Journal articles: 'Game theory mechanism'

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Sultana, Shabana, and Dr C. Vidya Raj Dr. C. Vidya Raj. "ANALYZING PACKET FORWARDING MECHANISM IN ADHOC NETWORKS USING GAME THEORY." Indian Journal of Applied Research 3, no. 5 (October 1, 2011): 144–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.15373/2249555x/may2013/43.

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Ito, Hiromu, and Jun Tanimoto. "Dynamic utility: the sixth reciprocity mechanism for the evolution of cooperation." Royal Society Open Science 7, no. 8 (August 2020): 200891. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsos.200891.

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Game theory has been extensively applied to elucidate the evolutionary mechanism of cooperative behaviour. Dilemmas in game theory are important elements that disturb the promotion of cooperation. An important question is how to escape from dilemmas. Recently, a dynamic utility function (DUF) that considers an individual's current status (wealth) and that can be applied to game theory was developed. The DUF is different from the famous five reciprocity mechanisms called Nowak's five rules. Under the DUF, cooperation is promoted by poor players in the chicken game, with no changes in the prisoner's dilemma and stag-hunt games. In this paper, by comparing the strengths of the two dilemmas, we show that the DUF is a novel reciprocity mechanism (sixth rule) that differs from Nowak's five rules. We also show the difference in dilemma relaxation between dynamic game theory and (traditional) static game theory when the DUF and one of the five rules are combined. Our results indicate that poor players unequivocally promote cooperation in any dynamic game. Unlike conventional rules that have to be brought into game settings, this sixth rule is universally (canonical form) applicable to any game because all repeated/evolutionary games are dynamic in principle.

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Zhang, Jinxin, and Meng Wu. "Cooperation Mechanism in Blockchain by Evolutionary Game Theory." Complexity 2021 (November 8, 2021): 1–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/1258730.

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In the blockchain network, to get rewards in the blockchain, blockchain participants pay for various forms of competition such as computing power, stakes, and other resources. Because of the need to pay a certain cost, individual participants cooperate to maintain the long-term stability of the blockchain jointly. In the course of such competition, the game between each other has appeared invisibly. To better understand the blockchain design of cooperation mechanisms, in this paper, we constructed a game framework between participants with different willingness, using evolutionary game theory, and complex network games. We analyzed how the behavior of participants potentially develops with cost and payoff. We consider the expected benefits of participants for the normal growth of the blockchain as the major factor. Considering the behavior of malicious betrayers, the blockchain needs to be maintained in the early stage. Numerical simulation supports our analysis.

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Chang, Shu-Lin, Kun-Chang Lee, Ruey-Rong Huang, and Yu-Hsien Liao. "Resource-Allocation Mechanism: Game-Theory Analysis." Symmetry 13, no. 5 (May 4, 2021): 799. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/sym13050799.

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Recently, owing to the trend of cross-disciplinary research in various fields, it is imperative to optimize the resource-allocation performance by analyzing allocation behavior and strategies from different perspectives as well as based on ideas from various fields. There are many decisive roles, such as changes in allocation behavior, related allocation methods, and the interaction and work effectiveness of strategies, to be implemented. By using game-theory analysis under resource-allocation procedures, in this article, we analyzed, constructed, simulated, and derived an efficient resource-allocation mechanism. Additionally, we generalized a power index by evaluating the operators and their activity levels. This article adopted the axioms of level completeness, criterion for weighted circumstances property, level synchronization, pure excess equal symmetry, and specific consonance to offer characterizations to assess the related rationality and accuracy of the proposed power index. Based on the above discussion, different from the rule of thumb, expert meeting, or other existing concepts, in this research game theory is used to provide an alternative guide for resource-allocation procedures by the optimal or equilibrium state established.

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Roth, Alvin E., and Robert B. Wilson. "How Market Design Emerged from Game Theory: A Mutual Interview." Journal of Economic Perspectives 33, no. 3 (August 1, 2019): 118–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.33.3.118.

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We interview each other about how game theory and mechanism design evolved into practical market design. When we learned game theory, games were modeled either in terms of the strategies available to the players (“noncooperative games”) or the outcomes attainable by coalitions (“cooperative games”), and these were viewed as models for different kinds of games. The model itself was viewed as a mathematical object that could be examined in its entirety. Market design, however, has come to view these models as complementary approaches for examining different ways marketplaces operate within their economic environment. Because that environment can be complex, there will be unobservable aspects of the game. Mathematical models themselves play a less heroic, stand-alone role in market design than in the theoretical mechanism design literature. Other kinds of investigation, communication, and persuasion are important in crafting a workable design and helping it to be adopted, implemented, maintained, and adapted.

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Liu, Yanhua, Hui Chen, Hao Zhang, and Ximeng Liu. "Defense Strategy Selection Model Based on Multistage Evolutionary Game Theory." Security and Communication Networks 2021 (November 11, 2021): 1–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/4773894.

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Evolutionary game theory is widely applied in network attack and defense. The existing network attack and defense analysis methods based on evolutionary games adopt the bounded rationality hypothesis. However, the existing research ignores that both sides of the game get more information about each other with the deepening of the network attack and defense game, which may cause the attacker to crack a certain type of defense strategy, resulting in an invalid defense strategy. The failure of the defense strategy reduces the accuracy and guidance value of existing methods. To solve the above problem, we propose a reward value learning mechanism (RLM). By analyzing previous game information, RLM automatically incentives or punishes the attack and defense reward values for the next stage, which reduces the probability of defense strategy failure. RLM is introduced into the dynamic network attack and defense process under incomplete information, and a multistage evolutionary game model with a learning mechanism is constructed. Based on the above model, we design the optimal defense strategy selection algorithm. Experimental results demonstrate that the evolutionary game model with RLM has better results in the value of reward and defense success rate than the evolutionary game model without RLM.

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Trestian, Ramona, Olga Ormond, and Gabriel-Miro Muntean. "Reputation-based network selection mechanism using game theory." Physical Communication 4, no. 3 (September 2011): 156–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.phycom.2011.06.004.

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Cheng, Ching Hung, Zhe Huang, Siqi Lin, and Hangyu Wu. "Analysis of Corporation’s Financial Fraud and Independent Directors’ Decision Based on Evolutionary Game Theory." BCP Business & Management 31 (November 5, 2022): 195–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.54691/bcpbm.v31i.2561.

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The case of Kangmei Pharmaceutical Company’s financial fraud reveals several important issues in the independent director system in China. It is valuable to study these issues separately from the corporation and the independent director’s perspective, as both wish to maximize their profitability. This paper applies evolutionary game theory to construct two games between the corporation and independent directors, and {honest, dishonest} is the strategy set for the corporation in both games, while {dutiful, undutiful} and {continue, resign} are the strategy sets for the independent directors in game 1 and game 2 respectively. The evolutionary stability strategies obtained from these two games and simulation results show that if the independent directors should be dutiful and not quit their positive while the corporation should never consider making any financial fraud, then the independent directors and the corporation will get the optimal benefit. The results suggest that the award mechanism and reputation mechanism for independent directors should be established and fully completed to improve the independent director system.

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Collins, Andrew J., and Sheida Etemadidavan. "Humans and the core partition: An agent-based modeling experiment." PLOS ONE 17, no. 9 (September 1, 2022): e0273961. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0273961.

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Although strategic coalition formation is traditionally modeled using cooperative game theory, behavioral game theorists have repeatedly shown that outcomes predicted by game theory are different from those generated by actual human behavior. To further explore these differences, in a cooperative game theory context, we experiment to compare the outcomes resulting from human participants’ behavior to those generated by a cooperative game theory solution mechanism called the core partition. Our experiment uses an interactive simulation of a glove game, a particular type of cooperative game, to collect the participant’s decision choices and their resultant outcomes. Two different glove games are considered, and the outputs from 62 trial games are analyzed. The experiment’s outcomes show that core coalitions, which are coalitions in a core partition, are found in about 42% of games. Though this number may seem low, a trial’s outcome is more complex than whether the human player finds a core coalition or not. Finding the core coalition depends on factors such as the other possible feasible solutions and the payoffs available from these solutions. These factors, and the complexity they generate, are discussed in the paper.

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Dong, Lihong, Xirong Wang, Beizhan Liu, Tianwei Zheng, and Zheng Wang. "Information Acquisition Incentive Mechanism Based on Evolutionary Game Theory." Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing 2021 (August 17, 2021): 1–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/5525791.

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Based on evolutionary game theory, this paper proposes a new information acquisition mechanism for intelligent mine construction, which solves the problem of incomplete information acquisition in the construction of new intelligent mining area and reduces the difficulty of information acquisition, which solves the problem of the imperfect mine information acquisition in the construction of a new smart mine regions and decreases the difficulty of a mine information acquisition. Based on the evolutionary game model, the perceptual incentive model based on group is established. The reliability of information collection is ensured by sharing and modifying the information collector. Through the analysis of the simulation results, it is found that the regional coverage model based on the cooperation in game theory and evolutionary game theory has a good effect on solving the bottleneck problem of the current intelligent mining area. This paper has an enlightening effect on the optimization of the mine information acquisition system. Through the improvement of the mine information acquisition system, the working efficiency of the information acquisition terminal can be effectively increased by 6%.

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McNamara, John M. "Towards a richer evolutionary game theory." Journal of The Royal Society Interface 10, no. 88 (November 6, 2013): 20130544. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2013.0544.

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Most examples of the application of evolutionary game theory to problems in biology involve highly simplified models. I contend that it is time to move on and include much more richness in models. In particular, more thought needs to be given to the importance of (i) between-individual variation; (ii) the interaction between individuals, and hence the process by which decisions are reached; (iii) the ecological and life-history context of the situation; (iv) the traits that are under selection, and (v) the underlying psychological mechanisms that lead to behaviour. I give examples where including variation between individuals fundamentally changes predicted outcomes of a game. Variation also selects for real-time responses, again resulting in changed outcomes. Variation can select for other traits, such as choosiness and social sensitivity. More generally, many problems involve coevolution of more than one trait. I identify situations where a reductionist approach, in which a game is isolated from is ecological setting, can be misleading. I also highlight the need to consider flexibility of behaviour, mental states and other issues concerned with the evolution of mechanism.

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Elkind, Edith, and Kevin Leyton-Brown. "Algorithmic Game Theory and Artificial Intelligence." AI Magazine 31, no. 4 (September 20, 2010): 9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aimag.v31i4.2310.

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We briefly survey the rise of game theory as a topic of study in artificial intelligence, and explain the term algorithmic game theory. We then de- scribe three broad areas of current inquiry by AI researchers in algorithmic game theory: game playing, social choice, and mechanism design. Finally, we give short summaries of each of the six articles appearing in this issue.

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WU, HAOYANG. "QUANTUM MECHANISM HELPS AGENTS COMBAT "BAD" SOCIAL CHOICE RULES." International Journal of Quantum Information 09, no. 01 (February 2011): 615–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s021974991100706x.

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Quantum strategies have been successfully applied to game theory for years. However, as a reverse problem of game theory, the theory of mechanism design is ignored by physicists. In this paper, the theory of mechanism design is generalized to a quantum domain. The main result is that by virtue of a quantum mechanism, agents who satisfy a certain condition can combat "bad" social choice rules instead of being restricted by the traditional mechanism design theory.

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MANISH, BHARADWAJ, M. K. TRIVEDI, and SHINDE VIKAS. "ACTIVITY OVERLAPPING MECHANISM FOR CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT USING GAME THEORY." i-manager’s Journal on Management 14, no. 3 (2020): 25. http://dx.doi.org/10.26634/jmgt.14.3.16294.

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Bo, Yu. "Cognitive Human Resource Allocation Mechanism based on Game Theory." International Journal of u- and e- Service, Science and Technology 9, no. 10 (October 31, 2016): 273–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.14257/ijunesst.2016.9.10.26.

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Antler, Yair. "Two-Sided Matching with Endogenous Preferences." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 7, no. 3 (August 1, 2015): 241–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20130272.

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We modify the stable matching problem by allowing agents' preferences to depend on the endogenous actions of agents on the other side of the market. Conventional matching theory results break down in the modified setup. In particular, every game that is induced by a stable matching mechanism (e.g., the Gale-Shapley mechanism) may have equilibria that result in matchings that are not stable with respect to the agents' endogenous preferences. However, when the Gale-Shapley mechanism is slightly modified, every equilibrium of its induced game results in a pairwise stable matching with respect to the endogenous preferences as long as they satisfy a natural reciprocity property. (JEL C78, D82)

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Garro, Alfredo. "Computing Nash Equilibria in Non-Cooperative Games." International Journal of Intelligent Mechatronics and Robotics 3, no. 3 (July 2013): 29–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/ijimr.2013070103.

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Game Theory has recently drawn attention in new fields which go from algorithmic mechanism design to cybernetics. However, a fundamental problem to solve for effectively applying Game Theory in real word applications is the definition of well-founded solution concepts of a game and the design of efficient algorithms for their computation. A widely accepted solution concept for games in which any cooperation among the players must be self-enforcing (non-cooperative games) is represented by the Nash equilibrium. However, even in the two players case, the best algorithm known for computing Nash equilibria has an exponential worst-case running time; furthermore, if the computation of equilibria with simple additional properties is required, the problem becomes NP-hard. The paper aims to provide a solution for efficiently computing the Nash equilibria of a game as the result of the evolution of a system composed by interacting agents playing the game.

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Niu, Gen Yi. "A Game Theory Based Analysis of the Tacit Knowledge Sharing and Incentive Mechanism." Advanced Materials Research 601 (December 2012): 564–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amr.601.564.

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Tacit knowledge sharing is the basis and prerequisite of knowledge innovation. In this paper the incentive mechanism of tacit knowledge sharing is proposed to improve tacit knowledge sharing. Firstly, game theory is introduced, and then we analyze the knowledge sharing and mechanism. Finally, Static and repeated game models of knowledge sharing are constructed. The results indicate that infinite repeated game can solve “Prisoner's dilemma” of knowledge sharing in the one-time game.

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Chandrasekharan, Sanjay, Alexandra Mazalek, Michael Nitsche, Yanfeng Chen, and Apara Ranjan. "Ideomotor design." Pragmatics and Cognition 18, no. 2 (August 13, 2010): 313–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/pc.18.2.04cha.

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Recent experiments show video games have a range of positive cognitive effects, such as improvement in attention, spatial cognition and mental rotation, and also overcoming of cognitive disabilities such as fear of flying. Further, game environments are now being used to generate scientific discoveries, and bring about novel phenomenological effects, such as out-of-body experiences. These advances provide interesting interaction design possibilities for video games. However, since the cognitive mechanisms underlying these experimental effects are unknown, it is difficult to systematically derive novel systems and interaction designs based on these results. We review the emerging cognitive mechanism known as common coding (which proposes a common neural representation connecting execution, perception and imagination of movements), and outline how this mechanism could provide an integrated account of the cognitive effects of video games. We then illustrate, using two ongoing projects, how novel video game interaction designs could be derived by extending common coding theory.

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Josheski, Dushko, and Elena Karamazova. "Auction theory and a note on game mechanisms." Croatian Review of Economic, Business and Social Statistics 7, no. 1 (May 1, 2021): 43–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/crebss-2021-0004.

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Abstract This paper will review important topics on the subject of auction theory and mechanism design, these include: efficiency first and foremost, also revenue comparison between different types of auctions and the issue of incentive compatibility, individual rationality with the general idea and proof that bilateral trade is inefficient. Mechanism design theory tells us that if buyers and sellers both have private information full efficiency is impossible, however Vickrey auction (single unit auction) will be efficient i.e. will put the goods in the hands of the buyers that value them most. However, the conclusion from this paper is that because of overvaluation of bidders the main result is inefficient, i.e. bids are too high. When weak and strong bidders are compared the main conclusion is that strong bidders’ expected payoff is higher in second price auction (SPA), while weak bidder prefers first price auction (FPA) bid.

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Yao, Lan, Fu Xiang Gao, and Lin Cong. "Research on Static Game Theory Based Secure Routing Algorithm in WSN." Applied Mechanics and Materials 571-572 (June 2014): 1030–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.571-572.1030.

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In deep research and analysis on WSN security routing protocols and according to the rational development trend of the sensor nodes, this paper proposes a new WSN security routing protocol based on the theory of the static game—GBR. GBR describes the interactions in a static game model using rational characteristics of nodes. When selecting the forwarding node, neighboring nodes decide whether to participate in forwarding data through game, and prevent the destruction of malicious nodes by calculating the utility function. They control and adjust the game process and results through incentive mechanism. GBR (Game theory Based Routing algorithm) reduces packet loss rate by the above mechanisms and strategies and effectively controls the self-ish behavior of nodes. In addition, GBR pursues security routing and makes design and improvement in the energy conservation, which considers node security and regards the energy of the nodes as an importing reference index, in order to balance the network energy consumption.

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Chi, Chuanxiu, Yingjie Wang, Yingshu Li, and Xiangrong Tong. "Multistrategy Repeated Game-Based Mobile Crowdsourcing Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Edge Computing in Internet of Things." Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing 2021 (January 25, 2021): 1–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/6695696.

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With the advent of the Internet of Things (IoT) era, various application requirements have put forward higher requirements for data transmission bandwidth and real-time data processing. Mobile edge computing (MEC) can greatly alleviate the pressure on network bandwidth and improve the response speed by effectively using the device resources of mobile edge. Research on mobile crowdsourcing in edge computing has become a hot spot. Hence, we studied resource utilization issues between edge mobile devices, namely, crowdsourcing scenarios in mobile edge computing. We aimed to design an incentive mechanism to ensure the long-term participation of users and high quality of tasks. This paper designs a long-term incentive mechanism based on game theory. The long-term incentive mechanism is to encourage participants to provide long-term and continuous quality data for mobile crowdsourcing systems. The multistrategy repeated game-based incentive mechanism (MSRG incentive mechanism) is proposed to guide participants to provide long-term participation and high-quality data. The proposed mechanism regards the interaction between the worker and the requester as a repeated game and obtains a long-term incentive based on the historical information and discount factor. In addition, the evolutionary game theory and the Wright-Fisher model in biology are used to analyze the evolution of participants’ strategies. The optimal discount factor is found within the range of discount factors based on repeated games. Finally, simulation experiments verify the existing crowdsourcing dilemma and the effectiveness of the incentive mechanism. The results show that the proposed MSRG incentive mechanism has a long-term incentive effect for participants in mobile crowdsourcing systems.

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Vijayalakshmi, C., and K. Sivaselvan. "Stochastic routing mechanism on multiclass switching network using game theory." Applied Mathematical Sciences 7 (2013): 1023–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.12988/ams.2013.13093.

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Lai, Wei Kuang, Mu Lung Weng, Yuh Chung Lin, and Chin Shiuh Shieh. "An Incentive Mechanism Using Game Theory for Wireless Mesh Networks." Applied Mechanics and Materials 284-287 (January 2013): 2694–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.284-287.2694.

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Wireless mesh networks (WMNs) have attracted much attention in recent years. The main problems in WMNs are the unfairness in bandwidth sharing and potential selfish behavior. In this paper, an incentive-based pricing model is designed which follows the concepts of mechanism design in game theory to encourage nodes to relay packets for other nodes and therefore achieve fairness. In the pricing model, we consider the packet transmitting amounts, idle conditions and the special need of border nodes in the margin area. The incentive is the main feature of the model. We also discuss the model using mathematical analysis from various perspectives. The analysis shows that this model is highly effective in eliminating unfairness in the multi-hop transmission topology. This is achieved by allowing border mesh routers to receive a fair profit. This flexible pricing model is capable of encouraging packet forwarding. With the issue of unfairness resolved, WMNs can be expected to have a broader range of applications.

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Lin, Wen, Song-nian Yu, and Qi Xiao. "Improved algorithmic mechanism based on game theory in computational grids." Journal of Shanghai University (English Edition) 11, no. 1 (February 2007): 68–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11741-007-0112-3.

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Feng, Renjian, Shenyun Che, Xiao Wang, and Jiangwen Wan. "An incentive mechanism based on game theory for trust management." Security and Communication Networks 7, no. 12 (March 10, 2014): 2318–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/sec.941.

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Feng, Tongyao, Shuangliang Tai, Chengshuang Sun, and Qingpeng Man. "Study on Cooperative Mechanism of Prefabricated Producers Based on Evolutionary Game Theory." Mathematical Problems in Engineering 2017 (2017): 1–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2017/1676045.

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Good cooperation mechanism is an important guarantee for the advancement of industrialization construction. To strengthen the partnership between producers, we analyze the behavior evolution trend of both parties using an evolutionary game theory. Based on the original model, the mechanism of coordination and cooperation between prefabricated producers is explained under the condition of punishment and incentive. The results indicate that stable evolutionary strategies exist under both cooperation and noncooperation, and the evolutionary results are influenced by the initial proportion of both decision-making processes. The government can support the production enterprises to establish a solid partnership through effective punishment and incentive mechanisms to reduce the initial cost in the supply chain of prefabricated construction, resulting in a win-win situation.

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Uchida, Satoshi, Hitoshi Yamamoto, Isamu Okada, and Tatsuya Sasaki. "Evolution of Cooperation with Peer Punishment under Prospect Theory." Games 10, no. 1 (February 21, 2019): 11. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g10010011.

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Social dilemmas are among the most puzzling issues in the biological and social sciences. Extensive theoretical efforts have been made in various realms such as economics, biology, mathematics, and even physics to figure out solution mechanisms to the dilemma in recent decades. Although punishment is thought to be a key mechanism, evolutionary game theory has revealed that the simplest form of punishment called peer punishment is useless to solve the dilemma, since peer punishment itself is costly. In the literature, more complex types of punishment, such as pool punishment or institutional punishment, have been exploited as effective mechanisms. So far, mechanisms that enable peer punishment to function as a solution to the social dilemma remain unclear. In this paper, we propose a theoretical way for peer punishment to work as a solution mechanism for the dilemma by incorporating prospect theory into evolutionary game theory. Prospect theory models human beings as agents that estimate small probabilities and loss of profit as greater than they actually are; thus, those agents feel that punishments are more frequent and harsher than they really are. We show that this kind of cognitive distortion makes players decide to cooperate to avoid being punished and that the cooperative state achieved by this mechanism is globally stable as well as evolutionarily stable in a wide range of parameter values.

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Amraoui, Hicham, Ahmed Habbani, Abdelmajid Hajami, and Essaid Bilal. "Security-Based Mechanism for Proactive Routing Schema Using Game Theory Model." Mobile Information Systems 2016 (2016): 1–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2016/5653010.

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Game theory may offer a useful mechanism to address many problems in mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). One of the key concepts in the research field of such networks with Optimized Link State Routing Protocol (OLSR) is the security problem. Relying on applying game theory to study this problem, we consider two strategies during this suggested model: cooperate and not-cooperate. However, in such networks, it is not easy to identify different actions of players. In this paper, we have essentially been inspired from recent advances provided in game theory to propose a new model for security in MANETs. Our proposal presents a powerful tool with a large number of players where interactions are played multiple times. Moreover, each node keeps a cooperation rate (CR) record of other nodes to cope with the behaviors and mitigate aggregate effect of other malicious devices. Additionally, our suggested security mechanism does not only take into consideration security requirements, but also take into account system resources and network performances. The simulation results using Network Simulator 3 are presented to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposal.

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Venkatachalam, Nallarasan, and Kottilingam Kottursamy. "Jamming Attack Mitigation in CR-IoT Using Game Theory." Revue d'Intelligence Artificielle 36, no. 4 (August 31, 2022): 615–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.18280/ria.360414.

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Jamming attack is Cognitive radio Internet of thing network disables the spectrum sharing and reduces the spectrum utilization .detection and mitigation of such attacks is the main component in realizing cognitive radio-based spectrum sharing in cognitive radio-based internet of thing network this work proposes a game theory-based jamming attack mitigation strategy. The problem of jamming attack mitigation is modeled as a zero-sum game and solved by finding Nash equilibrium. The cognitive node which tries to share the spectrum pays the zero-sum game with the jamming attacker and selects the best strategy of selecting the best frequency without getting into the jamming attack. The result of the proposed mechanism proves that the gaming mechanism can tackle the jamming attack.

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Zameer, Hashim, Ying Wang, Humaira Yasmeen, Amirhossein Akhavan Mofrad, and Rashid Saeed. "A game-theoretic strategic mechanism to control brand counterfeiting." Marketing Intelligence & Planning 36, no. 5 (August 6, 2018): 585–600. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/mip-02-2018-0053.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to design a game theory based model that not only provide theoretical basis to control brand counterfeiting, but it also provide a mechanism to enhance brand revenue. Design/methodology/approach This study used the dynamic game theory of incomplete information to understand and encounter the brand counterfeiting issues. The study analyzed the economic relationship of legitimate brand, counterfeiter and consumers using mixed strategy of the dynamic game theory of incomplete information. Findings The results have indicated that brands those take countermeasures to reduce counterfeiting earn maximum revenue, even when the legitimate brands and consumers are unaware from the actions of counterfeiting firms, the legitimate brands should take countermeasures to reduce counterfeiting to earn maximum revenue, and there exists optimal anti-counterfeiting cost for the legitimate brand. Further, this study provides theoretical basis where brand managers can decide to adopt or not to adopt anti-counterfeiting strategy, and also indicate the consequences of each decision. Practical implications Based upon the findings, the study put forward valuable managerial implications. The study revealed that the legitimate brand must emphasize on the significance of taking countermeasures against counterfeiter and also, brand managers should focus on making product traceable, empowering the consumer and ensuring coordination with government officials to control the counterfeiting issues. Originality/value This paper incorporates the role of legitimate brand, counterfeiter and a consumer to establish the dynamic game theory model using mixed strategy to understand and address the counterfeiting issues in the global market.

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Peng, Jin Shuan, Ying Shi Guo, and Yi Ming Shao. "Lane Change Decision Analysis Based on Drivers' Perception-Judgment and Game Theory." Applied Mechanics and Materials 361-363 (August 2013): 1875–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.361-363.1875.

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To clearly understand the mechanism of drivers lane-changing decision, based on drivers perception of external information, integrated cognitive judgment and game theory, the decision-making model was established, then the structure and operating mechanism of the model were detailedly analyzed. By introducing game theory-related knowledge, the non-cooperative mixed strategy game between the object vehicle and the following vehicle in the target lane was further discussed. Then, the benefits and Nash equilibrium solution of the participants in the game were deeply researched. Analysis shows that lane-changing decision is composed of information perception and three judgment-decision processes, the factors which would affect decision-making level include information source characteristics, the ability of drivers perception and comprehensive cognitive judgment, driving behavior characteristics and so on. The Nash equilibrium solution of the lane change game is determined by driving safety level, journey time and importance degree of the revenues.

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Gupta, Manik, Bhisham Sharma, Akarsh Tripathi, Shashank Singh, Abhishek Bhola, Rajani Singh, and Ashutosh Dhar Dwivedi. "n-Player Stochastic Duel Game Model with Applied Deep Learning and Its Modern Implications." Sensors 22, no. 6 (March 21, 2022): 2422. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/s22062422.

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This paper provides a conceptual foundation for stochastic duels and contains a further study of the game models based on the theory of stochastic duels. Some other combat assessment techniques are looked upon briefly; a modern outlook on the applications of the theory through video games is provided; and the possibility of usage of data generated by popular shooter-type video games is discussed. Impactful works to date are carefully chosen; a timeline of the developments in the theory of stochastic duels is provided; and a brief literature review for the same is conducted, enabling readers to have a broad outlook at the theory of stochastic duels. A new evaluation model is introduced in order to match realistic scenarios. Improvements are suggested and, additionally, a trust mechanism is introduced to identify the intent of a player in order to make the model a better fit for realistic modern problems. The concept of teaming of players is also considered in the proposed mode. A deep-learning model is developed and trained on data generated by video games to support the results of the proposed model. The proposed model is compared to previously published models in a brief comparison study. Contrary to the conventional stochastic duel game combat model, this new proposed model deals with pair-wise duels throughout the game duration. This model is explained in detail, and practical applications of it in the context of the real world are also discussed. The approach toward solving modern-day problems through the use of game theory is presented in this paper, and hence, this paper acts as a foundation for researchers looking forward to an innovation with game theory.

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Wu, Youcheng, Jinhao Li, Shunli Xiao, Zhihang Zhou, Manjie Huang, Zaitian Huang, and Chien Chi Chu. "Analysis of the Choice of Return Mechanism of PPP Model in Rural Human Settlement Improvement under the Rural Revitalization Strategy: Research Based on the Perspective of Evolutionary Game." Journal of Sustainable Business and Economics 5, no. 4 (December 30, 2022): 31–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.30564/jsbe.v5i4.39.

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The improvement of rural human settlement environment is a significant direction of the rural revitalization strategy. Based on the finite rational evolutionary game theory, a cooperative behavior evolutionary game model of rural human settlement environment improvement PPP model with local government, social capital and rural residents as the main game players with the reward mechanism of Government Payment and one with the reward mechanism of Viability Gap Funding are constructed. Comparing the total project revenue of two reward mechanisms, the thesis will obtain the effects of choosing the reward mechanism of rural human settlement improvement PPP. Finally, available suggestions are made to the decision of the reward mechanism of PPP project about rural human settlement environment, thus promoting the application and development of PPP in rural environmental management and to promote sustainable improvement of rural habitat improvement.

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Zhou, Hanbin, and Chunlong Nie. "The Balance Mechanism of Project Cost Audit Based on Game Theory." IOP Conference Series: Earth and Environmental Science 669, no. 1 (February 1, 2021): 012027. http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/1755-1315/669/1/012027.

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Yao, Run, Guangzhi Zhang, Yaofei Wang, and Rongfang Bie. "Design of Teaching Material Evaluation Incentive Mechanism based on Game Theory." Procedia Computer Science 202 (2022): 47–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.procs.2022.04.007.

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NIU, Xin-zheng. "Cooperative incentive mechanism based on game theory in mobile P2P networks." Journal of Computer Applications 28, no. 7 (November 3, 2008): 1823–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.3724/sp.j.1087.2008.01823.

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Wang, Yuanyuan, Ruguo Fan, Kang Du, Jinchai Lin, Dongxue Wang, and Yitong Wang. "Private charger installation game and its incentive mechanism considering prospect theory." Transportation Research Part D: Transport and Environment 113 (December 2022): 103508. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.trd.2022.103508.

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Hauert, Christoph, Miranda Holmes, and Michael Doebeli. "Evolutionary games and population dynamics: maintenance of cooperation in public goods games." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 273, no. 1600 (July 5, 2006): 2565–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2006.3600.

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The emergence and abundance of cooperation in nature poses a tenacious and challenging puzzle to evolutionary biology. Cooperative behaviour seems to contradict Darwinian evolution because altruistic individuals increase the fitness of other members of the population at a cost to themselves. Thus, in the absence of supporting mechanisms, cooperation should decrease and vanish, as predicted by classical models for cooperation in evolutionary game theory, such as the Prisoner's Dilemma and public goods games. Traditional approaches to studying the problem of cooperation assume constant population sizes and thus neglect the ecology of the interacting individuals. Here, we incorporate ecological dynamics into evolutionary games and reveal a new mechanism for maintaining cooperation. In public goods games, cooperation can gain a foothold if the population density depends on the average population payoff. Decreasing population densities, due to defection leading to small payoffs, results in smaller interaction group sizes in which cooperation can be favoured. This feedback between ecological dynamics and game dynamics can generate stable coexistence of cooperators and defectors in public goods games. However, this mechanism fails for pairwise Prisoner's Dilemma interactions and the population is driven to extinction. Our model represents natural extension of replicator dynamics to populations of varying densities.

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Qu, Xiaoyu, Xiao Wang, and Xutian Qin. "Research on Responsible Innovation Mechanism Based on Prospect Theory." Sustainability 15, no. 2 (January 11, 2023): 1358. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su15021358.

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In 2020, the new crown pneumoniaCOVID-19 epidemic swept the world, and it still has an impact on the production and lifestyle of various countries. Guiding enterprises to implement responsible innovation can enable enterprises to shoulder social responsibilities while innovating, resist the impact of the epidemic, accelerate countries to get out of the haze of the epidemic, and promote high-quality economic development. In this paper, three typical subjects of government, enterprise, and consumer are selected to construct an evolutionary game model, and prospect theory is introduced to explore the strategic choices and influencing factors of the three parties. Through the numerical simulation of MATLAB software, the following conclusions are obtained: in the early stage of policy implementation, the enthusiasm of enterprises to implement responsible innovation is not high; with the implementation of policies and the continuation of time, the enthusiasm of enterprises gradually increases; and the supervision role of the government and consumers gradually decreases. Appropriate government incentives and disincentives will promote enterprises and consumers to participate in responsible innovation. This paper explores the game process of government, enterprises, and consumers from a dynamic perspective, explores the decision-making process of all parties under the prospect theory, reveals the implementation process of responsible innovation and the factors affecting responsible innovation, and provides a theoretical reference for the implementation of responsible innovation model.

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Chen, Yi-Chun, Takashi Kunimoto, Yifei Sun, and Siyang Xiong. "Maskin meets Abreu and Matsushima." Theoretical Economics 17, no. 4 (2022): 1683–717. http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/te4255.

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The theory of full implementation has been criticized for using integer/modulo games, which admit no equilibrium (Jackson (1992)). To address the critique, we revisit the classical Nash implementation problem due to Maskin (1977, 1999) but allow for the use of lotteries and monetary transfers as in Abreu and Matsushima (1992, 1994). We unify the two well‐established but somewhat orthogonal approaches in full implementation theory. We show that Maskin monotonicity is a necessary and sufficient condition for (exact) mixed‐strategy Nash implementation by a finite mechanism. In contrast to previous papers, our approach possesses the following features: finite mechanisms (with no integer or modulo game) are used; mixed strategies are handled explicitly; neither undesirable outcomes nor transfers occur in equilibrium; the size of transfers can be made arbitrarily small; and our mechanism is robust to information perturbations.

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Chen, Yidan, and Lanying Sun. "Trust strategy simulation of corporation–NPO cross alliance using evolutionary game theory." Kybernetes 46, no. 3 (March 6, 2017): 450–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/k-03-2016-0034.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the dynamics and evolution of trust in organizational cross alliances. Design/methodology/approach In alliances between corporations and nonprofit organizations, trust in decision-making is a dynamic process. Using the replicated dynamics model of evolutionary game theory, this paper provides a trust decision model and analyzes four scenarios under different parameters. A numerical simulation is developed to present an intuitive interpretation of the dynamic development of trust decisions and the effects of incentive and punishment mechanisms. Findings Under different parameters, bounded rationality and utilities result in different but stable evolutionary strategies; the initial probability of adopting a trust strategy leads directly to whether participants adopt the strategy when the system reaches stability after continued games; and incentive and punishment mechanisms can significantly reduce the initial probability of adopting a trust strategy where the system evolves to meet stable state needs. Practical implications The establishment of trust relationships is an important influence on the stable and coordinated development of an alliance. The proposed model can help the alliance build closer trust relationships and provide a theoretical basis for the design of the trust mechanism. Originality/value Incentive and punishment bound by some degree of trust are introduced to address the problems of trust decisions and their dynamics; the model created reflects the bounded rationality and utility of each game stage. Useful evolutionary stable strategies using different variables are proposed to address the decision-making problems of trust in cross alliances.

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Jia, Junwei, Haoyue Zhang, and Qi Wang. "A Tripartite Game-Theory-Based Cooperation Mechanism for the Electronic Warehouse Receipt Pledge Financing Mode." Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 2021 (December 21, 2021): 1–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/1877475.

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To explore the electronic warehouse receipt pledge financing cooperation mechanism in the alliance formed between loan enterprises, commercial banks, e-commerce platforms, and logistics enterprises, by constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model, the game equilibrium strategy is then obtained, and the influencing factors of the cooperation mechanism are further simulated. It was found that in this tripartite evolutionary game, the stable strategy combination occurs when the loan enterprise chooses to repay on time, the platform alliance chooses to provide services, and the commercial bank chooses to continue to cooperate. However, heterogeneity exists in the influencing factors for the three-party selection strategy in the game, which is manifested in the fact that the higher the realization rate of the pledge, the more evolution is required in the selection strategy for loan enterprises to continue cooperating. The higher the information service fee, the higher the enthusiasm of the platform alliance in choosing to provide services. Credit levels, loan interest rates, and pledge realization rates are all important factors that affect the choice strategy of commercial banks.

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Egashira, Mahiro, Daisuke Son, and Arisa Ema. "Serious Game for Change in Behavioral Intention Toward Lifestyle-Related Diseases: Experimental Study With Structural Equation Modeling Using the Theory of Planned Behavior." JMIR Serious Games 10, no. 1 (February 21, 2022): e28982. http://dx.doi.org/10.2196/28982.

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Background Health activities should be tailored to individual lifestyles and values. To raise awareness of health behaviors, various practices related to health education, such as interactive activities among individuals with different backgrounds, have been developed. Moreover, serious games have been used as a tool for facilitating communication. However, there have been few investigations that are based on the framework of the theory of planned behavior on the mechanisms of health-related behavioral intention change from playing serious games. Objective We aimed to investigate the mechanisms of behavioral intention change among various age groups after an intervention using a serious game to increase awareness of lifestyle-related diseases. Methods Adults, undergraduates, and high school students played a serious game, called Negotiation Battle, and answered a questionnaire—Gaming Event Assessment Form for Lifestyle-related Diseases—before, immediately after, and 2-4 weeks after the game. The questionnaire was composed of 16 items based on the theory of planned behavior. We used structural equation modeling to compare responses from the 3 groups. Results For all 3 age groups (adults: mean 43.4 years, range 23-67 years; undergraduates: mean 20.9 years, range 19-34 years; high school students: mean 17.9 years, 17-18 years), perceived behavior control was the key factor of behavioral intention change. Immediately after the game, causal relationships between perceived behavioral control and behavioral intention were enhanced or maintained for all groups—adults (before: path coefficient 1.030, P<.001; after: path coefficient 2.045, P=.01), undergraduates (before: path coefficient 0.568, P=.004; after: path coefficient 0.737, P=.001), and high school students (before: path coefficient 14.543, P=.97; after: path coefficient 0.791, P<.001). Analysis of free descriptions after intervention suggested that experiencing dilemma is related to learning and behavioral intention. Conclusions The study revealed that the serious game changed the behavioral intention of adolescents and adults regarding lifestyle-related diseases, and changes in perceived behavioral control mediated the alteration mechanism.

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Johnson, Tim, and Oleg Smirnov. "An alternative mechanism through which economic inequality facilitates collective action: Wealth disparities as a sign of cooperativeness." Journal of Theoretical Politics 24, no. 4 (July 9, 2012): 461–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0951629812448236.

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Past models treat economic inequality as an exogenous condition that can provide individuals a dominant incentive to produce collective goods unilaterally. Here we part with that tradition so as to treat economic inequality and collective action as endogenous, and to examine whether economic inequality can foster collective action even when all individuals can gain from free-riding. Using evolutionary game theory and computer simulations, we study whether cooperation can evolve when agents play multiple, one-shot prisoner’s dilemma (PD) games per generation and employ strategies that condition cooperative play on their game partners’ wealth holdings. In this game environment, we find that collective action succeeds via a strategy in which players choose to cooperate when joining a PD with an economic equal and defect when partnered with a player possessing wealth holdings unequal to their own. These results signal an alternative avenue through which economic inequality can influence the viability of collective action.

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Wang, Jun, Xiao Lin Lu, Si Yuan Guo, Lu Yu, and Wei Liu. "Network Resource Allocation for Scalable Video Streaming over P2P Networks Based on Game Theory." Applied Mechanics and Materials 687-691 (November 2014): 1974–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.687-691.1974.

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In order to adapt to the heterogeneity of terminals and networks, Scalable Video Coding (SVC) encodes raw video stream with different scales of temporal, spatial and quality into layers. Considering the P2P network characteristic, it is a challenging task to design an appropriate P2P steaming network resource allocation mechanism combining with SVC. In this paper, SVC is applied in P2P streaming based on game theory; considering free-riding, bandwidth conflicts in P2P multi-overlay and one chunk with multiple providers, we design a bidirectional serial auction model that jointly optimize the bandwidth allocation, the data scheduling and the incentive mechanism, then optimized allocation for scalable video streaming over P2P networks is achieved. With extensive theoretical analysis, we show that these games converge to an optimal topology for each overlay.

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Yu, Tao, F. Xiong, J. B. Du, and Guo Qing Qu. "Research of Digital Nervous System Based on the Game Mechanism." Applied Mechanics and Materials 743 (March 2015): 758–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.743.758.

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In the current bottleneck for the development of enterprises, combined with artificial neural networks, game management theory, developing a new set of future information management systems and elaborate various aspects of its structure, function modules, the system features and so on.

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Li, Cui Ming, Ping Yang, Jun Gong, and Wan Cai Niu. "Swarm Robotics Cooperation Collision Strategies Based on Game Theory." Applied Mechanics and Materials 328 (June 2013): 182–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.328.182.

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In order to solve the problems in swarm robotics cooperation collision avoiding, this study tries to design some new cooperation collision avoiding strategies based on game theory so as to establish internal cooperation mechanism for swarm robotics. Specifically it aims at addressing the control issues in the swarm robotics cooperation collision avoiding system, which are caused by environmental restraints such as obstacles, special physical limit, etc. Cournot competition model is adopted here to build the game model of swarm robotics cooperation behavior and the game model is solved to find out the optimal cooperation solution. The numerical simulation verified the effectiveness and feasibility of the cooperation strategies put up by this study.

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Taylor, Mark, Vince Kwasnica, Denis Reilly, and Somasundaram Ravindran. "Game theory modelling of retail marketing discount strategies." Marketing Intelligence & Planning 37, no. 5 (August 5, 2019): 555–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/mip-11-2018-0489.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to use the game theory combined with Monte Carlo simulation modelling to support the analysis of different retail marketing strategies, in particular, using payoff matrices for modelling the likely outcomes from different retail marketing strategies. Design/methodology/approach Theoretical research was utilised to develop a practical approach for applying game theory to retail marketing strategies via payoff matrices combined with Monte Carlo simulation modelling. Findings Game theory combined with Monte Carlo simulation modelling can provide a formal approach to understanding consumer decision making in a retail environment, which can support the development of retail marketing strategies. Research limitations/implications Game theory combined with Monte Carlo simulation modelling can support the modelling of the interaction between retail marketing actions and consumer responses in a practical formal probabilistic manner, which can inform marketing strategies used by retail companies in a practical manner. Practical implications Game theory combined with Monte Carlo simulation modelling can provide a formalised mechanism for examining how consumers may respond to different retail marketing strategies. Originality/value The originality of this research is the practical application of game theory to retail marketing, in particular the use of payoff matrices combined with Monte Carlo simulation modelling to examine likely consumer behaviour in response to different retail marketing approaches.

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Li, Tao, Yuling Chen, Yanli Wang, Yilei Wang, Minghao Zhao, Haojia Zhu, Youliang Tian, Xiaomei Yu, and Yixian Yang. "Rational Protocols and Attacks in Blockchain System." Security and Communication Networks 2020 (September 24, 2020): 1–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/8839047.

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Blockchain has been an emerging technology, which comprises lots of fields such as distributed systems and Internet of Things (IoT). As is well known, blockchain is the underlying technology of bitcoin, whose initial motivation is derived from economic incentives. Therefore, lots of components of blockchain (e.g., consensus mechanism) can be constructed toward the view of game theory. In this paper, we highlight the combination of game theory and blockchain, including rational smart contracts, game theoretic attacks, and rational mining strategies. When put differently, the rational parties, who manage to maximize their utilities, involved in blockchain chose their strategies according to the economic incentives. Consequently, we focus on the influence of rational parties with respect to building blocks. More specifically, we investigate the research progress from the aspects of smart contract, rational attacks, and consensus mechanism, respectively. Finally, we present some future directions based on the brief survey with respect to game theory and blockchain.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Game theory mechanism'

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