Relevant bibliographies by topics / Game theory mechanism

Academic literature on the topic 'Game theory mechanism'

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Published: 10 December 2022
Last updated: 28 January 2023

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Journal articles on the topic "Game theory mechanism"

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Sultana, Shabana, and Dr C. Vidya Raj Dr. C. Vidya Raj. "ANALYZING PACKET FORWARDING MECHANISM IN ADHOC NETWORKS USING GAME THEORY." Indian Journal of Applied Research 3, no. 5 (October 1, 2011): 144–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.15373/2249555x/may2013/43.

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Ito, Hiromu, and Jun Tanimoto. "Dynamic utility: the sixth reciprocity mechanism for the evolution of cooperation." Royal Society Open Science 7, no. 8 (August 2020): 200891. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsos.200891.

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Game theory has been extensively applied to elucidate the evolutionary mechanism of cooperative behaviour. Dilemmas in game theory are important elements that disturb the promotion of cooperation. An important question is how to escape from dilemmas. Recently, a dynamic utility function (DUF) that considers an individual's current status (wealth) and that can be applied to game theory was developed. The DUF is different from the famous five reciprocity mechanisms called Nowak's five rules. Under the DUF, cooperation is promoted by poor players in the chicken game, with no changes in the prisoner's dilemma and stag-hunt games. In this paper, by comparing the strengths of the two dilemmas, we show that the DUF is a novel reciprocity mechanism (sixth rule) that differs from Nowak's five rules. We also show the difference in dilemma relaxation between dynamic game theory and (traditional) static game theory when the DUF and one of the five rules are combined. Our results indicate that poor players unequivocally promote cooperation in any dynamic game. Unlike conventional rules that have to be brought into game settings, this sixth rule is universally (canonical form) applicable to any game because all repeated/evolutionary games are dynamic in principle.
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Zhang, Jinxin, and Meng Wu. "Cooperation Mechanism in Blockchain by Evolutionary Game Theory." Complexity 2021 (November 8, 2021): 1–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/1258730.

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In the blockchain network, to get rewards in the blockchain, blockchain participants pay for various forms of competition such as computing power, stakes, and other resources. Because of the need to pay a certain cost, individual participants cooperate to maintain the long-term stability of the blockchain jointly. In the course of such competition, the game between each other has appeared invisibly. To better understand the blockchain design of cooperation mechanisms, in this paper, we constructed a game framework between participants with different willingness, using evolutionary game theory, and complex network games. We analyzed how the behavior of participants potentially develops with cost and payoff. We consider the expected benefits of participants for the normal growth of the blockchain as the major factor. Considering the behavior of malicious betrayers, the blockchain needs to be maintained in the early stage. Numerical simulation supports our analysis.
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Chang, Shu-Lin, Kun-Chang Lee, Ruey-Rong Huang, and Yu-Hsien Liao. "Resource-Allocation Mechanism: Game-Theory Analysis." Symmetry 13, no. 5 (May 4, 2021): 799. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/sym13050799.

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Recently, owing to the trend of cross-disciplinary research in various fields, it is imperative to optimize the resource-allocation performance by analyzing allocation behavior and strategies from different perspectives as well as based on ideas from various fields. There are many decisive roles, such as changes in allocation behavior, related allocation methods, and the interaction and work effectiveness of strategies, to be implemented. By using game-theory analysis under resource-allocation procedures, in this article, we analyzed, constructed, simulated, and derived an efficient resource-allocation mechanism. Additionally, we generalized a power index by evaluating the operators and their activity levels. This article adopted the axioms of level completeness, criterion for weighted circumstances property, level synchronization, pure excess equal symmetry, and specific consonance to offer characterizations to assess the related rationality and accuracy of the proposed power index. Based on the above discussion, different from the rule of thumb, expert meeting, or other existing concepts, in this research game theory is used to provide an alternative guide for resource-allocation procedures by the optimal or equilibrium state established.
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Roth, Alvin E., and Robert B. Wilson. "How Market Design Emerged from Game Theory: A Mutual Interview." Journal of Economic Perspectives 33, no. 3 (August 1, 2019): 118–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.33.3.118.

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We interview each other about how game theory and mechanism design evolved into practical market design. When we learned game theory, games were modeled either in terms of the strategies available to the players (“noncooperative games”) or the outcomes attainable by coalitions (“cooperative games”), and these were viewed as models for different kinds of games. The model itself was viewed as a mathematical object that could be examined in its entirety. Market design, however, has come to view these models as complementary approaches for examining different ways marketplaces operate within their economic environment. Because that environment can be complex, there will be unobservable aspects of the game. Mathematical models themselves play a less heroic, stand-alone role in market design than in the theoretical mechanism design literature. Other kinds of investigation, communication, and persuasion are important in crafting a workable design and helping it to be adopted, implemented, maintained, and adapted.
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Liu, Yanhua, Hui Chen, Hao Zhang, and Ximeng Liu. "Defense Strategy Selection Model Based on Multistage Evolutionary Game Theory." Security and Communication Networks 2021 (November 11, 2021): 1–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/4773894.

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Evolutionary game theory is widely applied in network attack and defense. The existing network attack and defense analysis methods based on evolutionary games adopt the bounded rationality hypothesis. However, the existing research ignores that both sides of the game get more information about each other with the deepening of the network attack and defense game, which may cause the attacker to crack a certain type of defense strategy, resulting in an invalid defense strategy. The failure of the defense strategy reduces the accuracy and guidance value of existing methods. To solve the above problem, we propose a reward value learning mechanism (RLM). By analyzing previous game information, RLM automatically incentives or punishes the attack and defense reward values for the next stage, which reduces the probability of defense strategy failure. RLM is introduced into the dynamic network attack and defense process under incomplete information, and a multistage evolutionary game model with a learning mechanism is constructed. Based on the above model, we design the optimal defense strategy selection algorithm. Experimental results demonstrate that the evolutionary game model with RLM has better results in the value of reward and defense success rate than the evolutionary game model without RLM.
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Trestian, Ramona, Olga Ormond, and Gabriel-Miro Muntean. "Reputation-based network selection mechanism using game theory." Physical Communication 4, no. 3 (September 2011): 156–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.phycom.2011.06.004.

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Cheng, Ching Hung, Zhe Huang, Siqi Lin, and Hangyu Wu. "Analysis of Corporation’s Financial Fraud and Independent Directors’ Decision Based on Evolutionary Game Theory." BCP Business & Management 31 (November 5, 2022): 195–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.54691/bcpbm.v31i.2561.

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The case of Kangmei Pharmaceutical Company’s financial fraud reveals several important issues in the independent director system in China. It is valuable to study these issues separately from the corporation and the independent director’s perspective, as both wish to maximize their profitability. This paper applies evolutionary game theory to construct two games between the corporation and independent directors, and {honest, dishonest} is the strategy set for the corporation in both games, while {dutiful, undutiful} and {continue, resign} are the strategy sets for the independent directors in game 1 and game 2 respectively. The evolutionary stability strategies obtained from these two games and simulation results show that if the independent directors should be dutiful and not quit their positive while the corporation should never consider making any financial fraud, then the independent directors and the corporation will get the optimal benefit. The results suggest that the award mechanism and reputation mechanism for independent directors should be established and fully completed to improve the independent director system.
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Collins, Andrew J., and Sheida Etemadidavan. "Humans and the core partition: An agent-based modeling experiment." PLOS ONE 17, no. 9 (September 1, 2022): e0273961. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0273961.

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Although strategic coalition formation is traditionally modeled using cooperative game theory, behavioral game theorists have repeatedly shown that outcomes predicted by game theory are different from those generated by actual human behavior. To further explore these differences, in a cooperative game theory context, we experiment to compare the outcomes resulting from human participants’ behavior to those generated by a cooperative game theory solution mechanism called the core partition. Our experiment uses an interactive simulation of a glove game, a particular type of cooperative game, to collect the participant’s decision choices and their resultant outcomes. Two different glove games are considered, and the outputs from 62 trial games are analyzed. The experiment’s outcomes show that core coalitions, which are coalitions in a core partition, are found in about 42% of games. Though this number may seem low, a trial’s outcome is more complex than whether the human player finds a core coalition or not. Finding the core coalition depends on factors such as the other possible feasible solutions and the payoffs available from these solutions. These factors, and the complexity they generate, are discussed in the paper.
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Dong, Lihong, Xirong Wang, Beizhan Liu, Tianwei Zheng, and Zheng Wang. "Information Acquisition Incentive Mechanism Based on Evolutionary Game Theory." Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing 2021 (August 17, 2021): 1–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/5525791.

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Based on evolutionary game theory, this paper proposes a new information acquisition mechanism for intelligent mine construction, which solves the problem of incomplete information acquisition in the construction of new intelligent mining area and reduces the difficulty of information acquisition, which solves the problem of the imperfect mine information acquisition in the construction of a new smart mine regions and decreases the difficulty of a mine information acquisition. Based on the evolutionary game model, the perceptual incentive model based on group is established. The reliability of information collection is ensured by sharing and modifying the information collector. Through the analysis of the simulation results, it is found that the regional coverage model based on the cooperation in game theory and evolutionary game theory has a good effect on solving the bottleneck problem of the current intelligent mining area. This paper has an enlightening effect on the optimization of the mine information acquisition system. Through the improvement of the mine information acquisition system, the working efficiency of the information acquisition terminal can be effectively increased by 6%.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Game theory mechanism"

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Zhang, Qi. "Applied game theory and optimal mechanism design." Thesis, University of Southampton, 2014. https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/370438/.

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This thesis applies game theory to study optimal toehold bidding strategies during takeover competition, the problem of optimal design of voting rules and the design of package bidding mechanism to implement the core allocations. It documents three different research questions that are all related to auction theory. Chapter 2 develops a two-stage takeover game to explain toehold puzzle in the context of takeover. Potential bidders are allowed to acquire target shares in the open market, subject to some limitations. This pre-bid ownership is known as a toehold. Purchasing a toehold prior to making any takeover offer looks like a profitable strategy given substantial takeover premiums. However actual toehold bidding has decreased since 1980s and now is not common. Its time-series patter is centred on either zero or a large value. Chapter 2 develops a two-stage takeover game. In the first stage of this two-stage game, each bidder simultaneously acquires a toehold. In the second stage, bidders observe acquired toehold sizes, and process this information to update their beliefs about rival's private valuation. Then each bidder competes to win the target under a sealed-bid second-price auction. Different from previous toehold puzzle literature focusing on toehold bidding costs in the form of target managerial entrenchment, this chapter develops a two-stage takeover game and points another possible toehold bidding cost - the opportunity loss of a profitable resale. Chapter 2 finds that, under some conditions, there exists a partial pooling Bayesian equilibrium, in which low-value bidders optimally avoid any toehold, while high-value bidders pool their decisions at one size. The equilibrium toehold acquisition strategies coincide with the bimodal distribution of the actual toehold purchasing behaviour. Chapter 3 studies the problem of optimal design of voting rules when each agent faces binary choice. The designer is allowed to use any type of non-transferable penalty on individuals in order to elicit agents' private valuations. And each agent's private valuation is assumed to be independently distributed. Early work showed that the simple majority rule has good normative properties in the situation of binary choice. However, their results relay on the assumption that agents' preferences have equal intensities. Chapter 3 shows that, under reasonable assumptions, the simple majority is the best voting mechanism in terms of utilitarian efficiency, even if voters' preferences are comparable and may have varying intensities. At equilibrium, the mechanism optimally assigns zero penalty to every voter. In other words, the designer does not extract private information from any agent in the society, because the expected penalty cost of eliciting private information to select the better alternative is too high. Chapter 4 presents a package bidding mechanism whose subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes coincide with the core of an underlying strictly convex transferable utility game. It adopts the concept of core as a competitive standard, which enables the mechanism to avoid the well-known weaknesses of VCG mechanism. In this mechanism, only core allocations generate subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs, because non-core allocations provide arbitrage opportunities for some players. By the strict convexity assumption, the implementation of the core is achieved in terms of expectation.
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Rivera, Thomas. "Essays on Game Theory, Mechanism Design, and Financial Economics." Thesis, Jouy-en Josas, HEC, 2020. http://www.theses.fr/2020EHEC0001.

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Cette thèse développe de nouveaux outils de théorie des jeux et mechanism design pour de multiples application en économie/finance. Le premier chapitre étudie la possibilité d’implémentation d’équilibres de communication dans le cadre de jeux stratégiques lorsque tous les joueurs de réseau peuvent communiquer par l’intermédiaire d’un médiateur impartial. Je dérive les conditions nécessaires et suffisantes sur la structure du réseau de joueurs telles que, pour tout jeu, tout équilibre de communication puisse être implémenté. Le deuxième chapitre propose un modèle d’encombrement de la chaine de production dans lequel les contraintes de capacité produisent de multiples équilibres de Nash Pareto-inefficients. Ce chapitre montre comment l’utilisation d’équilibres corrélés peut résoudre de manière substantielle ces inefficiences. Les deux dernier chapitres traitent de questions liées à la conception des exigences de fonds propres de banques. Dans le chapitre 3, on caractérise les exigences optimales de fonds propres des banques lorsque celles-ci disposent d’informations privées sur la valeur de leurs actifs existants. On montre comment l’implémentation des exigences de fonds propres peut éliminer le coût de l’augmentation de capital pour la banque en révélant ses informations au marché, et les conditions dans lesquelles ce transfert d’informations est optimal. Dans le chapitre 4, on fait l’hypothèse que les banques possèdent de l’information privée sur le risque de leurs actifs plutôt que sur leur valeur. Dans c ecas, si les investisseurs sont suffisamment averses au risque, on montre que n’importe quelle exigence de fonds subordonée au risque des banques incitent ces derniéres à mentir sur leur niveau de risque effectif. Ce résultat met em lumière d’importants problèmes de robustesse
This thesis develops and utilizes tools in game theory and mechanism design to study multiple applications in economics and finance. The first chapter studies the problem of implementing communication equilibria of strategic games when players communicate with an impartial mediator through a network. I characterize necessary and sufficient conditions on the network structure such that any communication equilibrium of any game can be implemented on that network. The next chapter studies a model of supply chain congestion whereby capacity constraints lead to very inefficient Nash equilibria and I show how the use of correlsted equilibria can substantially resolve those inefficiencies. The final two chapters study related issues in the design of bank capital requirements. In Chapter 3, I characterize optimal bank capital requirements when banks have private information about the value of their existing assets. I show how the implementation of capital requirements can eliminate the bank’s cost of raising capital by revealing their information to the market and conditions under which doing soi s optimal. In Chapter 4, I show how when the bank’s private information is about the riskiness of its assets instead, then any risk sensitive capital requirement will lead banks to optimally misreport their risk whenever investors are sufficiently risk averse, highlighting important robustness concerns
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Giannakopoulos, Ioannis. "Duality theory for optimal mechanism design." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2015. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:90e1fdec-8803-4306-8985-5106c457f34d.

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In this work we present a general duality-theory framework for revenue maximization in additive Bayesian auctions involving multiple items and many bidders whose values for the goods follow arbitrary continuous joint distributions over some multi-dimensional real interval. Although the single-item case has been resolved in a very elegant way by the seminal work of Myerson [1981], optimal solutions involving more items still remain elusive. The framework extends linear programming duality and complementarity to constraints with partial derivatives. The dual system reveals the natural geometric nature of the problem and highlights its connection with the theory of bipartite graph matchings. We demonstrate the power of the framework by applying it to various special monopoly settings where a seller of multiple heterogeneous goods faces a buyer with independent item values drawn from various distributions of interest, to design both exact and approximately optimal selling mechanisms. Previous optimal solutions were only known for up to two and three goods, and a very limited range of distributional priors. The duality framework is used not only for proving optimality, but perhaps more importantly, for deriving the optimal mechanisms themselves. Some of our main results include: the proposal of a simple deterministic mechanism, which we call Straight-Jacket Auction (SJA) and is defined in a greedy, recursive way through natural geometric constraints, for many uniformly distributed goods, where exact optimality is proven for up to six items and general optimality is conjectured; a scheme of sufficient conditions for exact optimality for two-good settings and general independent distributions; a technique for upper-bounding the optimal revenue for arbitrarily many goods, with an application to uniform and exponential priors; and the proof that offering deterministically all items in a single full bundle is the optimal way of selling multiple exponentially i.i.d. items.
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Nath, Swaprava. "Mechanism Design For Strategic Crowdsourcing." Thesis, Indian Institute of Science, 2013. http://etd.iisc.ernet.in/handle/2005/2497.

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This thesis looks into the economics of crowdsourcing using game theoretic modeling. The art of aggregating information and expertise from a diverse population has been in practice since a long time. The Internet and the revolution in communication and computational technologies have made this task easier and given birth to a new era of online resource aggregation, which is now popularly referred to as crowdsourcing. Two important features of this aggregation technique are: (a) crowdsourcing is always human driven, hence the participants are rational and intelligent, and they have a payoff function that they aim to maximize, and (b) the participants are connected over a social network which helps to reach out to a large set of individuals. To understand the behavior and the outcome of such a strategic crowd, we need to understand the economics of a crowdsourcing network. In this thesis, we have considered the following three major facets of the strategic crowdsourcing problem. (i) Elicitation of the true qualities of the crowd workers: As the crowd is often unstructured and unknown to the designer, it is important to ensure if the crowdsourced job is indeed performed at the highest quality, and this requires elicitation of the true qualities which are typically the participants' private information. (ii) Resource critical task execution ensuring the authenticity of both the information and the identity of the participants: Due to the diverse geographical, cultural, socio-economic reasons, crowdsourcing entails certain manipulations that are unusual in the classical theory. The design has to be robust enough to handle fake identities or incorrect information provided by the crowd while performing crowdsourcing contests. (iii) Improving the productive output of the crowdsourcing network: As the designer's goal is to maximize a certain measurable output of the crowdsourcing system, an interesting question is how one can design the incentive scheme and/or the network so that the system performs at an optimal level taking into account the strategic nature of the individuals. In the thesis, we design novel mechanisms to solve the problems above using game theoretic modeling. Our investigation helps in understanding certain limits of achievability, and provides design protocols in order to make crowdsourcing more reliable, effective, and productive.
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Wilbur, Dameon Stuart. "Sharing surplus : an analysis of mechanism design /." view abstract or download file of text, 2006. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1232409861&sid=7&Fmt=2&clientId=11238&RQT=309&VName=PQD.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2006.
Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 105-107). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.
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Rogers, William James. "Cross-Layer Game Theoretic Mechanism for Tactical Mobile Networks." Thesis, Virginia Tech, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/24767.

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In recent years, Software Defined and Cognitive Radios (SDRs and CRs) have become popular topics of research. Game theory has proven to be a useful set of tools for analyzing wireless networks, including Cognitive Networks (CNs). This thesis provides a game theoretic cross-layer mechanism that can be used to control SDRs and CRs. We have constructed an upper-layer Topology Control (TC) game, which decides which links each node uses. A TDMA algorithm which we have adapted is then run on these links. The links and the TDMA schedule are then passed to a lower-layer game, the Link Adaptation Game (LAG), where nodes adjust their transmit power and their link parameters, which in this case are modulation scheme and channel coding rate. It is shown that both the TC game and the LAG converge to a Nash Equilibrium (NE). It is also shown that the solution for the TC game approximates the topology that results from maximizing the utility function when appropriate link costs are used. Also seen is the increase in throughput provided by the LAG when compared to the results of Greedy Rate Packing (GRP).
Master of Science
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Chen, J.-H. "An automated negotiation mechanism based on co-evolutionary processes and game theory." Thesis, Coventry University, 2006. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.427568.

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Kucuksenel, Serkan Ledyard John O. Ledyard John O. "Incentives and institutions : essays in mechanism design and game theory with applications /." Diss., Pasadena, Calif. : California Institute of Technology, 2009. http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-04232009-163542.

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Yang, Tsung-Han. "Essays on Applied Game Theory and Public Economics." Diss., Virginia Tech, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/82963.

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The first chapter presents a theoretical model of electoral competition where two parties can increase campaign contributions by choosing policies benefiting a significant interest group. However, such decision will shrink their hardcore vote base where voters are well informed about the policy. The parties can then allocate the funds between campaigning and personal wealth. Different from the core voters, independent voters can be attracted by advertisements funded by campaign spending. Using a multi-stage extensive form game, I investigate how electoral competition interacts with diversions and policy distortions. My result shows that a higher level of electoral competition helps mitigate policy distortions but prompts the parties to divert more funds. Perfectly informed signal senders need to communicate their true type (productivity or ability) which is often private information to potential receivers. While tests are commonly used as measures of applicants' productivity, the accuracy of them has been questioned. Beginning with the framework of a two-type labor market signaling game, the second chapter investigates how tests of limited reliability affect the nature of equilibria in signaling games with asymmetric information. Our results show that, if a test is inaccurate and costly, only pooling PBE exists given certain conditions. Different forms of test inaccuracy may allow a separating PBE to exist. We also study the case of three types and find different PBEs. The central issue of siting noxious facilities is that the host community absorbs potential costs, while all others can share the benefits without paying as much. The third chapter presents a modified Clarke mechanism to facilitate the siting decision, taking into account all residents' strategies. Suppose that the social planner is able to reasonably estimate the possible costs, depending on the host location, to each resident created by the facility. Our proposed Clarke mechanism is characterized by strategy-proofness and yields an efficient siting outcome. The issue of budget imbalance is mitigated when the compensation scheme is fully funded with the tax revenue based on the benefits. We then use a simple example to show that a weighted version of the Clarke mechanism may yield a different outcome.
Ph. D.
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Schlake, Farimehr. "Optimal Consumer-Centric Delay-Efficient Security Management in Multi-Agent Networks: A Game and Mechanism Design Theoretic Approach." Diss., Virginia Tech, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/77362.

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The main aspiration behind the contributions of this research work is the achievement of simultaneuos delay-efficiency, autonomy, and security through innovative protocol design to address complex real-life problems. To achieve this, we take a holistic approach. We apply theoretical mathematical modeling implementing implications of social-economic behavioral characteristics to propose a cross-layer network security protocol. We further complement this approach by a layer-specific focus with implementations at two lower OSI layers. For the cross-layer design, we suggest the use of game and mechanism design theories. We design a network-wide consumer-centric and delay-efficient security protocol, DSIC-S. It induces a Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible equilibrium among all rational and selfish nodes. We prove it is network-wide socially desirable and Pareto optimal. We address resource management and delay-efficiency through synergy of several design aspects. We propose a scenario-based security model with different levels. Furthermore, we design a valuation system to integrate the caused delay in selection of security algorithms at each node without consumer's knowledge of the actual delays. We achieve this by incorporating the consumer's valuation system, in the calculation of the credit transfers through the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) payments with Clarke's pivotal rule. As the utmost significant contribution of this work, we solve the revelation theorem's problem of misrepresentation of agents' private information in mechanism design theory through the proposed design. We design an incentive model and incorporate the valuations in the incentives. The simulations validate the theoretical results. They prove the significance of this model and among others show the correlation of the credit transfers to actual delays and security valuations. In the layer-specific approach for the network-layer, we implement the DSIC-S protocol to extend current IPsec and IKEv2 protocols. IPsec-O and IKEv2-O inherit the strong properties of DSIC-S through the proposed extensions. Furthermore, we propose yet another layer-specific protocol, the SME_Q, for the datalink layer based on ATM. We develop an extensive simulation software, SMEQSIM, to simulate ATM security negotiations. We simulate the proposed protocol in a comprehensive real-life ATM network and prove the significance of this research work.
Ph. D.
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Books on the topic "Game theory mechanism"

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Maskin, Eric. Mechanism design: How to implement social goals. Barcelona: Publicaciones de la Real Academia de Ciencias Económicas y Financieras, 2009.

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Y, Narahari, ed. Game theoretic problems in network economics and mechanism design solutions. London: Springer, 2009.

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Qi ye jia xing cheng ji zhi: Jin hua bo yi lun de yan jiu shi jiao =The formation mechanism of entrepreneurs :Perspective of evolutionary game theory. Beijing: Jing ji ke xue chu ban she, 2005.

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Francqui Colloquium (2nd 1996 Brussels, Belgium). Social organization and mechanism design: Proceedings of the Second Francqui Colloquium, 10-11 June 1996, Brussels. Paris: De Boeck Université, 1999.

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Suter, Beat, René Bauer, and Mela Kocher, eds. Narrative Mechanics. Bielefeld, Germany: transcript Verlag, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.14361/9783839453452.

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What do stories in games have in common with political narratives? This book identifies narrative strategies as mechanisms for meaning and manipulation in games and real life. It shows that the narrative mechanics so clearly identifiable in games are increasingly used (and abused) in politics and social life. They have »many faces«, displays and interfaces. They occur as texts, recipes, stories, dramas in three acts, movies, videos, tweets, journeys of heroes, but also as rewarding stories in games and as narratives in society - such as a career from rags to riches, the concept of modernity or market economy. Below their surface, however, narrative mechanics are a particular type of motivational design - of game mechanics.
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Chadwicke, Jenkins Odest, ed. Creating games: Mechanics, content, and technology. Wellesley, MA: Wellesley, 2008.

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Stanley, Reiter, ed. Designing economic mechanisms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

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Leonid, Hurwicz, Groves Theodore, Radner Roy 1927-, and Reiter Stanley, eds. Information, incentives, and economic mechanisms: Essays in honor of Leonid Hurwicz. Oxford, UK: B. Blackwell, 1987.

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The mathematical theory of minority games: Statistical mechanics of interacting agents. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

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1948-, Hackbusch W., and Wittum Gabriel 1956-, eds. Adaptive methods--algorithms, theory and applications: Proceedings of the Ninth GAMM-Seminar, Kiel, January 22-24, 1993. Braunschweig: Vieweg, 1994.

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Book chapters on the topic "Game theory mechanism"

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Durlauf, Steven N., and Lawrence E. Blume. "Mechanism Design." In Game Theory, 207–22. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230280847_22.

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Durlauf, Steven N., and Lawrence E. Blume. "Mechanism Design (New Developments)." In Game Theory, 223–34. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230280847_23.

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Monderer, Dov. "Monotonicity in Mechanism Design." In Algorithmic Game Theory, 1. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04645-2_1.

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Garg, Jugal, and Peter McGlaughlin. "A Truthful Mechanism for Interval Scheduling." In Algorithmic Game Theory, 100–112. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99660-8_10.

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Fikioris, Giannis, and Dimitris Fotakis. "Mechanism Design for Perturbation Stable Combinatorial Auctions." In Algorithmic Game Theory, 47–63. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57980-7_4.

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Kyropoulou, Maria, Carmine Ventre, and Xiaomeng Zhang. "Mechanism Design for Constrained Heterogeneous Facility Location." In Algorithmic Game Theory, 63–76. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30473-7_5.

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Azar, Yossi, and Ety Khaitsin. "Prompt Mechanism for Ad Placement over Time." In Algorithmic Game Theory, 19–30. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24829-0_4.

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Brokkelkamp, Ruben, Sjir Hoeijmakers, and Guido Schäfer. "Greater Flexibility in Mechanism Design Through Altruism." In Algorithmic Game Theory, 41–59. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15714-1_3.

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Zhang, Xiuzhen, Yao Zhang, and Dengji Zhao. "Incentive Compatible Mechanism for Influential Agent Selection." In Algorithmic Game Theory, 79–93. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-85947-3_6.

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Filos-Ratsikas, Aris, and Alexandros A. Voudouris. "Approximate Mechanism Design for Distributed Facility Location." In Algorithmic Game Theory, 49–63. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-85947-3_4.

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Conference papers on the topic "Game theory mechanism"

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Hartline, Jason D., and Brendan Lucier. "Bayesian algorithmic mechanism design." In the Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807425.

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Hanany, Eran, Michal Tzur, and Alon Levran. "The transshipment fund mechanism." In the Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807437.

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Hartline, Jason. "Approximation in mechanism design." In the Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807441.

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Renou, Ludovic, and Tristan Tomala. "Mechanism design and communication networks." In the Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807500.

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Kesten, Onur, and M. Utku Ünver. "Lottery mechanism design for school choice." In the Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807504.

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Chawla, Shuchi, Jason Hartline, David Malec, and Balasubramanian Sivan. "Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing." In the Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807428.

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Cheng, Sheng-Tzong, Jian-Pan Li, and Gwo-Jiun Horng. "Game Theory Based Recommendation Mechanism for Taxi-Sharing." In 2014 28th International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications Workshops (WAINA). IEEE, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/waina.2014.106.

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Byde, Andrew. "Applying evolutionary game theory to auction mechanism design." In the 4th ACM conference. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/779928.779954.

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Motepalli, Shashank, and Hans-Arno Jacobsen. "Reward Mechanism for Blockchains Using Evolutionary Game Theory." In 2021 3rd Conference on Blockchain Research & Applications for Innovative Networks and Services (BRAINS). IEEE, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/brains52497.2021.9569791.

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Wang, Feiyue, and Silun Wang. "Application of Game Theory in Carbon Trading Mechanism." In 2021 3rd International Conference on Economic Management and Cultural Industry (ICEMCI 2021). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.211209.188.

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Reports on the topic "Game theory mechanism"

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Yusrina, Asri, Ulfah Alifia, Shintia Revina, Rezanti Putri Pramana, and Luhur Bima. Is the Game Worth the Candle? Examining the Effectiveness of Initial Teacher Education in Indonesia. Research on Improving Systems of Education (RISE), August 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.35489/bsg-rise-wp_2022/106.

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An impactful teacher education programme equips teachers with knowledge and skills to improve their effectiveness. Empirical findings on the effectiveness of teacher preparation programmes show that the accountability of institutions and teachers should not only be based on the knowledge or skills produced but also on student learning. Our study aims to evaluate the effectiveness of a pre-service teacher education programme in Indonesia, known as Pendidikan Profesi Guru Prajabatan or PPG. PPG is a one-year full-time programme in addition to four years of undergraduate teacher education (Bachelor of Education). PPG graduate teachers pass a selection process and receive a teaching certificate upon completion of the programme. We use mixed methods to understand the differences in the outcome of PPG graduates majoring in primary school teacher education to their counterparts who did not attend PPG. To estimate the impact of PPG, we exploit the combination of rules and events in the selection process which allows us to estimate the impact of PPG on teacher performance using fuzzy regression discontinuity design (RDD). Once we attest to the validity of the fuzzy RDD, we find that PPG has no impact on a teacher’s professional knowledge and student outcomes in numeracy and literacy. We argue that this is due to the ineffective selection mechanism in distinguishing the PPG and the comparison group. We conclude that as an initial teacher training programme, PPG did not improve teacher effectiveness. Despite incorporating best practices from effective teacher training into the programme design, PPG does not appear capable of producing a higher-quality teacher.
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Blum, Abraham, and Henry T. Nguyen. Molecular Tagging of Drought Resistance in Wheat: Osmotic Adjustment and Plant Productivity. United States Department of Agriculture, November 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.32747/2002.7580672.bard.

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Drought stress is a major limitation to bread wheat (Triticumaestivum L.) productivity and its yield stability in arid and semi-arid regions of world including parts of Israel and the U.S. Currently, breeding for sustained yields under drought stress is totally dependent on the use of yield and several key physiological attributes as selection indices. The attempt to identify the optimal genotype by evaluating the phenotype is undermining progress in such breeding programs. Osmotic adjustment (OA) is an effective drought resistance mechanism in many crop plants. Evidence exists that there is a genetic variation for OA in wheat and that high OA capacity supports wheat yields under drought stress. The major objective of this research was to identify molecular markers (RFLPs, restriction fragment length polymorphisms; and AFLPs, amplified fragment length polymorph isms) linked to OA as a major attribute of drought resistance in wheat and thus to facilitate marker-assisted selection for drought resistance. We identified high and low OA lines of wheat and from their cross developed recombinant inbred lines (RILs) used in the molecular tagging of OA in relation to drought resistance in terms of plant production under stress. The significant positive co-segregation of OA, plant water status and yield under stress in this RIL population provided strong support for the important role of OA as a drought resistance mechanism sustaining wheat production under drought stress. This evidence was obtained in addition to the initial study of parental materials for constructing this RIL population, which also gave evidence for a strong correlation between OA and grain yield under stress. This research therefore provides conclusive evidence on the important role of OA in sustaining wheat yield under drought stress. The measurement of OA is difficult and the selection for drought resistance by the phenotypic expression of OA is practically impossible. This research provided information on the genetic basis of OA in wheat in relations to yield under stress. It provided the basic information to indicate that molecular marker assisted selection for OA in wheat is possible. The RIL population has been created by a cross between two agronomic spring wheat lines and the high OA recombinants in this population presented very high OA values, not commonly observed in wheat. These recombinants are therefore an immediate valuable genetic recourse for breeding well-adapted drought resistant wheat in Texas and Israel. We feel that this work taken as a whole eliminate the few previous speculated . doubts about the practical role of OA as an important mechanism of drought resistance in economic crop plants. As such it should open the way, in terms of both concept and the use of marker assisted selection, for improving drought resistance in wheat by deploying high osmotic adjustment.
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Ayala, David, Ashley Graves, Colton Lauer, Henrik Strand, Chad Taylor, Kyle Weldon, and Ryan Wood. Flooding Events Post Hurricane Harvey: Potential Liability for Dam and Reservoir Operators and Recommendations Moving Forward. Edited by Gabriel Eckstein. Texas A&M University School of Law Program in Natural Resources Systems, September 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.37419/eenrs.floodingpostharvey.

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When Hurricane Harvey hit the Texas coast as a category 4 hurricane on August 25, 2017, it resulted in $125 billion in damage, rivaling only Hurricane Katrina in the amount of damage caused. It also resulted in the deaths of 88 people and destroyed or damaged 135,000 homes. Much of that devastation was the result of flooding. The storm dumped over 27 trillion gallons of rain over Texas in a matter of days. Some parts of Houston received over 50 inches of rainfall. The potential liability that dam and reservoir operators may face for decisions they make during storm and flooding events has now become a major concern for Texas citizens and its elected officials. Law suits have now been instituted against the federal government for its operation of two flood control reservoirs, as well as against the San Jacinto River Authority for its operation of a water supply reservoir. Moreover, the issues and concerns have been placed on the agenda of a number of committees preparing for the 2019 Texas legislative session. This report reviews current dam and reservoir operations in Texas and examines the potential liability that such operators may face for actions and decisions taken in response to storm and flooding events. In Section III, the report reviews dam gate operations and differentiates between water supply reservoirs and flood control reservoirs. It also considers pre-release options and explains why such actions are disfavored and not recommended. In Section IV, the report evaluates liabilities and defenses applicable to dam and reservoir operators. It explains how governmental immunity can limit the exposure of state and federally-run facilities to claims seeking monetary damages. It also discusses how such entities could be subject to claims of inverse condemnation, which generally are not subject to governmental immunity, under Texas law as well as under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. In addition, the Section discusses negligence and nuisance claims and concludes that plaintiffs asserting either or both of these claims will have difficulty presenting successful arguments for flooding-related damage and harm against operators who act reasonably in the face of storm-related precipitation. Finally, Section V offers recommendations that dam and reservoir operators might pursue in order to engage and educate the public and thereby reduce the potential for disputes and litigation. Specifically, the report highlights the need for expanded community outreach efforts to engage with municipalities, private land owners, and the business community in flood-prone neighborhoods both below and above a dam. It also recommends implementation of proactive flood notification procedures as a way of reaching and alerting as many people as possible of potential and imminent flooding events. Finally, the report proposes implementation of a dispute prevention and minimization mechanism and offers recommendations for the design and execution of such a program.
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Ginzberg, Idit, Richard E. Veilleux, and James G. Tokuhisa. Identification and Allelic Variation of Genes Involved in the Potato Glycoalkaloid Biosynthetic Pathway. United States Department of Agriculture, August 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.32747/2012.7593386.bard.

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Steroidal glycoalkaloids (SGAs) are secondary metabolites being part of the plant defense response. The two major SGAs in cultivated potato (Solanum tuberosum) are α-chaconine and α-solanine, which exhibit strong cellular lytic properties and inhibit acetylcholinesterase activity, and are poisonous at high concentrations for humans. As SGAs are not destroyed during cooking and frying commercial cultivars have been bred to contain low levels, and their content in tubers should not exceed 20 mg/100 g fresh weight. However, environmental factors can increase tuber SGA content above the safe level. The focus of the proposed research was to apply genomic approaches to identify candidate genes that control potato SGA content in order to develop tools for potato improvement by marker-assisted selection and/or transgenic approaches. To this end, the objectives of the proposal included identification of genes, metabolic intermediates and allelic variations in the potato SGAbiosynthetic pathway. The SGAs are biosynthesized by the sterol branch of the mevalonic acid/isoprenoid pathway. Transgenic potato plants that overexpress 3-hydroxy-3-methylglutaryl-CoA reductase 1 (HMG1) or squalene synthase 1 (SQS1), key enzymes of the mevalonic acid/isoprenoid pathway, exhibited elevated levels of solanine and chaconine as well as induced expression of genes downstream the pathway. These results suggest of coordinated regulation of isoprenoid (primary) metabolism and SGA secondary metabolism. The transgenic plants were further used to identify new SGA-related candidate genes by cDNA-AFLP approach and a novel glycosyltransferase was isolated. In addition, genes involved in phytosterol biosynthesis may have dual role and synthesize defense-related steroidal metabolites, such as SGAs, via lanosterol pathway. Potato lanosterol synthase sequence (LAS) was isolated and used to prepare transgenic plants with overexpressing and silencing constructs. Plants are currently being analyzed for SGA content. The dynamics of SGA accumulation in the various organs of a potato species with high SGA content gave insights into the general regulation of SGA abundance. Leaf SGA levels in S. chacoense were 10 to 20-fold greater than those of S. tuberosum. The leptines, SGAs with strong antifeedant properties against Colorado potato beetles, were present in all aerial tissues except for early and mid-developmental stages of above ground stolons, and accounted for the high SGA content of S. chacoense. These results indicate the presence of regulatory mechanisms in most tissues except in stolons that limit the levels of α-solanine and α-chaconine and confine leptine accumulation to the aerial tissues. The genomes of cultivated and wild potato contain a 4-member gene family coding for SQS. Three orthologs were cloned as cDNAs from S. chacoense and heterologously expressed in E. coli. Squalene accumulated in all E. coli lines transformed with each of the three gene constructs. Differential transcript abundance in various organs and amino acid sequence differences in the conserved domains of three isoenzymes indicate subfunctionalization of SQS activity and triterpene/sterol metabolism. Because S. chacoense and S. phureja differ so greatly for presence and accumulation of SGAs, we selected four candidate genes from different points along the biosynthetic pathway to determine if chcor phuspecific alleles were associated with SGA expression in a segregating interspecific diploid population. For two of the four genes (HMG2 and SGT2) F2 plants with chcalleles expressed significantly greater total SGAs compared with heterozygotes and those with phualleles. Although there are other determinants of SGA biosynthesis and composition in potato, the ability of allelic states at two genes to affect SGA levels confirms some of the above transgenic work where chcalleles at two other loci altered SGA expression in Desiree. Present results reveal new opportunities to manipulate triterpene/sterol biosynthesis in more targeted ways with the objective of altering SGA content for both human health concerns and natural pesticide content without disrupting the essential metabolism and function of the phytosterol component of the membranes and the growth regulating brassinosteroids.
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