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Academic literature on the topic 'German military intelligence'

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Published: 10 December 2022
Last updated: 28 January 2023

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Journal articles on the topic "German military intelligence"

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Nowacki, Krzysztof, and Adam Szymanowicz. "German preparations for the war in the light of documents of the Polish military intelligence (1933-1939) – selected aspects." Scientific Journal of the Military University of Land Forces 192, no. 2 (April 1, 2019): 253–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0013.2597.

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As a result of the Treaty of Versailles the provisions concerning the issue of limitation of the armed forces were imposed on Germany. These provisions were unilaterally terminated by Germany two years after Adolf Hitler had come to power. There was introduced general and compulsory military service. On 21st May 1935, Hitler – as the Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor – signed the secret Reich Defence Law, which gave the Wehrmacht command wide powers to expand the army. Thus, the intensive development of the German army was initiated. After the Nazi Party came to power in Germany, gaining new information by the Polish military intelligence became increasingly difficult. It was connected with the expansion of the German counter-intelligence services, especially the Gestapo, as well as the police supervision over the German society. Through good operational work of the Polish intelligence the Polish side already before the outbreak of the war was relatively well familiarized with the particular phases of the overall German army’s armaments, as well as the German operational doctrine and methods of warfare.
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Nogaj, Adam. "Evaluation of the correctness of the German military intelligence’s findings concerning armament and equipment of the Polish Army in 1939. Part II. Aviation, Navy, radio communication, means of transport and logistics of the Polish Army." Scientific Journal of the Military University of Land Forces 197, no. 3 (September 11, 2020): 600–619. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0014.3955.

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The presented article constitutes the second part of the publication and is devoted to the current knowledge of the German military intelligence concerning the armament and equipment of land forces, Navy, radio communication, means of transport and logistics of the Polish Army in 1939. The article also attempts to assess the correctness of these findings. The presented article is one of several articles written by the author to present the knowledge of German military intelligence about the Polish Army in 1939, together with the assessment of the correctness of these findings. The article is based on archival materials of the 12th Foreign Armies East Intelligence Section of the General Staff of the High Command of the Land Forces of 1939, which developed synthetic elaborations for the top military commanders of the German army, based on the analysis and collective materials from the individual Abwehstelle. For years, the documents analysed were classified and delivered exclusively to the top commanders of the German army and Hitler’s Chancellery. At present, they are entirely non-confidential and available to researchers at the Bundesarchiv-Militaerarchiv in Freiburg. Copies of parts of these documents, in the form of microfilms, can be found, among others, in the Archive of New Files in Warsaw. According to the author, working out both – the Polish aviation and fleet – was carried out at a high and correct level. Nevertheless, it does not mean that no mistakes were made, even very serious – for example as regards the assessment of the number of submarines. The greatest negligence of the German Military Intelligence’s findings on armament and equipment of the Polish Army concerns the equipment of signal corps. As the German Intelligence overlooked modernisation of communication equipment which took place in the years 1937-1939, there was no knowledge of, among the other things, the “N” type radio stations, which were used in almost every regiment. Scarcity of the Polish Army equipment as regards mechanical means of transport was well known. The shortages in the above scope were enormous. What is interesting, is the fact that logistics of the Polish Army was completely overlooked by the German Intelligence. It should be assumed that the German Military Intelligence’s figuring out of armament and equipment of the Polish Army was carried out on a high and correct level. Nevertheless, it does not mean that all the findings were appropriate and true. The accuracy of the correctness of the German Military Intelligence’s findings concerning figuring out of organisation and composition of the Polish Army, and dislocation of the Polish units in time of peace, should also be highly assessed. Nevertheless, the Intelligence’s findings, as regards signal mobilization process, figuring out the mobilization and operational plans of the Polish Army and organisation and the composition of the Polish Army during war should be evaluated differently. It results from the fact that the German Intelligence was not aware of, among the other things: number of divisions Poland would engage at war, names and composition of the Polish military units, very strong reserve of the High Commander, as well as it was not able to localize the Polish divisions developed over the borders just before the outbreak of war. Knowledge of the Polish economy was also on a very basic level. Therefore, the aforementioned negligence in the German Military Intelligence’s findings on the Polish Army and Poland itself during the period directly preceding the war, should be regarded as major. Taking the above into consideration, the conclusion is that the German agency did not exist among the people holding high positions in the Polish Army; in the Central Staff, General Inspector of Training, Corps District Commands. Nevertheless, the overall view of the Polish Army recorded by the German Military Intelligence was correct. It was noticed that the army is weak, poorly equipped and badly managed and it would not be able to fight the enemy. It was a correct assessment.
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BOCHACZEK-TRĄBSKA, Joanna. "ACTIVITY OF BRANCH 3 IN BYDGOSZCZ IN THE 1930s. OPERATION “WÓZEK”." Scientific Journal of the Military University of Land Forces 162, no. 4 (October 1, 2011): 200–208. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0002.3221.

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From the moment Poland regained independence, national security was threatened by Germany. This article shows the activity of Branch 3 of Unit II of the General Staff of the Polish Army in Bydgoszcz in the face of the war threat. Branch 3 conducted both military intelligence and counterintelligence activities. Operation “Wózek” carried out by the branch is worth attention. Its objective was to check German parcels, especially military ones, transported from Germany to East Prussia and the Free City of Gdańsk [Polish: Wolne Miasto Gdańsk]. Such a way of obtaining valuable intelligence material was not only important but also inexpensive. Operation “Wózek” contributed to the identification of German preparations for their aggression against Poland in September 1939.
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Landmann, Tomasz. "THE GERMAN-SOVIET RAPPROCHEMENT DURING THE YEARS 1921–1930, AND THE SECURITY OF THE POLISH STATE IN THE EVALUATION OF DIVISION II OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE POLISH ARMYT." Kyiv Historical Studies, no. 1 (2019): 6–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.28925/2524-0757.2019.1.1.

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This article attempts to look at practical examples approximation of political, economic and military Germany and Soviet Russia, then the Soviet Union in 1921–1930. It is adopted the thesis according to which the German-Soviet political, economic and military rapprochement during the years 1921–1930 significantly endangers the safety of the Second Republic of Poland.To prove this thesis it was decided to rely on both the literature and source materials, including first of all materials in the Central Military Archives in Warsaw-Rembertów. The key is turned out to be the materials collected in teams of Division II of the Supreme Command of the Polish Army and the Russian Collection Act. The collected archival documents pinpoint various areas of cooperation with the Germans and the Soviets during the given period, as well as determine to what extent the Polish military intelligence assessed the feasibility and effects of the approximation to a direct threat to the security of the Polish state.The content allows concluding that the Polish military intelligence had good diagnosis examples of German-Soviet cooperation, often with a strong anti-Polish shape and character. This cooperation in the years 1921–1930 was particularly intense, threatening the security interests of the Second Republic of Poland and leading to the negation established after the Treaty of Versailles and the Treaty of Riga Polish borders on both the west and the east.
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Żurawski, Damian. "Implementation of intelligence and diplomatic tasks by the military attache office of the legation of the republic of poland in berlin in 1928-1932." Scientific Journal of the Military University of Land Forces 189, no. 4 (October 1, 2018): 70–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0013.0724.

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The article presents the origins and functioning of the Military Attaché Office in Berlin in the years 1928-1932 led by Lieutenant Colonel Witold Dzierżykraj-Morawski, who carried out the intelligence activities under the guise of a military diplomat. Within the scope of his operational activities, Lieutenant Colonel Morawski established contacts with other military attachés and gathered and transmitted information on the country of residence in order to identify its military potential as well as internal and external political situation in the Weimar Republic. In his work, Lieutenant Colonel Morawski did not conduct intelligence activity of a purely operational nature, however, he managed to obtain a wide range of contacts for intelligence work, in which he used the meetings with military attachés of foreign countries, people from various circles from German pacifists and the Union of Poles in Germany as well as the environments related to the armaments industry. From 1929 to 1932 he expanded his activity to include open sources, i.e. the official press and announcements of the Ministry of the Reichswehr that gave him knowledge about the dates of the next maneuvers and detailed information about their course, which he received in a wider range from Japanese or Spanish military attachés. Moreover, he obtained information about the cooperation between Germany and the USSR, which was to serve to devalue contacts between the military attaché of Great Britain and the German military authorities. One of such information was obtained in 1931 from the military attaché of Sweden through the Finnish military attaché office. In spite of quite secretive action, in November 1931 he was accused of espionage and was expelled in March 1932. He also gave a lecture at the Center for Higher Military Studies in Warsaw (February 1932) where he presented the possible directions of attack of the German Army and the entire doctrine of combat activity of the Reichswehr.
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Buse, Dieter K. "Domestic intelligence and German military leaders, 1914–18." Intelligence and National Security 15, no. 4 (December 2000): 42–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520008432627.

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LANDMANN, Tomasz, and Piotr BASTKOWSKI. "MANIFESTATIONS OF CLOSER GERMAN-SOVIET POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY RELATIONS, IN THE YEARS 1921-1926, FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE STATE SECURITY, AS ASSESSED BY THE SECOND DEPARTMENT OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE POLISH ARMED FORCES." Journal of Science of the Gen. Tadeusz Kosciuszko Military Academy of Land Forces 184, no. 2 (April 2, 2017): 16–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0010.4895.

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The article attempts to analyse the practical examples of closer political, economic and military relations between Germany and Soviet Russia, and then the Soviet Union, in the years 1921-1926. The paper lays out the thesis that the closer German-Soviet political, economic and military relations, in the years 1921-1926, posed a significant threat to the security of the Second Polish Republic. To justify the above thesis both the literature and source materials were examined, including first of all the materials held in the Central Military Archives (Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe) in Warszawa-Rembertów. The materials gathered in the groups of records of the Second Department of the Polish Army High Command and the Collections of Russian records were found out to be of key importance. The collected archival materials made it possible to identify different planes of cooperation between the Germans and the Soviets in the discussed period and to establish to what extent the Polish military intelligence was aware of the feasibility and effects of such closer relations, resulting in a direct threat to the security of the Polish state. On the basis of the presented information it can be stated that the Polish military intelligence provided an accurate diagnosis of the examples of German-Soviet cooperation, often anti-Polish in its form and character. In the years 1921-1926, this cooperation was particularly intensified, posing a threat to the security of the Second Polish Republic and leading to negotiations regarding both the western and the eastern borders of Poland established after the Treaty of Versailles and the Treaty of Riga.
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Shpiro, S. "Intelligence Services and Foreign Policy: German-Israeli Intelligence and Military Co-operation." German Politics 11, no. 1 (April 2002): 23–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/714001230.

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Burdick, Charles B., and David Kahn. "Hitler's Spies: German Military Intelligence in World War II." Military Affairs 50, no. 4 (October 1986): 218. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1988029.

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Homze, Edward L., and Lauran Paine. "German Military Intelligence in World War II: The Abwehr." Military Affairs 52, no. 2 (April 1988): 103. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1988054.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "German military intelligence"

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Voss, William D. "Watching the rising sun : German and American military attaché reports and intelligence failure in Japan, 1931-1939 /." Search for this dissertation online, 2004. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/ksu/main.

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Luce, Alexandra Isabella. "British intelligence in the Portuguese world, 1939-1945 : operations against German Intelligence and relations with the Polícia de Vigilância e Defesa do Estado (PVDE)." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2010. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.608984.

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Collins, Steven Morris. "Intelligence and the Uprising in East Germany 1953: An Example of Political Intelligence." Thesis, University of North Texas, 2017. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc1011823/.

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In 1950, the leader of the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), Walter Ulbricht, began a policy of connecting foreign threats with domestic policy failures as if the two were the same, and as if he was not responsible for either. This absolved him of blame for those failures and allowed Ulbricht to define his internal enemies as agents of the western powers. He used the state's secret police force, known as the Stasi, to provide the information that supported his claims of western obstructionism and to intimidate his adversaries. This resulted in a politicization of intelligence whereby Stasi officers slanted information so that it conformed to Ulbricht's doctrine of western interference. Comparisons made of eyewitness' statements to the morale reports filed by Stasi agents show that there was a difference between how the East German worker felt and the way the Stasi portrayed their attitudes to the politburo. Consequently, prior to June 17, 1953, when labor strikes inspired a million East German citizens to rise up against Ulbricht's oppressive government, the politicization of Stasi intelligence caused information over labor unrest to be unreliable at a time of increasing risk to the regime. This study shows the extent of Ulbricht's politicization of Stasi intelligence and its effect on the June 1953 uprising in the German Democratic Republic.
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Jackson, Peter Darron. "French military intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1936-1939." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1995. https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/273043.

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Eldridge-Nelson, Allison. "Veil of Protection: Operation Paperclip and the Contrasting Fates of Wernher von Braun and Arthur Rudolph." Bowling Green State University / OhioLINK, 2017. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=bgsu1510914308951993.

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Books on the topic "German military intelligence"

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Historical dictionary of German intelligence. Lanham, Md: Scarecrow Press, 2009.

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Hitler's spies: German military intelligence in World War II. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2000.

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Hitler's spies: German military intelligence in World War II. New York: Collier Books, 1985.

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Yates, Phil. Diving Eagles: Intelligence handbook on German airborne forces. Auckland, N.Z: Battlefront Miniatures, 2003.

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Yates, Phil. Stalingrad: Intelligence handbook on Soviet and German infantry forces. Edited by Simunovich Peter and Brisigotti John-Paul. Auckland, N.Z: Battlefront Miniatures Ltd, 2004.

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Yates, Phil. Desert Fox: Intelligence handbook on German armoured forces in North Africa. Auckland, N.Z: Battlefront Miniatures, 2004.

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Scientific information in wartime: The Allied-German rivalry, 1939-1945. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1994.

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American intelligence and the German resistance to Hitler: A documentary history. Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 2008.

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Yates, Phil. Hitler's fire brigade: Intelligence handbook on German Armoured Forces on the Eastern Front. Auckland, N.Z: Battlefront Miniatures, 2003.

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1947-, Heideking Jürgen, Mauch Christof, and Frey Marc 1961-, eds. American intelligence and the German resistance to Hitler: A documentary history. Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1996.

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Book chapters on the topic "German military intelligence"

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Brennan, Nathaniel. "The Cinema Intelligence Apparatus." In Cinema's Military Industrial Complex. University of California Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/california/9780520291508.003.0008.

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This chapter, by Nathaniel Brennan, discusses the efforts of the Museum of Modern Art Film Library to make use of captured enemy motion pictures on behalf of the federal government’s wartime intelligence programs during World War II. While the chapter presents an overview of the film library’s governmental intelligence work, ranging from matters of storage to the challenges of training analysts, the central case study examines the work of British anthropologist Gregory Bateson, whose work at the film library consisted of trying to define an objective approach to the study of culture through cinema and the preparation of a test film that would instruct American soldiers about the peculiarities of the German character. Although Bateson’s plans did not materialize, the efforts of Margaret Mead to adapt Bateson’s anthropological film methodology for the Cold War nonetheless influenced the development of postwar film studies and the analysis of national cinemas.
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"French military intelligence responds to the German remilitarisation of the Rhineland, 1936." In Exploring Intelligence Archives, 77–110. Routledge, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203023129-10.

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Sims, Jennifer E. "Intelligence and Decision in 1938." In Decision Advantage, 362—C12.P151. Oxford University PressNew York, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197508046.003.0012.

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Abstract This chapter explores Hitler’s and Chamberlain’s decisions to negotiate Czechoslovakia’s fate rather than fight for it, comparing their decision-making at comparable moments. European decision-making in the run-up to WWII was almost as dimly lit as in July 1914, but with one difference: professional intelligence organizations were involved. They helped only marginally. Hitler’s primary objectives from 1937 to 1938 were domestic. He knew he needed to build his military while subjugating his generals, who believed they, not he, were the guarantors of the state. France and Britain missed Hitler’s moves in these regards, so missed learning his practical plans for territorial aggression against Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and France. Not knowing Hitler’s intelligence operations against his military, the Allies did not know to be skeptical of sources within the German military who thought they knew Hitler’s mind when they not; in fact, these sources were being positively manipulated. If Hitler thus gained repeated intelligence advantages in the run-up to Munich, Chamberlain won an intelligence advantage during those meetings. Afterward, most French officials and British citizens believed the problem of European order was not Britain’s failure to stand up for it or to understand and properly accommodate Hitler’s objectives; the problem was Hitler himself: he was lying about his territorial ambitions.
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Greenberg, Joel. "The Enigma machine." In The Turing Guide. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198747826.003.0018.

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Shortly after the end of the First World War, the German Navy learned that its encrypted communications had been read throughout the hostilities by both Britain and Russia. The German military realized that its approach to cipher security required a fundamental overhaul, and from 1926 different branches of the military began to adopt the encryption machine known as Enigma. By the start of the Second World War a series of modifications to military Enigma had made the machine yet more secure, and Enigma was at the centre of a remarkably effective military communications system. It would take some of the best minds in Britain—and before that, in Poland—to crack German military Enigma. The exact origins of the encryption machine that played such an important role in the Second World War are not entirely clear. In the early 1920s patent applications for a wheel-based cipher machine were filed by a Dutch inventor, Hugo Koch, as well as by a German engineer, Arthur Scherbius. In 1923, a company called Chiffrienmaschinen AG exhibited a heavy and bulky encryption machine at the International Postal Congress in Bern, Switzerland. This machine had a standard typewriter keyboard for input, and its design followed Scherbius’s original patent closely. Scherbius had named his machine ‘Enigma’, and this ‘Model A’ was the first of a long line of models to emerge. Models B, C, and D soon followed, and by 1927 Model D was selling widely for commercial use. A number of governments purchased Enigma machines in order to study them, and Edward Travis—the deputy head of Britain’s signals intelligence unit, the Government Code and Cypher School—bought one on behalf of the British government in the mid-1920s. In 1925, the German Navy decided to put Enigma into use the following year, despite having rejected one of Scherbius’s previous encryption mechanisms in 1918. Meanwhile, the German Army began to redesign Enigma, with the intention of strengthening its security. By 1928, Model G was in use, and in June 1930 Model I (Eins) became the standard version, deployed first by the army, then the navy in October 1934, and the air force in August 1935.
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Peiss, Kathy. "The Wild Scramble for Documents." In Information Hunters, 68–92. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190944612.003.0005.

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Intelligence gathering and assessment took on increased importance after D-Day. OSS librarians and information specialists were now part of a military operation as members of US Army documents teams called T-Forces. They scoured targets for operational or strategic information, records documenting German war crimes, and scientific reports. Books and other publications were often swept up in these collecting efforts. POW interrogations provided information about the removal of endangered German collections, many of which were found by Allied troops in caves and mines. The army teams and OSS agents engaged in mass confiscations and removals, even of materials with few intelligence-related uses. Americans distinguished their behavior from Nazi pillaging and Soviet trophy loot, respecting university and public research libraries and rescuing European cultural heritage. Despite ethical questions, the logic of collecting extended to books, periodicals, and even whole libraries.
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Faulkner, Marcus. "“A Most Disagreeable Problem”." In Decision in the Atlantic, 169–94. University Press of Kentucky, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9781949668001.003.0008.

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In the vast literature concerning the German attack on Allied maritime communications in the Atlantic theater during the Second World War, one particular factor has received little to no consideration – the potential threat that German aircraft carriers posed to Allied naval operations and the passage of maritime traffic in the North Atlantic and Arctic Oceans. While ultimately the Kriegmarine never fielded an operational carrier, such a development could not be discounted at the time. This chapter addresses what the British knew about the German effort and what implications this had on British strategy, naval planning, and fleet deployments. In covering these aspects, this chapter by Marcus Faulkner fills an existing gap concerning the Admiralty's perception and contributes to understanding the complexity of the maritime threat Britain faced during the war. It also illustrates the problems involved in evaluating enemy military capabilities and intentions on the basis of a very limited intelligence picture. This in turn helps historians understand why the Admiralty remained so apprehensive of the Kriegsmarine's surface fleet until 1943.
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Kurlander, Eric. "The Supernatural and the Second World War." In Hitler's Monsters. Yale University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.12987/yale/9780300189452.003.0007.

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This chapter evaluates the influence of the supernatural imaginary on the Third Reich's conception of foreign policy, investment in fanciful weaponry, and use of astrology, divination, clairvoyance, and telepathy in prosecuting the war. The Second World War was neither caused nor directed primarily by occult designs. However, many aspects of the war were influenced or determined by folklore, border science, and the broader Nazi supernatural imaginary. Rather than rely on a practical evaluation of risks and rewards, Hitler frequently tapped into his own intuition in making foreign-policy decisions and appealed to the German people's collective unconscious in selling his aggressive policies. Abetting Hitler's faith-based foreign policy, the Propaganda Ministry and Foreign Office employed professional astrologers and diviners to produce wartime propaganda aimed at both the Allies and the German public. Finally, the Third Reich utilized occultism and border science to gather military intelligence, search for enemy battleships, and train Nazi soldiers.
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Sims, Jennifer E. "Knowledge and Diplomacy in the Era of Total War." In Decision Advantage, 263—C10.P164. Oxford University PressNew York, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197508046.003.0010.

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Abstract The years encompassing WWI and WWII, roughly from 1880 to 1945, suffered from a unified but persistently dark terrain of uncertainty. Power relationships were in constant flux due to the effects of the industrial revolution, and decision-making was opaque due to the decline of monarchical authorities. The British Empire was stretched, the Ottoman Empire folding, and Austria-Hungary was tottering in the center of Europe. The greatest uncertainties destined to shape early twentieth-century diplomacy concerned (1) the relationship of industrial advances to military power and planning; (2) the volatility of rebalancing British and German power; (3) decision-making authorities within modernizing governments; (4) the impact on state power of a more educated and mobilized citizenry; and (5) the impact of institutionalized intelligence on diplomacy and state power.
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Copeland, Jack. "Tunny: Hitler’s biggest fish." In The Turing Guide. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198747826.003.0022.

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After 1942, the Tunny cipher machine took over increasingly from Enigma for encrypting Berlin’s highest-level army communications. Hitler used Tunny to communicate with his generals at the front lines. Turing tackled Tunny in the summer of 1942, and altered the course of the war by inventing the first systematic method for breaking into the torrent of priceless Tunny messages. The story of Enigma’s defeat by the Bletchley Park codebreakers astonished the world. Less well known is the story—even more astounding—of the codebreakers’ success against a later, stateof- the-art German cipher machine (Fig. 14.1). This new machine began its work encrypting German Army messages in 1941, nearly two years into the war. At Bletchley Park it was codenamed simply ‘Tunny’. Broken Tunny messages contained intelligence that changed the course of the war and saved an incalculable number of lives. How Bletchley Park broke Tunny remained a closely guarded secret for more than 50 years. In June 2000 the British government finally declassified the hitherto ultra-secret 500-page official history of the Tunny operation. Titled ‘General report on Tunny’, this history was written in 1945 at the end of the war by three of the Tunny codebreakers, Donald Michie, Jack Good, and Geoffrey Timms. Finally the secrecy ended: the ‘General report’ laid bare the whole incredible story of the assault on Tunny. Far more advanced than Enigma, Tunny marked a new era in crypto-technology. The Enigma machine dated from the early 1920s—its manufacturer first placed it on the market in 1923—and even though the German Army and Navy made extensive modifications, Enigma was certainly no longer state-of-the-art equipment by the time the war broke out in 1939. From 1942, Hitler and the German Army High Command in Berlin relied increasingly on the Tunny machine to protect their ultra-secret communications with the front-line generals who commanded the war in the eastern and western theatres. Germany’s compromised Tunny radio network carried the highest grade of intelligence, giving Bletchley Park the opportunity to eavesdrop on lengthy back-and-forth communications between the grand architects of Germany’s battle plans. Tunny leaked detailed information about German strategy, tactical planning, and military strengths and weaknesses.
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Klinger, William, and Denis Kuljiš. "The Purga Archipelago." In Tito's Secret Empire, 167–72. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197572429.003.0025.

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This chapter recounts the raid in Drvar, which was the final attempt to use military means to eliminate the Partisan movement and Marshall Tito's Supreme Command. It analyzes the supposed outcome of the Anglo-American units entering Yugoslavia in accordance with the plan for landings on Krk and in Rijeka, if the German paratroops succeeded in eliminating Tito. It also describes Tito's liberated territory on the island of Vis which offered a neutral ground and ideal conditions for special warfare. The chapter talks about intelligence operatives in the Balkans that were more important than Russian tank armies or a US strategic air force. It refers to Moscow-trained Yugoslav technocrats of the dictatorship of the proletariat and brigand captains that were disciplined and organized by Tito in order to carry out feats on a European scale.
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