Relevant bibliographies by topics / Game organized as cooperation

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  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Books
  4. Book chapters
  5. Conference papers
  6. Reports

Academic literature on the topic 'Game organized as cooperation'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 28 June 2021
Last updated: 4 February 2022

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Journal articles on the topic "Game organized as cooperation"

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Tan, Shaolin. "Proximity inheritance explains the evolution of cooperation under natural selection and mutation." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 286, no. 1902 (May 2019): 20190690. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2019.0690.

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In this paper, a mechanism called proximity inheritance is introduced in the birth–death process of a networked population involving the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Different from the traditional birth–death process, in the proposed model, players are distributed in a spatial space and offspring is distributed in the neighbourhood of its parents. That is, offspring inherits not only the strategy but also the proximity of its parents. In this coevolutionary game model, a cooperative neighbourhood gives more neighbouring cooperative offspring and a defective neighbourhood gives more neighbouring defective offspring, leading to positive feedback among cooperative interactions. It is shown that with the help of proximity inheritance, natural selection will favour cooperation over defection under various conditions, even in the presence of mutation. Furthermore, the coevolutionary dynamics could lead to self-organized substantial network clustering, which promotes an assortment of cooperative interactions. This study provides a new insight into the evolutionary mechanism of cooperation in the absence of social attributions such as reputation and punishment.
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Andrade-Lotero, Edgar, and Robert L. Goldstone. "Self-organized division of cognitive labor." PLOS ONE 16, no. 7 (July 19, 2021): e0254532. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0254532.

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Often members of a group benefit from dividing the group’s task into separate components, where each member specializes their role so as to accomplish only one of the components. While this division of labor phenomenon has been observed with respect to both manual and cognitive labor, there is no clear understanding of the cognitive mechanisms allowing for its emergence, especially when there are multiple divisions possible and communication is limited. Indeed, maximization of expected utility often does not differentiate between alternative ways in which individuals could divide labor. We developed an iterative two-person game in which there are multiple ways of dividing labor, but in which it is not possible to explicitly negotiate a division. We implemented the game both as a human experimental task and as a computational model. Our results show that the majority of human dyads can finish the game with an efficient division of labor. Moreover, we fitted our computational model to the behavioral data, which allowed us to explain how the perceived similarity between a player’s actions and the task’s focal points guided the players’ choices from one round to the other, thus bridging the group dynamics and its underlying cognitive process. Potential applications of this model outside cognitive science include the improvement of cooperation in human groups, multi-agent systems, as well as human-robot collaboration.
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Bear, Adam, and David G. Rand. "Intuition, deliberation, and the evolution of cooperation." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 113, no. 4 (January 11, 2016): 936–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1517780113.

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Humans often cooperate with strangers, despite the costs involved. A long tradition of theoretical modeling has sought ultimate evolutionary explanations for this seemingly altruistic behavior. More recently, an entirely separate body of experimental work has begun to investigate cooperation’s proximate cognitive underpinnings using a dual-process framework: Is deliberative self-control necessary to reign in selfish impulses, or does self-interested deliberation restrain an intuitive desire to cooperate? Integrating these ultimate and proximate approaches, we introduce dual-process cognition into a formal game-theoretic model of the evolution of cooperation. Agents play prisoner’s dilemma games, some of which are one-shot and others of which involve reciprocity. They can either respond by using a generalized intuition, which is not sensitive to whether the game is one-shot or reciprocal, or pay a (stochastically varying) cost to deliberate and tailor their strategy to the type of game they are facing. We find that, depending on the level of reciprocity and assortment, selection favors one of two strategies: intuitive defectors who never deliberate, or dual-process agents who intuitively cooperate but sometimes use deliberation to defect in one-shot games. Critically, selection never favors agents who use deliberation to override selfish impulses: Deliberation only serves to undermine cooperation with strangers. Thus, by introducing a formal theoretical framework for exploring cooperation through a dual-process lens, we provide a clear answer regarding the role of deliberation in cooperation based on evolutionary modeling, help to organize a growing body of sometimes-conflicting empirical results, and shed light on the nature of human cognition and social decision making.
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KUŁAKOWSKI, KRZYSZTOF. "COOPERATION AND DEFECTION IN GHETTO." International Journal of Modern Physics C 17, no. 02 (February 2006): 287–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0129183106009151.

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We consider ghetto as a community of people ruled against their will by an external power. Members of the community feel that their laws are broken. However, attempts to leave ghetto makes their situation worse. We discuss the relation of the ghetto inhabitants to the ruling power in context of their needs, organized according to the Maslow hierarchy. Decisions how to satisfy successive needs are undertaken in cooperation with or defection the ruling power. This issue allows to construct the tree of decisions and to adopt the pruning technique from the game theory. Dynamics of decisions can be described within the formalism of fundamental equations. The result is that the strategy of defection is stabilized by the estimated payoff.
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Akiyama, Eizo, and Kunihiko Kaneko. "Evolution of Cooperation, Differentiation, Complexity, and Diversity in an Iterated Three-Person Game." Artificial Life 2, no. 3 (April 1995): 293–304. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/artl.1995.2.3.293.

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A nonzero-sum three-person coalition game is presented to study the evolution of complexity and diversity in cooperation, where the population dynamics of players with strategies is given according to their scores in the iterated game and mutations. Two types of differentiation emerge initially: a biased one to classes and a temporal one to change their roles for coalition. Rules to change the hands are self-organized in a society through evolution. The coevolution of diversity and complexity of strategies and interactions (or communications) are found at later stages of the simulation. Relevance of our results to the biological society is briefly discussed.
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SCHWEITZER, FRANK, LAXMIDHAR BEHERA, and HEINZ MÜHLENBEIN. "EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION IN A SPATIAL PRISONER'S DILEMMA." Advances in Complex Systems 05, no. 02n03 (June 2002): 269–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219525902000584.

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We investigate the spatial distribution and the global frequency of agents who can either cooperate or defect. The agent interaction is described by a deterministic, non-iterated prisoner's dilemma game, further each agent only locally interacts with his neighbors. Based on a detailed analysis of the local payoff structures we derive critical conditions for the invasion or the spatial coexistence of cooperators and defectors. These results are concluded in a phase diagram that allows us to identify five regimes, each characterized by a distinct spatiotemporal dynamics and a corresponding final spatial structure. In addition to the complete invasion of defectors, we find coexistence regimes with either a majority of cooperators in large spatial domains, or a minority of cooperators organized in small non-stationary domains or in small clusters. The analysis further allowed a verification of computer simulation results by Nowak and May (1993). Eventually, we present simulation results of a true 5-person game on a lattice. This modification leads to non-uniform spatial interactions that may even enhance the effect of cooperation.
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Liu, Yongkui, Xiaojie Chen, Lin Zhang, Fei Tao, and Long Wang. "Social selection of game organizers promotes cooperation in spatial public goods games." EPL (Europhysics Letters) 102, no. 5 (June 1, 2013): 50006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1209/0295-5075/102/50006.

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Tomassini, Marco, and Alberto Antonioni. "Computational Behavioral Models for Public Goods Games on Social Networks." Games 10, no. 3 (September 2, 2019): 35. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g10030035.

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Cooperation is a fundamental aspect of well-organized societies and public good games are a useful metaphor for modeling cooperative behavior in the presence of strong incentives to free ride. Usually, social agents interact to play a public good game through network structures. Here, we use social network structures and computational agent rules inspired by recent experimental work in order to develop models of agent behavior playing public goods games. The results of our numerical simulations based on a couple of simple models show that agents behave in a manner qualitatively similar to what has been observed experimentally. Computational models such as those presented here are very useful to interpret observed behavior and to enhance computationally the limited variation that is possible in the experimental domain. By assuming a priori reasonable individual behaviors, the easiness of running simulations could also facilitate exploration prior to any experimental work in order to vary and estimate a number of key parameters that would be very difficult, if not impossible, to change during the actual experiment.
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Enkhbat, R. "A Note on Anti-Berge Equilibrium for Bimatrix Game." Bulletin of Irkutsk State University. Series Mathematics 36 (2021): 3–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.26516/1997-7670.2021.36.3.

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Game theory plays an important role in applied mathematics, economics and decision theory. There are many works devoted to game theory. Most of them deals with a Nash equilibrium. A global search algorithm for finding a Nash equilibrium was proposed in [13]. Also, the extraproximal and extragradient algorithms for the Nash equilibrium have been discussed in [3]. Berge equilibrium is a model of cooperation in social dilemmas, including the Prisoner’s Dilemma games [15]. The Berge equilibrium concept was introduced by the French mathematician Claude Berge [5] for coalition games. The first research works of Berge equilibrium were conducted by Vaisman and Zhukovskiy [18; 19]. A method for constructing a Berge equilibrium which is Pareto-maximal with respect to all other Berge equilibriums has been examined in Zhukovskiy [10]. Also, the equilibrium was studied in [16] from a view point of differential games. Abalo and Kostreva [1; 2] proved the existence theorems for pure-strategy Berge equilibrium in strategic-form games of differential games. Nessah [11] and Larbani, Tazdait [12] provided with a new existence theorem. Applications of Berge equilibrium in social science have been discussed in [6; 17]. Also, the work [7] deals with an application of Berge equilibrium in economics. Connection of Nash and Berge equilibriums has been shown in [17]. Most recently, the Berge equilibrium was examined in Enkhbat and Batbileg [14] for Bimatrix game with its nonconvex optimization reduction. In this paper, inspired by Nash and Berge equilibriums, we introduce a new notion of equilibrium so-called Anti-Berge equilibrium. The main goal of this paper is to examine Anti-Berge equilibrium for bimatrix game. The work is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the existence of Anti-Berge equilibrium in a bimatrix game for mixed strategies. In Section 3, an optimization formulation of Anti-Berge equilibrium has been formulated.
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Kifokeris, Dimosthenis, and Yiannis Xenidis. "Game Theory-Based Minimization of the Ostracism Risk in Construction Companies." Sustainability 13, no. 12 (June 8, 2021): 6545. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su13126545.

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Strategic and managemerial decision-making in an organization can have a crucial effect for the whole entity; however, it rarely involves the organization’s employees evenly at the different organizational levels. The result is—what is addressed in this paper as—the ostracism risk, namely the risk accruing from the lack of satisfaction of underprivileged employees’ groups during the decision-making process. The ostracism risk could jeopardize the organization’s integrity and therefore requires effective treatment. This paper aims at verifying a conceptual approach, which is proposed as a methodology for assessing the probability of organizational cooperation when deciding under risk, thus minimizing ostracism risk. The proposed approach is based on organizational and human resources management (HRM) theories and is contextualized for construction through the understanding of systems theory. The proposed methodology presents a potential modelling via game theory of a medium-sized construction company that is organized according to Mintzberg’s organizational model. The utilization of the bounded Pareto distribution is presented as an approach of the model’s probabilistic processing, and the potential for estimating the probabilities to adopt a favorable cooperational decision is verified. The paper concludes with the reference to the next steps required for the methodology’s validation and further improvement.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Game organized as cooperation"

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Mahmoodi, Korosh. "Emergence of Cooperation and Homeodynamics as a Result of Self Organized Temporal Criticality: From Biology to Physics." Thesis, University of North Texas, 2018. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc1248467/.

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This dissertation is an attempt at establishing a bridge between biology and physics leading naturally from the field of phase transitions in physics to the cooperative nature of living systems. We show that this aim can be realized by supplementing the current field of evolutionary game theory with a new form of self-organized temporal criticality. In the case of ordinary criticality, the units of a system choosing either cooperation or defection under the influence of the choices done by their nearest neighbors, undergo a significant change of behavior when the intensity of social influence has a critical value. At criticality, the behavior of the individual units is correlated with that of all other units, in addition to the behavior of the nearest neighbors. The spontaneous transition to criticality of this work is realized as follows: the units change their behavior (defection or cooperation) under the social influence of their nearest neighbors and update the intensity of their social influence spontaneously by the feedback they get from the payoffs of the game (environment). If units, which are selfish, get higher benefit with respect to their previous play, they increase their interest to interact with other units and vice versa. Doing this, the behavior of single units and the whole system spontaneously evolve towards criticality, thereby realizing a global behavior favoring cooperation. In the case when the interacting units are oscillators with their own periodicity, homeodynamics concerns, the individual payoff is the synchronization with the nearest neighbors (i.e., lowering the energy of the system), the spontaneous transition to criticality generates fluctuations characterized by the joint action of periodicity and crucial events of the same kind as those revealed by the current analysis of the dynamics of the brain. This result is expected to explain the efficiency of enzyme catalyzers, on the basis of a new non-equilibrium statistical physics. We argue that the results obtained apply to sociological and psychological systems as well as to elementary biological systems.
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Angus, Simon Douglas Economics Australian School of Business UNSW. "Economic networks: communication, cooperation & complexity." Awarded by:University of New South Wales. Economics, 2007. http://handle.unsw.edu.au/1959.4/27005.

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This thesis is concerned with the analysis of economic network formation. There are three novel sections to this thesis (Chapters 5, 6 and 8). In the first, the non-cooperative communication network formation model of Bala and Goyal (2000) (BG) is re-assessed under conditions of no inertia. It is found that the Strict Nash circle (or wheel) structure is still the equilibrium outcome for n = 3 under no inertia. However, a counter-example for n = 4 shows that with no inertia infinite cycles are possible, and hence the system does not converge. In fact, cycles are found to quickly dominate outcomes for n > 4 and further numerical simulations of conditions approximating no inertia (probability of updating > 0.8 to 1) indicate that cycles account for a dramatic slowing of convergence times. These results, together with the experimental evidence of Falk and Kosfeld (2003) (FK) motivate the second contribution of this thesis. A novel artificial agent model is constructed that allows for a vast strategy space (including the Best Response) and permits agents to learn from each other as was indicated by the FK results. After calibration, this model replicates many of the FK experimental results and finds that an externality exploiting ratio of benefits and costs (rather than the difference) combined with a simple altruism score is a good proxy for the human objective function. Furthermore, the inequity aversion results of FK are found to arise as an emergent property of the system. The third novel section of this thesis turns to the nature of network formation in a trust-based context. A modified Iterated Prisoners' Dilemma (IPD) model is developed which enables agents to play an additional and costly network forming action. Initially, canonical analytical results are obtained despite this modification under uniform (non-local) interactions. However, as agent network decisions are 'turned on' persistent cooperation is observed. Furthermore, in contrast to the vast majority of non-local, or static network models in the literature, it is found that a-periodic, complex dynamics result for the system in the long-run. Subsequent analysis of this regime indicates that the network dynamics have fingerprints of self-organized criticality (SOC). Whilst evidence for SOC is found in many physical systems, such dynamics have been seldom, if ever, reported in the strategic interaction literature.
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Moritz, Ruby Louisa Viktoria. "Cooperation in self-organized heterogeneous swarms." Doctoral thesis, Universitätsbibliothek Leipzig, 2015. http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:15-qucosa-161633.

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Cooperation in self-organized heterogeneous swarms is a phenomenon from nature with many applications in autonomous robots. I specifically analyzed the problem of auto-regulated team formation in multi-agent systems and several strategies to learn socially how to make multi-objective decisions. To this end I proposed new multi-objective ranking relations and analyzed their properties theoretically and within multi-objective metaheuristics. The results showed that simple decision mechanism suffice to build effective teams of heterogeneous agents and that diversity in groups is not a problem but can increase the efficiency of multi-agent systems.
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Durmaz, Huseyin. "International police cooperation as a response to transnational organized crime in Europe: Improvements in extradition." Thesis, University of North Texas, 2005. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc4883/.

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International criminality has been a challenging phenomenon for national police forces for years. States have developed international police cooperation relations and extradition instruments in order to fight international criminal activity. This treatise explores the reasons for the rise in transnational organized crime activities in Europe and presents an in-depth explanation concerning the emergence, mandates, and structures of multilateral police collaboration systems such as Interpol, Trevi, Schengen, and Europol. Since the extradition has become an inseparable part of international policing, this study examines the improvements in extradition procedure and emphasizes the importance of extradition. Finally this study compares traditional (European Convention on Extradition of 1957) and new (European Arrest Warrant) extradition systems.
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Hannan, Joseph. "Formative Evaluation of a Family Cooperation Board Game." UKnowledge, 2017. http://uknowledge.uky.edu/hes_etds/50.

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A lack of credible evidence demonstrating the effectiveness of play therapy and the use of therapeutic board game in play therapy exists (Phillips, 2010; Matorin, 1996). Parent involvement is a key variable in the effectiveness of play therapy (Kottman, Stother, and Deniger, 2001). Formative research was used in this study to evaluate of The Super Family Board Game™ (SFBG) in order to develop an effective therapeutic board game aimed at enhancing family cooperation and cohesion. As the first formative evaluation of a therapeutic board game, this study provides future research implications for developing and testing therapeutic board games.
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Berger, Ulrich. "Simple scaling of cooperation in donor-recipient games." Elsevier, 2009. http://epub.wu.ac.at/5590/1/2009_BioSys.pdf.

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We present a simple argument which proves a general version of the scaling phenomenon recently observed in donor-recipient games by Tanimoto [Tanimoto, J., 2009. A simple scaling of the effectiveness of supporting mutual cooperation in donor-recipient games by various reciprocity mechanisms. BioSystems 96, 29-34].
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Ji, Zhu. "Game theoretical framework for cooperation in autonomous wireless networks." College Park, Md. : University of Maryland, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/1903/6728.

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Thesis (Ph. D.) -- University of Maryland, College Park, 2007.
Thesis research directed by: Electrical Engineering. Title from t.p. of PDF. Includes bibliographical references. Published by UMI Dissertation Services, Ann Arbor, Mich. Also available in paper.
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Cesario, Loryn Nicolle 1984. "Coalition Building and Cooperation Between Organized Labor and Immgrant Day Laborers in Portland, OR." Thesis, University of Oregon, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/1794/11490.

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xi, 87 p. : col. map
This project explores the factors contributing to and hindering coalition building and cooperation between immigrant day laborers and the building trade unions in Portland, Oregon. The research is based on interviews with local labor and worker center leaders and an examination of public records and media discourse. It draws from a theoretical framework informed by Stuart Hall, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe and their work on identity politics in new social movements. The research concludes that the lack of full success in this case was the result of a conflicting message that conveyed to workers that they shared a similar identity, while at the same time that they labored in separate industries. As a result, no shared identity was ever established and organized labor continued to view immigrant workers as outsiders.
Committee in charge: Daniel HoSang, Chairperson; Joseph Lowndes, Member; Daniel Tichenor, Member
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Galli, Filippo. "Market expansion and the co-opetition of criminal organizations in Italy." Master's thesis, NSBE - UNL, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10362/11760.

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A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics
A mafia modernization process will be addressed. That is the process by which the expansion growth into new territories coincided with a shift of objectives and interests of the mafia itself, which turned from being "traditional" to "entrepreneurial." Beside that we will examine the strategies adopted by the criminal organizations in order to successfully face the legal market and maintain at the same time a deep control over their home-regions.
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Kamhoua, Charles A. K. "Modeling Security and Cooperation in Wireless Networks Using Game Theory." FIU Digital Commons, 2011. http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd/436.

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This research involves the design, development, and theoretical demonstration of models resulting in integrated misbehavior resolution protocols for ad hoc networked devices. Game theory was used to analyze strategic interaction among independent devices with conflicting interests. Packet forwarding at the routing layer of autonomous ad hoc networks was investigated. Unlike existing reputation based or payment schemes, this model is based on repeated interactions. To enforce cooperation, a community enforcement mechanism was used, whereby selfish nodes that drop packets were punished not only by the victim, but also by all nodes in the network. Then, a stochastic packet forwarding game strategy was introduced. Our solution relaxed the uniform traffic demand that was pervasive in other works. To address the concerns of imperfect private monitoring in resource aware ad hoc networks, a belief-free equilibrium scheme was developed that reduces the impact of noise in cooperation. This scheme also eliminated the need to infer the private history of other nodes. Moreover, it simplified the computation of an optimal strategy. The belief-free approach reduced the node overhead and was easily tractable. Hence it made the system operation feasible. Motivated by the versatile nature of evolutionary game theory, the assumption of a rational node is relaxed, leading to the development of a framework for mitigating routing selfishness and misbehavior in Multi hop networks. This is accomplished by setting nodes to play a fixed strategy rather than independently choosing a rational strategy. A range of simulations was carried out that showed improved cooperation between selfish nodes when compared to older results. Cooperation among ad hoc nodes can also protect a network from malicious attacks. In the absence of a central trusted entity, many security mechanisms and privacy protections require cooperation among ad hoc nodes to protect a network from malicious attacks. Therefore, using game theory and evolutionary game theory, a mathematical framework has been developed that explores trust mechanisms to achieve security in the network. This framework is one of the first steps towards the synthesis of an integrated solution that demonstrates that security solely depends on the initial trust level that nodes have for each other.
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Books on the topic "Game organized as cooperation"

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Hart, Sergiu, and Andreu Mas-Colell, eds. Cooperation: Game-Theoretic Approaches. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-60454-6.

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Stjernquist, Per. Organized cooperation facing law: An anthropological study. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 2000.

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G8 against transnational organized crime. Aldershot, Hants, England: Ashgate, 2008.

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Transnational organized crime. New York, NY: Routledge, 2009.

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Mayberry, John P. Game-theoretic models of cooperation and conflict. Boulder: Westview, 1992.

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Game theory: Stochastics, information, strategies, and cooperation. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000.

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Rosenmüller, Joachim. Game theory: Stochastics, information, strategies, and cooperation. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000.

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Castle, Allan. Transnational organized crime and international security. Vancouver, B.C: Institute of International Relations, University of British Columbia, 1997.

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Game theory and international environmental cooperation: Essential readings. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2015.

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al- Taʻāwun al-amnī al-ʻArabī wa-mukāfaḥat al-ijrām al-munaẓam ʻabr al-al-waṭanī. al-Qāhirah: Maktabat al-Ādāb, 2005.

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Book chapters on the topic "Game organized as cooperation"

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Durlauf, Steven N., and Lawrence E. Blume. "Cooperation." In Game Theory, 66–77. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230280847_6.

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Tuomela, Raimo. "Cooperation and Cooperative Game Theory." In Cooperation, 195–211. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9594-0_7.

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Peña, Nieves Arranz, and Juan Carlos Fernández de Arroyabe. "Cooperation in Game Theory." In Business Cooperation, 57–73. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230554696_5.

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McClennen, Edward F. "Rethinking Rational Cooperation." In Game Theory, Experience, Rationality, 117–29. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1654-3_10.

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Greenberg, Joseph. "Situation Approach to Cooperation." In Cooperation: Game-Theoretic Approaches, 143–66. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-60454-6_12.

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Sorin, Sylvain. "Communication, Correlation and Cooperation." In Cooperation: Game-Theoretic Approaches, 199–218. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-60454-6_14.

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Neyman, Abraham. "Cooperation, Repetition, and Automata." In Cooperation: Game-Theoretic Approaches, 233–55. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-60454-6_16.

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Selten, Reinhard. "Descriptive Approaches to Cooperation." In Cooperation: Game-Theoretic Approaches, 289–328. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-60454-6_19.

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Hart, Sergiu. "Classical Cooperative Theory I: Core-Like Concepts." In Cooperation: Game-Theoretic Approaches, 35–42. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-60454-6_5.

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Hart, Sergiu, and Andreu Mas-Colell. "Introduction." In Cooperation: Game-Theoretic Approaches, 1–3. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-60454-6_1.

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Conference papers on the topic "Game organized as cooperation"

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Driouech, Safaa, Essaid Sabir, and Hamidou Tembine. "Self-organized device-to-device communications as a non-cooperative quitting game." In 2017 International Conference on Wireless Networks and Mobile Communications (WINCOM). IEEE, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/wincom.2017.8238170.

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Khaluf, Yara, Emi Mathews, and Franz J. Rammig. "Self-Organized Cooperation in Swarm Robotics." In 2011 IEEE International Symposium on Object/Component/Service-Oriented Real-Time Distributed Computing Workshops. IEEE, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/isorcw.2011.30.

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Caballero-Gil, P., J. Molina-Gil, C. Hernandez-Goya, and C. Caballero-Gil. "Stimulating cooperation in self-organized vehicular networks." In 2009 15th Asia-Pacific Conference on Communications (APCC). IEEE, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/apcc.2009.5375621.

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"IWAGPR 2005 Workshop is organized in cooperation with." In Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Advanced Ground Penetrating Radar, 2005. IWAGPR 2005. IEEE, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/agpr.2005.1487826.

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Mohamed, Maryhan M., Fatma A. Newagy, and Abdelhalim Zekry. "Energy efficient cooperation scheme for self-organized femtocells." In 2015 Tenth International Conference on Computer Engineering & Systems (ICCES). IEEE, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icces.2015.7393067.

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Pinheiro, Flavio, Vitor Vasconcelos, Francisco Santos, and Jorge Pacheco. "Self-organized game dynamics in complex networks." In European Conference on Artificial Life 2013. MIT Press, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.7551/978-0-262-31709-2-ch010.

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Li Hui Shang. "Self-organized Evolutionary Minority Game on Networks." In 2007 IEEE International Conference on Control and Automation. IEEE, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icca.2007.4376748.

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Li Hui Shang. "Self-organized Evolutionary Minority Game on Networks." In 2007 IEEE International Conference on Control and Automation. IEEE, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icca.2007.4376689.

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Yu, Wei, and K. J. Ray Liu. "Anti-attack cooperation stimulation in self-organized ad hoc networks." In GLOBECOM '05. IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference. IEEE, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/glocom.2005.1577948.

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Zhang, Diping. "Game Analysis on Retail Enterprises Cooperation." In 2010 International Conference on Management and Service Science (MASS 2010). IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icmss.2010.5577208.

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Reports on the topic "Game organized as cooperation"

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Keller, Jay, Laura Hill, Kristian Kiuru, Katrina M. Groth, Ethan Hecht, and Will James. HySafe research priorities workshop report Summary of the workshop organized in cooperation with US DOE and supported by EC JRC in Washington DC November 10-11 2014. Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), March 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/1431263.

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Keller, Jay, Laura Hill, Kristian Kiuru, Katrina M. Groth, Ethan Hecht, and Will James. HySafe research priorities workshop report Summary of the workshop organized in cooperation with US DOE and supported by EC JRC in Washington DC November 10-11 2014. Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), March 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/1561166.

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Ryazantsev, Sergey, and Tamara Rostovskaya. I Russian-Iranian Sociological Forum. Conference Proceedings (Moscow, 16 – 18 November 2020) / Eds.-in-chief S.V. Ryazantsev, T.K. Rostovskaya, FCTAS RAS. – M.:, 2020. – 560 p. ООО Издательско-торговый дом «ПЕРСПЕКТИВА», November 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.38085/978-5-905-790-45-4-2020-1-560.

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The collection contains conference papers of the participants of the I Russian-Iranian Sociological Forum, organized by the ISPR and IDR FCTAS RAS with the support from the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation (16 – 18 November 2020, Moscow). The collection is addressed to sociologists, political scientists, economists, students, postgraduates, teachers, and everyone who is interested in the development of international cooperation between Russia and Iran in the field of social sciences.
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Ryazantsev, Sergey, and Tamara Rostovskaya, eds. I Russian-Iranian Sociological Forum. Conference Proceedings (Moscow, 16 – 18 November 2020) / Eds.-in-chief S.V. Ryazantsev, T.K. Rostovskaya, FCTAS RAS. – M.:, 2020. – 560 p. Perspectiva Publishing, November 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.38085/978-5-905-790-47-8-2020-1-560.

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The collection contains conference papers of the participants of the I Russian-Iranian Sociological Forum, organized by the ISPR and IDR FCTAS RAS with the support from the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation (16 – 18 November 2020, Moscow). The collection is addressed to sociologists, political scientists, economists, students, postgraduates, teachers, and everyone who is interested in the development of international cooperation between Russia and Iran in the field of social sciences.
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Ischinger, Wolfgang, and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Mind the Gap: Priorities for Transatlantic China Policy – Report of the Distinguished Reflection Group on Transatlantic China Policy. Munich Security Conference, July 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.47342/gxwk1490.

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Today’s China presents fundamental challenges to the democracies of Europe and North America. Perspectives on China will continue to differ due to geography, economic exposure, perceptions, historical trajectories as well as foreign policy approaches. But there has been significant convergence among transatlantic partners. Today, areas of agreement are substantial and offer a solid basis for cooperation. What is needed is a pragmatic approach identifying joint action where possible and managing differences where necessary. This report proposes a transatlantic agenda aimed at achieving quick wins, with recommendations organized by seven issue areas.
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Muñoz Castillo, Raul, Glen Hearns, Denea Larissa Trejo, and Luis Pabon Zamora. Joined by Water (JbW): IDB's Transboundary Waters Program. Inter-American Development Bank, April 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0003201.

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This discussion paper scopes out the IDBs initiative to engage in transboundary waters (TW) projects in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). The document is organized into four sections: brief history and overview of the TWs approach; international evidence on TW cooperation; a diagnosis of the current situation of TW in LAC; and presents the strategy of the new IADB transboundary water program (Joined By Water) which aims at enhancing the governance and management of transboundary waters in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). The document has been prepared in consultation with multiple stakeholders related to transboundary waters issues in LAC.
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