Academic literature on the topic 'French Napoleonic Army'
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Journal articles on the topic "French Napoleonic Army"
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Olejniczak, Andrzej. "Oficerowie – Polacy w Pułku Irlandzkim armii napoleońskiej w latach 1806–1815." Przegląd Historyczno-Wojskowy 21, no. 2 (2020): 126–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.32089/wbh.phw.2020.2(272).0004.
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Several scientific and popular publications have been devoted to the Polish military effort in the Napoleonic era. However, there is too little information about Poles who participated in Napoleonic wars under non-national banners, but also fought alongside Napoleon. Large units composed of Poles have their monographs, but there are no similar studies on the service in the French army of at least hundreds of Poles, scattered over many regiments. Indirectly, Poles from other than Polish formations of the Napoleonic army were mentioned by Stanisław Kirkor in his study of the fates of Poles in British captivity, but these are very short extracts from English sources. Thanks to a preliminary query in French materials, it was possible to determine that many citizens from the pre-partition Polish territory joined the ranks of the French army without serving in the army of the Duchy of Warsaw or in units composed primarily of Poles. Among them were volunteers, deserters from the armies of the partitioning powers, prisoners of war, and seemingly also conscripts. One of the most interesting units among the many different regiments of the Napoleonic army was the Irish Regiment, also known as the Irish Legion. It was in this regiment that many Poles served. They were mainly privates and non-commissioned officers, but there were also cases of Polish officers serving in this formation. During the investigation, at least 11 officers of Polish origin or from the territory of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth were identified and their service in the Irish Regiment was described. There were also individual cases of formal assignment of Polish officers to the Irish formation, but in practice these officers often did not take up service and were transferred to Polish units. This paper is an attempt to draw
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Mogilevskiy, N. A. "«Unclear Enemy»: Why the Guerrilla War in France in 1814 Failed." MGIMO Review of International Relations, no. 5(44) (October 28, 2015): 7–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2015-5-44-7-13.
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Abstract: Author of the article analyzes the reasons of the fail of Napoleon’s attempts to set the guerrilla war in France during the campaign of 1814. While the forces of anti-Napoleonic coalition were standing near the border of France, Napoleon did his best to recruit his new army. But the human resources of France were exhausted, and that’s why Napoleon decided to set the guerrillia. But all his proclamations and even his orders were disobeyed - French people were too tired of incessant war, and Napoleon again decided to gain his goals on the battlefield. Besides author shows great efforts of Russian headquarters to avoid the guerrilla war. Alexander I and his allies in theirs proclamations declared that they were fighting only with Napoleon, but not with the French nation. That tactic gave a brilliant result and helped to avoid the patriotic uplift in France in 1814. In this propagandistic war Napoleon was defeated and that cost him his throne. The reasons of Napoleon’s fail, firstly, was the unclear image of the enemy. French emperor didn’t manage to unite French nation against the rival. On the contrary the French Emperor, his enemies managed (in their proclamations and personal conversations) to persuade the French people, that the allies had one enemy - the Emperor Napoleon, not the French nation, and the ultimate goal of war - to set peace on the European continent. That was exactly how the allies did set the disunity between Napoleon and his people. Ultimately, the combination of these factors was the reason that a guerrilla war never broke out in France.
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Fraser, K. C. "Napoleonic Army Handbook: The French Army and her Allies200397Michael Oliver and Richard Partridge. Napoleonic Army Handbook: The French Army and her Allies. London: Constable 2002. xii + 354 pp., ISBN: 1 84119 223 6 £35." Reference Reviews 17, no. 2 (February 2003): 48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/09504120310461914.
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Del Negro, Piero. "La Scuola militare di Modena: caratteristiche istituzionali e ruolo politico." SOCIETÀ E STORIA, no. 124 (October 2009): 319–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.3280/ss2009-124005.
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- Bruno Giordano's book on the officers educated at the Modena military school opens a number of different paths of research. This comment focuses on institutional and political aspects: what is the place of the Modena experience in the history of military training? And how did it affect the relations between politic and the military in the Cisalpino-Italic system? In the first area special attention s given to the Italian tradition of military academies and especially to the model represented by the Collegio militare of Verona; in the second field the case of Modena is used to emphasize the difficulties and contradictions arising as a consequence of the predominance of the French influence.Parole chiave: esercito; periodo napoleonico; ingegneri; Scuola di Modena.Key Words: Army; Napoleonic age; engineers; Modena military School.
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Nawrot, Dariusz. "Początki żandarmerii wojskowej na ziemiach polskich." Przegląd Historyczno-Wojskowy 21, no. 1 (2020): 12–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.32089/wbh.phw.2020.1(271).0001.
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The article presents the beginnings of military police in the Polish territory, which are closely related to the Napoleonic era. It was then that French solutions in terms of internal security formations were adopted. The creation of military police formation, first in the liberated from Russian rule Lithuania, was closely connected with the events of the War of 1812. The failure of the plans to fight a decisive battle at the borders of Russia and the slackness of the Great Army, caused by weather breakdown and inadequate provisions, soon resulted in the disintegration of discipline, an unprecedented number of marauders, and ordinary banditry spreading at an alarming rate. The areas through which Napoleonic troops had marched were completely devastated. In this situation Napoleon, seeking a solution to the problems with ensuring peace at the rear, in his order of July 1st, 1812 appointing the authorities of the liberated Lithuania also commanded the formation of Lithuanian military police. The article discusses the organization of this formation and its participation in the campaign as well as attempts to create similar military police formation in the lands of the Duchy of Warsaw at the turn of 1812 and 1813, when they were threatened by the offensive of the victorious Russian army. It has been emphasized that successive gendarmerie and military police formations created in the Polish territory referred to the traditions of these units.
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Scharf, Claus. "The Power of the Weak Opponent: The Diplomacy of Alexander I in Tilsit." Journal of Modern Russian History and Historiography 12, no. 1 (September 23, 2019): 209–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22102388-01201008.
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Not only in Soviet patriotic historiography the conduct of war and the foreign policy of Alexander i were regarded as heroic only from the battle of Borodino onward. The earlier years of the Napoleonic Era and the retreat of Russian armies during the summer of 1812 appeared in a negative light. Revisionist research in Russia and abroad offers another interpretation. When the French army in 1807 after some victorious battles reached the Russian border Alexander maintained a much better bargaining position in talks with Napoleon than disappointed critics among the Russian elite recognized. The emperor of the French was not prepared to continue the war on Russian soil and did not make territorial demands on Russia. Napoleon wanted not only an armistice and peace, but also an alliance with Russia against Britain. Thus Alexander, using the power of the weak opponent, succeeded in winning time. Russia was able not only to maintain her strategic goals against the Ottoman Empire in the Rumanian principalities and in the Black Sea, but also to defend the political existence of Prussia as a possible Russian ally in a future coalition with Austria against Napoleon, which meant a sacrifice of Polish interests by Russia.
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Kosykh, Tatiana. "Africa Begins at the Pyrenees? The Experience of Cross-Cultural Contact of British Soldiers in Andalusia 1810—1812." ISTORIYA 12, no. 7 (105) (2021): 0. http://dx.doi.org/10.18254/s207987840015315-5.
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In the late 18th and early 19th centuries, there was a presentation which was dominated in Britain about romantic Andalusia, which has hidden Islamic heritage of past centuries, and only the most courageous traveler can decide to take in a journey to it. With the beginning of the Napoleonic Wars and the Pyrenean campaign of the French army, everything had changed, and British soldiers became “travelers in red uniforms”. Some of them visited occupied by the French troops Andalusia in 1810—1812. This article attempts to view Andalusia as a “frontier” between Europe and Africa and to reconstruct the image of southwestern Spain in the narratives of British participants of military operations on the Iberian Peninsula. The author analyzes the peculiarities of the relationship of British officers with local inhabitants, as well as with soldiers of the enemy army, the French and the Poles, and reveals the specificity of the British perception of allies and enemies in Andalusia the context of the Spanish War of Independence.
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Gordienko, Dmitry O. "«The Peninsular War»: The Anglo-French confrontation in the Pyrenees during the Second Hundred Years’ War (1689–1815)." Izvestiya of Saratov University. New Series. Series: History. International Relations 21, no. 1 (March 25, 2021): 60–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.18500/1819-4907-2021-21-1-60-66.
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The article shows the Anglo-French confrontation on the Iberian Peninsula as an important stage of the Second Hundred years’ War. The example of remote action of the British expeditionary force demonstrates the «English style» of war: the operation of army troops with the active support of the Royal Navy. The author comes to the conclusion that the Pyrenean wars of the beginning of the XIX century have a certain significance in the system of Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars.
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Riley, Mark Robert. "Romaine Amiel: a French surgeon in the British Army during the Napoleonic Wars." Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps 165, no. 6 (April 16, 2019): 457–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/jramc-2019-001223.
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Gevaert, Bert. "The use of the saber in the army of Napoleon." Acta Periodica Duellatorum 4, no. 1 (April 1, 2016): 103–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/apd-2016-0004.
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Abstract Though Napoleonic warfare is usually associated with guns and cannons, edged weapons still played an important role on the battlefield. Swords and sabers could dominate battles and this was certainly the case in the hands of experienced cavalrymen. In contrast to gunshot wounds, wounds caused by the saber could be treated quite easily and caused fewer casualties. In 18th and 19th century France, not only manuals about the use of foil and epee were published, but also some important works on the military saber: de Saint Martin, Alexandre Muller… The saber was not only used in individual fights against the enemy, but also as a duelling weapon in the French army.
Dissertations / Theses on the topic "French Napoleonic Army"
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Faulkner, Jacqueline Suzanne Marie Jeanne. "The role of national defence in British political debate, 1794-1812." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2006. https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/271636.
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This thesis examines the role of national defence in British parliamentary politics between 1794 and 1812. It suggests that previous analyses of the late eighteenth-century political milieu insufficiently explore the impact of war on the structure of the state. Work by J.E. Cookson, Linda Colley, J.C.D. Clark, and Paul Langford depicts a decentralised state that had little direct involvement in developing a popular “British” patriotism. Here I argue that the threat of a potential French invasion during the wars against Revolutionary and Napoleonic France provoked a drive for centralisation. Nearly all the defence measures enacted during the period gave the government a much greater degree of control over British manpower and resources. The readiness of successive governments to involve large sections of the nation in the war effort through military service, financial contributions, and appeals to the British “spirit”, resulted in a much more inclusive sense of citizenship in which questions of national participation and political franchise were unlinked. National identity was also affected, and the focus on military defence of the British Isles influenced political attitudes towards the regular army. By 1810, however, the nation was disillusioned by the lengthy struggle with France. The result of lingering political weakness was that attention shifted from national defence onto domestic corruption and venality. The aftermath of the Irish Act of Union, too, demonstrated the limits of attempts to centralise the policy of the whole United Kingdom. Significantly, however, the debates over the relationship between the centre and the localities in the 1830s and 1840s, and the response to a new French invasion threat in the 1850s and 1860s, revived themes addressed during the 1790s and 1800s. The political reaction to the invasion threats between 1794 and 1812 ultimately had more in common with a Victorian state bureaucracy than an eighteenth-century ancien régime.
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ABBIATI, MICHELE. "L'ESERCITO ITALIANO E LA CONQUISTA DELLA CATALOGNA (1808-1811).UNO STUDIO DI MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS NELL'EUROPA NAPOLEONICA." Doctoral thesis, Università degli Studi di Milano, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/2434/491761.
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L’esercito italiano e la conquista della Catalogna (1808-1811)
Uno studio di Military Effectiveness nell’Europa napoleonica
Settori scientifico-disciplinari SPS/03 – M-STO/02
La ricerca ha lo scopo di ricostruire e valutare l’effettività militare dell’esercito italiano al servizio di Napoleone I. In primo luogo attraverso un’analisi statistica e strategica della costruzione, e del successivo impiego, dell’istituzione militare del Regno d’Italia durante gli anni della sua esistenza (1805-14); successivamente, è stato scelto un caso di studi particolarmente significativo, come la campagna di Catalogna (1808-11, nel contesto della guerra di Indipendenza spagnola), per poter valutare il contributo operazionale e tattico dei corpi inviati dal governo di Milano e la loro integrazione con l’apparato militare complessivo del Primo Impero.
La tesi ha voluto rispondere alla mancanza di studi sul comportamento in guerra dell’esercito italiano e, allo stesso tempo, introdurre nella storiografia militare italiana la metodologia di studi, d’origine anglosassone e ormai di tradizione trentennale, di Military Effectiveness.
La ricerca si è primariamente basata, oltre che sulla copiosa memorialistica a stampa italiana e francese, sulla documentazione d’archivio della Secrétairerie d’état impériale (Archives Nationales di Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, Parigi), del Ministère de la Guerre francese (Service historique de la Défence, di Vincennes, Parigi) e del Ministero della Guerra del Regno d’Italia (Archivio di Stato di Milano).
Dal punto di vista dei risultati è stato possibile verificare come l’esercito italiano abbia rappresentato, per Bonaparte, uno strumento duttile e di facile impiego, pur in un contesto di sostanziale marginalità numerica complessiva di fronte alle altre (e cospicue) forze messe in campo da parte dell’Impero e dei suoi altri Stati satellite e alleati. Per quanto riguarda la campagna di conquista della Catalogna è stato invece possibile appurare il fondamentale contributo dato dal contingente italiano, sotto i punti di vista operazionale e tattico, per la buona riuscita dell’invasione; questo primariamente grazie alle elevate caratteristiche generali mostrate dallo stesso, ma anche per peculiarità disciplinari e organizzative che resero i corpi italiani adatti a operazioni particolarmente aggressive.The Italian Army and the Conquest of Catalonia (1808-1811) A Study of Military Effectiveness in Napoleonic Europe Academic Fields and Disciplines SPS/03 – M-STO/02 The research has the purpose of reconstruct and evaluate the military effectiveness of the Italian Army existed under the reign of Napoleon I. Firstly through a statistic and strategic analysis of the development, and the following deployment, of the military institution of the Kingdom of Italy in the years of its existence (1805-14). Afterwards, a particularly significant case study was chosen, as the campaign of Catalonia (1808-11, in the context of the Peninsular War), in order to assess the operational and tactical contribution of the regiments sent by the Government of Milan and their integration in the overall military apparatus of the First Empire. The thesis wanted to respond to the lack of studies on the Italian army’s behavior in war and, at the same time, to introduce the methodology of the Military Effectiveness Studies (of British and American origin and, by now, enriched by a thirty-year old tradition) in the Italian historiography. The research is primarily based, besides the numerous memoirs of the Italian and French veterans, on the archive documentation of the Secrétairerie d’état impériale (Archives Nationales of Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, Paris), of the French Ministère de la Guerre (Service historique de la Défence, of Vincennes, Paris) and of the Italian Ministero della Guerra (Archivio di Stato di Milano). About the results, it has been verified how the Italian army has become a flexible and suitable instrument for Bonaparte, albeit in a context of substantial overall numerical marginality in comparison to the heterogeneous forces available to the Empire and its others satellites and allied states. Regarding the campaign of Catalonia, instead, it was possible to ascertain the fundamental contribution of the Italian regiments, in an operational and tactical perspective, for the success of the invasion. This was primarily due to the excellent general characteristics shown by the expeditionary force, but also to disciplinary and organizational peculiarities that have made the Italian corps suitable for particularly aggressive operations.
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Cyr, Pascal. "Waterloo : la bataille de tous les enjeux." Thèse, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/1866/6662.
Full textBooks on the topic "French Napoleonic Army"
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1952-, Partridge Richard, ed. Napoleonic Army handbook : the French Army and her allies. London: Constable, 2002.
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Napoleon's army in Russia: The illustrated memoirs of Albrecht Adam, 1812. Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Military, 2005.
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Blaze, Elzéar. Life in Napoleon's army: The memoirs of Captain Elzéar Blaze. London: Greenhill Books, 1995.
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Napoleon's regiments: Battle histories of the regiments of the French army, 1792-1815. London: Greenhill Books, 2000.
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Forging Napoleon's Grande Armée: Motivation, military culture, and masculinity in the French army, 1800-1808. New York: New York University Press, 2012.
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Dempsey, Guy C. Napoleon's mercenaries: Foreign units in the French Army under the Consulate and Empire, 1799-1814. London: Greenhill Books, 2002.
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Forrest, Alan I. Conscripts and deserters: The army and French society during the Revolution and Empire. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.
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Marbot, Jean-Baptiste-Antoine-Marcelin. The memoirs of Baron de Marbot: Late lieutenant-general in the French Army. London: Greenhill Books, 1988.
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Soldiers of Napoleon's Kingdom of Italy: Army, state, and society, 1800-1815. Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1995.
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Chartrand, René. Napoleon's overseas army. London: Osprey Pub., 1989.
Find full textBook chapters on the topic "French Napoleonic Army"
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Mikaberidze, Alexander. "The Fateful Year." In Kutuzov, 345—C21.P36. Oxford University PressNew York, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197546734.003.0021.
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Abstract This chapter discusses Mikhail Kutuzov’s receipt of the news of Napoleon Bonaparte’s invasion. He heard of the invasion while he was still at his estate in northern Ukraine. Despite having more than a quarter million troops tied down in Spain, the French emperor drew upon the resources of his vast empire and raised close to 600,000 men for a new war in the east. The task of equipping, provisioning, and moving such a multitude was colossal, requiring patience, money, and organizational skill, all of which Napoleon amply possessed. The chapter recounts how Napoleon set out from the Saxon capital, Dresden, to join his army just as Kutuzov finalized the peace treaty with the Ottomans on May 28. Emperor Alexander had just 250,000 Russian soldiers to confront the Napoleonic juggernaut, and even these troops were scattered among three major armies and a handful of separate corps that had been mobilized.
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Mansfield, Nick. "Loyalism, Nationalism and the Army, 1790–1860." In Soldiers as Citizens, 151–71. Liverpool University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.3828/liverpool/9781789620863.003.0007.
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In contrast to chapters 3, 4 and 5, this chapter examines the traditional anti-foreigner and particularly anti-French feeling shared by many working class people. It examines how this aided the British army in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars and assesses how it contributed to the strengthening of political loyalism rather than radicalism. The account looks at examples of extraordinary rank and file unsolicited wartime bravery, and general keeness for battle which were promoted by post war commemoration and growing loyalty amongst soldiers to the martial traditions of their regiments. With rank and file support for regiment, army and nation, and with the army’s growing imperial role after 1815, this loyalism was combined with incipient imperialism. In addition, the survival of officer paternalism, albeit patchy, contributed to rank and file loyalty, often absorbing the anti-radicalism of the officer class. All this contributed to soldiers almost universally ‘doing their duty’ and explains why radical subversion was unsuccessful and why regiments could be safely used by the Victorian authorities against Chartists and strikers.
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Mikaberidze, Alexander. "The Last Campaign." In Kutuzov, 497—C30.P33. Oxford University PressNew York, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197546734.003.0030.
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Abstract This chapter recounts how the news of what transpired in Russia sent shock waves through Europe, dramatically altering the balance of power and signaling an opportunity to cast off French hegemony. It mentions the Convention of Tauroggen, signed by Russian negotiators and Prussian General Johann von Yorck on December 30, 1812, which marked the start of a new phase of the war. The Prussian general’s decision to declare his Prussian contingent of the French army neutral was a clear act of defiance, both against his French superiors and against the Prussian king. The chapter emphasizes how Mikhail Kutuzov saw matters differently, noting that the liberation of Europe was not a mission that he felt any desire to support. It was not Russia’s responsibility to seek the destruction of the Napoleonic imperium; it should focus on the restoration of its own forces.
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"Napoleon’s improbable synthesis." In The French army 1750–1820. Manchester University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.7765/9781526158918.00012.
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Bell, David A. "1. The Corsican, 1769–1796." In Napoleon, 14–26. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780199321667.003.0002.
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Napoleon Bonaparte was born in 1769 in Corsica, just after it came under the control of the Kingdom of France. ‘The Corsican, 1769–1796’ outlines Napoleon’s early life, including his enrolment at Brienne military boarding school at age nine. He developed a love of literature and considered life as an author, but after finishing Brienne, he went to the École Militaire in Paris, graduating in 1785. In 1786, after his father’s death, Napoleon returned home to Corsica to help with family affairs. He remained in Corsica after the start of the French Revolution, but his rise through the ranks of the French Army is described along with his marriage to Rose de Beauharnais (Joséphine) in 1796.
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Mikaberidze, Alexander. "“The Glorious Retreat”." In Kutuzov, 206—C13.P46. Oxford University PressNew York, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197546734.003.0013.
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Abstract This chapter recounts Napoleon Bonaparte’s victory at Ulm. This was a remarkable achievement. He was able to outsmart his opponents and destroy one hostile army. He was on the point of chasing the second one into the heart of the Habsburg Empire. The first to feel the consequences of Napoleon’s triumph was Mikhail Kutuzov, whose army was less than eighty miles from Munich. The chapter examines Napoleon’s decision to postpone his advance until after October 25, which meant that Kutuzov was given an opportunity to assess the situation, weigh different options, choose a course of action, and start to execute it. The chapter looks at Kutuzov’s immediate objective, which was to avoid battle and safeguard the Russian army in the face of the French juggernaut. To ensure a safe and orderly withdrawal, Kutuzov decided to keep a sting in his tail and appointed Major General Bagration to command the rear guard.
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Parry, Jonathan. "Sealing off Egypt and the Red Sea." In Promised Lands, 46–79. Princeton University Press, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691181899.003.0003.
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This chapter begins by analysing the aftermath of the 1799–1801 war. It mentions that the British officials were preoccupied with stopping the French from reinvading Egypt. Napoleon Bonaparte had justified his original invasion by stressing the extortionate and tyrannical rule of the Mamluks, so it became a priority to seek stability there. The chapter also looks at how Egypt fell into the destabilising civil war that the British army had predicted. It then reviews the initial British strategy for the Red Sea: The Dundas–Popham, one of the Arab trading alliances. Once the French were forced out of Egypt in 1801, local Arab chiefs had less incentive to pursue these. In the absence of French power in the region, the chapter emphasizes that there was little risk of the chiefs taking up Napoleon's cause, while Britain would incur Muslim hostility if it tried to interfere in the politics of the Hijaz and its Holy Cities.
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Nawrot, Dariusz. "Litwa i Konfederacja Generalna Królestwa Polskiego w 1812 roku." In Między obowiązkami, przywilejami a prawem Rzeczypospolitej XVI-XVIII w.: Konfederacje staropolskie, 243–60. Ksiegarnia Akademicka Publishing, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.12797/9788381384056.12.
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The article discusses the attitude of the new Lithuanian authorities in 1812 to the idea of the General Confederation of the Kingdom of Poland that was established when Napoleon started the war with Russia. The confederation was supposed to stir a great uprising movement on the lands of the Russian Partition. In that way the Emperor of the French wanted to achieve a quick settlement of the war on the territory of Lithuania. After the fiasco of those plans, Napoleon created a separate administration of Lithuania headed by the Provisional Government Commission. In addition, he agreed for the state liberated from the Russians to join the General Confederation. It provoked a problem of cooperation of these authorities with the Confederation Councils and the government of the Duchy of Warsaw. Mutual relations of these organs formed a new Napoleon’s approach to the issue of the confederation connected with the necessity of the advance of the Great Army to the east. There was also no convocation of one Sejm, but the form of Lithuanian accession to the General Confederation was a rejection of historical Lithuanian separatism in the name of creation one Polish Kingdom what became impossible because the lost war against Russia.
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Tolstoy, Leo. "8." In War and Peace. Oxford University Press, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/owc/9780199232765.003.0300.
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Napoleon enters Moscow after the brilliant victory de la Moskowa; there can be no doubt about the victory, for the battlefield remains in the hands of the French. The Russians retreat and abandon their ancient capital. Moscow, abounding in provisions, arms, munitions,...
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Bergman, Jay. "The Phantom of the Russian Bonaparte." In The French Revolutionary Tradition in Russian and Soviet Politics, Political Thought, and Culture, 393–452. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198842705.003.0014.
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Chapter 14 traces the evolution of the concept of Bonapartism. Marx and Engels thought it a remediable ‘wrong turn’ in history’s evolution that happily occurred only under capitalism; Louis Napoleon and Bismarck were its archetypical expressions. Initially, the Bolsheviks did not take issue with this characterization. But by the 1920s the Bolsheviks recognized that Bonapartism could also occur under socialism, and that the dictatorship it entailed would be a military one; the dictator would either be an army general or a civilian totally dependent on the military for his power. This caused the Bolsheviks to consider Napoleon Bonaparte, rather than Louis Napoleon, the prototypical Bonapartist in power. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the role the accusation of Bonapartism played in Khrushchev’s dismissal of Marshal Zhukov as Minister of Defence in 1957.
Conference papers on the topic "French Napoleonic Army"
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Marotta, Anna. "La “fortezza invisibile”: il telegrafo ottico Chappe nella Francia napoleonica." In FORTMED2020 - Defensive Architecture of the Mediterranean. Valencia: Universitat Politàcnica de València, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4995/fortmed2020.2020.11458.
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The “invisible fortress”: the Chappe optical telegraph in the Napoleonic FranceEven in the defensive and fortifying processes, two aspects can be found: the material component and the immaterial one. If all the constructive, material and structural procedures are the first, for example, all that concerns remote communications (maximum optics) belongs to the second, an indispensable tool to complete an optimal strategy for offensive and/or defensive operations. Remote optical transmissions are closely connected to the management of defensive systems: this is also what happens with the optical telegraph of Claude Chappe, conceived during the French Revolution and adopted by Napoleon for the potential inherent in the strategic and territorial logic, as for the organization, structuring and sending of encrypted messages (which since the sixteenth century had also seen the interest of Leon Battista Alberti. The densest part of the network spreads to France, from Paris to the borders of the nation. In Europe, you will see achievements in Spain, up to Russia. The Lyon-Paris-Venice line also led to the construction of a Lombard-Piedmontese section. The present contribution stems from a conspicuous research, founded on the twenty-year collaboration of Marotta with the FNARH (Fédération Nationale des Associations de Recherche Historique sur la Poste et les Télécommunications). The system included the installation in high positions (hills, towers or bell towers) of a mechanical device, which could be reached at a distance of kilometers. On top of a fixed pole of about 5 m, the apparatus consisted of a central axis (ordinateur) at the ends of which two mobile arms (indicateurs) were fixed which allowed (in the variation of the reciprocal positions and inclinations) to realize multiple signals, at the base of an entire encrypted visual alphabet, arrived in 1841 up to 61000 messages. Multiple types of models made. The contribution will return the chronological developments of the system, in time and space of territories involved, with the relative comparisons of types, models and languages, also through 3D modeling.