Academic literature on the topic 'Freudian epistemology'

The writings of J.G. Ballard respond to the sciences in multiple ways; as such his (early) writing may productively be discussed as science fiction. However, the theoretical discipline to which he publicly signalled most allegiance, psychoanalysis, is one whose status in relation to science is highly contested and complex. In the 1960s Ballard signalled publicly in his non-fiction writing a belief in psychoanalysis as a science, a position in keeping with psychoanalysis’ contemporary status as the predominant psychological paradigm. Various early Ballard stories enact psychoanalytic theories, while the novel usually read as his serious debut, The Drowned World, aligns itself allusively with an oft-cited depiction by Freud of the revelatory and paradigm-changing nature of the psychoanalytic project. Ballard’s enthusiastic embrace of psychoanalysis in his early 1960s fiction mutated into a fascinatingly delirious vision in some of his most experimental work of the late 1960s and early 1970s of a fusion of psychoanalysis with the mathematical sciences. This paper explores how this ‘Marriage of Freud and Euclid’ is played out in its most systematic form in The Atrocity Exhibition and its successor Crash. By his late career Ballard was acknowledging problems raised over psychoanalysis’ scientific status in the positivist critique of Karl Popper and the work of various combatants in the ‘Freud Wars’ of the 1990s; Ballard at this stage seemed to move towards agreement with interpretations of Freud as a literary or philosophical figure. However, despite making pronouncements reflecting changes in dominant cultural appraisals of Freud, Ballard continued in his later writings to extrapolate the fictive and interpretative possibilities of Freudian and post-Freudian ideas. This article attempts to develop a deeper understanding of Ballard’s ‘scientific’ deployment of psychoanalysis in The Atrocity Exhibition and Crash within the context of a more fully culturally-situated understanding of psychoanalysis’ relationship to science, and thereby to create new possibilities for understanding the meanings of Ballard’s writing within culture at large.

In this article, I try to reconstitute the inchoative debate that took place between Ricœur and Grünbaum concerning the epistemology of Freudian psychoanalysis. The debate was more inchoative than effective because of its asymmetry (Grünbaum read and analyzed Ricœur, but the converse is far from certain). First, I will underline the originality of Ricœur’s theory of motivation (as a mix of reason and cause) and causality (teleological). Then, I will examine the rest of Grünbaum’s objections: the overvaluation of clinical relationship and language, the ontological specificity of psychical reality, the narrative originality of the psychoanalytical explanation and the status of symbol. I finally conclude by underlining the added value of the debate concerning the specificity o

Abstract This essay argues that reading involves a form of unconscious psychic work that has the potential to deeply affect and transform the reader. Recent discussions about the practice of reading shunned psychoanalysis because of its alleged reliance on a suspicious epistemology rooted in the Freudian-Lacanian framework. But object-relations theory offers an alternative paradigm, as Eve Sedgwick knew when she proposed the concept of “reparative reading.” This essay looks to post-Kleinian developments in psychoanalysis, in particular the work of Wilfred Bion and the contemporary Bionians, to describe reading as a creative, quasi-intersubjective process, constituted by the unique match of the psychic demands made by a text and a reader's ability to work with those demands.

AbstractPerhaps best known by us as an exceptionally astute and incisive apologist, C.S. Lewis also has much to say to serious Pentecostals about religious experience—a foundational value in Pentecostalism. Aware of and interacting with Freudian and Jungian religious psychology, Lewis agreed with Rudolf Otto that religious experience is essentially mysterious encounter with the Numinous, arguing that numinous encounter constitutes the seed of all real religious experience. At its core authentic religious experience is divine encounter characterized by ineffable awe in God’s presence. Lewis’ articulation of experience informs and enhances Pentecostal theology and spirituality appreciably in key areas of ontology, epistemology, and anthropology. Personal testimony affirms the reality and centrality for Pentecostals of encountering God’s presence in Spirit baptism, speaking in tongues, and other spiritual gifts or experiences, as well as in private prayer and public worship.

At the turn of the nineteenth century, when the Freudian paradigm took its first steps towards becoming a modern amalgam of science and hermeneutics, history was considered the most established and instrumental discipline in man's quest to endow his thinking and action with meaning. The kinship between the disciplines, which could be traced back to the persona of Freud, took many shapes in the course of the twentieth century. Examined in perspective one could maintain that modern historiography and psychoanalysis have travelled the same distance in moving away from philosophical idealism, have shared some of the illusions of militant positivism and are accustomed to evoke the same criticism due to their claim to half-scientific, half-artistic epistemology. We start by considering the intellectual legacies and theoretical foundations that shaped the two disciplines' perspective of each other. We then proceed to juxtapose several historical moments in the evolution of psychoanalysis and history. Turning our attention to several key concepts and tropes, which form part of the contemporary objectivity-subjectivity discourse, we try to sketch an outline for a psychoanalytically-informed theory of history.

AbstractIn the first two decades of the twentieth century, the figure of the adolescent (Jugendlicher) was introduced into public discourse in the German-speaking world. The adolescent soon became an epistemic object for the still loosely defined field of psychology. Actors in the slowly differentiating scientific field of youth psychology were primarily interested in the normal development of adolescent subjects and sought out new materials and methods to research the inner life of young people. In order to access this inner life, they turned to the interpretation of diaries and other self-descriptions. This article takes up the questions of how diaries were used in the scientific context of psychology, and how diary writing was psychologically interpreted and theorized. The theoretical and methodological contexts of psychological knowledge production grouped around the subject of the diary will be examined in keeping with Hans-Jörg Rheinberger’s concept of historical epistemology. This analysis is carried out by using the example of three central actors who were in conversation with each other during the 1920s and 1930s: the developmental psychologist Charlotte Bühler (1893–1974), the psychologist and founder of personalistic psychology William Stern (1871–1938), and the youth activist Siegfried Bernfeld (1892–1953), who was influenced by Freudian psychoanalysis.

The relational perspective of analysis is a way of looking at, practising, and understanding the whole of analysis—including psycho-analysis, group-analysis, and socio-analysis—rather than a specific school of psychoanalysis. Farhad Dalal’s excellent article describes the evolution of his thinking and practice, from a classical analytic stance to a relational conception of it. There are two ways of conceiving and practising psychoanalysis, which he calls ‘the analytic’ and ‘the relational’, derived from two contrasting conceptions of the world and of life. This generates a split between theory and practice in analysis. Some practitioners adhere to the classical view, but are actually relational in their practice; others have adopted relational theory, but maintain the detached scientific attitude of the classical Freudian analyst. Freud’s abandonment of the traumatic theory of neuroses had unconscious sources that determined the injunction for analysts not to be relational. Group analysis, on the other hand, has been relational from the beginning. S.H. Foulkes had a contradiction between his adherence to Freudian theory and the revolutionary aspects of his thinking and practice—what Dalal calls ‘radical Foulkes’. The hierarchical, detached, and emotionally closed off form of relating prescribed by classical analysis is anti-therapeutic. By contrast, the kind of therapeutic relation that Dalal strives to develop has connotations with engagement, reciprocity and mutuality, and may generate corrective emotional experiences. But human events are never fully explained or predictable, so that the corrective emotional experience is an occurrence, not a technique. The analyst works in a radical uncertainty and can only be guided by his intuition, which has then to be checked by rational critical analysis. This generates a dialectic tension between imagination and rigour, which must be kept and nursed, not solved. This corresponds to an analogical hermeneutic stance, which rejects both the dogmatic univocality of Modernism and the relativistic equivocality of Postmodernism. The analyst must respond with his whole being, and this being must be developed through a process of personality development, not training but formation (Bildung in German). This implies a particular epistemology, ontology, axiology, and ethics, a whole Weltanschauung and Lebensanschauung that includes the Golden Braid of thinking, feeling, and acting, on a basis of relating.

Freud’s momentous discovery that the largest part of mental life, both individual and collective is unknown to us and out of our control, brought about a major revolution in epistemology and our conception of the human being, but such evolution was stalled by Freud’s adherence to several assumptions that were an essential part of his Weltanschauung or ‘Conception of the World’. These were the individualistic paradigm and the misguided attempt to turn the discipline he had created into a positivistic science, framed in the model of the natural sciences. Orthodox psychoanalysis has since focused on the intrapsychic, leaving out the interpersonal and social dimensions. Group analysis, as introduced by Foulkes has been a bold attempt to transcend the limitations of psychoanalysis and integrate the dimensions it has ignored or denied. Nonetheless, the development of Foulkes’ revolutionary contributions was encumbered by his adherence to Freudian theory, just like the latter was by his creator’s subservience to positivistic natural science. Psychoanalysis and group analysis are two aspects of the wider field of analysis, but they are still impeded by a series of assumptions held by both science and common sense. These are: i) materialistic metaphysics, ii) the Cartesian subject, iii) deterministic positivism, iv) neutral objectivism, and v) rejection of teleology. Hence, the need to go beyond psychoanalysis and group analysis and formulate a new paradigm of the human being. This is a work in progress, being tackled by many people from different fields of human knowledge and practice, such as physical science, biology, neuroscience, psychoanalysis, group analysis, sociology, political science, philosophy, theology, hermeneutics, and the Humanities, among many others. It is an interdisciplinary enterprise, to which analysis may and should contribute, but only through an open dialogue with its peers in the field of human thought.

Orientador: Luiz Roberto Monzani
Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas
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Resumo: Esta dissertação tem como objetivo realizar uma leitura da obra de Sigmund Freud, principalmente dos textos escritos até 1920, orientados pelos conceitos de sedução e de fantasia. A teoria da sedução surgiu no início das formulações do pensamento psicanalítico de Freud, trazendo algumas noções fundamentais para todo o desenvolvimento posterior da teoria. Aparentemente, a sedução foi abandonada em 1897, abrindo espaço para o conceito de fantasia. A fantasia ocupou um lugar central no corpo teórico como expressão maior da realidade psíquica, e como tal, pôde ser entendida enquanto estrutura organizadora da experiência. A fantasia mostrou-se sempre articulada ao desejo, caracterizando o mundo psíquico. Por outro lado, Freud parece não abrir mão de um fundamento "real", externo ao psiquismo, que retomaria um evento original, e por isso mesmo mais efetivo. Dessa maneira, realizou-se uma discussão a respeito da relação entre realidade interna e realidade externa, tentando percorrer as várias nuances dessa relação. Por fim, rearticularam-se os conceitos freudianos de sedução e de fantasia usando as indicações de Laplanche e os textos de Freud a partir de 1933. Desse modo, foi feita uma tentativa de esclarecer as posições desses conceitos e suas articulações ao longo do pensamento freudiano
Abstract: This dissertation aims at accomplishing a reading of Sigmund Freud's work, especially of those texts written until 1920, oriented by the concepts of seduction and fantasy. The seduction theory appeared in the beginning of the formulations of Freud's psychoanalytic thought, bringing some fundamental notions for all the subsequent development of the theory. Apparently, the seduction was abandoned in 1897, making room for the concept of fantasy. Fantasy occupied a central place in the theoretical body as a major expression of psychic reality and, as such, could be understood as an organizing structure of the experience. Fantasy has always been shown as articulated to the desire, characterizing the psychic world. On the other hand, Freud seems not to give up a "real" fundament, external to the psychic world, which would resume an original, and thus more effective, event. According to this, we performed a discussion on the relation between the inner and outer realities, in an attempt to encompass the several features of this relation. At last, we rearticulated the Freudian concepts of seduction and fantasy using the indications of Laplanche and the texts of Freud from 1933 on. Accordingly, an attempt was made as to clarify the position of these concepts and their articulations throughout Freud's thought
Mestrado
Filosofia
Mestre em Filosofia

En 1998, dans son livre intitulé Canguilhem et les normes, le philosophe G. Le Blanc affirme que la création d'un problème ne consiste pas à « inventer de toutes pièces un nouveau problème mais plutôt [à] rouvrir un ancien problème résolu », opération intellectuelle qui revient à « déplacer le problème du questionné au non questionné, du pensé à l'impensé ». En nous laissant guider par ce précepte d'inspiration canguilhemienne, cette thèse doctorale examine de façon critique l'histoire de la formation intellectuelle de Freud et les fondements de l'épistémologie freudienne, problème déjà « clos » depuis les travaux pionniers de S. Bernfeld, F. Wittels, M. Dorer et E. Jones, parmi d'autres, et depuis les études contemporaines de P.-L. Assoun. Notre objectif est d'y analyser l'influence clandestine ou souterraine, mais bien déterminante, du vitalisme, doctrine biomédicale des XVIIIe et XIXe siècles dont la présence dans l'histoire de la pensée freudienne est d'autant plus frappante qu'elle en a été radicalement exclue au profit du primat sans entrave du physicalisme de ladite « École de Helmholtz ». Eu égard à l'inexistence d'évidences empiriques et de références directes de la part de Freud qui permettraient d'établir son rapport au vitalisme, cette recherche essaie de construire ce lien sur la base d'un examen soigneux du contexte historique et épistémologique dans lequel les concepts majeurs de la psychanalyse évoluèrent, particulièrement celui de pulsion {Trieb}. Nous soulignons leurs parallélismes et leurs isomorphismes avec les concepts cruciaux du vitalisme, comme ceux de force vitale ou de principe vital, mais nous soulignons de plus - et c'est notre hypothèse fondamentale - que le projet freudien d'édifier une théorie énergétique du psychisme constitue une tentative d'articulation des registres du vivant et de l'humain et, de ce point de vue, une réponse à la question philosophique et scientifique par excellence qui selon G. Canguilhem s'est posée au XIXe siècle, à savoir « Qu'est-ce que la vie ? ». La première partie de notre recherche est consacrée à essayer de briser le mythe du « Freud mécaniste » et à démontrer que l'interrogation philosophico-biologique sur la nature du vivant est toujours à l'arrière-plan des préoccupations théoriques des penseurs physicalistes et matérialistes qui influencèrent Freud au cours du XIXe siècle. Deuxièmement, nous essayons de rouvrir les rapports de Freud à la Naturphilosophie et à la Médecine Romantique afin de rendre intelligibles les axes cruciaux de ses préoccupations d'ordre vitaliste concernant la pulsionnalité du vivant humain, ainsi que les enjeux théoriques de ses rapports à Darwin, à Goethe et à Fliess, penseurs autour desquels tournent les interrogations philosophiques de Freud concernant la nature de la vie. S'appuyant sur la déclaration de Freud qu'une « vision dualiste élémentaire » constitue l'exigence épistémologique par excellence de sa métapsychologie, la deuxième et dernière partie de notre recherche est consacrée à la construction des liens conceptuels - et à la recherche des incidences clandestines - entre les dualismes pulsionnels de Freud et les théories vitalistes, également dualistes, de Stahl et de Bichat d'abord et de Cl. Bernard ensuite. Dans cette partie de notre recherche, nous tentons de montrer que la conception freudienne de la vie, issue de son point de vue énergétique sur le psychisme, est fondée paradoxalement sur une prééminence des phénomènes de destruction et de mort, tout comme dans les vitalismes des physiologistes allemand et français susmentionnés. Cela nous conduit à formuler l'existence d'une « théorie de la vie » dans la pensée de Freud, théorie dans laquelle celle-ci est conçue comme une sorte de dé-vivre ou comme un certain devenir anti-vital inéluctable, et dont les termes de « vie » et de « mort », de « création » et de « destruction », loin de constituer les termes d'un antagonisme, deviennent les composants d'une unité ontologique
In 1998, in his book entitled "Canguilhem et les normes", the philosopher G. Le Blanc asserts that the creation of a problem does not consist in "inventing a new problem with brand-new elements but rather [in] reopening an old, solved problem", an intellectual procedure which amounts to "moving the problem from the questioned to the unquestioned, from the thought to the unthought". Letting ourselves be guided by this precept of Canguilhemian inspiration, this doctoral thesis critically examines the history of Freud's intellectual training and the foundations of Freudian epistemology, a problem already "closed" since the pioneering works of S. Bernfeld , F. Wittels, M. Dorer and E. Jones, among others, and since the contemporary studies of P.-L. Assoun. Our aim is to analyze the clandestine or the underlaying, but determining effects of vitalism, the biomedical doctrine of the 18th and 19th centuries whose presence in the history of Freudian thought is even more striking because it has been radically excluded from it in favor of the unfettered primacy of physicalism of the so-called "School of Helmholtz". Given the lack of empirical evidences and direct references from Freud which would allow us to establish his relationship to vitalism, this research will try to build this link on the basis of a careful examination of the historical and epistemological context in which the main concepts of psychoanalysis evolved, particularly that of drive {Trieb}. We emphasize their parallelisms and their isomorphisms with the crucial concepts of vitalism, such as those of vital force or vital principle, but we also emphasize - and this is our fundamental hypothesis - that the Freudian project of building an energetic theory of psychic processes represents an attempt to articulate the living and the human fields, and, from this point of view, an answer to the main philosophical and scientific question which, according to G. Canguilhem, was formulated in the 19th century, namely "What is life?". The first part of our research is devoted to trying to explode the myth of the "mechanist Freud" and to demonstrate that the philosophical-biological questioning about living beings' nature was always underlaying in the theoretical concerns of the physicalist and materialist thinkers who influenced Freud during the 19th century. Secondly, we try to reopen Freud's relationship to Naturphilosophie and Romantic Medicine, to make intelligible the crucial axes of his vitalist concerns regarding the drive's dimension of human beings, as well as the theoretical issues of his relationship to Darwin, Goethe and Fliess, thinkers around which Freud's philosophical questions concerning the nature of life turned. Considering Freud's statement that an "elementary dualistic vision" constitutes the main epistemological requirement of his metapsychology, the second and last part of our research is devoted to the construction of the conceptual links - and to the search for clandestine implications - between Freud's drive dualistic theories and the equally dualistic vitalist theories of Stahl and Bichat first, and then of Cl. Bernard. In this part of the research, we try to show that the Freudian conception of life, rising from his energetic point of view on the psyche, is paradoxically based on a preeminence of the phenomena of destruction and death, just like in the vitalisms of the German and French physiologists. This leads us to formulate the existence of a sort of "life's theory" in Freud's thinking, theory in which life is conceived as a kind of dis-living or as a certain inevitable anti-vital becoming, and in which the terms of "life" and "death", "creation" and "destruction'", far from represent the terms of an antagonism, become the components of an ontological unity

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Universidade Federal de Sao Carlos
The prospect of submitting the concepts of ego and object to an investigation capable of detecting its conditions of possibility, its guiding principles and its methods, becomes an important tool for elucidating the Freudian analysis of subjectivity. Therefore, this dissertation aims at providing the necessary conceptual fundaments for a more critical and cohesive view of these concepts and analyzing the way we can find some ambiguities throughout its metapsychological construction. Regarding the concept of ego, we addressed its theoretical importance in initial construction of Freud s theory of defense, passing on to its partial ostracism and return , respectively in The interpretation of dreams and in the first papers on the theory of narcissism, and eventually to the topical reformulation which took place in The ego and the id, published in 1923, and the final Freud´s papers. In turn, the concept of object is central in the Freudian theory of sexuality, since Three essays on the theory of sexuality (1905), paper in which the concept of drive [Trieb] is introduced, and from whose fundaments all ulterior metapsychological developments set out. Considering the relations established with key-notions of metapsychology, and the critical presentation of the guiding elements from which one can apprehend the constitution of the concepts of ego and object in Freudian theory, we can conclude that both are important pillars that support the psychoanalytical knowledge and it is possible to examine relevant theoretical impasses in his metapsychology.
A possibilidade de submeter os conceitos de ego e objeto a uma investigação capaz de detectar suas condições de possibilidade, seus princípios norteadores e seus métodos, torna-se uma importante ferramenta na tentativa de elucidar o projeto freudiano de análise da subjetividade. Deste modo, essa dissertação propõe-se a fornecer os fundamentos conceituais necessários para uma visão mais coesa e crítica desses conceitos e analisar o modo como encontramos algumas ambigüidades ao longo de sua construção metapsicológica. Em relação ao conceito de ego, acompanhamos sua importância na construção inicial da teoria freudiana da defesa, passando pelo seu parcial ostracismo e retorno , respectivamente em A interpretação dos sonhos e nos primeiros trabalhos sobre a teoria do narcisismo, até a reformulação da tópica em O ego e o id de 1923 e nos trabalhos finais de Freud. Por sua vez, o conceito de objeto apresenta-se como central na teoria freudiana da sexualidade, desde os Três ensaios de teoria sexual de 1905, trabalho no qual é introduzido o conceito de pulsão, e de cujos fundamentos partem todos os desenvolvimentos metapsicológicos posteriores. Considerando as relações que estabelecem com noções-chave da metapsicologia freudiana, a partir da apresentação crítica dos elementos norteadores a partir dos quais pode ser apreendido o modo como se dá a constituição dos conceitos de ego e objeto em sua obra, concluímos que, além de serem pilares de suma importância a para a manutenção de um saber psicanalítico, por meio desta análise, é possível examinar importantes impasses teóricos presentes em seu pensamento.

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Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos
Although Freud has explicitly reclaimed that psychoanalysis belongs to the field of natural science, subsequent philosophic and epistemological criticism tends to refuse the Freudian intention and to place his theories among the human sciences (Habermas, Ricoeur, Schafer, Klein, among others); or to consider it as an unsuccessful naturalistic project, unable to achieve the minimum request of scientificity (Popper, Grünbaum, etc.). In this work we intend to show how several models used by Freud have resulted in different interpretations of psychoanalysis. This thesis is an exegetic study of the explanation models utilized by Freud and the methodological procedure to do it was not only based on his work but also on the contemporary discussion in the field of evolutionary biology whose influences upon Freud have already been indicated by several authors (Sulloway, Ritvo, etc.), although, in general, they only point the presence of biological themes in the elaboration of the Freudian theory, without relating it to a constitution of a psychological explanation model simultaneously historic and naturalistic.
Embora Freud tenha reivindicado explicitamente o pertencimento da psicanálise ao campo das ciências naturais, as críticas filosóficas e epistemológicas posteriores tenderam, muito frequentemente, a recusar a pretensão freudiana e aproximar sua disciplina à área das humanidades (Habermas, Ricoeur, Schafer, Klein, entre outros) ou a considerá-la como um projeto naturalista fracassado, incapaz de atender aos critérios mínimos de cientificidade (Popper, Grünbaum, etc.). No presente trabalho procuramos evidenciar como o uso de diversos modelos explicativos por parte de Freud resultou em diferentes interpretações da psicanálise. Trata-se de um estudo exegético dos modelos de explicação utilizados pelo autor, tendo como método não só a análise de sua obra, mas também a discussão contemporânea no campo da biologia evolucionária cujas influências sobre Freud já foram indicadas por vários autores (Sulloway, Ritvo, etc.), embora, via de regra, apenas apontando a presença de certos temas biológicos na elaboração da teoria freudiana, sem relacioná-los com a constituição de um modelo de explicação psicológica simultaneamente histórico e naturalista.

The thesis here presented establishes a triple parallelism between biology and psychology. First, through Haeckel's recapitulation theory as the source of freudian and jungian psychology. Second, from the reductionist view of science to the new phenomenology of evolutionary developmental biology. Third, by overcoming the reductionist paradigm in biology through the Extended Synthesis and in psychology though the revisited archetype theory. By establishing these parallelisms, the thesis faces the nature vs. nurture debate on three epistemological levels, in which the external and internal levels are being mediatied by a middle one. This turns the dualistic debate into a heuristic paradigm aimed to resolve any irreducible dualism inherent in the reductionist view

This chapter considers Freudian itineraries in postwar Egypt through an exploration of the work of Yusuf Murad, the founder of a school of thought within the psychological sciences, and the journal he coedited from 1945 to 1953, Majallat ʿIlm al-Nafs. By training a generation of scholars, Murad left a wide-ranging legacy on psychology, philosophy, and the wider academic fields of the humanities and the social sciences. Melding key concepts from psychoanalysis with classical Islamic concepts, Murad elaborated a psychological theory of the subject as an integrative agent, embodying a complex synthesis of unity and multiplicity. Theorizing the temporality of the subject, the epistemology of psychoanalysis and the analytic structure, and the socius, Murad both drew upon and departed from European psychoanalytic thought, while often insisting on the epistemological and ethical heterogeneity of different theories of the self.

Chapter 3 tracks Auden’s productive ambivalence about psychoanalysis and his embrace of a radical set of psychologies that proposed the liberation of desire from all forms of repression. Auden identified psychoanalysis early on as a model for his poetics of difficulty and as an epistemology of same-sex desire, only to turn to more heterodox psychologies that recast psychoanalysis as a mode of repression and ideological consensus. Within the experimental laboratory of late Weimar Berlin, Auden began to challenge psychoanalytic views of same-sex desire as failed maturation and psychic regression, although he never fully abandons these ideas. Reading Auden’s poetry and critical prose of the early- and mid-1930s, I explore his idiosyncratic readings of psychoanalysis and his adoption of a group of marginal psychologists who helped him challenge the diagnostic activities of psychoanalysis and develop a queer poetics. Auden’s 1930s modernist style marks a turn away from the heuristic model of Freudian encryption and a poetics of difficulty, and toward a strategically amateurish poetics that preempts the need for critical experts.

Ensayo donde la propuesta es que el psicoanálisis freudiano es una forma de ciencia que se puede validar por observaciones de segundo orden desde la teoría de sistema de Niklas Luhmann. Este ensayo oscila entre la elaboración de una teoría del sistema psíquico y las formas de validación del conocimiento psicoanalítico. No debemos olvidar que Luhmann construyó una teoría de la sociedad y consideró a la conciencia (el individuo) como entorno de ésta. Si por conciencia entendemos aparato psíquico, podemos valorar el esfuerzo que significa hacer una teoría de este sistema. Pues mientras el sistema social se reproduce autopoiéticamente por medio de la comunicación, en cambio el psíquico lo hace por medio de la represión. Siempre y cuando por represión se entienda generación de lo latente.