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Relevant bibliographies by topics / Frege's philosophy

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Academic literature on the topic 'Frege's philosophy'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 11 February 2022

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Journal articles on the topic "Frege's philosophy"

1

Chauvier, Stéphane. "Frege et le cogito." Dialogue 38, no. 2 (1999): 349–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300007253.

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AbstractMost of the readers of Frege's first Logical Investigation, “The Thought,” have been convinced that, according to Frege, the sense of ‘I’ was a private one, that an I-thought was a private thought. But it is not the case: the famous Fregean distinction between private representations and public thoughts seems an explanation and a generalization of the I-thought problem as much as an anti-Cartesian repetition of the Cartesian Second Meditation. Frege's position concerning indexical thoughts is that they are public thoughts, for the sense of an indexical expression is not related to private representations but to some semiotical aspects of the public context of its utterance.

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Ellenbogen, Sara. "On the Link Between Frege's Platonic-Realist Semantics and His Doctrine of Private Senses." Philosophy 72, no. 281 (July 1997): 375–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100057065.

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Frege's doctrine that the demonstrative ‘I’ has a private, incommunicable sense creates tension within his theory of meaning. Fregean sense is supposed to be something objective, which exists independently of its being cognized by anyone. And the notion of a private sense corresponding to primitive aspects of an individual of which only he can be awaredoes violence both to Frege's theory of sense as well as to our notionof language as something essentially intersubjective. John Perry has arguedthat Frege was led to the doctrine of private senses in spite of his beliefin the objectivity of sense through his attempt to solve a problem which indexicals posed for his theory. And while philosophers have argued about whether the notion of a private sense is in fact problematic for Frege, they have tended to share Perry's assumption about its origin.

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Aukštuolytė, Nijolė. "Loginių žinojimo pagrindų analizė G. Frege's filosofijoje." Problemos 58 (September 29, 2014): 91–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.15388/problemos.2000.58.6811.

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Straipsnyje aptariamas G. Frege‘s indėlis sprendžiant pažintinio turinio formalizavimo galimybių problemą. Matematikos būklė ir poreikiai, paskatinę autorių imtis bendrųjų minties funkcionavimo principų analizės, sukoncentravo jo pastangas logikos srityje. Adekvačios minčiai kalbinės išraiškos paieška atvedė prie kalbos galimybių tyrimo. Frege‘s tyrinėjimai remiasi prielaida, kad loginė minties analizė galima tik per loginę kalbos analizę. Straipsnyje norima pabrėžti, kad autoriaus dėmesys kalbai – netiesioginis. Jis sąlygotas minties, jog kalboje tam tikru būdu yra duotas žinojimas. Analizuojami matematikos loginio konstravimo metmenys Frege's filosofijoje leidžia parodyti, kad matematikos logizavimas skatino naują pačios logikos ir jos pažintinių galimybių sampratą. Frege's kuriama formulių kalba, kaip tam tikra struktūra, jo filosofinių tyrinėjimų kontekste įgyja fundamentalią metodo reikšmę. Tai skatino pripažinti formalaus aspekto svarbą pažinime. Įvairi kalbinė minties raiška atkreipė Frege‘s dėmesį į simbolizavimo būdų skirtingą pažintinę vertę. Tai iškėlė prasmės ir reikšmės skyrimo problemą. Susiejęs prasmę ir reikšmę su sakinio struktūra, jis loginę kalbos analizę nukreipė į semantines problemas. Šios Frege‘s idėjos veikė vėlesnius filosofijos bandymus tyrinėti mūsų pažinimo galimybes prasmingos kalbos ribose.

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Shieh, Sanford, and William Demopoulos. "Frege's Philosophy of Mathematics." Philosophical Review 106, no. 2 (April 1997): 275. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2998362.

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Hale, Bob. "Frege's Philosophy of Mathematics." Philosophical Quarterly 49, no. 194 (January 1999): 92–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00132.

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Nye, Andrea. "Frege's Metaphors." Hypatia 7, no. 2 (1992): 18–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.1992.tb00883.x.

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The form of the sentence, as it is understood in contemporary semantics and linguistics, is functional. This paper interprets the metaphors in which Frege shows what the functional sentence means, arguing that Frege's sentence is neither an adequate translation of natural language nor of use in feminist theorizing.

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Hacker, P. M. S. "Frege and the Later Wittgenstein." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 44 (March 1999): 223–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100006743.

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In the preface to the Tractatus Wittgenstein acknowledged ‘Frege's great works’ as one of the two primary stimulations for his thoughts. Throughout his life he admired Frege both as a great thinker and as a great stylist. This much is indisputable. What is disputable is how he viewed his own philosophical work in relation to Frege's and, equally, how we should view his work in this respect. Some followers of Frege are inclined to think that Wittgenstein's work builds on or complements that of Frege. If that were true it would be plausible to suppose that the joint legacy of these two great philosophers can provide a coherent foundation for our own endeavours. But it is debatable whether their fundamental ideas can be synthesized thus. The philosophy of Wittgenstein, both early and late, is propounded to a very large extent in opposition to Frege's. They can no more be mixed than oil and water – or so I shall argue.

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Ruthrof, Horst. "Frege's Error." Philosophy Today 37, no. 3 (1993): 306–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtoday199337319.

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Vallor, Shannon. "Frege's Puzzle." Philosophy Today 46, no. 9999 (2002): 178–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtoday200246supplement20.

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Cook, Roy T., and Philip A. Ebert. "Frege's Recipe." Journal of Philosophy 113, no. 7 (2016): 309–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jphil2016113721.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Frege's philosophy"

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Jennings, Mark Richard John. "Frege's logicism : getting an insight into what we grasp." Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2002. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.269765.

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Broackes, J. "The identity of properties." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1986. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.375879.

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Yates, Alexander. "Frege's case for the logicality of his basic laws." Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/12252.

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Frege wanted to show that arithmetical truths are logical by proving them from purely logical basic laws. But how do we know that these basic laws are logical? Frege uses generality and undeniability to make a prima facie case for logicality—if a truth is general and undeniable, then it's likely logical. I argue that Frege could, did, and had to make a deeper case for why we're right in recognizing his basic laws as logical. Implicit in his work is a view of logical laws as epistemically analytic—his arguments for his basic laws serve to elicit a reflective awareness of the fact that understanding them is sufficient for recognizing them to be true. This view both fits with Frege's comments concerning the connection between logic, truth, and normativity, and serves to explain why and in what sense he took logic to be general and conceptually undeniable. In my view, semantics must play a distinctive role in any rational reconstruction of Frege's case for logicality—the aforementioned “reflective awareness” must be an explicit appreciation of how the truth of formulas expressing Frege's laws follows quickly from his stipulations governing terms which figure in those formulas. Opposing this view is the elucidatory interpretation of Thomas Ricketts, Warren Goldfarb, and Joan Weiner, which holds that Frege's arguments for his basic laws can't be taken at face value, and must serve the merely elucidatory purpose of easing us into the language. Another reading is the correctness interpretation of Richard Heck and Jason Stanley, which holds that Frege's primary purpose in his arguments is justifying the claim that Frege's axioms, qua formulas, are true. I argue against both of these interpretations, and in doing so clarify the role and limits of semantics in Frege's enterprise.

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Branquinho, João Miguel Biscaia Valadas. "Direct reference, cognitive significance and Fregean sense." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1992. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:9d87a630-2d56-4e0a-a437-ab8f3ad82ad8.

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This essay deals with certain problems in the theory of singular reference. The following question is taken as central: What role is to be assigned to nonempty and syntactically simple singular terms in fixing the semantic contents of utterances of declarative sentences in which they may occur? I focus on those aspects of the current dispute between Millian and neo-Fregean approaches to singular reference which are related to issues about the cognitive significance of language use; the following two issues are singled out as crucial: the issue about (alleged) potential differences in informativeness between sentences constructed out of co-referential singular terms; and the issue about (alleged) failures of substitutivity salva veritate of co-referential singular terms in propositional-attitude contexts. The general direction of my arguments is as follows. On the one hand, I argue that "notational variance" claims recently advanced on both sides of the dispute should be deemed unsound; and hence that one is really confronted with separate accounts of singular content. On the other, I argue that Milllanism does not provide us with a satisfactory solution to the problems about cognitive significance; and hence that a framework of singular senses is Indispensable to deal with such problems in an adequate way. I also discuss the problem of Cognitive Dynamics, i.e. the issue of attitude-retention and persistence of mental content, in connection with the individuation of indexical thought. I argue that the standard Intuitive Criterion of Difference for thoughts might be reasonably extended to the diachronic case, allowing thus the possibility of discriminating between thoughts entertained by a thinker at different times.

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Kaschmieder, Hartfried. "Beurteilbarer Inhalt und Gedanke in der Philosophie Gottlob Freges /." Hildesheim : G. Olms, 1989. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb35518128q.

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DUARTE, ALESSANDRO BANDEIRA. "HUMENULLS PRINCIPLE: POSSIBILITY OF A (NEO) FREGEAN PHILOSOPHY OF ARITHMETIC?" PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2004. http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=5189@1.

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CONSELHO NACIONAL DE DESENVOLVIMENTO CIENTÍFICO E TECNOLÓGICO
A dissertação apresenta e discute as idéias desenvolvidas por Crispin Wright no livro Frege´s Conception of Numbers as Objects (1983), em particular, a sua tese de que a aritmética é analítica. Wright deposita toda sua força argumentativa (em relação à analiticidade da aritmética) na derivação dos axiomas da aritmética de segunda ordem de Dedekind-Peano a partir do Princípio de Hume. Assim, é nosso principal objetivo apresentar e discutir em que medida o Princípio de Hume é capaz de fornecer, segundo Wright, um relato da analiticidade da aritmética, assim como, as objeções a esse relato.
The dissertation presents and discusses the ideas developed by Crispin Wright in his book Frege's Conception of Numbers as Objects (1983), in particular his thesis that arithmetic is analytic. Wright concentrates all his argumentative efforts (in relation to the analyticity of arithmetic) on the derivation of the axioms of Dedekind-Peano's second order arithmetic from Hume's Principle. Thus, it is our main goal to present and discuss how Hume's Principle provides, according to Wright, an explanation of the analytic character of arithmetic as well as some objections to this account.

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DUARTE, ALESSANDRO BANDEIRA. "LOGIC AND ARITHMETIC IN FREGE´S PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS." PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2009. http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=13942@1.

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PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO
Nos Fundamentos da Aritmética (parágrafo 68), Frege propõe definir explicitamente o operador-abstração ´o número de...´ por meio de extensões e, a partir desta definição, provar o Princípio de Hume (PH). Contudo, a prova imaginada por Frege depende de uma fórmula (BB) não provável no sistema em 1884. Acreditamos que a distinção entre sentido e referência e a introdução dos valores de verdade como objetos foram motivada para justificar a introdução do Axioma IV, a partir do qual um análogo de (BB) é provável. Com (BB) no sistema, a prova do Princípio de Hume estaria garantida. Concomitantemente, percebemos que uma teoria unificada das extensões só é possível com a distinção entre sentido e referência e a introdução dos valores de verdade como objetos. Caso contrário, Frege teria sido obrigado a introduzir uma série de Axiomas V no seu sistema, o que acarretaria problemas com a identidade (Júlio César). Com base nestas considerações, além do fato de que, em 1882, Frege provara as leis básicas da aritmética (carta a Anton Marty), parece-nos perfeitamente plausível que as estas provas foram executadas adicionando-se o PH ao sistema lógico de Begriffsschrift. Mostramos que, nas provas dos axiomas de Peano a partir de PH dentro da conceitografia, nenhum uso é feito de (BB). Destarte, não é necessária a introdução do Axioma IV no sistema e, por conseguinte, não são necessárias a distinção entre sentido e referência e a introdução dos valores de verdade como objetos. Disto, podemos concluir que, provavelmente, a introdução das extensões nos Fundamentos foi um ato tardio; e que Frege não possuía uma prova formal de PH a partir da sua definição explícita. Estes fatos também explicam a demora na publicação das Leis Básicas da Aritmética e o descarte de um manuscrito quase pronto (provavelmente, o livro mencionado na carta a Marty).
In The Foundations of Arithmetic (paragraph 68), Frege proposes to define explicitly the abstraction operator ´the number of …´ by means of extensions and, from this definition, to prove Hume´s Principle (HP). Nevertheless, the proof imagined by Frege depends on a formula (BB), which is not provable in the system in 1884. we believe that the distinction between sense and reference as well as the introduction of Truth-Values as objects were motivated in order to justify the introduction of Axiom IV, from which an analogous of (BB) is provable. With (BB) in the system, the proof of HP would be guaranteed. At the same time, we realize that a unified theory of extensions is only possible with the distinction between sense and reference and the introduction of Truth-Values as objects. Otherwise, Frege would have been obliged to introduce a series of Axioms V in his system, what cause problems regarding the identity (Julius Caesar). Based on these considerations, besides the fact that in 1882 Frege had proved the basic laws of Arithmetic (letter to Anton Marty), it seems perfectly plausible that these proofs carried out by adding to the Begriffsschrift´s logical system. We show that in the proofs of Peano s axioms from HP within the begriffsschrift, (BB) is not used at all. Thus, the introduction of Axiom IV in the system is not necessary and, consequently, neither the distinction between sense and reference nor the introduction of Truth- Values as objects. From these findings we may conclude that probably the introduction of extensions in The Foundations was a late act; and that Frege did not hold a formal proof of HP from his explicit definition. These facts also explain the delay in the publication of the Basic Laws of Arithmetic and the abandon of a manuscript almost finished (probably the book mentioned in the letter to Marty).

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McKinnon, Christine. "Wittgenstein, Frege and theories of meaning." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1985. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.385581.

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Harcourt, Edward. "Sense and the first person : Frege and Wittgenstein." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1995. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.295782.

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Rosenkrantz, Max Langan. "Sense, reference and ontology in early analytic philosophy /." Full text (PDF) from UMI/Dissertation Abstracts International, 2000. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/utexas/fullcit?p3004369.

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Books on the topic "Frege's philosophy"

1

Frege's puzzle. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1986.

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Frege's theorem. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2011.

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Wolfgang, Carl. Frege's theory of sense and reference: Its origin and scope. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

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Frege's theory of sense and reference: Its origins and scope. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

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Frege's notations: What they are and how they mean. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.

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Freges Philosophie nach Frege. Münster: Mentis, 2014.

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Frege: Philosophy of mathematics. London: Duckworth, 1991.

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Dummett, Michael. Frege: Philosophy of mathematics. London: Duckworth, 1991.

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Mendelsohn, Richard L. The philosophy of Gottlob Frege. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

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Kenny, Anthony John Patrick. Frege. London, England: Penguin Books, 1995.

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Book chapters on the topic "Frege's philosophy"

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Lavers, Gregory. "Frege the Carnapian and Carnap the Fregean." In Early Analytic Philosophy - New Perspectives on the Tradition, 353–73. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-24214-9_15.

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Wright, Crispin. "Neo-Fregean Foundations for Real Analysis: Some Reflections on Frege’s Constraint." In The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, 253–72. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-4265-2_14.

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Fennell, John. "Frege’s Begriffsschrift." In A Critical Introduction to the Philosophy of Language, 49–70. New York: Routledge, 2019.: Routledge, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429026553-4.

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Miller, Alexander. "Frege." In Philosophy of Language, 8–33. Third edition. | New York : Routledge, 2018.: Routledge, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781351265522-2.

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Rayo, A. "Frege’s Unofficial Arithmetic." In The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, 155–72. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-4265-2_10.

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Gönner, Gerhard. "Frege, Gottlob." In Philosophen, 67–68. Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-02949-2_18.

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Hintikka, Jaakko. "Identity in Frege’s Shadow." In Early Analytic Philosophy - New Perspectives on the Tradition, 21–29. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-24214-9_2.

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Kitcher, Philip. "Frege, Dedekind, and the Philosophy of Mathematics." In Frege Synthesized, 299–343. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1986. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4552-4_11.

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Kemp, Gary. "Fregean semantics." In What is this thing called philosophy of language?, 27–48. 2 [edition]. | New York: Routledge, 2018. | Series: What is this thing called?: Routledge, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315277486-3.

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Currie, Gregory. "Continuity and Change in Frege’s Philosophy of Mathematics." In Frege Synthesized, 345–73. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1986. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4552-4_12.

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