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1
Tan, Shaolin. "Proximity inheritance explains the evolution of cooperation under natural selection and mutation." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 286, no. 1902 (May 2019): 20190690. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2019.0690.
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In this paper, a mechanism called proximity inheritance is introduced in the birth–death process of a networked population involving the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Different from the traditional birth–death process, in the proposed model, players are distributed in a spatial space and offspring is distributed in the neighbourhood of its parents. That is, offspring inherits not only the strategy but also the proximity of its parents. In this coevolutionary game model, a cooperative neighbourhood gives more neighbouring cooperative offspring and a defective neighbourhood gives more neighbouring defective offspring, leading to positive feedback among cooperative interactions. It is shown that with the help of proximity inheritance, natural selection will favour cooperation over defection under various conditions, even in the presence of mutation. Furthermore, the coevolutionary dynamics could lead to self-organized substantial network clustering, which promotes an assortment of cooperative interactions. This study provides a new insight into the evolutionary mechanism of cooperation in the absence of social attributions such as reputation and punishment.
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Andrade-Lotero, Edgar, and Robert L. Goldstone. "Self-organized division of cognitive labor." PLOS ONE 16, no. 7 (July 19, 2021): e0254532. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0254532.
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Often members of a group benefit from dividing the group’s task into separate components, where each member specializes their role so as to accomplish only one of the components. While this division of labor phenomenon has been observed with respect to both manual and cognitive labor, there is no clear understanding of the cognitive mechanisms allowing for its emergence, especially when there are multiple divisions possible and communication is limited. Indeed, maximization of expected utility often does not differentiate between alternative ways in which individuals could divide labor. We developed an iterative two-person game in which there are multiple ways of dividing labor, but in which it is not possible to explicitly negotiate a division. We implemented the game both as a human experimental task and as a computational model. Our results show that the majority of human dyads can finish the game with an efficient division of labor. Moreover, we fitted our computational model to the behavioral data, which allowed us to explain how the perceived similarity between a player’s actions and the task’s focal points guided the players’ choices from one round to the other, thus bridging the group dynamics and its underlying cognitive process. Potential applications of this model outside cognitive science include the improvement of cooperation in human groups, multi-agent systems, as well as human-robot collaboration.
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Bear, Adam, and David G. Rand. "Intuition, deliberation, and the evolution of cooperation." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 113, no. 4 (January 11, 2016): 936–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1517780113.
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Humans often cooperate with strangers, despite the costs involved. A long tradition of theoretical modeling has sought ultimate evolutionary explanations for this seemingly altruistic behavior. More recently, an entirely separate body of experimental work has begun to investigate cooperation’s proximate cognitive underpinnings using a dual-process framework: Is deliberative self-control necessary to reign in selfish impulses, or does self-interested deliberation restrain an intuitive desire to cooperate? Integrating these ultimate and proximate approaches, we introduce dual-process cognition into a formal game-theoretic model of the evolution of cooperation. Agents play prisoner’s dilemma games, some of which are one-shot and others of which involve reciprocity. They can either respond by using a generalized intuition, which is not sensitive to whether the game is one-shot or reciprocal, or pay a (stochastically varying) cost to deliberate and tailor their strategy to the type of game they are facing. We find that, depending on the level of reciprocity and assortment, selection favors one of two strategies: intuitive defectors who never deliberate, or dual-process agents who intuitively cooperate but sometimes use deliberation to defect in one-shot games. Critically, selection never favors agents who use deliberation to override selfish impulses: Deliberation only serves to undermine cooperation with strangers. Thus, by introducing a formal theoretical framework for exploring cooperation through a dual-process lens, we provide a clear answer regarding the role of deliberation in cooperation based on evolutionary modeling, help to organize a growing body of sometimes-conflicting empirical results, and shed light on the nature of human cognition and social decision making.
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KUŁAKOWSKI, KRZYSZTOF. "COOPERATION AND DEFECTION IN GHETTO." International Journal of Modern Physics C 17, no. 02 (February 2006): 287–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0129183106009151.
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We consider ghetto as a community of people ruled against their will by an external power. Members of the community feel that their laws are broken. However, attempts to leave ghetto makes their situation worse. We discuss the relation of the ghetto inhabitants to the ruling power in context of their needs, organized according to the Maslow hierarchy. Decisions how to satisfy successive needs are undertaken in cooperation with or defection the ruling power. This issue allows to construct the tree of decisions and to adopt the pruning technique from the game theory. Dynamics of decisions can be described within the formalism of fundamental equations. The result is that the strategy of defection is stabilized by the estimated payoff.
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Akiyama, Eizo, and Kunihiko Kaneko. "Evolution of Cooperation, Differentiation, Complexity, and Diversity in an Iterated Three-Person Game." Artificial Life 2, no. 3 (April 1995): 293–304. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/artl.1995.2.3.293.
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A nonzero-sum three-person coalition game is presented to study the evolution of complexity and diversity in cooperation, where the population dynamics of players with strategies is given according to their scores in the iterated game and mutations. Two types of differentiation emerge initially: a biased one to classes and a temporal one to change their roles for coalition. Rules to change the hands are self-organized in a society through evolution. The coevolution of diversity and complexity of strategies and interactions (or communications) are found at later stages of the simulation. Relevance of our results to the biological society is briefly discussed.
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SCHWEITZER, FRANK, LAXMIDHAR BEHERA, and HEINZ MÜHLENBEIN. "EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION IN A SPATIAL PRISONER'S DILEMMA." Advances in Complex Systems 05, no. 02n03 (June 2002): 269–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219525902000584.
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We investigate the spatial distribution and the global frequency of agents who can either cooperate or defect. The agent interaction is described by a deterministic, non-iterated prisoner's dilemma game, further each agent only locally interacts with his neighbors. Based on a detailed analysis of the local payoff structures we derive critical conditions for the invasion or the spatial coexistence of cooperators and defectors. These results are concluded in a phase diagram that allows us to identify five regimes, each characterized by a distinct spatiotemporal dynamics and a corresponding final spatial structure. In addition to the complete invasion of defectors, we find coexistence regimes with either a majority of cooperators in large spatial domains, or a minority of cooperators organized in small non-stationary domains or in small clusters. The analysis further allowed a verification of computer simulation results by Nowak and May (1993). Eventually, we present simulation results of a true 5-person game on a lattice. This modification leads to non-uniform spatial interactions that may even enhance the effect of cooperation.
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Liu, Yongkui, Xiaojie Chen, Lin Zhang, Fei Tao, and Long Wang. "Social selection of game organizers promotes cooperation in spatial public goods games." EPL (Europhysics Letters) 102, no. 5 (June 1, 2013): 50006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1209/0295-5075/102/50006.
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Tomassini, Marco, and Alberto Antonioni. "Computational Behavioral Models for Public Goods Games on Social Networks." Games 10, no. 3 (September 2, 2019): 35. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g10030035.
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Cooperation is a fundamental aspect of well-organized societies and public good games are a useful metaphor for modeling cooperative behavior in the presence of strong incentives to free ride. Usually, social agents interact to play a public good game through network structures. Here, we use social network structures and computational agent rules inspired by recent experimental work in order to develop models of agent behavior playing public goods games. The results of our numerical simulations based on a couple of simple models show that agents behave in a manner qualitatively similar to what has been observed experimentally. Computational models such as those presented here are very useful to interpret observed behavior and to enhance computationally the limited variation that is possible in the experimental domain. By assuming a priori reasonable individual behaviors, the easiness of running simulations could also facilitate exploration prior to any experimental work in order to vary and estimate a number of key parameters that would be very difficult, if not impossible, to change during the actual experiment.
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Enkhbat, R. "A Note on Anti-Berge Equilibrium for Bimatrix Game." Bulletin of Irkutsk State University. Series Mathematics 36 (2021): 3–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.26516/1997-7670.2021.36.3.
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Game theory plays an important role in applied mathematics, economics and decision theory. There are many works devoted to game theory. Most of them deals with a Nash equilibrium. A global search algorithm for finding a Nash equilibrium was proposed in [13]. Also, the extraproximal and extragradient algorithms for the Nash equilibrium have been discussed in [3]. Berge equilibrium is a model of cooperation in social dilemmas, including the Prisoner’s Dilemma games [15]. The Berge equilibrium concept was introduced by the French mathematician Claude Berge [5] for coalition games. The first research works of Berge equilibrium were conducted by Vaisman and Zhukovskiy [18; 19]. A method for constructing a Berge equilibrium which is Pareto-maximal with respect to all other Berge equilibriums has been examined in Zhukovskiy [10]. Also, the equilibrium was studied in [16] from a view point of differential games. Abalo and Kostreva [1; 2] proved the existence theorems for pure-strategy Berge equilibrium in strategic-form games of differential games. Nessah [11] and Larbani, Tazdait [12] provided with a new existence theorem. Applications of Berge equilibrium in social science have been discussed in [6; 17]. Also, the work [7] deals with an application of Berge equilibrium in economics. Connection of Nash and Berge equilibriums has been shown in [17]. Most recently, the Berge equilibrium was examined in Enkhbat and Batbileg [14] for Bimatrix game with its nonconvex optimization reduction. In this paper, inspired by Nash and Berge equilibriums, we introduce a new notion of equilibrium so-called Anti-Berge equilibrium. The main goal of this paper is to examine Anti-Berge equilibrium for bimatrix game. The work is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the existence of Anti-Berge equilibrium in a bimatrix game for mixed strategies. In Section 3, an optimization formulation of Anti-Berge equilibrium has been formulated.
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Kifokeris, Dimosthenis, and Yiannis Xenidis. "Game Theory-Based Minimization of the Ostracism Risk in Construction Companies." Sustainability 13, no. 12 (June 8, 2021): 6545. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su13126545.
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Strategic and managemerial decision-making in an organization can have a crucial effect for the whole entity; however, it rarely involves the organization’s employees evenly at the different organizational levels. The result is—what is addressed in this paper as—the ostracism risk, namely the risk accruing from the lack of satisfaction of underprivileged employees’ groups during the decision-making process. The ostracism risk could jeopardize the organization’s integrity and therefore requires effective treatment. This paper aims at verifying a conceptual approach, which is proposed as a methodology for assessing the probability of organizational cooperation when deciding under risk, thus minimizing ostracism risk. The proposed approach is based on organizational and human resources management (HRM) theories and is contextualized for construction through the understanding of systems theory. The proposed methodology presents a potential modelling via game theory of a medium-sized construction company that is organized according to Mintzberg’s organizational model. The utilization of the bounded Pareto distribution is presented as an approach of the model’s probabilistic processing, and the potential for estimating the probabilities to adopt a favorable cooperational decision is verified. The paper concludes with the reference to the next steps required for the methodology’s validation and further improvement.
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Bevilacqua, Vitoantonio, Francesca Intini, and Silvana Kuhtz. "Un modello cooperativo di gestione intermunicipale della raccolta differenziata dei rifiuti: un'applicazione del valore di Shapley." ECONOMICS AND POLICY OF ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT, no. 3 (July 2009): 19–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.3280/efe2008-003002.
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- In this work we have carried out a study in order to estimate and allocate the costs related to separate waste collection in an inter-municipal area located in the province of Bari (Italy). This analysis promotes the cooperation among municipalities to manage, in an optimal way, the waste collection service. Indeed, according to Italian laws, the municipalities are responsible for organizing the management of municipal waste in accordance with principles of transparency, efficiency, effectiveness and inexpensiveness. For this reason we have built a model of separate waste collection management, highlighting the different cost functions. The total cost of the service has been divided among the individual municipalities using the theory of cooperative games, stressing that local authorities are not interested in paying off more than they would pay if they organized independently. To achieve this goal, we have created a model of aggregation of quantitative information on equipments and specialized personnel (and their costs). The problem of the cost allocation is interpreted as an example of transferable utility games and it is resolved with the technique of Shapley values that are included in the nucleolus of the inter-municipal game. Therefore it is more cost-effective to entrust a single operator with the waste collection for each area or sub domain in order not to double service costs. This work on waste management can integrate the studies and applications of the theory of cooperative games in the environmental field.Key words: Separate waste collection, Shapley values, cost allocation.JEL classifications: Q53.Parole chiave: Raccolta differenziata, valore di Shapley, allocazione dei costi.
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Fotouhi, Babak, Naghmeh Momeni, Benjamin Allen, and Martin A. Nowak. "Evolution of cooperation on large networks with community structure." Journal of The Royal Society Interface 16, no. 152 (March 2019): 20180677. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2018.0677.
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Cooperation is a major factor in the evolution of human societies. The structure of social networks, which affects the dynamics of cooperation and other interpersonal phenomena, have common structural signatures. One of these signatures is the tendency to organize as groups. This tendency gives rise to networks with community structure, which are composed of distinct modules. In this paper, we study analytically the evolutionary game dynamics on large modular networks in the limit of weak selection. We obtain novel analytical conditions such that natural selection favours cooperation over defection. We calculate the transition point for each community to favour cooperation. We find that a critical inter-community link creation probability exists for given group density, such that the overall network supports cooperation even if individual communities inhibit it. As a byproduct, we present solutions for the critical benefit-to-cost ratio which perform with remarkable accuracy for diverse generative network models, including those with community structure and heavy-tailed degree distributions. We also demonstrate the generalizability of the results to arbitrary two-player games.
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Terti, Galateia, Isabelle Ruin, Milan Kalas, Ilona Láng, Arnau Cangròs i Alonso, Tommaso Sabbatini, and Valerio Lorini. "ANYCaRE: a role-playing game to investigate crisis decision-making and communication challenges in weather-related hazards." Natural Hazards and Earth System Sciences 19, no. 3 (March 13, 2019): 507–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.5194/nhess-19-507-2019.
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Abstract. This study proposes a role-playing experiment to explore the value of modern impact-based weather forecasts on the decision-making process to (i) issue warnings and manage the official emergency response under uncertainty and (ii) communicate and trigger protective action at different levels of the warning system across Europe. Here, flood or strong-wind game simulations seek to represent the players' realistic uncertainties and dilemmas embedded in the real-time forecasting-warning processes. The game was first tested in two scientific workshops in Finland and France, where European researchers, developers, forecasters and civil protection representatives played the simulations. Two other game sessions were organized afterwards (i) with undergraduate university students in France and (ii) with Finnish stakeholders involved in the management of hazardous weather emergencies. First results indicate that multi-model developments and crowdsourcing tools increase the level of confidence in the decision-making under pressure. We found that the role-playing approach facilitates interdisciplinary cooperation and argumentation on emergency response in a fun and interactive manner. The ANYCaRE experiment was proposed, therefore, as a valuable learning tool to enhance participants' understanding of the complexities and challenges met by various actors in weather-related emergency management.
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Hooper, Paul L., Kathryn Demps, Michael Gurven, Drew Gerkey, and Hillard S. Kaplan. "Skills, division of labour and economies of scale among Amazonian hunters and South Indian honey collectors." Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 370, no. 1683 (December 5, 2015): 20150008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2015.0008.
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In foraging and other productive activities, individuals make choices regarding whether and with whom to cooperate, and in what capacities. The size and composition of cooperative groups can be understood as a self-organized outcome of these choices, which are made under local ecological and social constraints. This article describes a theoretical framework for explaining the size and composition of foraging groups based on three principles: (i) the sexual division of labour; (ii) the intergenerational division of labour; and (iii) economies of scale in production. We test predictions from the theory with data from two field contexts: Tsimane' game hunters of lowland Bolivia, and Jenu Kuruba honey collectors of South India. In each case, we estimate the impacts of group size and individual group members' effort on group success. We characterize differences in the skill requirements of different foraging activities and show that individuals participate more frequently in activities in which they are more efficient. We evaluate returns to scale across different resource types and observe higher returns at larger group sizes in foraging activities (such as hunting large game) that benefit from coordinated and complementary roles. These results inform us that the foraging group size and composition are guided by the motivated choice of individuals on the basis of relative efficiency, benefits of cooperation, opportunity costs and other social considerations.
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Deineko, Alfiіa, Ruslan Shcherbak, and Iurii Fishev. "Strength preparedness of 6-7 years boys in artistic gymnastics: experience of using the game method." Scientific Journal of National Pedagogical Dragomanov University Series 15 Scientific and pedagogical problems of physical culture (physical culture and sports), no. 1(129) (January 27, 2021): 31–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.31392/npu-nc.series15.2021.1(129).07.
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The article considers the effectiveness of using game method to increase the level of strength preparedness of 6-7 years boys. It is shown that children of this age due to the ontogenetic features of growing are characterized by increased motor activity and a strong need in it. It is highlighted that a game is one of the most important areas in the children’s life that in cooperation with activity, study, art and sports provides the necessary emotional conditions for a comprehensive, harmonious development of personality. For the teacher, it becomes a tool of education that allows to fully take into account the age characteristics of children and adolescents, to develop initiative, to create an atmosphere of freedom, independence, creativity and conditions for self-development. The game belongs to the traditional and esteemed methods of teaching and educating children of primary school age. The value of this method is that educational, developmental and upbringing functions are closely intertwined in during game activities. Game as a method of studying organizes, develops students, expands their cognitive abilities and educates the personality. It is highlighted that the game method involves the performance of motor actions in the game conditions within its characteristic rules the arsenal of technically-tactical intakes and situations. It is noted that in recent years, mobile games have become widely used as an effective tool in the training process due to the significant potential of the game method using in sports training. It is established that the using of the proposed games in the educational and training process of young gymnasts has increased the level of their strength preparedness.
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Vural, Dervis C., Alexander Isakov, and L. Mahadevan. "The organization and control of an evolving interdependent population." Journal of The Royal Society Interface 12, no. 108 (July 2015): 20150044. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2015.0044.
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Starting with Darwin, biologists have asked how populations evolve from a low fitness state that is evolutionarily stable to a high fitness state that is not. Specifically of interest is the emergence of cooperation and multicellularity where the fitness of individuals often appears in conflict with that of the population. Theories of social evolution and evolutionary game theory have produced a number of fruitful results employing two-state two-body frameworks. In this study, we depart from this tradition and instead consider a multi-player, multi-state evolutionary game, in which the fitness of an agent is determined by its relationship to an arbitrary number of other agents. We show that populations organize themselves in one of four distinct phases of interdependence depending on one parameter, selection strength. Some of these phases involve the formation of specialized large-scale structures. We then describe how the evolution of independence can be manipulated through various external perturbations.
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Benko, Miroslav, András Náhlik, and Kristijan Tomljanović. "Hunters in Europe: What does it mean "the hunters population" in Europe?" Sustainable Forestry: Collection, no. 81-82 (2020): 159–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.5937/sustfor2081159b.
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According to FACE (The European Federation of Associations for Hunting) approximately 7 million hunters are registered in Europe. Throughout the year they work in nature, in the hunting ground, or organize work of supporting teams and individuals on development of habitats with different kinds of animals, of which only some are hunted or listed as game. By using methods of positive selection and care in order to increase quality and quantity of the habitat itself, is maintained and permanently increased biological diversity of plant populations and whole ecosystem same as animal populations, including game. Disappearance of certain animal species in certain parts of Europe surely is not caused by game management, but is a result of rapid urbanization and development of urban and rural areas with all the supporting infrastructure. Human overpopulation parallel brought to reduction of habitat areas for numerous animal and game species. It's therefore required to establish balance between humans and other beings on a certain space, which therefore requires good management. The most competent members of human community which can manage wild animals and game in the most competent way are certainly hunters. In every community mutual understanding and cooperation of all other stakeholders and ecosystem beneficiaries is key. We should not forget that a human is part of natural ecosystem and a hunter is the most competent person who understands habits and life of game animals and therefore can manage it in the best way. Due to this reason game, hunter and hunters population take care of the game animals survival, their overall food chain their development and relative relationship in order to avoid deterioration and favoring of certain species over the other, increasing biological diversity of game animals and habitat which they inhabit; of overall and particular individual health state, of active and passive protection defining and implementing regulations important for behavior and management, on the basis of good management and good will in this way actively and significantly contributing to development of environmental protection.
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Huntington, Henry P. "The Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission and other cooperative marine mammal management organizations in northern Alaska." Polar Record 28, no. 165 (April 1992): 119–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0032247400013413.
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AbstractThe formation of the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission (AEWC) in 1977 was the first time that Native Alaskans had organized themselves to protect a specific hunting interest. The AEWC's success and prominence has led to the formation of other user-based management regimes for marine mammals in northern Alaska. This paper begins with a description of the creation and development of the AEWC as it fought the ban by the International Whaling Commission (IWC) on bowhead whaling and gained management authority for the Eskimo harvest. Then, three other regimes are examined, each of which focuses on a marine mammal species in northern Alaska. These are the Eskimo Walrus Commission, the Alaska and Inuvialuit Beluga Whale Committee, and the Agreement on Polar Bears in the Southern Beaufort Sea between the Inuvialuit Game Council and the North Slope Borough Fish and Game Management Committee. These regimes face the challenge of avoiding a management crisis rather than overcoming one. Without the incentive of a threat to end hunting, these regimes have not had the sense of direction that has enabled the AEWC to achieve its success. However, they have contributed to the management of certain species of wildlife, and are capable of contributing a great deal more.
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Lansing, J. Stephen, Stefan Thurner, Ning Ning Chung, Aurélie Coudurier-Curveur, Çağil Karakaş, Kurt A. Fesenmyer, and Lock Yue Chew. "Adaptive self-organization of Bali’s ancient rice terraces." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 114, no. 25 (June 5, 2017): 6504–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1605369114.
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Spatial patterning often occurs in ecosystems as a result of a self-organizing process caused by feedback between organisms and the physical environment. Here, we show that the spatial patterns observable in centuries-old Balinese rice terraces are also created by feedback between farmers’ decisions and the ecology of the paddies, which triggers a transition from local to global-scale control of water shortages and rice pests. We propose an evolutionary game, based on local farmers’ decisions that predicts specific power laws in spatial patterning that are also seen in a multispectral image analysis of Balinese rice terraces. The model shows how feedbacks between human decisions and ecosystem processes can evolve toward an optimal state in which total harvests are maximized and the system approaches Pareto optimality. It helps explain how multiscale cooperation from the community to the watershed scale could persist for centuries, and why the disruption of this self-organizing system by the Green Revolution caused chaos in irrigation and devastating losses from pests. The model shows that adaptation in a coupled human–natural system can trigger self-organized criticality (SOC). In previous exogenously driven SOC models, adaptation plays no role, and no optimization occurs. In contrast, adaptive SOC is a self-organizing process where local adaptations drive the system toward local and global optima.
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D. Angelou, Spiros, Nikos Stavropoulos, Vasiliki Manou, and Christos Galazoulas. "Factors affecting the effectiveness of the pick and roll offense at the 2017 European Men's Championship." Exercise and Quality of Life 13, no. 1 (June 15, 2021): 23–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.31382/eqol.210603.
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The evolution of basketball made the game faster, leading coaches to increase the use of pick and roll cooperation in offense. The purpose of this research was to investigate the performance time of the pick and roll every five minutes, the pair of players who participated in the pick and roll and the offensive action of the ball handler after the screen, in the European Men's Championship of 2017. The sample of the research was the sixteen games of the second round of the Championship. The instrument used for the analysis of the matches was the SportScout STA Version 3.2. Analysis with ꭓ2 (Chi-square) was used. In the results analysis, a total of 714 screens were found, of which 356 were successful (49.9%) and 358 (50.1%) failed. Most pick and rolls were performed in the second five-minute span of the third period of the games (14.8%) and in the first five-minute span of the first period (14.1%). Regarding the pairs of players participating in the action, most of them had the guard as the ball handler and the center as the screener (63.4%). In about 60% of the pick and rolls the ball handler chose to finish the action himself either by driving to the basket (31.8%) or with a shot (28.6%). The results of this study provide more information and directions to basketball coaches in order for them to better organize their training and maximize the offensive performance of their teams.
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Bielecki, Andrzej, and Sylwia Nieszporska. "Analysis of Healthcare Systems by Using Systemic Approach." Complexity 2019 (April 21, 2019): 1–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2019/6807140.
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National healthcare systems in all countries do not act effectively. Therefore, especially strategies for introducing organizational innovation to public organization should be considered. The problem is how to organize the research in this field. One of the generally accepted solutions is the systemic approach to healthcare systems. In this paper multiagent systems theory and autonomous systems theory are applied to the analysis of main types of healthcare systems. Such analysis allows us to consider the system properties: the level of the autonomy, energy dissipation in the system, the payoff specificity (in the meaning of game theory), functional role of the agents in the system, the level of the agents’ cooperation, and delays in flows of money, requests, rules, and controls. As a result, some new functionalities of the healthcare system on the national level have been found and analysed. The aforementioned parameters are good tools to analyse the system functionality.
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Vermeij, Geerat J., and Peter D. Roopnarine. "Reining in the Red Queen: the dynamics of adaptation and extinction reexamined." Paleobiology 39, no. 4 (2013): 560–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1666/13009.
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One of the most enduring evolutionary metaphors is Van Valen's (1973) Red Queen. According to this metaphor, as one species in a community adapts by becoming better able to acquire and defend resources, species with which it interacts are adversely affected. If those other species do not continuously adapt to compensate for this biotically caused deterioration, they will be driven to extinction. Continuous adaptation of all species in a community prevents any single species from gaining a long-term advantage; this amounts to the Red Queen running in place. We have critically examined the assumptions on which the Red Queen metaphor was founded. We argue that the Red Queen embodies three demonstrably false assumptions: (1) evolutionary adaptation is continuous; (2) organisms are important agents of extinction; and (3) evolution is a zero-sum process in which living things divide up an unchanging quantity of resources. Changes in the selective regime need not always elicit adaptation, because most organisms function adequately under many “suboptimal” conditions and often compensate by demonstrating adaptive flexibility. Likewise, ecosystems are organized in such a way that they tend to be robust and capable of absorbing invasions and extinctions, at least up to a point. With a simple evolutionary game involving three species, we show that Red Queen dynamics (continuous adaptation by all interacting species) apply in only a very small minority of possible outcomes. Importantly, cooperation and facilitation among species enable competitors to increase ecosystem productivity and therefore to enlarge the pool and turnover of resources. The Red Queen reigns only under a few unusual circumstances.
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Imber, Viktoriia I. "ОРГАНІЗАЦІЯ НАВЧАЛЬНОЇ ВЗАЄМОДІЇ ВИКЛАДАЧА І СТУДЕНТІВ ЗАСОБАМИ SMART BOARD." Information Technologies and Learning Tools 64, no. 2 (April 30, 2018): 119. http://dx.doi.org/10.33407/itlt.v64i2.1950.
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The article deals with the stages in the organization of teacher -student educational interaction by means of Smart Board. The possibilities of the updated SMART Learning Suite software have been described, including the Smart Lab interactive application for game technology learning, the new Smart Response 2 used as a student’s assessment tool for the organization of students’ cooperation within the single virtual Smart Amp workspace, student’s personal devices usage, online assignments accomplishment through Smart Learning Suite Online. It has been determined that the new forms of teacher-student educational interaction can be successfully implemented in the modern educational system. This will provide an opportunity for teachers to create interactive lessons, to find free time for assessing students’ achievements, master new forms of online classroom training, and provide the students’ training at their own pace. The set of interactive exercises and how to organize student’s learning process with the use of SmartLab tools have been introduced.
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Wang, Zhen, Marko Jusup, Hao Guo, Lei Shi, Sunčana Geček, Madhur Anand, Matjaž Perc, et al. "Communicating sentiment and outlook reverses inaction against collective risks." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 117, no. 30 (July 15, 2020): 17650–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1922345117.
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Collective risks permeate society, triggering social dilemmas in which working toward a common goal is impeded by selfish interests. One such dilemma is mitigating runaway climate change. To study the social aspects of climate-change mitigation, we organized an experimental game and asked volunteer groups of three different sizes to invest toward a common mitigation goal. If investments reached a preset target, volunteers would avoid all consequences and convert their remaining capital into monetary payouts. In the opposite case, however, volunteers would lose all their capital with 50% probability. The dilemma was, therefore, whether to invest one’s own capital or wait for others to step in. We find that communicating sentiment and outlook helps to resolve the dilemma by a fundamental shift in investment patterns. Groups in which communication is allowed invest persistently and hardly ever give up, even when their current investment deficits are substantial. The improved investment patterns are robust to group size, although larger groups are harder to coordinate, as evidenced by their overall lower success frequencies. A clustering algorithm reveals three behavioral types and shows that communication reduces the abundance of the free-riding type. Climate-change mitigation, however, is achieved mainly by cooperator and altruist types stepping up and increasing contributions as the failure looms. Meanwhile, contributions from free riders remain flat throughout the game. This reveals that the mechanisms behind avoiding collective risks depend on an interaction between behavioral type, communication, and timing.
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Neuman, Yair, Navot Israeli, Dan Vilenchik, and Yochai Cohen. "The Adaptive Behavior of a Soccer Team: An Entropy-Based Analysis." Entropy 20, no. 10 (October 2, 2018): 758. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/e20100758.
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To optimize its performance, a competitive team, such as a soccer team, must maintain a delicate balance between organization and disorganization. On the one hand, the team should maintain organized patterns of behavior to maximize the cooperation between its members. On the other hand, the team’s behavior should be disordered enough to mislead its opponent and to maintain enough degrees of freedom. In this paper, we have analyzed this dynamic in the context of soccer games and examined whether it is correlated with the team’s performance. We measured the organization associated with the behavior of a soccer team through the Tsallis entropy of ball passes between the players. Analyzing data taken from the English Premier League (2015/2016), we show that the team’s position at the end of the season is correlated with the team’s entropy as measured with a super-additive entropy index. Moreover, the entropy score of a team significantly contributes to the prediction of the team’s position at the end of the season beyond the prediction gained by the team’s position at the end of the previous season.
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Hong, Zhen, Xiaoman Pan, Ping Chen, Xianchuang Su, Ning Wang, and Wenqi Lu. "A Topology Control with Energy Balance in Underwater Wireless Sensor Networks for IoT-Based Application." Sensors 18, no. 7 (July 16, 2018): 2306. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/s18072306.
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As part of the IoT-based application, underwater wireless sensor networks (UWSN), which are typically self-organized heterogeneous wireless network, are one of the research hot-spots using various sensors in marine exploration and water environment monitoring application fields, recently. Due to the serious attenuation of radio in water, acoustic or hybrid communication is a usual way for transmitting information among nodes, which dissipates much more energy to prevent the network failure and guarantee the quality of service (QoS). To address this issue, a topology control with energy balance, namely TCEB, is proposed for UWSN to overcome time-delay and other interference, as well as make the entire network load balance. With the given underwater network model and its specialized energy consumption model, we introduce the non-cooperative-game-based scheme to select the nodes with better performance as the cluster-heads. Afterwards, the intra-cluster and inter-cluster topology construction are, respectively, to form the effective communication links of the intra-cluster and inter-cluster, which aim to build energy-efficient topology to reduce energy consumption. With the demonstration of the simulation, the results show the proposed TCEB has better performance on energy-efficiency and throughput than three other representative algorithms in complex underwater environments.
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Girão, Luis Miguel. "Cooperation Game." Digital Creativity 19, no. 3 (September 2008): 214–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14626260802422498.
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Keser, Tetiana Rybchenko. "The Training of the Fufure Teachers of Ukrainian Language and Literature by Means of Interactive Studying Techniques." Professional Education: Methodology, Theory and Technologies, no. 11 (June 25, 2020): 248–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.31470/2415-3729-2020-11-248-269.
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The article focuses on the theoretical and methodological aspects of the use of interactive learning and its advantages over traditional learning. The use of interactive learning in both secondary and higher education is analyzed. The research goal is to theoretically substantiate and highlight the introduction of methods of the model of training future Ukrainian language and literature teachers by means of interactive learning technologies, as well as to determine the factors of their choice. The main research methods used were analysis, generalization and modeling, observation, synthesis, systematization. The results of the conducted research allowed the author to reveal the qualities that a future teacher of Ukrainian language and literature should possess; to describe some pedagogical problems of training the future teachers of Ukrainian language and literature by means of interactive learning technologies.The benefit of this study is the defined content of interactive learning, which is believed to be a specially organized comfortable mutual learning of participants of the educational process as equal its subjects, which provides for their continuous active interaction, during which each of the students realizes and reflects all its knowledge and actions, feels successful and intellectually capable. The author identified such interactive learning methods of the model of training future teachers of Ukrainian language and literature in higher education institutions as: trainings, educational discussions; game technologies; interactive lectures: problem lectures, lecture-visualization, binary lecture, lecture-press conference, round table, cases, brainstorming. Moreover, the most used interactive learning methods of training future teachers of Ukrainian language and literature in universities are given and theoretically grounded; they are training, discussion, role playimg, method of «Spoiled phone», method of «remote project work Minecraft», «Сourt hearing», «Augmented reality», use of presentations. The author highlights their introduction into the work of the National Pedagogical Dragomanov University, states the positive aspects of interactive learning compared to classical one, determines seven factors for the choice of methods. As a result the author makes a conclusion that the use of interactive technologies not only contributes to the creation of an atmosphere of cooperation and mutual understanding in the educational institution, but also implements the basic principles of personality-oriented learning.
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MacRae, Sinclair A. "The Cooperation Game." Teaching Philosophy 37, no. 2 (2014): 153–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/teachphil20144212.
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Muñoz, Verónica, Pere Lavega, Jorge Serna, Unai Sáez de Ocáriz, and Jaume March. "Estados de ánimo al jugar en solitario o en cooperación: dos vivencias motrices y afectivas desiguales." Anales de Psicología 33, no. 1 (December 28, 2016): 196. http://dx.doi.org/10.6018/analesps.33.1.233301.
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<span style="font-family: 'Garamond',serif; font-size: 8pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA;" lang="EN-US">This study analyzed the effect of the variables: </span><span style="font-family: 'Garamond',serif; font-size: 8pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ansi-language: ES-TRAD; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA;" lang="ES-TRAD">game type (individual or cooperative),</span><span style="font-family: 'Garamond',serif; font-size: 8pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA;" lang="EN-US"> competition, gender, students' association type and </span><span style="font-family: 'Garamond',serif; font-size: 8pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ansi-language: ES-TRAD; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA;" lang="ES-TRAD">beginning-end</span><span style="font-family: 'Garamond',serif; font-size: 8pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA;" lang="EN-US"> of the session on the university students' moods. 201 Physical Education college students participated. After having received an initial instruction concerning moods, participants executed 2 sessions </span><span style="font-family: 'Garamond',serif; font-size: 8pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ansi-language: ES-TRAD; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA;" lang="ES-TRAD">involving cooperative games and 2 individual games. The POMS scale was filled in both at the beginning and at the end of each session. The data were analyzed using generalized estimating equations. Among the main findings, we can point out that positive emotional states increase significantly when cooperative games are applied, with competition. Negative moods are more present in individual games, with no competition, when practiced by men and when they are organized in separate groups.</span><span style="font-family: 'Garamond',serif; font-size: 8pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: SimSun; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ansi-language: ES-TRAD; mso-fareast-language: ZH-CN; mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-font-kerning: 1.5pt;" lang="ES-TRAD">All these factors contribute towards knowing the influence of play on the training of the future teachers of a modern physical education, in which there is the intention of promoting such important aspects as socioemotional well-being and co-education.</span>
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De Dreu, Carsten K. W., Jörg Gross, Zsombor Méder, Michael Giffin, Eliska Prochazkova, Jonathan Krikeb, and Simon Columbus. "In-group defense, out-group aggression, and coordination failures in intergroup conflict." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 113, no. 38 (September 6, 2016): 10524–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1605115113.
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Intergroup conflict persists when and because individuals make costly contributions to their group’s fighting capacity, but how groups organize contributions into effective collective action remains poorly understood. Here we distinguish between contributions aimed at subordinating out-groups (out-group aggression) from those aimed at defending the in-group against possible out-group aggression (in-group defense). We conducted two experiments in which three-person aggressor groups confronted three-person defender groups in a multiround contest game (n = 276; 92 aggressor–defender contests). Individuals received an endowment from which they could contribute to their group’s fighting capacity. Contributions were always wasted, but when the aggressor group’s fighting capacity exceeded that of the defender group, the aggressor group acquired the defender group’s remaining resources (otherwise, individuals on both sides were left with the remainders of their endowment). In-group defense appeared stronger and better coordinated than out-group aggression, and defender groups survived roughly 70% of the attacks. This low success rate for aggressor groups mirrored that of group-hunting predators such as wolves and chimpanzees (n = 1,382 cases), hostile takeovers in industry (n = 1,637 cases), and interstate conflicts (n = 2,586). Furthermore, whereas peer punishment increased out-group aggression more than in-group defense without affecting success rates (Exp. 1), sequential (vs. simultaneous) decision-making increased coordination of collective action for out-group aggression, doubling the aggressor’s success rate (Exp. 2). The relatively high success rate of in-group defense suggests evolutionary and cultural pressures may have favored capacities for cooperation and coordination when the group goal is to defend, rather than to expand, dominate, and exploit.
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Marini, Dianna, Wietske Medema, Jan Adamowski, Samuel Veissière, Igor Mayer, and Arjen Wals. "Socio-Psychological Perspectives on the Potential for Serious Games to Promote Transcendental Values in IWRM Decision-Making." Water 10, no. 8 (August 17, 2018): 1097. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/w10081097.
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Modern day challenges of water resource management involve difficult decision-making in the face of increasing complexity and uncertainty. However, even if all decision-makers possessed perfect knowledge, water management decisions ultimately involve competing values, which will only get more prominent with increasing scarcity and competition over resources. Therefore, an important normative goal for water management is long-term cooperation between stakeholders. According to the principles of integrated water resource management (IWRM), this necessitates that managerial decisions support social equity and intergenerational equity (social equity that spans generations). The purpose of this discussion is to formulate preliminary recommendations for the design of serious games (SGs), a potential learning tool that may give rise to shared values and engage stakeholders with conflicting interests to cooperate towards a common goal. Specifically, this discussion explores whether SGs could promote values that transcend self-interest (transcendental values), based on the contributions of social psychology. The discussion is organized in the following way. First, an introduction is provided as to why understanding values from psychological perspectives is both important for water management and a potential avenue for learning in SGs. Second, a review of the description of values and mechanisms of value change from the field of social psychology is presented. This review highlights key psychological constraints to learning or applying values. Based on this review, recommendations are made for SGs designers to consider when developing games for water management, in order to promote transcendental values. Overall, the main conclusions from exploring the potential of value change for IWRM through SGs design are as follows: 1-SGs design needs to consider how all values change systematically; 2-SGs design should incorporate the many value conflicts that are faced in real life water management, 3-SGs could potentially promote learning by having players reflect on the reasoning behind value priorities across water management situations, and 4-value change ought to be tested in an iterative SGs design process using the Schwartz’s Value Survey (SVS) (or something akin to it).
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Jervis, Robert. "Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation." World Politics 40, no. 3 (April 1988): 317–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2010216.
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AbstractRecent work has focused on the problem of how states cooperate in the environment of anarchy. Linked to the ideas of the Prisoners' Dilemma and public goods, that work has provided important insights and lines of research. But it also has problems and limitations, which are explored in the paper. The anarchy approach stresses individual actors' choices and slights questions of how issues are posed and constrained. It takes preferences as given without exploring either the frequency of PD situations or the ways in which preferences are formed and can change. Many of the concepts the framework uses—e.g., cooperation and defection, the distinction between offense and defense, and the nature of power—are problematical. Issues of beliefs, perceptions, norms, and values also lead to a different perspective on cooperation.
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Nakonechna, M., and M. Papucha. "INTERSUBJECT COOPERATION IN GAME SITUATIONS." Psychology and Personality, no. 1 (May 20, 2019): 226–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.33989/2226-4078.2019.1.164020.
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The article analyses a problem of empiric data mining related to psychological features of intersubject cooperation. It is specified that the reliable methodological basis of scientific search is an important pre-condition of empiric research efficiency in intersubject co-operation psychology. It is argued that intersubject co- operation must be studied by psychological science as fundamentally different domain from phenomenology of a separate individual. It is justified that exactly in cultural-historical psychology there is the foundation for cognition of consciousness of man, psychical life of man, and thus - and to the world of mutual relations of people, and phenomenon of intersubjetness. It is proven that by means of various concepts and ideas, introduced by L. S. Vygotsky (proximal development zone, interiorization, theory of experiencing, psychology of instruments and signs, correlation of sense and value), we can have deeper understanding of intersubject co-operation as specifically human type of interaction, aimed at development of agency and connections of a person with the world, other people and his/her inner self. Research of intersubject cooperation is described by means of modified checkers game. The main hypothesis of experimental research is that intersubjectly modified variant of checkers will display fundamentally different psychological features of cooperation, related to strategies of collaboration, positive emotional experiencing and taking into account points of view of the other human being. The article proves that intersubject cooperation is a specific modality of interaction, which in a situation of playing activity can be characterized by orientation on the common aim and cooperative strategies. Authors specify, that strategies of collaboration within intersubject gaming cooperation are various enough, from strictly rationalized to highly emotional. The accounting of other person’s position was demonstrated in many behavioral and verbal acts during sessions of intersubject variant of checkers game. To achieve common result participants had to operate coherently, that needed positions of the other participant to be taken into account. Intersubject variant of checkers became a heuristic research model, using which we made a step forward to deeper understanding of psychological essence of agency.
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PETROSYAN, LEON. "STRATEGICALLY SUPPORTED COOPERATION." International Game Theory Review 10, no. 04 (December 2008): 471–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198908002059.
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An n-person differential game Γ(x, T-t) with independent motions from the initial state x and with prescribed duration T - t is considered. Suppose that y(s) is the cooperative trajectory maximizing the sum of players' payoffs. Suppose also that before starting the game players agree to divide the joint maximal payoff V(x, T - t; N) according to the imputation α, which is considered as a solution of a cooperative version of the game Γ(x, T - t). Using individual rationality of the imputation α we prove that if in the game Γ(y(s),T - s) along the cooperative trajectory y(s), the solution will be derived from the imputation α with the use of the imputation distribution procedure (IDP), for each given ε > 0 there exists ε-Nash equilibrium in Γ(x, T - t) for which the payoffs of the players in the game will be equal exactly to the components of the imputation α (cooperative outcome). This means that the imputation α is strategically supported by some specially constructed ε-Nash equilibrium in Γ(x, T - t). A similar result is true for a discrete game with perfect information.
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Thigale, Prof M. H. "Self-Organized Cooperation in Swarm Robotics." International Journal for Research in Applied Science and Engineering Technology V, no. XI (November 14, 2017): 361–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.22214/ijraset.2017.11053.
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Zvekic, Ugljesa. "International Cooperation and Transnational Organized Crime." Proceedings of the ASIL Annual Meeting 90 (1996): 541–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0272503700087061.
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Ducatelle, Frederick, Gianni A. Di Caro, Carlo Pinciroli, and Luca M. Gambardella. "Self-organized cooperation between robotic swarms." Swarm Intelligence 5, no. 2 (March 18, 2011): 73–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11721-011-0053-0.
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Matskevich, Igor M. "The Experience of the International Cooperation in Organized Crime Combating." Legal education and science 11 (November 19, 2020): 4–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.18572/1813-1190-2020-11-4-8.
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Purpose. Explore the experience of international cooperation against organized crime and identify key positions for improving Russia’s interaction with other countries in this area. Methodology: the basic method of the presented scientific research was the comparative legal method, within the framework of which a diachronic and synchronous, normative and functional comparison of the experience of cooperation in the fight against organized crime was carried out. Conclusions. 1. Without international cooperation, success in the fight against organized crime is impossible. 2. The legal basis for international cooperation in the fight against organized crime is the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime of November 15, 2000. 3. An important component of international cooperation in this area is the relevant international organizations: a) UN Office on Drugs and Crime; b) Interpol; c) Europol. 4. Proposals for international cooperation in combating organized crime, which are enshrined in the corresponding US Strategy, are of interest. 5. For Russian law enforcement agencies, the overall coordination of their efforts in international cooperation is of great importance. Scientific and practical significance. The conclusions contained in the article are of practical importance for analyzing the effectiveness of international cooperation in the fight against organized crime.
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Li, Rui, Neng Gang Xie, Rui Meng, and Gang Xu. "Cooperation Research on Zero-Sum Game." Applied Mechanics and Materials 44-47 (December 2010): 3338–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.44-47.3338.
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The current studies have shown the necessary condition for cooperation is that cost must be less than benefit and there is no cooperation for zero-sum game in which cost is equal to benefit. Here we design a game model of Parrondo’s Paradox in a biological group, which embodies two kinds of game relationships between individual survival and evolution process: 1) the zero-sum game between individuals is called game A. Game A reflects the competition-cooperation relationship between individuals and we set up six kinds of behaviors, such as cooperation, competition, inaction, harmony, matthew and poor-competition-rich-cooperation; 2)the negative-sum game between individuals and environments is called game B. Game B is divided into two branches with different winning probability according to divisibility relations between the total capital and modulus called M. The results of computer simulation and analysis to game A and game B show that: 1) All manner of cooperation and competition behaviors are the adaptive behaviors .2) Harmony behavior has a low social efficiency and lower average fitness of the population, but it is fair and has a high proportion of population viability, equitable distribution of individual fitness.3) Matthew behavior will lead to individual fitness distribution of the population to a extreme imbalance and bring about a Matthew effect which means " Strong individual has always been strong and the weak individual has always been weak". Matthew approach has a lower proportion of the population living. 4) poor-competition-rich-cooperation behavior has the best adaptability, so cooperation of zero-sum game may be carried out by poor-competition-rich-cooperation behavior.
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Hirsch, Moshe. "Game Theory and International Environmental Cooperation." Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law 27, no. 3 (August 2009): 503–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02646811.2009.11435226.
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Su, Qi, Alex McAvoy, Long Wang, and Martin A. Nowak. "Evolutionary dynamics with game transitions." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 116, no. 51 (November 26, 2019): 25398–404. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1908936116.
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The environment has a strong influence on a population’s evolutionary dynamics. Driven by both intrinsic and external factors, the environment is subject to continual change in nature. To capture an ever-changing environment, we consider a model of evolutionary dynamics with game transitions, where individuals’ behaviors together with the games that they play in one time step influence the games to be played in the next time step. Within this model, we study the evolution of cooperation in structured populations and find a simple rule: Weak selection favors cooperation over defection if the ratio of the benefit provided by an altruistic behavior, b, to the corresponding cost, c, exceedsk−k′, where k is the average number of neighbors of an individual andk′captures the effects of the game transitions. Even if cooperation cannot be favored in each individual game, allowing for a transition to a relatively valuable game after mutual cooperation and to a less valuable game after defection can result in a favorable outcome for cooperation. In particular, small variations in different games being played can promote cooperation markedly. Our results suggest that simple game transitions can serve as a mechanism for supporting prosocial behaviors in highly connected populations.
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Brayko, Carolyn A., Ramona A. Houmanfar, and Elizabeth L. Ghezzi. "Organized Cooperation: a Behavioral Perspective on Volunteerism." Behavior and Social Issues 25, no. 1 (May 2016): 77–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.5210/bsi.v25i0.6739.
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Park, Sangmin, and Hyeong-Chai Jeong. "Emergence of cooperation with self-organized criticality." Journal of the Korean Physical Society 60, no. 3 (February 2012): 311–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.3938/jkps.60.311.
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KORTSHA, G. X. "Scientific Cooperation Between Industry and Organized Labor." American Industrial Hygiene Association Journal 48, no. 12 (December 1987): 980–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15298668791385949.
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Wang, Zhe, Hong Yao, Jun Du, Xingzhao Peng, and Chao Ding. "Snowdrift Game on Topologically Alterable Complex Networks." Mathematical Problems in Engineering 2015 (2015): 1–5. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2015/361270.
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In order to study the influence of network’s structure on cooperation level of repeated snowdrift game, in the frame of two kinds of topologically alterable network models, the relation between the cooperation density and the topological parameters was researched. The results show that the network’s cooperation density is correlated reciprocally with power-law exponent and positively with average clustering coefficient; in other words, the more homogenous and less clustered a network, the lower the network’s cooperation level; and the relation between average degree and cooperation density is nonmonotonic; when the average degree deviates from the optimal value, the cooperation density drops.
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KOZLOVSKAYA, NADEZHDA, and NIKOLAY ZENKEVICH. "STABLE COOPERATION UNDER ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTRAINTS." International Game Theory Review 12, no. 04 (December 2010): 453–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198910002775.
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A game-theoretic model of territorial environmental production under Cournot competition is studied. The process is modeled as cooperative differential game. The stable distribution mechanism of the common cooperative benefit among players is proposed. We proved that the cooperative total stock of accumulated pollution is strictly less then the pollution under Nash equilibrium for the whole duration of the game. We design a stable Shapley value as a cooperative solution, which is time-consistent. The Shapley value is also strategic stable and satisfies the irrational-behavior-proofness condition. The numerical example is given.
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Blume, Andreas, John Duffy, and Ted Temzelides. "Self-organized criticality in a dynamic game." Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 34, no. 8 (August 2010): 1380–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2010.04.002.
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WANG, LIN-GANG, NENG-GANG XIE, GANG XU, CHAO WANG, YUN CHEN, and YE YE. "GAME-MODEL RESEARCH ON COOPETITION BEHAVIOR OF PARRONDO'S PARADOX BASED ON NETWORK." Fluctuation and Noise Letters 10, no. 01 (March 2011): 77–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219477511000417.
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The paper devises a Parrondo's game model of biotic population with the network as its spatial carrier, trying to analyze individual's coopetition behavior and investigate the degree distribution of the heterogeneity on the impact of coopetition. The populational Parrondo's game model consists of a zero-sum game among individuals and a negative sum game between individuals and environment. In terms of relations of zero-sum game, four patterns are defined: cooperation, competition, harmony, and poor-competition-rich-cooperation. The simulation result shows that: (1) Cooperation and competition in any forms are adaptive behaviors. Cooperative and competitive behavior could convert the losing games combined into winning. The positive average fitness of the population represents the paradoxical feature that the Parrondo's game is counterintuitive. (2) BA Network is conducive to cooperation. (3) The relationships of individual fitness with node degree and with clustering coefficient are disclosed. As for cooperation and poor-competition-rich-cooperation pattern, the greater the node degree is, the greater the individual fitness is. (4) The heterogeneity has a positive impact on cooperation. (5) Population average fitness is the largest when the probability of playing zero-sum game is 1/3 in the Parrondo's game model.
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Cui, Guang-Hai, Zhen Wang, Yan-Cun Yang, Sheng-Wen Tian, and Jun Yue. "Heterogeneous game resource distributions promote cooperation in spatial prisoner’s dilemma game." Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 490 (January 2018): 1191–200. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.physa.2017.08.079.
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