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Journal articles on the topic 'Frege's philosophy'

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Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 11 February 2022

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1

Chauvier, Stéphane. "Frege et le cogito." Dialogue 38, no. 2 (1999): 349–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300007253.

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AbstractMost of the readers of Frege's first Logical Investigation, “The Thought,” have been convinced that, according to Frege, the sense of ‘I’ was a private one, that an I-thought was a private thought. But it is not the case: the famous Fregean distinction between private representations and public thoughts seems an explanation and a generalization of the I-thought problem as much as an anti-Cartesian repetition of the Cartesian Second Meditation. Frege's position concerning indexical thoughts is that they are public thoughts, for the sense of an indexical expression is not related to private representations but to some semiotical aspects of the public context of its utterance.

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2

Ellenbogen, Sara. "On the Link Between Frege's Platonic-Realist Semantics and His Doctrine of Private Senses." Philosophy 72, no. 281 (July 1997): 375–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100057065.

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Frege's doctrine that the demonstrative ‘I’ has a private, incommunicable sense creates tension within his theory of meaning. Fregean sense is supposed to be something objective, which exists independently of its being cognized by anyone. And the notion of a private sense corresponding to primitive aspects of an individual of which only he can be awaredoes violence both to Frege's theory of sense as well as to our notionof language as something essentially intersubjective. John Perry has arguedthat Frege was led to the doctrine of private senses in spite of his beliefin the objectivity of sense through his attempt to solve a problem which indexicals posed for his theory. And while philosophers have argued about whether the notion of a private sense is in fact problematic for Frege, they have tended to share Perry's assumption about its origin.

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3

Aukštuolytė, Nijolė. "Loginių žinojimo pagrindų analizė G. Frege's filosofijoje." Problemos 58 (September 29, 2014): 91–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.15388/problemos.2000.58.6811.

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Straipsnyje aptariamas G. Frege‘s indėlis sprendžiant pažintinio turinio formalizavimo galimybių problemą. Matematikos būklė ir poreikiai, paskatinę autorių imtis bendrųjų minties funkcionavimo principų analizės, sukoncentravo jo pastangas logikos srityje. Adekvačios minčiai kalbinės išraiškos paieška atvedė prie kalbos galimybių tyrimo. Frege‘s tyrinėjimai remiasi prielaida, kad loginė minties analizė galima tik per loginę kalbos analizę. Straipsnyje norima pabrėžti, kad autoriaus dėmesys kalbai – netiesioginis. Jis sąlygotas minties, jog kalboje tam tikru būdu yra duotas žinojimas. Analizuojami matematikos loginio konstravimo metmenys Frege's filosofijoje leidžia parodyti, kad matematikos logizavimas skatino naują pačios logikos ir jos pažintinių galimybių sampratą. Frege's kuriama formulių kalba, kaip tam tikra struktūra, jo filosofinių tyrinėjimų kontekste įgyja fundamentalią metodo reikšmę. Tai skatino pripažinti formalaus aspekto svarbą pažinime. Įvairi kalbinė minties raiška atkreipė Frege‘s dėmesį į simbolizavimo būdų skirtingą pažintinę vertę. Tai iškėlė prasmės ir reikšmės skyrimo problemą. Susiejęs prasmę ir reikšmę su sakinio struktūra, jis loginę kalbos analizę nukreipė į semantines problemas. Šios Frege‘s idėjos veikė vėlesnius filosofijos bandymus tyrinėti mūsų pažinimo galimybes prasmingos kalbos ribose.

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4

Shieh, Sanford, and William Demopoulos. "Frege's Philosophy of Mathematics." Philosophical Review 106, no. 2 (April 1997): 275. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2998362.

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5

Hale, Bob. "Frege's Philosophy of Mathematics." Philosophical Quarterly 49, no. 194 (January 1999): 92–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00132.

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6

Nye, Andrea. "Frege's Metaphors." Hypatia 7, no. 2 (1992): 18–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.1992.tb00883.x.

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The form of the sentence, as it is understood in contemporary semantics and linguistics, is functional. This paper interprets the metaphors in which Frege shows what the functional sentence means, arguing that Frege's sentence is neither an adequate translation of natural language nor of use in feminist theorizing.

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7

Hacker, P. M. S. "Frege and the Later Wittgenstein." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 44 (March 1999): 223–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100006743.

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In the preface to the Tractatus Wittgenstein acknowledged ‘Frege's great works’ as one of the two primary stimulations for his thoughts. Throughout his life he admired Frege both as a great thinker and as a great stylist. This much is indisputable. What is disputable is how he viewed his own philosophical work in relation to Frege's and, equally, how we should view his work in this respect. Some followers of Frege are inclined to think that Wittgenstein's work builds on or complements that of Frege. If that were true it would be plausible to suppose that the joint legacy of these two great philosophers can provide a coherent foundation for our own endeavours. But it is debatable whether their fundamental ideas can be synthesized thus. The philosophy of Wittgenstein, both early and late, is propounded to a very large extent in opposition to Frege's. They can no more be mixed than oil and water – or so I shall argue.

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8

Ruthrof, Horst. "Frege's Error." Philosophy Today 37, no. 3 (1993): 306–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtoday199337319.

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9

Vallor, Shannon. "Frege's Puzzle." Philosophy Today 46, no. 9999 (2002): 178–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtoday200246supplement20.

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10

Cook, Roy T., and Philip A. Ebert. "Frege's Recipe." Journal of Philosophy 113, no. 7 (2016): 309–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jphil2016113721.

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11

Forbes, Graeme, and Nathan Salmon. "Frege's Puzzle." Philosophical Review 96, no. 3 (July 1987): 455. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2185233.

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12

Ebert, Philip. "Frege's Theorem." Philosophical Quarterly 64, no. 254 (December 13, 2013): 166–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqt027.

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13

Snyder, Eric, Richard Samuels, and Stewart Shapiro. "Neologicism, Frege's Constraint, and the Frege‐Heck Condition." Noûs 54, no. 1 (April 6, 2018): 54–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/nous.12249.

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14

Moretti, Alberto. "La objetividad de los números fregeanos." Crítica (México D. F. En línea) 23, no. 68 (December 13, 1991): 139–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.1991.808.

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In section 1 I discuss some arguments suggested by Dummet's work, aimed to support the claim that the real problem between realism and antirealism is one about the meaningfulness of sentences. I give sorne reasons to consider them less than conclusive, and to mantain the importance of the traditional approach in terms of the nature of the referred objects. In section 2 I give an account of Frege's view on the objectivity of arithmetic and its relationship with the objectivity of numbers. I defend the possibility of a partially constructivistic interpretation of Frege's analysis. In section 3 Husserl's criticisms of Frege are summed up. I claim that they are not efficient in their original version but it is also suggested that the objections can be rephrased in such a way that they come closer to Benacerraf's criticism on Platonismo An abstractionist altemative, connected with the Erlangen Program, is examined. According to what was said in section 2, it is suggested that even though Frege's view is still unsatisfactory, it is not refuted and the abstractionist view is even weaker. [Traducción de Raúl Orayen]

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15

Urquhart, Alasdair. "The Unnameable." Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 34 (2008): 119–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/cjp.2011.0036.

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Hans Herzberger as a philosopher and logician has shown deep interest both in the philosophy of Gottlob Frege, and in the topic of the inexpressible and the ineffable. In the fall of 1982, he taught at the University of Toronto, together with André Gombay, a course on Frege's metaphysics, philosophy of language, and foundations of arithmetic. Again, in the fall of 1986, he taught a seminar on the philosophy of language that dealt with ‘the limits of discursive symbolism in several domains of human experience.’ The course description continues by saying: ‘Special attention will be given to the paradoxes underlying various doctrines of the inexpressible and the tensions inherent in those paradoxes. Some doctrines of semantic, ethical and religious mysticism will be critically examined.'

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16

Ruffino, Marco. "[NO TITLE AVAILABLE]." Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia 42, no. 104 (December 2001): 130–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/s0100-512x2001000200007.

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In this paper I discuss the intuition behind Frege's and Russell's definitions of numbers as sets, as well as Benacerraf's criticism of it. I argue that Benacerraf's argument is not as strong as some philosophers tend to think. Moreover, I examine an alternative to the Fregean-Russellian definition of numbers proposed by Maddy, and point out some problems faced by it.

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17

Kemp, Gary. "Frege's Sharpness Requirement." Philosophical Quarterly 46, no. 183 (April 1996): 168. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2956385.

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18

Heck,, Richard G. "Solving Frege's Puzzle." Journal of Philosophy 109, no. 1 (2012): 132–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jphil20121091/25.

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19

Smith, Nicholas J. J. "Frege's judgement stroke." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78, no. 2 (June 2000): 153–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048400012349451.

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20

MILNE, PETER. "Frege's Context Principle." Mind XCV, no. 380 (1986): 491–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/xcv.380.491.

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21

Bar-Elli, Gilead. "Frege's context principle." Philosophia 25, no. 1-4 (April 1997): 99–129. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02380028.

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22

Boolos, George. "Frege's Theorem and the Peano Postulates." Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 1, no. 3 (September 1995): 317–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/421158.

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Two thoughts about the concept of number are incompatible: that any zero or more things have a (cardinal) number, and that any zero or more things have a number (if and) only if they are the members of some one set. It is Russell's paradox that shows the thoughts incompatible: the sets that are not members of themselves cannot be the members of any one set. The thought that any (zero or more) things have a number is Frege's; the thought that things have a number only if they are the members of a set may be Cantor's and is in any case a commonplace of the usual contemporary presentations of the set theory that originated with Cantor and has become ZFC.In recent years a number of authors have examined Frege's accounts of arithmetic with a view to extracting an interesting subtheory from Frege's formal system, whose inconsistency, as is well known, was demonstrated by Russell. These accounts are contained in Frege's formal treatise Grundgesetze der Arithmetik and his earlier exoteric book Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik. We may describe the two central results of the recent re-evaluation of his work in the following way: Let Frege arithmetic be the result of adjoining to full axiomatic second-order logic a suitable formalization of the statement that the Fs and the Gs have the same number if and only if the F sand the Gs are equinumerous.

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23

DUNNING, DAVID E. "“ALWAYS MIXED TOGETHER”: NOTATION, LANGUAGE, AND THE PEDAGOGY OF FREGE'S BEGRIFFSSCHRIFT." Modern Intellectual History 17, no. 4 (September 26, 2018): 1099–131. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1479244318000410.

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Gottlob Frege is considered a founder of analytic philosophy and mathematical logic, but the traditions that claim Frege as a forebear never embraced his Begriffsschrift, or “conceptual notation”—the invention he considered his most important accomplishment. Frege believed that his notation rendered logic visually observable. Rejecting the linearity of written language, he claimed Begriffsschrift exhibited a structure endogenous to logic itself. But Frege struggled to convince others to use his notation, as his frustrated pedagogical efforts at the University of Jena illustrate. Teaching Begriffsschrift meant using words to explain it; rather than replacing spoken language, notation became its obverse in a bifurcated style of argument that separated deduction from commentary. Both registers of this discourse, however, remained within Frege's monologue, imposing a consequential passivity on his students. In keeping with Frege's visual understanding of notation, they learned by silently observing it, though never in isolation: notation and language were always mixed together.

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24

Imbert, Claude. "Gottlob Frege, One More Time." Hypatia 15, no. 4 (2000): 156–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2000.tb00358.x.

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Frege's philosophical writings, including the “logistic project,” acquire a new insight by being confronted with Kant's criticism and Wittgenstein's logical and grammatical investigations. Between these two points a non-formalist history of logic is just taking shape, a history emphasizing the Greek and Kantian inheritance and its aftermath. It allows us to understand the radical change in rationality introduced by Gottlob Frege's syntax. This syntax put an end to Greek categorization and opened the way to the multiplicity of expressions producing their own intelligibility. This article is based on more technical analyses of Frege which Claude Imbert has previously offered in other writings (see references).

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25

Rayo, Agustín. "Frege's unofficial arithmetic." Journal of Symbolic Logic 67, no. 4 (December 2002): 1623–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.2178/jsl/1190150304.

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AbstractI show that any sentence of nth-order (pure or applied) arithmetic can be expressed with no loss of compositionality as a second-order sentence containing no arithmetical vocabulary, and use this result to prove a completeness theorem for applied arithmetic. More specifically. I set forth an enriched second-order language L. a sentence of L (which is true on the intended interpretation of L), and a compositionally recursive transformation Tr defined on formulas of L, and show that they have the following two properties: (a) in a universe with at least ℶn−2 objects, any formula of nth-order (pure or applied) arithmetic can be expressed as a formula of L, and (b) for any sentence of is a second-order sentence containing no arithmetical vocabulary, and

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26

JACQUETTE, DALE. "Intentionality on the Instalment Plan." Philosophy 73, no. 1 (January 1998): 63–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819197000089.

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1. What's in a Name?Can philosophy of language do without the concept of intentionality? To approach this important question it may be useful to begin with the minimal explanatory requirements for a theory of reference that tries to explain the naming of objects as the simplest linguistic act. The limitations of trying to understand meaning without intentionality are therefore best illustrated by considering what is generally acknowledged to be the most thorough-going attempt to dispense altogether with intentional concepts in Frege's reputedly purely extensionalist semantics of proper names. I shall argue that despite his avowed anti-psychologism, Frege paradoxically needs to include psychological elements alongside his famous distinction between sense and reference in order to preserve the universal intersubstitutability of singular referring expressions salva veritate as an adequate extensional criterion of coreferentiality. In so doing, a revisionary Fregean semantics introduces the first instalment of intentionality at the foundations of naming, by which intentionality pervades the philosophy of language.

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27

Green, Karen. "Was Wittgenstein Frege's Heir." Philosophical Quarterly 49, no. 196 (July 1999): 289–308. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00143.

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28

Martin, Edwin. "FREGE'S DEFINITION OF NUMBERS." Philosophical Papers 16, no. 1 (April 1987): 59–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/05568648709506266.

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29

Kemp, Gary. "Caesar from Frege's Perspective." Dialectica 59, no. 2 (July 27, 2005): 179–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2005.01026.x.

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30

Tappenden, Jamie. "A Primer on Ernst Abbe for Frege Readers." Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 34 (2008): 31–118. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/cjp.2011.0035.

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Setting out to understand Frege, the scholar confronts a roadblock at the outset: We just have little to go on. Much of the unpublished work and correspondence is lost, probably forever. Even the most basic task of imagining Frege's intellectual life is a challenge. The people he studied with and those he spent daily time with are little known to historians of philosophy and logic. To be sure, this makes it hard to answer broad questions like: ‘Who influenced Frege?’ But the information vacuum also creates local problems of textual interpretation. Say we encounter a sentence that may be read as alluding to a scientific dispute. Should it be read that way? To answer, we'd need to address prior questions. Is it reasonable to think Frege would be familiar with the issue? Deep or superficial familiarity? Would he expect his readers to catch the allusion? Can he be expected to anticipate certain objections? Can people he knows be expected to press those objections? A battery of such questions arise, demanding a richer understanding of Frege's environment.

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31

Millar, Boyd. "Frege's Puzzle for Perception." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93, no. 2 (October 26, 2015): 368–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12230.

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32

Thau, Mike, and Ben Caplan. "What's Puzzling Gottlob Frege?" Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31, no. 2 (June 2001): 159–200. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2001.10717564.

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By any reasonable reckoning, Gottlob Frege's ‘On Sense and Reference’ is one of the more important philosophical papers of all time. Although Frege briefly discusses the sense-reference distinction in an earlier work (‘Function and Concept,’ in 1891), it is through ‘Sense and Reference’ that most philosophers have become familiar with it. And the distinction so thoroughly permeates contemporary philosophy of language and mind that it is almost impossible to imagine these subjects without it.The distinction between the sense and the referent of a name is introduced in the second paragraph of ‘Sense and Reference.’

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33

Heck, Richard G. "The development of arithmetic in Frege's Grundgesetze der arithmetik." Journal of Symbolic Logic 58, no. 2 (June 1993): 579–601. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2275220.

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AbstractFrege's development of the theory of arithmetic in his Grundgesetze der Arithmetik has long been ignored, since the formal theory of the Grundgesetze is inconsistent. His derivations of the axioms of arithmetic from what is known as Hume's Principle do not, however, depend upon that axiom of the system—Axiom V—which is responsible for the inconsistency. On the contrary, Frege's proofs constitute a derivation of axioms for arithmetic from Hume's Principle, in (axiomatic) second-order logic. Moreover, though Frege does prove each of the now standard Dedekind-Peano axioms, his proofs are devoted primarily to the derivation of his own axioms for arithmetic, which are somewhat different (though of course equivalent). These axioms, which may be yet more intuitive than the Dedekind-Peano axioms, may be taken to be “The Basic Laws of Cardinal Number”, as Frege understood them.Though the axioms of arithmetic have been known to be derivable from Hume's Principle for about ten years now, it has not been widely recognized that Frege himself showed them so to be; nor has it been known that Frege made use of any axiomatization for arithmetic whatsoever. Grundgesetze is thus a work of much greater significance than has often been thought. First, Frege's use of the inconsistent Axiom V may invalidate certain of his claims regarding the philosophical significance of his work (viz., the establish may invalidate certain of his claims regarding the philosophical significance of his work (viz., the establishment of Logicism), but it should not be allowed to obscure his mathematical accomplishments and his contribution to our understanding of arithmetic. Second, Frege's knowledge that arithmetic is derivable from Hume's Principle raises important sorts of questions about his philosophy of arithmetic. For example, “Why did Frege not simply abandon Axiom V and take Hume's Principle as an axiom?”

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34

Yourgrau, Palle. "What is Frege's Relativity Argument?" Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27, no. 2 (June 1997): 137–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1997.10717476.

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Sets are multitudes which are also unities. It is surprising that the fact that multitudes are also unities leads to no contradictions: this is the main fact of mathematics.Kurt Gödel (Hao Wang, A Logical Journey: From Gödel to Philosophy)In what sense can something be at the same time one and many? The problem is familiar since Plato (for example, Republic 524e). In recent times, Whitehead and Russell, in Principia Mathematica, have been struck by the difficulty of the problem: ‘If there is such an object as a class, it must be in some sense one object, yet it is only of classes that many can be predicated. Hence, if we admit classes as objects, we must suppose that the same object can be both one and many, which seems impossible.' It is, however, in Frege's great work, The Foundations of Arithmetic (henceforth, Grundlagen), that many see the final resolution of the old question: how can something be at the same time one and many?

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35

Bealer, George. "A Solution to Frege's Puzzle." Philosophical Perspectives 7 (1993): 17. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2214115.

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36

Frey, Gregor K., and Pavel Tichy. "The Foundations of Frege's Logic." Noûs 27, no. 4 (December 1993): 532. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2215797.

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37

Gray, Aidan. "Relational approaches to Frege's puzzle." Philosophy Compass 12, no. 10 (October 2017): e12429. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12429.

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38

Green, Karen. "LOGICAL RENOVATIONS: RESTORING FREGE'S FUNCTIONS." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73, no. 4 (December 1992): 315–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0114.1992.tb00341.x.

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39

KIM, JOONGOL. "FREGE'S CONTEXT PRINCIPLE: AN INTERPRETATION." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92, no. 2 (May 11, 2011): 193–213. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0114.2011.01391.x.

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40

Jeshion, R. "Frege's Notions of Self-Evidence." Mind 110, no. 440 (October 1, 2001): 937–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/110.440.937.

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41

SMILEY, T. J. "Frege's ‘series of natural numbers’." Mind XCVII, no. 388 (1988): 583–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/xcvii.388.583.

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42

Bell, J. L. "Type reducing correspondences and well-orderings: Frege's and Zermelo's constructions re-examined." Journal of Symbolic Logic 60, no. 1 (March 1995): 209–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2275518.

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A key idea in both Frege's development of arithmetic in the Grundlagen [7] and Zermelo's 1904 proof [10] of the well-ordering theorem is that of a “type reducing” correspondence between second-level and first-level entities. In Frege's construction, the correspondence obtains between concept and number, in Zermelo's (through the axiom of choice), between set and member. In this paper, a formulation is given and a detailed investigation undertaken of a system ℱ of many-sorted first-order logic (first outlined in the Appendix to [6]) in which this notion of type reducing correspondence is accorded a central role and which enables Frege's and Zermelo's constructions to be presented in such a way as to reveal their essential similarity. By adapting Bourbaki's version of Zermelo's proof of the well-ordering theorem, we show that, within ℱ, any correspondence c between second-level entities (here called concepts) and first-level ones (here called objects) induces a well-ordering relation W (c) in a canonical manner. We shall see that, when c is the “Fregean” correspondence between concepts and cardinal numbers, W (c) is (the well-ordering of) the ordinal ω + 1, and when c is a “Zermelian” choice function on concepts, W (c) is a well-ordering of the universal concept embracing all objects.In ℱ an important role is played by the notion of extension of a concept. To each concept X we assume there is assigned an object e(X) in such a way that, for any concepts X, Y satisfying a certain predicate E, we have e (X) = e (Y) iff the same objects fall under X and Y.

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43

Lowe, E. J. "Identity, Individuality, and Unity." Philosophy 78, no. 3 (July 2003): 321–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819103000329.

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Locke notoriously included number amongst the primary qualities of bodies and was roundly criticized for doing so by Berkeley. Frege echoed some of Berkeley's criticisms in attacking the idea that ‘Number is a property of external things’, while defending his own view that number is a property of concepts. In the present paper, Locke's view is defended against the objections of Berkeley and Frege, and Frege's alternative view of number is criticized. More precisely, it is argued that numbers are assignable to pluralities of individuals. However, it is also argued that Locke went too far in asserting that ‘Number applies itself to ... everything that either doth exist, or can be imagined’.

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44

Rivenc, François. "L'existence des objets logiques selon Frege." Dialogue 42, no. 2 (2003): 291–319. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300004534.

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AbstractThis article discusses several recent interpretations of Frege's philosophy of arithmetic, particularly those developed by C. Wright, M. Dummett, and G. Boolos. After proposing a new interpretation of § 10 of the Grundgesetze (about the indeterminacy of the referents of the names of the courses-of-values), and rejecting Dummett's analysis of Frege's failure in terms of impredicativity, I examine Boolos's objections to the analyticity of “Hume's Principle.” I wish to highlight the philosophical question: is the model-theoretical concept of validity adequate to the “intuitive notion” of the logically true?

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45

Speaks, Jeff. "Individuating Fregean sense." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43, no. 5-6 (December 2013): 634–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2014.925678.

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While it is highly controversial whether Frege's criterion of sameness and difference for sense is true, it is relatively uncontroversial that that principle is inconsistent with Millian–Russellian views of content. I argue that this should not be uncontroversial. The reason is that it is surprisingly difficult to come up with an interpretation of Frege's criterion which implies anything substantial about the sameness or difference of content of anything.

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46

Tappenden, Jamie. "Geometry and generality in Frege's philosophy of arithmetic." Synthese 102, no. 3 (March 1995): 319–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01064120.

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47

Zaiss, James. "Taking Frege's name in vain." Erkenntnis 39, no. 2 (September 1993): 167–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01128227.

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48

SPEAKS, JEFF. "Frege's Puzzle and Descriptive Enrichment." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83, no. 2 (December 14, 2010): 267–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00419.x.

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49

Blanchette, Patricia. "Relative Identity and Cardinality." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29, no. 2 (June 1999): 205–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1999.10717511.

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Peter Geach famously holds that there is no such thing as absolute identity. There are rather, as Geach sees it, a variety of relative identity relations, each essentially connected with a particular monadic predicate. Though we can strictly and meaningfully say that an individual a is the same man as the individual b, or that a is the same statue as b, we cannot, on this view, strictly and meaningfully say that the individual a simply is b.It is difficult to find anything like a persuasive argument for this doctrine in Geach’s work. But one claim made by Geach is that his account of identity is the account most naturally aligned with Frege's widely admired treatment of cardinality. And though this claim of an affinity between Frege's and Geach's doctrines has been challenged, the challenge has been resisted. William Alston and Jonathan Bennett, indeed, go further than Geach to argue that Frege's doctrine implies Geach's.

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50

Yagisawa, Takashi. "A Semantic Solution to Frege's Puzzle." Philosophical Perspectives 7 (1993): 135. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2214119.

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