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1
Jennings, Mark Richard John. "Frege's logicism : getting an insight into what we grasp." Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2002. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.269765.
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Broackes, J. "The identity of properties." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1986. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.375879.
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Yates, Alexander. "Frege's case for the logicality of his basic laws." Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/12252.
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Frege wanted to show that arithmetical truths are logical by proving them from purely logical basic laws. But how do we know that these basic laws are logical? Frege uses generality and undeniability to make a prima facie case for logicality—if a truth is general and undeniable, then it's likely logical. I argue that Frege could, did, and had to make a deeper case for why we're right in recognizing his basic laws as logical. Implicit in his work is a view of logical laws as epistemically analytic—his arguments for his basic laws serve to elicit a reflective awareness of the fact that understanding them is sufficient for recognizing them to be true. This view both fits with Frege's comments concerning the connection between logic, truth, and normativity, and serves to explain why and in what sense he took logic to be general and conceptually undeniable. In my view, semantics must play a distinctive role in any rational reconstruction of Frege's case for logicality—the aforementioned “reflective awareness” must be an explicit appreciation of how the truth of formulas expressing Frege's laws follows quickly from his stipulations governing terms which figure in those formulas. Opposing this view is the elucidatory interpretation of Thomas Ricketts, Warren Goldfarb, and Joan Weiner, which holds that Frege's arguments for his basic laws can't be taken at face value, and must serve the merely elucidatory purpose of easing us into the language. Another reading is the correctness interpretation of Richard Heck and Jason Stanley, which holds that Frege's primary purpose in his arguments is justifying the claim that Frege's axioms, qua formulas, are true. I argue against both of these interpretations, and in doing so clarify the role and limits of semantics in Frege's enterprise.
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Branquinho, João Miguel Biscaia Valadas. "Direct reference, cognitive significance and Fregean sense." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1992. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:9d87a630-2d56-4e0a-a437-ab8f3ad82ad8.
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This essay deals with certain problems in the theory of singular reference. The following question is taken as central: What role is to be assigned to nonempty and syntactically simple singular terms in fixing the semantic contents of utterances of declarative sentences in which they may occur? I focus on those aspects of the current dispute between Millian and neo-Fregean approaches to singular reference which are related to issues about the cognitive significance of language use; the following two issues are singled out as crucial: the issue about (alleged) potential differences in informativeness between sentences constructed out of co-referential singular terms; and the issue about (alleged) failures of substitutivity salva veritate of co-referential singular terms in propositional-attitude contexts. The general direction of my arguments is as follows. On the one hand, I argue that "notational variance" claims recently advanced on both sides of the dispute should be deemed unsound; and hence that one is really confronted with separate accounts of singular content. On the other, I argue that Milllanism does not provide us with a satisfactory solution to the problems about cognitive significance; and hence that a framework of singular senses is Indispensable to deal with such problems in an adequate way. I also discuss the problem of Cognitive Dynamics, i.e. the issue of attitude-retention and persistence of mental content, in connection with the individuation of indexical thought. I argue that the standard Intuitive Criterion of Difference for thoughts might be reasonably extended to the diachronic case, allowing thus the possibility of discriminating between thoughts entertained by a thinker at different times.
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Kaschmieder, Hartfried. "Beurteilbarer Inhalt und Gedanke in der Philosophie Gottlob Freges /." Hildesheim : G. Olms, 1989. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb35518128q.
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DUARTE, ALESSANDRO BANDEIRA. "HUMENULLS PRINCIPLE: POSSIBILITY OF A (NEO) FREGEAN PHILOSOPHY OF ARITHMETIC?" PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2004. http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=5189@1.
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CONSELHO NACIONAL DE DESENVOLVIMENTO CIENTÍFICO E TECNOLÓGICOA dissertação apresenta e discute as idéias desenvolvidas por Crispin Wright no livro Frege´s Conception of Numbers as Objects (1983), em particular, a sua tese de que a aritmética é analítica. Wright deposita toda sua força argumentativa (em relação à analiticidade da aritmética) na derivação dos axiomas da aritmética de segunda ordem de Dedekind-Peano a partir do Princípio de Hume. Assim, é nosso principal objetivo apresentar e discutir em que medida o Princípio de Hume é capaz de fornecer, segundo Wright, um relato da analiticidade da aritmética, assim como, as objeções a esse relato.
The dissertation presents and discusses the ideas developed by Crispin Wright in his book Frege's Conception of Numbers as Objects (1983), in particular his thesis that arithmetic is analytic. Wright concentrates all his argumentative efforts (in relation to the analyticity of arithmetic) on the derivation of the axioms of Dedekind-Peano's second order arithmetic from Hume's Principle. Thus, it is our main goal to present and discuss how Hume's Principle provides, according to Wright, an explanation of the analytic character of arithmetic as well as some objections to this account.
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DUARTE, ALESSANDRO BANDEIRA. "LOGIC AND ARITHMETIC IN FREGE´S PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS." PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2009. http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=13942@1.
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PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRONos Fundamentos da Aritmética (parágrafo 68), Frege propõe definir explicitamente o operador-abstração ´o número de...´ por meio de extensões e, a partir desta definição, provar o Princípio de Hume (PH). Contudo, a prova imaginada por Frege depende de uma fórmula (BB) não provável no sistema em 1884. Acreditamos que a distinção entre sentido e referência e a introdução dos valores de verdade como objetos foram motivada para justificar a introdução do Axioma IV, a partir do qual um análogo de (BB) é provável. Com (BB) no sistema, a prova do Princípio de Hume estaria garantida. Concomitantemente, percebemos que uma teoria unificada das extensões só é possível com a distinção entre sentido e referência e a introdução dos valores de verdade como objetos. Caso contrário, Frege teria sido obrigado a introduzir uma série de Axiomas V no seu sistema, o que acarretaria problemas com a identidade (Júlio César). Com base nestas considerações, além do fato de que, em 1882, Frege provara as leis básicas da aritmética (carta a Anton Marty), parece-nos perfeitamente plausível que as estas provas foram executadas adicionando-se o PH ao sistema lógico de Begriffsschrift. Mostramos que, nas provas dos axiomas de Peano a partir de PH dentro da conceitografia, nenhum uso é feito de (BB). Destarte, não é necessária a introdução do Axioma IV no sistema e, por conseguinte, não são necessárias a distinção entre sentido e referência e a introdução dos valores de verdade como objetos. Disto, podemos concluir que, provavelmente, a introdução das extensões nos Fundamentos foi um ato tardio; e que Frege não possuía uma prova formal de PH a partir da sua definição explícita. Estes fatos também explicam a demora na publicação das Leis Básicas da Aritmética e o descarte de um manuscrito quase pronto (provavelmente, o livro mencionado na carta a Marty).
In The Foundations of Arithmetic (paragraph 68), Frege proposes to define explicitly the abstraction operator ´the number of …´ by means of extensions and, from this definition, to prove Hume´s Principle (HP). Nevertheless, the proof imagined by Frege depends on a formula (BB), which is not provable in the system in 1884. we believe that the distinction between sense and reference as well as the introduction of Truth-Values as objects were motivated in order to justify the introduction of Axiom IV, from which an analogous of (BB) is provable. With (BB) in the system, the proof of HP would be guaranteed. At the same time, we realize that a unified theory of extensions is only possible with the distinction between sense and reference and the introduction of Truth-Values as objects. Otherwise, Frege would have been obliged to introduce a series of Axioms V in his system, what cause problems regarding the identity (Julius Caesar). Based on these considerations, besides the fact that in 1882 Frege had proved the basic laws of Arithmetic (letter to Anton Marty), it seems perfectly plausible that these proofs carried out by adding to the Begriffsschrift´s logical system. We show that in the proofs of Peano s axioms from HP within the begriffsschrift, (BB) is not used at all. Thus, the introduction of Axiom IV in the system is not necessary and, consequently, neither the distinction between sense and reference nor the introduction of Truth- Values as objects. From these findings we may conclude that probably the introduction of extensions in The Foundations was a late act; and that Frege did not hold a formal proof of HP from his explicit definition. These facts also explain the delay in the publication of the Basic Laws of Arithmetic and the abandon of a manuscript almost finished (probably the book mentioned in the letter to Marty).
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McKinnon, Christine. "Wittgenstein, Frege and theories of meaning." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1985. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.385581.
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Harcourt, Edward. "Sense and the first person : Frege and Wittgenstein." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1995. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.295782.
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Rosenkrantz, Max Langan. "Sense, reference and ontology in early analytic philosophy /." Full text (PDF) from UMI/Dissertation Abstracts International, 2000. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/utexas/fullcit?p3004369.
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Martin, Sean S. "A Fregean Response to Moore and Altman." Digital Archive @ GSU, 2011. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/77.
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In this paper I give a thorough account of the history of the open question argument. I have provide Moore’s original impetus for it and its traditional formulation. I then examine the Cornell Realists’ objection to that original formulation and showed that their objection does indeed show the open question argument to be incorrect in its conclusions. Having presented the history of the open question argument and having assessed the most challenging objections to it, I turn to Andrew Altman’s powerful reconstruction of the open question argument in order to see how well, if at all, it sidesteps the objections leveled against the classical formulation. I then argue that while Altman does present the most coherent defense of the open question argument available, I conclude that insofar as he has rested upon a commitment to Carnap's philosophy of language over a Fregean semantic and an untenable rendering of post-Kripkean philosophy of language as it concerns rigid designation, we must reject his reformulation. Given that rigid designation itself undermines Altman’s position, I conclude that the open question is still in need of a defense before it can regain its position as a major player in the discipline of ethics.
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Francisco, Antônio Marcos 1980. "Gottlob Frege : da noção de conteúdo à distinção entre sentido e referência." [s.n.], 2013. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/281688.
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Orientador: Arley Ramos MorenoDissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas
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Resumo: O intuito do presente trabalho é expor e associar dois momentos do pensamento de Gottlob Frege - um situado na obra Conceitografia, publicada em 1879, e outro presente a partir da distinção entre sentido e referência articulada, principalmente, no artigo Sobre o Sentido e a Referência, publicado em 1892. O objetivo é explicitar que apesar de existirem significativas diferenças entre as duas épocas é possível perceber uma profunda continuidade no desenvolvimento de um projeto único, e também uma clara conexão entre as duas obras, apesar de o léxico filosófico fregeano ter passado por expressivas alterações após a concepção da distinção entre sentido e referência. Este trabalho está dividido em quatro partes: a primeira apresenta o que motivou o matemático Gottlob Frege a dedicar-se à análise da linguagem e elaborar uma "conceitografia" para representar o que é fundamental na proposição - o conteúdo conceitual; o momento seguinte, capítulo II, expõe como o problema da identidade de conteúdo culminou com um esboço de uma teoria semântica na obra de 1879; a parte três expõe a conexão entre a teoria semântica de 1879 e de 1892; a parte final, capítulo IV, é uma tentativa de expor como os temas do artigo de 1892 estão intimamente associados com as questões apresentadas na obra Conceitografia
Abstract: The purpose of this work is to describe and to connect the two moments of thought of Gottlob Frege - one found in the work Conceptual Notation published in 1879 and the other one in the article On Sense and Reference published in 1892, which presents the distinction between sense and reference. The goal is to explain that although there are significant differences between the two moments it is possible to perceive a deep continuity in the development of a single project. There is also a clear connection between the two works despite of the Fregean technical terms having gone through major changes after taking into consideration the conception of the distinction between sense and reference. This work is divided into four parts: the first one introduces what motivated the mathematician Gottlob Frege to devote himself to the analysis of language and develop a formula language to represent what is fundamental in the proposition - the conceptual content; the second in the Chapter II exposes how the problem of identity content culminated with a sketch of a semantic theory in the work of 1879, the third one explains the connection between theory and semantics from 1879 and from 1892, and finally, Chapter IV , is an attempt to expose how the themes of the article of 1892 are closely associated with the work Conceitografia affairs
Mestrado
Filosofia
Mestre em Filosofia
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Klement, Kevin C. "Frege and the logic of sense and reference /." London : Routledge, 2002. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb38871352m.
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Butler, Martin Lucas. "Logical syntax and the limits of sense in the philosophy of Frege and Wittgenstein." Thesis, University of Sheffield, 1988. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.725247.
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Kienzler, Wolfgang. "Begriff und Gegenstand eine historische und systematische Studie zur Entwicklung von Gottlob Freges Denken." Frankfurt, M. Klostermann, 2004. http://d-nb.info/994135734/04.
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Kortum, Richard D. "Varieties of Tone: Frege, Dummett and the Shades of Meaning." Digital Commons @ East Tennessee State University, 2013. https://amzn.com/1349442593.
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In clear and lively prose that avoids jargon, the author carefully and systematically examines the many kinds of subtly nuanced words or word-pairs of everyday discourse such as 'and'-'but', 'before'-'ere', 'Chinese'-'Chink', and 'sweat'-'perspiration', that have proven resistant to truth-conditional explanations of meaning.https://dc.etsu.edu/etsu_books/1108/thumbnail.jpg
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Almeida, Henrique Antunes 1989. "Revisitando o Teorema de Frege." [s.n.], 2014. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/279774.
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Orientador: Walter Alexandre CarnielliDissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas
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Resumo: Neste trabalho, abordamos o Teorema de Frege sob uma perspectiva exclusivamente técnica. Primeiramente, propomos uma caracterização geral de linguagens de segunda ordem que sejam adequadas para formalizar quaisquer teorias fregeanas ¿ teorias que resultam da introdução de um ou mais princípios de abstração a um sistema dedutivo de lógica de segunda ordem; fornecemos uma semântica e um sistema dedutivo para essas linguagens e elaboramos alguns resultados metateóricos acerca desse sistema. Em segundo lugar, apresentamos uma exposicão detalhada da prova do Teorema de Frege, enunciado como uma relação entre a Aritmética de Frege e a Aritmética de Dedekind-Peano. Por fim, provamos a equiconsistência entre essas teorias e a Aritmética de Peano de Segunda Ordem
Abstract: In this work, we discuss Frege¿s Theorem under an exclusively technical perspective. First, we propose a general caracterization of second-order languages suitable to formalize all Fregean theories ¿ theories that result from the introduction of one or more abstraction principles to a deductive system of second-order logic; we also furnish a semantics and a deductive system for these languages and establish a few metatheorical results about the system. Second, we present a detailed proof of Frege¿s Theorem, formulated as a relation between Frege¿s Arithmetic and Dedekind-Peano Arithemtic. Finally, we prove the equiconsistency between these theories and Peano Second-Order Arithmetic
Mestrado
Filosofia
Mestre em Filosofia
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Burke, Mark. "Frege, Hilbert, and Structuralism." Thesis, Université d'Ottawa / University of Ottawa, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/31937.
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The central question of this thesis is: what is mathematics about? The answer arrived at by the thesis is an unsettling and unsatisfying one. By examining two of the most promising contemporary accounts of the nature of mathematics, I conclude that neither is as yet capable of giving us a conclusive answer to our question. The conclusion is arrived at by a combination of historical and conceptual analysis. It begins with the historical fact that, since the middle of the nineteenth century, mathematics has undergone a radical transformation. This transformation occurred in most branches of mathematics, but was perhaps most apparent in geometry. Earlier images of geometry understood it as the science of space. In the wake of the emergence of multiple distinct geometries and the realization that non-Euclidean geometries might lay claim to the description of physical space, the old picture of Euclidean geometry as the sole correct description of physical space was no longer tenable. The first chapter of the dissertation provides an historical account of some of the forces which led to the destabilization of the traditional picture of geometry. The second chapter examines the debate between Gottlob Frege and David Hilbert regarding the nature of geometry and axiomatics, ending with an argument suggesting that Hilbert’s views are ultimately unsatisfying. The third chapter continues to probe the work of Frege and, again, finds his explanations of the nature of mathematics troublingly unsatisfying. The end result of the first three chapters is that the Frege-Hilbert debate leaves us with an impasse: the traditional understanding of mathematics cannot hold, but neither can the two most promising modern accounts. The fourth and final chapter of the thesis investigates mathematical structuralism—a more recent development in the philosophy of mathematics—in order to see whether it can move us beyond the impasse of the Frege-Hilbert debate. Ultimately, it is argued that the contemporary debate between ‘assertoric’ structuralists and ‘algebraic’ structuralists recapitulates a form of the Frege-Hilbert impasse. The ultimate claim of the thesis, then, is that neither of the two most promising contemporary accounts can offer us a satisfying philosophical answer to the question ‘what is mathematics about?’.
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Shipley, Jeremy Robert. "From a structural point of view." Diss., University of Iowa, 2011. https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/1178.
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In this thesis I argue forin re structuralism in the philosophy of mathematics. In the first chapters of the thesis I argue that there is a genuine epistemic access problem for Platonism, that the semantic challenge to nominalism may be met by paraphrase strategies, and that nominalizations of scientific theories have had adequate success to blunt the force of the indispensability argument for Platonism. In the second part of the thesis I discuss the development of logicism and structuralism as methodologies in the history of mathematics. The goal of this historical investigation is to lay the groundwork for distinguishing between the philosophical analysis of the content of mathematics and the analysis of the breadth and depth of results in mathematics. My central contention is that the notion of logical structure provides a context for the latter not the former. In turn, this contention leads to a rejection of ante rem structuralism in favor of in re structuralism. In the concluding part of the dissertation the philosophy of mathematical structures developed and defended in the preceding chapters is applied to the philosophy of science.
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Rouilhan, Philippe de. "Catégories logiques et paradoxes : recherches à partir de Frege, Russel et Tarski." Paris 1, 1988. http://www.theses.fr/1988PA010521.
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Les recherches qui composent cette thèse, menées à partir de Frege, Russell et Tarski, sont consacrées à la notion de catégorie logique en relation avec le problème des paradoxes. Leurs titres, donnes ci-après, suggèrent plus précisément, au-delà de leur triplicité, l'unité organique du tout qu'elles constituent, si l'on ajoute que les "paradoxes de la représentation" dont fait état le premier sont, d'une part, le paradoxe de Russell, paradoxe logique par excellence, et, d'autre part, le paradoxe de Frege, que l'on peut considérer comme une sorte de paradoxe sémantique: -première recherche (à partir de Frege): sur les paradoxes de la représentation, deuxième recherche (à partir de Russell): sur la résolution commune des paradoxes logiques ou sémantiques par la théorie des types ramifiée, troisième recherche (à partir de Tarski): sur la résolution séparée des paradoxes logiques par la théorie des types simple ou par la théorie des ensembles, et des paradoxes sémantiques par la distinction des niveaux de langage. La visée ultime de cette thèse est quelque chose comme une résolution simultanée des paradoxes logiques et sémantiques, y compris, sous une forme ou sous une autre, le paradoxe de Frege, mais une résolution qui n'implique pas l'ordinaire distinction des niveaux de langage. La thèse ne produit pas une telle résolution, peut-être hors de portée dans l'état actuel de la logique, du moins tente-t-elle de réactualiser la valeur paradoxale du paradoxe de Frege sous une forme généralisée, de faire la critique en règle de la distinction des niveaux de langage, et de rappeler la communauté des logiciens a l'urgence de ladite résolution.
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Gühler, Janine. "Aristotle on mathematical objects." Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/6864.
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My thesis is an exposition and defence of Aristotle's philosophy of mathematics. The first part of my thesis is an exposition of Aristotle's cryptic and challenging view on mathematics and is based on remarks scattered all over the corpus aristotelicum. The thesis' central focus is on Aristotle's view on numbers rather than on geometrical figures. In particular, number is understood as a countable plurality and is always a number of something. I show that as a consequence the related concept of counting is based on units. In the second part of my thesis, I verify Aristotle's view on number by applying it to his account of time. Time presents itself as a perfect test case for this project because Aristotle defines time as a kind of number but also considers it as a continuum. Since numbers and continuous things are mutually exclusive this observation seems to lead to an apparent contradiction. I show why a contradiction does not arise when we understand Aristotle properly. In the third part, I argue that the ontological status of mathematical objects, dubbed as materially [hulekos, ÍlekÀc] by Aristotle, can only be defended as an alternative to Platonism if mathematical objects exist potentially enmattered in physical objects. In the fourth part, I compare Aristotle's and Plato's views on how we obtain knowledge of mathematical objects. The fifth part is an extension of my comparison between Aristotle's and Plato's epistemological views to their respective ontological views regarding mathematics. In the last part of my thesis I bring Frege's view on numbers into play and engage with Plato, Aristotle and Frege equally while exploring their ontological commitments to mathematical objects. Specifically, I argue that Frege should not be mistaken for a historical Platonist and that we find surprisingly many similarities between Frege and Aristotle. After having acknowledged commonalities between Aristotle and Frege, I turn to the most significant differences in their views. Finally, I defend Aristotle's abstractionism in mathematics against Frege's counting block argument. This whole project sheds more light on Aristotle's view on mathematical objects and explains why it remains an attractive view in the philosophy of mathematics.
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Höh, Hans Joachim [Verfasser], Ulrich [Gutachter] Pardey, and Michael [Gutachter] Anacker. "Neuropsychologische Bedeutungstheorie : eine Neubewertung Wittgensteins, Freges und Quines verschiedener Sprachkonzepte zur Erstellung einer aktuellen neuropsychologischen Bedeutungstheorie / Hans Joachim Höh ; Gutachter: Ulrich Pardey, Michael Anacker ; Fakultät für Philosophie und Erziehungswissenschaft." Bochum : Ruhr-Universität Bochum, 2014. http://d-nb.info/1221368265/34.
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Gomes, Rodrigo Rafael. "As concepções de função de Frege e Russell : um estudo de caso em filosofia e história da matemática /." Rio Claro, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/11449/132149.
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Orientador: Irineu BicudoBanca: Carlos Roberto de Moraes
Banca: Henrique Lazari
Banca: Marcos Vieira Teixeira
Banca: Renata Cristina Geromel Meneghetti
Resumo: O presente trabalho exibe um estudo de caso sobre o desenvolvimento conceitual e metodológico da Matemática, por meio do exame e comparação das concepções de função de Gottlob Frege e Bertrand Russell. Em particular, são discutidos: a extensão fregiana da ideia matemática de função, a noção russelliana de função proposicional, os seus pressupostos filosóficos e as suas implicações. O presente estudo baseia-se em análises dos livros que os dois autores publicaram sobre os fundamentos da Matemática, e também de alguns outros escritos de sua autoria, entre eles, manuscritos que foram publicados postumamente. Conclui-se a partir dessas análises que a concepção compreensiva de função de Frege e a função proposicional de Russell são generalizações de uma importante aquisição do pensamento matemático, qual seja, a ideia de função, e que a conceitografia e as teorias dos tipos e das descrições, por sua vez, constituem a exploração metódica daquilo que essas generalizações acarretam. Conclui-se, finalmente, que embora existam diferenças expressivas entre as concepções de função de Frege e Russell, um padrão de rigor associado a reflexões mais amplas sobre a natureza do significado emerge em meio às investigações que empreenderam sobre a noção de função: a função fregiana e a função proposicional são as entidades que participam de suas respectivas relações de significado e cuja natureza é precisada no âmbito dessas relações
Abstract: This work presents a case study about the conceptual and methodological development of Mathematics by the examination and comparison of function conceptions in the thinking of Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell. Particularly, we discuss the fregean extension of mathematical idea of function, the russellian notion of propositional function and their philosophical assumptions and implications. The basis for this study is a analisys of the authors' books on the foundations of Mathematics and some other authors' writings, included among these some posthumous publications. From this analisys we conclude that the comprehensive function concept of Frege and the Russell's propositional function are both generalizations of an important acquisition of mathematical thought, namely the idea of function, and that the conceptography, the type theory and the theory of descriptions, in turn, constitute the methodical exploration of what these generalizations imply. Finally, we conclude that, though there are expressives differences between the function conceptions of Frege and Russell, a pattern of rigour associated with more wide reflections on the nature of meaning emerges from their investigations of the concept of function: the fregian function and the propositional function are the entities that participate of their respective meaning relations and whose nature is explained by these relations
Doutor
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Ferguson, Stephen. "What structuralism could not be." Thesis, University of St Andrews, 1998. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/14756.
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Frege's arithmetical-platonism is glossed as the first step in developing the thesis; however, it remains silent on the subject of structures in mathematics: the obvious examples being groups and rings, lattices and topologies. The structuralist objects to this silence, also questioning the sufficiency of Fregean platonism is answering a number of problems: e.g. Benacerraf's Twin Puzzles of Epistemic and Referential Access. The development of structuralism as a philosophical position, based on the slogan 'All mathematics is structural' collapses: there is no single coherent account which remains faithful to the tenets of structuralism and solves the puzzles of platonism. This prompts the adoption of a more modest structuralism, the aim of which is not to solve the problems facing arithmetical-platonism, but merely to give an account of the 'obviously structural areas of mathematics'. Modest strucmralism should complement an account of mathematical systems; here, Frege's platonism fulfils that role, which then constrains and shapes the development of this modest structuralism. Three alternatives are considered; a substitutional account, an account based on a modification of Dummett's theory of thin reference and a modified from of in re structuralism. This split level analysis of mathematics leads to an investigation of the robustness of the truth predicate over the two classes of mathematical statement. Focussing on the framework set out in Wright's Truth and Objectivity, a third type of statement is identified in the literature: Hilbert's formal statements. The following thesis arises: formal statements concern no special subject matter, and are merely minimally truth apt; the statements of structural mathematics form a subdiscourse - identified by the similarity of the logical grammar - displaying cognitive command. Thirdly, the statements of mathematics which concern systems form a subdiscourse which has both cognitive command and width of cosmological role. The extensions of mathematical concepts are such that best practice on the part of mathematicians either tracks or determines that extension - at least in simple cases. Examining the notions of response dependence leads to considerations of indefinite extensibility and intuitionism. The conclusion drawn is that discourse about structures and mathematical systems are response dependent but that this does not give rise to any revisionary arguments contra intuitionism.
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Tatievskaya, Elena. "Der Begriff der logischen Form in der analytischen Philosophie : Russell in Auseinandersetzung mit Frege, Meinong und Wittgenstein /." Frankfurt [u.a.] : Ontos-Verl, 2005. http://www.ontos-verlag.de/Buchreihen-LOGOS-Tatievskaya.html.
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Hill, Claire Ortiz. "Le mot et la chose chez husserl et frege : les racines de la philosophie du vingtieme siecle." Paris 4, 1987. http://www.theses.fr/1987PA040195.
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En reunissant les elements constituitifs necessaires a une appreciation claire et satisfaisante du developpement de la pensee du jeune husserl dans ses contacts avec la logique de frege et en comblant systematiquement les lacunes dans la litterature qui porte sur cette periode nous esperons montrer pourquoi et comment les innovations en logique de frege conduisent a des paradoxes et comment russell a reussi a deplacer les problemes sans pourtant les resoudre definitivement. Remontant ainsi aux source de la philosophie du vingtieme siecle, nous voyons pourquoi la philosophie anglo-saxonne et la philosophie continentale, partant d'un fond philosophique tres similaire, ont suivi en ce siecle des chemins si radicalement opposesAssembling the facts necessary to a clear, satisfying picture of the development of husserl's thought during the period in which he came into contact with frege's ideas and systematically filling the gaps in the literature on turn of the century philosophy, we hope to show why and how frege's logical innovations lead to paradoxes and how russell succeeded in displacing the problems without, however, resolving them. Going back to the roots of twentieth century philosophy we see why, beginning in about exactly the same place, 20th century anglo saxon and continental philosophy have evolved in such radically different ways
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Bertran, San Millán Joan. "La Lógica de Gottlob Frege: 1879 – 1903." Doctoral thesis, Universitat de Barcelona, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/383748.
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Ofrecemos en esta tesis doctoral una reconstrucción global y detallada de la lógica desarrollada por Gottlob Frege a lo largo de su carrera. A pesar de que esta lógica fue objeto de profundas modificaciones desde su formulación inicial en Begriffsschrift hasta la versión revisada de Grundgesetze, muy raramente se han considerado las diferencias fundamentales que hay entre estas dos obras. No sólo defendemos que estas diferencias existen; además explicamos cómo deben entenderse atendiendo a la evolución del pensamiento de Frege.
En primer lugar, plateamos una reconstrucción de la lógica de Begriffsschrift, de la que resulta una lectura completamente original de su sistema formal; una que contradice la base de los estudios históricos modernos. En particular, defendemos que esta lógica no es, como se ha mencionado en multitud de ocasiones, una lógica de segundo orden y proporcionamos las razones siguientes. (1) El suyo no es propiamente un lenguaje formal. Por ejemplo, no dispone de una definición de la noción de fórmula atómica. La concepción de Frege del uso del sistema formal de Begriffsschrift como una herramienta, y no como su propio objeto de estudio, puede explicar esta omisión. (2) Contra lo que puede parecer, únicamente hay un tipo de cuantificación: la cuantificación sobre argumentos. (3) La lógica de Begriffsschrift no posee una semántica en sentido moderno. Sus letras pueden leerse de tantos modos distintos que no es posible atribuir un significado concreto a las fórmulas en las que aparecen. Además, los cuantificadores no reciben una interpretación semántica: no hay ningún dominio de cuantificación.
En segundo lugar, ofrecemos una explicación de las razones que determinan la evolución de la lógica de Frege. La transición de Begriffsschrift a Grundgesetze ha sido considerada muy raramente y nunca ha sido plenamente explicada. Según nuestro análisis histórico, el paso de la posición de Frege en Begriffsschrift relativa a la lógica a su concepción final, establecida en Grundgesetze, puede articularse mediante la adopción de la distinción entre concepto y objeto como el elemento esencial del sistema formal. Esto conlleva la formalización de la noción de concepto, que finalmente conduce a la noción de función de Grundgesetze.
Finalmente, proporcionamos un análisis global de la lógica de Grundgesetze. En esta obra, Frege desarrolla un sistema formal que es similar a un sistema estándar para la lógica de segundo orden. Presentamos una reconstrucción de este sistema formal que permite compararlo con el de Begriffsschrift. En particular, formulamos con precisión cada regla de inferencia planteada por Frege y prestamos especial atención a las reglas de substitución. Además, a partir de esta reconstrucción obtenemos resultados meta-lógicos como, por ejemplo, la equivalencia entre el fragmento proposicional de Grundgesetze y un cálculo completo para la lógica proposicional, y entre el fragmento de primer orden de Grundgesetze y un cálculo completo para la lógica de primer orden.In this dissertation I offer a global and detailed reconstruction of the logic developed by Gottlob Frege throughout his career. Even though Frege's logic suffered profound modifications from his initial formulation in Begriffsschrift to its revised version in Grundgesetze, the significant differences between these two works have been rarely taken at face value. I not only argue that these differences exist, but I also explain how they should be understood in the light of the evolution of Frege's thought. First, I suggest a new reconstruction of Begriffsschrift's logic, which amounts to a completely novel reading of its formal system—one that contradicts the core of modern historical studies. In particular, I defend that this logic is not—as it has been repeatedly said—a second-order logic and provide the following reasons. (1) The language is not properly a formal language. (2) In Begriffsschrift there is only one sort of quantification: quantification over arguments. (3) Begriffsschrift's logic does not have a semantics in the modern sense. Second, I offer an explanation of the reasons that drive the evolution of Frege's logic. The transition from Begriffsschrift to Grundgesetze has been seldom addressed and never fully explained. According to my historical analysis, the switch from Frege's position concerning logic in Begriffsschrift to his later conception—finally established in Grundgesetze—can be articulated through the adoption of the distinction between concept and object as the basic element of the formal system. This leads to a formalisation of the notion of concept, which in the end drives to Grundgesetze's notion of function. Finally, I put forward a global analysis of Grundgesetze's logic. In this work, Frege develops a formal system that resembles in many relevant ways a second-order one. I suggest a reconstruction of this formal system that allows us to compare it with Begriffsschrift's. In particular, I formulate precisely every rule of inference proposed by Frege and especially focus on the rules of substitution. Moreover, I reflect on several meta-logical results that can be drawn from this reconstruction.
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Davies, James Edgar. "Changes of Setting and the History of Mathematics: A New Study of Frege." Thesis, University of Canterbury. Mathematics & Statistics, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10092/4330.
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This thesis addresses an issue in the philosophy of Mathematics which is little discussed, and indeed little recognised. This issue is the phenomenon of a ‘change of setting’. Changes of setting are events which involve a change in a scientific framework which is fruitful for answering questions which were, under an old framework, intractable. The formulation of the new setting usually
involves a conceptual re-orientation to the subject matter. In the natural sciences, such re-orientations are arguably unremarkable, inasmuch as it is possible that within the former setting for one’s thinking one was merely in error,
and under the new orientation one is merely getting closer to the truth of the matter. However, when the subject matter is pure mathematics, a problem arises in that mathematical truth is (in appearance) timelessly immutable. The conceptions that had been settled upon previously seem not the sort of thing that could be vitiated. Yet within a change of setting that is just what seems to happen. Changes of setting, in particular in their effects on the truth of individual propositions, pose a problem for how to understand mathematical truth.
Thus this thesis aims to give a philosophical analysis of the phenomenon of changes of setting, in the spirit of the investigations performed in Wilson (1992) and Manders (1987) and (1989). It does so in three stages, each of
which occupies a chapter of the thesis:
1. An analysis of the relationship between mathematical truth and settingchanges, in terms of how the former must be viewed to allow for the latter. This results in a conception of truth in the mathematical sciences which
gives a large role to the notion that a mathematical setting must ‘explain itself’ in terms of the problems it is intended to address.
2. In light of (1), I begin an analysis of the change of setting engendered in mathematical logic by Gottlob Frege. In particular, this chapter will address the question of whether Frege’s innovation constitutes a change of setting, by asking the question of whether he is seeking to answer questions which were present in the frameworks which preceded his innovations. I argue that the answer is yes, in that he is addressing the Kantian question of whether alternative systems of arithmetic are possible. This question arises because it had been shown earlier in the 19th century that Kant’s conclusion, that Euclid’s is the only possible description of space, was incorrect.
3. I conclude with an in-depth look at a specific aspect of the logical system constructed in Frege’s Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. The purpose of this chapter is to find evidence for the conclusions of chapter two in Frege’s technical work (as opposed to the philosophical). This is necessitated
by chapter one’s conclusions regarding the epistemic interdependence of formal systems and informal views of those frameworks.
The overall goal is to give a contemporary account of the possibility of setting-changes; it will turn out that an epistemic grasp of a mathematical system requires that one understand it within a broader, somewhat historical context.
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Trebaul, Dewi. "Sens, référence, idéographie : études sur et autour de Frege." Thesis, Aix-Marseille, 2015. http://www.theses.fr/2015AIXM3115.
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Notre travail de thèse aborde la question suivante : quel est le thème de l'idéographie frégéenne ? Nous y répondons en questionnant l'emploi de la terminologie modèle-théorique ordinairement employée. Notre méthode consiste en un examen détaillé des Grundgesetze, ainsi qu'en une approche comparative avec les œuvres de deux objecteurs contemporains de Frege, le Tractatus-logico philosophicus de Wittgenstein et les Fondements de la géométrie de Hilbert. Pour déterminer ce dont traite l'idéographie, il faut envisager la manière dont sont rendues signifiantes les expressions qu'elle contient. En vue de répondre à cette question, un examen du statut des notions de sens et de référence est accompli, au niveau épistémique, correspondant à la compréhension par un locuteur, ainsi qu'au niveau théorique, concernant leur place précise dans le compte-rendu des démonstrations en langage idéographique. Les notions de sens et de référence sont expliquées par des éclaircissements : leur introduction est déjà leur mise en œuvre. Nous privilégions une lecture interne de ces notions. Au centre de notre travail se trouve le défi formaliste : peut-on conjuguer l'idéal d'une corrélation bi-univoque entre signes et sens et l'exigence d'une pluralité de signes de même sens, nécessaire aux définitions ? Nous montrons que la distinction entre sens et référence conserve un rôle opératoire dans l'idéographie, qu'elle illustre la fécondité démonstrative du système, ce qui a peu été souligné jusqu'à présent dans les études frégéennes. Ainsi il est possible de défendre Frege face à ce défi en soutenant que la diversité des sens, même corrélée à la diversité des signes, ne lui est pas réductibleOur doctoral thesis addresses the following question : what is the theme of the fregean conceptual script? We answer it in questioning the model-theoretical framework currently used. Our method consists in a close study of the fregean texts, especially the Grundgesetze, and in a comparative approach with the works of two contemporary critics of Frege, the Tractatus logico-philosophicus by Wittgenstein and the Foundations of geometry by Hilbert. To determine what the fregean conceptual script is about, we have to consider how the expressions it contains are made significant. For that purpose, a close examination of the notions of sense and reference is carried out, at the epistemic level, that corresponds to the understanding by a speaker, and at the theoretic level, that concerns the role it plays in the account of proofs in the conceptual script. Frege explains the notions of sense and reference through elucidations: their introduction is already part of their use. We favour an internal reading of these notions.Crucial in our work is what we reconstruct as a formalist challenge addressed to Frege: is it possible to combine the ideal of a one-one correlation between signs and senses with the demand of a plurality of signs with the same sense, necessary for the purpose of definitions? We show that the distinction between sense and reference retains an operative role in the conceptual script, that it highlights the fecundity of the system, which has seldom been underlined in the fregean studies. Thus we argue that Frege can face that formalist challenge, because the plurality of senses, even when it is correlated with the plurality of signs, cannot be reduced to it
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Gomes, Rodrigo Rafael [UNESP]. "As concepções de função de Frege e Russell: um estudo de caso em filosofia e história da matemática." Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP), 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/11449/132149.
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000853981.pdf: 780858 bytes, checksum: 5ceb1d5a7d209ea636278ac985213d40 (MD5)O presente trabalho exibe um estudo de caso sobre o desenvolvimento conceitual e metodológico da Matemática, por meio do exame e comparação das concepções de função de Gottlob Frege e Bertrand Russell. Em particular, são discutidos: a extensão fregiana da ideia matemática de função, a noção russelliana de função proposicional, os seus pressupostos filosóficos e as suas implicações. O presente estudo baseia-se em análises dos livros que os dois autores publicaram sobre os fundamentos da Matemática, e também de alguns outros escritos de sua autoria, entre eles, manuscritos que foram publicados postumamente. Conclui-se a partir dessas análises que a concepção compreensiva de função de Frege e a função proposicional de Russell são generalizações de uma importante aquisição do pensamento matemático, qual seja, a ideia de função, e que a conceitografia e as teorias dos tipos e das descrições, por sua vez, constituem a exploração metódica daquilo que essas generalizações acarretam. Conclui-se, finalmente, que embora existam diferenças expressivas entre as concepções de função de Frege e Russell, um padrão de rigor associado a reflexões mais amplas sobre a natureza do significado emerge em meio às investigações que empreenderam sobre a noção de função: a função fregiana e a função proposicional são as entidades que participam de suas respectivas relações de significado e cuja natureza é precisada no âmbito dessas relações
This work presents a case study about the conceptual and methodological development of Mathematics by the examination and comparison of function conceptions in the thinking of Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell. Particularly, we discuss the fregean extension of mathematical idea of function, the russellian notion of propositional function and their philosophical assumptions and implications. The basis for this study is a analisys of the authors' books on the foundations of Mathematics and some other authors' writings, included among these some posthumous publications. From this analisys we conclude that the comprehensive function concept of Frege and the Russell's propositional function are both generalizations of an important acquisition of mathematical thought, namely the idea of function, and that the conceptography, the type theory and the theory of descriptions, in turn, constitute the methodical exploration of what these generalizations imply. Finally, we conclude that, though there are expressives differences between the function conceptions of Frege and Russell, a pattern of rigour associated with more wide reflections on the nature of meaning emerges from their investigations of the concept of function: the fregian function and the propositional function are the entities that participate of their respective meaning relations and whose nature is explained by these relations
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Falc?o, Jeziel Cordeiro. "A morada do pensamento: um encontro com Plat?o na busca da natureza do sentido em Frege." Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte, 2008. http://repositorio.ufrn.br:8080/jspui/handle/123456789/16458.
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Previous issue date: 2008-10-30The ontological investigation of sense, from German philosopher Gottlob Frege s point of view, has, as its foundation, the understanding of reference, representation, thought and sense s categories. According to Frege s writings, On Sense and Reference, and Thoughts Logical Investigations, sense carries itself the solution for the problem of identity s relation. Sense gives us the knowledge s increment that identity doesn t give. But still there is a problem: the definition of sense's nature. Sense couldn t have its nature strictly defined because, in this case, it would be reduced to reference s category and thus, sense would be identified with the own extra-linguistic object, and this is a misconception. But Frege said that thought must be considered as the sense of the sentence. So, with this close relationship between sense and thought, a new goal in this investigation is putt in focus: thought. To Frege, thought is not a simple subjective performance of thinking, it is not a subjective representation, but it is an objective content that is real, eternal, and that exists by itself in a third realm . Thought exists in a realm beyond the world of subjective representations and beyond the world of sensible perception. From this point, the present investigation went back to Plato s World of Ideas. So, the platonic thinking was included in this debate about the metaphysic of the third realm in Frege, trying to clarify the original concepts of knowledge, reality and truth. To achieve this objective, the following dialogues had been included in our research: Theaetetus, Republic and Phaedo. And the following fregean questions had been brought to Plato's scope: how happens the new knowledge? What is the third realm s reality? What is the relation between truth and thought? Doing that we could see as much some of the platonic origins of Frege's approach, as some differences between this two philosophers
A investiga??o ontol?gica do sentido, a partir do ponto de vista do fil?sofo alem?o Gottlob Frege, tem por base o entendimento das categorias da refer?ncia, das representa??es, do pensamento e do pr?prio sentido. Em Frege, conforme seus textos Sobre o Sentido e a Refer?ncia, e O Pensamento uma investiga??o l?gica, o sentido imp?e-se como solu??o para o problema trazido pela rela??o de identidade. Com o sentido ele busca o acr?scimo de conhecimento que a identidade n?o produz. Mas aqui surge um problema: a defini??o da sua natureza. O sentido n?o pode ter sua natureza definida estritamente, pois assim seria reduzido ? categoria da refer?ncia, e com isso poderia ser confundido com o pr?prio objeto extraling??stico. Mas Frege diz que o pensamento ? o sentido de uma frase. Assim, nesse estreitar de rela??es entre o sentido e o pensamento, a presente investiga??o passa a focalizar o pensamento. Para Frege, o pensamento n?o ? o simples ato de pensar do sujeito, n?o ? sua subjetividade em forma de representa??es, mas ? sim uma coisa objetiva, real, eterna, e que existe em si num terceiro reino . O pensamento existe num reino para al?m do mundo das representa??es do sujeito e do mundo percebido pelos sentidos, e isso tamb?m leva esta investiga??o para o mundo das Id?ias em Plat?o. Assim, o pensamento plat?nico foi inclu?do no debate sobre a metaf?sica do terceiro reino em Frege, na tentativa de melhor esclarecer as origens dos conceitos conhecimento, realidade e verdade, fundamentais na abordagem fregeana. Para isso foram pesquisados os di?logos: Teeteto, A Rep?blica e F?don. E, para o ?mbito de Frege foram trazidas as quest?es: como ocorre o conhecimento novo? Qual ? a realidade do terceiro reino? Qual ? a rela??o entre verdade e pensamento? E estas investiga??es evidenciaram tanto as origens plat?nicas da abordagem fregeana, quanto certas diferen?as de pensamento entre os dois fil?sofos
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Fillion, Nicolas. "Les enjeux de la controverse Frege-Hilbert sur les fondements de la géométrie : une étude philosophique sur la logique et les mathématiques." Thesis, Université Laval, 2006. http://www.theses.ulaval.ca/2006/23902/23902.pdf.
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L’auteur entreprend dans ce mémoire de faire une présentation des
débats axiologiques de philosophie de la logique sous-jacents à la controverse
opposant Frege et Hilbert sur les fondements de la géométrie.
Contre le parti pris philosophique selon lequel la logique est une discipline
achevée, l’auteur entreprend une mise en contexte des positions
de Frege et Hilbert afin de montrer que dans leur conception de
la logique se trouvent des paradigmes incommensurables, résultant de
l’influence de traditions philosophiques et scientifiques diverses. Dans
cette perspective, Frege est le défenseur de la vision traditionnelle
de la logique comme medium universel de la science, tel qu’incarnée
dans la géométrie euclidienne. La logique symbolique de Frege est
ainsi vue comme la mise en oeuvre de moyens raffinés pour lutter contre
la (( perversion des sciences )) ayant lieu au 19ième siècle et pour la
défense de la vision traditionnelle de la science. à l’opposé, l’approche
métathéorique de Hilbert représente la conception moderne dite algébrique
de la logique telle que développée au 19ième sous l’influence des
métamathématiques, et certains rapprochements avec les conceptions
(( model-theoretic )) et catégorielles de la logique viennent appuyer
cette thèse.This memoir presents some axiological debates of philosophy of logic underlying the Frege-Hilbert controversy on the foundations of geometry. Against the philosophical bias according to which logic is an achieved discipline, a contextualized presentation of the respective positions of Frege and Hilbert is done in order to show that incommensurable paradigms are found in their view of logic, that is due to the influence of various philosophical and scientific traditions. From this standpoint, Frege is the defender of the traditionalist view of logic as the universal medium of science, as embodied in Euclidean geometry. In this perspective, Frege’s symbolic logic is seen as the achievement of a refined means to counter the 19th-century perversion of science with the purpose of defending the traditional conception of the role of science. On the other hand, Hilbert’s metatheoretical approach represents the so-called algebraic modern conception of logic as developed in the 19th century under the influence of metamathematics. Following this, parallels between Hilbert’s approach and the model-theoretical and categorical conceptions of logic are drawn to show their proximity.
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Gastaldi, Juan Luis. "Une archéologie de la logique du sens : arithmétique et contenu dans le processus de mathématisation de la logique au XIXe siècle." Thesis, Bordeaux 3, 2014. http://www.theses.fr/2014BOR30035/document.
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Ce travail s’engage dans la reconstitution d’une intelligibilité globale nouvelle pour la logique qui est née avec Frege afin de restituer l’une des conditions décisives pour la philosophie contemporaine, à savoir celle qui concerne son rapport aux pratiques et aux savoirs formels. Son hypothèse initiale affirme que le projet premier et constant de Frege a été celui d’une logique du contenu. Pourtant, il ne s’agit pas de réinvestir l’œuvre de Frege d’une cohérence nouvelle dans le but de rétablir une unité stable. Car l’intelligibilité procurée par cette reconstitution permet de localiser dans les formulations de Frege de véritables lacunes qui ne semblent pas avoir été identifiées comme telles jusqu’ici. Que la logique de Frege soit efficace malgré ces lacunes, voilà ce qu’il faut expliquer. La réponse que nous donnons à ces questions est que l’efficacité de la logique de Frege en tant que logique du contenu provient d’un certain rapport à l’Arithmétique, à savoir celui par lequel c’est la logique qui est construite d’après les principes de l’Arithmétique, avant qu’elle ne soit capable de la construire à son tour. La question se pose alors de caractériser avec précision à ce niveau constitutif, non « fondationnel », la nature du rapport entre une logique du contenu comme forme spécifique de la logique dans le cadre de sa mathématisation, et l’Arithmétique comme domaine mathématique particulier. De l’analyse minutieuse de la constitution du système logique frégéen, une idée se dégage qui constitue la thèse centrale de notre travail : les différents systèmes de la logique mathématisée ou formelle ne reposent sur les mathématiques que par l’intermédiaire d’une dimension d’exercice, de réflexion et d’élaboration de signes, où les circulations et les emprunts entre ces deux savoirs formels contemporains que sont les mathématiques et la logique se construisent et se justifient. C’est donc cette thèse qu’il s’agit de démontrer, par une étude détaillée des processus d’émergence des deux plus grands projets de formalisation de la logique du XIXe siècle : celui de Frege et celui de Boole et des Booléens. Dans cet espace qui mène des pratiques mathématiques aux systématisations logiques à travers les fonctionnements des signes, deux régimes généraux se dessinent : celui d’ « Abstraction symbolique » qui mène de l’Algèbre abstraite à la Logique propositionnelle booléenne ; et celui de l’ « Expressionnisme », qui mène de l’Arithmétique au Calcul logique des prédicats, associée aux travaux de Frege. Mais plus profondément, par l’effet d’une lecture symptomale au plus près des dynamiques internes à ces processus, le présent travail décèle un lien transversal entre le contenu logique d’une part et l’Arithmétique comme ensemble des déterminations du nombre de l’autre. En suivant ce lien, qui s’avère le responsable de l’introduction de la catégorie de sens dans le cadre de la logique mathématisée, une théorie de l’expression formelle se dessine, définissant les conditions pour le développement d’une logique du sensThis work aims at providing a new general interpretation of the logic that was born with the work of Gottlob Frege, in order to make explicit one of the most decisive conditions of contemporary philosophy: the one that concerns the relation of philosophy to formal practices and knowledge. Its initial hypothesis states that Frege’s primary and most constant project was that of building a logic of content. However, the intelligibility thus gained does not intend to unearth a new underlying unity of Frege’s thought; it rather aims at localising the real gaps within Frege’s formulations that have not been identified as such until now. Still, those gaps do not require to be filled, for Frege’s logic is indeed effective despite this indeterminacy. Rather than the gaps, it is this ungrounded effectiveness that needs to be explained. Our answer to this question is that the effectiveness of Frege’s logic as a logic of content comes from a certain relationship with Arithmetic; in fact, Frege’s logic is constructed on the template of Arithmetic, before it becomes capable of constructing Arithmetic in turn. The task then arises to characterise precisely, at this constitutive and non-foundational level, the nature of the relation between a logic of content as a specific form of logic in the framework of its mathematization, and Arithmetic as a particular mathematical domain. From the meticulous study of the constitution of the Fregean system, an idea can be drawn that constitutes the central argument of this thesis: the various mathematical or formalised logical systems rest upon mathematics only through an intermediary dimension consisting in the practice, the reflection and the elaboration of signs, where the circulations between these two contemporary domains of formal knowledge (mathematics and logic) are constructed and justified. From this point of view, we then lay out a detailed study of the rise of the two most significant projects for formalizing logic in the nineteenth century: Frege’s and Boole’s (and the Booleans’). In the space leading from mathematical practices to logical systematisations through semiotic functioning, two general schemes or semiotic formal regimes can be drawn: “Symbolic Abstraction”, leading from abstract Algebra to Boolean propositional logic; and “Expressionism”, leading from Arithmetic to Predicate Calculus, associated to Frege’s work. More deeply, our research reveals a deep connexion between logical content and Arithmetic (understood as the theory of integers), which horizontally crosses the different semiotic regimes. Following the multiple dimensions of this nexus – which is responsible for the introduction of the category of sense in the framework of mathematized logic – a formal theory of expression can be drawn, which defines the conditions for the actual development of a logic of sense
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Wezenberg, Han. "The content and nature of thought." Doctoral thesis, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Philosophische Fakultät I, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.18452/17382.
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Die Dissertation prüft das Potential von Fines Semantischem Relationismus für einen kognivistischen Ansatz der Sprache und des Geistes. Hauptziel ist es, den Semantischen Relationismus als einzig angemessene Inhalstheorie für die Gedankensprache zu verteidigen, indem die Vorzüge gegenüber den wichtigsten Alternativen, dem Referentialismus und dem Fregeanismus, aufgezeigt werden. Die Arbeit soll zeigen, dass nur der Semantische Relatinismus alle Varianten des Frege Puzzles für die Gedankensprache lösen kann, und zwar in einerWeise, die die erheblichen Schwierigkeiten der alternativen Theorien umgeht. Das Ergebnis ist sowohl eine Verteidigung des Sematischen Relationismus als auch eine Bestätigung der Tragbarkeit der Hypothese einer Gedankensprache. Auf Basis der Gedankensprache und einer relationistischen Semantik stellt die Arbeit zudem eine neue Theorie der Propositionen vor, die sich erheblich von allen bestehenden Alternativen, inbegriffen der von Fine, unterscheidet. Das Endergebnis ist eine Auffassung von Propositionen als syntaktisch strukturierten mentalen Repräsentationen, die Sätze in der Gedankensprache darstellen, sowie Träger von Inhalten, die durch ihren semantischen Inhalt typindividuiert sind. Ein Kernziel der Arbeit ist es, die Vorteile dieser Auffassung gegenüber klassischen und modernen Alternativen aufzuzeigen. Die Arbeit entwickelt ihr Gesamtergebnis durch die Aufarbeitung von drei aktuellen, eng miteinander verbundenen Debatten. Erstens, das Problem, dass Freges Puzzle für Gedanken und überzegungen darstellt, insbesondere in Form von Kripkes Puzzle. Zweitens, das Problem der Typindividuierung von Symbolen in der Gedankensprache. Drittens, die Debatte um die Ontologie von Begriffen und Propositionen. Indem eine vielversprechende relationistische Lösung in diesen Problembereichen entwickelt wird, bietet die Arbeit zusätzliche Bestätigung für Fines semantische Theorie durch eine erhebliche Erweiterung ihres Anwendungsbereichs.The thesis evaluates the potential of Fine’s Semantic Relationism for a cognitivist approach to language and the mind. The main aim is to champion Semantic Relationism as the only adequate theory of content for the Language of Thought by bringing out the benefits of the theory over its main rivals, Referentialism and Fregeanism. It seeks to show that only Semantic Relationism can address all the variants of Frege’s Puzzle for the Language of Thought, and that it can do so in a way that avoids the substantial difficulties that beset other semantic theories. The main outcome is at the same time a vindication of the adopted semantic theory and a confirmation of the viability of the Language of Thought hypothesis. The thesis also offers a new theory of propositions on the basis of the Language of Thought and a Relationist semantics that differs significantly from all such presently available theories, including Fine’s. The final result is a theory of propositions as syntactically structured mental representations, which are sentences in the Language of Thought, that are content bearers individuated by their semantic content as specified by Semantic Relationism. A major objective of the thesis is to highlight the advantages of this view over both classical and current alternatives. The thesis develops its overall view by offering solutions in three closely related ongoing debates. First, the challenge posed by Frege’s Puzzle for thought and belief, Kripke’s Puzzle notably included, secondly, the problem about the proper type-individuation of Language of Thought symbol tokens, and thirdly, the debate about the ontological nature of concepts and propositions. By developing a promising Relationist response to these problems, the thesis also provides additional support to Fine’s semantic theory by considerably expanding its scope of application.
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Contou, Mathieu. "Wittgenstein et Freud : un autre aspect." Thesis, Paris 1, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018PA01H218.
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À la différence de "Philosophie, mythologie et pseudo-science. Wittgenstein lecteur de Freud", l'influent essai de Jacques Bouveresse (1991), cette étude vise à établir qu'aussi critique qu'il se soit effectivement montré à l'égard de la psychanalyse, Wittgenstein n'en a pas moins beaucoup appris et retenu de Freud. Au plan de sa conception de l'élucidation philosophique, principalement. Composée de trois parties, ladite étude consiste d'abord à mettre en évidence les fragilités de l'argumentation présentée au premier chapitre de J'ouvrage classique de Jacques Bouveresse ; puis à rendre compte de la place centrale du motif psychologico-clinique dans la définition et la mise en œuvre de la méthode grammaticale de Wittgenstein ; pour mieux isoler ensuite les six aspects plus proprement freudiens de la clinique philosophique wittgensteinienne. La conclusion de ce travail étant finalement réservée à l'interprétation des résultats acquis au cours de cet itinéraireUnlike « Philosophie, mythologie et pseudo-science. Wittgenstein lecteur de Freud”, the influential essay of Jacques Bouveresse (1991), this study aims to establish that even though he was critical towards psychoanalysis, Wittgenstein also leamed a lot from Freud. Mainly on the plan of his conception of philosophical elucidation. This study is divided in three parts : the first highlights the weaknesses of the argumentation introduced in the first chapter of the classical work of Jacques Bouveresse; then the second one reflects the core of the psychologic-clinical pattern in the definition and the implementation of the grammatical method of Wittgenstein; finally, to better isolate the six aspects of the wittgensteinian philosophicaI clinic that are the most strictly freudian. The conclusion of this work is, in the end, dedicated to the interpretation of the results acquired in the course of this path
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Ouelbani, Mélika. "Le constructionnisme de carnap et ses origines." Paris 4, 1988. http://www.theses.fr/1988PA040053.
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Der logische aufbau der welt est une illustration du projet neopositiviste de realiser une unite de la science. C'est dans ce but que carnap a voulu developper une methode pour montrer la possibilite de realiser une constitution de tous les concepts de la science a partir de concepts de base, et de realiser une derivabilite de toutes les propositions de la science a partir d'une base unique constituee de propositions protocolaires exprimant le vecu le plus immediat. C'est ce qui a fait qu'au premier abord ce projet nous a semble etre empiriste. Mais en realite la construction (logique) du monde est logique. En effet, 1. Nous y avons affaire a une quasi-analyse, 2. L'interet des propositions protocolaires ne porte pas sur le vecu, mais sur la relation entre des vecus, 3. Et c'est ce qui constitue la cle de la constitution, la methode suivie par carnap est extensionnelle. Cette pression que carnap a operee sur le sens lui a evite des impasses et a favorise sa definition de la philosophie comme analyse syntaxique du langage, mais elle en a creees d'autres. Le projet constructionniste, s'appuyant sur des principes neopositivistes et voulant appliquer une methode analytico-logique n'a pu survivre aux critiques aussi bien empiristes que logiques, bien qu'elles ne le touchent en fait qu'indirectement et qu'exterieurement. Ce projet a ete rapidement sape a ses racines et dans ses fondements, en ce sens 1. Qu'une unite du langage de la science n'est pas du tout envisageable et 2. Que la these d'extensionalite s'est vite averee etre insuffisante et qu'elle a ete relayee par une methode semantique. En d'autres termes, il n'est plus possible de parler ni d'un projet d'unite de la science ni d'appliquer une methode purement extensionnelleDer logische aufbau der welt illustrates the neopositivist project to realize a unity of science. For this purpose carnap tried developing a method to show that it is possible to realize a constitution of all the scientific concepts that proceeds from some basic concepts, and to derive all the scientific propositions from a unique basis made up of protocolar propositions expressing our immediate actual experiences. Thus, the project seemed for us in the beginning, empiricist. But in reality the (logical) construction of the world is logical. As a matter of fact, first we are dealing with a quasi-analysis ; second, the advantage of the protocolar propositions is not in the actual experiences but in the relationship between those experiences ; third, and this is the key to the proposition, the method adopted is extensional. By putting pressure on the meaning, carnap managed to avoid some unsolvable problems, to promote his definition of philosophy as a language syntaxic analysis, but that created other problems for him. The constructionist project, based on neopositivist principles and using an analytico-logical method was severely, though indirectly and externally, criticised by both the empiricists and the logicans. The project was not viable for the following reasons : 1. A unity of the language of science is by no means possible, 2. The thesis of extensionality proved to be insufficient and was relayed by a semantic method. In other words, it is no longer possible to think of a project to unite all the scientific concepts or to use a pure extensional method
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Isaac, Manuel Gustavo. "Sémiotique, syntaxe et sémantique (1879-1901) : des conséquences de la modélisation du signe sur la théorie de la signification chez Frege et Husserl." Sorbonne Paris Cité, 2015. http://www.theses.fr/2015USPCC297.
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La thèse ici soumise en vue d'obtenir le grade de docteur en linguistique théorique e descriptive (LTD) délivré par l'Université Paris Diderot (École Doctorale 132) est un travai d'histoire et d'épistémologie des sciences du langage portant sur la redéfinition du concept d( signe qui intervient au tournant du xxème siècle à l'occasion du développement de nouveau: langages formels pour la logique. Dans ce contexte, elle se focalise sur les conditions d( constitution et d'émergence, respectivement, du programme logiciste de Frege (1893) et d( l'idée de la phénoménologie chez Husserl (1913). Axée sur le problème de la détermination dt statut et du rôle de la modélisation du signe à l'endroit du développement d'une théorie de signification, sa solution repose sur la mise au jour d'une alternative entre deux traitements d( l'articulation de la syntaxe d'un système de déduction avec sa signification (soit, moniste ot dichotomique) respectivement corrélés à deux perspectives opposées sur la signification de signes (soit, intensionnelle ou bien extensionnelle) et impliquant différentes conceptions de lî logique (soit, comme langage ou comme calcul). Dans le cadre tracé par cette alternative, sur lz base d'une analyse chronologique et thématique de corpus de textes représentatifs, contribution consiste dans la reconstitution des liens de causalité qui ordonnent l'interversior des propriétés caractérisant les théories du signe et de la signification de Frege et Husserl respectivement, des années 1879 à 1892 et 1887 à 1901My thesis is a work of history and epistemology of language sciences about the model of sigr redefining that occurs at the turn of the 20th century as a part of the development of nev formai languages for logic. In that context, it focuses on the constitutional conditions of Frege': logicist program (1893) and on the conditions of emergence of Husserl's idea of phenomenolow (1913). Aiming at determining the impact of sign modelling on the development of a theory o meaning, its outcome is based on the setting up of an alternative between two treatments of th( linkage between the syntax of a calculus and its signification (either monistic or dichotomous respectively correlated with two opposite views on sign meanings (either intensional o extensional) and entailing different conceptions of logic (either as calculus or as language). An( in the framework thus outlined, on the basis of a chronological and thematic analysis o representative corpus of texts, its contribution consists in the reconstitution of the causal link: which order the interversion of the properties characterizing Frege's and Husserl's theories o sign and meaning, respectively, from 1879 to 1892 and from 1887 to 1901
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Van, Geen Christine. "Dire la signification : la question de la possibilité de la sémantique." Rouen, 2006. http://www.theses.fr/2006ROUEL548.
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La question de la possibilité de la sémantique a été posée par Frege et Wittgenstein, aux origines de la philosophie analytique. Elle a été rendue obsolète par le développement de deux manières de rendre compte de la signification, qui sont les paradigmes dominants dans leur domaine. Il s'agit de la sémantique formelle, en logique, et du causalisme syntaxiste en sciences cognitives. Je montre dans cette thèse que la question de la possibilité de la sémantique demeure posée. Elle n'a été qu'occultée. J'y apporte une réponse négative, mais sans emprunter à l'imagerie transcendantaliste, traditionnellement associée, bien à tort, à la thèse de l'ineffabilité de la sémantiqueThe question whether semantics is possible was most important to Frege and Wittgenstein, at the beginning of analytical philosophy. The subsequent development of two different ways of expressing meaning has been thought to show that the whole point of semantics is obsolete. One is formal semantics in logic, the other, syntaxism in cognitive science. In this dissertation, I show that Frege's and Wittgenstein's question is extremely relevant, as long as it is not misunderstood as a transcendentalist thesis. I elaborate a view that semantics is impossible, but without using any of the transcendentalist imagery traditionally, and wrongly, associated to the thesis of the ineffability of meaning
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Bastos, Carolina Orlando. "Perspectiva e método para uma leitura analítica de Agostinho (“Confissões” e “Do Mestre”) a partir de Wittgenstein e de Frege." Universidade Federal de Juiz de Fora, 2014. https://repositorio.ufjf.br/jspui/handle/ufjf/506.
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A pesquisa em questão quer ser a verificação em duas obras agostinianas (Confissões e Do Mestre), de três conceituações formais da filosofia analítica contemporânea; a partir da nomenclatura conceitual específica do segundo Wittgenstein (jogos de linguagem) e da articulação de dois conceitos em Frege (sentido e referência), chegar-se-a detectar e analisar uma intrínseca aproximação no que tange ao conhecimento e ao estudo da linguagem, no sentido de sua formação, utilização e aplicação através de vivências, inclusive a religiosa. A linguagem como forma de vida, como linguagem da vida (inclusive a religiosa) se estabelece e se afirma como ponto de contato, na presente dissertação, entre a articulação crítica das três conceituações em obras específicas dos três autores aqui estudados.
This research aims to be apresent verification, in two of Augustine’s works, Confessions and De Magistro (On the teacher), of three formal conceptualizations from contemporary analytic philosophy; starting with the specific conceptual nomenclature of second Wittgenstein (Language-games) and the articulation of two concepts in Frege (sense and reference), we shall be able to detect and analyse an intrinsic similarity with respect to knowledge and language study, concerning its formation, usage and application through living experiences, including religious ones. Language as a form of life, as language of life, including religious life, establishes and affirms itself as an intersection, in this dissertation, between the critical articulation of those three conceptualizations in specific works by those three authors under study.
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Cormier, Stéphane. "Philosopher selon Thompson M. Clarke ou la paradoxale équivocité de l'ordinarité : la question de l'emprise de l'expérience et du langage sur les conditions de la connaissance et du scepticisme." Thesis, Bordeaux 3, 2012. http://www.theses.fr/2012BOR30066.
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Notre étude s'attache à reconnaitre en Thompson Clarke, le précurseur d'un contextualisme épistémique puissant qui rend compte de l'applicabilité conceptuelle et ce que prétendent signifier les philosophes. En effet, Clarke examine les définitions épistémologiques traditionnelles à propos de la nature des concepts, du philosopher, de l'ordinarité et du scepticisme. En étudiant la nature de l'épistémologie traditionnelle, il ambitionne de substituer à la méthode austinienne, sa propre méthode d'examen des présupposés concernant la nature de l'expérience et du langage. Il défend ainsi une philosophie de la connaissance programmatique qui nous interroge sur ce que nous faisons avec nos concepts en matière de connaissance. Elle peut être réalisée à partir de l'examen du legs du scepticisme, à savoir : un nouvel éclairage apporté à la nature et aux procédures du scénario sceptique montre manifestement que la prétendue objectivité attribuée à l'ordinarité n'est que superficielle ou relative. L'idée clarkienne de relative non-objectivité n'est en aucune mesure identifiable ou réductible à un relativisme ou à un subjectivisme épistémique. Selon Clarke, il n'existe pas de traits internes à l'expérience. Il suggère simplement que l'existence des objets nous est confirmée à partir de traits caractéristiques que nous discernons, reconnaissons et identifions comme tels. Ces traits qui caractérisent les objets nous permettent d'établir l'applicabilité des concepts. Or, l'ordinarité n'a pas proprement de traits qui la restreindraient à être de telle ou telle manière, comme le prétendent les philosophes et les sceptiques. Cette prétention relève d'un rêve d'une complétude intégrale de la concevabilité de la structure de l'ordinarité partagé implicitement par les épistémologues et leurs détracteurs, les sceptiques. Le rêve et la veille ne sont pas deux expériences au sein d'un genre qu'il suffirait d'identifier. Tout comme le rêve n'a pas de traits caractéristiques qui viendraient déterminer son application ou sa non-application, l'ordinarité n'a pas de traits en propre qui nous permettent fondamentalement de déterminer et de fixer, ni une limite à celle-ci, ni une frontière absolue entre le philosophique et le non philosophique. Pour ces raisons, selon Clarke, nous ne savons pas foncièrement, ni ce qu'est un concept, ni pourquoi les concepts et leurs applications, comme ceux de Plain et de Philosophical, sont susceptibles d'être sensible au contexteOur study focuses on the recognition that Thompson Clarke was the precursor of a powerful epistemic contextualism which gives an account of conceptual applicability and what philosophers claim to mean. Clarke examines the traditional epistemological definitions pertaining to the nature of concepts, of philosophizing, of ordinarity and of skepticism. By studying the nature of traditional epistemology, his ambition is to substitute his own method for examining presuppositions with regard to the nature of experience and of language for that of Austin. He thus defends a philosophy of programmed understanding which makes us look at what we do with our concepts regarding understanding. It can be achieved by an examination of the legacy of skepticism, i.e. a new light thrown on the nature and the procedures of the skeptic’s scenario manifestly show that the so-called objectivity attributed to ordinarity is only superficial or relative. The Clarkian idea of relative non-objectivity is in no way identifiable with, or merely reduced to, epistemic relativism or to epistemic subjectivism. According to Clarke, experience has no internal features. He simply suggests that the existence of objects is confirmed by characteristic features that we discern, recognize and identify as such. These features which characterize objects enable us to establish the applicability of the concepts. However, ordinarity does not strictly have features which would restrict it from being thus or thus as philosophers and skeptics claim. This claim belongs to a dream of a completedness of the conceivability of the structure of ordinarity shared implicitly by the epistemologists and their detractors, the skeptics. The states of dreaming and waking are not two experiences of a type which it suffices to identify. Just as the dream does not have characteristic features which will determine its application or its non-application, ordinarity does not have features of its own which fundamentally enable us to determine and to fix either a limit to it, or an absolute boundary between the philosophical and the non philosophical. For these reasons, according to Clarke, we don’t really know what a concept is, nor why concepts and their applications, such as those of the Plain and of the Philosophical, are likely to be context-sensitive
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Bochner, Gregory. "Naming and contingency : towards an internalist theory of direct reference." Doctoral thesis, Universite Libre de Bruxelles, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/2013/ULB-DIPOT:oai:dipot.ulb.ac.be:2013/209797.
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This work is an essay on the reference of names in language and thought. According to the Theory of Direct Reference, nowadays dominant in philosophy of language, the semantic content of a proper name is directly its referent (Chapter 1).Nevertheless, despite its current fame, this theory must face two major difficulties, familiar since Frege and Russell: the Co-Reference and the No-Reference Problems. The traditional response to these problems consisted precisely in abandoning Referentialism in favour of a version of Descriptivism according to which the semantic content of a proper name would be, not its referent, but a descriptive condition (Chapter 2).
However, it is also this traditional version of Descriptivism that the arguments offered by the pioneers of modern Referentialism—including Kripke, Putnam, and Kaplan—have largely discredited (Chapter 3).
The theoretical tools developed within the framework of possible worlds semantics enable to restate the problems generated by Referentialism in terms of the opacity of linguistic intensions and Modal Illusions (Chapter 4).
At this stage, our semantic theory of names seems to have reached a dead end: on the one hand, modern Referentialism recreates the problems which classical Descriptivism was meant to solve, but, on the other hand, this kind of Descriptivism appears to be refuted by the argumentation of new Referentialists. A common reaction, then, has been to devise more complex semantic theories purporting to combine Referentialism with crucial features from Descriptivism. However, a careful examination reveals that the various versions of this strategy fail (Chapter 5).
Another type of reaction, also ecumenical, has been to draw a distinction between two kinds of contents which would be associated with names and the sentences in which these occur: while the first kind of content would be descriptive, the second would be referential. The Two-Dimensionalist framework has received several interpretations (pragmatic, semantic, metasemantic); but a new construal, metasyntactic, is defended in this work (Chapter 6).
The metasyntactic interpretation of Two-Dimensionalism allows for a radical gap between language and thought: while the thoughts of their users can remain descriptive, names are supposed to achieve direct reference by themselves, and independently of the mental states of their users. Hence, names must be regarded as objects living in the external world, on a par with other ordinary objects like trees or chairs, and not as mental objects. An Externalist metaphysics of names is then submitted, as well as a corresponding epistemology, according to which external names are described in the mind through a description of their reference (Chapter 7).
The general strategy pursued in this work amounts to combining a Theory of Direct Reference in language with a Descriptivist (hence, Internalist) account of thought. Also, certain influential arguments — notably devised by Burge — intended to support Mental Referentialism (hence, Externalism) beyond Linguistic Referentialism, are rejected; it is moreover argued that a Non-Descriptivist conception of the mental is incapable of securing the introspective transparency of thoughts, which, however, seems indispensable, among other things in order to solve and even pose the Co-Reference and the No-Reference Problems (Chapter 8).
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Ce travail est un essai sur la référence des noms dans le langage et la pensée. Selon la Théorie de la Référence Directe, aujourd'hui dominante en philosophie du langage, le contenu sémantique d'un nom propre est directement son référent (Chapitre 1).
Or, malgré son succès récent, cette théorie Référentialiste se heurte à deux obstacles majeurs, reconnus depuis Frege et Russell : les Problèmes de la Co-référence et de la Non-Référence. La réponse traditionnelle à ces problèmes consistait précisément à abandonner la conception Référentialiste en faveur d'un Descriptivisme selon lequel le contenu sémantique d'un nom propre serait, non pas son référent, mais une condition descriptive (Chapitre 2).
Toutefois, c'est aussi ce Descriptivisme traditionnel que les arguments formulés par les hérauts du Référentialisme moderne—dont Kripke, Putnam, et Kaplan—ont largement discrédité (Chapitre 3).
Les outils théoriques développés dans le cadre de la sémantique des mondes possibles permettent de reformuler les problèmes générés par le Référentialisme en termes d'opacité des intensions linguistiques et d'Illusions Modales (Chapitre 4).
A ce stade, la théorie sémantique des noms semble dans une impasse : d'une part, le Référentialisme moderne recrée des problèmes que le Descriptivisme classique devait résoudre, mais d'autre part, ce Descriptivisme paraît bel et bien réfuté par l'argumentation des Référentialistes. Aussi, une réaction commune a été de chercher à concilier le Référentialisme et une forme de Descriptivisme au sein d'une même théorie sémantique. Cependant, un examen approfondi révèle que les différentes versions de cette stratégie échouent (Chapitre 5).
Une autre réaction, elle aussi œcuménique, a été d'opérér une distinction entre deux types de contenus qui seraient associés avec les noms et les phrases dans lesquels ceux-ci figurent : le premier contenu serait descriptif, tandis que le second serait référentiel. Le cadre offert par un tel Bi-Dimensionnalisme a reçu plusieurs interprétations très différentes (pragmatique, sémantique, métasémantique) ; mais c'est une nouvelle version, métasyntaxique, qui est défendue dans ce travail (Chapitre 6).
Le Bi-Dimensionalisme métasyntaxique autorise une séparation radicale entre langage et pensée : tandis que les pensées de leurs utilisateurs peuvent rester descriptives, les noms sont censés référer directement par eux-mêmes, indépendamment des états mentaux de leurs utilisateurs. Dès lors, les noms doivent être considérés comme des objets appartenant au monde extérieur, au même titre que des objets ordinaires tels que les arbres ou les chaises, et non comme des objets mentaux. Une métaphysique externaliste des noms est proposée, ainsi qu'une épistémologie assortie, selon laquelle les noms externes sont décrits dans l'esprit à travers une description de leur référence (Chapitre 7).
La stratégie générale qui est défendue dans ce travail revient à combiner une Théorie de la Référence Directe dans le langage avec une conception Descriptiviste (et donc, Internaliste) de la pensée. Aussi, certains arguments influents — émis par notamment Burge — censés établir un Référentialisme non seulement linguistique mais aussi mental (et donc, un Externalisme) sont rejetés ; il est en outre défendu qu'une vision Non-Descriptiviste du mental apparaît incapable de garantir la transparence introspective des pensées, cependant indispensable, notamment pour résoudre et même poser les Problèmes de Co-Référence et de Non-Référence (Chapitre 8).
Doctorat en Langues et lettres
info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished
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Murez, Michael. "Les concepts singuliers : des fragments aux fichiers mentaux." Paris, EHESS, 2016. http://www.theses.fr/2016EHES0086.
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Dans ma thèse, je propose une théorie des concepts singuliers, ceux qui nous servent à penser aux individus. M'inspirant du travail d'autres philosophes, j'identifie les concepts singuliers à des « fichiers mentaux ». Cependant, la façon dont je développe cette idée va à l'encontre de l'opinion reçue en philosophie de l'esprit contemporaine, selon laquelle toutes les propriétés importantes des fichiers mentaux peuvent être découvertes a priori. J'objecte qu'une telle approche rend impossible une explication adéquate de la distinction entre pensées singulières et pensées descriptives. Je propose donc une autre approche des fichiers mentaux, conçus comme formant une « espèce naturelle psychologique », ce qui leur fournit un ancrage empirique et accroît leur pouvoir explicatif. Je fais ainsi appel à la notion de « fichier objet », issue à l'origine des sciences de la vision. Une telle approche doit faire face à une objection majeure, le problème de la « portée cognitive ». Etant des percepts d'objets, plutôt que des concepts d'individus, les fichiers objets à eux seuls ne peuvent rendre compte des états représentationnels singuliers de haut niveau. J'apporte une double réponse à cette objection. D'une part, je développe un nouveau modèle de la perception singulière, le modèle des « fichiers triés », selon lequel la perception trie automatiquement les entités par domaines fondamentaux. D'autre part, je montre qu'il existe un certain nombre de liens importants entre les représentations singulières pré-conceptuelles et les concepts singuliers à part entièreIn this thesis, I develop an account of singular concepts, those we use to think directly about particular individuals. Building on the work of other philosophers, I identify singular concepts with mental files. Yet the way I flesh out this proposal significantly departs from philosophical tradition. According to the received philosophical view, any representations that satisfies a certain a priori task analysis counts as a file. I object that this renders the notion useless in distinguishing between genuinely singular thoughts and merely descriptive ones, and that it precludes files from playing any substantive explanatory role. I put forward an alternative conception of files as a cognitive natural kind, firmly rooted in empirical research. I propose that we think of singular concepts/mental files as representations suitably related to object files — a type of representation initially posited by vision scientists, that has since received independent support from other areas of cognitive science. Being singular percepts of objects, rather than concepts of individuals, object files alone cannot explain the full range of singular thought, however. To address this challenge, I outline a novel 'sorted files' model of core cognition, as composed of multiple subsystems of domain-specific representations of individuals, and explore paths leading from preconceptual singular representations to full-blown singular concepts
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Bouttier, Gilles. "Image et forme chez le premier Wittgenstein." Paris 1, 2011. http://www.theses.fr/2011PA010501.
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L'entreprise philosophique consistant en le Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus a ceci de particulier qu'elle semble être auto-contradictoire puisque I'auteur oblige le lecteur à considérer (in fine) les propositions (philosophiques) constituant le livre comme des propositions dépourvues de sens, en tant que "propositions philosophiques". Au-delà de la question de savoir s'il est possible de comprendre toutes les propositions du Tractatus qui sont autant de non-sens, c'est la philosophie elle-même en tant qu'activité (de "critique du langage") qui pourrait être considérée comme remise en cause par la conception wittgensteinienne de la philosophie telle qu'elle peut être comprise à la lecture du Tractatus. La fin (le but et la tâche) de la philosophie est-elle de mettre un terme à l'activité philosophique. I. E. D'en finir avec la philosophie? Les notions d'image et de forme sont au centre de l'oeuvre du "Premier Wittgenstein" - expression qu'il est nécessaire de fonder, par opposition à d' autres "Wittgenstein" - puisque ce sont elles qui structurent l'ensemble des distinctions les plus fondamentales du Tractatus - distinctions classiques et sur lesquelles s'appuie, pour une large part, la littérature secondaire -, les distinctions, notamment, entre ce qui peut être dit (une proposition en tant qu'elle est une image) et ce qui ne peut pas l'être mais se montre (18 forme logique de représentation), entre le sens (ou la pensée) et le non-sens. Or, ce sont ces oppositions conceptuelles qui pourraient être comprises comme justifiant un abandon de la philosophie pour s'en remettre à un silence "mystique" (ou non). Toutefois, la théorie tractarienne de la représentation -l'articulation entre les notions d'image et de forme - n'est pas une théorie représentationaliste au sens classique du terme : elle est en effet fondée sur une exigence (qui se retrouve à tous les degrés de « l'échelle» tractarienne) - l'exigence d'internalité des relations (et des propriétés). C'est à partir de cette exigence et d'autres- telles que les exigences de déterminité du sens, d'extensionalité, d'ana!ysibilité, d'atomicité, d' élimentarité, de bipolarité, etc. - qu'elle implique, que peut être perçu le (les) rapport(s) complexe(s) du premier Wittgenstein à la philosophie. Le Tractatus parvient-il, par conséquent, à tracer la limite fixe et précise entre sens et non-sens ?
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Onofri, Andrea. "Concepts in context." Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3462.
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My thesis tackles two related problems that have taken center stage in the recent literature on concepts: • What are the individuation conditions of concepts? Under what conditions is a concept C₁ the same concept as a concept C₂? • What are the possession conditions of concepts? What conditions must be satisfied for a thinker to have a concept C? I will develop a pluralist and contextualist theory of concept individuation and possession: different concepts have different individuation and possession conditions, and contextual factors play a crucial role in determining what concepts we attribute to other subjects when we ascribe propositional attitudes to them. In chapters 1-3, I defend a contextualist, non-Millian theory of propositional attitude ascriptions. Then, I suggest contextualist theories of ascriptions can be applied to the problem of concept individuation/possession. In particular, I use contextualism to provide a new, more effective argument for Fodor's “publicity principle”, according to which concepts must be shared in order for interpersonally applicable psychological generalizations to be possible. Publicity has important implications: in particular, it is inconsistent with existing versions of holism, on which concepts cannot be shared by ordinary thinkers. Nonetheless, in chapters 4-5 I show how holism can still play an important role in our best theory of concepts. More specifically, I argue that the tradition of appealing to modes of presentation in order to give an account of “Frege cases” is in fact committed to holism. To develop a version of holism that will give a successful account of Frege cases without violating publicity, I suggest we should adopt my pluralist-contextualist picture: on that picture, the concepts involved in a Frege case will be holistically individuated and not public, while other concepts will be more coarsely individuated and widely shared. In chapter 6, I will develop this view further by contrasting it with other pluralist theories (Weiskopf) and with rival theories of concepts, such as the localist views defended by Peacocke, Rey and Jackson.
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Gandon, Sébastien. "Logique et langage chez le premier Wittgenstein : une lecture du tractatus logico-philosophicus à la lumière de Frege et de Russell." Paris 1, 1999. http://www.theses.fr/1999PA010682.
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Les oeuvres de Frege et de Russell constituent le contexte dans lequel s'insère la réflexion du premier Wittgenstein ; c'est donc à partir de la pensée des deux logicistes que nous tentons de dégager la structure du tractatus. Nous soutenons en premier lieu que l'idée d'une essentielle bipolarité de la proposition est la reprise d'une intuition que Russell n'a jamais su véritablement développée. La bipolarité a une importance positive capitale dans l'oeuvre du premier Wittgenstein : c'est elle qui permet de résoudre la question de l'assertion, de renouveler la théorie de la molécularité, et de refonder les conceptions de la vérité et de l'inférence logique. Mais la thèse selon laquelle toute proposition est essentiellement vraie-fausse a également une importance négative fondamentale : elle interdit toute tentative visant à faire dépendre le sens d'une proposition, de la vérité d'une autre proposition. Ainsi, la théorie de la bipolarité rend nécessaire une nouvelle conception, d'inspiration frégéenne, du constituant propositionnel ; elle conduit également à une critique des théories russelliennes du jugement. En second lieu, nous soutenons qu'il y a, dans le tractatus, en plus d'une théorie de la logique, une théorie du langage. À partir d'une lecture de on denoting, nous cherchons à montrer que Wittgenstein élabore une nouvelle conception, anti-frégéenne, du symbolisme, selon laquelle une expression peut avoir la même multiplicité que ce qu'elle exprime, sans pour autant refléter cette multiplicité dans son signe. Cette théorie de l'expression permet de donner un sens nonpsychologique (non russellien) au concept d'analyse. Elle rend également intelligible ce que Wittgenstein dit sur la généralité, et permet de donner un contenu à la distinction tractatuséenne entre logique et mathématiques. Enfin, la nouvelle théorie du symbole nous donne les moyens de comprendre la caractérisation Wittgensteinienne de la philosophie comme clarification de nos modes d'expression.
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Dusa, Dan. "Recherches sur le "Tractatus" et la nouvelle logique." Paris 1, 2011. http://www.theses.fr/2011PA010663.
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Wittgenstein construit son propre chemin philosophique à partir de la nouvelle philosophie de la logique et des mathématiques de Frege et de Russell. L'objet de ce travail est de retrouver le parcours philosophique qui a mené au Tractatus à travers les réactions de Wittgenstein à la philosophie de la logique de ses deux maîtres, mais aussi à travers les critiques à ses propres conceptions esquissées dès 1913. Nous nous attachons tout d'abord à montrer comment la théorie de la bipolarité, la théorie de l'image, les fonctions de vérité et, finalement, les opérations de vérité ont rendu possible l'expression de la forme générale de proposition. Puis nous étudions le rôle du symbolisme logique exprimé par la structure fonction/argument. Dans le Tractatus se trouve une nouvelle manière de comprendre le symbolisme logique : ce n'est pas la fonction qui est l'élément constant d'une forme propositionnelle, mais la variable. Après avoir analysé le rôle de la notation fonction/argument dans les symbolismes de Russell et de Frege, nous suivons le parcours de Wittgenstein dès le projet partagé avec Russell en 1912 d'une théorie des complexes comme fondation du symbolisme des Principia, à la critique de la théorie des relations multiples, et jusqu'aux premières conceptions des Notes sur la logique, Notes dictées à G. E. Moore et au-delà dans les Carnets. Finalement, nous traitons de la relation entre logique et science dans le Tractatus, l'argument de la substance, et la critique de l'axiome de réductibilité.
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Törnqvist, Alexander. "Språkanvändning och förståelsekonstituering vid lärande : Ett studium om alternativ till den sociokulturella teorin inom pedagogik." Thesis, Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation, 2016. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-132283.
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I denna uppsats avhandlas alternativ till det sociokulturella perspektivet inom lärande och språkutveckling om hur förståelse konstitueras. Denna syn på språket grundar sig i Ludwig Wittgensteins teorier om till exempel språkspel som utvecklat en språktradition som kallas fenomenografi. Det fenomenografiska perspektivet ta i beaktande den föregående lärandeprocessen i medvetandet om hur konceptualisering av förståelse konstitueras. Detta är vad som inom filosofin kallas intentionalitet. Språket kan inte förstås utifrån en förutbestämd vokabuläranvändning eller logiska ideal. Inlärning borde istället förstås utav hur språket används i en kontext i en konkret användning. Förståelse blir därför något som inte går att utforska utifrån sociala relationer eller ideala lösningar.
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LI, YA-HUI, and 李雅惠. "Frege's Philosophy of Language─Focus on The theory of Reference." Thesis, 1999. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/13484192227460971774.
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"Hume's principle: possibility of a (neo) fregean philosophy of arithmetic?" Tese, MAXWELL, 2004. http://www.maxwell.lambda.ele.puc-rio.br/cgi-bin/db2www/PRG_0991.D2W/SHOW?Cont=5189:pt&Mat=&Sys=&Nr=&Fun=&CdLinPrg=pt.
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