorities did not allow the gendarmes to organize full-scale and successful operational work on a subordinate territory to identify hidden enemies of the state. The low potential, and, in some cases, the complete uselessness of secret service personnel for the interests of the military wanted list led to the fact that most politically disloyal persons were accidentally identified by other special services. In most cases, spies were detected either due to information from army intelligence and counterintelligence agencies, or due to the vigilance of military personnel of the advanced units of the Russian army. The authors conclude that the gendarmerie departments were unable to organize a systematic operational escort of military personnel of the Russian armies deployed in the Warsaw Military District. Despite the fact that the duty of the gendarmerie police included not only criminal procedures, but also operational searches, there was no qualified identification of spies with the help of secret officers.

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Chandler, Andrew. "The Death of Dietrich Bonhoeffer." Journal of Ecclesiastical History 45, no. 3 (July 1994): 448–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022046900017085.

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Early in April 1945 a little collection of political prisoners, including a British secret agent, a Russian air force officer and a German general, were driven by their guards across the diminishing face of the Third Reich. Among them was the thirty-nine year old theologian, Dietrich Bonhoeffer. It was curious company for a German pastor. Bonhoeffer had joined the group at Buchenwald concentration camp on 7 February. In April he and his new friends were moved to Regensburg, and from there to Schönberg. On 8 April 1945 Bonhoeffer was abruptly separated from the other prisoners. As he was about to leave, he turned to the British agent, Captain Payne Best, and said a few words. The next day he was hanged at Flossenburg with the former head of German Military Intelligence, Admiral Canaris, and Colonel Hans Oster. An SS doctor saw the execution, and was struck by the religious devotion, and the spiritual trust, of the victim.

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HAFTARCZYK, Karolina. "SECRET SERVICE AS PART OF NATIONAL SECURITY." Scientific Journal of the Military University of Land Forces 161, no. 3 (July 1, 2011): 194–203. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0002.3063.

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Recent years mark a period of profound redefinition of threats and dangers to national security, also in Poland. The end of the Cold War, stabilization in Polish-German relations, normalization of the situation in the other neighbouring countries and an averted threat of the so- called ‘Russian military generals rebellion’ scenario – so popular with some Hollywood screenwriters in the past – finally, Poland’s accession to NATO, significantly cut the risk of an open, direct outside aggression. The term ‘intelligence services’ refers to governmental agencies involved both in the collection of confidential information and in counter-intelligence activities. Intelligence agencies are devoted to gathering and protecting information crucial to national security, both domestic and external.In democratic countries their operations occasionally raise issues of ministerial control and accountability to parliamentary procedures. Intelligence agencies carrying out national security operations abroad sometimes break local law. The intelligence agencies of totalitarian regimes and non-democratic states sometimes employ various practices and techniques prohibited by their own law, such as bribery, blackmail, treacherous assassination, illegal weapons and drugs trade.

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Donohue, Alan. "Adolf Hitler and German Military Intelligence on the Eastern Front: Operations Blau and Edelweiß (January–November 1942)." Journal of Slavic Military Studies 31, no. 3 (July 3, 2018): 372–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2018.1487199.

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Mamedov, Zaur Imalverdi oglu. "The soviet school system in Central Intelligence Agency estimates at the initial stage of the Cold War." Samara Journal of Science 9, no. 1 (February 28, 2020): 192–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.17816/snv202091212.

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The paper is devoted to the analysis by the Central Intelligence Agency of the USSR school system. The US was in dire need of information about its new adversary. The situation was aggravated by the closed nature of the Soviet state and the absence of a long continuous tradition of intelligence activities of American intelligence. The president and other government bodies wanted to have comprehensive knowledge of any processes and phenomena in the world. US intelligence should have been able to solve this problem. In this regard, the first stage of the Cold War for the CIA was largely due to an analysis of official and semi-official sources, as well as the development of various strategies. In order to find out about various areas of the life in the USSR, analysts extracted information from Soviet scientific literature, press, radio, legislation and interrogations of former German prisoners. The National Assessment Bureau, led by William Langer and Sherman Kent, compiled reports on Soviet military capabilities, industry, agriculture, the political system, etc. The Soviet school system was considered by American intelligence specialists in the framework of the military and economic potential of the enemy, as well as the strategy of psychological warfare. The paper analyzes the reports concerning the educational system in the USSR in the aspect of school education, its strengths and weaknesses. The results allow us to conclude that the information about the Soviet school system contributed to the formation of the foreign policy and domestic policy of the United States.

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Hegemann, Hendrik. "Toward ‘normal’ politics? Security, parliaments and the politicisation of intelligence oversight in the German Bundestag." British Journal of Politics and International Relations 20, no. 1 (January 22, 2018): 175–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1369148117745683.

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Security has often been considered a special kind of politics that presents a particular challenge for liberal democracy, whether due to securitised states of exception or technocratic risk management. This article examines whether and how parliaments can be sites of politicisation, moving security from exceptional and technocratic politics toward more ‘normal’ democratic politics. Moving beyond the narrow focus on decisions over the use of military force, the examination focuses on the ‘hard case’ of parliamentary oversight of intelligence agencies and provides a case study on the German Bundestag. Overall, it finds that a strict divide between security and normal politics is overly simplistic, even when it comes to intelligence. There is evidence for politicisation that reveals patterns of normal politics through an increasingly institutionalised framework as well as public, increasingly controversial debates, including a good deal of partisan politics. However, debates tend to center on institutional and legal issues as well as symbolic skirmishes after specific events of high visibility, while many restrictions are deeply entrenched in parliamentary conventions and attitudes.

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Weinberg, Gerhard L. "German Documents in the United States." Central European History 41, no. 4 (November 14, 2008): 555–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008938908000848.

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At the end of World War II, vast quantities of German documents had fallen into the hands of the Allies either during hostilities or in the immediately following weeks. Something will be said near the end of this report about the archives captured or seized by the Soviet Union; the emphasis here will be on those that came into the possession of the Western Allies. The United States and Great Britain made agreements for joint control and exploitation, of which the most important was the Bissell-Sinclair agreement named for the intelligence chiefs who signed it. The German naval, foreign office, and chancellery archives were to be physically located in England, while the military, Nazi Party, and related files were to come to the United States. Each of the two countries was to be represented at the site of the other's holdings, have access to the files, and play a role in decisions about their fate. The bulk of those German records that came to the United States were deposited in a section of a World War I torpedo factory in Alexandria, Virginia, which had been made into the temporary holding center for the World War II records of the American army and American theater commands. In accordance with the admonition to turn swords into plowshares, the building is now an artists' boutique.

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Zverev, V. O. "GERMAN SPYING AND FIGHT AGAINST IT IN THE GRAND PRINCIPALITY OF FINLAND (ACCORDING TO MILITARY COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENTS)." Учёные записки Петрозаводского государственного университета 44, no. 2 (February 2022): 31–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.15393/uchz.art.2022.729.

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Pöhlmann, Markus. "Towards a New History of German Military Intelligence in the Era of the Great War: Approaches and Sources." Journal of Intelligence History 5, no. 2 (December 2005): i—viii. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2005.10555114.

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Grzybowski, Jerzy. "Komitet Białoruski w Generalnym Gubernatorstwie (1940–1945)." Studia Interkulturowe Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej 11 (November 6, 2018): 32–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0012.7232.

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The subject of this study is the activity of the Belarusians in the General Government in 1940–1945. Belarusians were the fifth largest ethnic group in the GG. The German occupation authorities, applying the principle of “divide and conquer”, were ready to give Belarusians some freedom in the sphere of culture, religion and economy. In 1940, the Belarusian Committee was established in Warsaw, with branches in Biała Podlaska and Kraków. The majority of committee members were Belarusians and Poles – prisoners of war and refugees from the Soviet occupation zone of Poland. As a priority of this organization, cultural, educational and religious activities among the Belarusians in the General Government were recognized. The activists of the committee managed to create a school in Warsaw and two parishes (Orthodox and Catholic). Belarusian activities faced some difficulties. Serious problems for the Belarusians Committee caused the activities of Ukrainian organizations in the GG. One of the episodes in the history of the Belarusian Committee is the cooperation of its activists with German military intelligence.

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MONGER, DAVID. "Know Your Enemy: Peter Chalmers Mitchell, British Military Intelligence and the Understanding of German Propaganda in the First World War." History 103, no. 358 (November 15, 2018): 777–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-229x.12675.

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Andó, Sándor. "Increasing the Effectiveness of Military Selection in the Early Days of Applied Psychology." Hadtudományi Szemle 15, no. 3 (December 8, 2022): 133–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.32563/hsz.2022.3.8.

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The study reviews the early days of the scientific application of psychology, the theoretical foundations of which can still be used as a basis for military selection. The framework within which the studies were initiated and conducted in the early 20th century shall be reviewed, and the major differences in the perceptions of the two (American and German) nations and how they were disseminated in Hungary shall be discussed. As with many other sciences, the development of psychological testing methods has been boosted by war. The Army Alpha and Beta, the widely known group intelligence tests was a national issue for effective placement in the United States of America. One of the slogans of psychotechnology in occupational psychology reads: “The right man on the right place”; the notion that everything should be done to employ people in jobs according to their character and abilities. In the Hungarian context, I reviewed the available literature from the organisational work started in the Monarchy, through the rise of psychotechnology, to the establishment of the Central Institute of Aptitude Testing at the Royal Hungarian Army and the studies conducted there.

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Journal articles on the topic 'German military intelligence'

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